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40 Individuals 1 Viktor YANUKOVYCH(YANUKOVICH

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40 Individuals 1 Viktor YANUKOVYCH(YANUKOVICH （Attachment） 40 individuals １ Viktor YANUKOVYCH(YANUKOVICH) Former President of Ukraine Date of birth：July 9, 1950 Place of birth：Yenakievo (Ukraine) ２ Sergey(Sergei) AKSYONOV(AKSENOV) “Acting Head of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth：November 26, 1972 Place of birth：Balti (Republic of Moldova) ３ Vladimir KONSTANTINOV “Speaker of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth：November 19, 1956 Place of birth：Vladimirovca (Republic of Moldova) ４ Rustam TEMIRGALIEV Former “Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth：August 15, 1976 Place of birth：Ulan-Ude (Russian Federation) ５ Denis (Denys) BEREZOVSKIY(BEREZOVSKY/BEREZOVSKII) Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy Date of birth：July 15, 1974 Place of birth：Kharkiv (Ukraine) ６ Aleksei(Alexey) CHALIY(CHALYY) Former “Governor of the City of Sevastopol” Date of birth：June 13, 1961 ７ Petr(Pyotr) ZIMA Former Head of the Security Service of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Date of birth：March 29, 1965 ８ Yuriy (Yurii) ZHEREBTSOV “Counsellor of the Speaker of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth：November 19, 1969 ９ Sergey(Sergei) TSEKOV Member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation (from “the Republic of Crimea”) Date of birth：September 28, 1953 １０ Mikhail MALYSHEV “Chairman of the Electoral Commission of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth：October 10, 1955 １１ Valery(Valeriy/Valerii) MEDVEDEV “Chairman of the Electoral Commission of the City of Sevastopol” Date of birth：August 21, 1946 １２ Sergei(Sergey) MENYAILO “Acting Governor of the City of Sevastopol” Date of birth：August 22, 1960 Place of birth：Alagir (Russian Federation) １３ Olga(Ol’ga) KOVITIDI Member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation(from “the Republic of Crimea”) Date of birth：May 7, 1962 １４ Petr(Pyotr) JAROSH(YAROSH) “Acting Head of the Federal Migration Service Office for the Republic of Crimea” of the Russian Federation Date of birth：January 30, 1971 １５ Oleg KOZYURA(KOZHURA) “Acting Head of the Federal Migration Service Office for the City of Sevastopol” of the Russian Federation Date of birth：December 19, 1962 １６ Natalia(Nataliya) POKLONSKAYA “Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth：March 18, 1980 Place of birth：Mykhailivka (Ukraine) １７ Igor SHEVCHENKO “Prosecutor of the City of Sevastopol” １８ Igor GIRKIN (also known as Igor STRELKOV) Self-proclaimed “Commander-in-chief of the Donetsk People’s Republic” Date of birth：December 17, 1970 Place of birth：Moscow (Russian Federation) １９ German(Herman) PROKOPIV Self-proclaimed “Commander of the Luhansk Guard” ２０ Valeriy(Valery/Valerii) BOLOTOV Self-proclaimed “the Head of the Luhansk People’s Republic” Date of birth：February 13, 1970 Place of birth：Stakhanov (Ukraine) ２１ Andriy(Andrei/Andrey) PURGIN(PURHIN) Self-proclaimed “Vice Prime Minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic” Date of birth：January 26, 1972 Place of birth：Donetsk (Ukraine) ２２ Denys(Denis) PUSHYLIN(PUSHILIN) One of the leaders of “the Donetsk People’s Republic” (Self-proclaimed) Date of birth：May 9, 1981 Place of birth：Makeyevka (Ukraine) ２３ Sergey(Sergei/Serhiy) TSYPLAKOV One of the leaders of “the Luhansk People’s Republic” (Self-proclaimed) Date of birth：May 1, 1983 Place of birth：Donetsk (Ukraine) ２４ Viacheslav(Vyacheslav/Vyacheclav) PONOMARIOV(PONOMAREV/PONOMAROV) Self-proclaimed “People’s Mayor of Sloviansk” Date of birth：May 2, 1965 Place of birth：Sloviansk (Ukraine) ２５ Igor BEZLER One of the leaders of “the Militia of Horlivka” (Self-proclaimed) Date of birth：December 30, 1965 ２６ Igor(Ihor) KAKIDZYANOV(KAKIZYANOV/KAKIDZHANOV) One of the leaders of “the Armed forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic” (Self-proclaimed) ２７ Oleg(Oleh) TSARIOV(TSAROV/TSARYOV/TSAREV) Member of Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine Date of birth：June 2, 1970 Place of birth：Dnipropetrovsk (Ukraine) ２８ Roman LYAGIN(LIAHIN/LYAHIN) Self-proclaimed “Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission of the Donetsk People’s Republic” Date of birth：May 30, 1980 ２９ Aleksandr(Oleksandr) MALIKHIN(MALYKHIN) Self-proclaimed “Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission of the Luhansk People’s Republic” Date of birth：January 12, 1981 ３０ Aleksandr BORODAI(BORODAY) Self-proclaimed “Prime Minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic” Date of birth：July 25, 1972 Place of birth：Moscow (Russian Federation) ３１ Aleksandr(Oleksandr) KHODAKOVSKY(KHODAKOVSKYY/KHODAKOVSKII) Self-proclaimed “Minister of Security of the Donetsk People’s Republic” ３２ Aleksandr(Oleksandr) KALYUSSKY(KALIUSKY/KALYUSKII/KALIUSKYY/KALYUSKYY) Self-proclaimed “Vice Prime Minister for Social Affairs of the Donetsk People’s Republic” Date of birth：October 9, 1975 ３３ Aleksandr(Oleksandr) KHRYAKOV(KHRIAKOV) Self-proclaimed “Minister of Information and Mass Communications of the Donetsk People’s Republic” Date of birth：November 6, 1958 Place of birth：Donetsk (Ukraine) ３４ Marat BASHIROV Self-proclaimed “Prime Minister of the Luhansk People’s Republic” Date of birth：January 20, 1964 Place of birth：Izhevsk (Russian Federation) ３５ Vasyl(Vasily/Vasiliy/Vasili/Vasilii) NIKITIN Self-proclaimed “Vice Prime Minister of the Luhansk People’s Republic” Date of birth：November 25, 1971 ３６ Aleksey(Aleksei/Oleksiy) KARYAKIN(KARIAKIN) Self-proclaimed “Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Luhansk People’s Republic” Date of birth：April 7, 1980 ３７ Yuriy(Yurii) IVAKIN Self-proclaimed “Minister of Internal Affairs of the Luhansk People’s Republic” Date of birth：August 13, 1954 Place of birth：Perevalsk (Ukraine) ３８ Igor(Ihor) PLOTNITSKY(PLOTNYTSKY/PLOTNYTSKYY/PLOTNITSKII) Self-proclaimed “Minister of Defense of the Luhansk People’s Republic” Date of birth：June 25, 1964 Place of birth：Luhansk (Ukraine) ３９ Nikolay(Nikolai/Mykola) KOZITSYN Self-proclaimed “Commander of Cossack Forces” Date of birth：June 20, 1956 Place of birth：Donetsk (Ukraine) ４０ Aleksei(Oleksiy) MOZGOVOY(MOZGOVOI/MOZGOVY/MOZHOVY/MOZHOVYY) One of the leaders of armed groups in Eastern Ukraine Date of birth：April 3, 1975 Place of birth：Nyzhnya Duvanka (Ukraine) 2 entities １ PJSC CHERNOMORNEFTEGAZ (Head office) Address：Prospekt Kirova(Kirova Avenue)/Pereulok Sovnarkomovskii(Sovnarkomovskiy Lane) 52/1, Simfelopol, Crimea Phone number：+38-065-27-73458 ２ FEODOSIIA(Feodosiia Enterprise on Supply of Oil Products/Feodosia) Address ： Ulitsa Geologicheskaya(Geologicheskaia Street) 2 ， Feodosiia(Feodosia), Crimea Phone number：+38-065-62-71683 / 57422 / 57433 .
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