Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Lying to Oneself Author(s): Raphael Demos Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 57, No. 18 (Sep. 1, 1960), pp. 588-595 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2023611 Accessed: 12-12-2015 22:02 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected]. Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 134.82.162.153 on Sat, 12 Dec 2015 22:02:33 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 588 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY LYING TO ONESELF IN ordinary language the terms lying and deceiving are not strictly equivalent. For instance we speak of B's deceiving C unintentionally-as when B conveys to C a false impression about the facts although he (B) did not intend to do so. Thus, in 'de- ceiving', it is the effect that counts-inducing an erroneous belief in C's mind. But in 'lying', the intention is part of the meaning. I have lied to you although you have not believed me and so have not been misled by me.