LEGAL TOLLS and the RULE of LAW: the JUDICIAL RESPONSE to POLICE KILLINGS in SOUTH AMERICA a Dissertation Submitted to the Gradu
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LEGAL TOLLS AND THE RULE OF LAW: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO POLICE KILLINGS IN SOUTH AMERICA A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Daniel M. Brinks, A.B., J.D., M.A. __________________________________ Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Director Graduate Program in Political Science Notre Dame, Indiana April 2004 © Copyright by DANIEL M. BRINKS 2004 All rights reserved LEGAL TOLLS AND THE RULE OF LAW: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO POLICE KILLINGS IN SOUTH AMERICA Abstract by Daniel M. Brinks This dissertation addresses core issues relating to law and democracy in Latin America. The judicial response to continuing high levels of police violence in Latin America is the empirical context used to explore the oft-mentioned but little studied gap between the law on the books and the law in practice in the region. The theoretical chapter presents a model that is applicable to many of the problems usually placed under the “rule of law” rubric, while the empirical chapters contribute new information on one of the key problems faced by these legal systems, the effectiveness and enforcement of civil rights. The dissertation addresses such key themes as equality before the law, access to justice, judicial independence and legal reform. The dissertation relies partly on an original database documenting the outcome of approximately 500 cases of police violence ending in death in Buenos Aires and Córdoba, Argentina, São Paulo and Salvador, Brazil, and all of Uruguay. The database includes information about the case, the victims, the perpetrators, and all the legal actors involved. This information is used to measure levels of effectiveness and inequality Daniel M. Brinks within and across social groups, cities, and countries. The comparison of five cities across three countries, in provincial and federal legal systems, allows controls on a wide variety of social, economic, political and institutional variables. Beginning with a heuristic model of the process of legal decision-making, and deriving implications for legal effectiveness from this model, the dissertation argues that disparate outcomes across cases are caused primarily by gaps in the supply of information to the legal system, compounded in certain systems by normative failures on the part of key decision-makers. It includes insights into possible institutional arrangements that might produce better results. DEDICATION I dedicate this dissertation in the first place to my family – to my wife Sandra, who indulged me by leaving behind a secure lifestyle and a sunny Caribbean island to travel with me on my academic (and physical) journey from the Virgin Islands to South Bend, Indiana, to Latin America and back again; to my children, Derek and Aaron, who left their comfortable spaces to spend time in tiny apartments in São Paulo and damp houses in Buenos Aires, to walk the streets of Montevideo and the beaches of Salvador, and Liam, who enlivened the last two years of this odyssey; and, finally, to my parents, Raymond and Gladys Brinks, whose lifelong dedication to and service among the outcasts of society inspired me to make the journey in the first place. Without their encouragement and support this would have been a much darker, more difficult, and less interesting trip. I also dedicate this dissertation to the victims of police violence everywhere and to their families. It is all too easy to forget that behind the theory and the data and the cases discussed in these pages are real people – a young man dead, a woman executed by the police, parents who have lost a child, children who have lost a father. May their voices be heard. ii CONTENTS PREFACE......................................................................................................................x CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION – EFFECTIVENESS AND INEQUALITY IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM .........................................................................................................1 A. THE RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................................5 B. THE LITERATURE ON THE RULE OF LAW ......................................................9 C. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS..................................15 1. Legal tolls and the rule of law ............................................................15 2. The process of adjudication................................................................21 D. PROPOSING AN EXPLANATION ..................................................................25 1. An interdependent model of the legal system.......................................26 2. Consequences of the model for prosecutions of police officers............31 3. Concrete implications of the theory ....................................................40 CHAPTER 2 METHODS, CASE SELECTION AND SAMPLING.........................42 A. CASE SELECTION .....................................................................................42 B. THE CHOICE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE:....................................................46 C. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLING................................................................50 1. Uruguay .............................................................................................51 2. Buenos Aires and Córdoba.................................................................52 3. São Paulo...........................................................................................59 4. Salvador da Bahia..............................................................................63 CHAPTER 3 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE – LEGAL TOLLS AND ILLUSORY RIGHTS.......................................................................................................................65 A. URUGUAY ...............................................................................................68 1. Violations...........................................................................................69 2. Judicial response................................................................................74 iii B. BUENOS AIRES AND CÓRDOBA, ARGENTINA ............................................81 1. Violations...........................................................................................82 2. Judicial response................................................................................88 C. SÃO PAULO .............................................................................................96 1. Violations...........................................................................................96 2. Judicial response..............................................................................102 D. SALVADOR DA BAHIA............................................................................110 1. Violations.........................................................................................111 2. Judicial response..............................................................................111 E. CONCLUSION: COMPARING THE JURISDICTIONS.......................................118 1. Pprior and ptoll: the likelihood of a violation across cities and within them .........................................................................................................119 2. ∆p and ptoll – the likelihood of a conviction across jurisdictions and victim class .........................................................................................................126 CHAPTER 4 BUENOS AIRES – POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AND INFORMATIONAL DEPENDENCE ......................................................................132 A. FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE..................................133 B. SOCIAL CONTEXT ..................................................................................138 1. Socio-economic context ....................................................................138 2. Socio-political context ......................................................................143 C. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT.149 1. Police forces active in the Buenos Aires area ...................................149 2. Non-state agents...............................................................................155 D. PROSECUTORS .......................................................................................159 E. JUDGES .................................................................................................162 F. SUMMARY.............................................................................................173 CHAPTER 5 SÃO PAULO – NORMATIVE AUTONOMY, UNEQUAL CONTEXT.................................................................................................................178 A. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE............................................................180 B. SOCIAL CONTEXT ..................................................................................187 1. Socio-economic context ....................................................................187 2. Socio-political context ......................................................................190 C. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT.195 1. São Paulo police forces ....................................................................195 iv 2. Other state agencies .........................................................................203 3. Non-state agents...............................................................................205