Ends, Choice, and Happiness – Significant Aspects of Practical Reasoning in Aristotle Against the Background of Human Action, Justice, and Politics

Research project by Dr. des. Florian Franken Mariendorfer Weg 21 12051 Berlin Kontakt: [email protected]

Ends, Choice, and Happiness – Significant Aspects of Practical Reasoning in Aristotle against the Background of Human Action, Justice, and Politics

Content

1. Summary of the research project and investigation area ...... 2 2. Particular subjects of investigation ...... 3 2.1. The concept of end ...... 3 2.2. The concept of choice ...... 4 2.3. The concept of happiness ...... 5 3. Abstracts of the papers ...... 7 4. References ...... 13

1. Summary of the research project and investigation area in which the project will be inserted

What is the normative character of practical reasoning? This question stands in the center of the research project. It is intended to investigate the work of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in order to develop an adequate understanding of the relation between practical reasoning and politics1. Thus, the research project will be located in the field of practical reasoning. An important part of politics, as Aristotle points out, is the art of legislation. A state takes care of people’s moral behavior by means of good laws and, hence, an important question regarding politics is how practical reasoning has to be conceived of in order to decide good laws. Present debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans concerning the nature of practical reasoning is currently dominated by the Humean view that human actions are best understood in light of agent desires, which figure into both the explanation and justification of action. Practical reasons, it is claimed, are provided by personal desires combined with suited beliefs about how to fulfil them (cf. e.g. Davidson 1963). It is also often claimed that Aristotle held a similar view about reasoning. For example, Aristotle claims that reasoning refers to the deliberative process concerning practical means to achieve the agent’s personal ends and aims (cf. Barlett/Collins 2012). Thus, it might seem that the way Aristotle conceives of practical reasoning is in instrumental terms. The main aim of my research is to find out how instrumental rationality is related to practical reasoning and consequently, to politics in Aristotle. I now go into more details regarding the different parts of my project. Altogether, they are concerned with an adequate understanding of the used concepts which form the cornerstones of the instrumental reasoning conception. How may ends and aims be conceived of in Aristo- tle’s sense? What does it mean to say that one is free to achieve his ends? How and under which circumstances does one deliberately choose? What considerations are relevant to this deliberative process? What presuppositions are at work in this process? By investigating each of these questions, I want to establish an argument for the claim that practical reasoning in the sense of instrumental rationality is in fact the less interesting case from an Aristotelian point of view of politics. This claim is especially controversial, since rationality is predominantly conceived of as instrumental rationality by current popular political and economic theories.

1 The writings I preferentially refer to are: Eudemian Ethics, Magna Moralia, Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, Virtues and Vices. Only the Nicomachean Ethics, however, discusses the close relationship between ethical in- quiry and politics.

According to Aristotle, however, instrumental reasoning is only at work in situations when the particular aim which is supposed to be achieved is already certain while normative reasons derive from proper means. It seems, however, that regarding more general aims the reasons for action cannot sufficiently determined by means. The target of investigation here is Aristo- tle’s concept of happiness. From this perspective, further questions arise: What is the difference between particular and general aims? How can general aims be determined? In which way does the process of reasoning differ from instrumental reasoning? Those questions will be investigated while developing an Aristotelian account of practical reasoning which subor- dinates instrumental reasons under the overall normative criterion referring to the highest aim of happiness. I elaborate this criterion in terms of what I call ›practicability‹.

2. Particular subjects of investigation

2.1. The concept of end

Aristotle introduces the idea that good is related to choices, ends and aims. He also states a hierarchy of ends in cases where the achievement regarding an end is subordinated to others. Those achievements seem to be instrumental in the sense mentioned above. The hierarchy of ends, however, must come to an end at some point; otherwise the demanding will had no content. Hence, apart from those ends which stand in instrumental means-end-relations there must be a different sort of ends. According to Aristotle it is the highest end which does not lead to further ends but restricts the hierarchy as an end in itself, i.e. as an end which is de- sired for its own sake. The research project intends to investigate what stands behind the idea of an end in itself from an Aristotelian point of view. What is the meaning of an end in itself? Can the meaning only be determined conceptually in a negative way? If not, how might the positive content to be separated from the concept of instrumental ends? By investigating these questions I aim to compare the Aristotelian account of ends with Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s account of ends. Kant construes them in terms of both subjective and objective ends (cf. Kant 1902ff), whereas Wittgenstein’s more contemporary account regards linguistic ends in language and the end of language in itself (cf. Wittgenstein 2009).

According to Aristotle, the knowledge of an end in itself belongs to politics. Why does Ar- istotle make this puzzling claim? One first answer might just be that politics uses the rest of the sciences for their own ends and thus includes those of the others. Interestingly, however, Aristotle draws a connection between the highest end and the common good while he stresses the community-aspect regarding both of them. Thus, an argument for the end in itself as the highest one seems to be that there is a common interest in preserving it. To elaborate this argument, it is especially interesting to compare it to Plato’s contrasting view that politics is the ability of individual persons who are able to achieve epistemic knowledge of the good (cf. Shorey 1935ff). Accordingly, the following questions arise: What kind of interest is it exactly that the members of a community (state, city, etc.) share? How can this interest of preserving the highest end can be spelled out? And why do members of the community share this interest?

2.2. The concept of choice

According to Aristotle, choices form a subclass of voluntary actions. It is, however, not exactly clear what the predicate ›voluntary‹ means and how it is actually related to choices. He calls, for example, the behavior of children and animals voluntary, whereas apparently both, children and animals, are not able to make choices. Hence, voluntary action does not seem to require the ability to make choices. Aristotle seems here to claim a conceptual difference between free will and free choice whereby the former cannot be explained by the latter. Given this claim, a number of questions come to mind: What are the requirements of making a choice? What does it mean to have free will? And how is free will related to free choice? A comparing view between human action and animal behavior will be interesting in this context (cf. Nussbaum 1985). I aim to respond to each of these questions. A further connection between free will and free choice is given by Aristotle’s definition of choice as voluntary deliberation. According to Aristotle, deliberation refers to action and human beings are conceived of as a principle of action. The question, therefore, arises: How may the relation between human beings as a principle of action and their ability to deliberate be spelled out. This question can be answered only once a proper understanding of Aristotle’s conception of deliberation is in place. After this is achieved, I offer an anthropological inter-

4 pretation to answer the question, compatible with Aristotle’s understanding of human beings as a principle of action. Moreover, it seems to be clear though that Aristotle differentiates between deliberation regarding actions and the right deliberation which refers to virtuous actions. In this respect, my interpretation supports his distinction and explains it by arguing that human beings are the principle of action insofar as their behavior is normatively guided by instrumental reasoning. Limited to this respect, the Humean interpretation mentioned above might be accepted. On the other hand, however, this kind of reasoning merely provides means to given ends and does not provide any information whatsoever about the correctness of ends. Apart from making choices regarding actions in terms of means-end-relations to deliberate correctly and to make the right choices means to reconsider those relations in respect to the considered ends which, according to the hierarchy, finally lead to the highest end which is non-instrumental. For pursu- ing this type of reconsideration a further normative criterion is needed which, in fact, guides practical wisdom, or so I shall argue.

2.3. The concept of happiness

The link between practical reasoning of an individual person in terms of virtuous action and legislation in politics is happiness. Law provides justice, whereas justice provides happiness for a state as well as for the individual person. But what does happiness consist in? Plato is convinced that happiness of a state is instituted by an equitable assignment of tasks among people doing one’s own business, but Aristotle has a fundamentally different understanding of what virtuous actions lead to happiness. I investigate the difference between Plato and Aristo- tle’s conceptions of happiness. I agree with Aristotle that virtuous action consists in how the action is pursuit to achieve happiness. Despite of assumed differences, however, both thinkers explain virtuous action by referring to their doctrine of the soul. Thus, it will be helpful to examine each of them (cf. Shorey 1935ff; Shields 2008; Barlett/Collins 2012). Aristotle claims that the soul is divided into a rational and an irrational part, whereas virtuous action, and therefore happiness, is conceived as an activity of the soul which is the result of the interaction of their parts. This interaction is, according to Aristotle, the typical function of man. I intend to examine the ›function-argument‹. Furthermore, I investigate the following

5 questions: Under which circumstances does the interaction take place? How does it pass of exactly? And how is it possible that virtuous actions result from the interactions between the parts of the soul? Habits or dispositions and a situation in which people learn them seem to be important requirements here. Thus, it will be interesting to look closer to the relation between the interaction of the soul and the learning situation, i.e. to the relation between Book I and II of the Ni- comachean Ethics. Apparently, there is a close relation between politics, normative guided actions and habituation which may offer the conclusion that the normative character of practical reasoning is instituted within a learning situation. Moreover, Aristotle has different approaches toward both what leads to happiness and what happiness consists in. On the one hand he follows the idea that right deliberation regarding one’s own action and the right legislation within a state leads to personal and common happiness. On the other hand, he claims that the best way to live, and therefore the happiest way, is the contemplative way of life. How do both claims fit together? Do they have to be conceived of as answers to different questions? How can the unity of the concept of happiness then be assured? I will argue that Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul provides all the resources to solve this problem. There is, in fact, no contradiction between a practical and a contemplative way of life, i.e. between practical wisdom and complete happiness. In general, by undertaking this research project I intend to develop a helpful understanding regarding Aristotle’s idea of practical reasoning that leads to happiness while I apply an approach that I have developed in my PhD thesis, called the ›Practicability Approach‹. Basical- ly, this approach provides a normative criterion for actions by simply ensuring that further actions of a person can intelligibly derive from the action in question. I think that this approach can shed light on what Aristotle might have meant by practical reasoning and happiness as well as it might be helpful to spell it out in Aristotelian terms.

3. Abstracts of the papers

1. Choice and Instrumental Reasoning in Aristotle

It is often claimed that Aristotle held the view that reasons are provided by personal ends of the agent (e.g. she wants to stay dry when it starts raining and therefore she brings an umbrel- la). In the Nicomachean Ethics in fact, he says that reasoning refers to the deliberative process regarding practical means to achieve one’s ends (1139a32ff). Thus, it seems that Aristotle thinks of practical rationality as instrumental rationality. He also talks about the reasoning of the Phronimos however, and it is not at all clear if having instrumental reasons is sufficient for prudential reasoning. In this paper I critically examine the role of instrumental and prudential reasoning in Aristotle’s practical philosophy. I argue (I) that they are corresponding to different normative requirements. Instrumental reasoning provides normative reasons for having the proper means for one’s ends, whereas prudential reasoning provides normative reasons for achieving one’s ends. Subsequently, I show (II) that following those requirements, the Phronimos achieves individual happiness as the highest end. I spell out the requirements in detail and give one account of what individual happiness is for Aristotle. Since happiness is an end in itself, I distinguish (III) between instrumental ends which may be used as means for further ends on the one hand and final ends which are ends in themselves on the other hand. I argue that only humans (in contrast to animals and gods) are in need to reconcile instrumental ends with final ends.

Literature (selection):

− Barnes, Jonathan. “Aristotle and the methods of ethics.” Revue Internationale de la Philoso- phie, 34 (1981), pp. 490–511. − Bartlett, Robert C. & Susan D. Collins (eds.). Action and Contemplation. Albany: State Uni- versity of New York Press, 1999. − Broadie, Sarah. “Interpreting Aristotle's Directions.” In Jyl Gentzler (ed.) Method in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 291–306. − Brown, Lesley. “What is the Mean Relative to Us in Aristotle’s Ethics?” Phronesis, 42 (1997), pp. 77–93. − Charles, David. “Aristotle on Well-Being and Intellectual Contemplation”. Aristotelian Socie- ty, Supplementary Volume, 73 (1999), pp. 205–223. − Clark, Stephen R.L. Aristotle's Man. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 14–27, 145– 63. − Cooper, Neil. “Aristotle's Crowning Virtue.” Apeiron, 22 (1989), pp. 191–205.

− Cooper, Neil. “A Defense of Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean.” Ancient Philosophy, 16 (1996), pp. 129–38. − Cooper, John M. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986. Chapters 1, 3. − Cooper, John M. Reason and Emotion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Chapters 9, 13. − Coope, Ursula. “Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wis- dom?” Phronesis 57 (2012), pp. 142–163. − Engstrom, Stephen and Jennifer Whiting (eds.). Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. − Frede & Gisela Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 115–155. − Gottlieb, Paula. “Aristotle's Ethical Egoism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 77 (1996), pp. 1–18. − Hursthouse, Rosalind. “Acting and Feeling in Character: Nicomachean Ethics 3.1.” Phronesis, 29 (1984), pp. 252–66. − Kraut, Richard. “Doing Without Morality: Reflections on the Meaning of Dein in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics”. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 30 (Summer 2006), pp. 169– 200. − Kenny, Anthony. Aristotle's Theory of the Will. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979. − Korsgaard, Christine. “Aristotle on Function and Virtue.” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 3 (1986), pp. 259–79. − Lorenz, Hendrik. The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Claren- don Press, 2006. − McDowell, John. “Some Issues in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology”. In Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 23–49. − McDowell, John. “Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle's Ethics”. In The En- gaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009, pp. 41–58. − McKerlie, Dennis. “Aristotle and Egoism”. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 36 (1998), pp. 531–55. − Pakaluk, Michael and Giles Pearson (eds.). Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. − Pearson, Giles. “Aristotle on Acting Unjustly without Being Unjust.” Oxford Studies in An- cient Philosophy, 30 (Summer, 2006), pp. 211–34. − Pearson, Giles. “Phronesis as a Mean in the Eudemian Ethics.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Phi- losophy, 32 (Summer 2007), pp. 273–96. − Reeve, C.D.C. Practices of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. − Reeve, C.D.C. “Aristotle's Philosophical Method.” In Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 150–170. − Sim, May (ed.). The Crossroads of Norm and Nature. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Little- field, 1995. − Taylor, C. C. W. “Aristotle on the Practical Intellect.” In Pleasure, Mind, and Soul: Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2008, pp. 204–222. − Tuozzo, Thomas. “Contemplation, the Noble, and the Mean: The Standard of Moral Virtue in Aristotle's Ethics”. In R. Bosley, R. Shiner, and J. Sisson (eds.), Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean. Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1995, pp. 129–54. − Zingano, Marco. “Aristotle and the Problems of Method in Ethics.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 32 (Summer 2007), pp. 297–330.

2. Practice and Politics. The Community-View and the Good

It is interesting that, in contrast to his teacher Plato, Aristotle regards the highest end as a common good and stresses the community aspect of it. Hence, he claims that the knowledge of an end in itself belongs to politics. In this paper I investigate the common interest in achieving the highest end. What kind of interest is it exactly that the members of a community share seeking for the highest end? What makes practical reasoning part of political science? I answer both questions in turn. First I argue that (I) the highest end may be spelled out as the end to be able to achieve further ends; I call this ability practicability. Every single human person has the interest to be able to achieve her ends, i.e. to be practicable. In a community, people with their particular interests are in practical interaction with each other. I argue that (II) practicability can be spelled out in terms of the fundamental self-interest that human beings have to sustain their practical interactions. The highest good may neither be determined in terms of a common tradition nor in terms of particular ends but as a common good to achieve those ends in practical interaction. Subsequently, I argue that (III) there is a conceptual connection between practical interaction and the virtues showing that the common good will be achieved in using the rational part of the soul.

Literature (selection):

− Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle's Politics. Trans. Richard J. Regan. Indianapolis Publishing Co.: Hackett, 2007. − Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (eds.). Articles on Aristotle, vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977. − Barker, Ernest. The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. London: Methuen, 1906; repr. New York: Russell & Russell, 1959 − Bodéüs, Richard. The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics. Albany: SUNY Press, 1993. − Broadie, Sarah. “On the Idea of the Summum Bonum.” In Aristotle and Beyond: Essays in Metaphysics and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 135–52. − Broadie, Sarah. “What Should We Mean by ‘The Highest Good’?”. In Aristotle and Beyond: Essays in Metaphysics and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 153– 65. − Höffe, Otfried ( ed.). Aristoteles Politik. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001. − Keyt, David, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.). A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. − Kraut, Richard and Steven Skultety. Aristotle's Politics: Critical Essays (eds.). Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. − Kraut, Richard. Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. − Lord, Carnes, and David O'Connor (eds.). Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

− McKerlie, Dennis. “Aristotle's Theory of Justice”. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39 (2001), pp. 119–141. − Miller, Fred D., Jr. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1995. − Mulgan, Richard G. Aristotle's Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. − Newman, W. L. The Politics of Aristotle, 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887– 1902; repr. Salem, NH: Ayer, 1985. − Nichols, Mary. Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefied, 1992. − Patzig, Günther (ed.). Aristoteles' Politik: Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990. − Roberts, Jean. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Politics. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. − Santas, Gerasimos. Goodness and Justice: Plato, Aristotle, and the Moderns. Oxford: Black- well Publishers, 2001. Chapter 8. − Theodore Scaltsas, “Reciprocal Justice in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.” Archiv für Ge- schichte der Philosophie, 77 (1995), pp. 248–62. − Schütrumpf, Eckart. Aristoteles Politik, 4 vols. Berlin and Darmstadt: Akademie Verlag, 1999–2005. − Simpson, Peter. A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle. Chapel Hill: Uni- versity of North Carolina Press, 1998. − Susemihl, Franz, and R. D. Hicks. The Politics of Aristotle. London: Macmillan, 1894. [Omits books IV-VI.] − Yack, Bernard. The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aris- totelian Political Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

3. Ancient Moral Psychology. Plato and Aristotle on the Soul

Aristotle determines virtuous action which leads to happiness as the “man’s function” and he explains the man’s function by referring to his theory of soul claiming that the soul is divided into a rational and an irrational part. Virtuous action, and therefore happiness, is conceived as an activity of the soul which is the result of the interaction of their parts. This interaction is, according to Aristotle, the typical function of man. In this paper I intend (I) to examine the function-argument. Subsequently, I argue for the claim (II) that Aristotle’s account to virtuous action refers to the way how the action is pursued to achieve happiness, rather than to the content of the action, as Plato suggests. Both thinkers claim a tight connection between the structure of the soul, virtuous action, and justice but they spell it out differently. I will show (III) that the difference between Aristotle and Plato in determining virtuous action and justice re- sults from their different theories of the soul. I analyze both theories against the background of their different outcome regarding the explanation of moral action. I explain that Aristotle’s

10 theory of the soul leads to a pragmatic account of moral action whereas Plato’s theory leads to an epistemological account.

Literature (selection):

− Apohastle, Hippocrates, 1981. Aristotle's On the Soul, Grinell, Iowa: Peripatetic Press. − Barney, Rachel. “Aristotle's Argument for a Human Function.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Phi- losophy, 34 (Summer 2008), pp. 293–322. − Charles, David, 1984. Aristotle's Philosophy of Action, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. − Ellis, John (ed.), 1992. Ancient Minds, Spindel Conference, October 1992 (= The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 31, supplement). − Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy. New Ha- ven: Yale University Press, 1986. − Gerson, Lloyd. “Platonism in Aristotle's Ethics.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 27 (Winter 2004), pp. 217–48. − Granger, Herbert, 1996. Aristotle's Idea of the Soul, Boston: Kluwer Academic Press. − Gröngross, Gösta. “Listening to Reason in Aristotle's Moral Psychology.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 32 (Summer 2007), pp. 251–72. − Hicks, Robert Drew, 1907. Aristotle, De Anima, with translation, introduction and notes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. − Lawson-Tancred, H., 1986 Aristotle: De Anima, Harmondsworth: Penguin. − Lear, Jonathon, 1988. Aristotle: The Desire to Understand, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. − Nussbaum, Martha C., 1978. Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, text with translation, commentary and interpretive essays, Princeton: Princeton University Press. − Nussbaum, Martha C. and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), [1992] 1995. Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, first paperback edition, with an additional essay by M.F. Burnyeat, Oxford: Clar- endon Press. (Originally published, 1992.). − Pakaluk, Michael and Giles Pearson (eds.). Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. − Theiler, W., 1979. Aristoteles: Über die Seele, Berlin: Akademie Verlag. − Annas, J., 1993, The Morality of Happiness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. − Crombie, I. M., 1963, Plato's Doctrines, 2 vols., London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. − Dover, K., 1974, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press. − Irwin, T., 1977, Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues, Oxford: Clarendon Press. − Irwin, T., 1995, Plato's Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. − Irwin, T., 2008, The Development of Ethics (Volume I: From Socrates to the Reformation), Oxford: Oxford: Oxford University Press. − Kahn, C., 1996, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. − Lorenz, H., 2006, The Brute within: appetitive desires in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford: Claren- don Press. − Nehamas, A., 1999, Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates, Princeton: Prince- ton University Press. − Prior, W. J., 1985, The Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Press. − Rist, J., 2012, Plato's moral realism: the discovery of the presuppositions of ethics, Washing- ton, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

− Ross, W. D., 1951, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford: Clarendon Press. − Russell, D., 2005, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. − Schofield, M., 2006, Plato: Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4. Educating the Virtues. Habitualization as Requirement for Happiness

Aristotle claims in the Nicomachean Ethics that learning or training is a requirement for humans to achieve happiness. Forms of habitualization occur in learning situations in which someone teaches and someone obeys seem. Those learning situations seem to be a necessary condition for the development of a virtuous person and justice. Moreover, since virtuous action and justice is based on the activity of the soul there is also a connection between the activity of the soul and the learning situation. But how is the learning situation exactly to be conceived of? And why is it necessary for virtuous action and justice from an Aristotelian point of view? I will argue (I) that the learning situation provides a normative character which is manifested in the rule-governed practice of the teacher. In following the rules, the behavior of the pupil becomes normatively structured. A habit structure is already formed on this basic level when the pupil just reacts on the action of the teacher, or so I will argue. I show subsequently (II) that the basic learning situation forms the background for a second, more sophis- ticated habit structure which is the result of the agent’s own action. On this level the agent forms the “habitus of choice”. Based on this two-stage-model of habitualization, I will show that (III) the possibility of virtuous action, i.e. the possibility of a good choice, depends on the normative structure formed at the basic level.

Literature (selection):

− DiMuzio, Gianluca. “Aristotle on Improving One's Character”. Phronesis, 45 (2000), pp. 205– 19. − Hursthouse, Rosalind. “Moral Habituation.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 6 (1988), pp. 201–19. − Hutchinson, D.S. The Virtues of Aristotle. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. − Hutchinson, D.S. “Aristotle on Becoming Good: Habituation, Reflection, and Perception”. In Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 529–557. − Kraut, Richard. “Aristotle on Method and Moral Education.” In Jyl Gentzler (ed.) Method in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 271–90.

− Leunissen, Mariska. “Aristotle on Natural Character and Its Implications for Moral Develop- ment”. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (2012), pp. 507–530. − Leunissen, Mariska. “’Becoming good starts with nature’Aristotle on the Heritability and Ad- vantages of Good Natural Character”. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XLIV (2013), pp. 99–128. − Lorenz, Hendrik. “Virtue of Character in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 37 (Winter 2009), pp. 177–212. − Sherman, Nancy. The Fabric of Character. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. − Sherman, Nancy. Making a Virtue of Necessity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

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