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Aristotle's Phronesis: Putting Some Meat on the Philosophy Of Aristotle’s Phronesis: Putting some Meat on the Philosophy of Innovation Gabriel J. Costello Galway-Mayo Institute of Technology, Galway, Ireland [email protected] Abstract This paper investigates Aristotle’s ethical writings, especially examining his synthesis of the ideas of knowledge and wisdom and their application in practice. This he achieved through the concept of phronesis ( phron ēsis ) variously described as practical wisdom with connotations of intelligence and soundness of judgement. The paper argues that the management and teaching of innovation requires a bottom-up approach to “put some meat” on the recent theoretical examinations of responsible innovation. In particular, it addresses the following research question: How can phronesis be developed in educational practice? The paper makes a novel contribution by describing an empirical case study of embedding Aristotle’s phronesis in the curriculum of Engineering and Business students, working in cross-functional teams. A philosophical schema was developed and summarized in tabular form, which can be used to phronetically examine the outputs from educational projects in the area of innovation. Furthermore, these guidelines provide suggestions for the development of phronesis in the formation of professionals and managers. Keywords : phronesis, Aristotle, teaching of innovation, philosophy of innovation, responsible innovation 1 1 Introduction Dante in the Divine Comedy describes his encounter with Aristotle as follows: “I saw the master sage of those who know” Inferno Canto IV, 131 (Dante, 1984 translation) . Dante considered Aristotle as epitomizing the pinnacle of human reason and his references to Aristotle came second only to that of the Bible. Without doubt, Aristotle is one of the most influential thinkers in the history of western civilisation. His works have covered an eclectic range of subjects such as logic ethics, metaphysics, politics, natural science and physics (ODE, 2006). Aristotle’s science was not superseded until the scientific revolution of the 16 th and 17 th centuries (ODS, 1999). Crithcley (2001) points out that among other things, ancient philosophy endeavoured to amalgamate knowledge and wisdom: “namely, that knowledge of how things were the way they were would lead to wisdom in the conduct of one’s life. The assumption that ties knowledge and wisdom together is the idea that the cosmos as such expresses a human purpose. This is called the “teleological view of the universe” (p. 7). This paper will focus on Aristotle’s ethical writings, especially examining his synthesis of the ideas of knowledge and wisdom and their application in practice. This he achieved through the concept of phronesis ( phron ēsis ) variously described as practical wisdom. Taylor (2005) explains phronesis as having, in ancient Greece, connotations of intelligence and soundness of judgement. In his deliberations on ethics, Aristotle used the term to represent the complete excellence of the practical intellect. In the practical sphere, it was the equivalent of sophia in the theoretical sphere. This paper argues that the management and teaching of innovation requires a bottom-up approach to “put some meat” 1 on the recent theoretical examinations of responsible innovation (Blok, 2014; Blok, Hoffmans, & Wubben, 2015; Blok & Lemmens, 2015). In particular it will address the following research question derived from a suggestion for future work in a paper devoted to the related theme of virtuous competence (Blok, Gremmen, & Wesselink, 2016p. 319) . How can phronesis be developed in educational practice? While much has been written on phronesis, there is a dearth of empirical work on the how the concept can be developed and implemented in practice (which is ironical given the nature of the idea). This paper will contribute to this nascent debate by providing empirical evidence of embedding Aristotle’s phronesis in the curriculum of future managers, in this case Engineering and Business students, working in cross-functional teams. The structure of the proposed paper will be as follows. First there will be a review of Aristotle’s concept of Phronesis with reference to the Nicomachean Ethics. Then there will be an examination of 1 EN Book VI Chapter 7 (Aristotle, 1967 translation) 2 the contemporary topic of phronesis and the recent interest in the area resulting from the scholarship of Bent Flyvbjerg. Next, a case study will be presented which has the objective of embedding phronesis in the curriculum of Engineering and Business students working in cross-functional teams. A discussion of the implications of Phronesis for the management and teaching of innovation will be presented together with suggestions for future work. Finally, the conclusions of the study are summarised. 2 Phronesis and its Origin in the Nicomachean Ethics A man is aware that light meats are easily digested and beneficial to health but does not know what meats are light. Such a man is not so likely to make you well as one who knows that chicken is good for you. Aristotle Taylor (2005) defines phronesis as “comprising a true conception of the good life and the deliberative excellence necessary to realize that conception in practice via choice”. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes three approaches to knowledge: episteme, techne and phronesis . Flyvbjerg (2001) explains that “whereas episteme concerns theoretical know why and techne denotes technical knowhow, phronesis emphasizes practical knowledge and practical ethics” (p. 56). He summarizes the three as follows (p. 57): • Episteme - Scientific knowledge . Universal, invariable, context-independent. Based on general analytical rationality. The original concept is known today from the terms “epistemology” and “epistemic.” • Techne - Craft art . Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented toward production. Based on practical instrumental rationality governed by a conscious goal. The original concept appears today in terms such as “technique,” “technical,” and “technology.” • Phronesis - Ethics . Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatic, variable, context dependent. Oriented toward action. Based on practical value-rationality. The original concept has no analogous contemporary term. Flyvbjerg continues to elaborate on the term phronesis in Aristotelian terms: In Aristotle’s words phronesis is a ‘‘true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man.’’ Phronesis goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical knowledge or know-how (techne) and involves judgments and decisions made in the manner of a virtuoso social and political actor. I will argue that phronesis is commonly involved in social practice, and that therefore attempts to reduce social science and theory either to episteme or techne, or to comprehend them in those terms, are misguided.(ibid. p 14) Aristotle has his name associated with two treatises on Ethics; the Eudemian and the Nicomachean. The former is regarded to have been edited by his pupil Eudemus while the latter by his son 3 Nicomacheus. A third and little know work by Aristotle is called the Magna Moralia. The Nicomachean Ethics is dated to the last period of Aristotle’s life when, in his fifties or sixties, he was head of the Lyceum. Ross (1954) explains that Aristotle regards the purpose of human life as “consisting of the pursuit of ends” (p. vi) and describes this end as being eudaimonia . This concept however is usually translated unsatisfactorily as “happiness”; since Aristotle goes beyond this and contends that eudaimonia is “an activity of soul in accordance with virtue (p. vii)”. Aristotle describes his idea of virtue as being an activity. Just as men become builders by building, they become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts….And activities which produce excellence are those in which both excess and defect are avoided (p. viii). Thompson (1967) however reminds us that Aristotle was keen to take other views into account when developing his ethical program and that he had a genuine understanding of human nature. Furthermore statements like “man is a social animal” now seem to be a cliché but when first proposed by Aristotle it was quite revolutionary. According to Ross (1954), the plan of the Nicomachean Ethics is not simple and was probably delivered as a series of lectures. He provides the following taxonomy of the work (p. v) which is summarized in table 1 below. Table 1: A taxonomy of the Nicomachean Ethics from Ross (1954) Bk. 1 Deals with the nature of good for man and divides goodness into intellectual excellence and moral excellence. Bk. 2-4 These deal with moral excellence and discuss particular moral virtues in detail. Virtue according to Aristotle being a state of character concerned with choice. Bk. 5 Discusses one of the two cardinal virtues not dealt with in Bks 2-4 – namely justice. Bk. 6 Discusses the various form of intellectual excellence. In Aristotle’s scheme, phronesis is classified as one of several ‘intellectual virtues’ or ‘excellences of mind’ (Kinsella 2012). Bk. 7 Earlier part discusses two conditions which lie between virtue and vice – continence and incontinence. The later part is a discussion of pleasure. Bk 8-9 These are on the subject of friendship and are not regarded as core to the theme of Ethics. Bk 10 Elaborates on the concept of eudaimonia which is translated by Ross as well- being. Chapter six of the Nicomachean Ethics discusses a number of characteristics of the mind and in particular the two main intellectual virtues phronesis (practical wisdom) and sophia (philosophic wisdom) (Ackrill, 1973). Furthermore, the person who has phronesis can be described as a phronimos having the following attributes (p. 28) 4 The phronimos 2 is good at deliberation: he can sum up a situation, weigh up various factors, and work out what to do to promote or achieve his objectives. Often enough, because of his experience and wisdom, he can see straight off the best thing to do, without having to go through a process of deliberation. In chapter seven Aristotle provides the following guidelines.
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