The Structure of the Virtues a Study of Thomas Aquinas’S and Godfrey of Fontaines’S Accounts of Moral Goodness
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Alexander Stöpfgeshoff The Structure of the Virtues A Study of Thomas Aquinas’s and Godfrey of Fontaines’s Accounts of Moral Goodness Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Sal VIII, Universitetshuset, Biskopsgatan 3, 753 10, Uppsala, Monday, 10 September 2018 at 14:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in English. Faculty examiner: Professor Bonnie Kent (The Department of Philosophy, UC Irvine). Abstract Stöpfgeshoff, A. 2018. The Structure of the Virtues. A Study of Thomas Aquinas’s and Godfrey of Fontaines's Accounts of Moral Goodness. 173 pp. Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University. ISBN 978-91-506-2713-8. This dissertation is a study of Thomas Aquinas’s (1225–1274) and Godfrey of Fontaines’s (d. 1306) moral philosophies. In this study, I conduct a detailed analysis of two Aristotelian commitments concerning the character virtues, namely, The Plurality of the Character Virtues and The Connection of the Character Virtues. Both Aquinas and Godfrey think that there are many distinct character virtues (such as moderation and justice), however, one cannot (perfectly) possess these character virtues in separation from each other. In Chapter I, it is established that Aquinas believes in the plurality of the character virtues not because of a specific account of the human soul, but because he is committed to a plurality in what he calls “the notion of goodness.” In Chapter II, it is argued that Aquinas’s account of virtuous action requires that there be a likeness between a person and their actions in terms of the notion of goodness explored in Chapter I. Chapters III through V lay out my account of how to reconstruct both Aquinas’s and Godfrey’s arguments for The Connection of the Character Virtues. The focus here lies on finding an interpretation that provides a valid argument for the connection of the character virtues. I argue that we ought to focus on a dependence between prudence and the character virtues. A central problem for this analysis is how to account for prudence as a unified virtue. On this issue, Godfrey provides an explicit argument that conceives of prudence as unified because prudence strikes a balance between the character virtues. Chapter VI investigates whether different groups, such as men and women, possess different types of character virtues. Godfrey offers a novel argument for the impossibility of male- and female-specific virtues. Finally, Chapter VII explores the question of how we should understand Godfrey’s account of prudence itself. I show that his discussion emphasizes the variable nature of ethics and that he endorses a view that has certain affinities with ethical particularism (in the contemporary sense). Keywords: Thomas Aquinas; Godfrey of Fontaines; virtue; character virtue; prudence; moral goodness; medieval philosophy; medieval ethics; connection of the virtues; unity; dependence; gender; particularism; Summa Theologiae; Aristotle Alexander Stöpfgeshoff, Department of Philosophy, Box 627, Uppsala University, SE-75126 Uppsala, Sweden. © Alexander Stöpfgeshoff 2018 ISBN 978-91-506-2713-8 urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-354865 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-354865) Acknowledgements Throughout this process, so many have been a source of support and inspiration, both academically and emotionally. I would like to first and foremost thank my supervisors; Tomas Ekenberg for your endless patience and for never letting me turn away from the central philosophical questions and Frans Svensson for your relentless ambition for clarity and your enthusiasm for philosophy. I would not have been able to complete this dissertation without either of your support. Pauliina Remes deserves a special thank you for facilitating such a rich environment in History of Philosophy and for her many insightful comments on all the material I have presented at Uppsala. Juhana Toivonen read a draft of the entire dissertation. His clear and challenging comments were invaluable to me and helped immensely to improve the quality of this work as a whole. Jens Johansson and Andrew Riesner provided important encouragement at a crucial time in the writing process. I am very grateful for all the comments I have received on the many drafts I presented at the Higher Seminar in History of Philosophy. For that feedback, I would like to thank: Lilli Alanen, Lorenzo Casini, Ekrem Çetinkaya, Erik Eliason, Tor Freyr, Jari Kaukua, Peter Myrdal, Olof Pettersson, Oda Tvedt, Annika Wennersten, and Erik Åkerlund. And a special thanks to my good friend Hallvard Stette, for his enthusiasm to always discuss the history philosophy with me. Thanks to all the PhD-students at the philosophy department for creating such an inspiring environment. I have learned immensely from your presentations, our conversations and your feedback over the years. A special thank you to Nils Franzén for his eagerness to talk philosophy at all hours, and Johan Boberg for his willingness to discuss even the most newly hatched ideas with me. A special thanks to Simon Rosenqvist for organizing the lower seminar and to Henrik Rydéhn for facilitating social interactions, getting us all through the weeks. I would also like to thank Anna Gustafsson, Paulina Hansen and Rysiek Sliwinski, for helping with me with all things practical through my many years at Uppsala. Andrew Blasko deserves a special thank you for his careful editing of this thesis. I have been lucky to make so many global connections and friends during this time. I am grateful to Joseph Stenberg for his passion for discussing all matters related to Aquinas’s ethics with me. Thank you to Henrik Lagerlund for hosting me at the University of Western Ontario. And thank you to Cecilia Li, Jared Richards, Sarah Hogarth Rossiter, Matt Watton and Adam Woodcox for making that time so enjoyable in so many ways. I am grateful to the De- partment of Philosophy at UC Irvine for hosting me and providing such an inspiring experience. Thanks to Christopher Bobier and Joseph Dowd for en- riching my time at UC Irvine. Thank you to Professor Sean Greenberg for providing the opportunity to present an early draft of Chapter VII at Scientia Workshop and to Professor Robert Pasnau for giving me the chance to present an early version of Chapter V in Boulder. I want to thank Ian Drummond, Professor Martin Pickavé and Michael Szlachta at the University of Toronto for inspiring conversations as well as Professor Filipe Pereira da Silva for granting me the opportunity to present an early draft of Chapter V at the University of Helsinki. I am also grateful for the generous financial support from Byzantinska resestipendium, Hultengrens Fond för Filosofi, Göransson-Sandvikens forskarrstipendium and resestipendium and Sederholms utrikes. To my family and friends, I would not have made it to this juncture without all of you. A special thank you to Rasmus Brandt and Melissa Mann, for always providing a home away from home, Markus Holdo, for his positivity and encouraging listening, and to Isabella Lindström, for all the fun you always ensure I have. Thank you to my dear sister and brother and their beautiful families for their love and patience and my mother for her kind and unwavering care and to my father for his clear vision directing me to study philosophy and all his help throughout the years. Finally, to my wife Carly “You give me strength to carry on, And you're always there to lend a hand, In everything I do.” Alexander Stöpfgeshoff Uppsala, June 2018 I dedicate this dissertation to my Father. Contents Introduction .............................................................................................. 11 I. What is virtue? .................................................................................. 11 II. Character virtues and intellectual virtues........................................... 15 III. Outline of the dissertation ............................................................... 17 Chapter I: Accounting for Plurality – How to Enumerate the Character Virtues? .................................................................................................... 22 Introduction .......................................................................................... 22 I.1 The Enumeration Problem ............................................................... 23 I.1.1 The need for a criterion of enumeration .................................... 23 I.1.2 Broad and narrow usage of terms for virtue............................... 25 I.2 Goodness and the definition of virtue ............................................... 28 I.2.1 Merely acts of virtue ................................................................. 35 I.2.2 Integral parts of virtue .............................................................. 36 I.3 Other possible interpretations ........................................................... 37 I.3.1 Psychological differences ......................................................... 37 I.3.2 Areas of life as the object of virtue ........................................... 39 I.4 Some advantages over other proposed accounts ............................... 41 I.4.1 Desire and circumstances.......................................................... 41 I.4.2 Virtuous reasons ....................................................................... 42 I.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 46 Chapter II: Virtuous action, likeness, and dispositionalism........................