Ambassador Gauss and General Stilwell in China

chapter 5 “The Deckhand Diplomat”: Ambassador Gauss and General Stilwell in China

Introduction

In his recent study of Roosevelt’s wartime diplomacy, David Mayers examined the role that us Ambassadors around the globe played in us foreign policy- making. He included the personnel in China in that analysis and showed that Ambassador Gauss’s advice was largely ignored by the President. As Mayers’ study showed, this was not an uncommon experience for us Ambassadors during Roosevelt’s presidency. All over the world and in posts that were directly affected by the conflict us diplomats felt isolated and excluded from the foreign policy-making of the Administration.1 Mayers also provided an effective summary of the transition between the different Ambassadors chosen to rep- resent the United States in China throughout the war.2 The analysis below builds on that work and examines more closely the interaction between the State Department officials and War Department and military officers in China. It shows the importance of the relationship between these two important groups and the way that fdr mismanaged that relationship. President Roosevelt did not enunciate a clear military strategy for us army officials in China, and nor did he articulate a coherent diplomatic policy on China for the State Department. This failure on both fronts led to the misman- agement of military and diplomatic staff in China. The result was confusion and conflict between the Foreign Service officers and the Theatre Commander and this had important consequences for the achievement of American objec- tives for China. Roosevelt’s leadership style, especially his interaction with his cabinet secretaries, has been well noted.3 The President liked to appoint subordinates with opposing views. When conflict arose between them he could resolve it and thus have greater control over policy. The relationship between the President and those at a sub-cabinet level who were charged with the

1 David Mayers, fdr’s Ambassadors and the Diplomacy of Crisis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 2 Ibid. pp. 95–124. 3 See, for example, Emerson, “Franklin Roosevelt,” p. 185 and Irwin Gellman, Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 14.

The Deckhand Diplomat 97 development and implementation of policy, however, has been largely over- looked. In the State Department this level was occupied by Foreign Service officers and in the War Department by Theatre Commanders. In China these roles were filled by Ambassador Gauss and his subordinates and by General Joseph Stilwell. Throughout the war in China Roosevelt placed military concerns and the advice of the War Department above that of the State Department.4 In wartime this might seem appropriate, and on one level it was. The Allies needed China to fight the Japanese and hold them off while the war against Germany took precedence. The President, however, also used the War Department and the military to attempt to solve political problems and to achieve his plans for China. The complexities of Chinese domestic politics, and the fact that in China political issues influenced the military so heavily, meant that it was most important that Roosevelt should have trusted Gauss. The Ambassador under- stood Chinese politics, and the President could have encouraged him to work with Stilwell to develop a clear strategy for dealing with China based on coordi- nated us military and diplomatic representation to Chiang. Stilwell should also have had clearly defined aims to achieve and he should have acknowledged the political aspects of the Chinese military situation and his need for Gauss’s help to handle them. The President’s failure to clarify directives for Stilwell’s military command and what he wanted the military to achieve diplomatically in China, and what he expected from the Ambassador, meant that the General and Gauss often acted in competition for influence on us policy rather than in coopera- tion, and this was a great hindrance to Sino-us relations.

The Ambassador and His Role

Clarence E. Gauss was a career Foreign Service officer. He had had a great deal of experience in China by the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War, having held several posts and risen to be us Consul General in a number of cities under Nelson Johnson’s Ambassadorship to China. In 1921 Gauss published “A Notarial Manual for Consular Officers” in which he used China as his chief case study and used Chinese laws and customs to demonstrate his examples.5 He also received praise for his work in China during the 1930s; Admiral Harry

4 Document prepared by the Department of State, Washington, d.c., Dec. 27, 1943, Department of State, frus 1943: China, p. 487. 5 Clarence Gauss, A Notorial Manual for Consular Officers (Washington d.c: Government Printing Office, 1921), p. 66.