Track-Two Diplomacy & Canadian Foreign Policy: Approaches To
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Graduate Studies Master of Public Policy Capstone Projects
2015-04 Track-Two Diplomacy & Canadian Foreign Policy: Approaches to Conflict Resolution
Proctor, Kate
Proctor, Kate. (2015). Track-Two Diplomacy & Canadian Foreign Policy: Approaches to Conflict Resolution ( Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/51646 report
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UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY• OF PUBLIC POLICY
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY CAPSTONE PROJECT
Track-Two Diplomacy & Canadian Foreign Policy: Approaches to Conflict Resolution
Submitted by: Kate Proctor
Approved by Supervisor:
Dr. Ian Brodie
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of PPOL 623 and completion of the requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Literature Review 4
Methodology:
Approach 8
Methodological Limitations 11
Findings:
Case 1: Israel and Palestine 13
Case 2: Apartheid in South Africa 16
Case 3: Jerusalem 19
Case 4: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue 22
Results 26
Policy Suggestions & Conclusions 27 Proctor 1
INTRODUCTION
Government response to conflict resolution can vary. To find a solution to a conflict a government may confer with, and take ideas from, governmental institutions
like the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), and non- governmental institutions, such as the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute
(CDFAI). One such response comes from diplomacy and the role that it can play in conflict resolution. Any given sovereign state is represented internationally through the
use of diplomats. The role of an individual diplomat, as understood in conventional
terms, is to represent their state's interests and values and to maintain state-to-state relationships. This official diplomacy is also known as "track-one diplomacy." Track-one efforts in conflict resolution, as suggested by Jeff Mapendere, "are facilitated or mediated by government representatives or representatives of political institutions such as the
[United Nations] and regional groups." 1 Diplomats also represent, in accordance with a state's foreign policy, the primary and most formal avenue of a state's ability to engage in peacemaking and conflict resolution.2 Like other professions in the political field, the occupation of diplomat is highly institutionalized, visible and subject to media scrutiny.
Due to these very characteristics of the occupation, efforts to resolve conflict can often be slow to evolve.
However undeniably important official diplomacy is for any given state in promoting state interests and fostering state-to-state relationships, there exists another less known track of diplomacy that, at times, can attain the same end goal as its formally institutionalized counterpart. This alternative avenue is simply known as "track-two
1 Jeffery Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks," Culture of Peace 2, no. I: 70. 2 Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks," 67. Proctor 2 diplomacy." Track-two diplomacy, coined by former American Foreign Service Officer
Joseph Montville in 1981 is,
[u]nofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the contlict.3
Track-two diplomacy is facilitated through discreet means by track-two diplomacy practitioners and is funded by government. Track-two diplomacy seeks to open alternative avenues and methods of communication that would facilitate an environment conducive for conflict resolution, without the institutional and bureaucratic constraints that can hinder track-one diplomacy.4 It is important to note that if a government is interested in adopting track-two diplomacy, the role of the government is a funding one. In simple terms, and in most cases, practitioners willing to conduct a track- two diplomacy effort submit a proposal to the government for approval in order to obtain funding.
Track-two diplomacy, to be discussed in more detail in the proceeding section, has the ability to aid in the efforts of conflict resolution not by replacing official diplomacy, but by aiding official efforts through alternative methods. Some states have made track-two diplomacy an integral part of their foreign policy. One such example is the United States. As found on the public website for the Department of State for the
United States of America, track-two diplomacy has been added to their repertoire for
"2l51 Century Statecraft." As the literature from the Department of State suggests, track-
3 Joseph Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: 162. 4 Montville, ''The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," 163. Proctor 3 two diplomacy is used in assistance to official diplomacy, the central focus of the work.5
Although no official policy has been written to outline how track-two diplomacy works - a necessary stipulation to the discreet nature of the work- the Government of the United
States has embraced it.
When it comes to Canada, the embrace of track-two diplomacy differs. Although
Canadians have undertaken track-two diplomacy in the past, the federal government has not developed a sustainable capacity to continue those efforts.6 It is suggested by some
Canadian track-two practitioners, such as Paul Evans and Peter Jones, that the current
Conservative government considers track-two diplomacy to be "talk shops" and regards the practice with severe scepticism.7 This view is not uncommon in governments as many initially regard track-two diplomacy as a "feel-good exercise at best."8 Despite this view
Paul Evans states, '[that] the constant refrain in virtually every track-two channel is
'where is Canada?'9 With a history of, and international recognition for, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, Canada has the potential to succeed in implementing track- two diplomacy. It is the aim of this paper to evaluate track-two diplomacy as it has been practiced both by international practitioners and Canadian practitioners in order to evaluate its effectiveness in conflict resolution, and to investigate if it is a worthwhile unofficial counterpart to Canadian official diplomacy.
s Department of State, United States of America, "21 51 Century Statecraft," Diplomacy in Action, http://www.state.gov/statecraft/overview/index.htm (accessed November 23, 2014). 6 Peter Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, (Toronto: The Canadian International Council, 2008): 1. 7 Paul Evans, "Canada and Asia Pacific's Track-Two Diplomacy," International Journal 64, no. 4 (2009): 1037. 8 Charles Homans, ''Track II Diplomacy: A Short History," Foreign Policy, June 20, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/track_ii_diplomacy (accessed November 23, 2014) . 9 Paul Evans, "Canada and Asia Pacific's Track-Two Diplomacy," 1036. Proctor 4
LITERATURE REVIEW
The definition of track-two diplomacy by Joseph Montville is succinct and informative but does not allude to the highly complex nature of the subject. To begin, scholars such as Cynthia Cataway, Desmond Ball, Anthony Miner, Brendan Taylor and
Nadim Rouhana agree that track-two diplomacy can cover an array of various workshops, issues and concepts. This suggests that the field of practicing track-two diplomacy is vast, with many different tools being used for its purpose and conduct. Desmond Ball concisely states that the processes of track-two diplomacy" ... are incredibly diverse, often differing quite markedly in terms of their size, shape and level of institutionalization." 10 In agreement, Esra Cubadar and Bruce W. Dayton make it clear that under the guise of track-two diplomacy, the attempted processes can be quite different in their approach, methodology, process structure and end goals. 11
Stemming from the notion that track-two processes can be extremely diverse, this inevitably produces different opinions as to the appropriate ideological approach to track- two efforts. Within the literature of track-two diplomacy there are two main reoccurring ideological approaches that contribute to the divide amongst practitioners and scholars of the subject. On one side some like Rouhana believe that track-two practices should focus on a realist/rational choice approach to the field. This approach would include the further development of track-two with clear end goals and conflict resolution solutions ready to assist in official negotiations. As Rouhana believes, without precise and clearly outlined
10 Desmond Ball, A. Milner, and B. Taylor, ''Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions," Asian Security 2, no. 3 (2006): 176. 11 Esra Cuhadar and Bruce W. Dayton, "Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy," Negotiation Journal (2012): 158. Proctor 5 expectations, track-two as a profession will not be taken seriously or be considered a legitimate discipline.12
The other side of the ideological spectrum draws on the social-psychological approach. Scholars and practitioners such as L.A Fast, Vamik Volkan, Demetrius Julius,
John Burton, Leonard Doob and Herbert Kelman believe that the goal of the track-two process is to reveal and understand the underlying psychological and social factors that create and/or contribute to conflict and social divide. As can be found in "Multiparty
Mediation and the Conflict Cycle," Croker et al suggests that the social-psychological approach should focus
on the process of communication and exchange as a way to change perceptions and attitudes .. . this approach centers on providing a forum in which parties can explore options and develop solutions, often outside the highly charged arena of a formal negotiating structure. 13
This approach focuses less on the systematic development of the field to help attain academic notoriety, and more on trying to understand and subsequently breakdown the social and psychological barriers to conflict resolution.
Also prevalent in the academic literature of track-two diplomacy is how track-two processes are performed and what the role of the practitioner should be. As previously mentioned, the field of track-two is large and diverse. A common tool that is used in track-two diplomacy, as found in the literature, is Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR).
ICR is a tool used when practitioners follow the social-psychological approach in track-
12 Nadim Rouhana,"Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in Theory, Methodology, and Evaluation," in International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, ed. D. Druckman and P.C. Stern (Washington: National Academy Press, 2000), 301. 13 C.A. Croker, F.O. Hampson, and P. Aall, "Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle," in Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. C.A. Cocker, F.0. Hampson, and P. Aall (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2000), 22. Proctor 6 two diplomacy. Cynthia Chataway in "Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective," reveals that often scholars interchangeably use ICR and track-two diplomacy as the same concept, although ICR is in fact a form of track-two diplomacy" .. .in which a scholar- practitioner facilitates conflict analysis dialogues between influential people from the societies in conflict, at the grassroots as well as higher levels."14 As R.J Fisher articulates in "Historical Mapping of the Field of Conflict Resolution," ICR's definition is most commonly associated with John Burton, who in the 1960's presented ICR as a series of problem-solving methods employed by small-groups in order to discover and analyze resolutions to a conflict that has escalated to violence.15 The goal of ICR, as presented by
Harold Saunders, Paul Evans and R.J Fisher, is then to create a dialogue and prolonged communication between adversarial groups. As stated by Saunders in "Interactive
Conflict Resolution: a View for Policy Makers on Making and Building Peace," ICR participants "use unofficial dialogue [to] reflect the experience, feelings, and views of their own communities, their purpose in dialogue is to absorb the other party's perspective-not to force their own ... [the] purpose is to generate insight." 16 Because track-two and ICR are often used simultaneously it is no wonder that, as suggested by
Peter Jones and Paul Evans, track-two efforts are most commonly considered to be more of a dialogue than a process of negotiation.17
The role of the third party in the existing academic literature regarding track-two diplomacy is not wholly agreed upon. Brian L. Job for instance stresses that practitioners
14 Cynthia Chataway, "Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective" (270) 15 Chataway, "Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective," 61. 16 Harold Saunders, "Interactive Conflict Resolution: a View for Policy Makers on Making and Building Peace," in International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, ed. D. Druckman and P.C. Stern (Washington: National Academy Press, 2000), 256. 17 Paul Evans, "Canada and Asia Pacific's Track-Two Diplomacy," 1031. Proctor 7 should take on more of a leadership role in the track-two process. As he suggests in
"Track 2 Diplomacy ldeational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order," leadership is incredibly important and third party practitioners should be "willing to challenge the established consensus and norms to provoke debate and action on new initiatives. "18 In contrast, others like Saunders believe that the role of the practitioner is to be more facilitative and diagnostic. In this sense the practitioner acts like more of a consultant than an instigative agent. 19
Within the literature reviewed for the purposes of this paper, a universally agreed upon component was who should be a participant. Jeff Mapendere, R.J Fisher, Harold
Saunders, Agha et al, Peter Jones and Paul Evans agree that participants should be individuals that have close connections and influence with prominent individuals, and/or influence over the decision making process on either side engaged in the conflict. In most cases the participants should not be involved in any official capacity with any side of a conflict and should not be diplomatic or political officials. Although it is true that participants should not be political officials, some cases of track-two do allow for individuals that are currently engaged, at the time of conflict, as politicians, diplomats or adversarial group leaders, if they are acting in an unofficial capacity. This can be seen as a contradictory guideline, but as previously noted the variety of track-two diplomacy abounds.
18 Brian Job, "Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order," in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. M. Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 253. 19 R.J. Fisher, "Historical Mapping of the Field of Inter-active Conflict Resolution," in Second Track/Citizen's Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation, ed. J. Davies and E. Kaufman (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 62. Proctor 8
A last component that is widely agreed upon in the literature is the covert conduct of the track-two process. Jones, Kellen, Bekerman and Moaz articulate the need for discreet, secretive workshops that are more often than not conducted abroad and under
Chatham House rules, in which the dialogue discussed at the track-two discussions is kept only between those involved.20 The purpose for such a conduct is deemed necessary in the practice of track-two for a number of reasons. Such reasons include the deterrence of official conflict participants trying to manipulate or corrupt the process, and to create an environment where track-two participants are able to think and discuss freely, avenues of conflict resolution.
METHODOLOGY
Approach:
Evaluating the effectiveness of track-two diplomacy can be a problematic task. In its simplest form it would be reasonable to assume that a successful track-two effort would result in the resolution of the conflict. However, as previously mentioned, track- two diplomacy is merely a tool used to contribute to the end of the conflict, the culmination of any conflict must have an official conclusion. In addition, because of the different kinds of track-two diplomacy practiced, the process can be defined as successful or unsuccessful to the individual involved, depending on their ideological approach. In order to devise a method to determine the effectiveness of track-two diplomacy as best as circumstances allow, selected important components to track-two have been chosen for examination. The approach that was used to evaluate track-two diplomacy for the
20 David Kellen, Zvi Bekerman and Ifat Moaz, "An Easy Coalition: The Peacecamp Identity and Israeli- Palestinian Track Two Diplomacy," Journal of Conflict Resolution (2012): 2. Proctor 9 purposes of this paper was qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis was chosen because track-two diplomacy and its necessarily discreet nature make quantitative analysis rather impossible to perform.21 Four cases are used. Two of the cases used were lead by
Canadian practitioners, while the remaining two were lead by practitioners from other countries. Four cases allow for a small sample of comparative track-two efforts in order to research and evaluate the success and failures of unofficial diplomacy.
Out of the case study, six points were created and subsequently used in order to evaluate the cases being used to determine instances of relative success and failure. The first point of evaluation investigates if the conflict was at a point where third party intervention would be appropriate to use. In the field of track-two diplomacy this is known as ripeness. Ripeness, as a concept, is closely associated with mutually hurting stalemate known as "the plateau, a flat and unending terrain without relief... the point where things suddenly and predictably get worse."22 A ripe moment often reveals the point at which the parties involved in the conflict recognize that they are in or near a point of a mutually hurting stalemate.23 This can then lead the parties involved to tum to the process of negotiation to end the stalemate before catastrophe ensues.24
The second point for evaluation is the existence of willing participants. In the field of track·two diplomacy, "whether or not credible people are ready to begin informal discussions aimed at exploring ways to reframe the dispute in both practical and
21 Ball, Milner, and Taylor, "Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions," 182. 22 William Zartman, "Ripeness," Beyond Intractability in Conflict Information Consortium, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (University of Colorado, Boulder, 2003) http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/ripeness (accessed December 13, 2012), 228. 23 Zartman, "Ripeness," 228-229. 24 Zartman, "Ripeness," 228-229. Proctor 10 psychological terms," is called readiness.25 Credible people are individuals that are able to influence official participants in a decision-making role, like a politician or a military leader. Willing participants are necessary for the creation of a track-two process from all positions involved. A third party practitioner is needed to facilitate the process, and participants from both sides of a conflict are of course the crux of this track of informal diplomacy.
Funding, and the impact of funding, is the third point for evaluation. Funding for track-two largely comes from government coffers, more specifically from the governments that sponsor track-two processes. Due to the necessarily discreet nature of track-two diplomacy the money given to the processes by the government that is funding track-two is not stated in the government budget. Governments typically allocate a certain amount of funding to relevant government departments, such as DFATD, or to academic think tanks that will disperse money to practitioners. Other funding can also come from non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and businesses. Because track-two processes can take a number of years, the efforts are likely to be more sustainable and thus more effective if the funding is stable and continuous.
The fourth point of evaluation is the covert conduct and facilitation of the track-two process. Again, due to the need for discretion, there must be a location and facility where the process can take place. Processes are thus often undertaken in a place outside of the zone of conflict. This allows for a more conducive atmosphere for conflict resolution to take place without outside and unwanted interference.
The fifth point of evaluation is the occurrence of a successful workshop. A successful workshop in track-two diplomacy, for the purposes of this paper, indicates that
2s Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 7. Proctor 11 the workshop produced points of negotiation agreed upon by the individuals in the track- two process. For this specific point of evaluation, points of agreed upon negotiation in a track-two workshop can be seen as a point of success because it indicates that the two sides of the conflict have been able to move past the points of conflict to a state of resolution. In this instance, although the agreed upon points that the group has come up with may not translate into official negotiations, or actually aid in the solvency of the conflict, the success is that the group itself was able to come to an agreed upon solution in the context of the track-two effort.
The final point for the purposes of evaluation is transfer. Transfer in track-two diplomacy refers to the adoption of the negotiations made in the track-two workshop into the formal negotiation process.
Methodological Limitations:
There are a number of hindrances that impact the interpretation of the data. To begin, it is problematic to concretely assess if a track-two effort is a success because of the elusive outcomes of the practice.26 For instance, although a track-two effort may produce a positive outcome in creating mutually agreed upon terms of negotiations, those terms may reside solely in the confines of the process and never formally be adopted by the conflicting parties during formal negotiations. This fact, as mentioned in the literature review, leads one to question where the line of success should be drawn.
A second limitation that inhibits the interpretation of the data is the lack of scholarly and professional agreement on what the approach to track-two should be. To elaborate on what was previously stated, some scholars and practitioners choose a structuralist
26 Ball, Milner, and Taylor, "Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions," 182. Proctor 12
paradigm, or the rational choice view. In this rational choice approach, producing an
agreement is the sole purpose of the track-two effort. As Croker et al states,
[this approach is] based on a belief that through the use of persuasion, incentives, and disincentives, parties to a conflict can be led to and through a negotiated settlement. This view of the world treats the causes of conflict as objective-as opposed to subjective-issues that can yield to negotiation.27
The contrary approach, as highlighted previously, focuses on the social-psychological
issues that may be rooted deeply in the conflict. Because of this differentiation in the
approaches, the definition and analysis of success in a track-two process can differ
greatly. In addition, due to lack of agreement on methodologies on how to conduct track-
two, data gathering is an extremely difficult task.28
A third limitation, due to the discreet conduct of track-two, is that there is little record
of the actual talks that took place and a lack of public documentation of what transpired.
As Agha et al puts forward,
[o]ne of the main characteristics of Track-II talks is that they are relatively free of media coverage. Except in rare cases, even the fact that the talks took place-let alone their subsequent impact- is not made public. As a result, there is very little documented information about these talks.29
Media is not the only medium of information sharing that is denied. Most of what occurs in the workshop is not documented for fear of it being released during the process, an occurrence that could seriously damage the process. When a process has finished, the risk of information leaking out is ended, allowing for practitioners and process participants to write about their experiences. Track-two practitioners that write academic literature on the theories and at times their experiences of track-two diplomacy, provide
27 Croker, Hampson, and Aall, "Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle," 20-21 . 28 Job, "Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order," 234. 29 Hussein Agha, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Ze.ev Schiff, Track II-Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 5. Proctor 13 the information that is available. Precisely because the information of the on-goings of track-two are mainly produced by practitioners, such as Jan Egeland and Peter Jones, the information is at risk to contain bias, misleading information and false information.
Although a seemingly necessary component to track-two, lack of documentation hinders the accumulation of information regarding track-two processes.
A final limitation to the methodology exists in connection to the third limitation. Due to a lack of documentation, this leaves a lack of empirical data that tracks the progress and impact of track-two on official negotiations in conflict resolution. As a result some of the used studies may have a lack of data that would be necessary for a full evaluation.
FINDINGS: Case Studies
International Practitioners and Track-Two Diplomacy
Case 1: Israel and Palestine
Israel has been a hotbed for violent conflict since its independence from Britain in the late 1940's. The two most prominent parties involved in the conflict, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), have frequent violent clashes over the government structure, control of resources, rule of law and more in the region. During 1991 the official peace process negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians taking place in Madrid had stalled. One factor that impeded the continuation of the process was the fact that Israel and the United States labeled the PLO as a terrorist organization. This prevented the PLO from being one official representative of the Proctor 14
Palestinian people.30 The official channel for negotiations being effectively closed, this opened the possibility for more, and different, unofficial talks to take its place.
According to Jan Egeland, a practitioner of track-two for the Oslo Accords, track~ two efforts began during 1993 under the third party leadership of "the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the director of a nongovernmental think tank, the
Institute for Applied Social Science (FAF0)."31 The Norwegian government supplied the funding for the track-two process over the eight months that the talks were held in a remote country house located in Sarpsborg, Norway.32 Participants from the Israeli side include academic Yair Hirschfeld and from the Economic Cooperation Foundation, Ron
Pundak. Participants from the Palestinian side include Abu Ala, then minister of economy for the PLO, aided by two members from the staff of Yassir Arafat and Abu Mazen.33
Approximately fourteen rounds of track-two talks took place in Norway during
1993.34 Out of these talks came a number of results. First, the talks produced a mutually agreed upon document within the confines of the track-two process participants, containing a declaration of principles. 35 Many of those principles included in the document went on to be adopted into the official agreement. This agreement was signed by PLO leader Y assir Araft and then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the White
House in Washington, DC on September 13, 1993.36
30 Jan Egeland, ''The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, and P.Aall (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 2003), 530. 31 Egeland, "The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 530-531 . 32 Egeland, "The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 533. 33 Egeland, "The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 533. 34 Egeland, ''The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 529. 35 Egeland, ''The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 529. 36 Egeland, ''The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 530. Proctor 15
Another outcome from the track-two process was that the PLO was no longer seen as a terrorist organization but as a "legitimate representative of the Palestinians."37
This enabled additional negotiation processes to continue and not suffer the same fate as the Madrid process. Harold S. Saunders points to an additional outcome of the talks in
"Prenegotiations and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process." He states that the
[track-two] dialogues created a critical mass of people in each body politic who recognized the other group as persons with valid human needs and desires to fulfill their own legitimate aspirations. More important, the people decided they could risk trying to live in peace. The dialogues also produced many of the formulations and reassurances that made possible formal negotiations between Israel and the PL0.38
This suggests that the track-two efforts contributed to the progress in civil society in which individuals felt able to discuss resolutions for peace in a habitually hostile country.
Despite the success of the track-two process in the creation of mutually agreed upon points that transferred into official negotiations, Egeland reveals that not all issues in the conflict could be addressed and resolved. In fact, talks broke down due to both sides, at different times, revising the original mutually agreed upon principles of declaration, and little to no negotiations surrounding larger issues. These larger issues include, "UN Resolution 242 and 338 on Israel's occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, future negotiations on the permanent status, [and] the organizing of elections in
Jerusalem ... "39
37 Egeland, 'The Oslo Accord: Muhiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 534. 38 Harold Saunders, "Pre-negotiations and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process," in Managing Global Chaos: Sources ofand Responses to International Conflict, ed. C. Crawford, P.O. Hampson and P. Aall (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), 423. 39 Egeland, "The Oslo Accord: Muhiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 536-537. Proctor 16
Egeland makes many observations in the review of the time spent engaged in the
1993 Norway track-two process. Out of the observations, three variables seem to have contributed to the success of the Oslo Accord track-two process. To begin, news media were not present to disrupt and subjectively analyze the process.40Second, because it was an unofficial process with no formal setting, this allowed the participants to, according to
Egeland, "[spend] at least ninety percent of their waking hours, meals included, in real negotiations."41 Third, Egeland found that without the confines of a formal negotiation process, the participants were able to be direct with one another, while also being able to develop a close relationship to the point where adversaries were able to become comrades over meals and drinks.42 Egeland's observations suggest that the discreet and secluded nature of the track-two process was really what facilitated and allowed the creation of the principles of declaration to be made. It must be stated that although Egeland's account of the track-two efforts are mostly positive, because he is one of the few that has written about what transpired, this information has the potential to contain bias and other participants may have alternative views about the outcome of the process.
Case 2: Apartheid in South Africa
The conflict in South Africa under apartheid saw the white supremacist National
Party (NP) government against the opposition party African National Congress (ANC). a group of South Africans fighting for equal rights for all citizens regardless of ethnicity,
40 Egeland, ''The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 538. 41 Egeland, ''The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 538. 42 Egeland, "The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," 538. Proctor 17
race, as well as social, political and economic participation.43 Members of the ANC,
mainly exiled and pushed into neighbouring countries, actively sought negotiations to end apartheid. Official negotiations were nearly impossible to facilitate because the NP
government refused to meet with ANC members, then a banned party, amid violent clashes under President F.W. de Klerk.
Unofficial track-two processes to end apartheid in South Africa were conducted between 1984 and 1990. The track-two process that will be looked at is known as the
ANC-Elite Afrikaners Meeting (1987-1990). Funding for the process came from
Consolidated Goldfields (Consgold), a British gold mining company, as well as the
British government. Consgold was the second largest gold mining company in South
Africa.44 The company had a vested financial interest in the end of apartheid because, as
Daniel Liberfeld articulates in "Contributions of a Semi-Official Prenegotiation Initiative in South Africa," "Consgold's corporate image and relations with shareholders had been ruffled by the international anti-apartheid movement's calls for disinvestment from South
Africa. "45 The then Conservative British government funded hundreds of thousands of
British pounds to the track-two process, to be headed by public relations director and strategic advisor Michael Young of Consgold, because of pressure from the
Commonwealth to impose sanctions on South Africa. 46 Afrikaner participants included
Professors Willie Esterhuyse, Sampie Terreblanche and Willie Bretenbach from
Stellenbosch University, while ANC participants included Aziz Pahad, Harold Wolpe and
43 Daniel Liberfield, "Contributions of a Semi-Official Prenegotiation Initiative in South Africa," in Paving the Way: Contribution of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking, ed. R.J. Fisher (New York: Lexington, 2005), 105-106. 44 Liberfield, "Contributions of a Semi-Official Prenegotiation Initiative in South Africa," 108. 45 Liberfield, "Contributions of a Semi-Official Prenegotiation Initiative in South Africa," I 08. 46 Liberfield, "Contributions of a Semi-Official Prenegotiation Initiative in South Africa," 109. Proctor 18
Tony Trew of Oliver Tambo's President's Committee and the London office's Political
Research Discussion Group.47 ANC participants, during the period over which the track- two process took place, changed at times to include others such as Joe Nhlanhla, Thabo
Mbeki and Jacob Zuma.48 As stated previously this round of track-two talks spanned from 1987 to 1990. On average the talks took place every fourth months.49 According to
Liberfeld,
[t]rack-two meetings consistently highlighted participants' shared identity as South Africans and contributed significantly to lowered threat perception and to increased willingness to negotiate, thus upholding a constructivist interpretation of conflict resolution since shared identity is a socially constructed relationship.so
As a result, mutually agreed upon points of negotiation were created during this round of talks. The negotiations agreed upon and the issues discussed in the track-two process, according to Willie Esterhuyse, became a part of the construction of the official negotiations.s' Similar to the case on the Oslo Accords, mutually agreed upon principles and other ideas find their way into official negotiation by having official actors accept them. As stated in the methodology, participants in track-two processes are individuals that can influence and/or impact the official decision makers engaged in the conflict.
Once the official negotiations came to fruition in 1990, President de Klerk unbanned the
47 Daniel Liberfeld, "Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90," Journal of Peace Research 39, no.3 (2002): 365. 48 Liberfield, "Contributions of a Semi-Official Prenegotiation Initiative in South Africa," 111-112. 49 Liberfield, "Contributions of a Semi-Official Prenegotiation Initiative in South Africa," in Paving the Way: Contribution ofInteractive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking, ed. 111. so Liberfeld, "Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90," 370. 51 Liberfeld, "Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90," 114. Proctor 19
ANC and released future President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, from prison, ending apartheid. 52
Canadian Practitioners and Track Two Diplomacy
Case 3: Jerusalem
Jerusalem is home to some of the most important religious sites for Christianity,
Judaism and Islam. This city is extremely contentious in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and represents one of the main issues that have yet to be settled. The main point of disagreement revolves around control over, and access to, this holy city. The 1947
Partition Plan sought to divide the two distinct populations residing in this region into two different states, as well as to make Jerusalem a UN controlled city so that neither the
Jewish nor Palestinian people had complete control. The Palestinians refused the plan, which prompted the Jewish population to claim independence on May 14, 1948, effectively creating the Jewish state of Israel. The state of Israel claimed Jerusalem. This issue, among others, has been a continual impediment to the Middle East peace process.
Three former Canadian Foreign Service Officers pursued track-two diplomacy for the purposes of addressing the conflict over the city of Jerusalem. The push for a resolution concerning the conflict around Jerusalem was instigated by the failed attempt of resolution at Camp David in 2000.53 The aim of the initiative had been designed to target alternative possible ideas and solutions for the future governance of Jerusalem.54
Michael Molloy, Michael Bell and John Bell, the three former Canadian Foreign Service s2 Liberfeld, "Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90," 366. 53 Jerusalem Old City Initiative, http://www.mei.edu/events/jerusalem-old-city-initiative-sustainable- governance-solutions (accessed January 28, 2014). s4 University of Windsor, "Project Overview," http://wwwl.uwindsor.ca/joci/ (accessed January 28, 2014). Proctor 20
Officers, based this initiative out of the Department of Political Science at the University ofWindsor.55 The three obtained acceptance and funding grants for track-two from the
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) and the Human Security Fund at the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). 56 This funding allowed the former
Foreign Service Officers to conduct research and facilitate meetings of academics and experts on either side of the conflict. 57
The three were able to create and facilitate dialogue. Unofficial talks took place in the Middle East, most notably in Istanbul, Turkey. It was there in 2005 where participants from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict came together to review the compiled research and to discuss points that could be used for further negotiations.58 The outcome of discussions in
Turkey was a document published by the Munk Centre for International Studies called,
"New Directions for Deliberation and Dialogue."59 In addition to addressing the main issues of the conflict, the discussions also produced topics of research and policy to be investigated. Such topics included zoning, security and access to the city. Gilead Sher, a negotiator for Israel during Camp David, articulated the dire need for new ideas to help bring the Palestinian and Israel conflict to an end, putting support behind the Canadian- led track-two effort. He said, "[w]e need this kind of unofficial work because within governments and within the official entities, some of the issues are too sensitive and too
55 University of Windsor, "Project Overview." 56 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 13. 57 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 13. 58 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 13. 59 University of Windsor, "Project Overview." Proctor 21 explosive to handle."60 This quote from Sher illustrates the benefit that track-two diplomatic efforts have in dealing with sensitive conflicts.
In addition to the creation of documents, the Jerusalem track-two talks were able to create sub-groups, divided up among the track-two participants, in order to have more concentrated and specific discussions and workshops on targeted issues. Some of these group topics include security, property, political economy, and govemance.61 This allowed for specific components of the Jerusalem issue to be discussed in order to develop a more comprehensive and narrowed solution.
The track-two effort for Jerusalem made clear gains during the initial period of its engagement. However, the track-two efforts faced barriers to success that resulted in a lack of momentum in the process. The funding process, for instance, was becoming increasing more bureaucratized and the Canadian government tightened the rules and regulations required for funding of theses kinds of endeavours. 62 In addition to the barriers in Canada for funding, such as the previously mentioned increase in the bureaucratization of funding, the political climate in the Middle East was no longer conducive to the facilitation of unofficial dialogues. The dialogues stalled due to "the second Intifada, the election of Hamas, the Hamas take over of Gaza, and the clash between Israel and Hezbollah."63 As Peter Jones notes, "[t]he two governments are interested in the project, but do not want to be seen as directly engaged until the moment
60 Meredith Buel, "Jerusalem Old City Initiative Releases New Peace Plan," May 10, 2010. http://www.voanews.com/content/jerusalem-old-city-initiative-releases-new-peace-plan- 93441729/171990.html (accessed January 28, 2014).
61 University of Windsor, "Project Overview." 62 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 13. 63 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 13. Proctor 22 has arrived for this issue to be addressed by the official process." This indicates that, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the political climate will largely control if unofficial dialogues can be undertaken and if they can be sustainable in such an unstable area.
Case 4: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue
The end of the Cold War in the early 1990's brought with it a renewed sense of international cooperation and engagement to provide conflict resolution. A great example that showcases this point for Canada was the Canadian involvement in Northeast Asian multilateral security. With the end of the Cold War there was a rise in willingness to engage in international trade and openness for new commercial possibilities within the
Northeast Asia region. Although new opportunities had begun to present themselves, the
North Pacific region was burdened with multiple conflicts that spanned into political, economic and social spheres. During the 1990's there was worldwide concern surrounding the uncertain regional security in the North Pacific region. For example, the
Korean peninsula presented problems of overlapping waterway claims and rights of use for trade between North and South Korea, China, Russia and Japan. Tensions were high in this region with no cooperative body in place to ensure all regional states were represented and had a say in security.
To aid in resolving the regional conflicts in Northeast Asia, multiple track-two efforts were undertaken. Some efforts include the North Pacific Forum in Hokkaido, the
North Pacific Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
(CSCAP), and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue. The specific track-two effort Proctor 23 that will be looked at is the effort known as the North Pacific Cooperative Security
Dialogue (NPCSD). A springboard for Canadian involvement in the conflicts of
Northeast Asia began in the 1980' s with Joe Clark, at the time acting as Foreign Affairs
Minister, articulating the issue of regional security concerns in the North Pacific in an address to the United Nations General Assembly.64 Taking on a lead role, Canada initiated a track-two effort through the NPCSD.
Paul Evans and David Dewitt, both professors at York University, created the unofficial dialogues for finding a solution to the question of cooperative security in the
North Pacific.65 Their efforts were funded mostly by DFAIT, CIDA, and aided by support from York University and institutions from North Pacific countries.66 The Canadian government spent approximately five million dollars on track-two efforts between 1990 and 2005.67 States involved included China, North and South Korea, Japan, Russia and
Mongolia. The participants were academics from each country; some of the participants were government officials but were acting in unofficial and private capacity during the process.68
Evans and Dewitt, operating under the track-two channel, were able to construct a facilitative atmosphere where their operative was to
construct new or revised agendas, to figure out ways to manage issues and differences, and to seek more insightful understanding of differing perspectives and priorities. It [the track-two talks] focused on critical themes or issues, and used commissioned research and the discussion about the results of that research as the principal means of engagement. 69
64 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 4. 65 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 14. 66 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 14. 67 Evans, "Canada and Asia Pacific's Track-Two Diplomacy," 1034. 68 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 15. 69 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 15. Proctor 24
In this particular use of the track-two stream, documents were created and information was compiled into readily accessible records to all.70 Since the information was available for all, officials had a choice to look at the data and make the decision on whether or not to adopt ideas officially.71 The NPCSD produced a number of successful outcomes using its informal, track-two basis. Already noted was the ability to bring together academics and politicians to begin discussing regional issues, prime among them being security. The process was also able to create diplomatic relations between North Korea and the other involved states in 2001.72 In addition Canada, through its role in track-two and NPCSD, was able to create discussion platforms for conflict resolution concerning such serious issues as arms control, non-proliferation and the weaponization of space.73
In 1993 the dialogues ended due to more strict financial process at DFAIT. As
Peter Jones articulates in his article for the Canadian International Council,
DFAIT's financial system required a higher degree of specificity than desirable- the need to outline exactly what they would be doing several months hence meant that opportunities to explore new ideas which arose in discussions could not be pursued in a timely way.74
These new criteria seriously damaged the process. Upon the closing of the dialogues,
Dewitt reported that
several senior officials in the region told him that Canada had been one of the few countries that could have brought everyone together at this point and that Canada had gained considerable credibility through the project, but the way it was ended had caused many in the region to doubt Canada's "staying power."75
70 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 15. 71 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 15. 72 Paul Evans, "Canada and the perverse challenge of Northeast Asian regional security," Wordpress. March 20, 2013, https://vtncankor.wordpress .com/2013/03/20/canada-and-the-perverse-challenge-of- northeast-asian-regional-security-by-paul-evans/ (accessed November 23, 2014). 13 Evans, "Canada and the perverse challenge of Northeast Asian regional security." 74 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 14-15. 15 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 15. Proctor 25
Although Canada was no longer present in the North Pacific Security Dialogues, it set the foundation for the United States to lead efforts on the northeast Asia cooperation dialogue.76 In addition to the increased trouble for funding, the track-two effort faced hardship in early 2000's with the nuclear arms proliferation in North Korea.
As Paul Evans noted in a 2012 presentation regarding NPCSD at a workshop on
"New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia: Breaking the Gridlock," in Washington,
D.C., the 2006 Canadian federal election marked a change in Canadian involvement in the North Pacific region. This is not to say that the Conservative government abandoned relations with the North Pacific states, but it chose to adopt bilateral relations in their foreign policy. In addition, the Canadian government was in favour of a coalition of the willing, where a group of states agree to act together to intervene in a chosen conflict area. This approach was a change from the previous middle power role Canada had been pursing with a multilateral approach in NPCSD.77 The Canadian government has continued to support the idea of, and push for, regional security in the North Pacific region. It has since, however, ceased engagement in track-two efforts.
16 Evans, "Canada and Asia Pacific's Track-Two Diplomacy," 1033. 77 Evans, "Canada and the perverse challenge of Northeast Asian regional security." Proctor 26
TABLE 1: Case Study Results
Ripeness Readiness Funding Covert Successful Transfer Facilitation/ Workshop Conduct Case 1: Official Participants Continual Covert Mutually Select Israel and negotiations present funding by facilitation agreed upon mutually Palestine ceased which Norwegian location in document agreed upon allowed for an government Sarpsborg, with a principles unofficial Norway declaration adopted into process to take of the official its place principles negotiations created Case 2: Conflict came Participants Continual Covert Mutually Mutually Apartheid to a mutually present funding by conduct agreed upon agreed upon in South hurting UK undertaken points of points aided Africa stalemate government negotiation in the and created structure of Consgold official negotiations Case 3: Official Participants Funding Covert Participants No transfer Jerusalem negotiations present increasingly facilitation in able to due to stalled, difficult to the Middle come unwilling and allowing for attain East together and hostile alternative discuss political avenues to be points of atmosphere pursued negotiation Case 4: Worldwide Participants Funding cut Covert Dialogues Up to The North call for a present by DFAIT conduct not undertaken officials to Pacific cooperative used, as and adopt at their Cooperativ security documents documents own e Security dialogue due to were made produced discretion Dialogue high regional readily tensions available to officials
Table I shows the compiled results for all of the case studies used for this paper.
Each case was evaluated using the points for analysis stated in the methodology section.
Out of the results shown in the table, and from the descriptions of the conflict and track-
two efforts in the case studies, it can be stated that wholly successful instances of track- Proctor 27 two diplomacy are the cases of Israel and Palestine and the Apartheid in South Africa.
The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue can be seen as successful as it did produce mutually agreed upon diplomatic relations and the setup of important discussions regarding regional issues. The engagement of Canada in NPCSD ceased due to funding restrictions and a change in government foreign policy approach.
A clear example of failure in track-two diplomacy is the case of Jerusalem. Track- two in Jerusalem failed due to the hostile political environment and continuous violent outbursts between Palestinians and Israelis on a range of contentious issues. Funding for
Jerusalem, because of the increased bureaucratization of funding applications, also contributed to the lack of success because it was not reliable or sufficient.
The case studies used in this paper show that track-two diplomacy can be very successful to aid in the resolution of conflicts. These results also show that track-two efforts can be used in a variety of conflicts, as long as the track-two efforts are designed to facilitate the right kind of atmosphere, depending on the situation. To summarize the results found in this paper, an applicable quote can be taken from Peter Jones in his work for the Canadian International Council (CIC),
[track-two diplomacy] is not a panacea for all the world's ills. Nor is it appropriate in every case. But where it is appropriate, it has demonstrated over the years an ability to assist in developing dialogues where none had existed before.78
POLICY SUGGESTIONS & CONCLUSIONS
It is important to proceed with caution when making conclusions based on the research and compiled data. This is so because of the potential for bias. It is important to again highlight that because there is a relatively small base of primary accounts of track-
78 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 25. Proctor 28 two processes, the existing literature may contain writer bias, misinformation or lack of information. With this important note in mind, conclusions and policy suggestions from the existing data can be made.
From the results of the case studies it can be suggested that track-two diplomacy is an effective tool for conflict resolution. As such, it would be a useful tool for Canadian foreign policy for the purposes of aiding in conflict resolution, and as an effective counterpart to official diplomacy. Canada, known as a nation to pursue conflict resolution through peaceful means, has the ability to effectively execute track-two diplomacy. As seen from participant comments in the Jerusalem case and the NPCSD case, Canada clearly has a unique ability to facilitate track-two workshops that are successful in creating cooperative points of negotiation. This ability is due to a couple of reasons. First,
Canada is not a superpower nation. This is positive for the conduct of track-two as
Canada can pursue an effective middle power position.79 As a middle power, it is suggested by Peter Jones that Canada would be more impartial to some conflicts.
Impartiality is a good quality to have when bringing two adversaries together.
While Canada does have the great ability to be successful in track-two,
Canadian participation has been less than perfect. As noted from the Canadian led track- two efforts in the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, Canada lacks commitment to long-term presence and engagement. This is directly due to the volatile nature of securing government funding. The partisan nature of the Canadian government hinders track-two participation and sustainability. This is especially so as the government of the day can radically, and often does, change the funding requirements and change the institutions through which funding is dispersed. There is no better example of this than
79 Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, 21. Proctor 29 the merging of CIDA and DFAIT into DFATD. This occurrence resulted in the cutting of many funding programs, including funding for track-two. It should be noted that partisanship is not in itself a bad component to politics or of governance, but it can have a negative impact on issues that may require a greater degree of consensus that should transcend party lines.
Government of the day ideology and subjective principles has, as of late, negatively impacted track-two efforts. As noted previously, under the current
Conservative government, track-two is seen as inefficient talk shops that are of no use to
Canada in its foreign policy. Because of this view Canada no longer funds track-two diplomacy.
From the case studies, both international and Canadian cases have proven track- two to be an effective tool in conflict resolution. It is suggested then that Canada reintegrate track-two into foreign policy because of the benefits it can have for the purposes of conflict resolution. In order to sustain track-two diplomacy, Canada has to create a sustainable and government supported, through nonpartisan consensus, track-two approach. Sustaining track-two over a long period of time is necessary in some cases to facilitate the process, and this is the largest barrier for Canada to overcome-it is not about short-term gains but rather long-term sustainable benefits. Proctor 30
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