University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies Master of Public Policy Capstone Projects 2015-04 Track-Two Diplomacy & Canadian Foreign Policy: Approaches to Conflict Resolution Proctor, Kate Proctor, Kate. (2015). Track-Two Diplomacy & Canadian Foreign Policy: Approaches to Conflict Resolution ( Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/51646 report Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca THE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY• OF PUBLIC POLICY MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY CAPSTONE PROJECT Track-Two Diplomacy & Canadian Foreign Policy: Approaches to Conflict Resolution Submitted by: Kate Proctor Approved by Supervisor: Dr. Ian Brodie Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of PPOL 623 and completion of the requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree Table of Contents Introduction 1 Literature Review 4 Methodology: Approach 8 Methodological Limitations 11 Findings: Case 1: Israel and Palestine 13 Case 2: Apartheid in South Africa 16 Case 3: Jerusalem 19 Case 4: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue 22 Results 26 Policy Suggestions & Conclusions 27 Proctor 1 INTRODUCTION Government response to conflict resolution can vary. To find a solution to a conflict a government may confer with, and take ideas from, governmental institutions like the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), and non- governmental institutions, such as the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). One such response comes from diplomacy and the role that it can play in conflict resolution. Any given sovereign state is represented internationally through the use of diplomats. The role of an individual diplomat, as understood in conventional terms, is to represent their state's interests and values and to maintain state-to-state relationships. This official diplomacy is also known as "track-one diplomacy." Track-one efforts in conflict resolution, as suggested by Jeff Mapendere, "are facilitated or mediated by government representatives or representatives of political institutions such as the [United Nations] and regional groups." 1 Diplomats also represent, in accordance with a state's foreign policy, the primary and most formal avenue of a state's ability to engage in peacemaking and conflict resolution.2 Like other professions in the political field, the occupation of diplomat is highly institutionalized, visible and subject to media scrutiny. Due to these very characteristics of the occupation, efforts to resolve conflict can often be slow to evolve. However undeniably important official diplomacy is for any given state in promoting state interests and fostering state-to-state relationships, there exists another less known track of diplomacy that, at times, can attain the same end goal as its formally institutionalized counterpart. This alternative avenue is simply known as "track-two 1 Jeffery Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks," Culture of Peace 2, no. I: 70. 2 Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks," 67. Proctor 2 diplomacy." Track-two diplomacy, coined by former American Foreign Service Officer Joseph Montville in 1981 is, [u]nofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the contlict.3 Track-two diplomacy is facilitated through discreet means by track-two diplomacy practitioners and is funded by government. Track-two diplomacy seeks to open alternative avenues and methods of communication that would facilitate an environment conducive for conflict resolution, without the institutional and bureaucratic constraints that can hinder track-one diplomacy.4 It is important to note that if a government is interested in adopting track-two diplomacy, the role of the government is a funding one. In simple terms, and in most cases, practitioners willing to conduct a track- two diplomacy effort submit a proposal to the government for approval in order to obtain funding. Track-two diplomacy, to be discussed in more detail in the proceeding section, has the ability to aid in the efforts of conflict resolution not by replacing official diplomacy, but by aiding official efforts through alternative methods. Some states have made track-two diplomacy an integral part of their foreign policy. One such example is the United States. As found on the public website for the Department of State for the United States of America, track-two diplomacy has been added to their repertoire for "2l51 Century Statecraft." As the literature from the Department of State suggests, track- 3 Joseph Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: 162. 4 Montville, ''The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," 163. Proctor 3 two diplomacy is used in assistance to official diplomacy, the central focus of the work.5 Although no official policy has been written to outline how track-two diplomacy works - a necessary stipulation to the discreet nature of the work- the Government of the United States has embraced it. When it comes to Canada, the embrace of track-two diplomacy differs. Although Canadians have undertaken track-two diplomacy in the past, the federal government has not developed a sustainable capacity to continue those efforts.6 It is suggested by some Canadian track-two practitioners, such as Paul Evans and Peter Jones, that the current Conservative government considers track-two diplomacy to be "talk shops" and regards the practice with severe scepticism.7 This view is not uncommon in governments as many initially regard track-two diplomacy as a "feel-good exercise at best."8 Despite this view Paul Evans states, '[that] the constant refrain in virtually every track-two channel is 'where is Canada?'9 With a history of, and international recognition for, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, Canada has the potential to succeed in implementing track- two diplomacy. It is the aim of this paper to evaluate track-two diplomacy as it has been practiced both by international practitioners and Canadian practitioners in order to evaluate its effectiveness in conflict resolution, and to investigate if it is a worthwhile unofficial counterpart to Canadian official diplomacy. s Department of State, United States of America, "21 51 Century Statecraft," Diplomacy in Action, http://www.state.gov/statecraft/overview/index.htm (accessed November 23, 2014). 6 Peter Jones, Canada and Track Two Diplomacy, (Toronto: The Canadian International Council, 2008): 1. 7 Paul Evans, "Canada and Asia Pacific's Track-Two Diplomacy," International Journal 64, no. 4 (2009): 1037. 8 Charles Homans, ''Track II Diplomacy: A Short History," Foreign Policy, June 20, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/track_ii_diplomacy (accessed November 23, 2014) . 9 Paul Evans, "Canada and Asia Pacific's Track-Two Diplomacy," 1036. Proctor 4 LITERATURE REVIEW The definition of track-two diplomacy by Joseph Montville is succinct and informative but does not allude to the highly complex nature of the subject. To begin, scholars such as Cynthia Cataway, Desmond Ball, Anthony Miner, Brendan Taylor and Nadim Rouhana agree that track-two diplomacy can cover an array of various workshops, issues and concepts. This suggests that the field of practicing track-two diplomacy is vast, with many different tools being used for its purpose and conduct. Desmond Ball concisely states that the processes of track-two diplomacy" ... are incredibly diverse, often differing quite markedly in terms of their size, shape and level of institutionalization." 10 In agreement, Esra Cubadar and Bruce W. Dayton make it clear that under the guise of track-two diplomacy, the attempted processes can be quite different in their approach, methodology, process structure and end goals. 11 Stemming from the notion that track-two processes can be extremely diverse, this inevitably produces different opinions as to the appropriate ideological approach to track- two efforts. Within the literature of track-two diplomacy there are two main reoccurring ideological approaches that contribute to the divide amongst practitioners and scholars of the subject. On one side some like Rouhana believe that track-two practices should focus on a realist/rational choice approach to the field. This approach would include the further development of track-two with clear end goals and conflict resolution solutions ready to assist in official negotiations. As Rouhana believes, without precise and clearly outlined 10 Desmond Ball, A. Milner, and B. Taylor, ''Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions," Asian Security 2, no. 3 (2006): 176. 11 Esra Cuhadar and Bruce W. Dayton, "Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy," Negotiation Journal (2012): 158. Proctor 5 expectations, track-two as a profession will not be taken seriously or be considered a legitimate discipline.12 The other side of the ideological spectrum draws on the social-psychological approach. Scholars and practitioners such as L.A Fast, Vamik Volkan, Demetrius Julius, John Burton, Leonard Doob and Herbert Kelman believe that the goal of the track-two process is to reveal and understand the underlying psychological and social factors that create and/or