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1 Liddell Hart's Theory of Armoured Warfare 1 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, the Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart (London, 1965), I

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1 Liddell Hart's Theory of Armoured Warfare 1 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, the Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart (London, 1965), I Notes 1 Liddell Hart's Theory of Armoured Warfare 1 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart (London, 1965), i. 86; idem, 'Suggestions on the Future Development of the Combat Unit- the Tank as a Weapon of Infantry', RUSI Journal (Nov. 1919), 666-9; Jim Harper to LH, 6 Sept. 1919: 7/1919/6 (references are to LH's papers at King's College, London). LH's false pretence has been tacitly noted in Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1966), 84-5; Harold Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armoured Doctrine, 1927-1938 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1988), 38 n.67. 2 LH, 'H.G. Wells as a False Prophet', unpublished article: 7 /1918/25b. For Wells' forecasts of future society and future mechanized warfare see my Fascist and Liberal Visions of War: Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet and Other Modernists (Oxford, 1998), 8-12. 3 LH to Fuller, 23 April 1948, in 1/302, taking sentences out of their original context and intent; misleading in the same manner is LH, Memoirs, i. 89-90. 4 Fuller to LH, 25 Aug. 1920, 1/302. 5 For Fuller's vision of future mechanized war see 'J.F.C. Fuller: Positivism, Evolution, Fascism, and Future Warfare', in my Fascist and Liberal Visions ofWar, 13-42. 6 LH to Fuller, 16 and 31 Jan. 1922 (citation from the later date); Fuller to LH, 19 Jan. 1922, 1/302. 7 LH, 'Are Infantry Doomed?', The National Review (May 1922), 455-63; idem. 'Infantry- 11 The New Model'", ibid. Quly 1922), 712-22; idem, 'The Future Development of Infantry', ibid. (Oct. 1922), 286-94. 8 Fuller to LH, 18 Dec. 1922, 1/302; LH, Memoirs, i. 91-2. 9 LH, 'The Next Great War', The Royal Engineers Journal (March 1924), 90-107. 10 LH, 'The Development of the 11 New Model" Army, Suggestions on a Progressive, but Gradual Mechanization', The Army Quarterly (Oct. 1924), 37-50. Cf. Fuller, 'Gold Medal (Military) Prize Essay for 1919: "The Application of Recent Developments in Mechanics and Other Scientific Knowledge to Preparation and Training for Future War on Land'", RUSI Journal, 65 (1920), 239-74. 11 Only a couple of historians have noted this briefly. As Brian Holden Reid, f.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker (London, 1987), 225, has written: 'the simi­ larity in the approach, content and style of Fuller's The Reformation of War and Liddell Hart's Paris is striking though rarely remarked upon.'; also Michael Carver, The Apostles of Mobility (London, 1979), 43-4. 12 LH, Paris, or the Future of War (London, 1925), 41-89; the reference to 'Plan 1919' (pp. 82-3) is the only direct citation from Fuller. 13 See e.g. LH's briefing of John Wheldon, Machine Age Armies (London, 1968), 33-8. Notes 97 14 See more fully in my Fascist and Liberal Visions of War, 143-150 and passim. 15 LH, Memoirs, i. 90-1. 16 But see the significant time distinction ibid. i. 270. 17 John Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (London, 1988), 33-46. 18 Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940 (London, 1965), 405. 19 This is fast becoming the accepted view; cf. J.P. Harris, 'British Armour 1918-40: Doctrine and Development', in his and F.H. Toase (eds), Armoured Warfare (London, 1990), 29, claiming that LH had no theory of armoured warfare other than what he wrote in Paris; also his Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester, 1995). 20 This historiographical 'black hole' is evident in LH's works consulted in Luvaas, lac. cit. For the works referred to by Mearsheimer see his LH, 35 n. He mentions, but fails to cite, a 'handful' of Daily Telegraph columns, primarily relying on Liddell Hart's later private list which incorporated extracts from those columns: 'Suggestions and Forecasts: Salient Points from Captain Liddell Hart's Articles in The Daily Telegraph, 1925-1934', 13/3; this list could have in fact led to much of the relevant material, had it been used properly. 21 LH, The Tanks (London, 1959), i. 241-54; idem, Memoirs, i. 107-36; Winton, To Change an Army, 72-105. 22 LH, The Daily Telegraph, 31 Aug. 1927. 23 LH, The Daily Telegraph, 10 Sept. 1927; idem, The Tanks, i. 251-2; idem, Memoirs, i. 129. 24 The quotation is from LH, 'Medieval Cavalry and Modern Tanks', English Review Ouly 1925), 91; also published in the Atlantic Monthly (Sept. 1925) and in The Royal Tank Corps Journal (Oct. 1925). See also, less directly but still clear enough: 'Two Great Captains: Jenghiz Khan and Subutai', Blackwood's Magazine (May 1924), 644-59; incorporated in LH, Great Captains Unveiled (London, 1927), 1-34. 25 See e.g. The Daily Telegraph, 9 Sept. 1927, 23 Aug. 1928, 31 Aug. 1934; 'The New British Doctrine of Mechanized War', The English Review (Dec. 1929), 700. 26 The Daily Telegraph, 29 Aug., 4 and 22 Sept. 1928. 27 Ibid. 25 Aug. 1928. 28 Ibid.; reproduced in LH, Thoughts on War (London, 1944), 53-4. 29 The Daily Telegraph, 26 Sept. and 28 Nov. 1928; the former reprinted as 'Armoured Forces in 1928', RUSI Journal (Dec. 1928). 30 Ibid. quotation from p. 723. 31 LH, 'The New British Doctrine of Mechanized War', 700; idem, 'The Future of Armament and Its Future Use', Yale Review Oune 1930), 663; also published in Royal Air Force Quarterly, (Oct. 1930). 32 LH, 'The Army Exercises of 1930', RUSI Journal (Nov. 1930), 681-90; also in The Daily Telegraph, 25-6 Sept. 1930. 33 The Daily Telegraph, 16 Sept. 1932; LH, When Britain Goes to War (London, 1935), 276, 280. 34 The Daily Telegraph, 11 Nov. 1933. 98 Notes 35 LH, Memoirs, i. 238; idem, The Tanks, i. 306. 36 LH, Memoirs, i. 236-8; Hobart to Lindsay 10 Nov. 1933, 1/376; The Tanks, i. 305 and seq. Cf. Kenneth Macksey, Armoured Crusader: a Bio'graphy of Major General Sir Percy Hobart (London, 1967), 117-18. 37 See Hobart's echoing of LH's ideas, esp. in his letter of 7 Oct. 1934, and his reference to LH's enormous influence on the 1934-37 manoeuvres, 19 Jan. 1946: 1/376. Cf. Macksey, Armoured Crusader, 117-18, 136. 38 LH, The Tanks, i. 307-8. Again cf. Hobart to LH, 7 Oct. 1934, 1/376. 39 The Daily Telegraph, 28 Aug. 1934; see also ibid. 14 Aug. 1928; The New York Times Magazine, 2 Dec. 1934; rep. in The Sunday Chronicle, 27 Jan. 1935. 40 LH, The Tanks, i. 339; Memoirs, i. 264. 41 The Times, 23, 24 and 27 Aug. 1935; the passage of 24 Aug. was reproduced in LH, Thoughts on War, 55. 42 Mearsheimer, LH, 43. 43 Robert Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare 1918-1940 (Newark, Delaware, 1984), 163-7, 170; Mearsheimer was appar­ ently unfamiliar with this book. Hobart's manoeuvres of August 1934 are not covered by Winton's excellent To Change an Army, because the hero of his book, General Burnett-Stuart, was not involved in them, having just returned from a three-year tenure as commander-in-chief in Egypt; but see ibid. 123. Hobart's historical manoeuvres of 1934-37 are curiously not even mentioned by J. Paul Harris, 'Sir Percy Hobart', in Brian Bond (ed.), Fallen Stars, Eleven Studies of Twentieth Century Military Disasters (London, 1991), 86-106. 44 This also has the effect of making The Tanks a far more balanced book than Memoirs. 45 Cf. LH's views in 1933, When Britain Goes to War, 278-9. 46 The Times, 18 Sept. 1935. 47 Ibid. 10 Sept. 1937; reproduced in LH, The Defence of Britain (London, 1939), 376-8, and Memoirs, ii. 25-6. 48 The Times, 25 Oct. 1937. More on mechanized long-range strategic pene­ tration can be found ibid. 4 May 1936 and 1 Oct. 1937. 49 E.g. LH, Defence of the West (London, 1950), 269. SO 11/1932/49. The point about the 'tactical base' had already been strongly alluded to in LH, Great Captains Unveiled (London, 1927), 32. In a later edition of Lectures of FSR III Fuller acknowledged his omission in respect to close ground-air cooperation: Armoured Warfare (London, 1943), Preface, 28-9, 106-7; he had always believed that the ground-attack aircraft and the tank were the weapons of the future, but not necessarily working in close cooperation; for LH's advocacy of such cooperation see e.g. The Daily Telegraph, 19 June 1926; The Defence of Britain, 299. 51 This crucial point has been relegated to an obscure note: Mearsheimer, LH, 208 n.97. 52 Letter exchange in Feb. 1964, in 1/302. See also A.J. Trythal, 'Boney' Fuller: the Intellectual General (London, 1977), 60-4, 71, 73. 53 Reid, Fuller, 151. 54 See e.g. LH, 'Contrasts of 1931, Mobility or Stagnation', Army Quarterly Oan. 1932), 235ff, rep. in When Britain Goes to War, 213-15, also 261-2; The Times, 27 Aug. 1935 and 1 Sept. 1937; LH, The Tanks, i. 327, 348. Cf. Notes 99 Victor Germains's scathing criticism, The 'Mechanization' of War (London, 1927), 229. 55 Macksey, The Tank Pioneers (London, 1981), 83; Mearsheimer, LH, 39; LH in The Daily Telegraph, 28 Aug. 1925; rep. in The Remaking of Modem Armies (London, 1927), Ch. 5; Broad to LH, 29 june 1932, in 1/108; When Britain Goes to War, 265; and, somewhat misleadingly, in Memoirs, i.
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