DOCSLIB.ORG

An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September, 1944 Steven D

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September, 1944 Steven D Eastern Illinois University The Keep Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications 1997 An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September, 1944 Steven D. Rosson Eastern Illinois University This research is a product of the graduate program in History at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more about the program. Recommended Citation Rosson, Steven D., "An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September, 1944" (1997). Masters Theses. 1824. https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/1824 This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THESIS REPRODUCTION CERTIFICATE TO: Graduate Degree Candidates (who have written formal theses) SUBJECT: Permission to Reproduce Theses The University Library is rece1v1ng a number of requests from other institutions asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion in their library holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, we feel that professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained from the author before we allow theses to be copied. PLEASE SIGN ONE OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to lend my thesis to a reputable college or university for the purpose of copying it for inclusion in that institution's library or research holdings. 30 APR/99'7- Date I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University not allow my thesis to be reproduced because: Author Date An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation For Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September, 1944 (TITLE) BY Captain Steven D. Rosson United States Army THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Masters of Arts, History IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY CHARLESTON. ILLINOIS 1997 YEAR I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PAR f OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE 5 (A~~ /177 DA II . ABSTRACT The Allied defeat at Arnhem, Holland in September 1944 marked the end of one of the most bold and audacious, ground and airborne operations ever undertaken. Many military historian have incorrectly labeled Operation MARKET-GARDEN an intelligence failure. This statement is true only in so far as the Allied intelligence structure failed to persuade their commanders to alter the planned invasion despite the voluminous intelligence data acquired. But did these commander have hidden agendas which made intelligence almost irrelevant? The purpose of this research is to investigate the Allied, strategic and operational intelligence preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN and determine its adequacy. It also examines the political and military factors that caused the commanders failure to heed the intelligence warnings. The primary focus will be upon the British 1st Airborne Division and the battle for the Dutch town of Arnhem, however to properly examine operational situation one can not ignore the remainder of the First Allied Airborne Army and the ground forces of British XXX Corps. Although there are numerous studies of MARKET-GARDEN, few have focused on the intelligence situation leading to the battle. This study examines political and personal influences in the military command process and it has as important implications today as it did over fifty years ago. By September 1944, the Allies great march across Western Europe began to stall. With their logistical system tremendously overtaxed, the field armies struggled to continue offensive operations. The other great problem was a disagreement within the Supreme Command on how best to exploit their successes, and the apparent collapse of the German Western Group of Forces. The fundamental argument was between Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery, Eisenhower favoring a "Broad Front", while Montgomery was opting for a narrow flanking movement which would allow the Allies to roll-up the northern German forces and strike into the industrial Ruhr valley. It was out of this dynamic situation that Operation MARKET-GARDEN was born. Hastily planned, Operation MARKET-GARDEN was to combine airborne (MARKET) and ground (GARDEN) assaults on German­ occupied Holland. The plan called for the 1st Allied Airborne Army to seize bridges over major Dutch waterways up to Arnhem, after which XXX Corps would pass over these bridges and strike north. The operation was a failure because commanders at operational levels failed to heed the multitude of intelligence warnings indicating that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had relocated to the vicinity of Arnhem. The failure to properly direct the intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination can directly be attributed to the overwhelming desire to execute this operation, despite the apparent risks, held by British Generals Montgomery and Browning. Montgomery rightly believed that this was the last opportunity to attempt a "narrow front" approach to operations in the west. Driven by his belief in the narrow front strategy and a desire for personal and professional fame, Montgomery overtly ignored intelligence and allowed a hastily and inadequately planned operation to be executed, which resulted in the destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The research into the intelligence preparation for the battle of Arnhem has been a labor of love spanning over three years. The author wishes to express his gratitude to those individuals who assisted in the research and preparation of this work. My grateful thanks goes to Major B. Scott Hill, United States Army, who on three occasions accompanied me to the battlefield and openly offered copies of research materials, sound advice and generally shares the same passion for the battle of Arnhem. To Major Kevin Austra whose constant encouragement and joint battlefield research trips gave me a clearer understanding of the European Theater of Operations during World War Two. Particular thanks to Sir Brian Urquhart who through his correspondence provided an invaluable first hand insight into the command climate and intelligence planning process. An understanding of the Dutch underground activities preceding and during the battle was heightened by my conversations with Dr. Adrian Groneweg from the Hartenstein Airborne Museum in Oosterbeek. Similarly, the author wishes to thank Second Lieutenant Ron Watkins who painstakingly researched the Public Records Off ice in London for the missing pieces to the puzzle. Special thanks are also due to Lieutenant Colonel David C. Sims Jr., who not only served as a proof reader of the entire document, making laudable recommendations, but provided his encouragement and ensured appropriate relief from military duties to allow for completion of this project. To the members of my thesis committee, Ors. Wolfgang Schlauch and Joy Kammerling, a sincere appreciation for their expert advice and recommendations. For the committee chairman, Dr. Dan Hockman, I hold a personal fondness and professional admiration for his genuine concern for students and the instruction of military history. He was willing to provide sound technical advice pertaining to the strategic and operational military situation prior to and following MARKET-GARDEN. His encouragement, professionalism and constant availability to discuss issues of history shall not be forgotten. Finally, this work would never have been written if my wife Johanna had not been able to assume many of mundane tasks which seemed to previously occupy much of my free time. Her constant support for and toleration of a husband that would spend countless hours both physically and mentally in Arnhem is truly appreciated. Charleston, Illinois April 1997 CONTENTS Chapter I Introduction and Bibliographic Review Page l Chapter II Strategic Overview Page 14 Evolution of the Western Theater of Operation Page 14 Broad Front -vs- Narrow Front Strategy Page 20 MARKET-GARDEN The Plan Page 30 Chapter III Intelligence Collection Methods Page 33 Signals Intelligence Collection (SIGINT) Page 38 Human Intelligence Collection (HUMINT) Page 38 Imagery Intelligence Collection (IMINT) Page 42 Chapter IV Collllland Climate Page 48 Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination Page 57 Chapter v Conclusion and Pinal Analysis Page 67 Fate of the 1st Airborne Division Page 67 Final Analysis and Future Application Page 69 Appendix A (Map: Allied Troop Deployment) Page 73 Appendix B (Map: German Troop Deployment) Page 74 Appendix c (Figure 1: Chain of Coaunand) Page 75 Bibliography Page 76 ACKROWLBDGMBRTS The research into the intelligence preparation for the battle of Arnhem has been a labor of love spanning over three years. The author wishes to express his gratitude to those individuals who assisted in the research and preparation of this work. My grateful thanks goes to Major B. Scott Hill, United States Army, who on three occasions accompanied me to the battlefield and openly offered copies of research materials, sound advice and generally shares the same passion for the battle of Arnhem. To Major Kevin Austra whose constant encouragement and joint battlefield research trips gave me a clearer understanding of the European Theater of Operations during World War Two. Particular thanks to Sir Brian Urquhart who through his correspondence provided an invaluable first hand insight into the command climate and intelligence planning process. An understanding of the Dutch underground
Load more

Recommended publications
  • LEPT Study Tour Amsterdam, Arnhem, Rotterdam 12-14 May 2019
    Facilitating Electric Vehicle Uptake LEPT study tour Amsterdam, Arnhem, Rotterdam 12-14 May 2019 1 Background Organising the study tour The London European Partnership for Transport (LEPT) has sat within the London Councils Transport and Mobility team since 2006. LEPT’s function is to coordinate, disseminate and help promote the sustainable transport and mobility agenda for London and London boroughs in Europe. LEPT works with the 33 London boroughs and TfL to build upon European knowledge and best practice, helping cities to work together to deliver specific transport policies and initiatives, and providing better value to London. In the context of a wider strategy to deliver cleaner air and reduce the impact of road transport on Londoners’ health, one of London Councils’ pledges to Londoners is the upscaling of infrastructures dedicated to electric vehicles (EVs), to facili- tate their uptake. As part of its mission to support boroughs in delivering this pledge and the Mayor’s Transport Strategy, LEPT organised a study tour in May 2019 to allow borough officers to travel to the Netherlands to understand the factors that led the country’s cities to be among the world leaders in providing EV infrastructure. Eight funded positions were available for borough officers working on electric vehicles to join. Representatives from seven boroughs and one sub-regional partnership joined the tour as well as two officers from LEPT and an officer that worked closely on EV charging infrastructure from the London Councils Transport Policy team (Appendix 1). London boroughs London’s air pollution is shortening lives and improving air quality in the city is a priority for the London boroughs.
    [Show full text]
  • Blitzkrieg: the Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht's
    East Tennessee State University Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works 8-2021 Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era Briggs Evans East Tennessee State University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Evans, Briggs, "Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era" (2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3927. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/3927 This Thesis - unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era ________________________ A thesis presented to the faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in History ______________________ by Briggs Evans August 2021 _____________________ Dr. Stephen Fritz, Chair Dr. Henry Antkiewicz Dr. Steve Nash Keywords: Blitzkrieg, doctrine, operational warfare, American military, Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, World War II, Cold War, Soviet Union, Operation Desert Storm, AirLand Battle, Combined Arms Theory, mobile warfare, maneuver warfare. ABSTRACT Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era by Briggs Evans The evolution of United States military doctrine was heavily influenced by the Wehrmacht and their early Blitzkrieg campaigns during World War II.
    [Show full text]
  • Peacekeeping: the Way Ahead?
    INSTITUTEFOR NATIONAL STRATEGICSTUDIES PEACEKEEPING: THE WAY AHEAD? Contributors William H. Lewis John Mackinlay John G. Ruggie Sir Brian Urquhart Editor William H. Lewis NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY McNair Paper 25 A popular Government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people who mean to be their own Go vernors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY August 4, 1822 PEACEKEEPING: THE WAY AHEAD? Report of a Special Conference Contributors William H. Lewis John Mackinlay John G. Ruggie Sir Brian Urquhart Editor William H. Lewis McNair Paper 25 November 1993 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Washington, D.C. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY [] President: Lieutenant General Paul G. Cerjan [] Vice President: Ambassador Howard K. Walker INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES rn Acting Director: Stuart E. Johnson Publications Directorate [] Fort Le, ley J. McNair [] Washington, D.C. 20319--6000 [] Phone: (202) 475-1913 [] Fax: (202) 475-1012 [] Director: Frederick T. Kiley [] Deputy Director: Lieutenant Colonel Barry McQueen [] Chief, Publications Branch: George C. Maerz [] Editor: Mary A. SommerviUe 12 Secretary: Laura Hall [] Circulation Manager: Myma Morgan [] Editing: George C. Maerz [] Cover Design: Barry McQueen From time to time, INSS publishes short papers to provoke thought and inform discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the post-Cold War era. These monographs present current topics related to national security strategy and policy, defense resource man- agement, international affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, com- bined, and coalition operations.
    [Show full text]
  • World War Ii in Europe
    “THEIR SACRIFICE, OUR FREEDOM” WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE War in Europe Lesson Plans Recommended Level: High School Time Required: 5 Days Introduction This unit covers the European Theater. Preceding these lessons, the students have covered the rise of dictators and identified Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin. These lessons begin with Hitler’s seizure of territories and end with V-E Day in Europe, and covers five days. Part 1 of the video gives an excellent introduction or review of the steps leading to World War II. It is used as a review of foreign policy in the 1930’s through the Allied invasion of Africa and Sicily. Part 2 covers from D-Day to V-E Day and may also be used as an introduction or review. It is used as an introduction of U.S. troops fighting in Europe. Along with excellent video, eyewitness accounts and commentaries are presented by our veterans giving the added value of thoughts and details on what it was like to be there at that time and place. Materials • Video – “Their Sacrifice, Our Freedom: World War II in Europe” • Internet resources • Map of European Theater • Art supplies and poster board Unit Goals After completing this unit, students will be able to: 1. Label and identify Hitler’s seizure of territories in 1930’s 2. Identify participants in the Munich Conference and understand the effects of appeasement. 3. Describe U.S. neutrality efforts in the 1930’s. 4. Identify Churchill and Roosevelt and the goals of the Atlantic Charter. 5. List effects of the fall of France on U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States Airborne Divisions, and Their Role on June 6, 1944
    The Histories Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 3 The nitU ed States Airborne Divisions, and Their Role on June 6, 1944 Dennis Carey Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/the_histories Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Carey, Dennis () "The nitU ed States Airborne Divisions, and Their Role on June 6, 1944," The Histories: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. Available at: https://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/the_histories/vol6/iss1/3 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship at La Salle University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The iH stories by an authorized editor of La Salle University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Histories, Volume 6, Number 1 2 I The United States Airborne Divisions, and Their Role on June 6,1944 By Dennis Carey ‘07 The United States Airborne Divisions that were dropped behind Utah Beach in the early morning hours of June 6,1944 played a critical role in the eventual success of Operation Overlord. On the evening of June 5th, General Eisenhower visited the men of the 101st Airborne division as they geared up in preparation for their jump. In making his rounds among the troops giving his words of encouragement, a paratrooper remarked “Hell, we ain’t worried General. It’s the Krauts that ought to be worrying now.”1 This is just one example of the confidence and fortitude that the men of both the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions possessed on the eve of Operation Overlord.
    [Show full text]
  • Title: Study Visit Energy Transition in Arnhem Nijmegen City Region And
    Title: Study Visit Energy Transition in Arnhem Nijmegen City Region and the Cleantech Region Together with the Province of Gelderland and the AER, ERRIN Members Arnhem Nijmegen City Region and the Cleantech Region are organising a study visit on the energy transition in Gelderland (NL) to share and learn from each other’s experiences. Originally, the study visit was planned for October 31st-November 2nd 2017 but has now been rescheduled for April 17-19 2018. All ERRIN members are invited to participate and can find the new programme and registration form online. In order to ensure that as many regions benefit as possible, we kindly ask that delegations are limited to a maximum of 3 persons per region since there is a maximum of 20 spots available for the whole visit. Multistakeholder collaboration The main focus of the study visit, which will be organised in cooperation with other interregional networks, will be the Gelders’ Energy agreement (GEA). This collaboration between local and regional industries, governments and NGOs’ in the province of Gelderland, Netherlands, has pledged for the province to become energy-neutral by 2050. It facilitates a co-creative process where initiatives, actors, and energy are integrated into society. a A bottom-up approach The unique nature of the GEA resides in its origin. The initiative sprouted from society when it faced the complex, intricate problems of the energy transition. The three initiators were GNMF, the Gelders’ environmental protection association, het Klimaatverbond, a national climate association and Alliander, an energy network company. While the provincial government endorses the project, it is not a top-down initiative.
    [Show full text]
  • A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present
    CRM D0006297.A2/ Final July 2002 Charting the Pathway to OMFTS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations From 1941 to the Present Carter A. Malkasian 4825 Mark Center Drive • Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850 Approved for distribution: July 2002 c.. Expedit'onaryyystems & Support Team Integrated Systems and Operations Division This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Specific authority: N0014-00-D-0700. For copies of this document call: CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123. Copyright 0 2002 The CNA Corporation Contents Summary . 1 Introduction . 5 Methodology . 6 The U.S. Marine Corps’ new concept for forcible entry . 9 What is the purpose of amphibious warfare? . 15 Amphibious warfare and the strategic level of war . 15 Amphibious warfare and the operational level of war . 17 Historical changes in amphibious warfare . 19 Amphibious warfare in World War II . 19 The strategic environment . 19 Operational doctrine development and refinement . 21 World War II assault and area denial tactics. 26 Amphibious warfare during the Cold War . 28 Changes to the strategic context . 29 New operational approaches to amphibious warfare . 33 Cold war assault and area denial tactics . 35 Amphibious warfare, 1983–2002 . 42 Changes in the strategic, operational, and tactical context of warfare. 42 Post-cold war amphibious tactics . 44 Conclusion . 46 Key factors in the success of OMFTS. 49 Operational pause . 49 The causes of operational pause . 49 i Overcoming enemy resistance and the supply buildup.
    [Show full text]
  • Rustin Military Collection
    Richard Rustin Military Books Donated 3 October 2009 THE RUSTIN MILITARY COLLECTION The Rustin Military Collection consists of nearly a thousand military books and periodicals collected by Richard E. Rustin during his lifetime. His wife, Ginette Rustin, donated this collection from his estate to the Archive Center and Genealogy Department, Indian River County Main Library, in October 2009 – April 2010. Richard E. Rustin passed away July, 2008. His wife considered him a genius regarding military history. He was a brilliant writer, a former reporter, manager and assistant chief of the New York news bureau. He edited coverage at the heart of the Wall Street Journal’s financial and economic news operations. He served in the U. S. Navy as an officer from 1956 to 1959. The focus of his collection centered on World War I and World War II. The collection also includes books on the Revolutionary War, Civil War, Mexican War, Korean War, and Viet Nam War, among others. Regimental histories and books of detailed campaigns, military science, military equipment and biography predominate. The library is very fortunate to have such a magnificent research collection containing many rare, out of print and hard to find volumes. It should be of great interest to anyone exploring military history. To date, the complete collection has been processed and is available to the public in the Genealogy Department. Use the online catalog at http://www.irclibrary.org or browse the list below. Title Author Publ Date 106th Cavalry Group in Europe J. P. Himmer Co. 1945 10th Royal Hussars in the Second World War 1939-45 Dawnay, D., etc.
    [Show full text]
  • To Revel in God's Sunshine
    To Revel in God’s Sunshine The Story of RSM J C Lord MVO MBE Compiled by Richard Alford and Colleagues of RSM J C Lord © R ALFORD 1981 First Edition Published in 1981 Second Edition Published Electronically in 2013 Cover Pictures Front - Regimental Sergeant Major J C Lord in front of the Grand Entrance to the Old Building, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Rear - Army Core Values To Revel in God’s Sunshine The Story of the Army Career of the late Academy Sergeant Major J.C. Lord MVO MBE As related by former Recruits, Cadets, Comrades and Friends Compiled by Richard Alford (2nd Edition - Edited by Maj P.E. Fensome R IRISH and Lt Col (Retd) A.M.F. Jelf) John Lord firmly believed the words of Emerson: “Trust men and they will be true to you. Treat them greatly and they will show themselves great.” Dedicated to SOLDIERS SOLDIERS WHO TRAIN SOLDIERS SOLDIERS WHO LEAD SOLDIERS The circumstances of many contributors to this book will have changed during the course of research and publication, and apologies are extended for any out of date information given in relation to rank and appointment. i John Lord when Regimental Sergeant Major The Parachute Regiment Infantry Training Centre ii CONTENTS 2ND EDITION Introduction General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen – CGS v Foreword WO1 A.J. Stokes COLDM GDS – AcSM R M A Sandhurst vi Editor’s Note Major P.E Fensome R IRISH vii To Revel in God’s Sunshine Introduction The Royal British Legion Annual Parade at R.M.A Sandhurst viii Chapter 1 The Grenadier Guards, Brighton Police Force 1 Chapter 2 Royal Military College, Sandhurst.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Introduction
    Notes 1 Introduction 1. Donald Macintyre, Narvik (London: Evans, 1959), p. 15. 2. See Olav Riste, The Neutral Ally: Norway’s Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965). 3. Reflections of the C-in-C Navy on the Outbreak of War, 3 September 1939, The Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–45 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 37–38. 4. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 10 October 1939, in ibid. p. 47. 5. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 8 December 1939, Minutes of a Conference with Herr Hauglin and Herr Quisling on 11 December 1939 and Report of the C-in-C Navy, 12 December 1939 in ibid. pp. 63–67. 6. MGFA, Nichols Bohemia, n 172/14, H. W. Schmidt to Admiral Bohemia, 31 January 1955 cited by Francois Kersaudy, Norway, 1940 (London: Arrow, 1990), p. 42. 7. See Andrew Lambert, ‘Seapower 1939–40: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (1994), pp. 86–108. 8. For the importance of Swedish iron ore see Thomas Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1981). 9. Churchill, The Second World War, I, p. 463. 10. See Richard Wiggan, Hunt the Altmark (London: Hale, 1982). 11. TMI, Tome XV, Déposition de l’amiral Raeder, 17 May 1946 cited by Kersaudy, p. 44. 12. Kersaudy, p. 81. 13. Johannes Andenæs, Olav Riste and Magne Skodvin, Norway and the Second World War (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1966), p.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Market Garden WWII
    Operation Market Garden WWII Operation Market Garden (17–25 September 1944) was an Allied military operation, fought in the Netherlands and Germany in the Second World War. It was the largest airborne operation up to that time. The operation plan's strategic context required the seizure of bridges across the Maas (Meuse River) and two arms of the Rhine (the Waal and the Lower Rhine) as well as several smaller canals and tributaries. Crossing the Lower Rhine would allow the Allies to outflank the Siegfried Line and encircle the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland. It made large-scale use of airborne forces, whose tactical objectives were to secure a series of bridges over the main rivers of the German- occupied Netherlands and allow a rapid advance by armored units into Northern Germany. Initially, the operation was marginally successful and several bridges between Eindhoven and Nijmegen were captured. However, Gen. Horrocks XXX Corps ground force's advance was delayed by the demolition of a bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal, as well as an extremely overstretched supply line, at Son, delaying the capture of the main road bridge over the Meuse until 20 September. At Arnhem, the British 1st Airborne Division encountered far stronger resistance than anticipated. In the ensuing battle, only a small force managed to hold one end of the Arnhem road bridge and after the ground forces failed to relieve them, they were overrun on 21 September. The rest of the division, trapped in a small pocket west of the bridge, had to be evacuated on 25 September. The Allies had failed to cross the Rhine in sufficient force and the river remained a barrier to their advance until the offensives at Remagen, Oppenheim, Rees and Wesel in March 1945.
    [Show full text]
  • Dutch Military Landscapes Heritage and Archaeology on WWII Conflict Sites
    Dutch Military Landscapes Heritage and Archaeology on WWII conflict sites Max VAN DER SCHRIEK Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Abstract: In the Netherlands, archaeological research concerning World War II (WWII) is not very well explored compared with the neighboring countries. Its key methodologies were developed already in the 1980s in the United States, where both specialized field techniques (such as advanced metal detectors) and methods for analysis like Geographical Information Systems (GIS) were administered to locate specific artefacts and to map and reconstruct military strategies and other war events. Dutch (conflict) archaeologists still need to develop, practice and reflect international developments in the subject area to learn from the experiences of colleagues abroad. Individual archaeologists participated in the research out of personal interest and/or a particular personal commitment to the features and artefacts they came across during excavations. However, there are still large differences in the approach to the archaeology of WWII between the various commercial excavation companies, provincial administration and municipalities. Even when recording has been systematically undertaken, there have sometimes been administrative, conservation, and legal difficulties in dealing with WWII conflict sites in the Netherlands. Modern Conflict Archaeology plays a vital role with regard to the preservation of these sites and relics. There are several non-invasive approaches and techniques which we can use without any juridical problems, for example KOCOA (Key terrain, Obstacles, Cover and concealment, Observation and fields of fire, Avenues of approach), an established approach to military analysis, and the application of LiDAR (Li ght Detection And Ranging), a remote sensing technology which can provide a detailed digital elevation model of a landscape.
    [Show full text]