Eastern Illinois University The Keep Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications 1997 An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September, 1944 Steven D. Rosson Eastern Illinois University This research is a product of the graduate program in History at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more about the program. Recommended Citation Rosson, Steven D., "An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September, 1944" (1997). Masters Theses. 1824. https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/1824 This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 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Rosson United States Army THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Masters of Arts, History IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY CHARLESTON. ILLINOIS 1997 YEAR I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PAR f OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE 5 (A~~ /177 DA II . ABSTRACT The Allied defeat at Arnhem, Holland in September 1944 marked the end of one of the most bold and audacious, ground and airborne operations ever undertaken. Many military historian have incorrectly labeled Operation MARKET-GARDEN an intelligence failure. This statement is true only in so far as the Allied intelligence structure failed to persuade their commanders to alter the planned invasion despite the voluminous intelligence data acquired. But did these commander have hidden agendas which made intelligence almost irrelevant? The purpose of this research is to investigate the Allied, strategic and operational intelligence preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN and determine its adequacy. It also examines the political and military factors that caused the commanders failure to heed the intelligence warnings. The primary focus will be upon the British 1st Airborne Division and the battle for the Dutch town of Arnhem, however to properly examine operational situation one can not ignore the remainder of the First Allied Airborne Army and the ground forces of British XXX Corps. Although there are numerous studies of MARKET-GARDEN, few have focused on the intelligence situation leading to the battle. This study examines political and personal influences in the military command process and it has as important implications today as it did over fifty years ago. By September 1944, the Allies great march across Western Europe began to stall. With their logistical system tremendously overtaxed, the field armies struggled to continue offensive operations. The other great problem was a disagreement within the Supreme Command on how best to exploit their successes, and the apparent collapse of the German Western Group of Forces. The fundamental argument was between Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery, Eisenhower favoring a "Broad Front", while Montgomery was opting for a narrow flanking movement which would allow the Allies to roll-up the northern German forces and strike into the industrial Ruhr valley. It was out of this dynamic situation that Operation MARKET-GARDEN was born. Hastily planned, Operation MARKET-GARDEN was to combine airborne (MARKET) and ground (GARDEN) assaults on German­ occupied Holland. The plan called for the 1st Allied Airborne Army to seize bridges over major Dutch waterways up to Arnhem, after which XXX Corps would pass over these bridges and strike north. The operation was a failure because commanders at operational levels failed to heed the multitude of intelligence warnings indicating that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had relocated to the vicinity of Arnhem. The failure to properly direct the intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination can directly be attributed to the overwhelming desire to execute this operation, despite the apparent risks, held by British Generals Montgomery and Browning. Montgomery rightly believed that this was the last opportunity to attempt a "narrow front" approach to operations in the west. Driven by his belief in the narrow front strategy and a desire for personal and professional fame, Montgomery overtly ignored intelligence and allowed a hastily and inadequately planned operation to be executed, which resulted in the destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The research into the intelligence preparation for the battle of Arnhem has been a labor of love spanning over three years. The author wishes to express his gratitude to those individuals who assisted in the research and preparation of this work. My grateful thanks goes to Major B. Scott Hill, United States Army, who on three occasions accompanied me to the battlefield and openly offered copies of research materials, sound advice and generally shares the same passion for the battle of Arnhem. To Major Kevin Austra whose constant encouragement and joint battlefield research trips gave me a clearer understanding of the European Theater of Operations during World War Two. Particular thanks to Sir Brian Urquhart who through his correspondence provided an invaluable first hand insight into the command climate and intelligence planning process. An understanding of the Dutch underground activities preceding and during the battle was heightened by my conversations with Dr. Adrian Groneweg from the Hartenstein Airborne Museum in Oosterbeek. Similarly, the author wishes to thank Second Lieutenant Ron Watkins who painstakingly researched the Public Records Off ice in London for the missing pieces to the puzzle. Special thanks are also due to Lieutenant Colonel David C. Sims Jr., who not only served as a proof reader of the entire document, making laudable recommendations, but provided his encouragement and ensured appropriate relief from military duties to allow for completion of this project. To the members of my thesis committee, Ors. Wolfgang Schlauch and Joy Kammerling, a sincere appreciation for their expert advice and recommendations. For the committee chairman, Dr. Dan Hockman, I hold a personal fondness and professional admiration for his genuine concern for students and the instruction of military history. He was willing to provide sound technical advice pertaining to the strategic and operational military situation prior to and following MARKET-GARDEN. His encouragement, professionalism and constant availability to discuss issues of history shall not be forgotten. Finally, this work would never have been written if my wife Johanna had not been able to assume many of mundane tasks which seemed to previously occupy much of my free time. Her constant support for and toleration of a husband that would spend countless hours both physically and mentally in Arnhem is truly appreciated. Charleston, Illinois April 1997 CONTENTS Chapter I Introduction and Bibliographic Review Page l Chapter II Strategic Overview Page 14 Evolution of the Western Theater of Operation Page 14 Broad Front -vs- Narrow Front Strategy Page 20 MARKET-GARDEN The Plan Page 30 Chapter III Intelligence Collection Methods Page 33 Signals Intelligence Collection (SIGINT) Page 38 Human Intelligence Collection (HUMINT) Page 38 Imagery Intelligence Collection (IMINT) Page 42 Chapter IV Collllland Climate Page 48 Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination Page 57 Chapter v Conclusion and Pinal Analysis Page 67 Fate of the 1st Airborne Division Page 67 Final Analysis and Future Application Page 69 Appendix A (Map: Allied Troop Deployment) Page 73 Appendix B (Map: German Troop Deployment) Page 74 Appendix c (Figure 1: Chain of Coaunand) Page 75 Bibliography Page 76 ACKROWLBDGMBRTS The research into the intelligence preparation for the battle of Arnhem has been a labor of love spanning over three years. The author wishes to express his gratitude to those individuals who assisted in the research and preparation of this work. My grateful thanks goes to Major B. Scott Hill, United States Army, who on three occasions accompanied me to the battlefield and openly offered copies of research materials, sound advice and generally shares the same passion for the battle of Arnhem. To Major Kevin Austra whose constant encouragement and joint battlefield research trips gave me a clearer understanding of the European Theater of Operations during World War Two. Particular thanks to Sir Brian Urquhart who through his correspondence provided an invaluable first hand insight into the command climate and intelligence planning process. An understanding of the Dutch underground