Strategic Communications in Crisis: How East Asian Governments Responded to the Covid-19 Pandemic

978-9934-564-77-2

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS IN CRISIS: HOW EAST ASIAN GOVERNMENTS RESPONDED TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC Published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence ISBN: 978-9934-564-77-2 Authors: Rueban Manokara, Kristina Van Sant, Monika Hanley, Marina Paramonova, Henrik Twetman Contributor: Rolf Fredheim Copy editing: Anna Reynolds Design: Kārlis Ulmanis

Riga, May 2020 NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalnciema Iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter: @stratcomcoe

This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here do not represent the views of NATO. Contents

Introduction �� 4 Case study: Singapore �� 32 Country Overview �� 32 Methodology �� 6 COVID-19 Cases �� 33 COVID-19 Cases �� 6 Policy Responses �� 33 Policy Responses �� 6 Government Communications Activities �� 34 Government Communications Activities �� 7 Levels of Interest and Anxiety �� 36 Levels of Interest and Anxiety �� 8 Subsequent Key Developments �� 36 Comparative analysis �� 9 Endnotes �� 38 Policy Responses �� 10 Government Communications Activities �� 11 Effects on Behaviour Patterns �� 13 Conclusion �� 13 Case study: Japan �� 15 Country Overview �� 15 COVID-19 Cases �� 16 Policy Responses �� 17 Government Communications Activities �� 18 Levels of Interest and Anxiety �� 19 Subsequent Key Developments �� 20 Case study: Malaysia �� 21 Country Overview �� 21 COVID-19 Cases �� 22 Policy Responses �� 22 Government Communications Activities �� 23 Levels of Interest and Anxiety �� 24 Subsequent Key Developments �� 25 Case study: South Korea �� 26 Country Overview �� 26 COVID-19 Cases �� 27 Policy Responses �� 28 Government Communications Activities �� 29 Levels of Interest and Anxiety �� 31 Subsequent Key Developments �� 31

�� 3 INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 outbreak has confirmed explores how countries chose to act and that, in an era of globalisation, local communicate in relation to the outbreak disasters quickly and unexpectedly of the virus during the initial period of the escalate into world-spanning crises. What crisis. Although it is still far too early to began as a local viral infection in Wuhan evaluate the effectiveness of any approach, grew into a global pandemic in less than comparing and contrasting different courses two months. The COVID-19 crisis is an of action at an early stage provides valuable unprecedented event in almost every way, insight into different crisis communication not least from a strategic communications strategies when swift and unanticipated perspective. Faced with uncertainty about communications were required. the development of the virus and its impact on society, governments are under For this purpose, four countries in Asia enormous pressure to communicate policy were selected for study: Japan, South initiatives and advice to their publics under Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia. East Asian extraordinary circumstances. countries were hit by the COVID-19 virus at an early stage of the pandemic and While recognising that the crisis is still have been regarded as ‘first responders’ unfolding at a global level, this report because they were relatively unconditioned

4 �� by other countries’ responses to the crisis. to strategic communications and their To capture official responses during the effects on patterns of behaviour. The report initial period of the pandemic, we collected ends with a discussion about the potential data on the policy actions and government effects of the observed responses and communications enacted in each country provides a general overview of the COVID-19 throughout the period 2 January 2020 to situation in each country. 17 February 2020.

Information availability was a key factor in case selection; for the most part, information about the responses and communications of these countries is openly available in English. These four countries are also excellent cases for study because they represent a cross-section of East Asia in terms of variables relevant from a communications perspective. Singapore stands out with a GDP per capita more than 5 times that of Malaysia,1 high levels of trust in government (70%),2 and relatively high levels of trust in news (42%), internet penetration (84%), and social media participation (79%).3 At the other end of the spectrum, Malaysia is characterised by lower economic prosperity,4 lower trust in government (58%)5 and news (31%), and lower internet penetration (78%).6 Japan and South Korea share similar numbers in terms of GDP per capita7 and internet penetration (93%),8 but diverge in terms of government trust (43% versus 51%)9 and trust in news (39% versus 22%).10

The structure of this report is as follows. First, we discuss our methodological framework, followed by a comparison of policy actions and communications activities to illustrate different approaches

�� 5 METHODOLOGY

Our research addresses how different health security is based on the Global Health governments respond to a pandemic in Security Index,13 which measures health its initial phase—in this case, 2 January security as an aggregate of 6 categories. to 17 February—and whether particular strategic communications approaches COVID-19 Cases had an effect on COVID-19 anxiety among their respective populations. To assess While we recognise that the intensity government response, we chose to consider of national policy and communications four key variables in each case study: the responses also play a part, the number of number and nature of COVID-19 cases, the local COVID-19 cases within each country policy responses during the monitoring represent the reality, and likely affect period, the communications activities levels of anxiety within the population. enacted by governments, and the levels of In compiling information about the local interest in and anxiety about the virus. A cases, we looked at the detection of the comprehensive explanation of each variable first case and tracked the rate of escalation is provided below. of cases throughout the monitoring period. We also assessed additional indicators Additionally, our analysis includes an that might have contributed to differing assessment of the level of emergency levels of concern between countries, such health preparedness in each country. as the number of deaths within the period This assessment relies, in part, on five and the likelihood of cases to be imported national indicators: trust in government, from China, which is represented by the transparency of government, trust in media, estimated number of Chinese tourist visitor health security, and internet penetration. arrivals in the country per year. Data about trust in government is derived from the Edelman Trust Barometer, which Policy Responses is published on a yearly basis. Government transparency is measured by Transparency We refer to the NATO Strategic International’s Corruption Perceptions Communications Terminology definition Index.11 In order to evaluate trust in of strategic communications, defined as a news and levels of internet penetration, holistic approach to communications, based we referred to the Digital News Report on values and interests, that encompasses published by the Reuters Institute and the everything an actor does to achieve University of Oxford.12 Finally, our figure for objectives in a contested environment.14 By

6 �� this definition, everything communicates— communications and levels of interest and including policy initiatives. Adapting the anxiety within the population. methodology used by the Blavatnik School of Governance’s working paper on the variation Government Communications Activities in Government responses to COVID-19,15 we clustered policy initiatives adopted by the To collect data about government countries studied into 7 clusters—School communications, we referred to official closing, Workplace closing, Cancel public government websites, federal agency events, Public information campaigns, websites, state news agencies, and other Restrictions on internal movements, English-language resources. We studied International travel controls, and Emergency three main indicators. First, we identified the investment in health care. The intensity most frequent government communicator of policy initiatives within each cluster for each country as a percentage of was then graded according to a scale communications put out by all government (elaborated in Table 1). We also studied bodies in relation to COVID-19. Second, the frequency of policy initiatives over the while recognising that more is not always monitoring period to assess their intensity better, we assessed the intensity of within sub-periods as a possible indicator of government communications per day correlation with the intensity of government related to COVID-19 by the number of

Policy Cluster Grading scale

School closing

Workplace closing 0 – No measures 1 – Recommend closing 2 – Require closing

Cancel public events

Public information campaigns 0 – No measures 1 – General campaign 2 – Targeted campaign

Restrictions on internal 0 – No measures 1 – Screening movements 2 – Recommend movement restriction 3 – Restrict movement

0 – No measures 1 – Screening International travel controls 2 – Quarantine imposed 3 - Ban imposed

Emergency investment 0 – No measures 1 – Preparing healthcare workers in health care 2 – Protecting vulnerable groups 3 – Expanding healthcare facilities

Table 1: Grading scheme for policy initiatives does not match the rest of the document

�� 7 communicators putting out communiques. And third, wherever possible, we tracked the medium of government communication (e.g. press releases, media interviews etc.) within the monitoring period. In doing so, we assessed the broad communications strategy adopted by each State.

Levels of Interest and Anxiety

We used survey data from Black Box Research, a communications research company based in Singapore, to determine the level of anxiety amongst the local population of nine Asian countries over the period of 14–17 February.16 We also assessed the level of interest in the outbreak by examining the number of google searches related to COVID-19 over the monitoring period (using the search terms coronavirus, COVID, and COVID-19).

8 �� ComparativeCOMPARATIVE Analysis ANALYSIS After gathering the data on each of the selected indicators, we carried out a comparative study of our four country cases. As is depicted in the radar graph below, South Korea and Singapore had After gathering the data on each of the COVID-19 cases and levels of anxiety varied significantlyselected higher indicators, levels of wepolicy carried intensity out than aJapan andconsiderably Malaysia. between Singapore, countries. Japan, andGiven Malaysia that had comparativevery similar intensitiesstudy of our of four government country cases. communications the COVID-19 activities, pandemicwhich were was all lowercompletely than the intensityAs is of depicted South Korea’sin the radar communication graph below, strategy.South Thenovel number at the of timetotal forCOVID both- 19the cases general and public levels of anxietyKorea varied and Singapore considerably had betweensignificantly countries. higher Givenand that federal the COVID governments,-19 pandemic and wasthere completely was a novellevels at the of time policy for bothintensity the general than Japan public and federalgeneral governments, lack of information and there aboutwas a the general severity lack Malaysia. Singapore, Japan, and Malaysia of the situation, we assumed that individuals of information about the severity of the situation, we assumed that individuals would be more anxious had very similar intensities of government would be more anxious about the possibility about the possibility of contracting COVID-19 as the number of confirmed cases escalated in each communications activities, which were all of contracting COVID-19 as the number of respectivelower country. than the intensity of South Korea’s confirmed cases escalated in each respective communication strategy. The number of total country.

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�� 9 We therefore hypothesised that higher Malaysia adopted late but intense policy numbers of COVID-19 infections would lead responses upon confirmation of its first few to correspondingly high levels of anxiety local cases. However, this early intensity about the virus in each country. However, quickly tapered off as policy responses our comparative analysis did not find a lagged behind the escalating number of positive correlation between the volume cases. Japan, in contrast, was markedly low of COVID-19 cases and levels of anxiety. on both speed and intensity of responses, The case of Singapore illustrates this, as it despite their close proximity to China, displayed the highest number of confirmed early detection of local cases, and steadily cases outside of China while maintaining increasing number of cases. relatively low levels of anxiety. In contrast, Malaysia exhibited elevated levels of The levels of interest and anxiety anxiety despite having the lowest numbers appearing in the surveys for each country of COVID-19 cases amongst the countries are inversely correlated with the intensity studied. This finding fuelled further analysis of policy responses adopted, regardless of the effects of policy responses and of the actual number of confirmed government communications activities on COVID-19 cases. While having a relatively pandemic-related anxiety in the general high number of cases and a much lower population. rate of trust in government, the data for South Korea indicated the lowest levels Policy Responses of COVID-19 anxiety. The South Korean government reacted proactively, enacting Singapore and South Korea both launched policy responses in all policy clusters policy initiatives relatively early, shortly as they restricted international travel, after China announced local clusters of provided access to healthcare, bolstered severe pneumonia cases. South Korea health facilities throughout the country, and was first to respond with policy action and maintained a transparent communications maintained a high level of policy response strategy. These measures likely reassured intensity throughout January despite having South Koreans that their government a relatively low number of cases (15 in was adopting all necessary measures to total). Singapore was initially slightly more address COVID-19. We observed a similar cautious in its policy response, opting for situation in Singapore, where levels of equally early but more nuanced measures interest in and anxiety about the outbreak until the first local clusters were confirmed. were low despite having the highest number of confirmed cases outside China. Conversely, policy responses from Malaysia Though Singapore already benefits from and Japan were initiated later, more than high levels of trust in government and three weeks after their regional neighbours. media, the robustness and holistic nature

10 �� We therefore hypothesised that higher numbers of COVID-19 infections would lead to correspondingly high levels of anxiety about the virus in each country. However, our comparative analysis did not find a positive correlation between the volume of COVID-19 cases and levels of anxiety. The case of Singapore illustrates this, as it displayed the highest number of confirmed cases outside of China while maintaining relatively low levels of anxiety. In contrast, Malaysia exhibited elevated levels of anxiety despite having the lowest numbers of COVID-19 cases amongst the countries studied. This finding fuelled further analysis of the effects of policy responses and government communications activities on pandemic-related anxiety in the general population.

Policy Responses

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Singapore and South Korea both launched policy initiatives relatively early, shortly after China of its policy responses may have increased Government Communications Activities announcedconfidence local domestically. clusters of severe pneumonia cases. South Korea was first to respond with policy action and maintained a high level of policy responseReflecting intensity throughout its approach January to policy despite responses, having a relativelyCorrespondingly, low number the of Malaysiancases (15 government’sin total). Singapore Singaporean was initially slightlyauthorities more cautiouscommunicated in its policy late policy responses likely influenced about the outbreak early, with Japan, the relatively higher levels of interest and South Korea, and Malaysia following suit anxiety exhibited by the population. Despite two weeks later. The decision of Japan authorising a minimalist policy response, and Malaysia to delay communications Japan exhibited lower levels of interest and may have been in an attempt to prevent anxiety regarding the COVID-19 outbreak. panic in the general public and to prolong This may be attributed to socio-cultural economic security, particularly in Japan, factors, such as a homogeneous population, where the 2020 Olympics were due to be broader social resilience, and generally held. Similarly in Malaysia, as late as the high levels of social distancing and use of first week of February, Tourism Malaysia facemasks. declared that Malaysia was a safe place to travel to and was well equipped to deal with the outbreak.

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The communications strategy adopted communicate on almost all matters related Reflectingby each its countryapproach differed to policy depending responses, on Singaporeanto the virus. authorities Information communicated related to about other the outbreaklocal early,context. with SouthJapan, Korea,South Korea,which and had Malaysia areas, following such suit as two manpower weeks later. and The business decisions of theserecently governments dealt with to an delay outbreak their COVID of MERS-19 informationmatters, campaig werens also may put have out been by inthe an attempttask to preventin 2015, panic employed in the generala much public more and intense to prolong economicforce. Like security, Singapore, particularly Malaysia in Japan,chose notwhere the communications2020 Olympics were strategy, due to be flooding held. Similarly the in Malaysia,to centralise as thelate flow as the of informationfirst week of throughFebruary, Tourisminformation Malaysia environment declared that with Malaysia a high volume was a safe placethe executive; to travel tothe and government was well equipped passed thisto deal of communiques from executive officials task to the Ministry of Health. with the outbreak. and various government agencies informing

and reassuring the public. Similar to South South Korea’s fervent approach to TheKorea, communications information strategy about adopted the COVID-19 by each countrycommunications differed depending appeared on localto reduce context. public South Korea,outbreak which inhad Japan recently was dealt circulated with an outbreakby the of MERSfear, asin 20their15, employedpopulation a muchreported more intenseless communicationsexecutive. In strategy,contrast, flooding Singapore the informationelected environmentanxiety about with the a high virus. volume Nevertheless, of communiques when fromfor executive its specialised officials COVID-19and various task government force to agenciescompared informing with and the reassuring other three the public.countries, Similar to South Korea, information about the COVID-19 outbreak in Japan was circulated by the executive.

12 �� the intensity of government communication responses. We recognise that certain alone displayed much less correlation with policies enacted throughout this period may levels of anxiety. This is demonstrated in have directly impacted the movement of Malaysia, which observed higher levels of individuals. However, our findings indicate In contrast,anxiety Singapore despite reaching elected forequally its specialised high levels COVID that-19 taskpolicy force responses to communicate and communications on almost all mattersof relatedcommunications to the virus. within Information the monitoring related to otheractivities areas, maysuch have as manpowerhad an additional and business effect matters,period were and also having put out a relativelyby the task low force. number Like of Singapore, on the Malaysia reduction chose of notmovement to centralise during the this flow COVID-19 cases. crisis situation. Specifically, a combination of information through the executive; it passed the task to the Ministry of Health. of robust communications activities and

Effects on Behaviour Patterns policy responses can achieve both desired South Korea’s fervent approach to communications appeacognitivered to reduce and behavioural public fear, effects. as their population reportedWe lessanalysed anxiety changes about inthe rates virus. of Nevertheless,movement when compared with the other three countries, the intensityduring theof government monitoring communicationperiod in order alone to displayedConclusion much less correlation with levels of anxietyassess. This iswhether demonstrated policy in Malaysiaresponses, which and observing higher levels of anxiety despite reaching equallygovernment high levels ofcommunications communications were within linked the monitoring While period the COVID-19and having pandemic a relatively continues low number to 17 of COVIDto patterns-19 cases. of behaviour. Interestingly, challenge societies around the world, this we observed a negative correlation report sheds light on how governments

between movement rates, the intensity responded to and communicated about Effectsof communications on Behaviour activities, Patterns and policy the viral crisis during the initial period.

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�� 13 Policymakers and national institutions the socio-cultural context, emergency typically employ strategic communications preparedness, and government practice strategies to support a common goal. within that particular country. Nevertheless, Our research indicates that strategic given the unprecedented nature of this communications approaches, both health crisis, national institutions should traditional communications and policy emphasise cooperation in a pan-government responses, have an influential effect on effort to better learn from one another behaviour and perceptions, even in the and identify best practices for the future. midst of a global crisis. Ultimately, this would raise both national and global responses to unforeseen health Our comparative analysis of the four case crises to a higher standard. studies revealed less correlation between the number of confirmed infections and the behaviours and perceptions of affected populations than we had expected. In fact, we observed the opposite in Malaysia, where the population exhibited high levels of anxiety despite having the smallest share of COVID-19 cases among the countries studied. Of the four countries, Japan was the only outlier where levels of anxiety remained low despite a relatively muted policy response. However, this anomalous case may be attributable to Japan’s long- standing culture of hygiene, which emerged in the 20th century after the country had been affected by several flu pandemics. Our study indicates that governments should implement a comprehensive communications strategy regarding standards of hygiene in tandem with an equally robust policy response in order to manage a health crisis effectively.

Despite our findings, we acknowledge that there is no one best strategy for all governments. The crisis response strategy a country adopts is highly dependent on

14 �� CASE STUDY: JAPAN

Country Overview factors, mask wearing has grown to a year- round practice. From 2008 to 2018, mask With a population of 128.6 million, the production rose from 1.8 billion to 5.5 billion island country of Japan is one of the most showing a steady rise in the trend prior to homogeneous in the world. Japan has a COVID-19.19 This habit, already in place, has high-context culture, with strong behavioural led researchers to conclude that Japan saw norms dictating communications, often a slower initial rise of COVID-19 cases due leading to less direct, but more respectful to a high level of hygienic standards and communication, relying on the public to practices, along with common access to do what is best for society, instead of and wearing of face masks.20 Casemandating Studies: changes outright. In18 Depth Japan has a long history of wearing face masks, Japan has seen a decline in trust in stemming from the flu pandemic in the early government, the lowest figure of the 1900s, as well as a second pandemic in countries in this report at 43%.21 The past 1934. A resurgence in mask wearing came few years Japan has seen a decline in

Japanduring the SARS outbreak and has continued trust in institutions, as well as growing to present day. Combined with a growing pessimism about the future. The sharpest Countryawareness Overviewof pollution and environmental decline in trust was noted after the

Ͳ ʹͲ ͶͲ ͸Ͳ ͺͲ ͳͲͲ ȀͳͲͲ With a population of 128.6 million, the island country of Japan is one of the most homogeneous in the world. Japan �� has a high-context culture, with strong behavioural norms dictating communications, 15 often leading to less direct, but more respectful communication, relying on the public to do what is best for society, instead of mandating changes outright.18 Japan has a long history of wearing face masks, stemming from the flu pandemic in the early 1900s, as well as a second pandemic in 1934. A resurgence in mask wearing came during the SARS outbreak and has continued. Combined with a growing awareness of pollution and environmental factors, mask wearing has grown to a year-round practice. From 2008 to 2018, mask production rose from 1.8 billion to 5.5 billion showing a steady rise in the trend prior to COVID-19.19 This habit, already in place, has led researchers to conclude that

18 https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/-covid-19-did-not-change-much-in-japan-s-daily-life-/1819015 19 https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00647/demand-for-disposable-face-masks-pushes-japanese- production-above-4-billion-annually.html and https://www.statista.com/statistics/712476/japan-face-masks- production-volume/ Fukushima disaster of 2012, from which tourists per year, 2.6 million in January the country has not yet recovered. Japan alone,23 Japan’s first case involved a man has a high level of internet penetration, from China who had travelled to Wuhan, as well as one of the highest GDPs in the followed by two more Chinese nationals region after Singapore. Regarding trust in visiting from the same region.24 Community the news, Japan ranks lower than average, transmission was soon apparent with and trust in business is also low. Similar to the first non-traveller case reported on the communications and policy responses 28 January. Despite the development of employed now, Japan’s reaction to the community transmission, along with the JapanSARS saw crisis a slower of 2003 initial created rise ofa baselineCOVID-19 for cases highdue tonumber a high oflevel annual of hygienic Chinese standards tourists and practices,its pandemic along with preparedness. common access The Japaneseto and wearing toof faceJapan, masks. initial20 response was slow. government ordered Chinese visa applicants Preventative measures to stem community Japanto presenthas seen a a health decline certificate, in trust in government,as well as thespread lowest were figure announced of the countries on 25 February,in this report by at 43%.enhancing21 The past airport few yearsquarantine Japan procedures, has seen a declinewhich in pointtrust therein institutio were alreadyns, as 140well cases.as growing and instituting temperature checks.22 pessimism about the future. The sharpest decline in trust was noted after the Fukushima disaster of However, in 2003, there were only about During the reporting period, in the first 30 days 2012,449,000 from whichyearly the visitors country from has notChina. yet recovered.That since Japan the has initial a high case level wasof internet detected, penetration, the as wellfigure as onehas sinceof the grownhighest to GDPs over 8.9 millionin the region in afternumber Singapore. of cases Regarding slowly trustincreased, in the exhibitingnews, Japan ranks2019. lower than average, and trust in business is alsoa muchlow. Similar flatter tocurve the communicwhen comparedations to and China policy responses employed now, Japan’s reaction to the SARS(excluding crisis theof 2003Diamond created Princess a baseline cruise for its pandemicCOVID-19 preparedness. Cases The Japanese governmentcases). ordered ChineseBy 17 February, visa applicants Japan toreported present a health certificate, as well as enhancing airport quarantine65 cases, procedures, fewer than and its institut neighboursing temperature in the Japan was the first country to officially same time period. Notably, Japan’s practice checks.22 However, in 2003, there were only about 449,000 yearly visitors from China. That figure has detect the first non-Chinese case of of identifying clusters has potentially led to a since grown to over 8.9 million in 2019. COVID-19 on 15 January. As one of the most slower, gentler rise. Measures to counter the visited countries in Asia, with over 31 million spread of the virus, in the form of a ‘Cluster COVID-19 Cases

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Japan was the first country to officially detect the first non-Chinese case of COVID-19 on 15 January. As one of the most visited countries in Asia, with over 31 million tourists per year, 2.6 million in January alone,23 Japan’s first case involved a man from China who had travelled to Wuhan, followed by two �� more16 Chinese nationals visiting from the same region.24 Community transmission was soon apparent

20 https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-how-japan-keeps-covid-19-under-control/a-52907069 21 https://www.edelman.com/trustbarometer 22 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/world/asia/coronavirus-japan-china-tourism.html 23 https://www.tourism.jp/en/tourism-database/stats/inbound 24 https://www.who.int/csr/don/17-january-2020-novel-coronavirus-japan-ex-china/en/ with the first non-traveller case reported on 28 January. Despite the development of community transmission, along with the high number of annual Chinese tourists to Japan, initial response was slow. Preventative measures to stem community spread were announced on 25 February, by which point there were already 140 cases.

During the reporting period, in the first 30 days since the initial case was detected, the number of cases slowly increased, exhibiting a much flatter curve when compared to China (excluding the Diamond Princess cruise cases). By 17 February, Japan reported 65 cases, fewer than its neighbours in the same time period. Notably, Japan’s practice of identifying clusters has potentially led to a slower, gentler rise. Measures to counter the spread of the virus, in the form of a ‘Cluster Response Section’ were announced on 25 February in line with the Basic Policies for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control. This section was tasked with identifying small clusters of COVID-19 infections before they could grow and spread. The slow escalation of the disease in Japan may also be attributed to mask wearing, which has been prevalent in the country since the 1918 flu pandemic and saw an even greater resurgence during SARS in 2002.

Policy Responses A Limited and Slow Response

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Response Section’ were announced on 25 designating the virus as an infectious February in line with the Basic Policies for disease to allow the government to Novel Coronavirus Disease Control. This mandate hospitalisation on 28 January, section was tasked with identifying small creating a Novel Coronavirus Task Force clusters of COVID-19 infections before they on 30 January, and banning travellers could grow and spread. The slow escalation from the Hubei province on 3 February. of the disease in Japan may also be attributed The Prime Minister went on to invoke the to mask wearing, which has been prevalent in Quarantine Act, under which passengers the country since the 1918 flu pandemic and from the cruise ship Diamond Princess were saw an even greater resurgence during SARS placed under quarantine on the ship and in 2002. tested for the virus. As the spread of the virus continued, the government changed its focus from containment attempts to Policy Responses prevention policies. This resulted in ‘cluster A Limited and Slow Response countermeasures’ to identify areas or communities where the virus was spreading. Japan was comparatively slow in adopting From 2 March, all schools were closed, policies to contain the spread of COVID-19. although no laws exist in Japan that allows Prime Minister Abe’s government did the government to restrict the movement not declare a state of emergency even of the people; instead, the government 2.5 months after the first case was detected requested the cooperation of the public. in mid-January. Early actions included

�� 17 Japan was comparatively slow in adopting policies to contain the spread of COVID-19. Prime Minister Abe’s government did not declare a state of emergency even 2.5 months after the first case was detected in mid-January. Early actions included designating the virus as an infectious disease to allow the government to mandate hospitalisation on 28 January, creating a Novel Coronavirus Task Force on 30 January, and banning travellers from the Hubei province on 3 February. The Prime Minister went on to invoke the Quarantine Act, under which passengers from the cruise ship Diamond Princess were placed under quarantine on the ship and tested for the virus. As the spread of the virus continued, the government changed its focus from containment attempts to prevention policies. This resulted in ‘cluster countermeasures’ to identify areas or communities where the virus was spreading. From 2 March, all schools were closed, although no laws exist in Japan that allows the government to restrict the movement of the people; instead, the government requested the cooperation of the public.

Broadly, Japan’s policy responses were targeted, sector specific, and focused almost entirely on tightening international travel controls, investing in healthcare facilities, and raising public awareness Broadly, Japan’s policy responses were Government Communications Activities targeted, sector specific, and focused Communications from the Prime Minister almost entirely on tightening international travel controls, investing in healthcare Criticised for slow action, the Japanese facilities, and raising public awareness government began more enhanced of the outbreak. Japan was seemingly communication only after the first virus- cautious not to implement more socially related death. The government had been invasive measures, such as restricting harshly criticised internationally due to its internal movement and disrupting places of handling of the Diamond Princess cruise study and work. ship, docked in Yokohama under quarantine. At the time, the cruise ship had the most

18 �� of the outbreak. Japan was seemingly cautious not to implement more socially invasive measures, such as restricting internal movement and disrupting places of study and work.

Government Communications Activities Communications from the Prime Minister

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self-reporting via the survey mentioned Subsequent Key Developments above. The first signs of interest were noted when the initial Japanese case was While Japan did not see many cases during detected on 16 January. A second, much the initial 60-day period, as of 30 March, higher expression of interest peaked on the number of infections had reached 30 January, when three Japanese nationals 1,472, nearly doubling between 22 March tested positive and the Novel Coronavirus and 1 April. However, only on 26 March Response Headquarters was formed. was a stay-at-home request announced for After testing on the Diamond Princess was the greater Tokyo area, urging residents to completed on 19 February, interest rose work from home.27 An emergency had not steadily, culminating in a third peak on been declared but was being discussed. 27 February, likely corresponding to the Public reaction remained in line with the announcement that schools would be closed low level of interest in the virus indicated by until early April. The lack of interest between responses to the initial survey. An additional the first two peaks could be attributed to the survey,28 conducted by NHK News from government’s initial slowness in responding 6–8 March found that only 6% strongly to the growing crisis. approved of the government’s response, 43% approved somewhat, 34% disapproved At the end of the monitoring period, somewhat, and 13% strongly disapproved, 44% of Japanese respondents surveyed indicating disapproval by a majority of expressed worry about the outbreak—the respondents, even after actions were taken. second lowest figure of the four countries However, 69% responded that they felt in this study. This is notable given that the closing schools was too drastic a response. Japanese also expressed the highest level This reaction seems to reflect a relatively of pessimism (85%) regarding their opinion low level of concern and anxiety regarding of governmental response for the future the virus in Japan. trajectory of the outbreak.26

20 �� CASE STUDY: MALAYSIA

Country Overview of the turmoil in Putrajaya, the administrative Malaysia, with an estimated population centre of the country, Malaysia is a federal of 32.6 million, is ethnically and culturally representative democratic constitutional diverse. While roughly half of the population monarchy, consisting of 13 states, each with is ethnically Malay, the country has a large its own constitution and with differences in Chinese minority, as well as smaller groups the level of autonomy from state to state. of ethnic Indians and various indigenous For instance, states of Sabah and Sarawak peoples. Clear divisions along ethnic lines have significantly more independence in are evident in public policies, such as the some areas of policymaking than other bumiputra policies which provide ethnic states. Malays with various benefits.29 The differing policies reflect underlying ethnic and Like Japan, Malaysia has seen a decline racial tensions.30 In addition to generally in trust in government, down to 58% in the growing levels of discontent with corruption latest 2020 surveys.32 In recent years there and political inaction,31 the Malaysian has been a general sense of pessimism political system is characterised by fragile about the future,33 with the GDP performing democraticMalaysia processes. Recent political at its lowest levels for the past decade.34 manoeuvring resulted in the election of a Malaysia also had low scores for trust in new,Country unexpected Overview Prime Minister. Regardless news and government transparency.

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Malaysia, with an estimated population ȀͳͲͲof 32.6 million, is ethnically and culturally diverse. While roughly half of the population is ethnically Malay, the country has a large Chinese minority, as well as �� 21 smaller groups of ethnic Indians and various indigenous peoples. Clear divisions along ethnic lines are evident in public policies, such as the bumiputra policies which provide ethnic Malays various benefits.29 The differing policies reflect underlying ethnic and racial tensions.30 In addition to generally growing levels of discontent with corruption and political inaction,31 the Malaysian political system is characterised by fragile democratic processes. Recent political manoeuvring resulted in the election of a new, unexpected Prime Minister. Regardless of the turmoil in Putrajaya, the administrative centre of the country, Malaysia is a federal representative democratic constitutional monarchy, consisting of 13 states, each with its own constitution and with differences in the level of autonomy from state to state. For instance, states of Sabah and Sarawak have significantly more independence in some areas of policymaking than other states.

29 https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/malaysias-malay-first-malaise/ 30 https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3024542/malaysias-racial-and-religious-divisions-widen- opposition-seeks 31 https://www.dw.com/en/malaysia-election-people-were-disgusted-with-governments-corruption/a-43728203; https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/what-next-ph-after-yet-another-crushing-election-loss COVID-19 Cases Singapore, South Korea, or Japan. The recovery rate was also considerably high Malaysia confirmed its first four COVID-19 with no COVID-19-related deaths recorded. cases just a few days after Singapore, on The rate of escalation of confirmed cases 25 January, as three family members of remained relatively constant throughout the a patient who had earlier tested positive monitoring period. in the neighbouring state were confirmed as infected. With China being the third biggest source of tourists in Malaysia,35 it is Policy Responses unsurprising that these three related cases The Outbreak Does Not Yet and the additional fourth were all tourists Warrant Such a Move from Wuhan. Malaysia was quick to introduce limited Adding to the complexity of the situation, response measures just a few days after Malaysia had been experiencing an China announced the outbreak of the outbreak of Influenza A, with the first virus, such as screening the temperatures cases observed in December 2019. In the of passengers arriving from Wuhan at beginning of January, there was a great deal major Malaysian airports. There was an of information circulating about Malaysian evident increase in the intensity of policy hospitals running out of beds and flu response as the number of cases slowly Likemedication Japan, Malaysia as the has number seen ofa decline Influenza in trust A in grew.government, According down to some to 58% local in specialists,the latest 202037 surveys.cases32 increased. In recent 36years This t helikelyre hasraised been concern a general sensethe country’s of pessimism experience about the with future, SARS33 with and the GDPamong performing Malaysians at its lowest about levels the for country’s the past decade.the 34Nipah Malaysia virus also made had itlow more scores proactive for trust in newsinability and government to overcome transparency a health crisis. and ready to efficiently and successfully overcome COVID-19. In 2002, during the Throughout the monitoring period, SARS outbreak, when five cases and two Malaysia reported fewer cases than either deaths were recorded in Malaysia, it took COVID-19 Cases

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Malaysia confirmed its first four COVID-19 cases just a few days after Singapore, on 25 January, as three family members of a patient who had earlier tested positive in the neighbouring state were confirmed as infected. With China being the third biggest source of tourists in Malaysia,35 it is 22 �� unsurprising that these three related cases and the additional fourth were all tourists from Wuhan.

Adding to the complexity of the situation, Malaysia had been experiencing an outbreak of Influenza A, with the first cases observed in December 2019. In the beginning of January, there was a great deal of information circulating about Malaysian hospitals running out of beds and flu medication as the number of Influenza A cases increased.36 This likely raised concern among Malaysians about the country’s inability to overcome a health crisis.

Throughout the monitoring period, Malaysia reported fewer cases than either Singapore, South Korea,

32 https://www.edelman.com/trustbarometer 33 https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2020/01/05/malaysians-losing-confidence-about-future- says-report/ 34 https://www.aseaneconomist.com/malaysia-gdp-falls-to-new-10-year-low/ 35 https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/china-one-malaysias-largest-tourist-source-countries 36 https://codeblue.galencentre.org/2020/01/10/hospitals-running-out-of-beds-medicines-amid-flu-outbreak/ or Japan. The recovery rate was also considerably high with no COVID-19-related deaths recorded. The rate of escalation of confirmed cases remained relatively constant throughout the monitoring period.

Policy Responses The Outbreak Does Not Yet Warrant Such a Move

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Malaysiaweeks was for quick the to specialists introduce limitedto trace response the measuresGovernment just a fewCommunications days after China Activities announced the outbreakinfections, of whereasthe virus, in such the caseas screening of COVID-19 the temperaturesCentralised of passengers Information arriving from Wuhan at majorthe Malaysian process airports. has evolvedThere was much an evidentmore increase in the intensity of policy response as the numberquickly of cases as a resultslowly ofgrew. expertise According gained to andsome localIn specialists,the beginning37 the country’sof the experienceperiod, the with improvements in technology. government communicated only SARS and the Nipah virus made it more proactive and ready to efficiently and successfully overcome occasionally and mostly to reassure the COVID-19. In 2002, during the SARS outbreak, when five cases and two deaths were recorded in Malaysia’s early response to the outbreak Malaysian public that the illness spreading Malaysia,focused it took mainly weeks on restricting for the specialists and controlling to trace the ininfections, Wuhan waswhereas not linkedin the caseto the of outbreakCOVID-19 the processtravel to hasand evolvedfrom affected much areas. However,more quickly as a resultof Influenza of expertise A that gained was and on theimprov risee inments early in technology.within the monitoring period, there was a January. After the first cases of coronavirus lack of action in several policy clusters, were identified in Malaysia, the frequency such as the closure of workplaces and the of communications escalated significantly restriction of public events. The moderate as the Ministry of Health issued press policy response was often explained to statements almost every day. From 3 the public as appropriate for the apparent February, when the rate of confirmed cases mildness of the outbreak in Malaysia at the began to accelerate, press statements were 37 https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2020/01/560893/malaysiatime. There was also a notable disparity issued-more daily.-proactive The press-containing statements-coronavirus were- comparedbetween-sars the overall federal response and also put out in English during this period. the responses of the individual states, The Ministry of Health was active on social especially in the case of Sarawak and Sabah, media throughout the monitoring period, which both adopted more drastic measures. providing updated infographics with global and local statistics, and engaging with people who were asking questions about

�� 23

the virus itself or about the suspected and Minister. Overall, communications by the Malaysia’sconfirmed early cases response in Malaysia. to the outbreak focused mainlygovernment on restricting consisted and controllingmostly of travel press to and from affected areas. However, within the monitoring period,releases there with was updates a lack of on action the innumber several ofpolicy clusters,The Ministry such as ofthe Healthclosure wasof workplaces the primary and the restrictionthe cases of and public the events.current Thesituation moderate in the policy responsecommunicator was ofte nthroughout explained tothe the monitoring public as appropriatecountry, for alongthe apparent with consistent mildness ofreminders the outbreak in Malaysiaperiod. While at the the time. Deputy There Minister was also of aHealth notable disparitythat there between is no the reason over allfor federal alarm responseor for the and theand responses the Director of the General individual of Health states, were especially the inintroduction the case of of Sarawak drastic measures. and Sabah, which both frequent communicators initially, as the adopted more drastic measures. situation escalated the Minister of Health Levels of Interest and Anxiety became the key communicator, providing Governmentdaily updates at Communications live press conferences andActivities To understand the levels of interest and Centralisedthrough the publication Information of press statements. anxiety in Malaysia in relation to the Later on, communication efforts were outbreak, it is important to consider the also often supported by the Deputy Prime wider context in which the situation was

24 �� Google searches related to the outbreak

unfolding, such as the aforementioned on the part of the federal government outbreak of Influenza A and related as some states adopted much more anxiety as resources were perceived to be drastic measures. Moreover, despite an insufficient by the general public.38 adequate—albeit declining—level of trust in government, public concern may have been While interest in the coronavirus was exacerbated by the overall political turmoil slowly increasing prior to 25 January—likely that characterised the end of February and due to the first cases being detected and the beginning of March in Malaysia. confirmed in Singapore—it peaked when the first positive cases were identified in Subsequent Key Developments Malaysia itself. Following this peak, interest quickly decreased and remained relatively As the number of COVID-19 cases in stable throughout the period defined. Malaysia grew rapidly throughout March, the policy actions introduced also became more Despite the constant flow of information— drastic. On 16 March, the new Prime Minister especially starting from late January Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin announced a and continuing through February—and Movement Control Order (MCO) to be in the insistence of the government that force from 18 March to 31 March (this was there was no reason for panic or drastic later extended multiple times40). In general, measures, Malaysia showed the second the MCO banned all mass gatherings, highest level of concern about the virus closed all educational institutions, and other among the nine Asian countries surveyed.39 governmental and private venues, with the According to that same survey conducted exception of essential services. Restrictions from 14 February to 17 February, 66% of were placed on foreigners coming into the respondents in Malaysia were very worried country and all Malaysians were banned about the coronavirus. This worry should be from travelling abroad. The Malaysian understood in the context of the Influenza Armed Forces were ordered to enforce the A outbreak and the perceived lack of action MCO.

�� 25 CASE STUDY: SOUTH KOREA

Country Overview Korea in 1948, South Korea has developed into one of Asia’s most affluent countries, South Korea, officially the Republic of Korea, having the 3rd largest economy in the region has an ethnically homogeneous population and the 12th largest in the world. of over 51 million inhabitants. The country has been governed by a presidential republic The experiences of recent epidemics, both since the late 1980s, when a democratic caused by a coronavirus, have shaped movement brought 40 years of authoritarian South Korea’s response to health crises. rule to an end. South Korea’s government South Korean institutional capacity was is characterised by a strong executive challenged by the 2003 SARS (Severe Acute office, which has been held by Democratic Respiratory Syndrome) pandemic, and once President Moon Jae-in since 2017. With again in 2015 with the sudden outbreak of the approval of the national legislature, MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome). President Moon appointed fellow party These experiences galvanised South Korean Southmember Chung Korea Sye Kyun to serve as Prime authorities to develop a higher level of Minister in early 2020. Since the partition of preparedness, as both government and Country Overview

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ȀͳͲͲ South Korea, officially the Republic of Korea, has an ethnically homogeneous population of over 51 million inhabitants. The country has been governed by a presidential republic since the late 1980s, �� when26 a democratic movement brought 40 years of authoritarian rule to an end. South Korea’s government is characterised by a strong executive office, which has been held by Democratic President Moon Jae-in since 2017. With the approval of the national legislature, President Moon appointed fellow party member Chung Sye Kyun to serve as Prime Minister in early 2020. Since the partition of Korea in 1948, South Korea has developed into one of Asia’s most affluent countries, having the 3rd largest economy in the region and the 12th largest in the world.

The experiences of recent epidemics, both caused by a coronavirus, have shaped South Korea’s response to health crises. South Korean institutional capacity was challenged by the 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) pandemic, and once again in 2015 with the sudden outbreak of MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome). These experiences galvanised South Korean authorities to develop a higher level of preparedness, as both government and citizens learned that widespread testing and compliance with restrictions are crucial to a successful epidemic response strategy.41

South Korea enjoys a very high level of internet penetration, with almost its entire population connected online. Health security and government transparency are also relatively high. The remaining indicators are relatively lower than they are for the other countries included in this study, with trust in government slightly above average and trust in news slightly below average. The level of people’s trust in government has been consistently low since South Korea’s transition to democracy in the 1980s, reaching a higher level of distrust in social institutions in the 2000s than was observed in the 1990s.42 According to the Edelman Trust Barometer for 2017, only 36% of respondents expressed trust in the government, as former president Park Guen-hye was embroiled in political scandal and was subsequently impeached and arrested.43 Levels of trust have followed an upward trend since President Moon Jae-in took office.44

COVID-19 Cases

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citizens learned that widespread testing and COVID-19 Cases

41 Fleming,compliance Sean with (2019) restrictions “South Korea’s are crucial Foreign to aMinister explains how the country contained COVID-19” Worsuccessfulld Economic epidemic Forum. responsehttps://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03 strategy.41 The Korean/south Centre-korea for-covid Disease-19-containment Control - testing/ (KCDC) announced the first imported case 42 Jung,South Yong Korea-duck enjoys and Sea a Youngvery high Sung level (2012) of “The Public’sof COVID-19 Declining on Trust20 January, in Government making in South Korea” Meijiinternet Journal penetration, of Political Science with almost and Economics its entire. Korea the second country outside of China to 43 https://www.edelman.com/research/2017population connected online. Health security-edelman -detecttrust-barometer a local infection. A Chinese resident 44 https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2018- 10/2018_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report_FEB.pdfand government transparency are also of Wuhan ;in her 30s was detected as having https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019relatively high. The remaining indicators a fever- by a thermal scanner during entry 02/2019_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report.pdfare relatively lower than they are for the screening at Incheon International Airport. other countries included in this study, with China is South Korea’s most significant trust in government slightly above average trade and tourism partner, as visitors from and trust in news slightly below average. mainland China account for roughly 30% of The level of people’s trust in government annual South Korean tourism.45 has been consistently low since South Korea’s transition to democracy in the The number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in 1980s, reaching a higher level of distrust in South Korea escalated gradually throughout social institutions in the 2000s than was the monitoring period. In the first ten days observed in the 1990s.42 According to the of the outbreak, the KCDC reported six Edelman Trust Barometer for 2017, only confirmed infections. The caseload began 36% of respondents expressed trust in the to rise more rapidly in the following weeks, government, as former president Park Guen- with 28 confirmed cases reported on hye was embroiled in political scandal and 10 February as the virus spread among the was subsequently impeached and arrested.43 personal contacts of previously infected Levels of trust have followed an upward trend persons. Public officials expressed hope that since President Moon Jae-in took office.44 the situation was under control in the days

�� 27 after the 28th case was announced, as no when the first imported case of COVID-19 new infections were identified for five days was reported, by increasing the alert level in a row. However, this optimism was short- from Blue (Level 1) to Yellow (Level 2) of a lived, as 30 cases were confirmed by the end four-level national crisis management scale. of the monitoring period. Throughout this period, no deaths were reported and a third The intensity of policy actions only began of patients were discharged from hospital. to increase after South Korea confirmed its first case of COVID-19 on 20 January. International travel controls tightened from Policy Responses screening and quarantine measures to travel Trace, Test, and Treat bans in a matter of days. The frequency and intensity of policy actions increased rapidly South Korea was among the first countries with the increasing rate of infection, levelling to launch a COVID-19 policy initiative on out only during the short period in which no 3 January, immediately after Chinese new cases were identified. officials announced an investigation into the novel coronavirus. South Korean authorities South Korea implemented actions in responded by implementing quarantine every policy cluster, particularly tightening and screening measures for travellers international travel controls, enhancing arriving from the virus-affected city and by public health measures, and spreading strengthening surveillance of pneumonia public information. The government cases in health facilities nationwide. South response included providing universal health Korea took further action on 20 January, care for the population; on 29 January, the

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Ͳ ʹǤͳǤʹͲ ͹ǤͳǤʹͲ ͳʹǤͳǤʹͲ ͳ͹ǤͳǤʹͲ ʹʹǤͳǤʹͲ ʹ͹ǤͳǤʹͲ ͳǤʹǤʹͲ ͸ǤʹǤʹͲ ͳͳǤʹǤʹͲ ͳ͸ǤʹǤʹͲ South Korea was among the first countries to launch a COVID-19 policy initiative on 3 January, �� immediately28 after Chinese officials announced an investigation into the novel coronavirus. South Korean authorities responded by implementing quarantine and screening measures for travellers arriving from the virus-affected city and by strengthening surveillance of pneumonia cases in health facilities nationwide. South Korea took further action on 20 January, when the first imported case of COVID-19 was reported, by increasing the alert level from Blue (Level 1) to Yellow (Level 2) of a four- level national crisis management scale.

The intensity of policy actions only began to increase after South Korea confirmed its first case of COVID-19 on 20 January. International travel controls tightened from screening and quarantine measures to travel bans in a matter of days. The frequency and intensity of policy actions increased rapidly with the increasing rate of infection, levelling out only during the short period in which no new cases were identified.

South Korea implemented actions in every policy cluster, particularly tightening international travel controls, enhancing public health measures, and spreading public information. The government response included providing universal health care for the population; on 29 January, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced that the state would cover costs for the treatment of all virus-infected Ministry of Health and Welfare announced Government Communications Activities patients.that the By thestate end would of the covermonitoring costs period, for the South KoreanAll-government authorities approach had raised the country’s crisis alerttreatment to Orange of all(Level virus-infected 3), implemented patients. early By travel restrictions, strict screening, and quarantine measuresthe end. Rapidof the-result monitoring COVID -19period, testing South kits wereThroughout made available the first throughout weeks ofthe the country, outbreak and hundredsKorean of authorities extra medical had personnelraised the werecountry’s mobilised . in South Korea, government authorities crisis alert to Orange (Level 3), implemented provided centralised and consistent early travel restrictions, strict screening, communication with the general public Governmentand quarantine Communicationsmeasures. Rapid-result Activitiesabout COVID-19. In the days leading up COVID-19 testing kits were made available to the republic’s first confirmed case, the throughout the country, and hundreds of Public Health and Safety Agency requested extra medical personnel were mobilised. information from China regarding the new

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strain of coronavirus, and announced plans While health authorities released clear and Throughoutto prepare thehealthcare first weeks workers of forthe increasedoutbreak in Southfrequent Korea, information, government the authoritiesPresident providedand centralisedtravel and and public consistent gatherings communication around withthe the generalPrime public Minister about reassured COVID-19. the In the public days leadingby up timeto the of republic’s the approaching first confirmed Lunar New case, Year. the As Public Healthholding and emergency Safety Agency cabinet requested meetings, informationvisiting fromdepicted China inregarding the graph the below,new strain the intensityof coronavirus, hospitals and announced and marketplaces, plans to prepare delivering healthcare workersof government for increased communications travel and public steadily gather ings aroundspeeches, the andtime publishingof the approaching press releases. Lunar New increased from 20 January until 17 February. On 26 January, President Moon delivered a Year. As depicted in the graph below, the intensity of government communications steadily increased special public message in which he vowed a from 20 January until 17 February. The most frequent communicators pan-governmental effort to curb the spread throughout the monitoring period were of the virus. Concurrently, President Moon’s Thehealth most institutionsfrequent communicators (the Ministry ofthroughout Health the messagingmonitoring periodencouraged were healthclose cooperationinstitutions (the Ministryand Welfareof Health and and theWelfare Korean and theCentre Korean for Centrewith for DiseaseSouth Control)Korean andregional the executive and city branch (theDisease offices Control)of Prime andMinister the Chungexecutive Sye branch-kyun and Presidentgovernments, Moon as Jae well-in). as The with bulk neighbouring of public health information(the offices was shared of Prime by the Minister KCDC, which Chung Sye- providedcountries, multiple particularly daily updates China in and the Japan. form ofThe press kyun and President Moon Jae-in). The bulk of chief executive also focused on safeguarding releases on the details of confirmed cases and on the progress of epidemiological investigations. public health information was shared by the the South Korean economy, as he urged the

KCDC, which provided multiple daily updates public not to curb their normal economic Whilein the health form authorities of press releases released on clear the detailsand frequent activities information, and instructedthe President the Finance and Prime Ministry Minister reassuredof confirmed the public cases by holding and on emergency the progress cabinet of to meetings, take strong visiting measures hospitals to andminimise marketplaces, the deliveringepidemiological speeches, investigations. and publishing press releases.negative On 26 effectsJanuary, of Presidentthe coronavirus Moon deliveredon the a special public message in which he vowed a pan-governmentaleconomy. effort to curb the spread of the virus. Concurrently, President Moon’s messaging encouraged close cooperation with South Korean regional

30 �� Google searches related to the outbreak

Levels of Interest and Anxiety Subsequent Key Developments

There was virtually no interest in COVID-19 Despite their seemingly successful early expressed in South Korea before the first prevention efforts, South Korean authorities case was reported on 20 January. Interest were overwhelmed in late February after then began to climb, first spiking on a cluster of cases connected to the 27 January when the government raised the Shincheonji Church of Jesus, a fringe national crisis management level to Orange religious sect, caused the number of (Level 3 of 4). Interest then dipped until infections to skyrocket from fewer than 50 to another brief spike on 31 January, when more than 5,000. Over the course of 10 days, President Moon requested that his cabinet South Korea became the country that implement emergency countermeasures suffered the second largest outbreak in Asia. against the COVID-19 outbreak and he At a pan-governmental COVID-19 meeting announced the evacuation of South Korean on 21 February, Prime Minister Chung nationals from Wuhan. Interest waned announced a shift in government strategy briefly until 2 February, when the Ministry from preventing outbreaks to containing the of Health and Wellness announced its plan spread of the virus. Aggressive mass testing to bar entry to foreigners who had been to became a pillar of South Korea’s response Hubei province in the previous two weeks. to the epidemic—by 30 March, South Korea Following this announcement, online had tested 395 194 individuals and had interest declined further and plateaued 9 661 confirmed cases. towards the end of the monitoring period. At the time the survey was conducted, only 32% of respondents reported that they ‘worry a lot about the coronavirus (COVID-19)’; this is the lowest level reported among the nine Asian countries surveyed by Black Box Research.

�� 31 CASE STUDY: SINGAPORE

Country Overview Existing socio-economic issues such as the increase in cost of living, influx of A city-state with a population of just under foreign workers, and rising religiosity have 6 million,46 Singapore has a racially and resulted in social fault lines and continuing religiously diverse society, in which Chinese vulnerabilities for social order and stability make up around 75% of the population in Singapore. and Malays, Indians, and Eurasians form the largest minority groups.47 Singapore is Based on the indicators considered here, also known for its strong executive branch; Singapore has a high level of internet since its independence in 1965, the state penetration and similarly high scores has been ruled by a one-party government. for trust in government and government The SARS outbreak of 2003 was regarded transparency. Singapore ranks above as a ‘wakeup call’. Singapore responded by average when compared to the rest of the investingSingapore heavily in upgrading and expanding world for health security and for trust in its healthcare system, virus research news. capability, and emergency preparedness.48 Country Overview

Ͳ ʹͲ ͶͲ ͸Ͳ ͺͲ ͳͲͲ ȀͳͲͲ A city-state with a population of just under 6 million,46 Singapore has a racially and religiously diverse society, in which Chinese make up around 75% of the population and Malays, Indians, and Eurasians form the largest minority groups.47 Singapore is also known for its strong executive branch; since its 32independence �� in 1965, the state has been ruled by a one-party government. The SARS out break of 2003 was regarded as a ‘wakeup call’. Singapore responded by investing heavily in upgrading and expanding its healthcare system, virus research capability, and emergency preparedness.48 Existing socio-economic issues such as the increase in cost of living, influx of foreign workers, and rising religiosity have resulted in social fault lines and continuing vulnerabilities for social order and stability in Singapore.

46 https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/search-by-theme/population/population-and-population- structure/latest-data 47 https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/singapore-population/ 48 https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3052120/sars-covid-19-what-lessons-has- singapore-learned Based on the indicators considered here, Singapore has a high level of internet penetration and similarly high scores for trust in government and government transparency. Singapore ranks above average when compared to the rest of the world for health security and for trust in news.

COVID-19 Cases

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Singapore is a popular global tourist destination attracting approximately 19 million visitors a year— 49 aroundCOVID-19 3.4 million Cases from mainland China. Additionally,outside with Singapore’sof China. Singapore’s porous borders recovery and raterole as a global hub for finance and air travel, it was no surprisefor thatCOVID-19 Singapore patients was theremained third country relatively globally to Singaporereport, on 23is January, a popular its first global case of touristCOVID -19,50constant attributed throughout to a group theof tourists monitoring from period. the Chinese citydestination of Guangxi arrivingattracting in Singapore approximately for Chinese New Year. 19 million visitors a year—around 3.4 million 49 Policy Responses Throughoutfrom mainland the monitoring China. period,Additionally, there waswith a sharp but relatively constant escalation in the number Singapore’s porous borders and role as a Staying One Step Ahead of confirmed cases, with no deaths reported. The early detection and rapid increase in cases of global hub for finance and air travel, it was COVIDno surprise-19 in Singaporethat Singapore stands was in markedthe third contrast Singapore to the situation began early,in its mualertingch larger healthcare neighbour , Indonesia,country globallywhich reported to report, no oncases 23 duringJanuary, the sameworkers period. and By thecommencing end of the screeningmonitoring period,at Singaporeits first hadcase recorded of COVID-19, 75 cases50 attributed, the highest to a numberairports globally on outside 2 January, of China. when Singapore’s China firstrecovery rategroup for CofOVID tourists-19 patients from the remained Chinese re citylatively of constantannounced throughout a cluster the monitoring of severe period. pneumonia Guangxi arriving in Singapore for Chinese cases in Wuhan. Policy actions during the PolicyNew Year. Responses first month were almost entirely related to the progressive tightening of Singapore’s Staying One Step Ahead Throughout the monitoring period, there was borders; in addition, a multi-ministry task

a sharp but relatively constant escalation force to deal with a potential local outbreak in the number of confirmed cases, with was set up, and minor enhancements were no deaths reported. The early detection made to the healthcare system. The intensity and rapid increase in cases of COVID-19 of policy actions remained relatively

49 inhttps://www.budgetdirect.com.sg/travel Singapore stands in marked contrast-insurance/research/singapore to constant until-tourism the discovery-statistics of the country’s 50 thehttps://www.gov.sg/article/covid situation in its much larger-19- casesneighbour,-in-singapore first local cluster, on 4 February, sparked an Indonesia, which reported no cases intense period of policy responses; actions during the same period. By the end of the were taken to reassure the public and to monitoring period, Singapore had recorded enforce social distancing for vulnerable 75 cases, the highest number globally groups. This continued through the first

�� 33 ͶͲ

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Ͳ ʹǤͳǤʹͲ ͹ǤͳǤʹͲ ͳʹǤͳǤʹͲ ͳ͹ǤͳǤʹͲ ʹʹǤͳǤʹͲ ʹ͹ǤͳǤʹͲ ͳǤʹǤʹͲ ͸ǤʹǤʹͲ ͳͳǤʹǤʹͲ ͳ͸ǤʹǤʹͲ

Singaporehalf of Februarybegan early, as the alerting number healthcare of people workers cases and commencingwere detected, screening the atgovernment airports on 2 January,infected when climbed China sharply. first announced a cluster of severeissued pneumonia statements cases 2–3 in Wuhan. times Policya week. actions during the first month were almost entirely related to theAfter progressive the detection tightening of the of Singapore’s first local borders; case in addition,Singapore’s a multi policy-ministry response task force was to holistic, deal with a statementspotential local were outbreak issued almostwas set daily. up, andSocial minor enhancementswith actions were taken made in toall the policy healthcare clusters. system. Themedia intensity were ofalso policy employed; actions residentsremained relativelywere Robust actions were taken within each advised to subscribe to daily updates from constant until the discovery of the country’s first local cluster, on 4 February, sparked an intense period cluster, including the implementation the government via WhatsApp and overseas of ofpolicy monitoring responses at; actionsall land, were air, taken and tosea reassure Singaporeans the public and could to enforce sign socialup to distancing receive for vulnerablecheckpoints, groups. closing This continuebordersd throughto Chinese the first halfupdates of February from the as Ministrythe number of Foreign of people Affairs’ infected climbedtravellers sharply. in response to the lockdown of Telegram channels. the city of Wuhan, the enforcement of strict quarantine measures, and the institution of Issuing press statements only, the a nationwide cleaning campaign and a ban Ministry of Health was the most frequent on large-scale events. communicator in the first three weeks of the monitoring period. Following the detection of the first local case, the COVID Government Communications Activities multi-ministry Task Force took over, issuing Early, Open, and Direct Communications general communications on the outbreak through press conferences and media Overall, the Singaporean government interviews (sometimes several a week). The provided regular and centralised information content consisted largely of factual updates about the outbreak. Before the first local on the situation and additional policy

34 �� Early, Open, and Direct Communications

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Ͳ ʹǤͳǤʹͲ ͹ǤͳǤʹͲ ͳʹǤͳǤʹͲ ͳ͹ǤͳǤʹͲ ʹʹǤͳǤʹͲ ʹ͹ǤͳǤʹͲ ͳǤʹǤʹͲ ͸ǤʹǤʹͲ ͳͳǤʹǤʹͲ ͳ͸ǤʹǤʹͲ

Overall, the Singaporean government provided regular and centralised information about the outbreak. actions taken. Information about ad-hoc to focus healthcare resources on dealing Before the first local cases were detected, the government issued statements 2–3 times a week. After domain-specific policy actions undertaken directly with the rapidly escalating number theby detectionindividual of theministries first local also case pepperedstatements wereof cases.issued almost daily. Social media were also employed;the information residents space were advisedduring tothe subscribe latter to daily updates from the government via WhatsApp andhalf overseas of the monitoringSingaporeans period. could Singapore’s sign up to receiveLevels updat ofes Interest from the and Ministry Anxiety of Foreign Affairs’ Telegramcommunication channels. strategy shifted—at first communications were provided solely by Despite intensive government policy actions the Ministry of Health and later by the COVID and communications starting 2 January, IssuingTask Forcepress statementsand individual only, ministries. the Ministry This of Healththe was residents the most offrequent Singapore communicator showed inlittle the first threeshift weeks could ofrepresent the monitoring a deliberate period. decisionFollowing the interestdetection in of the the virus first untillocal thecase, first the local COVID case multi - ministry Task Force took over, issuing general communications on the outbreak through press conferences and media interviews (sometimes several a week). The content consisted largely of factual updates on the situation and additional policy actions taken. Information about ad-hoc domain- specific policy actions undertaken by individual ministries also peppered the information space during Google searches related to the outbreak the latter half of the monitoring period. Singapore’s communication strategy shifted—at first communications were provided solely by the Ministry of Health and later by the COVID Task Force and individual ministries. This shift could represent a deliberate decision to focus healthcare resources on dealing directly with the rapidly escalating number of cases.

�� 35

Singapore’s policy response was holistic, with actions taken in all policy clusters. Robust actions were takenwas within reported each on cluster 23 January., including This the could impl ementationsurveyed. of monitoringThe generally at all land,low air,level and of sea checkpoints,be attributed closing to theborders low levelto Chinese of coverage travellers in interestresponse and to theanxiety lockdown could of be the explained city of Wuhan, by thein enforcement mainstream of mediastrict quarantine before 22 measures, January. and theInformation institution overloadof a nationwide due to cleaningsteady stream campaign The early policy responses garnered some of communications, and by the high level of and a ban on large-scale events. interest, but this dipped until the detection of public trust in government to deal with the

the first local cluster at the end of January. outbreak as it dragged on. After a week-long period of sustained interest, attention declined steadily despite Subsequent Key Developments the rapidly escalating number of cases. After an initial slowdown in new cases, At the end of the monitoring period, 46% of thanks to tight international controls and respondents surveyed ‘worried a lot’ about strict quarantine measures, Singapore the outbreak; this was the third lowest saw a ‘second wave’ of cases due largely

level among the nine Asian countries to returning citizens and residents Government Communications Activities

36 �� importing the virus from overseas. Singapore continued its intense policy actions throughout the monitoring period, including housing returning Singaporeans in designated hotels,51 banning all events and gatherings of 10 or more participants,52 staggered home-based learning for schools,53 and closing borders to all non- residents.54 Digital solutions were also implemented to promote a community- driven approach to contact tracing55 and to enforcing home quarantines.56 Government communications activities retained their initial intensity; the Prime Minister continued his frequent addresses to local and international audiences.

�� 37 38 �� Endnotes

1 Government of Singapore (2020) Department of Statistics 22 Motoko Rich (2020) ‘Coronavirus Outbreak Sours Japan on Singapore 2019, Singstat.gov.sg Chinese Tourist Boom’. The New York Times. 2 Edelman Intelligence (2020) 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer. 23 Japan National Tourism Organization (2020) Japan-bound Edelman. Statistics. JTB Tourism Research & Consulting Co. 3 Edson C. Tandoc Jr. (2019) Digital News Report Survey 24 World Health Organization (2020) Novel Coronavirus – Singapore. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Japan (ex-China). WHO.com 4 Ai Ballesteros (2020) Malaysia GDP falls to new 10-year low. 25 Leah F. Moriarty, Mateusz M. Plucinski, Barbara J. Marston, ASEAN Economist. Ekaterina Kurbatova, Barbara Knust, Erin L. Murray et. Al. 5 Edelman Intelligence (2020) 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer. (2020) Public Health Responses to COVID-19 Outbreaks on Edelman. Cruise Ships – Worldwide, February-March 2020. Centers for 6 Zahoram Nain (2019) Digital New Report Malaysia. Reuters Disease Control and Prevention. Institute for the Study of Journalism. 26 Raquel Carvalho (2020) ‘Coronavirus: Anxious Asian 7 OECD (nd) OECD Data. Countries want China flight ban, says new poll’. South China 8 Sonho Kim (2019) Digital New Report South Korea. Reuters Morning Post. Institute for the Study of Journalism. 27 Naomi Tajitsu (2020) Koike Urges Tokyo residents to stay at 9 Edelman Intelligence (2020) 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer. home at weekend. Japan Today Edelman. 28 Aizawa Yuko (2020) Coronavirus anxiety spreads across 10 Yasuomi Sawa (2019) Digital News Report Japan. Reuters Japan. NHK World Japan Institute for the Study of Journalism; Sonho Kim (2019) 29 Chandran Nair (2020) ‘Malaysia’s ‘Malay first’ Malaise’. The Digital New Report South Korea. Reuters Institute for the Diplomat. Study of Journalism. 30 Amy Chew (2019) ‘Malaysia’s Racial and Religious Divisions 11 Transparency International (2019) Corruption Perceptions Widen as Opposition seeks Political Gain.’ South China Index. Transparency.org Morning Post. 12 Digital News Report (2019) Overview. Reuters Institute for 31 Srinivas Mazumdaru (2018) ‘Malaysia Election: People the Study of Journalism. were ‘disgusted with government’s corruption’ DW.com; 13 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2019) The Global Health Norshahril Saat (2019) ‘What next for PH after yet another Security Index. Ghsindex.org. (crushing) by-election loss?’. Today Online. 14 Neville Bolt and Leonie Halden (2019) Improving NATO Strategic 32 Edelman Intelligence (2020) 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer. Communications Terminology. Riga, Latvia. NATO StratCom COE. Edelman. 15 Anna Petherick, Beatriz Kira, Noam Angrist, Thomas Hale, 33 FMT Reporters (2020) ‘Malaysians losing confidence about Toby Phillips and Samuel Webster (2020) Variation in future, says report’. Free Malaysia Today. Government Responses to Covid-19. Blavatnik School 34 Ai Ballesteros (2020) Malaysia GDP falls to new 10-year low. Working Paper. ASEAN Economist. 16 Raquel Carvalho (2020) ‘Coronavirus: Anxious Asian 35 Tan Xue Ying (2020) ‘China is one of Malaysia’s largest Countries want China flight ban, says new poll’. South China tourist source countries’. The Edge Financial Daily. Morning Post. 36 CodeBlue (2020) Hospitals Running Out of Beds, Medicines 17 Apple (2020) Mobiliteitstrends. Apple.com. Amid Flu Outbreak’. Code Blue. 18 Riyaz ul Khaliq (2020) ‘Covid-19 did not change much in 37 Bernama (2020) ‘Malaysia more proactive in containing Japan’s daily life’. Anadolu Agency coronavirus compared to SARS’. New Straits Times. 19 Nippon (2020) ‘Demand for Disposable Face Masks Pushes 38 D. Kanyakumari (2020) ‘Concerned parents in Malaysia hunt Japanese Production Above 4 Billion Annually’. Nippon. for influenza vaccine as stocks run low’. Channel News Asia. com; Statista Research Department (2019) Face Masks 39 Raquel Carvalho (2020) ‘Coronavirus: Anxious Asian Production Volume in Japan FY 2008-2017. Statista.com. Countries want China flight ban, says new poll’. South China 20 Martin Fritz (2020) Coronavirus: How Japan keeps COVID-10 Morning Post. under control. DW.com 40 Vincent Tan (2020) ‘COVID-19: Malaysia extends movement 21 Edelman Intelligence (2020) 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer. control order for third time until May 12’. Channel News Edelman. Asia.

�� 39 41 Fleming, Sean (2019) “South Korea’s Foreign Minister explains how the country contained COVID-19” World Economic Forum. 42 Jung, Yong-duck and Sea Young Sung (2012) “The Public’s Declining Trust in Government in Korea” Meiji Journal of Political Science and Economics. 43 Edelman Intelligence (2017) 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer. Edelman. 44 Edelman Intelligence (2018) 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer. Edelman. ; Edelman Intelligence (2019) 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer. Edelman. 45 Korea Tourism Organization (2020) ‘Korea, Monthly Statistics of Tourism’. KTO. 46 Department of Statistics Singapore (2020) Population and Population Structure. Department of Statistics Singapore. 47 World Population Review (2020) Singapore Population 2020 (Live). Worldpopulationreview.com 48 Dewey Sim (2020) ‘From Sars to Covid-19, what lessons has Singapore Learned?’. South China Morning Post. 49 Budget Direct Insurance (2020) ‘Singapore Tourism Statistics 2020’. Budget Direct Insurance. 50 Government of Singapore (2020) ‘COVID-19: Cases in Singapore’. Gov.sg. 51 Clara Chong (2020) ‘Coronavirus: People returning from UK and US to serve stay-home notice’. The Straits Times. 52 Lim Min Zhang (2020) ‘Ban on Social Gatherings of any size homes or public areas’. The Straits Times. 53 Channel News Asia (2020) Covid-19: Schools to Conduct Home- Based Learning Once a Week from April. Channel News Asia. 54 Grace Ho (2020) ‘Coronavirus: An unprecedented Singapore border closure, in unprecedented times’. The Straits Times. 55 Government of Singapore (2020) Trace Together, safer together. Tracetogether.gov.sg. 56 Singapore Government Agency (2020) Everything you need to know about Stay-Home Notice. Gov.sg.

40 �� Prepared and published by the NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) is a NATO accredited multi-national organisation that conducts research, publishes studies, and provides strategic communications training for government and military personnel. Our mission is to make a positive contribution to Alliance’s understanding of strategic communications and to facilitate accurate, appropriate, and timely communication among its members as objectives and roles emerge and evolve in the rapidly changing information environment.

Operating since 2014, we have carried out significant research enhancing NATO nations’ situational awareness of the information environment and have contributed to exercises and trainings with subject matter expertise.