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The Rules of Engagement in the Conduct of Special Operations
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California thesis THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS by Michael S. Reilly December 1996 Thesis Advisor: John Arquilla Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. SCHOOL Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | 5! REP6RT t)ATE T. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 1996 Master's Thesis 4. TITLE AMD SUBTITLE T. FUNDING NUMBERS THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 6. AUtHOR(S) Reilly, Michael S. 7. PERFORMING oRgaN1ZaTI6N NaME(S) aND addREss(Es) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey CA 93943-5000 9~ SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.SPONSOR1NG /MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 1 1 . SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. dIstRIbUtIoN/aVaILabILIty STATEMENT T2b! DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. -
24Th Infantry Division Association
24th Infantry Division . • 2 ECH) . l \C iO RY'O/ V ~T ~ ISIOty - - - ~ .- ,;;..'-'-' .. \;-.,. ~ Welcome to the 24th InfanCfll, Division, soldier. now a menib~\2u9h) combat-ready unit- with a -..Lor through two majo"4!~rs. Inltlally,~guestlQJIs ari~rdin!il your newlml,l or the country'-"""which you are SlaliO~iS booklet, cQn1IQe!"oraling the division's 26th anniversary; may gIve you some answers .- 2 ,~ , ......... ,.. '" .... ' ~, ~ <.... , "" ---.. ~ ........ ~--_., ..;:,"" --. ~-.., - - T1>t....,G.. _ d ,I>< Uth W....u-1 n""f"'" ~1"(" ....... 0\ .... ,1'",.• ........ 11k.I, to !orV'. Ttl. V!":" ..""" ......, ...~ ",,,b tIl<R'--~'" 0., ..... l.c>yto. ~ I/IdoO<O. lJ.o ,,,,,. CO"''';-' MInd''''"' Ta'l"'" ,td ~ .."" ... .... <0 ....... ,Iv"'. ""''''~ ..... ~. So "..,m>< y I><"'"~'' ' " ......00 ",... ,ItO pr'<tl<;:o: d «",,'\0.'" ,b< " "t~'1 L-""I>k>o ,...a.) ,B tit • .,.'" CO" "".~ .,Uo P''''''' Tot- T>r~ V" ... bo.l~" ~ ..Il""''''''' fPl"ltioc. " . ,,<or" ... ""'".,.,.. 01 ••n~ .""."".,,..! I'.••• , .... ""'01 .",:l <0""",,0«. AJJ Uo' ~ ~ 'b 1tlI;u>1'~ Ih<l"''' c~"...,~, .... ,t; lEI. fur .. .. r""" '0 ....... ,10>.. I ()::,~''''. ,II< dU"" ..,.d ".""n' ..... ' ,~- .. ", be ""'.... ,. , ..04.. rt~ ..., ~ '<<I" n,y ....... ,...... lOr M~'~ >~« ... ,n the ,n<I" ioO" thO \'''''''f 1)<""0<\. "' ... ...u .f to. .m.. '" .... ... " .f .... 1<11.1,"" , .. "...".o"."..,o! • ...,... .... 1 ....... _","'0"- ......." ",.".0 .. -" .. , .. ",,,, I"'''''''' .. .-1"_" "'" ....'" ~ f ..... ,-'>''''1><.0 AMI .... ..,.· ....... .,.u.'" ..... .... ,,"" -
A RESOLUTION to Honor Four-Star General Carl Wade Stiner, Co-Author of Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces, a Best-Selling Book
Filed for intro on 05/01/2002 HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 925 By Goins A RESOLUTION to honor Four-Star General Carl Wade Stiner, co-author of Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces, a best-selling book. WHEREAS, this General Assembly is proud to honor those persons whose professional achievements have redounded to the benefit of the public good; and WHEREAS, General Carl Stiner is one such person, whose brilliant and distinguished military career has led to a prominent role in contributing to Shadow Warriors, co-authored by Tom Clancy about the U.S. Special Forces; and WHEREAS, born in LaFollette, General Stiner was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U. S. Army in May, 1958, following graduation from the Tennessee Polytechnical Institute with a Bachelor of Science degree in Agriculture. He later earned a Master of Science degree in Public Administration from Shippensburg State College; and WHEREAS, General Stiner was the Second Commander-in-Chief of the United States Special Operations Command headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, from May, 1990 to May, 1993. As Commander-in-Chief, he was responsible for the readiness of all Special Operations Forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, both in active duty and the reserves; and HJR0925 01425247 -1- WHEREAS, his major assignments include duty as Company Commander of the 5th Battalion, 1st Training Brigade. From August, 1964 until May, 1966, he was assigned to the 3rd Special Forces Group as Detachment Command and Company Operations Officer; and WHEREAS, following a tour in Southeast Asia, General Stiner reported for assignment to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U. -
US Army, Berlin, 1961-1994
COLD WARRIORS, GOOD NEIGHBORS, SMART POWER: U.S. ARMY, BERLIN, 1961-1994 Rex A. Childers A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2015 Committee: Beth A. Griech-Polelle, Advisor Marc V. Simon Graduate Faculty Representative Bill Allison Michael E. Brooks © 2015 Rex Childers All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Beth Griech-Polelle, Advisor The end of the Cold War and the manner in which it was “won” by the Allied nations ignited debate over the utility of military power as a source of American leadership in the new unipolar world. A popular theme arose, that a new form of state power, soft power, had the capacity to achieve America’s interests as it prepared to enter the 21st century. The idea that expensive and dangerous technologies could be replaced by investments in peaceful means of influence, wielded by America’s foreign policy professionals to foster a new cooperative spirit in the world, was naturally attractive. The United States could be relieved of much of its global military presence and reduce its military’s intrusions upon foreign people and their cultures. This dissertation challenges the assumption that the impact of military stationing in the Cold War was limited to hard power. In the case of the U.S. Army in Berlin, the unit and its members practiced civic, social, cultural, and political behaviors that meet the criteria of the post-Cold War branded term, soft power. In their daily interactions with Berliners, they exercised the full spectrum of foreign policy smart power tools, as Cold Warrior defenders of West Berlin and in compliance with U.S. -
Small Wars Journal U.S. Special Operations
Small Wars Journal www.smallwarsjournal.com U.S. Special Operations - Personal Opinions John M. Collins 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group Camp Mackall, NC, 11 December 2008 Vice Admiral James Stockdale, a Medal of Honor recipient and H. Ross Perot’s Vice Presidential running mate in 1992, opened his first and only televised appearance with these words: “Who am I? Why am I here?” His audience never did figure that out, but I’m gonna tell you right up front who I REALLY am and why I’m here. My Credentials I’m a paper-pusher with no decorations for valor. I’m an honorary member of Special Forces Chapter XIII in Korea, but remain a wannabe who never wore a green beret and briefly served with only one Special Ops outfit more than 40 years ago. That makes me feel like Elizabeth Taylor’s eighth husband on their wedding night: I know what I’m supposed to do, but I’m not sure how to make it interesting, because my knowledge about SOF is almost all second hand. Even so, I take comfort from long-standing close contact with a slew of icons like Bill Yarborough, who convinced President Kennedy that Army Special Forces possessed the capabilities he needed to combat Communist insurgencies; Sam Wilson, who helped convince Congress that it should create a U.S. Special Operations Command; and Barbwire Bob Kingston, who helped convince top-level decision-makers that Delta Force could provide the USA with much needed counterterrorism capabilities. Those great men all called me John and I called them by their first name, which is General. -
Brothers in Berets the Evolution of Air Force Special Tactics, 1953-2003
Brothers in Berets The Evolution of Air Force Special Tactics, 1953-2003 Forrest L. Marion, PhD Air Force History and Museums Program In Conjunction With Air Force Special Operations Command Air University Press Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Project Editors Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Belinda Bazinet and Dr. Ernest Allan Rockwell Names: Marion, Forrest L., author. | Air University (U.S.). Press, publisher. | Curtis E. LeMay Center for Copy Editor Doctrine Development and Education, issuing body. Tammi Dacus Title: Brothers in berets : the evolution of Air Force Cover Art and Book Design Special Tactics, 1953-2003 / Forrest L. Marion Daniel Armstrong Description: First edition. | Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama : Air University Press, Curtis E. LeMay Cen- Composition and Prepress Production Michele D. Harrell ter for Doctrine Development and Education, [2018]. | At head of title: Air University, Curtis E. LeMay Center Print Preparation and Distribution for Doctrine Development and Education. | Includes Diane Clark bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017059577| ISBN 9781585662784 | ISBN 158566278X Subjects: LCSH: United States. Air Force—Combat controllers—History. | United States. Air Force— Commando troops—History. | Special forces (Military science)—United States—History. | United States. Air Force Special Operations Command. Classification: LCC UG633 .M3144 2018 | DDC AIR UNIVERSITY PRESS 358.4131—dc23 | SUDOC D 301.26/6:T 11 -
WINTER 2008 - Volume 55, Number 4 WINTER 2008 - Volume 55, Number 4
WINTER 2008 - Volume 55, Number 4 WWW.AFHISTORICALFOUNDATION.ORG WINTER 2008 - Volume 55, Number 4 WWW.AFHISTORICALFOUNDATION.ORG From Satellite Tracking to Space Situational Awareness: Features The USAF and Space Surveillance 1957-2007 Rick W. Sturdevant 4 Precision Aerial Bombardment of Strategic Targets: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection Daniel L. Haulman 24 Operation Just Cause: An Air Power Perspective Stetson M. Siler 34 The P–51 Mustang: The Most Important Aircraft in History? Marshall L. Michel 46 Book Reviews The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 By Rick Atkinson Reviewed by Curtis H. O’Sullivan 58 The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 By Rick Atkinson Reviewed by Grant T. Weller 58 Gunning for the Red Baron By Leon Bennett Reviewed by Carl A. Christie 58 Clash of Eagles: USAAF 8th Air Force Bombers versus the Luftwafffe in World War II By Martin W. Bowman Reviewed by Anthony E. Wessel 59 Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space Race By Matthew Brzezinski Reviewed by J. Ron Davis 59 Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq By Steve Call Reviewed by David J. Schepp 60 A Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, and the Hard Lessons of War By Kenneth J. Campbell Reviewed by John L. Cirafici 60 Risk and Exploration: Earth, Sea, and the Stars By Steven J. Dick & Keith L. Cowing, Eds. Reviewed by Steven Pomeroy 61 Under the Guns of the Red Baron: Von Richtofen’s Victories and Victims Fully Illustrated By Norman Franks, et al. -
A Small War in Panama
A Small War in Panama The main Air Force contribution to Operation Just Cause was the airlift, which doubled the number of combat troops in the country. By John T. Correll n 1989, the United States decided “You could not buy Manuel Noriega, juries in Miami and Tampa, Fla., to take down the Noriega regime in but you could rent him,” said Gen. Colin indicted Noriega on 13 counts of Panama by military force. Manuel L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs violating US racketeering and drug Antonio Noriega had been dictator of Staff. laws. The indictments said he took Iof the country since 1983. Over the In addition to his moonlighting for the $4.6 million in payoffs for allowing the years, he had been on and off the CIA CIA, Noriega had side deals with Cuba, Colombian cartel to use Panamanian payroll, but that relationship soured as Libya, and other intelligence customers, ports and airports to ship cocaine to the his corruption, repression, and collusion and he allowed the Soviet KGB to oper- United States. In retaliation, the PDF in drug smuggling became too blatant ate freely in Panama. His ties with the intensified harassment of US military to ignore. Medellin drug cartel in Colombia were members and dependents in Panama. Noriega had risen in the service of close and of long standing. The United States had a stake in Panama’s previous dictator, Omar Torrijos, Noriega was ruthless in eliminating Panamanian affairs because of both who called him “my gangster.” the opposition. He ousted two elected the drug smuggling and continuing US Torrijos died in an airplane crash in Presidents when they resisted his will. -
The Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1996-12 The command and control of Special Operations Forces Brown, Harry S. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/39299 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE COMMAND AND CONTROL .OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES by Harry S. Brown December 1996 Thesis Advisor: Rodney Minott Second Reader: Wayne Hughes Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 19970626 051 Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Public reporting burden for this collection of infonnation is estimated to average I hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction. searching existing data sources, of this gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of infonnation. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect collection of infonnation, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Infonnation Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0!88) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 1996. Master's Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Command and Control of Special Operations Forces 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHOR(S) Harry Scott Brown 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Monterey CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. -
Washington Update
WASHINGTON UPDATE A MONTHLY NEWSLETIER Vol 6 No 7 Published by the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare August 1994 National security strategy statement signed by Readiness Task Force submits report. The find President Clinton. Titled "AN ational Security Strategy ings and recommendations of the Defense Science Board of Engagement and Enlargement, July 1994," this paper Task Force on Readiness, chaired by Gen. Edward C. outlines the administration's goals and guidelines under ·Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff, were released by three broad headings: security, economics and democ OSD on July 22. Based on preliminary releases, there racy. It is, therefore, considerably broader than national were no surprises in the final report. It found that the defense. readiness of forces today was generally acceptable for missions as currently defined. It did, however, note Such a statement has been long awaited, but it adds pockets of unreadiness and raised red flags for the future. nothing new with respect to national military strategy. Rather, it confirms the DoD Bottom-Up Review along The report strongly emphasized the need to keep readi with the adjusted five-year budget as basic defense ness as a top priority concern and the need to guard against the negative pressures (force reductions, fre guidelines. It endorses the need for capability to handle quent mission deployments, budget cuts, turbulence, two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts as the basis etc.) which could push forces into a "hollow state." for planning, and stresses the need to draw the line against further cuts that would undermine the force Special note was made of the need to address joint structure or erode U.S. -
Sarah B. Snyder Sarah B
CREATING REQUIREMENTS: EMERGING MILITARY CAPABILITIES, CIVILIAN PREFERENCES, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS By Alice Hunt Friend Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In International Relations Chair: Sharon K. Weiner, Ph.D. Sarah B. Snyder Sarah B. Snyder, Ph.D. Kathleen H. Hicks, Ph.D. Dean of the School of International Service 3/20/2020 Date 2020 American University Washington, D.C. 20016 © COPYRIGHT by Alice Hunt Friend 2020 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED To my compatriots, civilian and military. CREATING REQUIREMENTS: EMERGING MILITARY CAPABILITIES, CIVILIAN PREFERENCES, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS BY Alice Hunt Friend ABSTRACT This dissertation explores the relationship between civilian and military preferences in the United States. A standard measure of the health of the civil-military relationship is whether civilian preferences prevail over military preferences in times of disagreement. Generally, the civil-military relations literature focuses on civilian efforts to impose their preferences on the military. But is it possible that the military is able to impose its preferences on civilians as well? This study asks and answers the questions: Does the military shape civilian preferences, and to what extent? If the military does shape civilian preferences, under what conditions does it do so? I contend that both purposeful actions by the military and factors natural to the civil-military relationship, each centered on the distribution of information resources, shape civilian preferences. I hypothesize that the less information civilians possess relative to the military, the more civilian preferences are based on military preferences. -
Signal Brigade, and to Colonel William L
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE JARED A. KLINE, CAPT (P), USA B.A., The Citadel, Charleston South Carolina, 1980 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1991 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. - MASTER OF MILITARY SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of candidate: Captain Jared A. Kline Title of thesis: Joint Communications in Support of Joint Task Force South during Operation Just Cause. Approved by: -, Thesis Committee Chairman - , Member Major Scott Solon, M.A. Accepted this 7th Day of June 1991 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ABSTRACT JOINT COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE by Capt. (P) Jared A. Kline, USA, 240 pages. This study investigates and analyzes the provision of tactical and strategic communications in support of Joint Task Force South (JTF-South) during Operation Just Cause, the American invasion of Panama during the period 20 December 1989-12 January 1990. The purpose of the study is to present a detailed analysis of communications support actually provided to a Joint Task Force engaged in a contingency operation, while recording for posterity the actual history of what occurred in this connection.