A Force at Razor's Edge
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April 2010/$4 A Force at Razor’s Edge Cyber Menace Tankers in Unknown Territory MiG Alley Remembered F-35 LIGHTNING II USA DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE. THE PARTNERSHIPS WithW each flight test, the F-35 Lightning II continues to ddeliver unprecedented performance as the world’s only iniinternational 5th generation multirole fighter. While each vvariant is uniquely designed to operate from different bbases, all three variants – conventional, carrier and SSTOVL – set new standards in network-enabled mission ssystems, sensor fusion, supportability and maintainability. AllA while bringing together nnine international partners wwith a common commitment tto build the most capable, aaffordable multirole fighter that willw provide global security forfof decades to come. F-35 – COMMITMENT Redefining the multirole fighter. NORTHROP GRUMMAN BAE SYSTEMS PRATT & WHITNEY GE ROLLS-ROYCE FIGHTER ENGINE TEAM LOCKHEED MARTIN April 2010, Vol. 93, No. 4 2 Editorial: The Mullen Doctrine 56 Commissioned in Hanoi By Robert S. Dudney By Leo K. Thorsness The threshold for commitment of Art Cormier, Neil Black, and Bill forces is lower than it used to be. Robinson showed excellence in the Now it looks like it will go lower still. POW camps around Hanoi. 24 A Force at Razor’s Edge 61 MiG Alley By John A. Tirpak By John T. Correll There will be no margin for error, The American F-86 Sabres stopped said senior Air Force leaders at the MiG-15s—and their Russian AFA’s Air Warfare Symposium. pilots—at the Yalu. 30 Airpower On Demand 65 Chart Page Special: By Marc V. Schanz Defense Budget at a Glance 34 At AFA’s Air Warfare Symposium in By Tamar A. Mehuron and Heather Orlando, airmen describe incessant Lewis requests for what USAF does. 68 The Longest Mission 34 China Turns Up the Heat By Charles A. Jones By Richard Halloran The crew of the B-29 Double Trouble The Chinese military is pushing had some odd moments on a flight hard into cyber warfare, anti-access fraught with dangers. weapons, and others means to blunt US advantages. 38 Battling the Phantom Menace By Rebecca Grant www.airforce-magazine.com USAF’s cyberwar-fighting 24th Air Force is up against an anonymous 4 Letters and hard-striking set of foes. 48 10 Washington Watch 44 When the U-2 Fell to Earth 12 Air Force World By Walter J. Boyne Fifty years ago, a Soviet missile shot 15 Index to Advertisers down Francis Gary Powers and his exotic spyplane. 18 Senior Staff Changes 22 Issue Brief 48 What’s Next for Airborne Laser? By Thomas Duffy 43 Verbatim The ABL did everything it was sup- 72 The Keeper File posed to do. Now, the Pentagon wants to call it quits. 73 AFA National Report 52 Tankers in Unknown Territory 76 Unit Reunions By Marc V. Schanz 79 AFA National Leaders “Nobody’s ever flown a modern jet transport for 80 years.” 80 Airpower Classics About the cover: An F-22 Raptor in a sharp turn. See “A Force at Ra- zor’s Edge,” p. 24. Photo by Richard Seaman. AIR FORCE Magazine (ISSN 0730-6784) April 2010 (Vol. 93, No. 4) is published monthly by the Air Force Association, 1501 Lee Highway, Arlington, VA 22209-1198. Phone (703) 247-5800. Second-class postage paid at Arlington, Va., and additional mailing offices. Membership Rate: $36 per year; $90 for three-year membership. Life Membership (nonrefundable): $500 single payment, $525 extended payments. Subscription Rate: $36 per year; $29 per year additional for postage to foreign addresses (except Canada and Mexico, which are $10 per year additional). Regular issues $4 each. USAF Almanac issue $6 each. Change of address requires four weeks’ notice. Please include mailing label. POSTMASTER: Send changes of address to Air Force Association, 1501 Lee Highway, Arlington, VA 22209-1198. Publisher assumes no responsibility for unsolicited material. Trademark registered by Air Force Association. Copyright 2010 by Air Force Association. AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2010 1 Editorial By Robert S. Dudney, Editor in Chief The Mullen Doctrine KEY issue for the US concerns when, and senior officers were determined to to end up, after the Sept. 11 terrorist at- A how, and for what America will fight. prevent recurrences. tacks, mounting the largest use of force In October 1984, Secretary of State The 1990-91 Gulf War met all of since Vietnam. In Iraq, Bush’s resort to George P. Shultz famously warned about Weinberger’s six tests, and proved to be “preventive war” drove the threshold of becoming “the Hamlet of nations,” frozen a shining example of how to commit US combat to new depths. by uncertainty. He wanted President forces. The then-JCS Chairman, Gen. By one count, the US has committed Reagan to pull the trigger more often, Colin Powell, was a former Weinberger forces more than 75 times since 1980. even in murky situations. aide and advocate of his ex-boss’s views. Thus, Admiral Mullen’s expansive view This greatly bothered Defense Secre- His own set of tests, “the Powell Doc- on the use of military power seems less tary Caspar Weinberger, who proposed trine,” made “decisive” force a priority. like a departure from the norm than it six tests for use of force. Is a vital na- Toward the end of his 1989-93 tenure, does a recognition of the facts of life. tional interest at stake? Will we commit Powell’s view drew fire. Rep. Les Aspin For all that, the Mullen Doctrine un- resources to win? Will we sustain that avoidably raises concerns about employ- commitment? Is the objective clear? Can The threshold for commit- ment of military power. we expect public support? Is force a last ment of forces is lower than One is the danger of “gradualism,” resort? The “Weinberger Doctrine” set a it used to be. Now it looks Vietnam-style. As Mullen correctly ob- high bar for a few years. serves, “We can, merely by our pres- Ultimately, though, the Shultz view like it will go lower still. ence, help alter certain behavior.” It is has prevailed. In the post-Weinberger (D-Wis.), chairman of House Armed also true that each actual commitment world, Washington has progressively Services Committee, claimed in 1992 of Americans to combat carries risk, loosened up on its use of force, at times that Powell and other military leaders with its own dynamic. Limited opera- dispatching US units with undefined or constituted an “All-or-Nothing” school tions can generate pressure to expand vague objectives. The threshold for com- of thought. Building up in reaction, in intended ways. mitment of forces is lower than it used to he added, was a “Limited Objectives” Another concern stems from restric- be. Now it looks like it will go lower still. school, which saw merit in using force tive rules of engagement—a precondi- A new jolt of downward pressure was more often for lesser interests. tion for “precise” use of force. Mullen recently delivered by Adm. Michael G. This was inevitable. In the Weinberg- concedes US troops in Afghanistan Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs er-Powell era, the goal was to deter “have concerns” about such restraints of Staff. In March 3 remarks at Kansas nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Only on their actions, and “believe they have State University, the top US officer a vital interest was worth the risk of es- become more vulnerable.” sketched out a “Mullen Doctrine” of sorts, calation. When the USSR collapsed, the In addition, Mullen’s third point wak- with three key “principles”: risk faded. Also, advanced technology ens echoes of Vietnam, a conflict char- “We must not look upon the use of made it easier to use force—especially acterized by political meddling in what military forces only as a last resort, but airpower—with precision and limited risk. should have been military decisions. as potentially the best, first option.” President Clinton came to office in “Some in the military no doubt would “We must not try to use force only 1993 prepared to make freer use of prefer political leadership that lays out in an overwhelming capacity, but ... in a force. Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s a specific strategy and then gets out of precise and principled manner.” ambassador to the UN, asked Powell: the way,” he said, adding his view that “We must not shrink from the tug of “What’s the point of having this superb this is not possible in today’s wars. war ... that inevitably plays out between military that you’re always talking about The Mullen Doctrine does little to as- policy-making and strategy execution.” if we can’t use it?” sist policy-makers struggling with new Where Weinberger counseled cau- In line with this view, George H. W. sets of military threats such as cyberwar tion, Mullen offers enthusiasm; where Bush’s late 1992 humanitarian mission and Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons. In Weinberger liked decisive power, Mullen to Somalia was transformed in 1993 into such situations, should use of force be demands restraint; where Weinberger Bill Clinton’s armed peacekeeping in a last resort, or an early option? Should wanted military execution of a clear that chaotic nation. In the end, 18 Army any future action be restrained, given plan, the admiral welcomes a “struggle” Rangers died pursuing a Somali warlord the price of failure? Should political between officers and civilians. in Mogadishu, and the US withdrew. influences intrude? Mullen’s concept is not necessarily Still, the threshold of combat contin- In his 1993 memoir Turmoil and Tri- wrong. The details matter, but that is ued downward through the 1990s, with umph, Shultz had harsh words for Wein- getting ahead of the story.