NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California thesis THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS by Michael S. Reilly December 1996 Thesis Advisor: John Arquilla Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. SCHOOL Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | 5! REP6RT t)ATE T. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 1996 Master's Thesis 4. TITLE AMD SUBTITLE T. FUNDING NUMBERS THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 6. AUtHOR(S) Reilly, Michael S. 7. PERFORMING oRgaN1ZaTI6N NaME(S) aND addREss(Es) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey CA 93943-5000 9~ SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.SPONSOR1NG /MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 1 1 . SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. dIstRIbUtIoN/aVaILabILIty STATEMENT T2b! DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines the effect that ROE have on the conduct of special operations in order to contribute to an increased understanding of the proper employment of elite forces. It argues that "inappropriate" ROE can result from 1) an imbalance in the natural tension between the requirements of statecraft and military efficiency present in all military operations and 2) organizational friction resulting from inaccurate translation of broad political objectives, through various levels in the chain of command, into an inappropriate tactical ROE for a specific unit. Additionally, it argues that the nature of special operations missions, and the principles vital to their proper employment, cause them to be most sensitive to these sources of inappropriate ROE in either crisis or conflict. This thesis concludes that ROE can be used to achieve indirect political control over special operations, but achieving this control is more difficult and more hazardous with special operations than with conventional forces. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Rules of Engagement (ROE), Special Operations Forces (SOF), special PAGES operations, control, Operation Just Cause, command and Panama, 242 UNOSOM II, Somalia IE PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY i$. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT THIS PAGE ABSTRACT UL Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 11 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS Michael S. Reilly Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.S\, United States Naval Academy, 1986 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December, 1996 DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY K »«™,»„m ' "GRADUATE SCHOOL ABSTRACT MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 This thesis examines the effect that ROE have on the conduct of special operations in order to contribute to an increased understanding of the proper employment of elite forces. It argues that "inappropriate" ROE can result from 1) an imbalance in the natural tension between the requirements of statecraft and military efficiency present in all military operations and 2) organizational friction resulting from inaccurate translation of broad political objectives, through various levels in the chain of command, into an inappropriate tactical ROE for a specific unit. Additionally, it argues that the nature of special operations, and the principles vital to their proper employment, cause them to be most sensitive to these sources of inappropriate ROE in either crisis or conflict. This thesis concludes that ROE can be used to achieve indirect political control over special operations, but achieving this control is more difficult and more hazardous with special operations than with conventional forces. v VI . .... 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS I INTRODUCTION 1 A. RELEVANCE 1 B . PURPOSE 3 C . THESIS OVERVIEW 5 II THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 13 A. ROE IN THEORY 14 1 Definitions 14 2 Development Of Current ROE Methods 16 3 Forms Of Indirect Control Using ROE 23 4. Influences In The Creation Of ROE 24 5 How The Roe Control The Use Of Force 27 B ROE IN REALITY 32 1 Organization Theory 33 2 Definitions 34 3 The Structural Frame of Reference 36 4. The Human Resource Frame of Reference 43 5. The Political Frame of Reference 51 6 The Cultural Frame of Reference 54 C . CONCLUSIONS 58 III THEORY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND ROE 61 A. DEFINITIONS AND TYPOLOGY 62 1 Definitions 62 2 Typology of Special Operations 63 VI .. .. B. THE STRATEGIC LEVEL OF ANALYSIS - 68 C THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 76 D THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 78 E . CONCLUSIONS 87 IV. PANAMA: THE PAITILLA AIRPORT OPERATION 91 A INTRODUCTION 91 B BACKGROUND 93 1 The Situation in Panama 93 2 The Political Objectives 97 3 Military Objectives 101 4. The Resulting ROE for Operation Just Cause 106 C . TASK FORCE WHITE OPERATIONS 108 1. TF White's Objectives 108 2 . Planning 110 3 . Execution 122 D. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 132 V. SOMALIA 13 9 A. INTRODUCTION 139 B . BACKGROUND 141 C. THE INTERVENTION: POLITICAL GOALS, MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND THE ROE 144 1 UNOSOM I 144 2 UNITAF 145 3 UNOSOM II 147 D FACTORS COMPLICATING THE ROE 152 Vlll . E TASK FORCE RANGER OPERATIONS 154 1 Background 154 2 Analysis 158 a Planning Phase 158 b. Execution Phase 163 F SOF SNIPER OPERATIONS 168 1 Background 168 2. Analysis 170 G CONCLUSIONS 177 VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 181 APPENDIX A. ROE FOR OPERATION JUST CAUSE 191 APPENDIX B. UNITAF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 193 APPENDIX C . UNOSOM II RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 195 APPENDIX D. UNOSOM II FRAGMENTARY ORDERS 3 9 AND 101 199 APPENDIX E . TASK FORCE RANGER ROE 2 01 APPENDIX F. ROE USED BY SOF SNIPERS 203 APPENDIX G. MAPS 2 05 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 211 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 217 IX EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The ROE under which SOF operate were initially influenced and formalized with ships, aircraft or general purpose ground forces in mind. These ROE were created within a Cold War setting and calibrated to minimize chances of sparking general war with the USSR. With the end of the Cold War and an increased focus on and employment of SOF, it is imperative that the ROE governing special operations be examined. The ROE used in the conduct of special operations influence the success or failure of these operations, and in turn contribute to the success or failure of national policy. The purpose of this thesis is to address the effect that the ROE have on the conduct of special operations and to contribute to an increased understanding of the proper employment of elite forces. Specifically, this thesis addresses two questions. First, can ROE be used to achieve indirect political control over special operations? Second, what are the causes and consequences of "inappropriate" ROE when employing SOF in pursuit of political objectives? I argue that there are two causes of inappropriate ROE. First, inappropriate ROE can result from an imbalance in the natural tension between the requirements of statecraft and military efficiency present in all military operations. This tension becomes greater in the OOTW environment where the political objectives and military requirements experience the greatest XI . 1 divergence. Oddly, the ROE are a case where healthy "pulling and hauling" between policy makers and military commanders makes for better, rather than worse, overall outcomes. Second, while inappropriate ROE can result from an imbalance in the political-military tension, I argue that organizational friction is also a cause of inappropriate ROE. Using organization theory, this thesis examines how organizational friction is created from inaccurate translation of broad political objectives, through various levels in the chain of command, into inappropriate tactical ROE for a specific unit. In this situation there can exist, not only written ROE, but also implicit ROE. Finally, I argue that the nature of special operations, and the principles vital to their proper employment, cause them to be most sensitive to these sources of inappropriate ROE in either a crisis or conflict. This thesis lays out exactly how the ROE can affect SOF and their ability to conduct operations successfully on a strategic, operational and tactical level in support of a larger military or national purpose. U.S. intervention in two different cases, Panama and Somalia, are examined through a process of "analytic induction" to illustrate the results of employing ROE that are inappropriate in the conduct of special operations The first case, the U.S. Navy SEAL raid on Paitilla airfield during Operation Just Cause, illustrates how XI . inappropriate ROE are created through organizational friction. Operation Just Cause was a unilateral U.S. action influenced by a great concern for minimizing collateral damage in an effort to avoid domestic and international criticism. During the translation of the political goals into military objectives and tactical ROE by each level in the chain of command, inferences "shaped" the written ROE and created implicit ROE which further restricted the conduct of this operation.