DOCSLIB.ORG

Download Date 29/09/2021 10:09:31

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Download Date 29/09/2021 10:09:31 Coin: the missing currency in peace support operations and beyond Item Type Thesis Authors Pinder, David Rights <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-nc-nd/3.0/"><img alt="Creative Commons License" style="border-width:0" src="http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by- nc-nd/3.0/88x31.png" /></a><br />The University of Bradford theses are licenced under a <a rel="license" href="http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/">Creative Commons Licence</a>. Download date 29/09/2021 10:09:31 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10454/2320 University of Bradford eThesis This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team © University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons Licence. COIN: THE MISSING CURRENCY IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND BEYOND? David Pinder Dissertation submitted for The degree of Master of Philosophy Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford 2007 ABSTRACT David PINDER COIN: THE MISSING CURRENCY IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND BEYOND? Keywords: Counterinsurgency, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Peace Support Operations, Intervention, Post-conflict Stabilisation, UN Military Missions The United Nations has a long history of peacekeeping missions. These have evolved over time but since the end of the Cold War there has been rapid growth in those missions where the remit placed on the peacekeepers, both military and civilian, is more complex and demanding. In trying to define these missions and their mandates a wide range of terminology has been developed in an effort to describe the exact nature of the mission. Since many of these deployments take place into theatres where there is no peace to keep, or where a fragile peace reverts to a conflict situation such tight definitions often lead to the troops involved no longer having an appropriate mandate. More recently some of these larger missions constitute in fact interventions to impose peace. Attempts to find a „peace‟ classification for such deployments often confuse the issue rather than bring clarity. In reality these missions are not peacekeeping at all. The almost forgotten doctrine, principles and practices of Counterinsurgency provide a better framework for defining these missions, the respective roles of the key players and the factors necessary to bring success. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I am grateful to: Oliver Ramsbotham for suggesting that I attempt this project in the first place. Jim Whitman for his supervision, constant support and encouragement – far beyond the call of duty. My friend and former colleague, Nick Evans for his assistance in uncovering the more obscure details of early military expeditions. Colleagues and comrades, too numerous to mention, with whom I have served and who have helped to form my experiences and opinions. I particularly acknowledge and remember those who did not return from the various missions in which I have participated. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Setting the Problem: P.1 Chapter Two: The Evolution of Peace Support Operations: P.14 Chapter Three: Case Studies: P.41 Chapter Four: The Convergence of Peace Support Operations with Classical COIN Operations: P.111 Chapter Five: The Situation Today: P.150 Bibliography: P.185 iv COIN1: THE MISSING CURRENCY IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND BEYOND? CHAPTER ONE SETTING THE PROBLEM Sadly, in the 50th year of UN peacekeeping operations, the perceived failures and costs of the UN mission in former Yugoslavia, and recent experiences in Somalia, have led to widespread disillusionment. Yet if the world loses faith in peacekeeping, and responses to the new world disorder are limited to the extremes of total war or total peace, the world will become a more dangerous place. Rather than lose faith in the whole peace process, we need to analyse the changed operational circumstances and try to determine new doctrines for the future. General Sir Michael Rose, Commander UNPROFOR in Bosnia, 1994-5 How to bring an end to conflicts short of formal war and replace them with order and stability is a question which has occupied the international community increasingly since the end of the Cold War. The problem is not new. In itself this seems a fatuous comment - at best a banality - with which to begin such a work; however the fact remains that it is a problem, whether it concerns formal war between states or what have sometimes been called Small Wars2, which has been around as long as one group has sought to impose a solution on another group. Even in what is commonly termed the ancient period the problem was hardly new. Examples include Alexander the Great‟s defeat of the Persian Empire and his subsequent attempts to hold together its component parts; the early and late Roman Republic and Empire; and the Mongol Empire of Ghengis Khan and his successors found difficulty not in conquest but in reconstruction of the conquered lands. Later history includes yet more examples from both East and West, whilst more recently the Age of European Imperial expansion yields further examples. It is not suggested that these earlier examples provide „best practice‟ models but it does illustrate that the current period is in no way unique in facing such challenges. The greater problem is not war, 1 The traditional military abbreviation for Counter Insurgency. 2 Caldwell, C. E., Small Wars, London, HMSO, 1896. 1 difficult though that may be, it is the rebuilding afterwards which requires the greater skill. The more remarkable then that to date there are few examples of „getting it right‟; the more remarkable then that so many of the same errors are made on each occasion. It can be well argued that the Allied philosophy and programme after the successful invasion of Europe in 1944 provides many examples of good practice; and considering the scale of the conflict and the complexity and scale of the post-conflict tasks, it was certainly an awesome achievement. Equally, however, examination of the planning for it also reveals that even here there were failings which seem to be characteristic of such endeavours. Robert Murphy, appointed political advisor on German affairs to General Eisenhower in September, 1944, recalled: I was aware that an Anglo-American-Russian agency, called the European Advisory Commission, had been at work in London all through 1944 trying to decide how to administer Germany and I assumed at this late date a detailed occupation plan must be in readiness. Paris had been liberated on August 25, Allied armies were advancing from the west, Russian armies were closing in from the east and the surrender of Germany appeared imminent. To my astonishment, I learned in Washington that no American plan was ready yet because President Roosevelt had not made known his own views and the three departments of the government were wrangling among themselves about postwar Germany. 3 When WWII ended the international community, conscious of the shortcomings of the League of Nations, established the United Nations (UN) in the hope that future conflicts could either be avoided altogether or at worst, brought back from violence to negotiation. The advent of the Cold War placed a cold hand on the more optimistic of these hopes but the consequent emergence of peacekeeping as a lesser option seemed to offer a way forward. Peacekeeping has evolved considerably in the intervening years and several clear stages in that process can be identified; these will be examined in Chapters Two and Four. The end of the Cold War paradoxically gave the UN the opportunity to function 3 Murphy, R., Diplomat Among Warriors, London, Collins, 1964, p.279. 2 more nearly as its founders had hoped, but also saw a significant increase in small wars, which the unreformed UN was incapable of either preventing or managing. This, in turn, led to a plethora of studies, reforms, attempts to redefine categories of UN missions, unrealistic expectations and occasions when regional organisations took the initiative, either with or without UN authorisation. Most recent and perhaps most contentious of the new types of mission are those designated Peace-Enforcement Missions. Whilst clinging to the word „peace‟ in their title they are a tacit admission that they deploy into areas where there is no peace to keep. The term „Peace Support Operations‟ (PSOs) is also finding favour, although as will be demonstrated, in actual fact it is more of an „umbrella‟ term than a concise definition. The advent of global terrorism has brought in another dimension which further confuses the boundaries between traditional peacekeeping and normal war. It will be argued that Peace Enforcement Missions and the immediate post-combat phase of interventions, create a type of operation which fits into neither of these categories but which closely resembles what used to be termed Counterinsurgency. It will be argued that study of this near-forgotten doctrine, its philosophies and methodologies provides the key to understanding the dynamics and requirements of today‟s complex and demanding missions. For reasons of space, missions other than peacekeeping will not be considered in detail; thus although post-conflict peace building (PCPB) missions enjoy a close relationship to peacekeeping operations and as will be shown, share many characteristics with COIN, it will be for others to examine that relationship. It is partly the complexity of these recent missions which exposes the flaws inherent in present planning and practice, irrespective of the exact nature of the mission. For example, where the number of actors is large, the need for a clear mandate and constant 3 cooperation and coordination increases correspondingly; equally, the difficulties in achieving them are also greater and the consequences more severe and obvious if they are not achieved.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Working Environment of Interpreters, Translators And
    The care and feeding of linguists: the working environment of interpreters, translators and linguists during peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina Dr Catherine Baker University of Southampton Contact details: Department of Modern Languages, Avenue Campus, University of Southampton, Highfield Road, Southampton, SO17 1BF. Email: [email protected] Abstract: The history of war and peacekeeping has little to say about languages or the people who work with them, yet a closer inspection shows that contacts between different languages and the presence of an interpreter were a routine experience during the peacekeeping and peace-building operations conducted by the UN and NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This paper shows how political, strategic, tactical and economic pressures affected the working lives of local civilians employed as interpreters/translators/linguists and the soldiers from the multinational force who served as military interpreters. In so doing, it argues that the history of interlingual communication deserves to be included in the history of conflict. The United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) to safeguard humanitarian aid convoys and protect the UN safe areas during the war (1992–95), then implement and uphold the Dayton peace agreement which laid out BiH’s post-war settlement, required a multi-national assortment of soldiers and civilian defence staff to encounter a place of which they mostly knew little and forced the remaining inhabitants of BiH to encounter them. Indeed, the activities of ‘peacekeeping’ comprised a multitude of intercultural encounters not only between the peacekeepers and the local civilian and military populations but also between the soldiers from more than 30 different national and military cultures who worked together at headquarters, in logistics or engineering projects, on weapons inspections and in combined training exercises.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rules of Engagement in the Conduct of Special Operations
    NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California thesis THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS by Michael S. Reilly December 1996 Thesis Advisor: John Arquilla Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. SCHOOL Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | 5! REP6RT t)ATE T. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 1996 Master's Thesis 4. TITLE AMD SUBTITLE T. FUNDING NUMBERS THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 6. AUtHOR(S) Reilly, Michael S. 7. PERFORMING oRgaN1ZaTI6N NaME(S) aND addREss(Es) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey CA 93943-5000 9~ SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.SPONSOR1NG /MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 1 1 . SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. dIstRIbUtIoN/aVaILabILIty STATEMENT T2b! DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
    [Show full text]
  • Excerpt from Compellence and Accommodation In
    Excerpt from Compellence and Accommodation in Counterinsurgency Warfare A Dissertation Presented to The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University Politics Department Robert J. Art, Advisor In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy by Jacqueline L. Hazelton August 2011 Part II Successful Enemy-Centric-Plus Counterinsurgency Chapter 3 The Case Of Dhofar, Oman, 1965-1976 INTRODUCTION Oman defeated a nationalist-Communist insurgency that enjoyed a secure cross- border base and external state support. It took 11 years and significant British and regional military and political backing. Oman, on the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, has remained a stable state and a Western ally ever since. How did it happen? The conventional wisdom on Dhofar says the rise of an enlightened leader brought fast economic and political development, gained the allegiance of the populace, and thus defeated the insurgency. This view supports the contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) emphasis on a population-centric approach to success.1 Archival research and interviews with British officers who led the campaign reveal a more complex, less ambitious success. The COIN campaign began with the use of collective punishment and reprisals against the populace as a whole, but the British-led Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) only managed to fight the growing insurgency to a stalemate. The campaign entered a new phase under a new, British-approved sultan. Hard fighting reliant on superior firepower and mobility eventually defeated the insurgency 1 A number of scholars include Dhofar in the ranks of population-centric successes. See, e.g., Thomas R.
    [Show full text]
  • International Co-Operation in the Use of Elite Military
    INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE USE OF ELITE MILITARY FORCES TO COUNTER TERRORISM: THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE EXPERIENCES IN THE EVOLUTION OF LOW-INTENSITY OPERATIONS BY JOSEPH PAUL DE BOUCHERVILLE TAILLON A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE LONDON, ENGLAND, 1992 UMI Number: U615541 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615541 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 F 7 0 XJl\lbj6S3 ABSTRACT J. Paul de B. Taillon "International Co-operation in the Employment of Elite Military Forces to Counter-Terrorism: The British and American Experience With Special Reference to Their Respective Experiences in the Evolution of Low-Intensity Operations." This thesis examines the employment of elite military forces in low-intensity and counter-terrorist operations, and in particular, placing the principal emphasis on the aspect of international co-operation in the latter. The experiences of Great Britain and the United States in such operations are the main elements of the discussion, reflecting their heavy involvement in such operations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Newsletternewsletter
    TheThe DevonshireDevonshire andand DorsetDorset RegimentalRegimental AssociationAssociation THE DEVONSHIRE AND DORSET REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER No 12 - 2018 ASSOCIATION REGIMENTAL AND DORSET THE DEVONSHIRE THE DEVONSHIRE AND DORSET REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER No 12 - 2018 ASSOCIATION REGIMENTAL AND DORSET THE DEVONSHIRE 11th, 39th and 54th of Foot TheThe NewsletterNewsletter No 12 2018 THE DEVONSHIRE AND DORSET REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER THE DEVONSHIRE AND DORSET REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER 2018 Contents Locations 2 The Regimental Charities 36 The Regimental Association 2 Regimental Reunion 38 Regimental Association Reunion 2019 2 Events Chairman’s Message 3 Bois des Buttes Centenary 44 President’s Message 4 Pte Sidney Humphris Centenary 50 Association Calendar 5 Locquignol Liberation Centenary 52 Appointments 7 Minden Dorsets Band Concert 54 Editorial 8 LCpl Onions VC Memorial Plaque 54 Supporting the Regimental Association 8 Weymouth Remembrance Parade 55 The Association Website 10 Weymouth Veterans Weekend 56 Information on Branches 11 Photographic Memories 58 Focal Point Leaders 12 Historical Articles President's Awards 13 A Tale of Two Victoria Crosses 63 Notices 14 Wimbledon Parish Church Memorials 64 Postbag 16 The Battle of Plassey 66 The Keep Military Museum 19 11th Foot Military Aid, Cornwall 1873 70 Branch Reports Fovant Badges 71 Band 22 An Extraordinary Man 72 Bridport 23 Malta GC 74 Exeter 23 Sarah Sands - a Little Known Fact 76 Gillingham 26 The Other William Shakespear 77 Honiton 28 Welfare Report 78 The Officers' Club 28 News from The Rifles 84 D and D Old Comrades Forum 29 Bankers order form The Bugle 88 Plymouth 31 Last Post 89 Poole 33 Obituaries 91 Purbeck 34 Support Your Newsletter 95 Semper Fidelis Dinner Club 34 Editor: Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) GS Nicholls © Crown Copyright: This publication contains official information.
    [Show full text]
  • The Devonshire and Dorset Regimental Association Newsletter
    THE DEVONSHIRE AND DORSET REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER THE DEVONSHIRE AND DORSET REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER 2017 Contents Locations 2 Plymouth 23 The Regimental Association 2 Poole 23 Regimental Association Reunion 2018 2 Purbeck 24 Chairman’s Message 3 Semper Fidelis Dinner Club 24 President’s Message 3 Weymouth 25 Association Calendar 4 The Regimental Charities 26 Appointments 6 Regimental Reunion 26 Editorial 7 Supporting the Regimental Association 7 Events The Association Website 8 Field of Remembrance 30 Information on Branches 9 Junior Soldiers Reunion at Wyvern Barracks 31 Focal Point Leaders 10 The Regimental Memorial at the President's Awards 11 National Memorial Arboretum 32 Notices 12 Legion d'Honneur Awards 44 Postbag 12 Tirah Memorial Service - Dorchester 44 The Keep Military Museum 14 Plassey Day Celebrations 46 Branch Reports An Unknown Dorset Regiment Soldier 46 Band 15 New Memorial Unveiled at Wagon Hill 47 Bath 16 Bridport 16 Welfare Report 48 Exeter 16 News from The Rifles 51 Exmouth 17 Bankers order form The Bugle 56 Gillingham 18 Last Post 57 The Officers' Club 19 Obituaries 58 D and D Old Comrades Forum 21 Memorial Donors 66 Editor: Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) GS Nicholls © Crown Copyright: This publication contains official information. It should be treated with discretion by the recipient. The opinions expressed in the articles in this journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy and views, official or otherwise, of the Regiment or the Ministry of Defence. No responsibility for the goods or services advertised in this journal can be accepted by the publishers or printers.
    [Show full text]
  • Kindle Trusted Mole: a Soldier S Journey Into Bosnia S
    Trusted Mole: A Soldier s Journey into Bosnia s Heart of Darkness > Book » WZQT8LGHEI Trusted Mole: A Soldier s Journey into Bosnia s Heart of Darkness By Milos Stankovic HarperCollins Publishers, United Kingdom, 2001. Paperback. Book Condition: New. 194 x 130 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. The powerful, disturbing and highly acclaimed account of a British officer in the Parachute Regiment, of part Yugoslav origin, painfully caught up in the savage maelstrom of the Bosnian war. Milos Stankovic worked as an interpreter and liaison officer for senior British commanders and two British UN generals - Mike Rose and Rupert Smith. Armed with the pseudonym Mike Stanley he was propelled from one nerve-racking crisis to another as he helped negotiate ceasefires between rival warlords, secured the release of UN hostages and organised the escape from Sarajevo of stricken families. Yet his close contacts with the Bosnian Serb leadership of Dr Karadzic and General Mladic bred suspicion and paranoia on all sides - not just in the Bosnian Muslim and Serb ranks (who thought he might be a British spy - General Rose s trusted mole ) but in the minds of the Americans as well. In a final, horrific twist, the author was arrested by the British authorities on suspicion of being a Serb spy - two and a half years after returning from Bosnia. READ ONLINE [ 4.45 MB ] Reviews This book will never be easy to start on reading but quite exciting to see. It is actually rally intriguing throgh looking at period of time. Your daily life span will be convert once you total looking over this book.
    [Show full text]
  • The “Hearts and Minds” Fallacy the “Hearts and Jacqueline L
    The “Hearts and Minds” Fallacy The “Hearts and Jacqueline L. Minds” Fallacy Hazelton Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare Debates over how governments can defeat insurgencies ebb and ºow with international events. Such debates tend to arise when the United States runs into problems in its efforts to support a counterinsurgent government. Often the United States approaches the problem of an armed, organized, internal nonstate political challenge to a government as a zero-sum game. In this competition, the state and nonstate actors compete for popular support and cooperation. The U.S. prescription for success is twofold: to provide support for liberaliz- ing, democratizing reforms designed to reduce popular grievances and gain popular support while weakening the insurgency, and to target insurgents with military force without harming civilians. I identify this prescription as the “good governance approach” for its focus on building a liberal, reform- ist central government to quell insurgency. Others have referred to it as the “population-centric approach,” the “comprehensive approach,” or the “hearts-and-minds approach.”1 In this article, I reconsider the effectiveness of the good governance ap- proach in light of the extreme difªculty that liberal great powers have experi- enced in applying it in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Since the al-Qaida attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been trying to help smaller Jacqueline L. Hazelton is Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College. For their helpful comments, the author thanks the anonymous reviewers, Robert Art, Andrew Birtle, Nick Carter, Joseph Collins, Conrad Crane, David Edelstein, William Fallon, Brendan Green, Chaim Kaufmann, Rodrigo Javier Massi, Emily Meierding, J.E.
    [Show full text]
  • Anglo- Iranian Military Relations During the Dhofar War in Oman
    ‘AMATEURS WHO PLAY IN LEAGUE DIVISION ONE’? ‘Amateurs Who Play in League Division One’? Anglo- Iranian Military Relations During the Dhofar War in Oman GERAINT HUGHES King’s College London Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT This article examines the Iranian military intervention in the civil war in Dhofar, Oman, from 1972 to 1975, focusing in particular on the often strained relationship between the Imperial Iranian Task Force (IITF) and the officers of the British armed forces seconded to command the Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces (SAF). This article concludes that while the IITF was hampered by its own internal shortcomings and also distrust of its British allies, it made an important contribution to the Sultanate’s victory in the Dhofar conflict. The Anglo-Iranian relationship in this war also highlights the potential challenges that Western militaries can face when advising and mentoring non-Western allies in future expeditionary conflicts. Introduction In the autumn of 1972 Shah Reza Pahlavi, the absolutist ruler of Iran, began an incremental intervention in the civil war raging at that time in Southern Oman. Acting at the request of his fellow monarch, the Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said, the Shah first committed special forces soldiers to the fight against the guerrillas of the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), 1 and subsequently deployed a series of task forces of increasing size to Dhofar, the main battleground of the PFLO insurgency. This represented the Imperial Iranian armed forces’ (Artesh) first experience of battle since the suppression of the Soviet-backed separatist republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in December 1946.2 In this campaign 1 The insurgent movement in Dhofar changed its name four times between 1963 and 1974, and for convenience’s sake the author has used its final version, the PFLO, throughout this article.
    [Show full text]
  • Find Book Trusted Mole: a Soldier S Journey Into Bosnia S Heart Of
    5GY7V8VNX1WQ \\ Kindle Trusted Mole: A Soldier s Journey into Bosnia s Heart of Darkness Trusted Mole: A Soldier s Journey into Bosnia s Heart of Darkness Filesize: 2.93 MB Reviews A really awesome book with lucid and perfect information. Of course, it is actually play, nonetheless an amazing and interesting literature. You are going to like just how the article writer create this ebook. (Nakia Toy Jr.) DISCLAIMER | DMCA IWBOU8NJNVLE « PDF / Trusted Mole: A Soldier s Journey into Bosnia s Heart of Darkness TRUSTED MOLE: A SOLDIER S JOURNEY INTO BOSNIA S HEART OF DARKNESS HarperCollins Publishers, United Kingdom, 2001. Paperback. Book Condition: New. 194 x 130 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. The powerful, disturbing and highly acclaimed account of a British oicer in the Parachute Regiment, of part Yugoslav origin, painfully caught up in the savage maelstrom of the Bosnian war. Milos Stankovic worked as an interpreter and liaison oicer for senior British commanders and two British UN generals - Mike Rose and Rupert Smith. Armed with the pseudonym Mike Stanley he was propelled from one nerve-racking crisis to another as he helped negotiate ceasefires between rival warlords, secured the release of UN hostages and organised the escape from Sarajevo of stricken families. Yet his close contacts with the Bosnian Serb leadership of Dr Karadzic and General Mladic bred suspicion and paranoia on all sides - not just in the Bosnian Muslim and Serb ranks (who thought he might be a British spy - General Rose s trusted mole ) but in the minds of the Americans as well. In a final, horrific twist, the author was arrested by the British authorities on suspicion of being a Serb spy - two and a half years after returning from Bosnia.
    [Show full text]
  • Informers, Agents and the Liberal Ideology of Collusion in Northern Ireland Professor Mark Mcgovern
    Article submitted to Critical Studies on Terrorism Published online May 2016 Informers, agents and the liberal ideology of collusion in Northern Ireland Professor Mark McGovern Professor in Sociology Department of Social Sciences, Edge Hill University, St Helens Road Ormskirk Lancs L39 4QP Tel: 01695 584621 (W) 07970002085 (M) E-mail: [email protected] Word Count: 10,480 Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge the help and support of Relatives for Justice and their families. A special thanks to Mark Thompson, Director of RFJ. This work was supported by the European Union under the Peace IV Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation Fund, via the Harms to Rights strand of the Relatives for Justice ‘Transitional Legacies’ programme and by the British Academy under the Small Grants Award Scheme. 1 Informers, Agents and the Liberal Ideology of Collusion in Northern Ireland Abstract There is now considerable evidence of systemic and institutionalised collusion between state forces and loyalists paramilitary groups during the Northern Ireland conflict, not least in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Focussing on a critical reading of the 2012 de Silva report into the killing of human rights lawyer Pat Finucane, this article examines state collusive practices surrounding the handling of agents and informers as evidence of a culture of collusion extending into the highest echelons of state institutions. The article will argue such practices evidence an approach to state counterinsurgency predicated on a ‘doctrine of necessity’ and what will be understood as a ‘liberal ideology of collusion’. Keywords: Counterinsurgency, Collusion, Extra-Judicial Killing, Pat Finucane, State Violence, Northern Ireland An unfortunate attitude… then persisted within RUC Special Branch and the Force Research Unit.
    [Show full text]
  • John Graham Collection
    GRAHAM GB165-0327 Reference code: GB165-0327 Title: John Graham Collection Name of creator: Graham, John David Carew (1923-2012) Major General Dates of creation of material: c 1968-2007, predominant 1970-1972 Level of description: Fonds Extent: 10 boxes Biographical history: Graham, John David Carew (1923-2012) Born 18 January 1923, Major General, CB, CBE, CStJ. Son of the late Colonel J A Graham, and Constance Mary Graham (nee Carew-Hunt). Educated at Cheltenham College 1936 – 1940 served with the Isle of Wight Home Guard, and enlisted into the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in August 1941. In 1942 he was commissioned into the 2nd Battalion of that regiment, serving with them in the UK and during the campaign in NorthWest Europe. He was mentioned in despatches 1945. In early 1945 he took a Regular Commission in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, was posted to the 1st Battalion (the 91st Highlanders), serving October 1945 – December 1946 with them in Palestine. In 1947 he volunteered for parachute training and was posted to the 5th (Scottish) Battalion of The Parachute Regiment with whom he served in the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). In late 1948 he was sent to London to learn Czech prior to working in the British Embassy in Prague 1949-1950, and later in the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in London. In 1952, he rejoined the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders for a tour of regimental duty in the appointment of Adjutant, initially in Edinburgh and then in British Guiana (now Guyana), South America. Returning to England, he spent 1955 attending courses at the Army Staff College, Camberley, Fremington (Amphibious Operations), and at the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham.
    [Show full text]