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Defence Forces Review 2012 Defence Forces Review 2012 www.military.ie Defence Forces Review 2012 ISSN 1649-7066 Published for the Military Authorities by Public Relations Section at the Chief of Staff’s Branch, and printed at the Defence Forces Printing Press, Infirmary Road, Dublin 7 © Copyright in accordance with Section 56 of the Copyright Act, 1963, Section 7 of the University of Limerick Act, 1989 and Section 6 of the Dublin University Act, 1989. PREFACE Intellectual growth should commence at birth and cease only at death. Albert Einstein It gives me great pleasure to present the Defence Forces Review for 2012. The Review was launched in 1993 with a mission ‘to inform’ and provide a focus for intellectual debate within the wider Defence Community on matters of professional interest. This edition continues these fine traditions and upholds the continued high standards of the journal, a tribute to the voluntary efforts of our contributors, to whom sincere thanks and congratulations are due. It comprises a collection of articles, designed to promote and support continued intellectual growth in the defence community. The continued expansion of intellectual activities within the Defence Forces included the hosting in 2012 of an international academic conference on military education titled Taking You a Stage Further… Military Education in the 21st Century. This was conducted by the Defence Forces Command and Staff School, in partnership with the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, to promote high quality, relevant research and enhanced awareness of the educational activities and research routinely conducted within the organisation (Work submitted for this conference can be accessed at: http://www.military.ie/education-hq/military-college/command-and-staff-school/ academic-conference-2012). In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge the efforts of the personnel who undertook the work of preparing this Review in addition to their normal duties. I would like to thank the editor Comdt Mark Hearns, Comdt Dave O’Neill and his staff at the Defence Forces Printing Press and Capt Bernard Behan and his staff at An Cosantóir who ensure that the Review is brought to our readership. Further copies of the Review are available from the Defence Forces Public Relations Section at [email protected] or online at http://www.military.ie/info-centre/publications/defence- forces-review Rory Sheerin Lieutenant Colonel OIC Defence Forces Public Relations The material contained in these articles are the views of the authors and do not purport to represent the official views of the Defence Forces. EDITor’s noTE During an economic crisis when financial resources are scarce, it is refreshing to find healthy intellectual capital within the defence community. The Defence Forces Review 2012 showcases this capital through an eclectic mix of articles by a wide range of voluntary contributors from civilians and Defence Force personnel both serving and retired. We are proud to present this body of work that is both current and relevant and bound to be of interest to our readership. The Review commences, marking Ireland’s first ever chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with a piece by James C. O’Shea from the Department of Foreign Affairs based at the Permanent Mission to the OSCE in Vienna. O’Shea examines the work carried out by the OSCE in the Transdniestrian settlement process one of Europe’s ‘protracted conflicts’. As Ireland assumes the presidency of the European Council in the first half of 2013 it is appropriate that the next article reflects on some of the important implications for European security. Dr John Doyle looks at the likely priorities in the defence and security arenas and analyses the Irish domestic factors that might influence government action in these areas. This is followed by Comdt Ian Byrne who provides an insider’s view of the mechanics of the CSDP infrastructure and an overview of some of the key issues to be developed during the Irish presidency. The next two articles address issues in military decision making processes. Comdt Con Barber, using a historical case study of Napoleon’s battle plan for Waterloo, analyses the applicability of Game Theory to successful military strategies. Comdt Liz O’Neill follows with a comparative analysis of the traditional mechanistic reductionist approach and a systems approach to military problem solving in the contemporary dynamic environment. Next Lt Col Niall Connors examines contested knowledge in civil–military relations in the strategic space within which the two communities work together, producing interesting conclusions for successful military education programmes. Dr Graham Heaslip and Elizabeth Barber continue the civil–military theme by looking at the civil–military logistical interface and how fundamental differences in principles and doctrines between the two communities highlight the need for greater coordination to optimise the provision of humanitarian aid. They conclude with recommendations for the synergistic use of military logistic input in responses to natural disasters and man-made complex emergencies. Changing tack the next article by Commander Pat Burke looks at the subject of targetted killings and the adequacy of law of armed conflict in contemporary counter terrorism campaigns. Capt Dónal Gallagher follows with an analysis of the credibility of embedded conflict reporting. He reviews the legitimacy of such reportage against conventional media norms to determine whether or not it can play a part in contributing to our overall understanding of war. Sticking to the media theme, Capt Pat O’Connor then looks at the impact of the omnipresent gaze of social media and the implications for behavioural education in the military. Comdt Sean Murphy’s essay on the Irish participation at the Battle of Fredricksburg steers the Review onto a historical course. Murphy examines the performance of the Irish units and evaluates the leadership of the commanding generals of the Army of the Potomac in their handling of the battles of Antietam and Fredricksburg. He is followed by Comdt Billy Campbell (retd) who looks at how military doctrine failed to address changes in military technology during World War I with disastrous consequences. Then Lt Col Dave Dignam examines the case study of the French counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria in the late 1950s early 1960s. He concludes that pure military strategies as opposed to ‘comprehensive approaches’ are almost always destined to fail in counterinsurgency. Lt Conor MacCarthy continues with a case study of the 1972 defence of Mirbat in Oman by a small detachment of the SAS in order to evaluate Special Operations Forces as force multipliers in engagements with superior sized conventional forces. Comdt Mark Hearns concludes the contributions with a piece examining the current Syrian crisis and the efforts of the international community to find a negotiated peaceful solution to it. As has been customary over the last number of editions, the Review concludes with the abstracts from the Theses of the MA in Leadership Management and Defence Studies completed by the students of the latest (67th) Senior Command and Staff Course. If you are interested in reading a complete version of any of these research papers please contact the Defence Forces Library in the DFTC at [email protected]. These studies, the Defence Forces Review and the inaugural Academic Conference conducted in conjunction with NUI Maynooth earlier this year demonstrate the vibrant level of research conducted by the Defence Forces. Mark Hearns Commandant TABLE OF CONTENTS Article Title Page The Irish OSCE Chairmanship and the Transdniestrian Settlement Process 1 James C. O’Shea Defence, Security and the Irish EU Presidency, 2013 7 Dr John Doyle Clearing the EU ‘Fog of War’ – Ends, Ways and Means 15 Comdt Ian Byrne DSM Utilitarian Clausewitz: A study of the doctrine of military decision making and the theory of utility maximising games 27 Comdt Con Barber Change in the Work Environment – The reductionist versus the systemic approach to future management problem solving 41 Comdt Liz O’Neill Civil-Military Relations: Contested Knowledge in a Community of Practice? 51 Lt Col Niall Connors Improving Civil Military Coordination in Humanitarian Supply Chains 61 Dr Graham Heaslip and Ms Elizabeth Barber In the Cross-Hairs – Targeted Killing in Contemporary Conflict 73 Commander (NS) Pat Burke Embedded Reporting: History, Security, Objectivity, and War 83 Capt Dónal Gallagher The Strategic Private in the Virtual Sphere: Social Media’s Omnipresent Moral Gaze on the Defence Forces 97 Capt Pat O’Connor “That damned infernal Green Flag!” 105 Comdt Seán Murphy A Flawed Doctrine: The Descent into Stalemate on the Western Front in 1914 117 Comdt (Retd) Billy Campbell The Importance of the Military Contribution to the Prosecution 125 of a Counter-Insurgency Campaign: An Algerian Case Study Lt Col David Dignam The Battle of Mirbat 131 Lt. Conor Mac Carthy Complex Problem, Complex Peacekeeping, the Case of Syria 143 Comdt Mark Hearns Abstracts – 67 Senior C&S Course, MA in Leadership Management and Defence Studies 151 Short Biographical Details 179 Defence forces review 2012 JAMES C. O’ShEA The Irish OSCE Chairmanship and the Transdniestrian Settlement Process ABSTRACT In January 2012 Ireland assumed the one year chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for the first time. This article examines the case study of the Transdniestrian settlement process
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