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JOINT COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE JARED A. KLINE, CAPT (P), USA B.A., The Citadel, Charleston South Carolina, 1980 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1991 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. - MASTER OF MILITARY SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of candidate: Captain Jared A. Kline Title of thesis: Joint Communications in Support of Joint Task Force South during Operation Just Cause. Approved by: -, Thesis Committee Chairman - , Member Major Scott Solon, M.A. Accepted this 7th Day of June 1991 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ABSTRACT JOINT COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH DURING OPERATION JUST CAUSE by Capt. (P) Jared A. Kline, USA, 240 pages. This study investigates and analyzes the provision of tactical and strategic communications in support of Joint Task Force South (JTF-South) during Operation Just Cause, the American invasion of Panama during the period 20 December 1989-12 January 1990. The purpose of the study is to present a detailed analysis of communications support actually provided to a Joint Task Force engaged in a contingency operation, while recording for posterity the actual history of what occurred in this connection. Operation Just Cause was conducted in a country that had known a long and continuous U.S. military presence. An extensive "fixed-station" or strategic telecommunications infrastructure therefore existed upon which JTF-South could build their tactical communications networks. This was a critical factor in the quality and quantity of communications means available to JTF-South. Single channel radio was the most important tactical means of command and control communications, and the use of a single document to govern'all radio communications, the Joint Communications Electronics Operating Instructions (JCEOI), and the use of a single communications security (COMSEC) variable throughout the entire theater ensured the reliability of radio communications, in spite of the risk to COMSEC. The tactical multichannel network, initially a weak area as a result of inadequate systems and technical control, was made useful by bringing a large contingent of tactical systems control officers and sergeants from Fort Bragg to Panama four days after the initiation of open war. This study explains that communications in support of JTF- South, while they were a brilliant success, were not perfect, and that lessons for future operations may be derived from a study of the actions of the men and machines that provided communications during Operation Just Cause. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Colonel Jackson C. Moss 111, formerly Commander, 35th Signal Brigade, and to Colonel William L. Mason, formerly Deputy J- 6 for JTF-South. These gentlemen contributed so much not only to the successful outcome of the events described in this history, but also to my ability to put all of this information together while the operation was still in progress, that it is no exaggeration to state that the success of both enterprises would have been in doubt without their wise and effective leadership. I would also like to acknowledge the kind assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Lambert and Major Steve Witt, both formerly of JTF-South J-6, for reviewing and criticizing Chapters 11-V. The success of single channel radio communications in support of the operation which is the subject of this study owed more to these two gentlemen than to anyone else. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the bravery and skill of the Signal Corps and Air Force communications soldiers who helped to make Operation Just Cause a military victory. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page THESIS APPROVAL PAGE......................................ii TABLE OF CONTENTS.....................,...,,,.......,....,,v LIST OF FIGURES...........................................vi CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO OPERATION JUST CAUSE..........l CHAPTER TWO: COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE BEFORE JUST CAUSE...................................l7 CHAPTER THREE: CONTINGENCY COMMUNICATIONS IN XVIIIth AIRBORNE CORPS...................48 CHAPTER FOUR: OPERATIONS PLAN 90-2......................73 CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOUTHERN COMMAND ALTERNATE COMMAND CENTER MISSION.................. ,103 CHAPTER SIX: SINGLE CHANNEL RADIO COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE WAR .............................124 CHAPTER SEVEN: THE TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK DURING THE WAR...........................l43 CHAPTER EIGHT: FIXED STATION, STRATEGIC, AND COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE WAR...........174 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION.................................l93 APPENDIX A: COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT USED IN JUST CAUSE............................,.208 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST...............................240 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)........... 14 JTF-South Task Organization ..........................15 Map of JTF-South Area of Operations .................16 Strategic External Connectivity .....................42 Strategic Microwave Radio Network ...................43 Strategic Cable Network .............................44 Military Dial Central Offices in Panama .............45 1109th Signal Brigade Organization Chart ............46 154th Signal Battalion Organization Chart ...........47 XVIIIth Airborne Corps Organization Chart ...........67 35th Signal Brigade Organization Chart ..............68 25th Signal Battalion Organization Chart ............69 50th Signal Battalion Organization Chart ............70 327th Signal Battalion Organization Chart ...........71 426th Signal Battalion Organization Chart ...........72 Communications Systems Control Under "Blue Spoon" ..100 Communications Systems Control Under OPLAN 90-2 ....101 OPLAN 90-2 Tactical Multichannel Radio Network .....102 Tactical Communications Network as of 18 Dec 1989 ..123 Single Channel Radio Net Matrix ....................142 Tactical Network as of 19 December 1989 ............167 Tactical Network as of 20 December 1989 ............168 Tactical Network as of 27 December 1989 ............169 Mature Tactical Voice Switching Network (TP)....... 170 Tactical Network as of 12 January 1990 .............171 Communications Systems Control Prior to 24 Dec 89 ..172 Communications Systems Control on 25 Dec 89 ........173 Strategic Telephone Network with ALASCOM Overlay ...191 Message Switching (Teletype) Network ...............192 PREFACE This paper is addressed to two audiences. In the first place, it is intended to provide an analysis of an instance in which successful communications were provided in support of a small war in the form of a contingency operation, at a basic enough level that a reader who is not a specialist in such things (such as a civilian, a new Signal Corps lieutenant, or an officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier with a different area of expertise) may derive some useful knowledge from it. In the second place, this study is intended to record for posterity the history of communications in support of Joint Task Force South (JTF- South) on Operation Just Cause, the American invasion of Panama in 1989-1990. This second reason is of some moment. As yet, there has been no detailed attempt to record and analyze communications in support of Operation Urgent Fury, the American invasion of Grenada in 1983, which had been the last large contingency mission prior to Just Cause, even though communications were an important issue in that operation. Much has been lost in regard to the history of Urgent Fury, as imperfect and impermanent human memory has thus far been the primary repository for the events surrounding communications support for that operation. This vii study seeks to prevent such a loss to history with respect to Just Cause. It should be noted at the outset that, as in most if not all historical studies, there are certain limitations to a definitive analysis of this subject. A definitive analysis would require the collection of every written order, every unit after-action report, every edition of every telephone directory, and communications-electronics operating instructions from every level. In addition, every signal officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier would have to be interviewed. All of the commanders and staff officers who used the communications system would have to be polled about their evaluation of the network's effectiveness. General Noriega and his staff would have to answer questions about why they did not take very effective actions against JTF-South's communications system, while the Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan intelligence communities would have to provide us with their evaluation of JTF-South's signal and communications security. Not all of these sources were available for this study. Sources that were available have been examined very critically and checked against other sources to guard against a possible lack of objectivity. Especially in the case of published literature, many writings by participants show a partisan slant, and although a degree of objectivity viii can be derived from