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The Army and Joint Forcible Entry

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The Army and Joint Forcible Entry The Army and Joint Forcible Entry By GEN Carl Stiner however, there has been no mention mal statements of requirements in de- U.S. Army retired of forcible entry since the 2001 QDR. fense planning documents. and The 2002 edition of the Joint Strategic Army advocacy for its legitimate LTG Daniel R. Schroeder Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the last role in forcible entry operations is not U.S. Army retired mention of forcible entry as a required apparent. Given the current opera- capability. There is no joint integrating tional tempo and end-strength con- he August article “‘Stacking Iron’— concept on the subject. Thus we now straints, some of that may be under- TMAFEX Prepares Air Assets For find a divergence of approaches being standable. But with the advent of the Army Forcible Entry Operations” was taken unilaterally to what are proba- Army force generation model and the of great interest. Earlier in this decade, bly the most complex and compli- Army’s role in the GRF, it is time to Joint Forces Command was developing cated joint operations, and no compre- assert that advocacy. What used to be a joint integrating concept (JIC) entitled hensive statement of the requirement called strategic brigade air drop was a joint forcible entry operations (JFEO). in Department of Defense documents. joint capability specified in the JSCP Unfortunately, that JIC did not sur- Worse, the approaches are ad hoc in that was jointly trained through the vive the Joint Requirements Oversight that there is no forcing function such formal JAAT program. It was through Council review, and work was termi- as mandated joint airborne air trans- that program and Department of nated in 2005. This has led to inconsis- portability training (JAAT) or joint Defense guidance that sufficient air tencies and lack of jointness in today’s amphibious/airborne training. The drop-qualified aircrews were trained thinking about joint forcible entry op- Global Response Force (GRF) execu- to provide the capability to conduct a erations, which is particularly germane tive order makes no mention of forc- brigade-sized drop from 500 feet at to the transformed Army responding ible entry capability, training or exer- night, as would be required in a joint to contingencies in the future. cising. Joint Publication 3-18, Joint forcible entry. That capability has not Doctrinal language about forcible Forcible Entry Operations, cites three pri- been trained in at least seven years. entry is found in Joint Publications 3- mary forcible entry operational capa- Joint exercises such as Swift Strike, 17, 3-18 and 3-31, and the Army Field bilities: amphibious assault, airborne Solid Shield and Sand Eagle honed Manuals 3-0 and 3-92. In Quadrennial assault and air assault. These are not the edges on those early-entry joint Defense Review (QDR) documents, trivial evolutions, and they require for- forces. The most recent Mobility Air November 2009 I ARMY 19 More C-17s, like these that participated in an exercise at Nellis AFB, Nev., are needed in order to support improved joint “capabilities” of the airlift fleet. Scott R. Gourley Force Exercise and the 82nd Airborne joint force projection and special oper- equipment issues to permit BCT-sized Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team ations forces. air drops; retiring the C-5As and re- (BCT) exercise to address its GRF role placing them with an improved C-17; were ad hoc. t is obvious that the C-17 will be the and integrating joint forcible entry op- Military principals speak of global Ibackbone of the airlift fleet for dec- erations into joint exercises, experi- mobility for joint force projection and ades to come, and the current number ments, war games and analyses. support and precision air-drop capa- is not nearly enough to ensure the na- Operations Golden Pheasant, Ur- bility—the devil is in the details. Pro- tion’s ability to respond to crises in a gent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Storm, jection issues from 20 years ago per- timely manner. The insufficiency in our Uphold Democracy, Enduring Free- sist today, such as secure en route airlift numbers is highlighted by the dom and Iraqi Freedom have served communications for the airborne ele- most recent deployment of the 5th as evidence of the ongoing need to in- ment of the joint force. The old C-130- Stryker Brigade Combat Team from clude joint forcible entry operations in type hatch-mount antennas still have Fort Lewis, Wash., to Afghanistan. our guidance, doctrine, training and to be used on the most modern air- Those Strykers being moved by ship planning. Their execution was—and lifter we have, the C-17, and they take will ultimately be lifted into Afghan- is—due in no small part to the habit- too long to install. Station-keeping istan by C-17s. But some of the unit’s ual relationships and practices devel- equipment issues make the trail of air- Strykers had to be transported by oped during deliberate joint training craft so long that it precludes a BCT- Ukrainian AN-124s. The United States under the defense planning guidance sized air drop at night. A dual-row is spending millions of dollars a year to requiring those relationships. No one air-drop system from the C-17—a ca- lease these foreign aircraft, money that can anticipate where the nation may pability the Army asked for years could be much better invested in buy- have to respond again, but a trained ago—is still not demonstrated. Those ing more C-17s. The Air Force is no- and demonstrated joint forcible entry three capabilities were conceived to tably silent on the issue. capability is too important a matter of allow the rapid build-up of combat Guidance, training, equipping and national security to ignore. I power on the ground. numbers issues are out there. To affect Then there is the issue of how many them, the Army should take an advo- GEN Carl Stiner, USA Ret., commanded airlifters are required. The analyses to cacy stand on joint forcible entry guid- the Joint Special Operations Command, calculate that requirement have all ance, requirements and capabilities. the 82nd Airborne Division and the been flawed with bad models, bad The Army should advocate the inclu- XVIII Airborne Corps, and was com- scenarios and old metrics. Conse- sion of those elements into the defense mander in chief, U.S. Special Opera- quently, the program of record is 205 planning documents currently being tions Command. He was the comman- C-17s and 111 C-5s (59 of which are C- developed, for instance, the QDR and der of Joint Task Force South, which 5As with chronic readiness problems). the JSCP. There should be a modifica- executed Operation Just Cause. LTG This implies that 316 aircraft are suffi- tion to the GRF operation order that Daniel R. Schroeder, USA Ret., cient—if this is so, the mix is wrong. requires a strategic BCT air-drop capa- served as chief of staff, 24th Infantry This year’s supplemental budget fi- bility. In addition, the Army should ad- Division; chief of staff, XVIII Airborne nally allows the Air Force to retire the vocate: reestablishment of the JAAT Corps; assistant deputy chief of staff, C-5As. Those 59 aircraft should be re- program; whatever it takes to provide operations, Department of the Army; placed with modern, more reliable C- inherent secure en route communica- and deputy commander in chief, U.S. 17s, which would allow the introduc- tions to the airborne element of a joint Army Europe. He commanded Joint tion of better capabilities to make the force; fixing the dual-row air-drop sys- Task Force Golden Pheasant and Joint C-17 even more effective in support of tem of the C-17; fixing station-keeping Task Force Support Hope. 20 ARMY I November 2009.
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