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RCED-86-15 Operation Crossroads: Personnel Radiation Exposure

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RCED-86-15 Operation Crossroads: Personnel Radiation Exposure ad ru* United S&s General Accounting Office Report to the Honorable @an Cranston, U.S. Senate i November 1985 OPERATION CROSSROADS Personnel Radiation Exp osure Estimates Should Be Improved s “I 3 About Our Kew Look This GAO report was produced using a new design and printing process to help you get the information you need more easily. GAO will phase in this new design during 1985. As we do so, we welcome any comments you wish to share with us. United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548 Comptroller General of the United States B-219252 November 8, 1985 The Honorable Alan Cranston Ranking Minority Member Cmmittee on Veterans' Affairs United States Senate * Dear Senator Cranston: On August 3, 1984, you asked us to review certain issues concerning radiation safety activities during the 1946 nuclear test--ration Crossroads. The report found that certain adjustments in the calculation of Crossroads particiwts' radiation exposure estimates rnav be necessary because (1) no allowance was made for inaccuracies associated with the film badges mm by participants to measure external radiation exposure, (2) comprehensive personnel decontamination procedures were lacking or not followed, and (3) no estimates were made for radiation exposure through inqestion or open wounds and the estimate for inhalation may be in error by a factor of 5 or 10, As arranged with vour oHice , unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan r10 further distribution of this report until 30 davs from the date of the remrt. At that tim we will send copies to interested oarties and make spies available to others upon request. Sincerely yours, -troller General of the United States Executive Swnmary Many of the 42,000 military participants in the 1946 atmospheric nuclear weapons test, known as Operation Crossroads, were subjected to 1 varying amounts of radiation exposure. Documents recently discovered by concerned private citizens raise questions about the accuracy of the Defense Nuclear Agency’s (DNA) radiation exposure estimates. The Vet- erans Administration uses these estimates in adjudicating former par- ticipants’ radiation-related disability claims. Because of specific Congressional concerns, GAO reviewed certain issues regarding the radiation exposure of Crossroads participants, such as the l reliability of the personnel film badges used to measure radiation, l adequacy of the personnel decontamination procedures, and l accuracy of DNA'S radiation dose reconstruction. i r Crossroads consisted of two nuclear bomb detonations in the Pacific Background Bikini Island Iagoon from July 1 to August 10, 1946. After each detona- tion, a task force of approximately 42,000 military personnel and civil- ian scientists entered the lagoon and examined the damage to and radiation intensities on target ships. Given the responsibility by the Secretary of Defense to estimate radia- tion doses for atmospheric nuclear weapons test participants, DNA-in 1 October 1984-issued its report on Operation Crossroads, concluding that personnel had not been overexposed to radiation, DNA'S position is based on radiation data recorded on film badges worn by about 6,300 of the 42,000 Crossroads participants and reconstructed external and internal radiation dose estimates for the participants. (See pp. 15 to 16.) Crossroads personnel were exposed to four specific radiation types- Results in Brief internal alpha, internal and external beta, and external gamma (see pp. 36 and 37). GAO found that DNA'S calculation of exposure estimates for each radiation type may need adjustment because 1 l film badges were not reliable for measuring both external gamma and beta radiation, as intended, and were not worn by all Crossroads z participants; l personnel decontamination procedures did not provide adequate protec- tion for Crossroads personnel throughout the operation; and Page 2 GAO/RCED-8615 Radiation Safety i ExecutiveSummary 9 DNA'S dose reconstruction analysis for internal alpha and beta radiation has not properly estimated the possible personnel exposure from three potential pathways-inhalation, ingestion, and open wounds. Principal Findings Reliability of Film Badges DNA'S radiation exposure estimates have made no allowance for inaccu- racies attributable to film (in badges) or its processing. GAOfound and DNA acknowledges that the recorded film badge readings would have had an overall inaccuracy of approximately + 30 percent because of inaccuracies in the film. Further inaccuracies normally occur during film processing and reading. While it was not possible to calculate actual Crossroads inaccuracies. GAO found that a mid-1950’s U.S. National Bureau of Standards test showed that readings by several laboratories of film badges similar to those at Crossroads, exposed to known amounts of radiation, were inac- curate by as much as & 100 percent. GAO believes it is unlikely that the film badge readings performed under harsh Crossroads conditions would have been more accurate than those in laboratories. DNA recognizes the film badges at Crossroads were incapable of accu- rately recording external beta because the portion of the film intended for that measurement actually recorded both external gamma and beta. Although DNA assigned doses to personnel believing the badges overtlsti- mated external beta radiation, GAO found cases in which beta exposure may have been underestimated or not estimated at all. Adequacy of Personnel Because DNA believes adequate personnel decontamination procedures Decontamination existed from the beginning at Crossroads, its radiation exposure esti- Procedures mates do not recognize the possibility that personnel may have retained radioactivity on their bodies and clothes after working on contaminated target ships. In contrast GAO believes this possibility exists because decontamination procedures were evolving at Crossroads. For example, the earliest evidence that GAO found of personnel being required to shower or change clothes after returning from contaminated target ships was in procedures issued on -July 31, 1946,6 days after the second Page 3 GAO/RCEDWlS Radiation Safety Executive Summary detonation. Moreover, even after comprehensive decontamination proce- 1 dures were instituted, some violations were reported. Thus, Crossroads participants were probably exposed to more radiation than accounted for by DNA. Accuracy of Internal Internal radiation exposure was not measured at Operation Crossroads. ! Exposure Dose DNA has estimated the exposure from inhaling radioactive materials but j Reconstruction used a constant ratio between alpha, beta, and gamma radiation that \ may have underestimated alpha radiation by a factor of from 5 to 10. r Moreover, DNA has not evaluated internal radiation exposure from inges- ’ tion and open wounds. DNA believed, incorrectly, a prohibition against food consumption aboard target ships effectively precluded ingestion and did not know how to calculate for open wounds. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct DNA to adjust, Recommendations where feasible, the Crossroads participants’ exposure estimates in the following manner: . develop a range for each film badge reading that recognizes film and film processing inaccuracies; reassess the accuracy of the external beta i&ion dose information for those who wore film badges and, because I1 wore film badges, perform a dose reconstruction for external beta &ion; + esilmate the extent to which personnel received radiation exposure from a lack or violation of comprehensive decontamination procedures; l reevaluate and disclose the possible errors or uncertainties associated with its analysis of internal radiation exposure by inhalation and ana- lyze possible internal radiation exposure through ingestion or open wounds. In addition, where any of the preceding actions have been determined not to be feasible, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require j DNA to document the reasons for each such determination so that the military services can provide this information to the Veterans Adminis- ; tration and the affected veterans. ! Agency Comments The Department of Defense generally disagreed with the report’s find- ings, conclusions, and recommendations. However, GAO'S analysis of its Page4 GAO/RCElS&316 Radiation Safety Executive Summary comments showed that the Department (1) provided incorrect or unsup- ported statements, (2) misinterpreted certain Crossroads-related docu- ments, or (3) presented information inconsistent with DNA'S historical report on Operation Crossroads and other material. For these reasons, GAO continues to believe that the Department can improve radiation exposure estimates for Crossroads personnel by effectively addressing and implementing GAO'S recommendations. (See p. 56 for GAO'S evalua- tion of the Department’s positions on the issues discussed in the report and see appendix IV for GAO'S detailed evaluation of the Department’s comments.) The Veterans Administration stated that the report’s recom- mendations for calculating radiation doses for Crossroads participants should also be applied to participants in all other atmospheric nuclear tests (see app. III). j Page 6 GAO/RCED-t3&16 Radiation Safety Contents Executive Summary 2 j Chapter 1 8 Introduction Operation Crossroads 9 Responsibilities of DNA 13 16 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology s Chapter 2 20 ; Evaluation of Selected Crossroads Film Badges Provided Only an Estimation of 21 ;1 Gamma Radiation Exposure Aspects of Radiation Personnel Decontamination Procedures
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