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Home , Alden (crater), Atomic age, Bikini Atoll, Conning tower, Diver down flag, Diver trim

THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE ATOMIC :

A SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT OF THE SUNKEN FLEET OF AT AND LAGOO NS

REPUBLIC OF THE

Prepared for:

The Kili/Bikini/Ejit Local Government Council

By:

James P. Delgado Daniel J. Lenihan (Principal Investigator) Larry E. Murphy

Illustrations by:

Larry V. Nordby Jerry L. Livingston

Submerged Cultural Resources Unit National Maritime Initiative

United States Department of the Interior

Southwest Cultural Resources Center Professional Papers

Number 37

-Santa Fe, New

1991 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... iii

FOREWORD ...... vii Secretary of the Interior, Manuel Lujan, Jr.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... ix

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction ...... 1 Daniel J. Lenihan

Project Mandate and Background ...... 1 Methodology ...... 4 Activities ...... 7

CHAPTER TWO: Operation Crossroads ...... 11 James P. Delgado

The Concept of a Naval Test Evolves ...... 14 Preparing for the Tests ...... 18 The Able Test ...... 23 The Baker Test ...... 27 Decontamination Efforts ...... 29 The Legacy of Crossroads ...... 31 The 1947 Scientific Resurvey ...... 34

CHAPTER THREE: 's Histories for the Sunken Vessels 43 James P. Delgado

USS Saratoga ...... 43

USS ...... 52

HIJMS Nagato ...... 55

HIJMS Sakawa ...... 59

USS Prinz Eugen ...... 60

USS ...... 64 USS Lamson ...... 66

USS Apogon ...... 70

USS Pilotfish ...... 72

USS Gilliam ...... 73

USS Carlisle ...... 74 ARDC-13 ...... 76

Y0-160 ...... 76 LCT-414, 812, 1114, 1175, and 1237 ...... 77

CHAPTER FOUR: Site Descriptions ...... 85 James P. Delgado and Larry E. Murphy

Introduction ...... 85 Reconstructing the Nuclear Detonations ...... 86 Site Descriptions: Vessels Lost During the Able Test ...... 90 USS Gilliam ...... 90 e USS Carlisle ...... 92 Site Descriptions: Vessels Lost During the Baker Test ...... 93 USS Arkansas ...... 93 USS Saratoga ...... 100 USS Pilotfish ...... 124 USS Apogon ...... 125 Y0-160 ...... 127 HIJMS Nagato ...... 128 LCT-1175 ...... 132 Site Descriptions: Vessels Lost After the Test ...... 134 USS Prinz Eugen ...... 134 Final Observations ...... 136

CHAPTER FIVE: The Significance of the Sunken Vessels of Operation Crossroads James P. Delgado ...... 143

Monuments and Memorials to the Dawn of the . 144 Insuring the Navy's Survival in the Age of the Bomb ...... 145 A Demonstration of Wealth and Power ...... 148 Crossroads as a Spectacle and Demonstration ...... 150 Learning to Live with the Bomb ...... 153 The Reality of the Bomb: Radioactive Fears ...... 154 Crossroads at the Bottom of the Sea ...... 157 Confronting the Atomic Age ...... 158

CHAPTER SIX: Nuclear Park Potential 163 Daniel J. Lenihan

Precedent ...... 163 Park Appeal ...... 163 Park Protection ...... 165 Interpretive/Educational Devices ...... 166 /Liability ...... 168 Special Diving : , ...... 169 Environmental Hazards Posed by ...... 170 Mooring Systems ...... 170 Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 170

APPENDIX I: Target Vessels at Bikini and Their Disposition 173

APPENDIX II: Relics of Operation Crossroads ...... 177

APPENDIX III: Estimates of Radiological Dose at Bikini (W. L. Robison, 1990) 179

APPENDIX IV: Archeological Site Record Forms for the Documented . . . . . 189

BIBLIOGRAPHY 197

SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT REPORT AND PUBLICATION SERIES ...... 205

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

Bikini Atoll, from a 1947 Navy Chart ...... xii David McCampbell locates and plots the wreck locations ...... 3 The Navy's Ordnance Demolition Unit One safes a 350-lb. depth bomb ...... 3 Lengthy stops were required ...... 5 Boat launching by front-end loader ...... 6 Daniel Lenihan, Larry Nordby and Jerry Livingston compare notes ...... 6 The Bikini Council's dive team takes measurements on Saratoga . 9 The system of trilateration used to map the wrecks is discussed ...... 10

CHAPTER TWO

Target area at Bikini, 1946 ...... 11 W. H. P. Blandy, commander of Joint Task One 13 The Able Target Array, showing the actual point of detonation ...... 16 The Baker Target Array, showing the actual point of detonation ...... 17 A Mark III "" bomb casing ...... 18 Press release chart depicting "scrap" costs of Operation Crossroads ...... 21 Two goats aboard USS Niagara ...... 22 , the target vessel for Able ...... 23 Journalists aboard LCT-52 inspect USS In dependence after Able ...... 24 Able's mushroom towers over ...... 25 Able, from Bikini Island ...... 25 LSM-60 suspended the bomb detonated during Baker ...... 26 Baker blasts out of the lagoon after detonation ...... 27 Navy tug sprays down USS after Baker ...... 29 Decontamination efforts aboard Prinz Eugen ...... 30 is scuttled off Kwajalein ...... 32 The Bikini Scientific Resurvey teams lands at Bikini, 1947 35 Divers prepare to descend on an unidentified sunken ship ...... 36

CHAPTER THREE

Saratoga in drydock at Hunter's Point, , 1928 ...... 43 view of Saratoga ...... 45 Saratoga off , February 21, 1945 ...... 47 Saratoga arrives at San Francisco on a Magic Carpet voyage ...... 48 Saratoga being prepared for Operation Crossroads ...... 49 Saratoga sails for Bikini ...... 50 Saratoga sinks at Bikini ...... 51 Arkansas on its trials, 1912 ...... 52 Stern view of Arkansas, 1945 ...... 53 Arkansas' bow ...... 54 Na gata underway in the 1920s ...... 56 Nagata's A and B turrets and distinctive superstructure, at Bikini, May 1946 ...... 57 The "capture" of Nagata at Yokasuka, August 30, 1945 ...... 58 Sakawa, circa 1945 ...... 59

Sakawa sinking ...... 60 Prinz Eugen at the Krupp yard in , circa 1939-1940 ...... 61 Prinz Eugen at , March 1946 ...... 61 Artist's perspective of Prinz Eugen at Kwajalein, 1973 ...... 63

Anderson ...... 65 Lamson off Yorktown, , April 1939 ...... 67 Depiction of the destruction of Lamson during Able ...... 69 The stern of sunken Lamson after Able ...... 69 Ap ogon surfaces after a test submergence at Bikini, 1946 ...... 71 Pilotfi sh enters , November 1945 ...... 73

Gilliam, 1946 ...... 74

Depiction of Able's detonation over Gilliam and Carlisle ...... 75

1946 drawing of the sunken Carlisle ...... 75

CHAPTER FOUR

Actual positions of the sunken ships at Bikini, 1989 84 The most famous photograph of Baker 88

Wreckage of midships house, Gilliam ...... 90

Gas cylinders in No. 1 hold of Gilliam ...... 91

Stern of Carlisle ...... 93

Stern of Arkansas ...... 94

Capsized New York ...... 95

Perspective sketch of Arkansas ...... 95

Daniel Lenihan swims forward past the port bilge keel of Arkansas ...... 96

Port aircastle of the capsized Arkansas ...... 97

Two ROY views of the barrels of the 14- guns of Arkansas' No. 1 turret ...... 98 Inside Arkansas' port aircastle ...... 99

Inside Arkansas' port aircastle, 1946 ...... 99

Saratoga, hit by the first blast generated wave ...... 100

Saratoga's island, stack, and No. 1, 5-inch mount after stripping ...... 101

The same view today ...... 101

Saratoga's flight ...... 103 The secondary conning position on the forward edge of Saratoga's collapsed stack 104

Perspective painting of Saratoga ...... 105

Perspective drawing of Saratoga ...... 106

Profile views of Saratoga ...... 107

Plan view of Saratoga ...... 109

Mark 37 director ...... 111

No. 1, 5-inch/38 caliber mount...... 111 Gun tub, with quad 40mm mount 112

Single 5-inch/30 caliber AA gun ...... 112

Live 5-inch/38 caliber cartridges ...... 113 Five-inch cartridge case, showing the cartridge ...... 113 Divers illuminate the bow and mooring cables...... 114

Army 155mm antiaircraft gun ...... 115

Installing a ruptured foil peak gauge on a " Tree," in 1946 ...... 116

Aft "Christmas Tree" blast-gauge tower...... 116

Lead indentation pressure gauges ...... 117

Catherine Courtney inspects the blast covers on Saratoga's ...... 117

Helm position on Saratoga's bridge, showing the binnacle, helm, and ...... 118

A 500-lb. bomb on USS Yorktown ...... 119

Five general purpose 500-lb. , AN-Mk 64, on their bomb carts ...... 119

Two views of the Helldiver ...... 120

ABC-Television divers illuminate an SBF-4E "Helldiver" on the deck ...... 120 Pilot's cockpit instrument panel ...... 121 A single Mk 13 aerial , on a cradle ...... 121 A Mk 13 torpedo suspended beneath a TBM-3E on USS Yo rktown ...... 122 Daniel Lenihan illuminates an unbroken light on the overhead inside Saratoga ...... 122 Radio equipment in the emergency radio equipment compartment ...... 122 Perspective sketch of Pi/otfish ...... 123 Jerry Livingston hovers over the sail of Pi/otfish ...... 124

ROV view of Apogon ...... 126 Ap ogon's stern ...... 127 Y0-160 on the surface after Able ...... 128 Daniel Lenihan swims past the and toward two of Na gato's four screws ...... 129 Daniel Lenihan inspects the muzzle of one of Nagato's 16.1-inch guns ...... 129 Catherine Courtney hovers over the superstructure of Nagato ...... 130 Perspective sketches of Nagato ...... 131 Bow of the capsized Nagato ...... 132 Larry Nordby maps the aft deck of LCT-1175 ...... 133 Anchor mount LCT-1175 ...... 134 Prinz Eugen's stern ...... 135 Prinz Eugen's , a shaft, and a screw ...... 135 Daniel Lenihan inspects a partially buried "Christmas Tree" blast gauge tower ...... 136

CHAPTER FIVE

Able and Baker day stamp cancellations ...... 142 USS Skate in the aftermath of Able ...... 146 USS Skate makes its triumphant, yet radioactive return to the fleet after Able ...... 146 Breech and the muzzles of Na gato's 16.1-inch guns ...... 149 Celebrating the end of Operation Crossroads ...... 152 A sailor paints a for Able on Pensacola's battle record ...... 154 In dependence at San Francisco in January 1951 ...... 155 Certificate issued to the 42,000 participants in Operation Crossroads ...... 156 Prinz Eugen's ...... 157 Journalists inspect burned test materials on the foredeck of Pensacola ...... 158 Battle record painted on Saratoga's island, 1945 ...... 160

CHAPTER SIX

Underwater visitation by nondivers ...... 164 Underwater monument ...... 166 Interpretative exhibits in a visitor center ...... 166 Package of materials experimented with at Isle Royale National Park ...... 166 Foldout brochure to be consulted by visitor before diving ...... 167 Three-dimensional models of shipwrecks ...... 167 Special earphones allowing visitors to hear wireless communications ...... 168 Daniel Lenihan takes radiation readings on the lagoon bottom next to Saratoga ...... 169 Mooring buoys with appropriate visitor use guidelines ...... 171

v THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1991

FOREWORD

This assessment report compiled by a special team of National Park Service underwater archaeologists sheds light on the historical importance of the sunken ships in Bikini Lagoon.

The information provided here will assist the people of Bikini to make informed decisions concerning these sunken ships. I hope that it will also serve to open new areas of interest and increase awareness to inform readers the world over of the importance of events at this historic place.

vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Foremost, we wish to thank the Bikini Council supported the project; we particularly wish to for inviting the National Park Service (NPS) to thank Larry Morgan of the Assistant Secretary's work at Bikini. office. In the National Park Service, present Director James M. Ridenour, former Director Jonathan Weisgall, attorney for the Bikinians, William Penn Matt, Southwest Regional Office has conducted considerable research on Bikini; Director John Cook, Western Regional Director his voluminous files made research a much Stan Albright, Associate Director Jerry L. easier task. We are grateful for his and his Rogers, Associate Director Rick Smith, Pacific research associate Alison MacDonald's hard Area Director Bryan Harry, Deputy Associate work. Jack Niedenthal served as liaison for Director Rowland T. Bowers, Chief the Bikini Council during the period NPS Anthropologist Doug Scovill, and Chief operations took place. Historian Edwin C. Bearss lent their support and released the team for work at Bikini. William Livingston and Lee McEachern are preparing a documentary on Bikini for ABC The Navy, through the auspices television. Lee shared his research, including of the Supervisor of Salvage and Mobile Diving footage of the tests that provided a clearer and Salvage Unit One (MDSU 1), provided understanding of the effects of the blast on logistical support. Help was provided by the Saratoga. Commander-In-Chief, ; by Capt. Dave McCampbell, commander of Mobile The field operations at Bikini Atoll were in Diving and Salvage Unit One; and by Lt. Dave part funded by the United States Department Rattay, commander of the Explosive Ordnance of Energy (DOE), Pacific Area Support Office, Disposal Unit One, Detachment 63, at Pearl J. H. Dryden, Director. Holmes and Narver, , as well as by the men of MDSU 1 and Inc., DOE's contractors and managers of the EOD Mobile Unit One in locating the target Bikini Field Station, coordinated and hosted ships, buoying them, safing ordnance, and the National Park Service (NPS) team. Kent providing detailed coverage of the ships Hiner, Project Manager; Dr. Catherine through dive observations and remote operated Courtney, Project Coordinator; John "Alan" vehicle surveys. , Holmes and Narver representative on Kwajalein, and his assistant Lance Yamaguchi The issue of radiation was a concern for the tackled and ultimately removed every obstacle, team. Dr. W. L. (Bill) Robison of the from transporting equipment to arranging University of , Lawrence Livermore flights and making arrangements. In the field, Laboratory, provided data on radiation levels at the staff of the Bikini Field Station provided Bikini, as well as an appendix to this report. one of the most comfortable working Jim Sprinkle, a lab specialist in radiation environments the team has ever had. Richard monitoring and detection, also provided a Giles, the station manager, Stephen Notarianni, personal assessment of the radiation hazards-­ Eric Hanson, Wayne Oliva!, Edward Maddison, an independent source second opinion--to John Lajuan, Roger Joel, Thompson Johnson, project director Lenihan. Cdr. Roger Chatham, Harry Nashon, Wilma Riklon, and Kane Janer Director of the U.S. Navy's Nuclear provided invaluable assistance. The Survivability Program at the Pentagon also and crew of the DOE research vessel G. W. provided an assessment and opinion of the Pierce provided logistical support which was radiation hazards associated with the critical to the success of the project. Crossroads ships.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Considerable information about Operation Interior for International and Territorial Affairs Crossroads and the ships involved in the tests

was provided by a number of persons. that greatly assisted our Informative discussions were held with several understanding Anderson and Lamson; among staff members of the Los Alamos National the bonuses of the tour was a greasy but Laboratory (LANL). Roger Meade, Historian informative foray into the Mark 37 director and Archivist at the Los Alamos National atop the bridge. John Smith, Vice President of Laboratory provided archival sources, Merchant Marine Veterans of WWII, Inc., gave photographs, and helped us contact Los an excellent tour of SS Lane in San Alamos veterans of Operation Crossroads. Pedro, California, that helped us better Interviews with Crossroads participants understand Gilliam and Carlisle. Dennis W. "Bob" Henderson, Albuquerque, New Ditmanson, Superintendent, White Sands Mexico, the chief engineer of the Los Alamos National Monument, Nancy S. Dumas, Public Group at Crossroads; Leon D. Smith, also of Affairs Officer, and Robert J. Burton, Albuquerque, the "Able" weaponeer; and Archaeologist, White Sands Missile Range, Woody P. Swancutt of , Texas, the provided a tour of Site that proved to pilot of "Dave's Dream," were very helpful in be very helpful in understan ding the answering questions not addressed by the development of the bomb and early test written record. instrumentation.

The generosity of in Fall River, Linda Jackman of the Navy's Naval Sea System , particularly Mark Newton, is Command's Shipbuilding Support Office especially appreciated. Mr. Newton provided provided a listing of the Crossroads ships and historical references, photographs, and technical their fates as well as other information. The manuals for radar, ordnance, and armament staff of the Naval Historical Center in and was present in spirit at Bikini as a valued , D.C., were as usual a tremendous member of the team. Russell Booth, manager help; among those who provided support and of USS Pampanito (SS-383) in San Francisco, assistance were John Reilly of the Ships California, provided information on Mark 13 History Branch, Mike Walker in Operational torpedoes and shipboard radar systems and Archives, and Charles Haberlein, the gave an informative tour of his that photographic archivist in the Curatorial Branch. answered many questions about Apogon and Henry Vadnais, the Navy's Chief Curator, Pilotfish . B. J. Dorman, Museum Director, and helped track down items removed from the Jeffrey L. Crawford, Assistant Museum Director ships prior to the tests, such as Saratoga's bell for the Pacific Memorial and Lamson's homeward bound pennant, which Association, provided material on Pilotfish , is on display in the Navy Memorial Museum at Parche, Batao-class , JP , and the . Paul Stillwell at 20 and 40mm weapons, as well as an the United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, informative tour of USS Bowfin (SS-287) in Maryland, provided access to oral histories that , . Sue Moss and Carolyn included reminiscences of Operation Scheffer of the Texas Department of Parks, Crossroads. Paul also provided the address of Fish, and Wildlife, provided a tour of USS Capt. Dick Laning, former Commanding Officer Texas while the battleship was in the drydock of Pilotfish, who put us in touch with the other in the Todd Shipyard in Galveston, Texas. skippers of the target submarines at Bikini. That tour was invaluable in providing a better Joe Fetherston, one of Saratoga's ship's understanding of Arkansas. Mark Pinsel photographers, loaned his postwar "mugbook" provided a tour of USS Cabot (CVL-28) in and history of Saratoga and several original , , that served as an photographs of Sara's trying hours off Iwo excellent orientation of carrier operations and Jima. Roy Alton, president of the USS characteristics. Ironically, Cabot, sole survivor Arkansas (BB-33) Association, loaned his of the In dependence-class carriers, shares a "mugbook" and arranged for a meeting with common origin with Saratoga--both were built Arkansas' crew at the ship's fourth annual at the same yard, and more importantly, were reunion. Kevin Foster, formerly with the carriers converted from hulls. Timothy National Maritime Initiative, provided Rizzuto, curator of USS Kidd (DD-661) in considerable information on the tests and faxed Baton Rouge, Louisiana, provided a tour of his needed documents to the team in the Pacific.

X Lawrence E. Wilson, Research Technician at The staffs of the following organizations and the National Air and Space Museum, institutions are also here acknowledged: Los Smithsonian Institution, identified three of the Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New aircraft in the hangar of USS Saratoga as Mexico; History Branch and Still Helldivers before the BuAer report was located Pictures Branch, National Archives, Washington, and provided reference materials on the D.C.; Naval Historical Center, Washington, SB2C/SBF Helldiver for this report. Norman D.C.; Pacific Fleet Submarine Memorial Polmar read the text, made many critical Museum, Honolulu, Hawaii; J. Porter Shaw suggestions, and provided information from his Library, San Francisco Maritime National files. This report also was reviewed by Betty Historical Park, San Francisco; USS Perkins and Roger Meade of LANL. Their Memorial, Honolulu, Hawaii; War in the Pacific assistance and review is appreciated. National Historical Park, Agana, ; U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland; United Linda Cullen of the U.S. Naval Institute States Naval Academy Museum, Annapolis; opened her photographic files on the National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Crossroads ships and tests. The staff at the Institution; Philadelphia Maritime Museum. Philadelphia Maritime Museum, particularly curator Jane E. Allen and librarian Ann Robbyn Jackson of the NPS Historic American Wilcox, provided access to the photographic Buildings Survey/Historic American archives of the New York Shipbuilding Record, redrafted the Able and Baker arrays Corporation, which assisted the task of and plotted and drafted the sunken ship assessing Saratoga and Arkansas, both products position chart from data supplied by the U.S. of that shipyard. Steve Haller, archivist at San Navy. Tom Freeman granted permission, with Francisco Maritime National Historical Park, all rights reserved, to publish his painting of directed our attention to the recently processed Saratoga on the bottom. The painting was first San Francisco Call-Bulletin photographic published in the U.S. Naval Institute archives, which included a few dozen invaluable Proceedings in October 1990. views of Saratoga, including photographs of the ship being prepared for the tests and underway Drafts of this document were prepared by the to Bikini. McElfresh and Alice Hall, National Maritime Initiative with the assistance National Geographic Society, are gratefully of Fran Day of the Submerged Cultural thanked for arranging Resources Unit. Design, layout, and final by Bill Curtsinger for National Geographic in production of the camera-ready text was August 1990. Mr. Curtsinger is thanked for undertaken by J. Candace Clifford of the the use of selected photos in this report. National Maritime Initiative staff.

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xii CHAPTER ONE: INTRO DUCTION

Daniel J. Lenihan

In June 1988, while returning from a world is there such a collection of capital cooperative NPS/Navy diving operation in , augmented by a largely intact aircraft , Dan Lenihan, Chief of the National Park carrier, USS Saratoga, and the flagship of the Service Submerged Cultural Resources Unit Japanese Navy at the time of the attack on (SCRU) was approached regarding a potential , Na gato. Through or sunken ship survey at Bikini Atoll. Dr. intent, vessels of great symbolic importance to Catherine Courtney of Holmes and Narver, the history of World War II were included in representing her client, the Department of the test array and now reside at the bottom of Energy (DOE), described the nature of the the lagoon. These ships, all within a few research problem in a presentation at the hundred yards of each other, comprise an headquarters of U.S. Navy Mobile Diving and incomparable diving experience. Salvage Unit One in Honolulu. Cdr. David McCampbell, Unit Commander, had been in During the course of the project the team communication with Dr. Courtney about the members, without exception, were impressed project for some time and recommended a not only with the extraordinary cultural and joint effort using NPS and Navy personnel--a natural resources of Bikini but with the combination that had proved effective in compelling dimension of the problem of numerous prior operations known collectively as and resettlement of the Bikinian Project SeaMark. people. We hope the discussions in this report will help expand the range of options available As formal requests for assistance were initiated to the Marshall Islanders in reestablishing their and arrangements were made for a field community on Bikini and other islands operation in the summer of 1989, the NPS impacted from nuclear testing. underwater team began preparations for one of the most challenging and compelling projects it has ever been asked to undertake. The ships PROJECT MANDATE AND BACKGROUND of Operations Crossroads lying at the bottom of Bikini Atoll Lagoon and Kwajalein Lagoon Under the terms of the Compact of Free are the remains of a fascinating event in Association between the Government of the American history, an event with international United States and the Governments of the dimensions, including implications for the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of restructuring of geopolitical alliances in the (Public Law 99-239), the United latter part of the 20th century. States, in Section 177, accepted responsibility for compensating the citizens of the Marshall The notion that these ships might be Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, or considered as the focus for a marine park, Palau, for "any losses or damages suffered by which is the specific forte of SCRU, only their citizens' property or persons resulting further fueled the team's interest. Efforts to from the U.S. nuclear testing program in the evaluate the ships as historical, archeological, northern Marshall Islands between June 30, and recreational resources for disposition by 1946, and August 18, 1958." The U.S. and the the Bikinian people began in August 1989 and Marshall Islands also agreed to set forth in a resulted in the completion of this report in separate agreement provisions for settlement of March 1991. claims not yet compensated, for treatment programs, direct radiation-related medical Although "ghost fleets" related to World War surveillance, radiological monitoring, and for II exist at Truk Lagoon, etc., nowhere in the such additional programs and activities as may

1 I be mutually agreed. (99 Stat. 1812) In section Government of the Marshall 234, the United States transferred title to U.S. Islands shall hold harmless the • Government property in the Marshall Islands Government of the United to the government of the Marshall Islands States from loss, damage and except for property which the U.S. Government liability associated with such determined a continuing requirement. (99 Stat. vessels, ordnance, oil and cable, 1819) including any loss, damage and liability that may result from Based on section 177, an agreement between salvage operations or other the U.S. and the Government of the Marshall activity that the Government of Islands relating to the nuclear testing programs the Marshall Islands or the was reached. Under the terms of this people of Bikini take or cause agreement, the U.S. Government reaffirmed its to be taken concerning such commitment to provide funds for the vessels or cable. The resettlement of Bikini Atoll by the people of Government of the Marshall Bikini, who were relocated during the first Islands shall transfer, in nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific, Operation accordance with its Crossroads in 1946. Since then, studies that constitutional processes, title to have focused on the eventual resettlement of such vessels and cable to the Bikini have been and continue to be people of Bikini. undertaken. Under the Agreement, the U.S. Department of In July-August 1989 and April-May 1990, a Energy conducted a study of the sunken ships team from the U.S. National Park Service in Bikini Atoll, in particular assessing leaking traveled to Kwajalein and Bikini atolls to fuel and oil that may pose long-term document ships sunk during the Operation environmental impacts that would result from Crossroads atomic bomb tests. The team was the sudden rupture of tanks containing oil or invited by the Bikini Council, the United States fuel. Recommendations for the final Department of Energy, Pacific Region, and disposition of the ships depended on Holmes and Narver, DOE's primary contractor assessments of their structural integrity and in the Pacific and operator of DOE's Bikini historic significance. The DOE requested the Field Station. assistance of the U.S. Navy, Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit One, headquartered at Pearl The sunken ships at Bikini are the property of Harbor, Hawaii, to (1) determine the the people of Bikini. Title was transferred in geographic location (latitude and longitude) of the U.S. Marshall Islands agreement in accord each ship; (2) mark the bow, stern, and with Article 177 of the Compact of Free midships section of each ship with spar buoys; Association; according to Article VI, Section 2 (3) make a preliminary description of the of the agreement: condition of each ship; and (4) determine if the condition of the ships warranted an Pursuant to Section 234 of the Compact, assessment of historical significance. any rights, title and interest the Government of the United States may The U.S. Navy deployed MDSU 1 at Bikini have to sunken vessels and cable situated between August 5-17, 1988. This activity, as in the Bikini lagoon as of the effective well as general footage of Bikini and the ships, date of this Agreement is transferred to was filmed by Scinon Productions, which the Government of the Marshall Islands produced a special for PBS and for KGO-TV, without reimbursement or transfer of San Francisco. Following this exercise and the funds. It is understood that unexpended concurrence of the Bikini Council, on ordnance and oil remains within the December 21, 1988, the Department of Energy hulls of the sunken vessels, and that requested the services of the National Park salvage or any other use of these vessels Service to conduct an evaluation of the could be hazardous. By acceptance of historical significance, marine park potential, such right, title and interest, the and associated with the sunken

2 Honolulu, Hawaii, in early August 1989 and from there traveled to Bikini by way of Kwajalein. The team returned for a second and final lidd season in late April-early May 1990.

Of the original array of target vessels, 21 ships (counting eight smaller ) were sunk in Bikini Lagoon during the Able and Baker atomic bomb tests of July 1 and 25, 1946. A number of the remaining vessels, among them the former German Prinz Eugen (JX-30), which "survived" the tests, were towed to Kwajalcin Atoll for decontamination and offloading of munition. Progressive flooding from leaks, however, led to the capsizing and sinking of Prinz Eugcn in shallow in Kwajalein Atoll Lagoon in 1946. Another target vessel, LCI-327, was stranded and "destroyed" on Bascombe (Mek) Island in Kwajalein Atoll in 1947. These two vessels comprise a secondary deposition of Crossroads target ships that are accessible for :.tudy.

The NPS team was able to visit nine of these Commander David McCampbell, USN (left ), led 23 vessels and document them to varying the NaY) effort Lo locate and plot Lite wreck locations. (NPS, Lar Murphy)

fleet at Bikini. Because the ships and test equipment submerged in Bikini Lagoon are an immensely valuable cul!urnl resourc� deserving thorough study, and the Service's Submerged Cultural Resource Untt IS the only U.S. Government program with experience in this work, the National Park Sen·1ce agreed to assist DOE. At the same time, MDSU 1 was redeployed at Bikini with EOD Mobile Unit One to continue marking wrecks and to assess and safe live ordnance in, on, and around the ships.

The National Park Service team wa� led by Daniel J. Lenihan, Chief of the Submerged Cultural Resource Unit, and included as team members NPS Maritime Historian James P. Delgado, !lead of the National Maritime Iniliativ�o, SCRU Archeologist Larry E. Murphy; Archaeologist Larry V. Nordby, Chief of the Branch of Cultural Research, Southwest Regional Oflice; and Scientific Illustrator Jerry 17te Navy's Explosive L. Livingston of the Branch of Cultural One safed a 350-lb. depth bomb by "gag its live fuse. (NPS, LArry Murphy) Research. The same team assembled in

3 degrees. The team subsequently evaluated two plans showing Saratoga's last pre-Crossroads other vessels utilizing the Navy's Remote refit at Bremerton Naval Shipyard in May 1945 Operated Vehicle (ROV) video coverage of was obtained. From these and published plans them. The major focus of the documentation of the ship, a deck plan and starboard was the Saratoga (CV-3) at elevation of the carrier as it was configured at Bikini; a lesser degree of documentation was the end of the Second World War were achieved for the Na gato and available. The scale of these drawings was too Arkansas (BB-33), the submarines Pilotfish small to serve as a basis for field work, so they (SS-386) and Ap ogon (SS-308), Y0-160, LCT- were expanded using a Map-0-Graph machine 1175, LCM-4, and the attack transports Gilliam to a final scale of 1/8-inch per (1:96). (APA-57) and Carlisle (APA-69) at Bikini, as This selection was based on the preference of well as the cruiser Prinz Eugen at Kwajalein. illustrators, who found this scale ideal when In every case, the NPS found sufficient cause mapping Arizona and other ships of similar to determine that these vessels are indeed size. historically and archeologically significant. Finally, scale drawings of ordnance and radar This report documents the pre-sinking equipment were gleaned from naval manuals. characteristics of each of the vessels, as well as Drawings of aircraft known to be aboard an assessment of their careers and participation Saratoga were obtained from books. These in Operation Crossroads. In the case of the were mechanically reproduced and the scale nine vessels visited by the NPS team and the changed to match the deck plan. The result two ROY-dived vessels, a site description based was a rough approximation of what the vessel on the assessment dives and documentation would have looked like on the eve of efforts is included. The report includes the Operation Crossroads, expressed in drawings of results of several weeks of research that the deck plan and starboard elevation, each provided more concise information pertaining more than nine feet long. Mylar tracings of to target vessel characteristics, specifically small sections of their conjectural drawings Crossroads modifications and outfitting. were carried on each dive by the illustrators Among the more interesting archival discoveries and altered to fit the archeological reality of was that the firing assemblies for some test the ship's present appearance. ordnance on the test ships were incomplete, with inert elements (plaster) replacing either Site and the main or booster charges. To develop a narrative presentation of findings from the research, archeologists Dan Lenihan METHODOLOGY and Larry Murphy, and historian James Delgado, swam through each site and recorded Research observations or notes after the dive or on videotape during the dive. To permit filming, In preparation for the project, background a special experimental hookup was designed material on Operation Crossroads and the before the project to connect a full face mask individual target ships included in the tests was (AGA) to a small underwater video camera. obtained by historian James Delgado through The mask was installed with a microphone that several sources. Historical information about permitted to speak directly onto a each vessel's characteristics, history, videotape as he panned the site with the participation in the tests, and the circumstances camera. This permitted onsite recording of of its sinking were obtained, as were materials field observations and also permitted much pertaining to test planning, logistics, and easier referencing of the viewer to the location results. of the image on the site. On large sites, recording the location of the camera image has In preparation for field activities, the plans been a consistent problem. most likely to reflect the final configuration of armament and deck features present on In addition to personal observation on the site, Saratoga were sought. A set of microfilmed the Navy's 1946 description of

4

ACTIVITIES After lunch, a first assessment dive was made on the wreck of 1989 Field Season Saratoga to a maximum depth of 100 feet. August 8-10: The team traveled fr om their duty stations in Santa Fe, New August 15: During the first full day of dive Mexico, and Washington, D.C., operations at Bikini, the team to Kwajalein, Marshall Islands. made an assessment dive on Saratoga and commenced taking August 11: Layover in Kwajalein. Team observations for the site plan traveled around Kwajalein with and starboard profile of the public affairs liaison officer ship. The starboard side was visiting WWII sites. reconnoitered at 140 feet; the was entered and its August 12: Prepared for departure to immediate area investigated, as Bikini, but was the forward section of the came in overbooked and would ship, particularly the 5-inch gun not take the team to Bikini. mount. Obtained access to a boat during latter part of the day August 16: Dives on Saratoga focused on and snorkeled the wreck of assessments of the island, Prinz Eugen. including the penetration of the plot and bridge, a survey August 13: The plane did not come, so the of the port side of the ship, Holmes and Narver and the penetration of the representative arranged for team hangar. to dive on Prinz Eugen. The team conducted a August 17: Mapping of the after area of reconnaissance survey of the the ship disclosed the first site, obtaining video footage, major damage to Saratoga from photographs, and a sketch. It the tests. A reconnaissance of was discovered that the the bottom of the lagoon at the description of the ship in Ja ne's stern and additional penetration Fighting Ships was incorrect in of the bridge were completed. that it stated the ship had four screws rather than the three it August 18: Additional dives were made on has. On the basis of this dive, Saratoga to continue the a section on Prinz Eugen was mapping of the wreck. included in the results section of this report and specific August 19: Saratoga's island was more management recommendations thoroughly investigated. will be made for transmission to the Base Commander. August 20: Dives on Saratoga began to focus on mapping the starboard August 14: Once again Air Marshall Islands side of the ship for the profile (AMI) decided not to fly. Kent drawing. Hiner, Holmes & Narver's project manager, radioed an August 21: Dives completed the AMI plane en route to preliminary mapping of Kwajalein fr om some other Saratoga, focusing on the point and negotiated a flight to forward section, midships area, Bikini before they took their and island. scheduled return flight to in the Marshall Islands.

7 August 22: Entire team dived on Arkansas, 1990 Field Season resulting in video and a sketch of the wreck. The dive April 25-27: The team travelled from their assessed the more intact port duty stations in Santa Fe, and side of the battleship at the Washington, D.C., to Honolulu, 160-foot level and the keel at and then to Kwajalein. the 140-foot level. April 28: Layover in Kwajalein. The August 23: A dive was made on Pilotfish, team made a dive on Prinz using for the first time the Eugen and obtained additional experimental AG A-video photos and information for a hookup. Delgado narrated his map of the wreck. notes on the dive directly onto a tape at 150 feet, accompanied April 29: The team boarded the DOE by Lenihan, while the other research vessel G. W. Pierce team members sketched and and sailed from Kwajalein for photographed the boat. The Bikini. second dive of the day, with Delgado again m the AGA, April 30: At sea most of the day. Bikini visited Nagato, exploring the was sighted at 4:00 p.m., and at after section of the ship. 5:20 p.m., anchor was dropped off the island. The team was August 24: The only dive of the day was shuttled ashore. made to Gilliam, the accidental zeropoint ship for the Able Test May 1: First dives were made with team bomb's detonation. The team membbrs working on the island swam the length of the ship, and iti the hangar of Saratoga. sketching and photographing it. Larry Murphy departed with the May 2: Mapp�ng Saratoga continued. majority of the equipment to Lenihan and Murphy penetrated catch a Military Air Command the hangar to its aft bulkhead, (MAC) flight to Honolulu in locating additional torpedoes, order to assure loading of that rockets, and homing torpedoes equipment for another operation (depth of 130 feet). Five-inch in the Aleutians. shells in the handling rooms and the open twin 5-inch/38 August 25: The team made of mount were explored aft of the 1989 on Saratoga, penetrating stack by Delgado. Afternoon the hangar and more extensively dives focused on the bow; the documenting the aircraft inside. windlass and emergency radio That afternoon, remaining compartments were penetrated. equipment was packed for Delgado and National departure. Geographic Society writer John Eliot dove on a shallow August 26: The team made an early inshore wreck, which proved to afternoon departure from Bikini, be LCT-1175. flying via AMI to Kwajalein. From Kwaj alein, the team May 3: Documentation of Saratoga members separated--Lenihan continued. Arkansas was dived and Nordby to Santa Fe; on and port Livingston and Delgado to penetrated by Lenihan and Guam. Murphy at a depth of 170 feet. Wreck of LCM-4 snorkeled and

8

detonation of July 25, 1946, at approximately realization set in. Moral implications of the 8:35 a.m. local time, were the first two of the use of the atomic bomb troubled some three-part "Operation Crossroads" tests. (The observers. More pragmatically, many realized third detonation, the "Charlie" test, was that the bomb was a world-threatening weapon. cancelled.) Formulated at the war's end and The spectre of nuclear armageddon approved by President Harry S Truman on overshadowed the globe, and in the United January 10, 1946, Operation Crossroads was not States, the understanding that the bomb could only the first of more than 850 publicly also someday be used against the United States announced atomic weapons tests. It was a brought the first chills to the . major demonstration of the power of the bomb General H. H. "Hap" , head of the U.S. and of that had produced and used Army Air , was the first to publicly it, the United States. The name was selected prophesize that World War III would not last because the atomic bomb represented a as long as World War II; World War III would "crossroads"--from conventional to nuclear war. be over in hours, with no one left to determine who had won. The tests involved assembling a fleet of 242 ships, 42,000 men, 156 , and tens of Widespread comprehension of the bomb's grim thousands of tons of equipment, ordnance, and reality was not immediate. It took many years, material at Bikini, as well as relocating the 162 the detonation of a nuclear bomb by the Soviet residents of the atoll--beginning an odyssey that Union, and the development of vast arsenals of has earned for these displaced people the more potent nuclear weapons with the capacity sobriquet of "nuclear nomads" of the Pacific. to kill every living thing on several times Observers from Congress, from other nations over, for fear to set in. Yet until then, people (including the ), and accepted the bomb as a deadly and powerful representatives of "U.S. press, radio, pictorial beneficial force. At the very beginning, though, services, magazines, etc." made these tests the the message was clear. In 1946, a press report most public and the most reported of any noted that while "a large number of scientists nuclear weapons tests.1 The inherent message are looking forward to the forthcoming of nuclear weapons was underscored at Bikini, ... [the] least curious ...are the atomic and has since become increasingly the subject scientists. They take a poor view of the entire of public debate and concern as the progeny of operation, maintaining that the at the multiplied until by 1986, and have perfectly well according to one nonofficial estimate, the demonstrated the basic fact that the atomic United States had manufactured 60,000 bomb is too powerful a weapon to leave warheads of 71 types for 116 different weapons outside the confines of international control systems.2 and that Operation Crossroads will simply underline this truth.... "3 The commander of Initially, the development and use of atomic Joint One which conducted weapons was welcomed and celebrated in the Operation Crossroads was Vice Adm. William United States because the destruction of two Henry Purnell Blandy. Blandy, writing in the Japanese cities had brought a fierce enemy to foreword to Bombs at Bikini, the "official" his knees through the fear of rapid public report on the tests, noted "the atomic annihilation. The toll of fighting at Palau, Iwo bomb is definitely not 'just another weapon;' its Jima, and Okinawa was still vividly recalled. destructive power dwarfs all previous weapons. Many thousands of American would have Observers at Bikini saw the bomb sink great been lost in a bloody invasion of the Japanese steel warships and, with its penetrating nuclear home islands. Consciences were salved when radiation, reach into ships' interiors to kill test the death toll at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while animals. The explosions in air and underwater terrible, was less than the number of Japanese were very different spectacles, but their end civilians killed in the B-29 fire-bombing raids results mean the same: death and destruction on , , and . Soon, however, on an enormous scale."4 as historian Paul Boyer has noted, a grim

12

THE CONCEPT OF A NAVAL TEST available to the Army Air Forces for use in EVOLVES tests involving atomic bombs and other • weapons."12 The news of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima started discussions among naval circles as to This proposal met with a positive response the new weapon's effect on ships; this question from the Navy. As early as June 1945, the was posed on the floor of the Senate on Navy's Bureau of Ships (BuShips) and Bureau August 25, 1945, when Senator Brien McMahon of Ordnance (BuOrd) had recommended a of stated: "comprehensive program for testing high explosives against merchant and hulks, In order to test the destructive powers captured enemy vessels, and of the atomic bomb against naval vessels, combatant ships about to be stricken from the I would like ...Japanese naval ships taken active list."13 The to sea and an atomic bomb dropped on Program had been approved by the Chief of them. The resulting explosion should Naval Operations, but the deployment of the prove to us just how effective the atomic atomic bomb changed the scope of the effort. bomb is when used against the giant On August 28, the same day Admiral King naval ships. I can think of no better use recommended destroying the Japanese ships, for these Jap ships.9 the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, Vice Adm. E. L. Cochrane, informed the Underwater The idea of using the bomb against ships was Explosion Program staff that they "must be not new; "even in 1944, Los Alamos scientists prepared to undertake broad-scale experiments were looking into the possibilities of eventually with the atomic bomb to clear up its major atomic-bombing Japanese fleet ," influence on naval warfare" as their first specifically the Japanese naval base at Truk priority. The Chief of Naval Operations was Lagoon, but by that late date the Imperial notified by BuShips and BoOrd that "full-scale Japanese Navy was already decimated by testing ...both underwater and above water, conventional warfare.10 American submarines against ships of various types" using the atomic waged a terrible war of attrition: disastrous sea bomb was imperative.14 At the same time, the battles and bombing raids sank most Japanese United States Navy, which had built a capital ships, leaving a pitiful remnant of the formidable fleet of more than 1,200 ships once formidable fleet at war's end. during the war, was scaling down.

The destruction of the 48 surviving surface At the end of August 1945, Secretary of the warships of the Navy suggested that the Navy surrendered at war's end was guaranteed would be reduced to a 400-ship force with regardless of whether or not the atomic bomb 8,000 aircraft, with the remaining ships held in was used.1 1 The new would be reserve. This situation provided the Navy with demilitarized and its remaining vessels sunk or a large number of potentially expendable ships scrapped. On August 28, 1945, Fleet Adm. for weapons testing. Questioned about the Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the atomic bomb, Forrestal strongly underscored U.S. Fleet, recommended that the remaining the fact that the bomb would ultimately be put Japanese vessels be destroyed. Lt. Gen. B. M. to use at sea, noting that "control of the sea by Giles, on MacArthur's staff in Tokyo, followed whatever weapons are necessary is the Navy's Senator McMahon's lead and proposed on mission." The next day, The New Yo rk Times, September 14, 1945, that atomic bombs be used reporting on the Navy's opposition to merging to sink the Japanese ships. The proposal was the War and Navy Departments, noted that the supported by Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay, Navy was probably amenable to joint operations architect of the fire-bombing raids on Japan. regarding "scientific developments," and Gen. H. H. "Hap" Arnold concurred, and prophesized that "it would not at all be asked the Navy on September 18 that "a surprising" within the next six months for a number of the Japanese vessels be made proposal "to test the effects of the new atomic

14 bomb against warships. There has been overt symbolism of the atomic bomb destroying speculation ...whether the atomic bomb ...might the surviving capital ships of the Japanese cause the bottoms of steel ships to disintegrate Navy; one early 1946 newspaper account, and thus sink the entire fleet...some Navy accompanied by an authorities say they would like to see such a photograph of 24 battered-looking submarines test conducted against some of our old and , crowed "Trapped Remnants of battleships, for, if the atomic bomb works this J ap Fleet Face Destruction in United States way, they want to know it."15 Navy -Bomb Tests." Another symbolic and significant aspect of the tests was a Given the Navy's strong interest in the bomb demonstration that the United States was now and its commitment to the Underwater the world leader; it alone possessed the secret Explosion Program and that program's priority of , it had a stockpile of atomic being atomic testing, and with the Army Air bombs capable of being used again, and it was Forces' proposal in hand, Admiral King agreed sufficiently wealthy to expend three (the on October 16, 1945, to atomic bombing of the original number of planned detonations) of Japanese ships as a coordinated action of the these bombs and nearly a hundred ships in the Army and Navy under the control of the Joint most costly and elaborate weapons tests Chiefs of Staff, with "a few of our own modern performed on earth up to that time. naval vessels .. .included in the target array" for air and underwater detonations, following the Considerable interest in the tests by scientists advice and plans of the Underwater Explosion assessing the weapon's effects was publicly Program staff.16 On October 24, The New Yo rk touted. In , reported Times reported that the Navy was to test the that "a large number of scientists are looking bomb to assess its effect on ships both forward to the forthcoming explosion ....never dispersed and "massed at anchorage as in Pearl having had a chance to test the effects of Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941."17 It was not until atomic energy in their own areas of December 10, 1945, however, that an official knowledge," because they would have "a announcement of joint Army-Navy tests of the laboratory example of what may happen to the bomb was made. Th e New York Tim es, world and the animate and inanimate things on covering the announcement, stated that the it in the event that war comes again. "20 details had yet to be worked out, specifically Throughout Operation Crossroads, and well noting that the Army Air Forces "have been after, "scientific benefits" of the tests were working aggressively to get a leading role in stressed. These benefits were for the military, the experiment to make sure it would not be which learned from Crossroads and the an all-Navy affair.''18 While hotly denied, the hundreds of tests that followed to make issue of Army-Navy competition was continually stronger, deadlier nuclear weapons: raised throughout the tests; a July 30, 1946, article in Th e New York Times quoted an At Hiroshima and Nagasaki a few unnamed Army officer's attacks on the photographs and pressure measurements "battleship mentality" of "die-hard" naval were made of the explosions, but almost officers, noting "in the event of a future war ...a nothing of value to physicists was Navy as we know it now will be utterly helpless learned. Physicists wanted actual values on either side." of the following: pressure, impulse, accelerations, shock-wave velocity, ranges The concept of the tests was appealing for and intensities of gamma radiation, more than technical reasons; while "it is indeed decrease of the gamma radiation during routine to test each new weapon in all maj or the first few hours. And medical men, applications," including against naval targets, arriving at the scene late, found it "the novelty of the proposed test of the atomic difficult to tell what the early symptoms bomb against naval vessels would lie in the of the injured persons had been, and unprecedented scale and world-wide importance whether the injuries resulted primarily of the tests."19 Even more attractive was the from flash burn, gamma radiation, or

15 (1) DD Anderson (11) ARDC-13 (21) APA Catron (2) SS Apogon (12) Y0-160 (22) AP A Crittenden (3) BB Arkansas (13) LCT-1114 (23) APA Dawson ( 4) APA Carlisle (14) APA Banner (24) SS Dentuda (5) APA Gilliam (15) APA (25) APA Fallon (6) DD Lamson (16) APA Bracken (26) APA Gasconade (7) BB Nagato (17) APA Briscoe (27) DD Holmes (8) SS Pilotfish (18) APA Brule (28) CVL Independence (9) CL Sakawa (19) APA Butte (29) DD Mayrant (10) CV Saratoga (20) AP A Carteret (30) DD Mu stin

'@ � @� =-@J ® ®� @ ' �® Nt ,0 � c:@ '\� c: 0 ,@ �@ @ "@ �

""® "'® '0 = � � ® c: .@ @) �@ �@

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The Able Target Array, showing the actual point of detonation. Shaded vessels sank as a result of th e blast.

16 (31) BB New York (41) SS Skipjack (51) YOG-83 (32) BB Nevada (42) DD Stack (52) LST-133 (33) SS Parche (43) DD Talbot (53) LCT-327 (34) BB Pennsylvania (44) DD Tripp e (54) LCT-332 (35) CA Pensacola (45) SS Tuna (55) LCT-674 (36) IX Prinz Eugen (46) DD Wainwright (56) LCT-816 (37) DD Rhind (47) DD Wilson (57) LCT-818 (38) CA Salt Lake City (48) LCM-1 (39) SS Searaven (49) LST-52 ( 40) SS Skate (50) LSM-60

The Baker Target Array, showing the actual point of detonation. Shaded vessels sank as a result of the blast. Both illustrations were redrawn by Robbyn Jackson of the NPS Historic American Engineering Record from JTF-1 sketches.

17 torpedo had holed the ship in August 1945. included. The American-built ships were This patch was reinforced and tightened, and "excellent examples of prewar riveted a special watertight box was built around a construction, with structure somewhat heavier steam steering engine shaft which, if flooded, than any up to the latest 8-in. cruisers would be damaged if the shaft bearings were built during the war." Sakawa and Prinz Eugen immersed in salt water.27 Other preparations were selected because "they represented the included the establishment of vertical and latest in cruiser design of and horizontal reference lines for list and twist Japan."32 Sakawa was intended to sink, as was determination, installation of deck compression Na gato; both vessels were moored within a gauges, installation of special boarding ladders 1,000-yard perimeter of the designated on the shell plating from waterline to deck zeropoint for both tests, while Prinz Eugen w&.s edge, and painting of frame numbers on the moored outside of the immediate blast area. hull and decks. A full photographic record Saratoga and In dependence, the two carriers, was made of all "special installations."28 were selected to include an old, pre-war carrier and a modern, but less than satisfactory light Factors involved in selecting the ships ranged carrier. (The In dependence class, a wartime from specific types and methods of construction necessity, were light, hastily constructed ships.) to specific materials. In its enabling directive, Saratoga's selection was justified as follows: One was instructed to include not only captured enemy vessels in the target Subdivision of the Saratoga was unusually array but to also test vessels "representative of complete; she had approximately 1000 modern U.S. naval and merchant types ...." watertight compartments. There were 22 However, "it was not feasible to include vessels main transverse bulkheads and two of all U.S. naval types--especially the most continuous longitudinal bulkheads modern types." A range of vessels were extended 70 percent of the length. Two selected to include welded and riveted watertight platforms extended fore and construction and the evolution of ship aft of the machinery spaces. The compartmentalization; "although the older underwater protection was very similar in vessels have extensive subdivision, recent ships arrangement to that of modern have more complete transverse water-tightness battleships and large carriers. An inner to high-level decks and incorporate principles bottom above the bottom shell was fitted of longitudinal framing."29 Therefore, the final between the innermost torpedo bulkheads target array included for the most part vessels for about 80 percent of the length.33 that were "over-age or of obsolete design--which would otherwise have been The 12 target destroyers selected represented decommissioned and sold for scrap. However, three immediate prewar types--the Mahan , a modern aircraft carrier and several modern Gridley, and Sims classes . The attack heavy-hulled submarines were included also."30 transports were "typical of modern Five battleships were selected, one being the merchant-ship practice, with good transverse Japanese Na gato, which was presumably subdivision.... These vessels were designed and included solely to sink it. The U.S. battleships, built during the war and were essentially of all of a type made obsolete by the newer all-welded construction, with very few riveted classes, were included because "although not of joints."34 Target landing craft were included most modern design [they] possessed great "more for the purpose of determining the resistance to battle damage" because of heavy effects of wave action than for determining hulls, torpedo-protection systems of multiple direct effects of pressure on the hulls."35 longitudinal bulkheads, heavy , double or triple bottoms, and some 600 watertight Three reinforced concrete vessels were compartments.31 used--ARDC-13, Y0-160, and YOG-83. These three vessels were selected for dispersal within Four cruisers--two U.S., one German (Prinz the target array from a group of craft Eugen), and one Japanese (Sakawa)--were scheduled for disposal to satisfy the Navy's

19

Bureau of Yards and Docks' interest "in the In response to criticism over the cost, Blandy damage to reinforced concrete structures at responded on April 16 that the total costs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki .... The lack of suitable the tests would probably not exceed the total land areas at Bikini made construction of cost of "one large new ship," since the obsolete similar installations impractical, even if there targets had been declared surplus and even if had been time."36 The eight target submarines sunk "the cost for at least 90 percent would be were "selected from those scheduled for the only their scrap value," which the admiral reserve fleets or for disposal by scrapping. estimated at $100 million.43 In response to They represented the two major types [the letters protesting the use of the target ships, Gato and Batao classes], light and heavy hull Joint Task Force One's form letter response construction, built in recent years by [among was that the ships were either obsolescent or others] the three submarine building yards of "in excess of the number required to keep our the Electric Boat Company and the naval post-war Navy at its proper strength." The shipyards at and ."37 letter emphasized that not all ships would be Some vessels were individually selected because destroyed; even "those badly damaged ...may be of age, previous battle damage, and, towed to the United States and sold as occasionally, to replace ships selected but not scrap. Still others may be placed back into available. LCT-705 and LCT-1013 were placed service ...."44 One letter writer wanted to place in the Able target array to serve as "catchers target ships in personal service: 11-year-old to collect samples of any fission products which Max Ladewasser "and gang" wanted some of might fall out of the atomic cloud."38 The the ships presented to the children of the selection of 35 "major" vessels--from the country; specifically "I would like to have a battleships and carriers to the submarines--was real P.T. boat which we could run on Lake publicly announced on January 24, 1946, at the Michigan. "45 first Crossroads press conference in Washington. 39 Some protests focused on the selection of individual ships as targets, specifically the Opposition to the tests surfaced for a variety battleships New Yo rk and Pe nnsylvania. When of reasons, among them the destruction of the New York sailed from its namesake city in ships. One objection was to the cost of the January 1946 for Bikini, the loss of the ship various target ships: in March 1946, Admiral was lamented as veterans' groups and the state Blandy testified before the Senate Naval Affairs chamber of commerce lobbied to save it. "New Committee that the construction costs for the York may lose forever its most useful and target ships totaled $450 million, but noted that fitting war memorial unless something is done all the ships were obsolescent except for five to prevent destruction of our century's Old submarines and the light carrier Ironsides as an atom bomb target. This ship Independence. 40 Senator Scott Lucas of should be permanently on display in New criticized the tests as a "grandiose display of York. ..." An unnamed officer stated that "I atomic destruction" and argued that the target don't see why she couldn't have been given to ships, if no longer useful for naval purposes, the State, just as her sister ship, the Texas, was could be converted "into temporary homes for given to that State."48 The response from Joint veterans."41 One citizen, writing to protest the Task Force One was that while "it is regretted tests, was angry not over the loss of ships, but that such ships as the New York cannot be of valuable steel, and noted that spared and exhibited as memorials, it is felt engineers tested models in wind tunnels and that this gallant battleship could perform no thus "do not need to destroy full size planes to more valuable or distinguished service for our see just what the planes will do under certain post-war Navy than it will render in the conditions.... Scientists do not need to kill historic tests ...."4 7 It was also noted that "many elephants to determine the reaction of other ships of the target group have equally chemicals and drugs. They use small mice."42 glorious battle records and are similarly

20 • OPERATION SCRAP VALUE OF TA RG ET SHIPS 4 BB

1 cv} ICVL ABOUT HALF THE COST OF A NEW 2CA

- -

17 DO - -

ass 370.000 TONS OF SCRAP �3.700.000 6 LST} (FOR�lE·4D TON) 6LCI $3.700.000.

23APA -

Joint Task Force One press release chart depicting "scrap " costs of Op eration Crossroads. (U.S. Naval Institute)

distinguished historically in their respective ships' crews. What might happen in a classes. It is sincerely regretted that such ships real case, is that a large ship, about a which have served with distinction in our Navy away from the explosion, would for so many years cannot be spared .... "48 escape sinking, but the crew would be killed by the deadly burst of The criticism by some nuclear scientists that from the bomb, and only a ghost ship the tests would add little or nothing to the would remain, floating unattended on the understanding of the bomb was in part based vast waters of the ocean. If not killed on their assertion that ships, as mechanically outright, the crew may well suffer such stronger structures than buildings, would remain strong , as to become afloat and undamaged, lessening fear of the critically ill a few days later.49 bomb by people who expected the total destruction of the fleet prophesized by the This prescient comment's various implications press, thus creating a "feeling of false security." were in part answered by the decision to place Two explosive weapons had already been animals on the target ships to study the bomb's detonated--Able and Baker's bombs were effects on them. Protests against the use of identical to the Nagasaki weapon. The the animals were numerous; among the letters "greatest weakness" of the tests, however, was received were a few that grimly reflected on that as of early , the use of enemy vessels as targets, with the addition of "Germans and Japanese who have no provisions are indicated for studying been condemned to death by proper courts of the effects of the bomb's radiation on jurisdiction,"50 One writer suggested that "in

21

THE ABLE TEST adhered to only for those ships tbnt were present in large quantities- landing craft, The target urrays were !iClccted "to provide the destroyers, and nttack transport These shaps best instrumentation possible, rather than be were berthed at regular intervals along a single, placed in a tactical formation. This policy was curved (to keep one ship from partially 88 approved for both tcsts.• The vessels were shielding another) line extending radially from closely grouped together ncar the center of the the designated zeropoint, which was 5,40 yards array "because of the ..decrease of pressure off the beach of Bikini Island. The battleship 57 with ancreusc in distance from the zeropoinl." Nevada was selected as the zcropoint "target• The test array for the Able test included 24 for Able because it was "the most rugged ship 51 vessels within the 1,00-yard radius of Nevada, available." the designated zeropoint, while 21 vesls were placed within the 1,00-yard radius of the point The target arrays were different for each test. of detonation for the Baker test. The Able target array consisted of 78 vessels; the Baker nrray consisted of 75. After the Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Stnff required several vessels saru in tbe Able lest, some of the target arrays to graduate the level of the ships in the •fringes" of the test area were damage; "this involved dispersing the target shifted closer to the zeropoint to replace the fleet so that individual ships of each major lost vessels. Additionally, other vessels were type would be placed in positions ranging from placed farther out in the Able array to spare close .. for major damage ...to appreciable them from major damage since they were to be distances ...for light dnmnge."118 Since sufficient the primary targets in the Baker test; among numbers of each type of vessel were not these sh•ps wao; the carrier Sarotoga.80 The available, the best layout, geometric lines, bow Able test dc.ton.ttion, oraginally scheduled for and stern on, and broadside to the blast, was May 15, was postponed six weeks to allow,

23

Arkansas, the submarines Apogon, Pilotfish, and the ships "clean" was only partially successful. Skipjack, and the auxiliaries Y0-160 and The effort to decontaminate the target ARDC-13 sank almost immediately. The badly battleship New Yo rk was a case in point: damaged carrier Saratoga , listing but too radioactive to be boarded by salvage teams, The main deck forward had not been sank within hours, followed by the Japanese touched as yet.. . .I made a careful survey battleship Nagato, and LCT-1114. Within the of the deck, finding the intensity to vary next few days, five other landing craft that a great deal in a matter of feet. One were damaged in the Baker test were scuttled gets the impression that fission products in Bikini lagoon; another was taken outside of have become most fixed in the tarry the atoll and sunk. The destroyer Hugh es and caulking of the planking and in rusty the Fallon, badly damaged and spots in the metal plates. When the sinking, were taken in tow and beached. The survey was complete the Chief turned his detonation effect of Baker was greater than booted, sweating, profane and laughing Able; reports and interest were rekindled, crew loose with brushes, water, and a although total destruction by the bomb had barrel of lye. Yet when the hydraulics once more been averted. One reporter, were done and the deck rinsed clean William L. Laurence, the "dean" of atomic again, another survey showed the reporters who had witnessed the detonation of invisible emanations to be present.. .. The the Trinity test bomb, the Nagasaki bomb drop, portly Chief stood watching the dial of and the two Bikini blasts, described a new my Geiger counter, completely public attitude as a result of Operation bewildered. The deck was clean, Crossroads. Returning to the United States, anybody could see that, clean enough for Laurence found that while "before Bikini the the Admiral himself to eat his breakfast world stood in awe of this new cosmic off of. So what was all this goddam force ...since Bikini this feeling ...has largely radioactivity?71 evaporated and has been supplanted by a sense of relief unrelated to the grim reality of the While no extensive deposit of long-life situation." Laurence felt this was because of radioactive materials were found on the target the desire of the average citizen "to grasp the ships after the Able test, the Baker test flimsiest means that would enable him to regain detonation generated more radiation; even the his peace of mind. He had expected one salt in the water, for example, was transformed bomb to sink the entire Bikini fleet, kill all the into a short-lived radioactive material. animals ... make a hole in the bottom of the However, and other long-lived fission ocean and create tidal waves. He had even products that emitted beta and gamma rays been told that everyone participating in the test were the major problem. The reboarding of would die. Since none of these happened, he ships after Able was undertaken after a few is only too eager to conclude that the atomic hours in some cases. After Baker, only five bomb is, after all, just another weapon."70 vessels at the extreme ends of two vessel strings could be boarded. Access to the rest Laurence himself, as well as nearly everyone of the target array was denied. By July 26 and else involved in the tests, failed to realize or 27, crews were able to beach Hugh es and report the insidious effect of the bomb. Far Fallon, which were sinking, "but both vessels deadlier than the actual blast, in that time of were radioactive to the extent that taking them "limited yield" nuclear weapons, was the lasting in tow... required fast work. The forecastle of effect of radiation, confirming once again the Hugh es, for example, had a tolerance time of fears and prophecies of the nuclear scientists about eight minutes."72 By July 27 and 28, that even seemingly "undamaged" vessels could surveys of all remaining target vessels were and would suffer from radioactive made from distances of 50 to 100 feet. contamination. Decontamination by scrubbing

28

The "severe" contamination problem was kept vessels. Rounding of ship surfaces and as quiet as possible; according to an August 10 wash-down systems to spray a vessel subjected memorandum from the Manhattan Engineer to fallout and facilitate the rinsing off of the District of the Army Corps of Engineers ship were the only Crossroads-induced changes observer, Col. A. W. Betts, to his , Brig. for passive defense against nuclear weapons. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols, "the classification of The primary naval modifications after this memo can only be explained by the fact Crossroads were measures to take the bomb to that the Navy considers this contamination sea as a weapon, leading to nuclear-capable business the toughest part of Test Baker. They carriers, guided missile cruisers, and had no idea it would be such a problem and submarines. Additionally, there was a demand they are breaking their necks out here to find for new designs of nuclear weapons suitable for some ."79 Gross decontamination efforts carrying in these vessels. In an atmosphere of continued that enabled the Navy to complete no adequate defense against nuclear the removal of test instruments and records, deployment, the Navy, like the rest of the technical inspections, and salvage operations; military, embraced nuclear deterrence through however, the report on radiological the adoption of and subsequent escalation of decontamination concluded that these efforts, use of nuclear weapons at sea as a defense. "although successful to a certain extent in the limited application they received, revealed Decontamination efforts at Kwajalein ceased in conclusively that removal of radioactive September 1946; work after that focused on contamination of the type encountered in the removing ammunition aboard the ships. On target vessels in Test Baker cannot be one such detail, the light carrier Independence accomplished satisfactorily.... "8 0 On August 25, was visited and described: 1946, the Navy's Director of Ship Material, in charge of the inspections, "felt that all The In dependence is a ghost ship--its significant information had been recorded and blown up, leaving the thick reported that the technical inspection phase at oak planks broken like so much Bikini was complete." That day he and his boxwood; its hangar deck blasted down staff departed for Kwajalein "to establish and only the skeleton of its sides facilities there for continued examination and remammg. Gun turrets and gangways, radiological re-checks of the target ships. "81 twisted, crushed, dangle oversides, Some of the vessels had departed as early as grating and creaking with the roll of the August 19, and now the other ships followed; ship. Doors are smashed in and jammed by August 29, only 19 target vessels--the tight against the bulkheads, or blown out destroyer Mustin, YOG-83, and 16 landing altogether, and the rusty water sloshes craft, were left at Bikini, along with 18 salvage aimlessly back and forth across the rusty vessels. decks. For the most part the radiation is not particularly high, although sometimes these rusty pools will set your THE LEGACY OF CROSSROADS earphones singing and shoot your indicator needles off scale.83 Thirteen target ships were sent to Pearl Harbor or to the West Coast "for further study of A confidential memorandum from the damage and for development of radiological Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, decontamination and safety techniques by the (CINCPAC) , dated September 4, 1946, Navy... .it is the policy of the Navy to carry out authorized the sinking of contaminated vessels an aggressive active program of radiological at Kwajalein.84 The same day, Admiral Blandy, and . atomic defense research to apply the back in Washington, reported that "only 9 of lessons of Crossroads."82 The study of the 92 ships escaped at Bikini," noting that "all but ships led to certain modifications in the nine ...were either sunk, damaged or construction of new naval vessels, though after contaminated by radioactivity," naming the World War II the United States built few large submarines Tu na, Searaven, Dentuda, and

31 submarines- -Dentuda, Tuna, Parche, Searaven, The message of Bikini, while not understood by Skate, and Skipjack were sent to Mare Island the public at the time, and only grasped later Naval Shipyard and the San Francisco Naval in hindsight, was clear to the military, which Shipyard at Hunter's Point. Dentuda and had seen a fleet survive physically but Parche were considered only "radiologically nonetheless lost forever to radioactive suspect" and were cleared for preservation and contamination. Blast effect, while impressive, reuse. Four of the submarines could not be paled next to radiation effect: "From a military decontaminated; Skipjack, Searaven, Skate, and viewpoint, the atomic bomb's ability to kill Tu na were sunk as targets off San Clemente, human beings or to impair, through injury, California, in 1948. their ability to make war is of paramount importance. Thus the overall result of a Pearl Harbor received the battleships Nevada bomb's explosion upon the crew .. .is of greater and New Yo rk. Naval Shipyard interest.. .. " Therefore, it followed that, received the destroyer Hu ghes and the cruisers Pensacola and Salt Lake City. In 1948 all If used in numbers, atomic bombs not three were towed to sea and sunk as targets in only can nullify any nation's military deep water.88 Fifty of the target vessels were effort, but can demolish its social and sunk as targets for conventional weapons economic structure and prevent their (surface bombardment and aerial attack); 36 re-establishment for long periods of time. were sunk in the vicinity of Kwajalein. New With such weapons, especially if York and Nevada were sunk off Hawaii in deep employed in conjunction with other water; Hu ghes and Pensacola were sunk off the weapons of mass destruction, as, for Pacific coast of Washington, and Independence, example, pathogenic bacteria, it is quite Crittenden, Gasconade, Salt Lake City, and the possible to depopulate vast areas of the four submarines previously mentioned were earth's surface, leaving only vestigial sunk off California. Nine ships are known to remnants of man's material works.91 have escaped or sinking: two submarines, Dentuda and Parche; two LCis Ironically, the vestigial remnants of man's were sold for scrap along with one LCM; and material works in the form of the target ships four attack transports--Cortland, Fillmore, were the first tangible demonstrations of the Geneva, and Niagara were transferred to the power of the atomic bomb and the futility of Maritime Commission and ultimately scrapped defense against it; as Paul Boyer notes, an by them. The fate of 13 landing craft (five awakening slowly resulted from "the navy's LCis, three LCMs, and five LCVPs) is determined, frustrating, and ultimately futile unknown.89 If they were scrapped later, this efforts to decontaminate the surviving ships by would raise the number of "survivors" of the scrubbing, scraping, and sandblasting ...the target fleet to 22 vessels. Although a fourth of pariah fleet of ghostly radioactive ships ...."92 the total fleet numerically, these ships included only two combatant ships and a small fraction Public awareness and wariness began to surface of the total tonnage assembled at Bikini for the in 1948. That year, David Bradley, M.D., a two blasts. The contaminated or "suspect" member of the radiological safety team at support vessels present better statistics; by the Bikini, published his diary, written during the beginning of 1947, 80 of the 159 support ships tests as the book, No Place to Hide, which was were granted "final radiological clearance." By syndicated in a pre-publication release by the the end of the year, every one of the 159 was Atlantic Monthly, condensed by The Reader's cleared, though some, like the destroyer Laffey , Digest, made into a Book-of-the-Month Club required drydocking in floating drydocks (to release, and stayed on The New Yo rk Times avoid contaminating permanent onshore best sellers list for ten weeks. No Place to facilities), sandblasting and repainting of all Hide was a forceful book that subtly told the underwater surfaces, and acid washing and real message of Bikini; Bradley felt that the partial replacement of salt-water piping and Crossroads tests, "hastily planned and hastily evaporators in the ship.90 carried out ...may have only sketched in gross

33 outlines ...the real problem; nevertheless, these Land.'' Juda noted, sadly, that the Bikinians outlines show pretty clearly the shadow of the "were naive then .... We are, sadly, more akin to colossus which looms behind tomorrow."93 the Children of when they left and Bradley also was drawn to the analogy of the wandered through the for 40 years.''97 target ships at Kwajalein, including "the Now, 44 years later, the Bikinians and the rest beautiful Prinz Eugen, once the pride of the of the world more fully understand the meaning German fleet and as sleek and cavalier a ship and legacy of Operation Crossroads, a legacy as ever sailed the seas," intact and unbroken by that is reflected in twenty-three vessels that lie the blasts but "nevertheless dying of a accessible to divers at two Pacific atolls. malignant disease for which there is no help."94 The cure was sinking the ships. In February 1949, The Washington Post published a column THE 1947 SCIENTIFIC RESURVEY by Drew Pearson that termed the test results a "major naval disaster." Pearson reported that In early 1947, plans for a scientific resurvey of as of 1949, "of the 73 ships involved in the Bikini during that summer were drafted by the Bikini tests, more than 61 were sunk or Joint Crossroads Committee. Adm. W. S. destroyed. This is an enormous loss from only Parsons, the Navy's Director of Atomic two bombs .... The aircraft carrier Defense, forwarded a proposal to the Joint Independence... is now anchored off San Chiefs of Staff on April 9, 1947. A program Francisco, permanently destroyed--usable only of biological study was necessary "in order to as a testing ground to determine the possibility determine the long-term effects of Test Baker of removing radioactivity. This is still on fish and other marine organisms including dangerous two years after the ship was corals and calcareous algae ...and to obtain data attacked."95 on which to base a decision relative to possible resettlement of the native population."98 At the It is strangely prophetic that almost all of the same time, diving on some of the sunken target target ships were ultimately taken to sea and ships was proposed to "make additional diving scuttled in deep water, joining their sisters observations" and retrieve test data from sunk in the more shallow waters of Bikini. Crossroads instruments abandoned in 1946. Once too radioactive to visit, these vessels, with Specifically mentioned as high priorities for the beta or gamma activity reduced due to reassessment were Saratoga, Na gato, Pilotfish , decay are now the focus of a new Arkansas, and Apogon.99 look at them and at Crossroads. The plan was approved, and a group of Ironically, the "nuclear nomads" of the Pacific, scientists and technicians from the Navy, Army, presently the absentee owners and managers of the Smithsonian Institution, the U.S. Fish and many of the vessels from the sunken fleet of Wildlife Service, and other unnamed institutions Operation Crossroads, were, like the ships was placed under the command of Capt. themselves, harbingers of a nuclear future. In Christian L. Engleman, USN, the Project 1948, David Bradley wrote of his 1946 visit to Director at Bikini. Overall command of the the displaced Bikinians on Rongerik Island. resurvey ships was given to Capt. H. Henry They "are not the first, nor will they be the Hederman, USN. Both men were Crossroads last, to be left homeless and impoverished by veterans. While a classified operation, the the inexorable bomb. They have no choice in resurvey was publicly announced because of a the matter, and very little understanding of it. strong desire by the Joint Chiefs to stress "the But in this perhaps they are not so different story of cooperation that exists between civilian from us all.''96 In 1978, Tomaki Juda, leader of and military agencies in the Bikini resurvey the Bikinians, testified before Congress that his work. Proper handling of the Bikini Resurvey people had been relocated on the premise that story can do much to acquaint the American the tests were for the good of mankind and public with the long-range value of Operation that they were to be like "the Children of Crossroads."100 Israel, whom the Lord led into the Promised

34

1946, as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 23 585, 79th Congress, 1st Session). The bill passed control W. A. Shurcliff, "Technical History of Operation of atomic energy from the Manhattan Engineer District, Crossroads," Vol. 1, (1946) copy on file at the National and hence the military, to the newly created Atomic Technical Information Service, p. 5.3. Hereafter cited as Energy Commission, created a military liaison committee, Shurcliff, "Technical History.• and instituted security provisions to protect against the release of "classified" nuclear secrets. See Vincent C. 24 Jones, Manhattan: Th e Army and the Atomic Bomb: Director of Ship Material, "Historical Report,• Vol. 1, The in World War II, Special pp. 68-69. Studies (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1985), pp. 576-578. 25 Ibid. , p. 67. 10 Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 9. A dispatch by Hanson 26 W. Baldwin to Th e New York Ti mes, published in the Ibid. , p. 68. paper's July 25, 1946 edition, reported that the target array for Baker, a "tactical situation of the fleet in 27 harbor... was frankly patterned after an opportunity in the Ibid. , p. 69. Also see Vice Admiral E. L. Cochrane, past war that was never realized," namely an atomic USN, "Crossroads and Ship Design," Shipmate, bombing of Truk. Baldwin noted the bomb was not (September 1946) pp. 9-10. used because of the Japanese fleet's near destruction and "no of enemy ships sufficiently large 28 enough to warrant the use of the atomic bomb was ever Ibid. , pp. 74-75. detected." p. 2. Tri nity, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki came as soon as active material and other components were 29 ready--no earlier detonation was ever possible. Shurcliff, "Technical History," p. 6.3.

11 30 According to Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of th e Ibid. , p. 6.4. Imperial Japanese Navy (1 941-1945) (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978), Appendix A, "Name, Date of 31 Completion, and Fate of Major Ships of the Imperial Ibid. Japanese Navy," pp. 343-350. The remaining ships, some of them half-sunk at Kure or practically inoperable (such 32 as Naga to at Yokosuka) were one battleship, two Shurcliff, "Technical History,• p. 6.5. carriers, two light carriers (CVLs), two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers (CLs), and thirty-eight destroyers. 33 Ib id. 12 Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, pp. 10-11. 34 Shurcliff, "Technical History," p. 6.6. 13 Director of Ship Material, "Historical Report," Volume 35 1, p. viii. Ibid.

14 36 Ibid., pp. ix-x. Director of Ship Material, "Historical Report,• pp. 72-73.

15 37 Th e New York Times, August 25, 1945, p. 2. Ibid. , p. 71.

16 38 Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 11. Ibid. , p. 21.

17 39 Th e New York Ti mes, October 24, 1945, p. 4. Th e New York Ti mes, January 25, 1946, pp. 1, 4.

18 40 Th e New York Ti mes, December 11, 1946, pp. 1, 3. Th e New York Times, March 20, 1946, p. 10. The Bureau of Ships, when totalling the costs of the target 19 ships, was ordered not to include the cost of armament. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 9. Also untallied were modernization, modifications, and repair costs. 20 Kinkaid, "Bikini," p. 41. 41 Th e New York Ti mes, March 24, 1946, p. 4. 21 Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 7. 42 Letter, John P. Howe to the President, April 16, 1946, 22 filed in Protest Answers, Joint Task Force One, Records Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, p. 50. of the Defense Atomic Support Agency, National Archives Record Group 374.

37 Crossroads," Naval His tory, Vol. II, No. 4, Fall 1988, p. Ships, eight volumes (Washington, D.C.: Government 28. Printing Office, 1959-1981).

73 89 "Radiological Decontamination of Target and Non-Target See, for example, "Atom Bombed Ship Undergoes Study," Vessels," Vol. I, p. 4. in Th e New York Ti mes, May 11, 1947, p. 19, which discusses the sinking of New York as a conventional 74 weapons target as the battleship's probable fate. Ibid. , p. 5. Parch e's is now on display at the Pacific Fleet Submarine Memorial Museum at Pearl Harbor. 75 Ibid. , p. 6. 90 Cook, "The Legacy of Crossroads," pp. 31-32. 76 Ibid. , p. 8. 91 "The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military 77 Weapon: The Final Report of the Ibid. , p. 13. Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads," (June 30, 1947), CCS 471.6, 10-15-46, Section 9, Part 1, p. 60, 73 78 (top quote). National Archives Re cord Group 218. Director of Ship Material, "Historical Report," p. 55. 92 79 Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Ligh t, p. 92. Memorandum, Col. A. W. Betts, USACOE, to Brig. Gen. K. D. Nichols, MED, USACOE, August 10, 1946. 93 F-3-5, Test Baker Results, Box 26, National Archives Bradley, No Place to Hide, pp. 165-166. Record Group 377, Re cords of the Manhattan Engineer District. 94 Ibid., p. 147. 80 "Radiological Decontamination of Target and Non-Target 95 Vessels," Vol. I, p. 17. Drew Pearson, "Bikini Naval Losses Disaster," Th e Wa shington Post, February 18, 1949. 81 Director of Ship Material, "Historical Report," p. 57. 96 Bradley, No Place to Hide, p. 163. 82 Memorandum, CNO to CINCPAC, "Removal of 97 Equipment and Supplies from Contaminated Cited in Jonathan M. Weisgall, "The Nuclear Nomads of CROSSROADS Target Ships," February 18, 1947, Serial Bikini," Foreign Policy, Vol. XXVIV (Summer 1980), p. 034P36, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. 98. Also see William S. Ellis, "A Way of Life Lost: Bikini," Na ti onal Geographic (June 1986), pp. 813-834. 83 Bradley, No Place to Hide, pp. 143-144. 98 Memorandum to Op-36 from Op-33 and Op-38 (Parsons), 84 April 9, 1947. Serial 106P36, Operational Archives, Cited in "Radiological Decontamination of Target and Naval Historical Center. Non-Target Vessels," Vol. Ill, p. 14. 99 85 Ibid., attached memorandum from the Joint Th e New York Ti mes, September 5, 1946, p. 7. Crossroads Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of War. 86 Memorandum, CNO to Chiefs of the Bureau of Ships, 100 , Bureau of Aeronautics, Bureau of "Bikini Resurvey Operation Plan 1-47, Annex L, Public Medicine and Surgery, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Information Plan," National Archives Record Group 374, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, "Handling and Control Entry 4B, Box 156, Folder A4. of Radiologically Contaminated Material from CROSSROADS," June 10, 1947, Serial 0138P36, 101 Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. Ibid., Annex D, "Sunken Ship Inspection Plan."

87 102 Cook, "The Legacy of Crossroads," p. 29. Ibid.

88 103 A. G. Nelson, Capt. USN, "Crossroads Ta rget Ships," "Bikini Backtalk," 10 September 1947, Vol. I, No. 16. Memorandum, NNTPR #24-78, May 25, 1978, Copy on file in RG 374, Box 28, Folder 212. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; NAVSEA Shipbuilding Support Office, "US 104 Vessels Involved in Operation Crossroads," "Report of the Director Ship Material," in "Technical NAVSEASH PSO, Philadelphia, n.d.; and James L. Report, Bikini Scientific Resurvey" (Washington, D.C.: Mooney, ed. Dictionary of America n Naval Figh ting Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 1947) Vol. III,

39 TABLE ONE: SHIPS LOST DURING OPERATION CROSSROADS TESTING AT BIKINI ATOLL LAGOON

AIRCRAFf CARRIERS

BAKER TEST: USS Sfloga (CV-3), Lexington Class

BATTLESHIPS

BAKER TEST: USS Arkans/JS (BB-33), New York Class HIJMS Nagata, Nagato Class

CRUISERS

ABLE TEST: HIJMS Sakawa, Agano Class*

DESTROYERS

ABLE TEST: USS Anderson (DD-411), Sims Class* USS Lamson (DD-367), Mahan Class*

SUBMARINES

BAKER TEST: USS Apogon (SS-308), Batao Class USS Pilotfish (SS-386), Batao Class

TRANSPORTS

ABLE TEST: Gilliam (APA-57) , Gilliam Class Carlisle (APA-69), Gilliam Class

AUXILIARIES AND LANDING CRAFf

BAKER TEST: ARDC-13 LCM-4 LCT-414 (scuttled after) LCT-812 (scuttled after) LCT-1114 LCT-1175 LCT-1 187 (scuttled after) LCT-1 237 (scuttled after) LCVP-10 LSM-60 (completely destroyed) Y0-160

41

war against the United States, Arkansas served moored within 500 feet of the detonation point on duty, escorting vessels to Ireland, for the Baker Test of July 25, 1946; it was the , , and French . In closest of the target vessels with the exception June 1944, Arkansas participated in the invasion of the vessel that suspended the bomb, LSM- of Normandy, providing fire support on Omaha 60. The detonation is popularly believed to Beach. It also was used in the bombardment have lifted the battleship vertically out of the of Cherbourg, and later assisted in the invasion water within the blast column. Careful analysis of Southern France in mid-August of the same of the sequence of movie photographs, year. Returning to the United States in however, shows what appears to be the September 1944, Arkansas was modernized at battleship's foremast in the blast column, with the Navy Yard in Boston and sent into the dark "hole" thought to be the up-ended the Pacific. 43 battleship caused by the mass of the ship blocking the uplifted water column rising above When Arkansas arrived in the Pacific in late it. Arkansas sank almost immediately; the Navy 1944, it was the oldest and smallest of the technical inspection report for Arkansas notes then-existing American capital ships, as well as it disappeared within 19 seconds after the blast. the last American battleship to mount 12-inch According to Bombs at Bikini, "in sinking, she guns. Replaced as a first-line ship by the new carried with her the dubious honor of being battleship North Carolina, Arkansas nonetheless the first battleship to be sunk by an atomic played a major role in the . bomb, and the first battleship to be sunk by a Arkansas provided pre-invasion bombardment at bomb that never touched her."45 both Iwo Jima (February 1945) and Okinawa (March 1945) as well as ongoing fire support for both operations. The battleship fired 1,262 HIJMS NA GA TO rounds of 12-inch ammunition at Iwo Jima and 2,564 rounds at Okinawa. Through the war Characteristics Arkansas' 12-inch guns fired 5,255 rounds in all; the 5-inch guns of the secondary battery The Japanese battleship Nagato was a fired 5,123 rounds, and the ship's lighter steel-hulled vessel 708 feet in , antiaircraft battery fired8,422 rounds, while the with a 95-foot and a 30-foot draft. battleship steamed 134,141 miles. Returning to Nagato displaced 38,500 tons standard. The the United States in October 1945, Arkansas ship was armored with a 3.9-to-11.8-inch belt; was readied for participation in Operation the turrets were protected by 14-inch thick "Magic Carpet"; the veteran battleship then armor. Nagato's armament consisted of eight made three voyages transporting returning 16.1-inch/45 caliber guns, twenty 5.5-inch/50 servicemen to Pearl Harbor. Arkansas was caliber guns, four 3.1-inch antiaircraft guns, selected as a target vessel for Operation three machine guns, and eight 21-inch torpedo Crossroads and was prepared for the bomb tubes, four above and four below the waterline. tests at Terminal Island, California, before Between 1934-1936, Nagato was reconstructed: steaming from Pearl Harbor on May 8, 1946. torpedo bulges were added and the Arkansas left Pearl on May 20 and arrived at superstructure was raised and modified. In Bikini on May 29, 1946. June 1944, Nagato had sixty-eight 25mm Hotchkiss antiaircraft guns; by October of the Arkansas was moored off the port beam of same year, the number of antiaircraft guns had USS Nevada, the for the Able test increased to include ninety-eight 20mm guns. on July 1, 1946. The battleship was "one of At that time, Nagato retained eighteen 5.5-inch the three major combatant ships within one guns; Nagato's full load displacement at that half mile of the zeropoint."44 The ship was the time was 43,581 tons.46 site of the maximum measured radioactive contamination from the Able test; a pool of Nagato's four screws were driven by Gihon water on Arkansas was measured at eight steam turbines that developed 80,000 shaft roentgens per eight hours. Arkansas was at 26.7 knots. By October 1944,

55

turbines consisted of a high, intermediate, and 1941, Prinz Eugen was harassed by British air low pressure turbine, with astern turbines raids. While blockaded at Brest, Eugen was installed in the casings of the main I.P. and damaged by aerial bombing; a hit on July 2, L.P. turbines. The main reduction gears were 1941, destroyed the main gunnery control room single reduction. The engines were powered by and damage control, and killed 52 men.76 high pressure, Lamont forced circulation watertube . The ship's electrical power In another famous breakout, Prinz Eugen, with was provided by six turbo generators and four the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau raced diesel emergency generators. According to up the English Channel between February 11 wartime issues of Jane's Fighting Ships, "internal and 13, 1942, as allied aircraft, coastal gun arrangements of these ships [were] reported to batteries, and ships attempted to sink them. be decidedly cramped and badly ventilated." After its escape, Prinz Eugen operated in Prinz Eugen's capacity was rated at 1,049 crew Norwegian waters. On February 23, 1942, by Jane's. In many respects, Prinz Eugen however, the cruiser was torpedoed by the resembled the battleship Bismarck, its "big British submarine Trident in a Norwegian fjord brother" and running mate: according to and lost its counter. After another harrowing German officers from both, even trained run to Germany under attack by British planes, observers had difficulty telling the two ships the ship was repaired and returned to service apart at a distance when their relative size as a on the Baltic in the summer could not be assessed.73 of 1942. In October 1943 the ship rejoined the fleet as flagship of the German Baltic forces. In this capacity, the cruiser provided fire support for German troops and panzers in The heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen was built by Lithuania and Latvia in 1944; Prinz Eugen spent Krupp at their Germania W erft shipyard in the last months of the war on the Baltic coast, Kiel for the German Navy under the 1936 naval supporting ground forces retreating from the construction program. Laid down in 1936, Russian advance, firing more than 5,000 rounds. Prinz Eugen was launched on August 20, 1938, Surrendered at the end of the European war in the presence of Adolf Hitler and on May 7, 1945, at , Prinz Eugen Grossadmiral Erich Rader. The cruiser was was taken by the United States as a prize of christened by Madame Horthy, wife of the war .77 Designated IX-300 as a special Hungarian dictator, Admiral Nicholas Horthy.74 auxiliary, Prinz Eugen was taken to the United Second of four Hipper class heavy cruisers States for tests and analysis in January 1946, (A dmiral Hipper, Prinz Eugen, Seydlitz, and arriving at Boston on the 24th of the month.78 Lutzow), Eugen was completed in 1940 and commissioned on August 1 of that year. Selected as a target vessel for Operation Constructed principally for high seas commerce Crossroads, Prinz Eugen was readied at the raiding, Prinz Eugen spent most of WWII Philadelphia Navy Yard in February-March blockaded in port. After shakedown exercises 1946. This work involved removing two 8-inch in the Baltic, the cruiser joined KMS Bismarck gun barrels from turret "A" for additional in in May 1941. Prinz Eugen and the evaluation. A fire control tower was also taken battleship made their famous breakout into the from the ship at this time. Prinz Eugen then North Atlantic, where they engaged and sank proceeded to Bikini, arriving on June 11, 1946. the battle cruiser Hood on May 24; Prinz There it was moored between two U.S. Eugen's shells were credited with setting the destroyers off the port quarter of USS British ship afire before a hit from Bismarck Arkansas, 1,200 yards from the zeropoint. The detonated Hood's magazines. Prior to being vessel was not appreciably damaged in the met by a superior British task force that sank Able test of July 1, 1946, nor in the Baker test Bismarck after a running sea battle, Prinz three weeks later, when it was moored one Eugen escaped the battleship's fate by slipping mile off the detonation point, but was away to the .75 Arriving at Brest, contaminated with radioactive fallout. The France, for sanctuary and an overhaul in June cruiser was towed to Kwajalein for

62 radiation could no longer be detected on the stern lying 15 feet off the bottom. The Eugen, but that the vessel had suffered severe damage that sank the ship was presumed to be hull damage amidships, was partially imbedded on the port side; the starboard hull was in the lagoon bottom, and required removal of wrinkled and "several seams ... were leaking oil residual fuel oil and ordnance before salvage and air."84 The worst damage noted was operations could commence.80 As a topside; the mainmast was stripped of fittings consequence, no action to remove the ship was and the yardarm was snapped in half. Radar taken. antenna and the stack were missing. The deckhouses were crumpled, the No. 2 gun shield split open, bulwarks on several USS ANDERSON (00-411) superstructure decks were torn away, the torpedo crane was bent at a 90-degree angle, Characteristics and the starboard "Y" launchers were ripped off the deck.85 The Navy The Sims-class destroyer Anderson was a determined that blast damage and a post-blast welded steel vessel with an overall length of fire and explosion sank Anderson . This was 348.3 feet, a waterline length of 341.4 feet, a the only occasion during the tests that 36.1-foot beam, a 19.8-foot depth, and a shipboard munitions detonated. 17.4-foot draft. Anderson displaced 1,720 tons standard.81 The Sims-class destroyers were supposed to have been 1,570 tons; lack of communication between the Navy's Bureau of USS Anderson was the third of twelve Sims­ Construction and Repair and the Bureau of class destroyers. The last of the American Engineering led to the overweight problem of "single stackers," these vessels were the result the Sims class. As a result of this and other of a 1935 request by the Chief of Naval problems, the two Bureaus were merged into a Operations for a new design for destroyers. single organization, the Bureau of Ships, in The U.S. Navy's General Board forwarded a 1940.82 Anderson's twin screws were driven by proposal in May 1936 for a 1,570-ton ship with Westinghouse steam turbines and three oil-fired five 5-inch guns and twelve 21-inch torpedo and Wilcox boilers, rated at 50,000 tubes.88 Twelve destroyers were built to the shaft horsepower at 35 knots. The Navy design, commencing with USS Sims (DD-409). experimented with streamlining these vessels in Authorized in fiscal year 1937, the destroyers an effort to improve speed and fuel were built by different yards to a design by the consumption; a rounded bridge structure on the noted New York firm of Gibbs and Cox. The Sims class produced less wind resistance and Sims class had robust hulls and were heavily turbulence than previous classes. Anderson's armed; more significantly, these destroyers were comprised five 5-inch/38 caliber the first to carry the newly developed Mark 37 guns in single mounts. The ship carried twelve fire control system, which introduced for the triple-mounted 21-inch torpedo tubes on deck. first time in a destroyer a computer room In mid-1941, four .50 caliber machine guns for below decks--an innovation that proved highly AA use were installed. Anderson also mounted successful in combat in WWII and was fitted to two depth charge racks aft. 83 all major U.S. combatant vessels by 1945.87

USS Anderson's superstructure was badly Anderson was laid down in late 1938 at the damaged by the Able test burst; the stack Kearny, , yard of the Federal toppled, and a fire started abaft the bridge. Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation (a The fire subsided in a minute's time, then subsidiary of U.S. Steel). The destroyer was flared up as Anderson capsized to port. Once launched on February 4, 1939, and fitted out capsized, Anderson sank by the stern. Shortly over the next few months.88 Anderson was after the Able event, Navy divers found the commissioned on May 19, 1939, and began a destroyer in 176 feet of water, lying on its port year-long program of tests and trials. Sent into side, with the bow imbedded in the bottom and the Pacific in 1940, Anderson spent a year as

64 submarine launched two torpedoes that sank the however, Anderson was ordered retained in the carrier and the destroyer Hammann (DD-412), Pacific "in an inactive status in view of a sister ship of Anderson, which was experimental tests." Selected as a target vessel alongside. 90 for Operation Crossroads Anderson was "stripped in preparation for use as a target. .." Always in the front lines, Anderson screened at Pearl Harbor between January and May USS Wasp (CV-7), which was sunk by torpedo 1946.93 attack on September 15, 1942. The destroyer next screened USS Hornet (CV-8) at the Battles Arriving at Bikini on May 30, 1946, in the of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz; in the company of the carrier Saratoga, Anderson was latter battle (October 25-26, 1942) Hornet was moored close to the actual zeropoint for the lost. In both cases Anderson again moved Able test on July 1, 1946. Following the burst, towards the stricken carriers and rescued men; Anderson suffered two explosions within nine in all, the destroyer saved more than 1,000 crew seconds' time. The ship capsized, while members from the four carriers. The destroyer burning, onto its port side, and sank within was shifted from screening duty to invasion seven minutes.94 Ironically, the destroyer that support in November 1942; Anderson screened had stood by and rendered assistance when transports carrying reinforcements to Lexington went down, sank at Bikini with and shelled Japanese troops on the Saratoga, sister of the lost carrier. island. It then went on escort duty and anti-submarine patrols in the New Hebrides. In Of 12 Sims-class destroyers, none survived past July-September 1943 Anderson served in the 1948; five were lost during the war, Anderson Aleutians, participating in the bombardment of was sunk at Bikini in 1946, three were broken the Japanese garrison on occupied . The up in 1947, and three were sunk as targets in destroyer then screened transports and provided 1948.95 Anderson was stricken from the Navy fire support for troops invading . register on September 25, 1946. The ship's bell Anderson then steamed to the Marshalls for the and nameplate were presented to the city of invasion of those heavily defended islands. The Anderson, South Carolina, by Congressional destroyer bombarded Wotj e and screened request. These had apparently been removed vessels shelling Kwaj alein. Anderson was hit by at Bikini and given to an Anderson, South an enemy 155mm shell off Wotje, which killed Carolina, press representative on board USS the captain and five other officers and wounded Appalachian. 98 18 men. While transferring the wounded off ship, Anderson struck an uncharted pinnacle that badly damaged the destroyer, which was USS LAMSON (DD-367) then towed to Pearl Harbor for repairs.91 Characteristics After repairs, Anderson was deployed to assist the Sansapor, Morotai, and Leyte operations; at USS Lamson was a welded steel destroyer of Leyte on November 1, 1944, the ship was again the Mahan class. Lamson was 341.3 feet long badly damaged when a struck the overall, with a waterline length of 334 feet, a deck, killing 18 and wounding 21 members of 34.8-foot beam, a 9.9-foot draft, and a 1,726-ton the crew. Anderson steamed to San Francisco displacement.97 Lamson's twin screws were for repairs at Hunter's Point. After these driven by General Electric geared turbines, repairs and an overhaul, Anderson joined the which were powered by four Babcock and 9th Fleet operating off the Kuriles on Wilcox, oil-burning, Express boilers. The ship's anti-submarine patrols and shore bombardment. plant was rated at 46,000 shaft horsepower at Anderson ended the war by participating in the 37 knots. Armament consisted of a main occupation of northern Honshu after the battery of five 5-inch/38 caliber guns and three Japanese surrender.92 The ship was ordered to quad 21-inch torpedo tubes mounted on deck. the Atlantic for decommissioning. Anderson Lamson additionally carried four .50 caliber arrived at on November 8, en route machine guns, two depth charge tracks, and to Philadelphia. On November 14, 1945, "K"-type depth charge projectors.98

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Thus was introduced a class "whose long antisubmarine warfare screen until April endurance was so important for Pacific 1943.109 warfare. " 106 The Mahan class was also important in that additional above-the-waterline Returning to Pearl Harbor on May 6, 1943, 21-inch torpedo tubes were added and gun Lamson was soon dispatched to . The crew shelters were built for the superimposed destroyer participated in the bombardment of weapons fore and aft for the first time.107 The and was one of four destroyers Mahan destroyers were the first destroyers that penetrated Japanese lines some 160 miles fitted with emergency diesel generators. to bombard the main Japanese naval base at Eighteen of these destroyers were built between Madang in on November 29, 1943. 1935 and 1936, among them, Lamson. As part of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Lamson served off New Guinea and in the Marshall Islands Lamson was laid down on March 20, 1934, at through much of 1944. On October 20, 1944, the Bath Works Corporation, Bath, . Lamson was ordered to join the Seventh Fleet The ship was launched on June 17, 1936, and and proceeded to the . In was commissioned on October 21, 1936, at the December 1944, Lamson was deployed off . After a shakedown cruise Leyte as fighter director ship for small convoys to South America, the destroyer proceeded going through the Surigao Straits to reinforce through the Canal on July 1 for the troops ashore. Attacked by , these Pacific. For the entire month of July, Lamson convoys were badly mauled. On December 6, searched the Marshall and for 1944, Lamson's sister ship Mahan was sunk at missing aviatrix Amelia Earhart. Returning to 11:00 a.m.; at 3:00 p.m., the convoy was again the United States, Lamson was based at San attacked. A kamikaze came in low from astern Diego for the next four years except for a and hit Lamson's after stack with its right wing one-month deployment on the East Coast in before cartwheeling into the superstructure: 1938. Ordered to Pearl Harbor in October 1941, Lamson was deployed with other vessels The flame of the explosion reached to the in an unsuccessful search for the Japanese Task top of the and flashed from stem to Force on December 7-8, 1941. The destroyer stern. 21 enlisted men and 4 officers was then detached and sent to Johnston Island were either killed instantly or died of to rescue civilians from the advancing Japanese. wounds received, 1 man was missing and With refugees aboard, Lamson arrived at Pearl 54 men wounded. The superstructure Harbor on January 3, 1942.108 from the forecastle deck up and both stacks were completely destroyed. The In February 1942, Lamson was sent south to forward fireroom was flooded. A join the ANZAC in . This tug ...attempted to put out the fires but it six-vessel squadron (USS Ch icago, USS Perkins, appeared hopeless, all remaining men HMAS Australia, HMZNS Achilles, HMZNS aboard the Lamson were put aboard the Leander, and Lamson), was formed to keep tug. Just as the USS Flusser, which was South Pacific supply lines open. The destroyer standing by, prepared to sink the Lamson was sent back to Pearl Harbor on June 1 to with torpedoes, the tug reported making serve in the reserve line for the Battle of headway against the fires and the ship Midway. Detached from this unit on June 13, was saved.110 Lamson was sent to Mare Island Navy Yard for an overhaul before being deployed again to Towed to safety, the destroyer received the South Pacific. On October 22, 1942, rudimentary repairs and proceeded under its Lamson and sister ship Mahan raided Japanese own power to Pearl Harbor and then to picket boats between the Gilbert and Ellice Bremerton for repairs. Lamson made the trip Islands; together they sank a 7,000-ton armed with its torpedo tubes loaded "with enough auxiliary. After a month-long duty patrolling torpedoes to sink a battleship" but jammed by Guadalcanal, Lamson joined Task Force 67 and the kamikaze attack.111 fought in the Battle of Tassafaranga and then patrolled the as part of an After arriving at Bremerton on January 16, 1945, 90 percent of the ship's superstructure

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was removed and a new deckhouse was 12 seconds after the burst show the destroyer installed; "electrical repairs on the Lamson upright, but with heavy superstructure damage; required four times more work than usually is a second photograph, taken nearly six minutes required for a complete electrical overhaul.... after the burst, shows the same. At 9:40 a.m. Bomb fragmentation had pierced cables in a reconnaissance plane, PBM Charlie, noted the remote places. More than 200 major circuits destroyer was on its beam ends, "on her had to be installed and 25 percent of the total starboard side with her bridge structure battle damage repair fell to the electrical underwater, and the port side of her bottom shop. "112 The destroyer steamed from above the surface. A large oil slick ...trailing to Bremerton on April 15 for San Diego, and then leeward."115 Lamson remained afloat at least quickly proceeded back to the Pacific. until 2:00 p.m., when PBM Charlie departed the Stationed off Iwo Jima, Lamson spent the lagoon; at 5:00 p.m., USS Reclaimer (ARS-42) remainder of the war rescuing downed aviators made a quick tour of the lagoon and found "no who ditched while returning from striking the trace of the Lamson ."116 Lamson was Japanese home islands. At the war's end, the decommissioned on July 29 and stricken from destroyer was sent to Sasebo as part of the the Navy Register on August 15, 1946. occupation force, departing for Pearl Harbor on October 29, and arriving there on November 9, 1945. Lamson was ordered retained in inactive USS APOGON (SS-308) status on November 15 "in view of experimental tests" and was sent to San Diego on November Characteristics 29.113 At year's end, the destroyer returned to Pearl Harbor, where it was prepared for USS Apogon was a welded, riveted, and Operation Crossroads. high-tensile Ba/ao-class steel submarine--311.8 feet long overall, with a 27.3-foot extreme Lamson steamed from Pearl on May 21, 1946, beam, a height of 47.2 feet, and a 15.3-foot for Bikini. The destroyer sailed with Submarine draft at surface trim. Apogon displaced 1,525 Division 111, made up of Skipjack, Tuna, Skate, tons standard surfaced and 2,424 tons and Searaven, also bound for Crossroads. On submerged.117 The boat's two shafts were the afternoon of Thursday, May 30, 1946, driven by twin Elliot electric motors, each rated Lamson arrived at Bikini and was anchored at at 2,740 shaft horsepower for a total of 5,480 "Berth 142" in 21 fathoms of water. According SHP. While surfaced, was provided to the ship's log for June 30, 1946, the main by four Fairbanks-Morse diesel engines, each engines were secured on 12 hours notice, the rated at 5,400 brake horsepower. While gyro was secured, and No. 4 alone was submerged, Apogon's motors were powered by lit for auxiliary purposes. That morning the 252 Exide battery cells. Apogon was capable of crew was mustered, evacuated to USS Henrico 20.25 knots surfaced and 8.75 knots (APA-45), and the last inspection of the ship submerged.118 The boat's primary armament was made. In the afternoon the fires were consisted of ten 21-inch torpedo tubes--six allowed to die under the No. 4 boiler, the located forward and four aft. Apogon carried engineering plant was secured, and condition 24 Mark torpedoes. The boat also mounted a "affirm" was set: "ship is secured throughout" single 5-inch/25 caliber gun on deck; lighter AA before the last of the crew departed. The log guns were also fitted. reported on Monday, July 1, "Anchored as before. 0902 Bomb for Test 'ABLE' was detonated. 0930 Lamson was reported as capsized, with her keel in the air, as a result of The United States Navy built hundreds of "fleet the atom bomb detonation. In the early boat" submarines during the Second World afternoon the Lamson rolled onto her port side War. One hundred thirty-two of the Balao and sank stern first in 21 fathoms of water."114 class, the most common U.S. submarine of the war, were constructed at shipyards throughout Lamson was anchored approximately 700 yards the country. As part of this effort, beginning abeam and slightly aft of the actual zeropoint in 1940, an order was placed for 73 Gato-class for the Able bomb's detonation. Photos taken vessels, "in response to the realization that the

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member of the "Mickey Finns."126 Apogon's last for a total of 5,480 SHP. While submerged, kill came in June 1945 as the submarines Pilotfish's motors were powered by 252 Exide blockaded Japanese ports and commenced battery cells. Pilotfish was capable of 20.25 finishing off the rapidly diminishing merchant knots surfaced and 8.75 knots submerged.131 marine of the nearly defeated nation. North of The boat's primary armament consisted of ten the Kuriles, Apogon ambushed the 2,614-ton 21-inch torpedo tubes; six tubes were located transport Hakuai Maru on June 18, sending it forward and four tubes aft. Pilotfish carried 24 to the bottom.127 Apogon returned from its last Mark 14 torpedoes. As built, the boat carried patrol on September 2, 1945. a 5-inch/25 caliber gun on the deck aft of the sail and a single 40mm Bofors antiaircraft gun Consigned to the Operation Crossroads tests, forward of the sail. When sunk at Operation Apogon arrived at San Diego on September 11, Crossroads, Pilotfish had been modified to a 1945. There the boat was readied for the tests. late-war configuration; the 5-inch gun had been One of eight submarines selected for removed, and twin 20mm Oerlikon AA guns Crossroads, Apogon was modified to submerge had been mounted aft of the shears and surface without a crew on board. on the sail. According to Bombs at Bikini, "never before had there been occasion to submerge a submarine without crew aboard. The method used was to fill part of the ballast tanks with USS Pilotfish (SS-386) was laid down at the water, then suspend heavy from the Portsmouth Navy Yard, New Hampshire, on bow and stern by cables of carefully chosen March 15, 1943. The submarine was launched length. These weights overcame the August 30, 1943. After fitting out, Pi!otfish was submarine's residual and drew her commissioned December 16, 1943, and down to the desired depth. She could be proceeded to the Pacific after training on surfaced again by pumping air back into her March 29, 1944, arriving at Pearl Harbor on ballast tanks."126 April 26.132 At this time submarines were deployed in wolf-packs, and on its first patrol, Lightly damaged during Able, Apogon sank Pilotfish was sent out with the pack known as during Baker. Shortly after sinking, Navy divers "Blair's Blasters," which included Pintado and located the submarine in 180 feet of water, under tactical command of Capt. L. N. entered the boat, and began salvage operations, Blair of Pintado.133 The boat made five war which included blowing air into the flooded patrols, beginning the first, to the Marianas, in . The salvage efforts were abandoned, May 1944. (By this time, the Pacific war had however, before the boat was brought to the turned against Japan. Submarines played an surface. Apogon was decommissioned and important role by sinking merchant ships stricken fr om the Navy Register on February seeking to supply, reinforce, or withdraw troops 25, 1947.129 cut off in the Marianas.) Subsequent patrols took Pilotfish to the , the East Sea, Marcus Island, and off the southeast USS PILOTFISH (SS-386) coast of Japan. The submarine was not able to make a successful attack except on the third Characteristics patrol, when the submarine hit and badly damaged a Japanese cargo ship off the USS Pilotfi sh was a welded and riveted, Bonins.134 In 1945 Pilotfish served as the high-tensile-steel submersible Balao-class boat. command vessel for a coordinated-attack group Pilotfish was 311.8 feet long overall, with a sent to the . This group was 27.3-foot extreme beam, a height of 47.2 feet, credited as being strategically essential to the and a 15.3-foot draft at surface trim. Pilotfish success of the lwo Jima assault.135 In its last displaced 1,525 tons standard when surfaced war patrol, Pilotfish served on picket and 2,424 tons when submerged.130 The boat's duty off the Japanese home islands, armed with two shafts were driven by twin GE electric AA guns and standing by to rescue downed motors, each rated at 2,740 shaft horsepower, airmen returning from the bombing of Japan.136

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17re transport was identical to tire 31 other slups of tire Institute) transport carried occupation troops to Sasebo, The vessel was armed with a single 5-inch/38 Japan, and ferried returnin1 troops home as caliber gun, four twin-mounted 40mm Bofors part of Operation "M�tgic Carpet."'"" antiairc.relected as a target vessel for LCPL, and 1,032 tons of cargo or 849 troops. IH Operation Crossroads. Arriving at Pearl The ship's superstructure was located Harbor on February 16, 1946, the ship wb amidships; two masts, fore and aft, were fitted readied for the tests 45 Gilliam was moored with booms nnd steam winches to handle aft of Nevada, the prOJected target for the Able landing craft and cargo. test detonation. The bomb rnstcad detonated off Nevada and close to Gilliam, wthe only ship located within 1,000 feet of the projected :teropoint."1"0 The vessel sank in less than two USS Carlisle, a type S4-SE2-BU 1 transport, wa:; minutes. built under a U S. Maritime Commi:;sion contract by the Consolidated Steel Corporation of Wilmington, Californi:t.'•8 Cur/is/� was one USS CARLISLE (APA-69) of 32 Gilliam class attack trunsports.1411 The keel was laid on May 12, 1944; Carlisle was Chamctcrist launched liulc more th

arriving there on . The ship's main watertight compartments, four on each side, in propulsion motor had shorted and burned while addition to fore and after peak tanks.153 The underway to Pearl Harbor; after landing the ARDC was capable of drydocking submarines, troops and cargo aboard, Carlisle was sent to destroyers, and LSTs. Two Christmas trees San Francisco for repairs. Returning to San were mounted on the wing walls for Crossroads. Diego in March 1945, Carlisle loaded personnel and cargo and again sailed for Pearl Harbor on March 17, 1945, arriving on March 26. Carlisle was used for crew training in the Hawaiian ARDC-13 was rushed to completion in March Islands before the vessel returned to the West 1946 to serve as a target vessel for Operation Coast in June 1945. After a trip to and Crossroads. No armament was fitted, and the San Francisco, the ship returned to Pearl, main discharge pumps and cranes were never where it was sent to Eniwetok, , and installed. Only one anchor windlass was fitted. , arriving at the latter port on August 11, The vessel was only 60 percent complete when 1945.151 towed to Bikini. "Otherwise, the dock was essentially complete insofar as required to At the war's end the ship was detailed to perform its function as a target ship."1 54 "Magic Carpet" service, carrying troops from ARDC-13 was moored off Saratoga for the the Philippines, Pearl Harbor, and Japan to Able test blast. The pressure wave from the Seattle and San Francisco. In this capacity, blast came from approximately 12 degrees Carlisle had loaded 44 officers and 92 enlisted forward of the port beam; this cracked the port men at Tokyo, and on January 26, 1946, sailed wingwall, carried away the control house, for Seattle. Four days later, while at sea, the spalled concrete and strained the hull ship was ordered to Pearl Harbor for "sufficiently to open hairline cracks, for the assignment to Joint Task Force One for most part, throughout the length of the dock. Operation Crossroads. Arriving at Pearl on A few of the cracks are well defined."155 February 4, the ship was "stripped" during that Beached on Enyu where temporary repairs were month before sailing to Bikini Atoll as one of effected, ARDC-13 was remoored in the array eighteen attack transports slated for the tests.152 for Baker. Refloated and moored in the target Moored close to Gilliam, Carlisle was sunk by array for Baker, ARDC-13 was damaged by the the Able test burst on July 1, 1946. USS detonation, but remained afloat. It was not Carlisle was stricken from the Navy Register on inspected until eight days after Baker. At that August 15, 1946. time, "slow leakage was observed through cracks in the underwater body which had resulted from Test A. The rate of flooding was ARDC-13 calculated to be approximately 30 percent of that which was observed before temporary Characteristics repairs .... Two days later the dock capsized as a result of progressive flooding of the port side The floating drydock ARDC-13 (Auxiliary compartments."156 After capsizing, ARDC-13 Repair Drydock, Concrete) was built of remained afloat, with its starboard side up, steel-reinforced concrete with a lift capacity of until sunk by demolition charges on August 6, 2,800 tons. The dock's overall length was 389 1946. feet, with an 84-foot width, and a height of 40 feet. The dock floated with a 9-foot, 6-inch draft. The dock was built of three sections; (1) Y0-160 the 5-3/4-inch to 6-inch thick slabs that formed the hull, which consisted of the side, bottom, Characteristics and dock floor; (2) the 5-1/2-inch-thick port; and (3) the starboard wing walls, each Y0-160 (Yard Oiler) was a steel-reinforced containing a 5-inch-thick intermediate and concrete , 375-feet long overall, with a 6-1/2-inch-thick top deck. The vessel was 56-foot beam and a 28.6-foot draft. The barge further reinforced by concrete transverse fr ames displaced 6,422 tons, and was registered at every six feet. The hull was divided into eight 5,426 tons gross and 5,295 tons net. The

76 barge's capacity was 62,900 cubic barrels of fuel were Mark 5 and Mark 6 versions. The latter oil.157 was an improved design that permitted stern loading and had increased living accommodations. One purpose of the Mark 6 modification was to serve as links in floating Y0-160 was ordered by the Maritime causeways between LSTs (Landing Ships, Tank) Commission from the Concrete Ship and the shore. They had a detachable stern Constructors of National City, California. The plate, "with a lip beneath it for the LST ramp hull was converted to naval use almost to engage; ...the superstructure was split in half immediately as construction proceeded in May to permit vehicles to run the entire length of 1943. The completed barge was acquired by the craft."163 LCTs were propelled by three the 11th Naval District, which purchased it screws, each driven by a single 225 HP Gray from the Maritime Commission on August 31, Marine that developed a maximum 1943, at a cost of $2,900,000.158 The barge was speed of 9 knots. The fuel capacity was 11.12 towed to Pearl Harbor by the fleet tug Tawasa tons in addition to 140 gallons of lube oil.164 (ATF-92), arriving on November 5, 1943. These craft were usually armed with two single There Y0-160 was assigned to . the advanced 20mm antiaircraft guns. According to a bases in the Pacific, arriving at Funafuti in the wartime manual, the LCT was often seen Ellice Islands in December 1943.159 Presumably "transported on LSTs or in sections on APAs the barge spent its entire wartime career there and AKAs. They are the largest of the U.S. before being ordered to Bikini Atoll to open-deck, bow-ramp types."165 participate in Operation Crossroads in March 1946.

Heavily damaged during Able, Y0-160 was sunk The LCT was the largest of all U.S. shipborne by the Baker test blast; Navy reports credit the amphibious warfare craft and the smallest U.S. descending water column as the probable cause. landing craft to receive numbers in their own Photographs of the blast taken from Enyu show right.166 LCTs were the result of a November the barge's bow lifted some 36 feet by the blast 1941 British request for a U.S. version of a wave.160 Subsequent photographs show the tank lighter for a projected European invasion. water column covering the vessel. When the The first LCT was completed on June 29, 1942; air cleared, Y0-160 was no longer afloat. No the last wartime-built LCT was finished on dives were made. The vessel was stricken from December 22, 1944. In all, five hundred LCTs, the Navy Register on August 15, 1946.161 Mark 5 models were built, along with 965 Mark 6 LCTs.167

LCT-414, 812, 1114, 1175, 1187, and 1237 LCT-1114 was a late-model Mark 6 unit. The vessel was one of ten LCTs requisitioned for Characteristics Operation Crossroads and placed in the target array. LCT-1114 capsized as a result of the The LCT (Landing Craft, Tank) was a welded Baker test detonation and the resulting wave of steel "light but extremely rugged vessel designed water. After the blast, it was observed floating for direct 'on-the-beach' loading and bottom up, bow ramp secured, with the "stern unloading.... Equipped with a bow ramp ...the awash and the bow four feet out of the water" bottom is especially designed for next to ARDC-13.168 LCT-1114 remained afloat 'beaching' ....docking facilities are not for four days, gradually drifting in a westerly required."162 These standardized craft were direction "until it was finally sunk off Amen 117.5 feet long overall, with a beam of 32 feet, Island with a demolition charge to prevent it and a light draft of 1.5 feet forward. The from becoming a menace to navigation."169 loaded draft was 3.75 feet forward. LCTs displaced 134 tons light and 286 tons loaded Similarly, the other LCTs were sunk in the days and could carry 150 tons of cargo; this could after the Baker test as hazards to navigation. be four medium or three heavy tanks. The A total of 18 vessels were beached off Bikini LCT came in several models: the target LCTs Island during the Baker test; among them were

77 six LCTs: the Mark 5 LCT-412, and five Mark Vol. XXXVIII (New York: Society of Naval Architects 6 LCTs--Nos. 812, 1175, 1187, and 1237, which and Marine Engineers, 1928), p. 64. were beached between the high and low 2 mark on the lagoon side of the island. LCT- Roger Chesnau, ed. Conway' s All th e World's Figh ting 1187 and LCT-1237 "suffered major flooding as Ships, 1922-1946 (New York: Mayflower Books, 1980), p. 101. Also see the specifications for Saratoga in the a result of apparent bottom damage due to contract book, contract No. 199, Saratoga, in the New pounding against coral ledges and working in York Shipbuilding Corporation Collection, Philadelphia Maritime Museum, Philadelphia, and the official ship's the surf."110 They were also displaced by wave characteristics card on file at the Ships History Branch, action. LCT-812 suffered major damage, with Naval Historical Center. its bow ramp torn free and missing after the 3 test; both it and LCT-412 became waterborne Rock, "Some Observations on the Design of Airplane "as a direct result of the waves which Carriers," p. 64. immediately followed the test.. . .''171 4 Ibid. , p. 69. Also see Lieut. Commander J. T. Post-Baker inspection of LCT-1187 found that , USN, "Trial Trip Data of the U.S.S. Saratoga," Transactions of th e Society of Naval Arch itects and Marine Engin eers, Vol. XXXVII (New the tanks from about midships aft were York: Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, completely flooded. The manhole cover 1929), p. 201. plate to the void below the forward 5 starboard wing tank deckhouse was not Norman Friedman, U. S. Aircraft Ca rriers: An Illustra ted secured in place. This void was flooded. Design History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), The galley was flooded to a depth of two p. 48. Hereafter cited as Friedman, Aircraft Carriers.

feet from water coming in over the 6 stern.... This craft was slightly above Ibid., p. 51. Also see Saratoga, War Damage Report, radiological tolerance when boarded on 1 Final report, Torpedo Damage, 11 January 1942, no 2 serial, Box 615, and Saratoga, War Damage Report, 21 August 1946.17 September 1942, serial 0120, World War II Action Reports, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. After the Baker detonation, LCT-1237 was 7 displaced about 20 feet along the beach and Friedman, Aircraft Carriers, pp. 53-54. swung around parallel to the water's edge. 8 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, This craft was leaking badly before the "Bureau of Ships Group Technical Inspection Report, test and by Baker day the engine room USS Saratoga (CV3), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," were completely flooded. The tanks just p. 14. National Archives Record Group 374, Records of the Defense Atomic Support Agency, National Archives. forward of the crew's quarters was Hereafter cited as "Technical Inspection Report, completely flooded. The tanks just aft of Saratoga, Test Able;" the identical report, from Test the forward stowage compartments Baker, will be similarly cited.

contained about one foot of water. The 9 after end of the galley contained 1-1/2 feet Navy Department Press Release, March 20, 1925. On of water. The sounding hole covers were file at Ships History Branch, U.S. Naval Historical Center. Also see Chesnau, Conway' s All th e World' s missing from the flooded tanks. Figh ting Ships, p. 101. Indications are that much of the tank flooding was due to waves washing over 10 Richard Humble, U. S. Fl eet Carriers of World War II, the vehicle deck, but leaky propeller shaft (Poole: Blanford Press, 1984), pp. 18-19. Hereafter cited glands probably caused flooding of the as Humble, Fl eet Carriers. Also see Harold and engine space. 173 Margaret Sprout, To ward a New Order of Sea Power: American Na val Policy and th e World Scene, 1918-1922 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940), pp. 230-235. NOTES 11 E. H. Rigg, "The Launch of the Airplane Carrier U.S.S. 1 Saratoga, " Tra nsactions of th e Society of Naval Re ar Admiral George R. Rock, USN, "Some Architects and Marine Engineers, Vol. XXXIII (New Observations on the Design of Airplane Carriers and York: Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Notes on the Saratoga and Lexington," Transactions of 1925), p. 148. th e Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers,

78 12 29 Launch program, USS Saratoga, April 7, 1925. Original Commander, Joint Task Force One, "Report on Atomic copy on file, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Bomb Tests Able and Baker (Operation Crossroads) Center. The same quote may also be found in the Conducted at Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands, 1 July 1946 Philadelphia Evening Star, March 21, 1925. and 25 July 1946," Vol. 1, Chapter VII, p. 7. Copy on file at Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. 13 Mooney, Dictional)' of American Naval Figh ting Ships, 30 Vol. VI, p. 339. Shurcliff, "Technical History," Vol. II, p. 6.5.

14 31 Humble, Fl eet Carriers, p. 21. Director of Ship Material, "Technical Inspection Report, Saratoga, Test Able," p. 7. 15 Philadelphia Evening Star, March 21, 1921. 32 Shurcliff, "Technical History," p. 6.12. 16 As quoted in Friedman, Aircraft Ca rriers, p. 49. 33 Director of Ship Material, "Technical Inspection Report, 17 Saratoga, Test Baker," p. 8. Humble, Fl eet Carriers, p. 21. 34 18 Hanson W. Baldwin, dispatch of 22:02 to Th e New York Ibid. , p. 27. Ti mes, July 25, 1946, from on board USS Appalachian. Press Dispatches, July 25, 1946, from nos. 2534 to 2644, 19 National Archives Record Group 374, Records of the Mooney, Dictional)' of American Naval Figh ting Ships, Defense Atomic Support Agency. Vol. VI, p. 340. 35 20 Ship's characteristics card, Ships History Branch, Naval Humble, Fl eet Carriers, p. 27. Historical Center.

21 36 William F. Halsey and Joseph Bryan Ill, Admiral Chesnau, Conway's All th e World's Figh ting Ships, p. 91 Halsey's Stozy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), p. 62. and Jane's Figh ting Ships, 1920 (: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., 1920), p. 187. Also see the 22 original contract specifications for Contract No. 97, Mooney, Dictionazy of American Naval Figh ting Ships, Arkansas, in the New York Shipbuilding Corporation Vol. VI, p. 340. Collection, Philadelphia Maritime Museum, Philadelphia, and the ship's characteristics card, Ships History Branch, 23 Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Ibid. , pp. 340-341. 37 24 Ja ne's Figh ting Ships, 1935 (New York: D. Van Nostrand Cited in Ships Section, Office of Public Information, Company, Inc., 1935), p. 492, and Chesnau, Conway's All Navy Department, 'History of USS Sara toga (CV-3)," th e World's Figh ting Ships, p. 91. (August 29, 1946), p. 5. Copy on file in Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center. Hereafter cited as Ship 38 Section, "History of USS Saratoga. • Ja ne's Figh ting Ships, 1944-45, Corrected to April 1946 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), p. 458, and 25 Chesnau, Conway's All th e World' s Figh ting Ships, p. 91. Mooney, Dictional)' of American Na val Figh ting Ships, Vol. VI, p. 341. 39 Ibid. 26 Ibid. , p. 341. Also see Navy Department Press Release, 40 June 15, 1945, "The 'SARA's' Luck Runs Out,• on file Contract Data, USS Arkansas (BB-33), New York at Ships' History Branch, Naval Historical Center. Also Shipbuilding Corporation Collection, Philadelphia see a reminiscent account by an officer, Irwin Patch, Jr., Maritime Museum; also see James L. Mooney, "USS Saratoga at Iwo Jima," Shipmate, Volume LII, No. Dictional)' of American Naval Figh ting Ships, p. 62. 5 (June 1989), pp. 20-22. Shipmate is the magazine of the United States Naval Academy Alumni Association. 41 A detailed report on the action and the damage suffered Ibid. is found in Sara toga report, serial 007 of 21 February 1945, Box 616, World War II Action Reports, Operational 42 Archives, Naval Historical Center. Ibid.

27 43 Ships Section, "History of USS Saratoga," p. 10. Ibid.

28 44 Ibid. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 134.

79 45 60 Ibid. , p. 164. I am indebted to Charles Haberlein, Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Curator of Photographs, Naval Historical Center, who "Bureau of Ships Group, Technical Inspection Report, conducted a detailed analysis of the Baker Blast Naga to (Ex-Jap BB), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," photographs and spotted the mast in the blast column. pp. 105-106. National Archives Record Group 374.

46 61 Hansgeorg Jentschura, Dieter lung, and Peter Mickel, Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Warships of the Imperial Japanese Na vy, 1869- 1945 "Bureau of Ships Group, Technical Inspection Report, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 28. Naga to (Ex-lap BB), Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," p. 6. 47 Ibid. 62 Ito and Pineau, Th e End of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 48 p. 1. U.S. Division of Naval Intelligence, ONI-221-J (June 1945). 63 Jentschura, Jung, and Mickel, Warships of the Imperial 49 Japanese Navy, 1869- 1945, p. 111. Also see ONI-221-J Janes Figh ting Ships, 1945, n.p. and Jam1s Figh ting Ships, 1944 45, Corrected to April, 1946 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), p. 307. 50 Jentschura, Jung and Mickel, Warships of th e Imperial 64 Japanese Navy, p. 28; also see Stephen Howarth, Th e Ibid. Figh ting Ships of the Rising Sun: Th e Drama of the Imperial Japanese Na vy, 1895- 1945 (New York: 65 Atheneum, 1983), p. 134. Jentschura, lung, and Mickel, Wa rships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 112. 51 Hiroyuki Agawa, Th e Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and 66 th e Imperial Navy, trans. John Bester (Tokyo and New Ibid. York: Kodansha International Ltd., 1979), pp. 200-201. 67 52 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine "Bureau of Ships Group, Technical Inspection Report, V. Dillon, At Dawn We Slept; Th e Untold Stozy of Pearl Sakawa (Ex-lap CL), Test Able, • p. 9. National Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), Archives Record Group 374. pp. 503-504. 68 53 Ibid. , p. 6. Agawa, Th e Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, pp. 269-270. 69 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 54 Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine 70 V. Dillon, Miracle at Midway (New York: McGraw-Hill Ibid. , pp. 6-7. Book Company, 1983); also see Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway: Th e Battle th at Doomed 71 Japan, Th e Japanese Na vy'sStozy (Annapolis, Maryland: Ibid. , p. 5. United States Naval Institute Press, 1955). 72 55 Ibid., p. 8. Masanori Ito and Roger Pineau, Th e End of the Imperial Japanese Navy (New York: Jove Books, 1986), pp. 93-110, 73 passim. The ship's specifications are found in a circa January 1946 document, "A Short Historical Sketch of the 'Prinz 56 Eugen' IX-300," with "General Statements Involving the Ibid., p. 181. Ship's Characteristics," Serial 10-00C, Operational Archives, U.S. Naval Historical Center. Additionally, 57 statements regarding the ship are found in Jane's Ibid. , pp. 198-205, passim. Figh ting Ships for 1941-1946, though these entries are not completely reliable. Also Director of Ship Material, 58 Joint Task Force One, "Bureau of Ships Group, , Histozy of United States Naval Technical Inspection Report, Prinz Eugen (Ex-German Operations in World War II, Volume XIV: Victory in the CA), Test Able, • p. 3. National Archives Record Group Pacific, 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), 374. p. 316. 74 59 Paul S. Schmalenbach and Commander James E. Wise, Certificate of Commendation on file at the USS Arizona Jr., USN, "Prinz Eugen Album,• U.S. Naval Institute Memorial, Honolulu, Hawaii. Proceedings (August 1969). Also see "A Short Historical Sketch ... • Mr. Schmalenbach was a member of Prinz

80 Eugen's German crew throughout its career and 90 accompanied the vessel to the United States. He and Ibid. ; also see Anderson, Action Report, Battle of the other German members of the crew left the ship at Midway, June 5, 1942, Serial 0109, Operational San Diego before it steamed for Pearl Harbor and Archives, Naval Historical Center; and Robert Cressman, Bikini. Th at Gallant Ship: USS Yorktown (CV 5) (Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories, 1985), pp. 158-160. 75 Ibid. 91 "History of USS Anderson." 76 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 77 Ibid.; also see "Prinz Eugen," Our Navy, July 1969, p. 7. 93

Ship's service record, Ships History Branch, Naval 78 Historical Center. Schmal enbach and Wise, "Prinz Eugen Album;" also see Mooney, Dictional}' of American Naval Figh ting Ships, 94 p. 388. Director of Ship Material, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Anderson, Test Able," pp. 8-9. Also see Shurcliff, 79 Bombs at Bikini, p. 131. Captain George L. Dickey, Jr. USN, "The End of the Prinz," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1969, 95 pp. 149-151. Capt. Dickey, then a young officer, was in Chesnau, Conway' s All the World's Figh ting Ships, p. charge of the attempt to beach Prinz Eugen at Kwajalein. 127.

80 96 Battelle, Inc. "Summary Report on Salvage Survey of Memorandum, H. C. Bruton, Administrative Aide to Prinz Eugen, Supsalv Report No. 6-74, to US Navy, CNO to Vice Admiral Carpender, June 17, 1946. On Supervisor of Salvage, Naval Ships System Command," file in Anderson's jacket, Ships History Branch, Naval (June 1974), manuscript on file in the ship's history file, Historical Center. Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center. 97 81 Ship's characteristics card, Ships History Branch, U.S. Chesnau, Conway's All the World's Figh ting Ships, p. Naval Historical Center. 127. Also see the ship's characteristics card, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center, p. 127. 98 Ibid. Also see Friedman, Destroyers, p. 405. 82 Ibid. Also see Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers: An 99 Illustrated Histol}' (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, 1983), p. 93. Hereafter cited as Friedman, Destroyers. "Bureau of Ships Group, Technical Inspection Report, USS Lamson (DD367), Test Able, Operation 83 Crossroads," pp. 8-9. National Archives Record Group Chesnau, Conway's All the World's Figh ting Ships, p. 374. 127. 100 84 Ibid., p. 5. Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, "Bureau of Ships Report, Technical Inspection Report, 101 USS Anderson (DD411), Test Able," pp. 5, 9. National Ibid. , p. 6. Archives Record Group 374. 102 85 Ibid. Ibid. , pp. 5-6. 103 86 Ibid. Chesnau, Conway' s All th e World's Figh ting Ships, p. 127. 104 Chesnau, Conway' s All th e World' s Figh ting Ships, p. 87 125. Friedman, Destroyers, p. 93. 105 88 Friedman, Destroyers, p. 88. "History of USS Anderson (DD 411)," (May 26, 1948), Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center. 106 Chesnau, Conway's All the World' s Figh ting Ships, p. 89 126. Ibid. 107 Ibid.

81 108 126 "Battle History of the USS Lamson (DD367), 21 October Ibid. , p. 364. 1936 till 1 October 1945," (October 1945), typescript, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center. 127 Ibid. , pp. 478, 527. 109 Ibid. 128 Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 147; also see plate 17, 110 caption, between pp. 118-119. Ibid., also see "Commander John V. Noel, Jr, USN, Awarded Bronze Star Medal," (October 31, 1945), press 129 release, Navy Department, Lamson file, Ships History John D. Alden, Th e Fl eet Submarine in th e U.S. Navy: Branch, Naval Historical Center, and Capt. John V. Noel, A Design and Construction His tory (Annapolis: Naval Jr. USN (Ret.) "Homeward Bound," Shipmate, May 1984, Institute Press, 1979), p. 260. pp. 17-18. 130 111 Chesnau, Con way s All th e World' s Figh ting Ships, p. Seattle Star, June 19, 1945 and Sun, June 19, 145. Also see the ship's characteristics card on file at 1945. the Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center.

112 131 "The USS Ha raden and USS Lamson Go Back to War," Ibid. (June 18, 1945) press release, Navy Department, Lamson file, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center. 132 Mooney, Dictionary of American Naval Figh ting Ships, 113 Vol. V, p. 308. Ship's service record, USS Lamson, Ships HistoryBranch. 133 114 Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World Log Book, USS Lamson, entries for May 30, June 30, War II, p. 341. and July 1, 1946. National Archives Record Group 45. 134 115 Mooney, Dictionary of American Naval Figh ting Ships, Director of Ship Material, "Technical Inspection Report, p. 309. USS Lamson," p. 8. 135 116 Ibid. Ibid. 136 117 Ibid. Ship's characteristics card, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center. 137 Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World 118 Wa r II, p. 491. Ibid. 138 119 Mooney, Dictionary of Amen'can Figh ting Ships, Vol. 5, Robert C. Stern, U.S. Subs in Action (Carrollton, Texas: p. 308-309. Squadron/Signal Publications, 1983), p. 34. 139 120 Alden, Th e Fl eet Submarine in th e U.S. Navy, p. 268. Ibid. Also see Chesnau, Conway s All th e World's Figh ting Ships, p. 145; and Mooney, Dictionary of American 121 Figh ting Ships, Vol. V, p. 308. "History of USS Apogon (SS-308)," (1945), Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center. Also see ship's service 140 record, also on file at Ships History Branch. Characteristics card for USS Pilo tfish , Naval Historical Center. 122 Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Opera tions 141 in World War II (Annapolis: United States Naval Chesnau, Con way s All the World's Figh ting Ships, p. Institute, 1949), pp. 285-286, 288. 160.

123 142 Ibid. , p. 527; also see "History of USS Apogon. • Mooney, Dictionary of American Figh ting Ships, Vol. V, p. 308. 124 Roscoe, United States Submarine Op era tions in World 143 War II, p. 343. Chesnau, Conway s All th e World's Figh ting Ships, p. 160. 125 Ibid. , p. 527.

82 144 161 Mooney, Dictionary of American Figh ting Ships, Vol Ill, Ship's characteristics card and service record, Ships p. 97. History Branch, Naval Historical Center.

145 162 Ibid. , p. 97. War Shipping Administration and Maritime Commission, U.S. Army and U.S. Na vy Floating Equipment, Landing 146 Craft and Misc. Vessels, For Sale (Washington, D.C.: Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 130. War Shipping Administration, n.d. [ca. 1955]) n.p. entry for LCTs. 147 Chesnau, Conway' s All th e World's Figh ting Ships, p. 163 160. Chesnau, Conway' s All th e World's Figh ting Ships, p. 163. 148 Ship's characteristics card, Ships History Branch, U.S. 164 Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. War Shipping Administration, U.S. Army and U.S. Navy Floating Eq uipment, n.p. 149 Chesnau, Conway's All th e World' s Figh ting Ships, p. 165 160. U.S. Division of Naval Intelligence, ONI-54 Series: U.S. Naval Vessels (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy, 1943) n.p., 150 section on landing craft. This work has now been Ship's service record, USS Carlisle, Ships History Branch, reprinted, with an introduction by A. D. Baker III, as Naval Historical Center. Also see "Ship's History: USS US Naval Vessels, 1943 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Carlisle (APA-69)," (April 1, 1946) Ships History Branch, Press, 1986). Naval Historical Center, and Mooney, Dictionary of American Naval Figh ting Ships, Vol. 1, p. 36. 166 Chesnau, Conway' s All th e World's Figh ting Ships, p. 151 163. Ibid. 167 152 Ibid. Also see Major L. F. Ellis, C. R. G. Allen, A. E. Ibid. Warhurst, and Sir James Robb, Vi ctory in th e West: Volume I: Th e Battle of Normandy (London: Her 153 Majesty's Stationary Office, 1962), pp. 511-512 for a Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, discussion on the development of the LCT. "Bureau of Ships Group., Technical Inspection Report, USS ARDC-13, Test Able, Operation Crossroads," p. 13, 168 National Archives Record Group 374. Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS 154 LCT's 705, 816, 818, 874, 1013, 1078, 1112, 1113, 1114, Ibid. 1115, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," p. 170, National Archives Record Group 374. 155 Ibid. , p. 7. 169 Ibid. , p. 172. 156 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Bureau 170 of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Bureau ARDC-13, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," p. 3, of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Beached National Archives Record Group 374. Landing Craft, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," p. 3, National Archives Record Group 374. 157 Ship's characteristics card and service record, Ships 171 Histories Branch, Naval Historical Center. Ibid. , p. 4.

158 172 Ibid. Ibid. , pp. 10-11.

159 173 Ibid. Funafuti is the capitol of (formerly the Ibid. , p. 11. Ellice Islands), and lies at 8.30 S-179.12 E between the Gilberts and in the South Pacific.

160 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Y0-160, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," p. 5, National Archives Record Group 374.

83 ARDC I3

BB NAGATO

' APA GILLIAM 88 ARKANSAS .. SS PI LOTFISH

' YO ISO

- 01 SARATOGA SS APOGON

Actual positions of the sunken ships at Bikini, as plotted by the U. S. Navy, 1989. (Redrawn by Robbyn Jackson, HABS/HAER)

84

CHAPTER FOUR: SITE DESCRIPTIONS

James P. Delgado and Larry E. Murphy

INTRODUCTION of quantified data collected by the numerous test-instrument arrays. The Able test included During two field sessions at Bikini and 5,000 pressure gauges, 25,000 Kwajalein, eleven shipwrecks from the Able and radiation-measuring instruments, 750 cameras, Baker tests were surveyed. The results include and four television transmitters within and graphics, photographs, and narrative site around the target array.1 Eighty percent of the descriptions included in this report, as well as instruments were recovered after each test from several hours of video footage. Time spent the sunken test ships.2 These data, recently underwater on each site was limited by both declassified, offer a rare chance to observe field session lengths and diving constraints. structural hull damage that can be attributed to Most dives were decompression dives between measured peak-pressure waves of known 100 and 180 feet in depth. Typically, two dives duration. These observations provide a were done each day, and in the two sessions comparison against which other wreck which cumulatively totalled four weeks, there processes, whether conventional explosives or were 24 diving days. natural effects, can be measured for steel-hulled shipwrecks. In addition to site descriptions, which are the principal archeological fieldwork products, we The discussions in this chapter follow the evaluated the Bikini wrecks in terms of site categorical sequence of Pre-Test Alterations, formation processes. Rather than emphasizing Immediate Post-Blast Observations, and 1989/90 the unique nature of wreck events caused by Site Descriptions. Pre-Test Alterations includes an atomic blast, we take the position that the recorded changes to each vessel in whatever the agency of destruction, ships are preparation for Operation Crossroads. . In damaged and sunk by forces governed by order to make the atomic test reliable, the physical processes that are repetitive, often vessels had to be in good repair. Most test quantifiable, and that ultimately may be vessels were recent combat veterans and predictable. In addition to describing the required some repairs. Post-Blast Observations, target ships and evaluating their like Pre-Test Alterations, are derived from condition as the result of a unique set of historical records. This section presents both historical circumstances that may never be surface observations of each ship's sinking and repeated, we present the analysis in terms that underwater observations made by divers may be useful for comparisons with other examining the wrecks shortly after each blast. wreck processes. A comparative approach is Apparently there were two diving evaluations taken for those ships sunk by the same blast, made by the Navy, one soon after the blast and between categories of ships and between ships another a year later. Unfortunately, with the sunk by the two blasts. The site descriptions exception of Saratoga, most of the detailed pay particular attention to variables of ship descriptions of the 1947 dives on these vessels class, proximity, and orientation to the blast, are not available; only general descriptions pre-blast vessel condition and alterations. We were microfiched, the rest are missing from the have also included contemporary observations archival record. from immediate post-blast vessel evaluations as a control for natural deterioration resulting Two target vessels were lost in shallow water from submersion for nearly 45 years. inside Kwajalein Atoll lagoon. The German cruiser Prinz Eugen and an infantry landing This particular approach incorporates into the craft, LCI-327, were lost to capsizing or site description some of the remarkable amount grounding and left in place. All but nine of

85 the other target vessels not sunk in Bikini apart and fission was no longer possible. A Lagoon were scuttled in deep water. This luminous mass known as the " of fire" was leaves a group of 21 wrecks associated with formed. The ball of fire emitted thermal Operation Crossroads accessible to divers at radiation that started fires as far away as 3, 700 Bikini and Kwajalein atolls. Nine were dived yards.6 The thermal radiation accounted for 35 and assessed during two field seasons by the percent of the total energy released in the NPS; two others were ROV dived by the Navy detonation. The ball of fire continued to and subsequently assessed by the NPS. expand, touching the water, as vapor from the detonation formed a reddish-brown cloud rich This Site Descriptions section contains the 1989 in nitrous acid and , which and 1990 fieldwork observations as well as climbed at a rate of 200 miles per hour. At observations made by divers and through use of 0.5 seconds after the detonation, the fireball surface-monitored Remote Operated Vehicles. was nearly 1,500 feet in diameter. Each site discussion is a composite drawn from direct observations, video, photographic and Immediately after detonation, a high-pressure field illustrations. The amount of time spent wave was created that swept about 750 feet on each site was variable, which is reflected in ahead of the fireball. This "" with its the amount of detail in each site discussion. shock front, accounted for 50 percent of the total energy released by the bomb. At 1.25 seconds, the shock front had moved out more RECONSTRUCTING THE NUCLEAR than a third of a mile, and had struck the DETONATIONS lagoon surface. This created a reflected shock wave that travelled up to collide with the initial The "nominal yield" of the two plutonium, shock wave, fusing with it to form a single, implosion-core Mk III "Fat Man" bombs reinforced "mach effect" front that generated up detonated during Operation Crossroads has to 16-pounds-per-square-inch peak been variously estimated in secondary source overpressure.7 The mach front continued to histories to have been between 20 to 23 grow, so that three seconds after detonation, it kilotons, or a force equal to 20,000 to 23,000 was nearly a mile from the zeropoint and 185 tons of TNT. The formerly classified official feet high, creating winds at the front of 165 analysis of the "Able" detonation of July 1, miles per hour.8 1946, noted that one measuring technique indicated that the bomb's yield was 19.1 Ten seconds after detonation, the mach front kilotons.3 The "Baker" detonation of July 25, was 2.5 miles from the zeropoint, moving at 40 1946, was noted to have yielded approximately mph with a peak overpressure of one psi. The 20.3 kilotons, described as a "normal" yield for blast effect of the bomb at this time was "an atomic bomb of the Nagasaki type."4 effectively over, as the hot, gaseous ball of fire rose, drawing up air and producing strong air The Able Detonation currents, or "afterwinds" that sucked up water and debris to form the stem of the The proximity (VT) fuze of the "Able" bomb characteristic "mushroom cloud."9 Only 30 was set for an altitude of 515 feet over the seconds after detonation, the cloud was about ocean surface. Even though the bomb missed a mile and a half high. Ten minutes after the intended target ship, USS Nevada, by 710 detonation, the water sucked up into the cloud yards, it detonated close to the set altitude, at or vaporized by the ball of fire was released 518 feet, 50 yards off, and slightly to starboard, when a light, radioactive fell. of USS Gilliam .5 Apart from the initial release of nuclear The firing of the weapon caused the fissionable radiation, which accounted for five percent of material in the bomb to become supercritical, the total energy expended, residual radiation and a self-sustaining chain reaction was near the point of detonation was reported to initiated. The fission process released the be minimal, which was attributed to the energy equivalent to approximately 20 kilotons carrying up by the afterwinds of the radioactive of TNT before the bomb was quickly blown materials into the cloud and their distribution

86 into a diffuse, light fallout that did not, for the survived sinking, although it suffered "severe most part, land on the target fleet. dishing and deflection of the deck." Carlisle's sinking was attributed more to its beam-on 1946 "Able" Assessments orientation; hence Crittenden's "bow-on orientation may have saved her from being A summary of damage to the target ships was sunk."12 prepared by Joint Task Force One. The following discussion is drawn from that The loss of Sakawa, which sank in 25 hours document and not from the archeological from tears in the stern plating, was attributed record prepared by the NPS. to its "considerably lighter construction," as opposed to the two U.S. cruisers moored The worse damage was done to ships within a nearby, which suffered dished decks and stacks thousand-yard radius of the zeropoint. Five and superstructure damage.13 The destroyers ships were sunk: Gilliam (50 yards from the Anderson and Lamson, two of three destroyers zeropoint); Sakawa (420 yards); Carlisle (430 anchored within the thousand-yard radius of yards); Anderson (600 yards); and Lamson (760 the zeropoint, sank because of extensive hull yards). Additionally, six other target vessels damage. USS Hughes, at 920 yards, was dished were "immobilized" by blast damage, and but survived. Three other vessels suffered another eight suffered "short- or long-term major damage without sinking. The light serious loss of military efficiency" by having carrier In dependence's hull was "blown in and their boilers, radio, or radar and fire control there was buckling of bulkheads." Additionally, systems disabled. These were Skate ( 400 the flight deck was "badly warped and buckled, yards); Y0-160 (520 yards); In dependence (560 and the sides enclosing the hangar deck were yards); Crittenden (595 yards); Nevada (615 blown through."14 USS Skate suffered serious yards); Arkansas (620 yards); Pensacola (710 damage which prevented the submarine from yards); ARDC-13 (825 yards); Dawson (855 submerging, including a bent conning tower and yards); Salt Lake City (895 yards); Hugh es (920 a "badly stripped and crumpled superstructure." yards) ; Rhind (1,012 yards); LST-52 (1,530 Y0-160's concrete hull was broken and spalled, yards); and Saratoga (2,265 yards). exposing bent reinforcing bars, its concrete Additionally, four ships suffered "short- or deckhouses were smashed, and all of the wood long-term moderate loss of military efficiency": in the vessel was burned by a thermal­ Talbot (1,165 yards); Barrow (1,335 yards); radiation-induced shipboard fire.15 Pennsylvania (1,540 yards); and New York (1,545 yards). Based on these reports, Joint Flash scorching on painted surfaces was found Task Force One concluded after plotting the on vessels up to 3, 700 yards distant from the actual damage and determining its relationship zeropoint. Fires were started on several to the structural strength of the specific ship vessels, usually in cordage, canvas, or burlap types and methods of construction, that the wrappings on exposed Army test items, notably range of damage was "very serious" to 900 on USS Saratoga, the most distant vessel (2,265 yards, "serious" to 1,000 yards, "moderate" to yards) from the zeropoint to suffer any Able 1,300 yards, and "slight" to 1,500 yards.10 damage. Fires aboard USS Anderson probably exploded shipboard ordnance, hastening its The worse damage from the blast was that sinking. The only fuel oil fire was started suffered by vessel superstructures. Hull aboard Sakawa. damage, including decks, sides, and bottoms, was next in severity, followed by damage to The Baker Detonation masts and stacks. The worse hull damage was that done to Gilliam, which was described as The Baker bomb was detonated by Los Alamos "badly ruptured, crumpled, and twisted almost scientists inside its steel and concrete caisson, beyond recognition."11 Gilliam sank within a suspended 90 feet beneath LSM-60, and minute. The other attack transport, Carlisle, approximately 90 feet above the lagoon sunk, was dished, and had hull breaks. bottom.16 Energy release was similar to the However, the transport Crittenden, 165 yards Able shot. A fireball was formed that farther out from the zeropoint than Carlisle, illuminated the water with an orange-white light

87 feet from the zeropoint, the peak overpressure of detonation at the surface of the water at was 7,000 psi. Other readings were 5i900 psi more than 10,000 Roentgens, or at an amount (928 feet); 5,200 psi (996 feet); 4,400 psi (1,084 variously estimated to have been equal to feet); 3,200 psi (1,278 feet); 2,300 psi (1,554 placing 2,500 to 8,300 tons of radium at the feet); 1,400 psi (2,060 feet); 800 psi (3,040 zeropoint.29 feet); 560 psi (3,700 feet); and 330 psi (5,000 feet).23 It was later found that the ships A fatal dose of radiation is generally assumed shielded some of the blast. The underwater to be 400 Roentgens per 24 hours. Personnel pressure on the remote sides of hulls was on ships within 700 yards of the zeropoint measured at 40 percent of those on the would have received that fatal dose in 30 to 60 exposed sides.24 Peak were also seconds. A dose 20 times fatal--8,000 recorded in the air that were equal to a 4- Roentgens--would have been received in the kiloton air or surface burst. The pressures first hour. At 7,000 yards, the fatal dose was measured in the air were 16 psi at 550 yards, administered in seven minutes, while at 2,500 diminishing rapidly to 9.6 psi at 650 yards, 6.6 yards, a fatal dose would have been psi at 800 yards, 4.8 psi at 100 yards, 3.8 psi at accumulated in three hours. Radiation levels 1,200 yards, and 2.8 psi at 1,500 yards.25 on the ship's decks fell to 65 Roentgens per 24 hours four hours after the blast, and to .1 The velocity of the pressure wave was the same Roentgens per 24 hours by five days after the in the water and in the air: at two seconds the blast, in large part because of shock front had travelled two miles from the and the of radioactive materials by zeropoint. Another effect of the shock front convection and current.30 Yet four- to eight­ and the eruption of the fireball was the inch-thick contaminated sediments from the creation of a series of waves that moved at 45 50,000 cubic yards of bottom excavated from knots. At seven seconds after detonation, a the crater that were estimated to have fallen 94-foot-high wave passed the thousand-yard back in the lagoon demonstrated "high" mark. It was followed by a 47-foot wave at readings six days after the blast. Similarly, "a 2,000 feet at 20.5 seconds, and a 24-foot wave number of vessels were covered with at 4,000 feet at 47.5 seconds. These were the contaminated coral sand which had been only three waves of height. Four lesser waves sucked from the bottom of the lagoon" and followed, diminishing to a nine-foot wave at deposited by the base surge.31 12,000 feet 156 seconds after detonation. The nearby islands of the atoll, notably Bikini, were 1946 "Baker" Assessments washed by 15-foot breakers.26 The creation of these waves accounted for one percent of the The "Baker" detonation sank nine vessels and bomb's total energy. badly damaged another eleven within a thousand-yard radius of the zeropoint. Joint A "base surge" also emanated out from the Task Force One, tallying the results, column as it collapsed. "This doughnut-shaped determined that 700 yards was a "serious if not cloud moving rapidly out from the column.. .is fatal" damage zone, with serious damage at 900 essentially a dense cloud of water droplets, yards, moderate damage at 1,000 yards, and much like the spray at the base of Niagara slight damage at 1,500 yards. The majority of Falls ...but having the property of flowing almost damage was caused by two factors--underwater as if it were a homogeneous fluid."27 Moving at shock, and the violent motion caused by it, as 45 mph, the base surge was 800 yards distant well as the impact with and violent motion from the zeropoint and a thousand feet high. from the blast-induced waves.32 Five of the The base surge contained many of the bomb vessels not sunk within the 1000-yard radius material's as well as radionuclides were "immobilized." USS Pensacola suffered produced because of activation of the sea moderate hull dishing, damage to bulkheads, water, lagoon sand, etc. It has been estimated stanchions, and machinery foundations, holding by one expert that as much as 50 percent, and down clips on turrets and battery mounts. no less than 10 percent of the radioactive USS Hughes was the closest destroyer to the material remained trapped in the .28 zeropoint. It suffered major structural damage, Radiation levels were measured near the point including ruptured pipes and sea connections

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only bulkhead that seems to be in its original ship was first seen in photographs less than position. It is bent in an "s" shape that has a three minutes after the burst; "at that time she correspondingly distorted door in it. was smoking heavily amidships ...she continued to burn and by burst plus 5 minutes 33 seconds Forward of the bulkhead is the 20mm gun she had assumed a 10 degree list to mount. The remains of the forward hold, starboard."40 The ship sank unobserved which contained railroad iron as test cargo and approximately one-half hour after detonation. gas cylinders, is aft the bulkhead. Numerous In 1946 Navy divers located the wreck of gas cylinders and angle iron can be seen Carlisle lying in 170 feet of water, "with a small among the jumble of what was once the list of about 5 degrees to port."41 forward hold. The deck seems to have been ripped off, exposing the hold's contents. A Site Description kingpost lies off the starboard side. To port is the bulldozer, with its blade bent inward. One ROY dive was made by Navy operators in 1989 on Carlisle, commencing on the port side Within the jumbled wreckage, hatch coamings near the bow and heading aft to the fantail, can be discerned as rectangular interruptions of then running back along the port side to the ship scatter. The coamings appear to have hatch leading into the aft cargo hold. The been torn out of the deck. A perimeter of ROY then headed across the deck, descended broken deck plate adheres to the hatch into the hold, and then came out, dropped to coaming margin. the starboard side, and ran aft along it for a short distance before ending the dive. Gilliam is the most damaged of the vessels the team examined in Bikini Lagoon. It is Comparing the identical, sister ships Gilliam unforgettable. and Carlisle offers a comparison of the Able bomb's damage to this type of vessel as USS CARLISLE observed at the different positions of 50 and 430 yards from surface zero. Gilliam was USS Carlisle was dived by the Navy ROY in heavily mangled, as previously discussed. While August 1989. Videotapes of the ROY dive Carlisle is more substantially intact, the ship were assessed by us for comparison with suffered considerable and fatal damage at eight Gilliam. times the distance of its sistership, which the Navy attributed to Carlisle's beam-on Pre-Test Alterations orientation to the blast. Damage observed in the ROY dive would confirm this. The port Carlisle was loaded to 95 percent of its shell plating is buckled, dented, and dished capacity with fuel and diesel oil. This ship was considerably, with a major failure forward. also loaded with 100 percent of its wartime The superstructure, while more or less intact, allowance of ammunition "plus several loaded has separated from the hull at the port side, but plugged bombs, rocket heads and and is pushed to starboard, as indicated in incendiary clusters throughout the ship. The 1946 reports. Bureau of Aeronautics secured a VF airplane aft on the upper deck."39 The most interesting damage to Carlisle is that done to the decks, which evidence the same Post-Blast Observations compressive downward force of the blast that Gilliam's decks do, although not as severely. Carlisle was moored close to and athwart The port side of the deck around the aft hold's Gilliam, the accidental zeropoint of the Able hatch has separated fr om the bulwark and the test detonation. Carlisle was 430 yards from hull, and the deck seams have parted. The surface zero. Carlisle's port side faced the hatch coaming is bent and twisted, but remains blast. The blast displaced Carlisle attached to the deck plates except in its after approximately 150 feet, toppled the stacks and portions, where it has pulled free. The deck mainmast, displaced the superstructure to has partially collapsed into the hold, and starboard, and damaged the foremast. The stanchions have buckled inside the hold, so that

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strut in the stern had torn free, buckling shell enormous waves, and the results of tons of plating and tearing out the doubler plates. water thrown up by the blast falling on the The flight deck at the stern was dished in to decks. Below the flight deck level, damage a maximum depth of 12 feet that splintered the primarily consists of dishing along the starboard wood deck but did not penetrate the steel deck hull shell plating, most noticeably on the beneath. The funnel had collapsed to the torpedo blister, which is pushed inward flight deck, with three-quarters lying on the between fr ames to a depth of six feet in some deck and the remaining quarter "erect areas. Shell plate dishing increases toward the but...twisted about 20 degrees counterclockwise." stern. Some hull cracks show; it is not known The top foremast was broken off above the SK whether they resulted from bomb damage or radar platform. The starboard side of the hull post-depositional settling. exhibited a three-to-six-inch dishing in the central area of the ship.50 The worst hull damage is starboard side aft. Here, shell plating and doubler plates above When Navy divers inspected the wreck, they the turn of the bilge and the torpedo blister reported it lying in 180 feet of water on the are torn free, exposing frames. Navy reports in port bilge at a 10- to 15-degree angle. The 1946 and 1947 indicated that all shafts and bow reportedly tilted up at an approximate screws were visible, with the starboard struts five-degree angle. The ship had settled into broken. This was also noted in the 1989 the bottom, to the shaft level, leaving the survey, with the forward starboard strut broken screws exposed. The starboard bilge was about violently enough to damage the shell plating seven to eight feet above the bottom. The around it. Navy determined fr om oil leaks that the bottom shell plating had ruptured. This, they Deck. The flight deck shows extensive concluded, along with a tear in the hull near damage. A combination of blast wave and the starboard quarter, and the failure of sea thousands of tons of water falling from the chests and valves, had sunk Saratoga. 51 blast column collapsed and compressed the aft flight deck, beginning close to the stern and Site Description continuing forward nearly to the funnel about 200 feet down to a distance of 12 to 20 feet In 1989 and 1990 dive surveys found that the between the outermost longitudinal bulkheads. virtually intact USS Saratoga still lies upright These bulkheads, which provide the main flight on the bottom of Bikini Lagoon in deck support, are 70 feet apart. approximately 180 feet of water. The vessel rises to within 40 feet of the surface, with the Navy reports in 1946 noted "the indentation [of island and mast visible from the surface. the flight deck] is gradual with no abrupt Numerous hatches and the elevator bay stand breaks or bends. There is no indication that open. The vessel strongly retains its integrity the steel deck has ruptured but the wood as a ship and is easily identifiable as Saratoga. decking has been splintered and broken ...."52 Although the carrier's entire exterior was The steel deck is now ruptured. It could have surveyed, emphasis \Yas upon the starboard side been ruptured in 1946, with splintered wood (which faced the blast) and the flight deck. obscuring the break to observers. A large Few interior spaces were examined other than break about 100 feet aft of the stack is clearly the hangar deck amidships, as well as the visible and another open deck crack can be island, the flag plot, navigation bridge, and seen on the starboard side near the boat bay. aerological office. Additionally the auxiliary radio room and windlass area was entered The major flight deck failure is near the through a hole in the flight deck. funnel. A partial deck break beneath the collapsed funnel is probably attributable to the Saratoga readily evidences the effects of the latter crashing down on it. A roughly square Baker test bomb's detonation. More precisely, depression aft roughly conforms to the No. 2 the ship shows the aftermath of a nearby elevator position, which was sealed off in early nuclear detonation's pressure wave, the effects 1945 during Saratoga's last pre-Crossroads refit. of being lifted 29 to 43 feet, being hit by The platform that covered the elevator was 102 -I

photographs. The boat is upright, listing about missing its rubber cover. Powered by the 15 degrees to starboard. The pressure hull is submarine's batteries, the JP hydrophone was intact, but the aft portions are dished as much a passive listening sonar often called as six between frames; this confirms "iron-board sonar" because it is an oblong 1946 Navy diver reports and is indicative of the metal tube atop a shaft mount. boat's stern facing the blast. The pressure gives the impression of having been Pilotfish's original armament was a single "shrink-wrapped" around the circular frames. 5-inch/25 caliber gun and a single 40mm gun. The 5-inch gun mount is located aft on the The diving planes are present and stowed, deck. Another gun mount is forward. The aft folded up against the hull. The bow torpedo 5-inch , mounted near the war's end, shutters and stern tube shutters are closed. was apparently removed for Crossroads. A The anchors were not observed and probably single 40mm gun is mounted on the forward removed prior to the test; Pilotfish was moored fairwater; the barrel is slightly elevated and by means of weights and cables to enable the cants to starboard. This is a typical mounting boat to submerge without a crew aboard. for a late war boat engaged in lifeguard duty off the Japanese home islands. Navy manuals The superstructure is intact, but dented in all for the time indicate the 40mm, while areas except the sail front. Here the "principally an anti-aircraft weapon, may be superstructure is broken, deck beams have used against surface craft. It is a rapid fire, collapsed, and debris litters the pressure hull recoil-type weapon."84 Aft, on the after and the lagoon bottom on the starboard side. "cigarette" deck of the sail, a twin 20mm This damage may be the result of aborted Navy Orelikon gun is mounted. This gun is elevated salvage attempts because salvage fitting access and points aft and slightly to port. required cutting away the shifted superstructure. The teak decking of the The sail is intact and slightly dented. The superstructure is largely missing, apparently navigating bridge on the sail forward the shears consumed by marine organisms. Only stubs of is open; the mount for a target bearing the decking around fastenings have survived. transmitter (TBT) is located at the bridge starboard side, but the instrument is missing, Numerous fittings were noted on the deck. probably reflecting selective stripping of specific The superstructure and deck are missing in the types of reusable equipment for Crossroads. area of the forward torpedo loading hatch, The shears are intact, but the two which is closed. There is no trace of the have been removed. Forward the No. 2 hatch deck skid. The forward escape and periscope shear is an SJ (surface-search) radar rescue hatch are closed, as is the aperture for antenna of a late-war model. This radar gave the marker buoy. The forward tank valves the boat range and bearing of a target. Aft cover is open, probably from 1946 salvage the No. 2 shear is the antenna mount for an attempts. The aft escape hatch, leading into SS (air-search) radar. The antenna, a larger the after battery, is open. This hatch was version of the SJ, is missing. closed for the tests; 1946 photographs of the sunken submarine also show it closed. The The interior of the submarine was not entered. hatch was either opened by Navy divers The only open hatch is the after . attempting to salvage the boat or was opened It is believed that the boat is flooded, based after the Navy salvage effort. The portable on Navy reports from the 1946 dives. capstan, usually stowed when underway, is mounted on the deck near the bow. USS APOGON

No antennas were noted on the deck, but a Pre-Test Alterations topside JP sonar hydrophone is mounted on the deck to starboard just forward of the Apogon's periscopes were removed, as were its torpedo loading hatch. The hydrophone is anchors, for the tests. The vessel retained its two single 40mm guns on the sail.

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Bikini were dived with the exception of The graduated levels of damage sought by the Sakawa, Anderson , Lamson, and ARDC-13. Of planners of Operation Crossroads in their these four vessels, only ARDC-13's wreck has placement of ships of the same type at staged been located. Marked with a buoy placed by locations is demonstrated by the different site Navy and Holmes and Narver personnel who descriptions of Apogon, Pilotfish, Gilliam, report that the wreck lies upside down on the Carlisle, Arkansas, and Nagato. The ships more bottom, with one wing wall cracked at its distant from each zeropoint showed lesser junction with the hull bottom and tilted over to damage than those closer, as would be rest against the lagoon bottom. Of the various expected. At the same time, the ships showed small craft, the largest of which were the LCTs different damage. An example is the variation that were lost and then scuttled inside the in pressure hull failure in the two submarines. lagoon, most on the beach of Bikini, only one Apogon suffered a ruptured hatch and thus a was dived, although the visible remains of less catastrophic hull failure. While less dished another LCT rises above the water surface near than Pilotfish, however, the boat has a large the garbage dump area. The remains of an hole blown through the hull forward. The LCM on the beach of Bikini, heading toward designed of these Enyu, was also investigated and was determined boats was 412 feet, the crush depth was 600 to be of more modern origin. Discussions with feet, which would be equal to 300 psi.101 Holmes and Narver personnel indicate it was Given the 1,200-4,000 psi peak overpressures lost around the time of the aborted that hit the two submarines, their hull failures resettlement of Bikini. become understandable.

The failure to locate Sakawa may be explained For many of the ships observed at Bikini, it by the fact that after the Able blast, Sakawa appears that the worst damage resulted from probably sank very close to the location at the peak overpressures of the shock wave, which Baker detonated and lays within a few particularly to Gilliam and Carlisle on the hundred yards of the suspended Baker test surface, and the submarines while submerged. bomb, submerged 90 fe.et off the lagoon The same pressures also did considerable bottom. While it is unlikely that the bomb's damage to the underwater hulls of Nagato, detonation would have completely destroyed the Arkansas, and Saratoga. The major contributor vessel, it is possible that it was crushed, toward the sinking of the vessels, however, was possibly broken, and perhaps even partially the overwashing of them by the blast-generated buried by the 500,000 tons of excavated waves, particularly in the case of Saratoga, and material from the bomb crater that fell back the collapse of the blast column, which into the lagoon in the area in which it should materially contributed to the sinking of lie. We postulate, based on the comparison of Arkansas by hammering it more or less straight the arrays for each test, that remains of down into the lagoon bottom. The effects of Sakawa should lie between Arkansas and thermal radiation, which were visible on the Saratoga. ships after Able, is now no longer readily observable. Scorched paint and burned Although dived in 1946, but not located in materials have now disintegrated in the sea 1988, 1989, or 1990, the wrecks of Anderson water or are masked by coral and fouling, even and Lamson presumably lie in their original on ships known to have burned fiercely, such sinking locations in the prohibited zone as Carlisle. Other evidence of thermal quadrangle shown on the Bikini Atoll radiation, such as warped metal, is navigation charts. The failure to locate the indistinguishable, if it exists, from pressure or wrecks may be due to incorrect positions wave damage. Beta and gamma radiation, provided by Holmes and Narver during the measured at various levels in 1946 and 1947 1988 survey and the high rate of occurrence of and noted as "high," are no longer significantly tall coral heads encountered during the survey above background (see the appendix authored in 1988 which made detection by sonar by Dr. W. Robison). While these two difficult. Additional systematic survey efforts in particular effects of the bomb are no longer this section of the quadrant should disclose apparent, the basic fact remains that they were these two wrecks. contributing factors in the sinking of Carlisle,

137 and the as-yet-undiscovered Anderson, and The sunken fleet of Operation Crossroads is, as Sakawa. More importantly, radionuclide the significance chapter will discuss, a unique contamination and its resulting radiation was a underwater material record of the dawn of the major contributing factor in the abandonment atomic age. It also demonstrates that a force of salvage efforts on some ships, and in the as powerful as nuclear weapons is nonetheless limited nature of assessments made in 1946 in measurable, quantifiable, and understandable. radioactive water and silt. The most visible Much more work remains to fully quantify and victim of radiation is Prinz Eugen, now resting understand the effects of the bombs on the as the major monument to the Able and Baker ships at Bikini. At the same time, analysis and "spared" target ships that like Prinz Eugen were consideration must also be given to taken to Kwajalein or other ports. Ultimately understanding the cultural forces that most of the other target ships were scuttled assembled the fleet and sank it, and the because of their radioactive . Prinz behaviors that influenced the artifactual record Eugen, lost by accident before the decision to on the bottom, as indicated in the outfitting scuttle other surviving target ships, is now the discussion above, as well as the ramifications of most accessible of these surplus ships of these events in the world after mankind passed Crossroads. It was not salvaged, even when a over the Crossroads. recent (1989) request for scrapping the ship was considered by Naval Sea Systems Command, but rejected because of concerns of NOTES contaminating the world steel supply. 1 The outfitting of the ships at Bikini shows Samuel Glasstone, ed., Radiologi cal Defense: Th e Principles of Military Defense Against Atomic Weapons some variation in the historical accounts of (Washington, D.C.: Armed-Forces Special Weapons stripping of target ships. Items of potential Project, 1951), Vol. 2, p. 5. value for military purposes, such as some 2 weapons and electronic equipment, were left Ibid. aboard many of the ships. As indicated by the 3 large number of militarily valuable weapons and Shurcliff, "Technical History," p. 12.4. equipment left on the ships and now on the bottom, the value of military reuse of the 4 stripped items balanced against the need to test Ibid., p. 21.1. the effect of the atomic bomb reinforces in 5 part the concept of Crossroads as a potlatch, Ibid. , p. 30.3. while also offering another insight into the 6 relative wealth of the U.S. at this time. As Ibid., p. 13.20. other evidence of this attitude, veterans of 7 World War II service have reported the Samuel Glasstone, ed., Th e Effe cts of Nuclear Weapons disposal of complete silverware sets and dishes (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), that were in excess of a ship's allotment at p. 29. Also see Shurcliff, "Technical Report," p. 28.9. war's end, rather than returning them to the 8 quartermaster and filling out paperwork. A Glasstone, Radiological Defense., p. 36. German veteran of Prinz Eugen's crew has noted his amazement at American wastefulness 9 Ibid. , p. 39. on his ship when it was in the U.S. after the war: leftover and "extra" food, some of it 10 uncooked sausages, were fed to the sea gulls, Shurcliff, "Technical History," pp. 13.3-13.4. while a box of bolts, opened to get the few 11 bolts needed, was thrown overboard to avoid Ibid. , p. 13.6. the paperwork of returning it. This is just one 12 human behavior that may be reflected by the Ibid. material record of Operation Crossroads. 13 Ibid. , p. 13.5.

138 14 37 Ibid. Ibid.

15 38 Ibid. , p. 13.6 Ibid.

16 39 Ibid. , p. 20.3. Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, 17 USS Carlisle (APA-69), Test Able, Operation Glasstone, Th e Effe cts of Nuclear Weapons, p. 52. Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, p. 9. 18 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 19 Ib id. , p. 45. 41 Ibid. 20 Ibid., pp. 45-46; also see Shurcliff, "Technical History," 42 p. 28.3. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 161.

21 43 Shurcliff, "Technical History," p. 28.3 Ibid. , p. 134.

22 44 Ibid. , p. 28.7. Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, 23 USS Arkansas (BB-33), Test Baker, Operation Ibid. , p. 26.3. Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, p. 5. 24 Ibid. , p. 26.4. 45 Ibid., p. 7. 25 Ibid. 46 Ibid., pp. 6-8. 26 Ibid. , pp. 28.5-28.6. 47 Ibid. , p. 5. 27 Glasstone, Th e Effe cts of Nuclear Weapons, p. 46. 48 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, 28 "Bureau of Ships Group Technical Inspection Report, Shurcliff, "Technical History," p. 28.4. USS Sara toga (CV3), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, p. 14. Hereafter 29 cited as "Technical Inspection Report, Saratoga, Test Ibid. , p. 27.3. Able"; the identical report, from Test Baker, will be similarly cited. 30 Ibid. , pp. 27.4-27.7. 49 Glasstone, Th e Effe cts of Nuclear Weapons, p. 208. 31 Ib id. , p. 27.7. 50 Director of Ship Material, "Technical Inspection Report, 32 Sara toga, Test Baker," pp. 6-7, passim. Ibid. , pp. 23.2-23.4 and 23.8. 51 33 Ibid., p. 6. Ibid. , p. 23.5. 52 34 Ibid. , p. 7. Ibid. , p. 23.6. 53 35 Ibid. , p. 7. Ib id., pp. 23.6-23.7. 54 36 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, "Final Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Report of Tests Able and Baker, Bureau of Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Aeronautics, " (October 11, 1946), copy on file at USS Gilliam (AP A-57), Test Able," National Archives National Technical Information Service, p. 204. Record Group 374 , p. 5.

139 Hereafter cited as Director of Ship Material, BuAer photographs are contact prints of 4x5 negatives; picture final report. boards in each view indicate they were taken either on June 17 or June 19, 1946. The BACR stands for 55 "Before Able, Crossroads." The bombs remained in Ibid. , p. 73. their original positions for Baker.

56 73 Director of Ship Material, BuAer final report, p. 74. Photographs, Bureau of Ordnance, BACR Series, National Archives. 57 Ib id. , p. 73. 74 Director of Ship Material, BuAer final report, pp. 129, 58 139, 141-143, 197, 205-207. Director of Ship Material, "Technical Inspection Report, Saratoga, Test Baker," p. 8. 75 Ibid. 59 Ibid., p. 8. 76 Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United 60 States Navy Aircraft Since 1911 (Annapolis: Naval Director of Ship Material, BuAer final report, p. 74. Institute Press, 1969), pp. 150-152; also see Andrade, U.S. Military Aircraft Design ations and Serials Since 61 1909, p. 222. Col. J. D. Frederick, "Final Report of Army Ground Group (Task Group 1.4), Operation Crossroads Atomic 77 Bomb Tests," (1946), copy on file, National Technical E. W. Jolie, A Brief History of U.S. Navy To rpedo Information Service. Volume III, p. 117. Hereafter Development, (Newport, R.I.: Naval Underwater cited as Frederick, "Final Report of Army Ground Systems Center, 1978), pp. 33-34, 43, 45, and 80. The Group." Mk 13 torpedo was produced by Pontiac Motors Division, International Harvester Co., the Naval 62 Torpedo Stations at Newport, Keyport, and Alexandria, Ibid., p. 146. and the American Can Co., of Forest Park, Illinois. In all, 16,600 Mk 13 torpedoes were produced during the 63 war, undergoing refinement through the war's end. The Frederick, "Final Report of Army Ground Group," Vol. Mk 25 torpedo was developed to replace the Mk 13 but I, pp. 5, 7. was not produced. The most notable Mk 13 success was the sinking of the Japanese battleship Yamato in 64 1945. Ibid. , pp. 5, 8. 78 65 Shurcliff, "Technical History," Vol. II, pp. 7.11-7.12. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 69. 79 66 See footnote 73. Shurcliff, "Technical History," Vol. III, p. 9.5. 80 67 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 65. Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Pilotfish (SS-386), Test Baker, Operation 68 Crossroads, National Archives Record Group 374, p. 7. Shurcliff, "Technical History," p. 9.5. 81 69 Ibid., p. 6. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 69. 82 70 Ibid. Ibid. , Plate 12 caption, between pp. 70-71. Also see W. A. Shurcliff, Operation Crossroads: Th e Official 83 Pictorial Record (New York: Wm. H. Wise Co., 1947), Ibid. , p. 5. p. 150. 84 71 Th e Fl eet Typ e Submarine, Nav Pers 16169 Director of Ship Material, "Technical Inspection Report, (Washington, D.C.: Standards and Circulation Division, Saratoga, Test Baker," p. 7. Training, Bureau of Naval Personnel, June 1946) p. 16.

72 85 The ordnance was carefully labelled in BuOrd Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, photographs, Record Group 74, Records of the Bureau Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, of Ordnance, photographs labelled 74-BO-B4, USS USS Apogon (SS-308), Test Able," National Archives Saratoga (CV -3), Still Pictures Branch, National Record Group 374, p. 7. Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as 74-BO-B4. Originally labelled BACR-63-1563, these

140 86 94 Shurcliff, Operation Crossroads: Th e Official Pictorial Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Record, p. 106. Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Nagato (Ex-Jap BB), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," 87 National Archives Record Group 374, pp. 105-106. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 166. 95 88 Ibid. , p. 6. Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, 96 USS Apogon (SS308), Test Baker," p. 5, National Ibid. Archives Record Group 374. 97 89 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Ibid., p. 6. Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Naga to, Test Baker, • p. 5. 90 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, 98 Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Ibid. , p. 6. USS Y0-160, Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, p. 3. 99 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, 91 Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Ibid., p. 5. Beached Landing Craft, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, pp. 92 16, 18, 19, 21. Ibid. , p. 6. 100 93 Ibid. Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, 101 USS Y0-160, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," Norman Polmar, Naval Historian, Alexandria, Virginia, National Archives Record Group 374, p. 5. Personal Communication, November 6, 1990.

141

CHAPTER FIVE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUNKEN VESSELS OF OPERATION CROSSROADS

James P. Delgado

Ruminating on the nature of nuclear wars after The ships assembled at Bikini for Operation Operation Crossroads, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Crossroads and sunk in the tests represent 34 concluded that with atomic weapons "it is quite years of naval design and development, from possible to depopulate vast areas of the earth's the oldest ship, Arkansas, built in 1912, to the surface, leaving only vestigial remnants of man's newest, ARDC-13, which was rushed to material works. "1 Forty-four years after completion in March 1946. These vessels, as Crossroads, Bikini Atoll stands depopulated. Its the tests' planners intended, reflect a range of people, relocated for the tests, have not ship types, construction methods, and hull permanently resettled Bikini. Efforts to "clean forms, and in total represent in microcosm up" Bikini island after a 1968 declaration that many of the elements of a typical naval force, it was once again safe for human habitation with an aircraft carrier, battleships, cruisers, erased all traces of Operation Crossroads from destroyers, submarines, attack transports, and the surface of the island. Geometrically landing craft. Some of these vessels, such as planted palms and rows of uniform concrete USS Anderson, are the sole surviving intact houses for a reestablished Bikinian community representatives of specific classes of ships. brought a new look to the island. Found Many of the ships had long and significant unsafe for continual habitation in 1978, Bikini careers, beginning with the Veracruz landings was again abandoned, and today hosts a small, of 1914 and the First World War. Most ships transient population of field station support now sunk at Bikini also had significant World personnel, scientists, and occasional visitors. War II careers including roles in maj or engagements and battles--the Bismarck Visitors to Bikini seeking to confront the breakout, Pearl Harbor, the Battle of the Coral tangible evidence of the world's first nuclear Sea, Midway, the Aleutians campaign, the weapons effects tests are therefore Battle of the Solomons, the Battle of the disappointed. While the island itself, with all Philippine Sea, and the -­ its "reconstruction," is a reflection of nuclear­ and represent some of the better known and induced change brought about by the tests, the significant aspects of the war at sea, such as tall observation towers and concrete wolf pack attacks in the submarine war of foundations erected in 1946 for Operation attrition against Japan, the seaborne line of Crossroads are gone. The only evidence lies supply and replenishment, shore bombardment, beneath the surface of the lagoon, scattered kamikaze attacks, and the development of the about the rim and inside the now-nearly fast carrier task force. completely silt-buried crater formed by the Baker test bomb's detonation. The ships of The place of these ships in the history of naval Operation Crossroads, lying where they were development, their roles in naval history, and sunk by two nuclear blasts, are the last their World War II combat records establish "vestigial" remnants of that time and place. their significance only up to the moment they Substantially unchanged, they are the only were selected for Operation Crossroads. From essentially unmodified museum of the dawn of that point on, their previous histories become the era of the atomic bomb--unlike the picked­ secondary, for the pre-Crossroads significance over, filled-in, and fenced of the of the ships is overshadowed by the social, Trinity Site, or the rebuilt Hiroshima and political, and military decisions that brought Nagasaki. them to Bikini, and the forces unleashed by the

143 detonation of two atomic bombs that sent them age. On March 5, 1946, Senator Carl Hatch of to the bottom of the atoll's lagoon. Each of , a staunch supporter of the bomb, these vessels passed over a threshold at the introduced a proposal to create an Atomic "crossroads" between conventional and nuclear Bomb National Monument, to be administered warfare, as did the world that had built and by the National Park Service. The memorial, manned them. Regardless of type, age, or at the Trinity Site in the New Mexico desert career, each vessel that now lies where it was near San Antonio, was to include a nearby sunk by the Able and Baker test blasts is of museum where artifacts of the bomb's equal significance as the only uncompromised development and first test, including the B-29 material record of the early, formative stages , "from which the first atomic bomb 3 of nuclear weapons design and the development used in warfare was dropped ... ," would be of a nuclear military policy. While the wreck displayed. The planned National Monument of Prinz Eugen, secondarily deposited at and museum were never realized; Enola Gay Kwajalein as a direct result of the tests is also was held in reserve for possible use in significant, its value as an artifact of the Operation Crossroads, and the Trinity Site beginning of the atomic age is less so than the remained in military hands. (It is now ships in their primary deposition at Bikini; this included within the White Sands Missile also follows for the highly contaminated 53 Range.) A stone and bronze monument was target vessels later scuttle d or sunk by erected by the missile range command in 1965 conventional weapons in the deep ocean to mark "where the world's first nuclear device because they were radioactively "too hot to was exploded on , 1945." Designated a handle." National Historic Landmark in 1975, the site is open to the public twice each year. In 1990, nearly 6,000 persons visited the site. MONUMENTS AND MEMORIALS TO THE DAWN OF THE ATOMIC AGE Pieces of "," the ceramic-like pale green fused sand from ground zero, have been The sunken fleet of Operation Crossroads, carried off as souvenirs by visitors to the through its assessment and documentation, now Trinity Site since 1945. Trinitite was fashioned joins other monuments and memorials to the into costume jewelry by "enterprising atomic age. There are many such places in the entrepreneurs" in 1945, and by 1952 concern United States and Japan, ranging from the over the future of the vanishing Trinitite display of mock-up full-scale versions of the temporarily resurrected National Monument "" and "Fat Man" atomic bombs to plans, with the National Park Service requesting the proud display by the Department of Energy a 100-lb. box of the fused nuclear slag for of the Proj ect crater excavated by retention in its Santa Fe, New Mexico, regional nuclear detonation in the Nevada desert. The office for a future museum at the Trinity Site.4 effort to memorialize and celebrate the impact While most of the Trinitite is now gone from of the bomb began at the same time the new Trinity Site, other atomic artifacts were saved. age dawned. Social historian Paul Boyer has Enola Gay was not used for Crossroads noted, when asked how a people reacts when because of engine problems and remained in the entire basis of its existence is fundamentally storage until 1949, when it was donated to the altered, that usually these changes are more Smithsonian Institution. Restoration of the discernable to historians than to those who live plane began in 1984 and is expected to end in through them; however, "the nuclear era was 1994, when Enola Gay will be placed on different. It burst upon the world with display by the Smithsonian in a facility outside terrifying suddenness. From the earliest Washington, D.C.5 Bock's Car, the B-29 used moments, the American people recognized that to drop an atomic bomb on Nagasaki was things would never be the same again."2 preserved after Crossroads and is now on display at the U.S. Air Force Museum at As early as 1946 two actions were taken to Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, preserve both a site and an artifact of the new Ohio.

144 Other monuments to the beginning of the striking material example of U.S. power and atomic age do not reflect historical significance wealth. Operation Crossroads was the • or national pride in a technological beginning of an American determination to test achievement. The blasted remains of the and refine the bomb, and at the same time Industrial Exhibition Hall in Hiroshima, whose make it more commonplace in order to twisted metal dome has become a symbol of alleviate American fears that the bomb made the destructive power of the atomic bomb, and them more like "potential victims" rather than is now known as the "A-Bomb Dome," is one being "a potential threat to other peoples ... .'17 such site. Termed both a monument "left Crossroads partially succeeded at first by behind by the bomb," and a memorial to the falsely alleviating some fears, not only at home city demolished by "Little Boy," the dome is but abroad, yet for the first time it the only tangible remnant of August 6, 1945, demonstrated that the bomb's greater threat lay apart from the physical and emotional scars of in radioactive contamination. More the survivors. The preservation of the dome importantly, Bikini was part of a swift and was controversial as Hiroshima was rebuilt. complete absorption of the atomic bomb into According to journalist Peter Wyden, many the new and vastly altered landscape of survivors and "peace groups wanted it American defense, in which vigilance, suspicion, preserved as a reminder of human vulnerability, and the concept of the best defense being a especially for American visitors to see." Others strong offense, of Pearl Harbor and found it painful, a constant reminder for those confirmed with the development of the bomb, who wanted no reminding. It was left to changed not only America's military but foreign slowly disintegrate without demolition until and domestic policy--in large measure moves 1965, when the Hiroshima City Council voted made in response to the perceived threat of to preserve the ruin. Money was raised over global communism. the next two years throughout Japan as a "national act for peace," and in 1967 work to stabilize the dome began.6 Today the ruins, INSURING THE NAVY'S SURVIVAL IN THE part of an atomic peace park, are the backdrop AGE OF THE BOMB of a museum that offers souvenirs of another sort--the charred, twisted relics of life disrupted The primary purpose of Operation Crossroads or ended by the Bomb---watches, shoes, books, was focused more acutely on its value as a a human hand's bones fused to a melted pane demonstration than as a test. At its simplest of , and other personal items interspersed level, Operation Crossroads, although billed as with photographs of its effects on August 6, a joint exercise, was a key aspect of the 1945, and the days, weeks, and years that postwar struggle between advocates of naval followed. and air power--the latter represented by the Army Air Corps--over control of the United Unlike the Trinity Site, Enola Gay, Bock's Car, States' military power and national defense. or the A-Bomb Dome, the ships at Bikini are Advocates of air power, using the argument neither monuments to 's impact nor that saturation bombing, particularly the fire­ memorials. They are now, in their isolation bombing raids in and Japan, was from the rest of the world, in a depopulated capable of winning a war without pitched sea land, simply evocative artifacts, the material battles or invasions, felt that the atomic bomb record not only of Operation Crossroads, but had made the concept of naval power--even of the fundamental human behaviors that naval aviation--obsolete. The Navy, meanwhile, inspired and brought Crossroads to fruition. was acutely sensitive to such suggestions, remembering, as historian Lloyd Graybar notes, The Able and Baker blasts were more than the "how the Army Air Service had usurped the world's first nuclear weapons effects tests. headlines for the 1921 bombing test against the They were a statement by the United States on ex-German battleship Ostfriesland off the many fronts, a demonstration of U.S. pride in ... .''8 The Navy had previously its great and terrible achievement as well as a responded to the threat of air power by

• 145 efforts were made to promote a public image operational casualties of Able--and that of mutual cooperation and interservice amity, a concrete skins be added to armor hulls against major motivating factor behind Operation radiation because of the "relative success of Crossroads and the actual conduct of the tests, concrete structures (buildings in Japan, a was interservice rivalry and the strong floating drydock and a small auxiliary craft at determination of each service that they be Bikini) in withstanding blast, heat and preeminent. Ironically, for each branch radiation."1 4 After Baker, these Crossroads' results were "inconclusive." The recommendations, probably more reflective of Air Force, citing the fact that only nine of the the Navy's than Hanson Baldwin's opinions, target vessels escaped sinking, damage, or were modified to include protection from "unacceptable radioactive contamination," found radioactive fallout through wash-down systems proof of "what it had argued all along; ships and greater underwater protection. Baldwin were intolerably vulnerable in the atomic age."10 proposed "a reversion to the turtle-back More significant, however, was the Navy's -type ship, with thick underwater plates response to the inconclusive results. The Navy and little exposed superstructures.... Shallow responded, in large part through the press, that draft vessels were less exposed to shock the seeming knockout of its ships stressed by damage.... Naval designers, therefore, may the Army Air Force was the result of sacrifice draft for security."15 The Navy unmanned and undefended ships anchored in emphasized many of the same points, and in tight formation. The Navy argued that the immediate aftermath of Crossroads spoke "modern" ships, "properly dispersed, executing repeatedly and yet vaguely of redesigning ships evasive maneuvers and utilizing their own to meet the atomic threat. A proposal for defenses, would be far less vulnerable ... than, for redesigned warships surfaced as early as instance, fixed air bases."11 Obliquely noted September 1946, when Vice Adm. E. L. was the fact that the Army Air Force had Cochrane, chief of the Bureau of Ships, missed the target ship by "two miles"; the announced that as a result of Crossroads, implication was that dispersed, mobile ships superstructures would be redesigned; "the could outmatch a plane-dropped bomb. results may be emphatically streamlined topside structures designed to reduce the effect of the The Navy found an ideal proponent of its enormous wide-area pressures produced by survival in New York Times reporter Hanson W. atomic bomb blast."16 As late as 1958, the Baldwin, who, in the aftermath of Able, noted Navy, in describing USS Norfo lk (DL-1) that as terrible as the damage seemed, "the claimed that the ship was "designed as a results at Bikini must...be qualified." Baldwin special category of anti-submarine vessel...and also noted the tight spacing of the ships, their incorporates lessons learned at Bikini in her crewless state, and claimed that much of the construction."17 The Navy won its case "to the damage "could have been avoided had there extent that public and political pressure" to been fire-fighting crews and damage control merge as a secondary partner with the Air parties aboard."12 This argument repeatedly Force and Army, or even to cease to exist resurfaced, even after Baker, despite the "somewhat eased," giving the Navy time to prevailing high levels of radiation on the ships; develop a nuclear capability at sea.16 hence, even when the excessively "hot" Saratoga sank, the loss of the ship was attributed less to The harsh lessons of the efforts to the bomb by Baldwin, who opined "perhaps she decontaminate the target ships at Bikini, might have been saved, had there been a crew Kwajalein, and on the mainland, though not aboard. But she died a lonely death ...pumps stressed at the time, were in fact proof that idle and boilers dead ... .''13 the Navy, on the surface, was excessively vulnerable to atomic attack. Even with Baldwin felt that to meet the bomb and moderate damage and a crew aboard, the survive, "ships must seek safety in dispersion," radioactivity could not be washed away, despite with redesigned superstructures to better design changes such as rounded surfaces, steel protect radar and radio antennae--the greatest decks, and wash-down systems. The only

147 means of dealing with this threat was either , writing in 1949, noted that the avoidance or the harsh reality that "crews production of atomic weapons "requires such doomed to slow death from exposure to lethal major expenditures and such major effort that radioactivity are nevertheless able the first few they cannot be afforded at all except by days after exposure to continue normal duties. countries that are very strong economically and The seamen of tomorrow must be prepared to industrially."23 Such a nation was the United accept radioactivity as part of the hazards of States, "for we paid the bill" for developing their living and be ready to work and fight and such weapons. By expending two of these save their ship even though they know they are extremely expensive and rare weapons at Bikini, doomed to slow death."19 With no adequate the United States was demonstrating its wealth, defense against the bomb at sea (as well as on a fact underscored by the sacrifice of a land), the Navy moved firmly into line with the tremendous fleet of target ships, all in a prevalent theory of defense brought about by destructive display that echoed the potlatch the atomic age. When defense was impossible, ceremonies of Northwest Native Americans who the best means of defending one's territory was proved their wealth by purposeful destruction through demonstrating a superior ability to of valued and valuable items.24 inflict damage, namely through a greater nuclear capability. The size of the target fleet at Bikini also underscored the image of a powerful nation, for, as the Crossroads press releases A DEMONSTRATION OF WEALTH AND emphasized, this cast-off fleet of target ships POWER represented the world's fourth or fifth largest Navy. The United States, at that time, even if At a similar, but higher level, Crossroads was faced with the loss of all its target ships (as a demonstration to the world, particularly the indeed was the case) was still the world's Soviet Union, of the United States' wealth and greatest naval power, a fact obliquely, and, power at a time when the nation, in the according to Lloyd Graybar, "disingenuously" aftermath of the war, was assuming the role of mentioned by Admiral Blandy when asked if the global leader. The Los Alamos National the tests were "provocative:" Laboratory's archivist and historian notes that the prevalent attitude of the lab's weapons Some people fear that these tests may scientists then, as well as now, was that be construed by other nations as a Crossroads was not a true scientific test. "martial gesture." But the principal Rather, it was "purely a show."20 Such a targets are naval ships. , demonstration is critical when a new leader the only other country possessing a assumes the stage. The demonstration of this strong Navy, certainly does not believe fact, given the nuclear apprehension of its own that we are planning to use the bomb citizens, was of paramount importance to the against her fleet.25 U.S. government, and as early as April 1946, Admiral Blandy, speaking in a live radio The United States also backed up its image as broadcast, stated that Crossroads would "help a powerful nation by symbolically emphasizing us to be what the world expects our great, America as the principal victor in the war. non-aggressive and peace-loving country to be The inclusion of Prinz Eugen, Nagato, and --the leader of those nations which seek Sakawa as target ships was an echo of the nothing but a just and lasting peace."21 More earlier triumphant victory parades of bluntly, commentator Raymond Gram Swing conquering heroes in Republican and Imperial noted that Crossroads, "the first of the atomic Rome. Particularly indicative of Crossroads as era war games ....is a notice served on the world a spectacle were Nagato and Sakawa, both of that we have the power and intend to be which were moored within the so-called "fatal" heeded."22 Several factors support this view. zone of proximity to the planned detonations. The concept of the United States as the richest Neither vessel was extensively dived after nation on earth was implicit at Bikini. sinking at Bikini; Sakawa, although briefly

148 boarded after Able, was not dived at all and CROSSROADS AS SPECTACLE AND Nagato only briefly to assess the causes of its DEMONSTRATION sinking. Prinz Eugen, however, was moored well outside the fatal zone, since it was Crossroads as a spectacle and demonstration intended that the German warship would is also underscored by the massive publicity survive. Efforts to save the foundering Sakawa and the presence of foreign observers at the after Able, balanced against this view, may only tests. Operation Crossroads was heavily be indicative of keeping the ship afloat for its publicized, with Joint Task Force One final destruction in the Baker test. providing special facilities aboard USS Appalachian (AGC-1), which became the "press The two Japanese warships reflect not only the headquarters ship," and the preparation of United States' particular enmity towards Japan more than a hundred detailed and lengthy with underlying racial overtones and bitterness press releases, as well as "open" press over Pearl Harbor and the brutal war that conferences during the planning, execution, and followed, but a symbolic killing of the enemy's aftermath of the tests. Additionally, ships with the same weapon that had forced his capitulation. Nagato especially fulfilled that to help those correspondents who were role as the onetime flagship of the Imperial starting off "cold," Captain Lee Japanese Navy and the scene of operational (Crossroads public information officer) planning for Pearl Harbor. Nagato's "capture" arranged, besides press conferences, as a derelict on Tokyo Bay after the Japanese various orienting schemes. Lectures surrender had symbolized the surrender of the were arranged; motion picture films were Imperial Japanese Navy. Sinking the Japanese prepared and shown; press packets of battleship at Bikini ritually "destroyed" that pamphlets ...were prepared and Navy far better than scrapping or bombarding distributed. No effort was spared in the already bombed and badly damaged making this the best-reported as well as battleship with big guns, torpedoes, or 500-lb. being the most-reported technical bombs--so-called "conventional weapons." experiment of all time [original Reminiscent of the Aztec practice of caring for emphasisJ.27 and feeding a captured enemy for inevitable sacrifice was the attention given the Japanese In all, 114 U.S. radio, newspaper, magazine, ships. The Navy took quick action against five and news service reporters attended the Able sailors accused of trying to scuttle Sakawa test at Bikini, with 75 attending Baker, while while en route to the Marshalls, and at Bikini, 10 foreign reporters attended Able and eight the ships were carefully tended with support attended Baker. Able's detonation was even vessels alongside since "there was some danger broadcast "live" around the world. Hundreds that the captured Japanese ships ...might actually of articles and features dominated the nation's sink .. .if they were left unattended ...."26 The newspapers, newsmagazines, and newsreels, impact of the two ships' loss would be less, if while two books were published highlighting not non-existent, if allowed to simply founder the non-classified story and images of the --it was essential that they be "killed." Nagato, "bombs at Bikini." As seen earlier, this not badly damaged during Baker, was only then left only paid off for the Navy but also provided to slowly die, with no attempt made to save the U.S. with a world stage for its the ship over a four-and-a-half day period demonstration of the bomb's effects. Bikini as while the equally radioactive Hughes and Fallon a world stage for the United States is also were beached. There was no moving eulogy reflected by the invitation to foreign observers. for the once mighty warship, simply a notation Each country having membership in the United that the "Jap" BB had disappeared during the Nations Atomic Energy Commission was night after listing and settling in the water allowed to send two representatives to Bikini; throughout the day. Nagata's fate in particular ten nations accepted, sending 21 observers. reinforced the concept of America's superiority Particular attention was paid in the press to through atomic power. the Soviet observers, as was doubtless the case

150 by the Crossroads staff. While the reason for seemed, so that, in the opinion of some foreign the invitation to the observers was the stated observers intent of allaying foreign "suspicion and disapproval of the planned experimental use of even official American publications the world's most terrible war weapon" because dealing with the history of the "the atomic bomb is an international concern," production of the atomic bomb, the another, underlying motivating factor was the British considered, minimized the demonstration of power the tests represented. 28 contributions of British, French, and The "target" of this demonstration was the Canadian scientists. It seems typical of Soviet Union, then the U.S.'s primary opponent this attitude that in the official American for global domination. film of the Bikini test the voice of the British scientist on the The tremendous investment the United States loud-speaker system, counting the had in Operation Crossroads is also reflected seconds that elapsed before the by the American attitude that the tests were explosion, was cut out and replaced by indicative of a national achievement of a voice with an American accent.30 tremendous significance and reflective of a uniquely democratic society. As Vannevar The McMahon Act of 1946 excluded foreign Bush noted three years after Crossroads, the participation in further U.S. A-Bomb work. U.S. at that time, while expecting that a However, Crossroads required the use of many potential enemy could in time develop the of the British and Canadian scientists from Los bomb, felt that the time when "two prospective Alamos who had worked to develop the bomb. belligerents [would be] frowning at each other At Bikini, more or less "under the table," their over two great piles of atomic bombs" was far vital participation had to be discounted. off. Reflecting on an unnamed but nonetheless Hence the "voice over" Titterton's count down explicit enemy, Bush stated: was actually a product of this new law.

The time estimate depends, of course, The production of the bomb had been on how fully we think our adversaries accomplished with cooperation and mutual may put their backs into the effort, how sharing between the United States, Britain, much they are willing, or able, to , and to some extent other European reduce their standard of living in order countries, during the Manhattan Project. Now, to accomplish it. They lack men of with Operation Crossroads, the stakes of the special skills, plants adapted to making game were different, and the tests underscored special products, and possibly the fact that the United States, which alone materials ....they lack the resourcefulness had the bomb and the facilities to make it, was of fr ee men, and regimentation is ill­ the absolute power, even to the point of adapted to unconventional efforts. On emphasizing in as many ways as possible that the other hand, their tight dictatorship nuclear weapons and tests of them were can order effort, no matter how much American. American pride in the bomb, and it hurts.29 the tests, was also indicated by the preparation of special certificates for Crossroads Thus the atomic bomb was perceived more as participants, similar to those issued for a product of American democracy than as a graduations, promotions, awards, and rites of product of American intellect, particularly given initiation and passage, such as those given to the large contribution of European scientists to people who "crossed the line" at the equator the birth of the concept and the production of for the first time. results. Colleagues of these great minds who had remained in occupied Europe had failed to Finally, the emphasis of the tests as a key succeed where their relocated, newly American demonstration of U.S. power and global compatriots had triumphed. American pride leadership was even evinced from those critical eventually conspired to recast history it of Operation Crossroads. Senator Scott Lucas

• 151 of Illinois, one of a handful of Congressional Try to imagme yourself for n moment a opponents of Crossroads, pointedly asked, "If continental European, wondering, we are mukmg plans to outlaw the use of the brooding, asking yourself ,, hundred atomic bomb for military purpo�cs, why should times a day, will America lead us? we be muking plans to display ntomsc power as Then imagine yourself being shown this an instrument of destruction?"31 llarsher words picture. If l had the authority of a were spoken by the Rev. A. Powell Davies of priest of the Middle A!!,CS, I would call Washington, D.C., a Unitarian pastor, who down the wrath of God upon such an "thundered" from his pulpit thal the widely­ obscenity. I would damn to hcll...thcsc reprinted picture of Admiruls Blandy and traitors to humanity who could Lowry, culling u mushroom-cloud-shaped cake participate in such a monstrous betrayal with Mrs. Blandy to celebrate the successful of everything for which the dissolution of Joint Task rorce One was brokenhearted of the world are "ullerly lo.uhsome": waiting.32

Admiral all(/ Mrs. W. H. P. Bltmdy and Rear Admiral F. J. Iowry celebrate the tnd of Operation Crossroads and the dtssolution of Joint task Force One at Washington, D.C., in Novmrhcr 1946. 1J1e angel food cake drew cnlicism (Ptctorial lfistones)

LEARNING TO LIVE WITH THE BOMB attacks. Yet the classified, more sophisticated analysis of Able and Baker, never released to Operation Crossroads also was intended to the public, showed far worse results. Assessing demonstrate U.S. power and the ability to "combat readiness," the Bureau of Ships group come to terms with the bomb for the citizens found many of the "surviving" vessels would be of the United States. The basic domestic virtually dead in the water, their boilers, radar, message of Operation Crossroads was planning radio, and equipment out of commission, and for and supporting national defense. The fear, their crews dead or dying from radiation. immediately voiced by many Americans, that the bomb would in time be used against the The fears of atomic scientists that the bomb's United States, most probably in an deservedly terrible image would be lessened unannounced, "sneak attack," required an was also widely reported. William L. answer from the military and political leaders Laurence, the "dean of atomic reporters" who of America. Crossroads was the first vehicle had covered the Manhattan Project, Trinity, for that answer. Admiral Blandy, speaking on and the atomic bombing of Japan before going the larger issue of why Crossroads would on to report Operation Crossroads, was highly proceed, stated that "the tests stand out clearly sympathetic to the government's view of the as a defensive measure," stressing the operation new atomic age since he was the only media would determine the how and why of naval representative privileged with an inside view of survival in the atomic age. "By no stretch of the top-secret Manhattan Project prior to the imagination can such steps of caution and Hiroshima. A confidante of many of the economy be taken as a threat of aggression. "fathers" of the bomb and responsible for If, because of such a false assumption, we molding many of the initial public statements failed to carry out these experiments, to learn about the atomic bomb, Laurence viewed it as the lessons which they can teach us," said the beginning of a new age of hope, perhaps Blandy, military planners and weapons more so than fear. Critical of what he termed designers "would be groping their way along a an "unreasoning fear" of radiation, Laurence .e dark road which might well lead to another also either overtly participated in knocking and worse Pearl Harbor."33 The fear of a down the straw man or firmly believed Navy worse Pearl Harbor was, however, not assertions, noting in a famous dispatch that alleviated by Crossroads, but magnified. Before Bikini the world stood in awe of In the aftermath of Able and Baker, the this new cosmic force .... Since Bikini this government was placed in the difficult position feeling of awe has largely evaporated of stressing the potent power of its new and has been supplanted by a sense of weapon to strengthen its global leadership role relief unrelated to the grim reality of the while at the same time attempting to soothe situation. Having lived with the popular fears. Thus public statements from nightmare for nearly a year, the average Joint Task Force One emphasized the terrible citizen is now only too glad to grasp at effect of the bombs while knocking down the the flimsiest means that would enable straw man of imagined wide-scale death and him to regain his peace of mind. He destruction as a result of the tests. Admiral had expected one bomb to sink the Blandy on numerous occasions repeated the entire Bikini fleet.... He had even been fact that some "wags" had stated after Able told that everyone participating in the that Bikini should be renamed "Nothing Atoll," test would die. When none of these or "No Atoll Atoll." An attitude of business as things happened, he is only too eager to usual was stressed at Bikini, too. On at least conclude that the atomic bomb is, after one target vessel, USS Pensacola, the ship's all, just another weapon.34 painted battle record was augmented with a mushroom cloud and the word "Able," in a The emphasis to alleviate fear did produce place on the record previously reserved for some results. A few foreign observers narrow escapes with death, such as kamikaze ridiculed the bomb; Soviet press accounts

• 153

progeny can reap. The power of these "small" things, the ship would have to have sunk bombs to sink and maim a ship are during those times and in those roles. represented in the mangled, "stomped flat" Changed and modified for Crossroads, the Gilliam, the twisted, half-smashed Arkansas, the earner was reflective of a new reality and a split bottom, toppled stack, and dented flight new role. deck of Saratoga, and the abandoned, irradiated, capsized hulk of Prinz Eugen. Oceanographer Willard Bascom, working at Bikini during the various nuclear tests of the The significance of the bomb and what it had early 1950s, wrote in his memoirs of how he done was not lost on contemporary observers and others sought to dive Saratoga, "famous for and participants, and is materially represented its exploits in World War II." This telling by the taking of souvenirs from the ships after comment demonstrates the human each test. Thus painted signs that command preoccupation with the "great," or as Bascom visitors to take "No Souvenirs" occasionally termed the carrier, the "wonderful." The need appear in the photographs of scorched and to dive the ship was to see Saratoga, not to mangled ships. Reflective of the pilfering of assess what the bomb had done, and in this the radioactive Trinitite, the collection of Bascom was and is no different from anyone souvenirs from Bikini was done without else who has ever dived at Bikini, including the apparent concern over the possible risk. David National Park Service team, as well as those Bradley reports that one man "collected a who have focused submerged archeological chunk of metal from the ship considered to efforts on famous ships like Monitor or Titanic. have been nearest to the blast" after Able. We too at times succumb to the historical aura "He had it stowed away in a locker beside the of a famous ship. The need to confront and bed. Then one day somebody was checking a touch the ship was powerful for Bascom and geiger counter in the vicinity and began to pick his colleagues; "Most important, we walked, or up a strong emission. At once he tracked at least touched down, on the flight deck, down and located the loot and showed its stirring up wisps of dust." The images that the anxious owner that he'd been sleeping in a ship evoked were not of Crossroads or of the shower of gamma rays."45 Reports of looting bomb. Rather, artifacts from the ships, notably running lights from Saratoga in recent years reflect the Back aboard our LCM the four divers compulsion for souvenirs from this atomic were unusually pensive, our minds still graveyard, as does the removal of shells and communicating with the spirits of the wave-washed dead coral by visitors to the Saratoga's long-gone pilots and crew. Bikini field station, including the archeological Having visited their old haunts, our assessment team and the media representatives minds reconstructed the ship as it had there at the same time. been in its glory days. We could see the uniformed figures on the rail of the Yet the implications and reality of the bombs bridge and A-Ss on the deck, as the at Bikini is too much for some people. While ghost ship streamed through the fourth some confront their fears, others deny them. dimension, running into the wind like the This is found in the need by some to focus on Flying Dutchman to launch phantom the non-nuclear history of the ships, a aircraft. 46 phenomena that began before and during the tests as war records and the symbolic value of The need to deny the bomb's impact on the "great" and famous ships were touted. Saratoga ships, and by extension into our lives, is also is perhaps most reflective of this, for it was the reflected by the reaction of some of USS most eulogized of Crossroads' victims. It can Arkansas' crew. The 26,100-ton battleship, be argued that Saratoga at Bikini was to a popularly but incorrectly thought to have been great extent not the same ship commissioned in lifted up, end on end, in the Baker blast 1927, nor the ship that had fought pitched column, was nonetheless battered, smashed half battles at sea during the war. To be those flat, and capsized to lie bottom-up in 180 feet

159

NOTES 13 Hanson W. Baldwin, dispatch of 22:02 to Th e New York Tim es, July 25, 1946, on board USS Appalachian. Press 1 dispatches, July 25, 1946, from nos. 2543 to 2644, "The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military National Archives Record Group 374, Records of the Weapon: The Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Atomic Support Agency, National Archives. Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads," (June 30, 1947), CCS 471.6, 10-15-46, Section 9, Part 1, p. 60. 14 National Archives Record Group 218. Baldwin, "Atom Bomb is Proved Most Terrible Weapon," Th e New York Ti mes, July 7, 1946. 2 Boyer, By th e Bomb's Early Ligh t, p. 4. 15 Hanson W. Baldwin, "Lessons Learned in Bikini Tests," 3 Th e New York Ti mes, August 1, 1946. "Atomic Bomb National Monument, Proposed," S.2054, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., March 5, 1946. 16 "Guided Missile Warships on Way for Redesigned 4 Atomic-Age Navy," Th e New York Ti mes, September 8, "First A-Bomb Blast Site to be National Monument," 1946. Washington Daily News, April 3, 1952. The National Park Service's Chief of its Museum Division urged 17 collection of Trinity Site artifacts and "material evidence Jane's Figh ting Ships, 1958- 1959, (1958), p. 366. USS of the bomb explosion" on March 15, 1946. On Norfolk was the first of the Destroyer Leaders, later October 7, 1947, the Service's Chief Historian urged the reclassified as . The ship featured rounded gun same after a tour of the site, including saving the mounts and steel decks for passive defense against rapidly dispersing "atomsite" in the blast crater. The fallout. "Far too expensive to duplicate," Norfolk "spent Director of the NPS wrote to the Atomic Energy most her career as an experimental prototype." See Commission on January 7, 1952, requesting the 100-lbs. Destroyers, pp. 258-259. Friedman, interestingly, does of Trinitite. This correspondence is on file in the not mention Bikini-induced changes to warships in his Trinity Site National Historic Landmark (NHL) file, book Th e Postwar Naval Revolution (Annapolis: Naval Division of History, National Park Service, Washington, Institute Press, 1986), citing only tactical and strategic D.C. changes as the result of the development of the atomic bomb--for exa mple the dispersion at sea of carrier task 5 groups (see p. 51). "Enola Gay Resurrected: Craftsmen Restore First Atom ," Washington Ti mes, April 28, 1989, p. B6. 18 Also see the Natidnal Historic Landmark Bock's Car Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, p. 246. Also see (NHL) file, Division of History, National Park Service, Graybar, "Bikini Revisited," p. 121. Washington, D.C. 19 6 Baldwin, "Lessons Learned in Bikini Tests," Th e New Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima and After York Ti mes, August 1, 1946. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 342-343. 20 7 Interview with Roger Meade, LANL, Los Alamos, New Boyer, p. 14. By th e Bomb's Ea rly Ligh t, Mexico, December 19, 1990.

8 21 Lloyd J. Graybar, "Bikini Revisited," Military Affairs Address by Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, U.S.N., (October 1980), p. 118. Ironically, the wreck of Commander Joint Task Force One, on New York recently located by sport divers, is now Ostfriesland, Herald-Tribune Youth Forum, over Columbia also the subject of investigation. Broadcasting System, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, , April 13, 1946: "Why Test the Atom Bomb?" 9 Joint Army-Navy Task Force One, Crossroads Release Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and th e U.S. No. 36, Department of Energy Archives, , Navy, 1943 1946. (Chapel Hill: The University of North document #101008. Hereafter cited as Blandy, "Why Carolina Press, 1966), p. 243. Test the Atom Bomb?"

10 22 Ibid. , p. 246. As cited in Boyer, By th e Bomb's Early Ligh t, p. 83.

11 23 Ibid. Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of in Preserving 12 Democra cy (New York: Simon and Schuster), p. 92. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Atom Bomb is Proved Most Terrible Weapon: Surveys in Japan and Bikini Test Are 24 Enough to Change Concepts of War," Th e New York All of this had to be rectified with postwar budget cuts, Ti mes, July 7, 1946. swords-to-plowshares ideology, and a thrifty American taxpayer. See the discussion of this concept at the end of the chapter.

161 25 36 "Statement of Vice Admiral Blandy, U.S.N., Commander , "The of Catastrophe," Joint Army-Navy Task Force Number One on Purposes Saturday Review of Literature, August 10, 1946, p. 10, of Atomic Bomb Tests," Joint Army-Navy Task Force as cited in Boyer, By th e Bomb's Early Ligh t, p. 293. Number One, Crossroads Release No. 37, Department of Energy Archives, Las Vegas, Document No. 101007. 37 Boyer, By th e Bomb's Early Ligh t, p. 84. 26 "Cruiser Sabotage Alleged," Th e New York Ti mes, May 38 8, 1946, and Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 52. Ibid.

27 39 Ibid. , pp. 36-38, passim. "The Underwater Test," Th e New York Ti mes, July 26, 1946. 28 "Bikini Observers," Th e New York Ti mes, May 9, 1946. 40 Bradley, No Place To Hide, p. 166. 29 Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men, pp. 93-94. 41 Boyer, By th e Bomb's Early Ligh t, p. 90. 30 , Brigh ter Th an a Th ousand Suns: A 42 Personal History of th e Atomic Scientists (New York: Drew Pearson, "Bikini Losses Naval Disaster," Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), p. 251. Wa shington Post, February 18, 1949.

31 43 Graybar, "Bikini Revisited," p. 120. P. M. S. , Fear, War, and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (New 32 York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1949), p. 71. "Atomic Age Angel Food," Ti me Magazine, November 18, 1946, p. 31. 44 Bradley, No Place to Hide, pp. 66-69, passim. 33 Blandy, "Why Test the Atom Bomb?" 45 Ibid., p. 70. 34 William L. Laurence, "Bikini 'Dud' Decried for Lifting 46 Fears," Th e New York Ti mes, August 4, 1946. Willard Bascom, Th e Crest of the Wa ve: Adventures in Laurence's seminal and sympathetic role in introducing (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), p. the bomb is discussed in Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear 169. Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge: Press, 1988), pp. 98-102, passim. 47 Roy L. Alton, President, USS Arkansas (BB-33) 35 Association, to James P. Delgado, June 4, 1990. Letter Weart, Nu clear Fear, p. 109. in the author's files.

• 162 CHAPTER SIX: NUCLEAR PARK POTENTIAL

Daniel J. Lenihan

Making the sunken fleet at Bikini into a marine Tobermory, Ontario (now a federal park), was park carries with it two inherent concepts that one of the first to focus specifically on ship are common to all park lands. One is to remains as a diving attraction. Others in the preserve something of value for future Great Lakes include Isle Royale National Park, generations and the other is to create a natural area (a unit of the U.S. National "pleasuring grounds" for the present. Park System) in which sites were inadvertently included when the offshore The values worth preserving in Bikini are tied boundaries were established. These sites have to history and archeology and the natural became the focus of much attention from diversity of life forms on the ships which now divers, and a sophisticated program of comprise artificial reefs in the lagoon. The custodianship for the shipwrecks as resources ships' more immediate role as pleasuring was put into effect by park managers. Other grounds for recreation are due to their shipwrecks have become important to the local dramatic appeal as diving attractions for use by economy of certain Great Lakes communities. a large and growing international population of The State of Michigan in particular has been scuba divers. Additionally, they have very active in establishing state bottomlands educational value as the focus for an preserves to ensure that a degree of protection interpretive program aimed at the full spectrum and control be accorded shipwrecks. of potential park visitors--divers and nondivers. There are two reasons that Great Lakes parks The socioeconomic implications of a marine have focused on shipwrecks in advance of most park of this magnitude are considerable. The marine areas. First, the cold fresh water fact that a displaced society might use the preserves both metal and wooden vessel fabric atomic pollution of its environment virtually as much better than does salt water. Second, the focus for its reestablishment and there are no dramatic natural resources to revitalization is also significant as a model compete for diver's attention as is the case in beyond the immediate case of Bikini. coastal marine parks. The State of Vermont with similar resources in Lake Champlain has likewise developed an underwater preserve PRECEDENT system oriented to shipwrecks.

There is precedent in Micronesia for World War II period shipwrecks serving as stimuli for PARK APPEAL economic growth. Truk Lagoon is by far the most dramatic example, although significant Unique things have special appeal as park visitation also occurs for purposes of wreck attractions. The sunken ships at Bikini are diving at Guam and Palau. In the latter cases, unique in several ways besides being the only however, the shipwrecks in and ships sunk by nuclear weapons. They include the lagoon at Palau are secondary to the the only aircraft carrier in divable waters. Just excellent diving which is the primary the size of Saratoga makes it an awesome site attraction for sport divers. to behold. It is virtually intact with planes and armament easily accessible at depths within the Other parts of the world have capitalized on community standard for . shipwrecks for diving/recreation attractions, including the Great Lakes region of North Additionally, the selection of vessels which lay America. Fathom Five Provincial Park in on the lagoon floor have unusual historical

163 Undenvater vtsitation by nondivers is one of tile greatest arcus of potentUll growtll in marine parks. Forty passenger submarines ha\'C been found commercially �·iablt in Stl'ero/ parts of tile world, tllis particular OM is 11 Guam. (NPS, Joe Stl}·kowski)

significance. It is rare to have several warships about living with the nuclear age, as opposed within range of divers, let alone ships as to dying with it. An interpretive center or historically significant as Saratoga and Nagato. museum which included artifacts from the ships The U.S. battleship Arkansas, two submarines, and others brought from abroad could the badly damaged remains of two U.S. capitalize on that theme. If the physical destroyers, Anderson (recipient of 10 battle remnants of the blockhouses and experimental stars) and Lamson, two transports, and a agricultural stations are preserved, they could floating drydock, a yard oiler, and several be a focus of interpretation efforts by Bikinian landing craft round out an unparalleled Park Rangers or commercial tour guides. underwater museum of WW II relics. It would be important also to maintain the Most of these sites are at depths that are at written legacy of what happened at Bikini in the outer limits for safe sport diving. They are the form of an archive located on the island. not, however, undivable and are certainly within This should become part of the patrimony of ranges that the advanced diving community of the Bikinian people rather than being accessible ardent wreck divers would find extremely only in far-flung libraries around the globe, attractive. Although Saratoga sits on the including material that has become declassified lagoon bottom at 180 feet, it is important to at Los Alamos and other centers. note that the flight deck is at only 100 feet and many fascinating dives can be made to its island, reached at depths as shallow as 70 feet. PARK PROTECTION Pilotfish and Apogon, Batao-class submarines, may be the focus of a thrilling overflight dive One of the most critical aspects of park which does not exceed 150 feet. In many management is protection of the resources other locations each would be considered a which form the basis of the park. For our main attraction in its own right. The beached purposes, these can be divided into the natural, LCT-1175 would make a good or cultural, and scenic values associated with the shallow-water dive for novices. shipwrecks of Bikini. These include systemic factors such as the ecological health of the Besides the unique shipwreck population, Bikini lagoon, which should be the focus of ongoing has an appealing environment which environmental monitoring. They also include has had little disturbance since the testing, the specifics of visitor use of the dive sites, making it unusually intact compared to many which is the focus of our present discussion. places in Micronesia. Even the large numbers of outside the reef may be a draw to The most effective tools for site protection are certain advanced divers and underwater the right balance of education and enforcement. photographers. Most attrition to the of Bikini can be mitigated simply by ensuring Other aspects of Bikini which make it that visitors are aware they are in a marine­ appealing as a dive site are the proximity of all protected area. Because a large percentage of the ships to each other and the fact that they the potential visiting public comes from nations are all within a 15-minute boat ride from Bikini that have been exposed to marine park island in a relatively protected lagoon. concepts, education will be an especially important part of the resource protection If there were a facility on process. Sport divers visiting Bikini should the island, it is hard to imagine a more know that they are in a park, that there exist logistically feasible diving resort. There is not clear enforceable regulations, and that they are a great deal at this point to hold the attention expected to live by them. of the nondiving public, but that might be remedied by orienting the interpretive efforts The other necessary part of the equation is on the whole island to a nuclear theme. Many enforcement of these regulations when any studies have been conducted on Bikini flagrant violations occur. It is important that regarding radioactivity, and there are few other an enforcement officer is available to the places in which as much has been learned

165

detonation would be considered an fuel loads, we do not know how much was lost unacceptable risk, but that prospect appears is the wreck event. One must therefore assume very unlikely. The EOD experts did safe one the worst case until proven wrong. bomb which they felt presented an unreasonable hazard. EOD operations at This leaves the option of recovering the ships, Bikini are discussed further in a 1990 internal recovering the oil, stabilizing the oil so it U.S. Navy report by Lt. David Rattay. cannot come to the surface, or no action. Probably the worst option would be the The question of radiation on the ships is going attempt to salvage the ships. Besides being to be a major concern in the mind of any enormously expensive, the attempt would almost rational sport diver who first considers the certainly cause a massive release of any fuel possibility of diving Bikini. This is an area in present because of the deteriorated condition which myth can be as powerful an inducement of the vessels. It would also result in to behavior as reality, since most societies are destruction of a major historical (and far from having come to any sense of economic) resouce for the Bikinians. resolution over this issue. Suffice it to say that Recovering the oil through "hot-tapping" may it was not the least area of concern for the be possible but carries some risk of incurring NPS team when it conducted its own risk a major spill and would be moderately assessment before going to Bikini. expensive at the least.

Again, from the perspective of nonexperts who are called upon to interpret the findings of MOORING SYSTEMS specialists, it is our opinion that external radiation is not a significant hazard on the One important element in any diving park is a ships at Bikini. The NPS team carefully mooring system for dive boats. This enables scrutinized tests conducted by Holmes and the managing agency to increase safety by Narver, read the assessment by Lawrence controlling points of access to the wreck sites Livermore Labs, and personally took beta and and natural attractions while diminishing gamma detection instruments on several dives impacts from anchor dragging. through the ships and to the sediments in the bottom of the lagoon. There were never any A good moor is essential to a safe dive in signs of radiation danger past what one might deep water. It also establishes a physical expect fr om living day-to-day in most parts of presence on the site by the managing authority the continental United States. (A very concise and helps orient the visitor by ensuring that he and authoritative document by W. L. Robison or she begin their dive at a known point. The comprises Appendix III of this report; it is buoy attachment also provides a reliable line to recommended to any reader interested in follow back to the dive platform and may serve further information on this subject.) as a stable reference point for decompressing divers.

ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS POSED BY Regulations as to how many boats may attach SHIPS to one mooring cable, how they are "rafted off' to each other, etc., also allows the Bikinians to The threat of pollution from a massive release indirectly establish preferred carrying capacity of fuel oil is an area of concern expressed by of the sites. the Bikini Council, particularly in the event of structural collapse of the ship's bunkers. The problem should probably be seen as follows: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS We can assume in the worst case that there are significant quantities of oil present in some To responsibly assess park values at Bikini, we of the ships--indeed some is visibly seeping have had to scrutinize carefully the negative slowly from Saratoga and other vessels in the aspects, including any hazards to users. It is lagoon. The question of how much is more clear that Bikini offers far greater rewards and problematic. Although we may know original somewhat greater risks to the diving public

170

experience is not memorialized from 10. Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams only an American perspective. Living should be requested to continue history programs should be considered. examining the sites for any ordnance that presents exceptional hazards to 8. Contact commercial tourist submarine visiting divers. specialists and discuss what would be involved in establishing a submarine 11. Contact experts in industry and concession at Bikini. Consult with U.S. government who have knowledge of National Park Service concessionaire products' potential for specialists for advice on setting up pollution after longterm immersion in contracts for such services. order to explore possible means of stabilization or control. 9. Consider a 3D video viewing center for nondivers. Request assistance from 12. Develop dialogue between Bikinians and National Geographic Society and others parks and recreation programs affiliated in the technical aspects of obtaining with universities. footage and setting up a viewing center.

172 APPENDIX 1: TARGET VESSELS AT BIKINI AND THEIR DISPOSITION

Carriers

In dependence (CVL-22) Sunk as target off San Francisco, California, January 27, 1951. Saratoga (CV-3) Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 25, 1946.

Total: 2

Battleships

Arkansas (BB-33) Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 25, 1946. Nagato (Japanese) Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 29, 1946. Nevada (BB-36) Sunk as target off Pearl Harbor, July 31, 1948. New York (BB-34) Sunk as target off Pearl Harbor, July 8, 1948. Pennsylvania (BB-38) Scuttled off Kwaj alein, February 10, 1948.

Total: 5

Cruisers

Pensacola (CA-23) Scuttled off the Washington Coast, November 10, 1948. Prinz Eugen (IX-300) Stranded and sank at Kwaj alein, December 22, 1946. (New York Times article indicates December 16) . Sakawa (Japanese) Sunk by ABLE at Bikini, July 2, 1946. Salt Lake City (CA-25) Sunk as target off San Clemente, California, May 25, 1948.

Total: 4

Destroyers

Anderson (DD-411) Sunk by ABLE at Bikini, July 1, 1946. Conyngh am (DD-371) Scuttled off California, July 1948. Hugh es (DD-410) Sunk as target off Washington, October 16, 1948. Lamson (DD-367) Sunk by ABLE at Bikini, July 1, 1946. Mayrant (DD-402) Sunk off Kwaj alein, April 4, 1948. Mustin (DD-413) Sunk off Kwaj alein, March 18, 1948. (New Yo rk Times article indicates April 17). Ralph Talbot (DD-390) Scuttled off Kwaj alein, March 1948. (New Yo rk Times article indicates March 8). Rhind (DD-404) Scuttled off Kwajalein, March 22, 1948. (New York Tim es article indicates March 23). Stack (DD-406) Sunk as target off Kwaj alein, April 24, 1948. Tripp e (DD-403) Sunk as target off Kwaj alein, February 3, 1948. Wa inwright (DD-419) Sunk as target off Kwaj alein, July 5, 1948. Wilson (DD-408) Scuttled off Kwaj alein, March 8, 1948.

Total: 12

173 Submarines

�pogon (SS-308) Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 25, 1946. Dentuda (SS-335) Sent to West Coast, sold for scrap, January 20, 1969. Parche (SS-384) Sent to West Coast, sold for scrap, July 1970. Pilotfish (SS-386) Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 25, 1946. Searaven (SS-196) Sunk as target off California, September 11, 1948. Skate (SS-305) Scuttled off California, October 5, 1948. Skipjack (SS-184) Sunk as target off California, August 11, 1948. Tuna (SS-203) Scuttled off California, September 24, 1948.

Total: 8

Attack Transports

Banner (APA-60) Scuttled off Kwajalein, February 16,. 1948 Ba"ow (APA-61) Scuttled off Kwajalein, May 11,1948. Bladen (APA-63) Sent to East Coast, transferred to U.S. Maritime Commission, August 3, 1953. Bracken (AP A-64) Scuttled off Kwajalein, March 10, 1948. Briscoe (APA-65) Scuttled off Marshall Islands, May 6, 1948. Brule (APA-66) Scuttled off Kwajalein, May 11, 1948. Butte (APA-68) Scuttled off Kwajalein, May 12, 1948. Carlisle (APA-69) Sunk by ABLE at Bikini, July 1, 1946. Carteret (APA-70) Sunk by gunfire in the Pacific, March 19, 1948. Catron (APA-71) Sunk by gunfire in the Pacific, May 6, 1948. Cortland (APA-75) Sent to East Coast, transferred to U.S. Maritime Commission, March 31, 1948. Crittenden (APA-77) Scuttled off California, October 5, 1948. Dawson (APA-79) Scuttled off Kwajalein, March 19, 1948. Fallon (APA-81) Scuttled off Kwajalein, March 10, 1948. Fillmore (APA-83) Sent to East Coast, transferred to U.S. Maritime Commission, April 1, 1948. Gasconade (APA-85) Sunk by torpedoes off California, July 21, 1948. Geneva (APA-86) Sent to East Coast, sold for scrap, November 2, 1966. Gilliam (APA-57) Sunk by ABLE at Bikini, July 1, 1946. Niagara (APA-87) Sent to East Coast, sold for scrap, February 5, 1950.

Total: 19

LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank)

LST-52 Sunk in Pacific, April 1948. LST-125 Sunk off Bikini, August 14, 1946. LST-133 Scuttled off Kwajalein, May 11, 1948. LST-220 Scuttled off Kwajalein, May 12, 1948. LST-545 Scuttled off Kwajalein, May 12, 1948. LST-661 Scuttled off Kwajalein, July 25, 1948.

Total: 6

174 LSMs (Landing Ship, Medium)

LSM-60 Completely destroyed by BAKER at Bikini, July 25, 1946.

Total: 1

LCTs (Landing Craft, Tank)

LCT-412 Scuttled off Kwajalein, September 1947. LCT-414 Scuttled by BAKER at Bikini, July 1946. LCT-705 Scuttled off Kwajalein, September 1947. LCT-746 Scuttled off Kwajalein, March 1947. LCT-812 Scuttled by BAKER at Bikini, July 1946. LCT-816 Scuttled off Kwajalein, June 1947. LCT-818 Scuttled off Kwajalein, September 1947. LCT-874 Scuttled off Kwajalein, September 1947. LCT-1013 Scuttled off Kwajalein, September 1947. LCT-1078 Scuttled off Kwajalein, September 1947. LCT-1112 Scuttled off Kwajalein, September 1947. LCT-1113 Scuttled off Kwajalein, June 1947. LCT-1114 Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 30, 1946. LCT-1175 Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 25, 1946. LCT-1187 Scuttled by BAKER at Bikini, July 1946. LCT-1237 Scuttled by BAKER at Bikini, July 1946.

Total: 16

Auxiliaries

Y0-160 Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 25, 1946. YOG-83 Scuttled off Kwajalein, September 16, 1948. ARDC-13 Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, August 6, 1946.

Total: 3

LCis (Landing Craft, Infantry)

LCI-327 Destroyed on Bascombe (Mek) Island, Kwajalein, October 30, 1947. LCI-329 Scuttled off Kwajalein, March 16, 1948. LCI-332 Scuttled off Kwajalein, September 1947. LCI-549 Sold to private party in California, August 19, 1949. LCI-615 Sold to private party in California, August 19, 1949. LCI-620 Scuttled off Bikini Lagoon entrance, August 10, 1946.

Total: 6

LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized)

[Note these craft, like the LCVP, did not ordinarily receive hull numbers. The numbers were provided by Joint Task Force One to facilitate damage reports.]

LCM-1 Fate unknown. LCM-2 Fate unknown. LCM-3 Fate unknown. LCM-4 Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 25, 1946.

175 LCM-5 Fate unknown. LCM-6 Sold for scrap in Guam, n.d.

Total: 6

LCVPs (Landing Craft Vehicles, Personnel)

LCVP-7 Fate unknown. LCVP-8 Fate unknown. LCVP-9 Fate unknown. LCVP-10 Sunk by BAKER at Bikini, July 25, 1946. LCVP-11 Fate unknown. LCVP-12 Fate unknown.

Total: 6

Sources: A. G. Nelson, Capt. USN, "Crossroads Target Ships," Memorandum, NNTPR #24-78, May 25, 1978, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; NAVSEA Shipbuilding Support Office, "U.S. Vessels Involved in Operation Crossroads," NAVSEASHPSO, Philadelphia, n.d.; Commander, Joint Task Force One, "Report on Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker (Operation Crossroads) Conducted at Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands, on 1 July 1946 and 25 July 1946," (1946) Vol. 1, Part VII, pp. 6-15; and James L. Mooney, ed. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, 8 volumes. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959-1981). Jonathan Weisgall provided articles which indicate different sinking dates for several of the vessels.

176 APPENDIX II: RELICS OF OPERATION CROSSROADS

The target ships of Operation Crossroads, even those that survived sinking at Bikini and those that also outlasted subsequent sinking, are now scrapped. The same holds true in large measure for the support fleet of ships. Nonetheless, four Crossroads veterans remain in active naval service as of 1990, and another one is preserved as a . In 1990, surviving vessels of Operation Crossroads are:

USS Conserver (ARS-39). Attached to the repair and service group for Operation Crossroads, the Bolster-class salvage vessel Conserver is assigned to the Pacific Fleet and based at Pearl Harbor.

USS Fulton (AS-11). Also assigned to the repair and service group for Operation Crossroads, the Fulton is now attached to the Atlantic Fleet and based at Norfolk, Virginia.

USS Laffey (DD-724). Attached to the support fleet for Crossroads, Laffey patrolled the seas outside the atoll. Preserved and open as a museum display vessel at Patriot's Point, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, Laffey is one of five historic vessels there, including USS Yorktown (CV-10).

USS Preserver (ARS-8). Attached to the repair and service group, this salvage ship is now assigned to the Naval Reserve Training Facility at Little Creek outside Norfolk, Virginia.

USS Reclaimer (ARS-42). Attached to the repair and service group as its first assignment, this then-new Diver-class salvage ship later returned to Bikini in 1954 for the Castle-Bravo test. This vessel remains in active service at Pearl Harbor.

Additionally, preserved portions of one target and one support ship survive as historic exhibits. The bridge of the target submarine Parche (SS-384), one of the nine vessels to survive the spate of post-Crossroads , served as a Naval Reserve training boat at Mare Island, California, until November 1969. Sold for scrap in July 1970, portions of the submarine were saved and retained by the Navy. The bridge is on display at the Subase, Pearl Harbor, while the conning tower once inside the sail and bridge is displayed outdoors at the USS Bowfin Submarine Museum and Park at Pearl Harbor. The above-the-waterline portion of the bow of USS Fall River (CA-131), the target ship group flagship for Crossroads, was saved after the cruiser was stricken and scrapped in 1971. It is now on display at Battleship Cove, Fall River, Massachusetts, where the battleship Massachusetts, the destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. , and the submarine Lionfish are preserved.

At least one Crossroads aircraft survives as a museum exhibit. An F6F Hellcat used as a drone to sample the air after each burst is now at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. The ARADO 196 spotting plane from Prinz Eugen that did not accompany the cruiser to Bikini is also owned by U.S. Navy, and is in storage.

Some of the items of "historical interest" removed from the Crossroads target ships are displayed at various memorials, sites, and museums. The ship's bell of USS

177 Arkansas is the centerpiece of the Arkansas War Memorial in Little Rock, while the Governor's office retains the ship's service for use on ceremonial occasions. Saratoga's bell is displayed at the Naval Aviation Museum at Pensacola, . The bell of USS Anderson is displayed at the Anderson, South Carolina, post of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). Lamson's bell is displayed at the 9th Naval District Headquarters in Des Moines, Iowa. The U.S. Navy retains Prinz Eugen's bell, now in storage, as well as Lamson's commissioning plaque in Washington, D.C. Ordnance items stripped from Prinz Eugen prior to Crossroads are now in the Navy's museum collections, and include a 20mm and 37mm antiaircraft gun. flown from the ships at Bikini, including a Japanese Naval from Nagato are in the Navy's collections.

Other artifacts from the target ships rest throughout the country in various museums and in private hands, and many are proudly displayed by the veterans of these vessels at their reunions--the last remnants in hand of the sunken fleet of Operation Crossroads.

178 APPENDIX Ill: Estimates of the Radiological Dose to People Living on Bikini Island for Two Weeks while Diving In and Around the Sunken Ships in Bikini Lagoon

W. L. Robison

Introduction

Bikini Island and Bikini Lagoon were swimming in and around the ships raises the contaminated by fallout from nuclear weapons question of the potential radiological dose from tests conducted at the atoll by the United States the radionuclides present in or on the ships and from 1946 to 1958. The second test, Baker, of the in the lagoon sediments. Crossroads series was an underwater detonation In addition, radionuclides were deposited in 1946 that sank several ships in the lagoon, on the islands. We have spent several years including the USS Saratoga and the Japanese evaluating the radiological conditions on Bikini battleship Nagata. and Eneu Islands at Bikini Atoll and Enjebi The ships received high-intensity gamma­ Island at , and estimating the ray and bombardment from the Baker radiological dose people might receive living on test, which induced radioactivity in the metal these islands (1-8). As a result, we have the structures. Some of the tests conducted after the data to also evaluate the radiological dose Baker shot (there were 21 tests in all) injected people would receive if they were to live on contaminated carbonate particles into the air, Bikini Island for a two-week period while some of which were deposited across the lagoon diving near the sunken ships in the lagoon. surface. Most of this contaminated soil then The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to settled onto the ships' decksand other structures present an analysis of the potential radiological and on the lagoonbottom. dose to persons who would dive near the sunken These sunken ships provide an interesting ships and live on Bikini Island for a short location for divers. and period of time.

The Radiological Dose while in the Lagoon and around the Ships

Radionuclides in the Sediment would be lower.) The radionuclides currently present in the lagoon sediments and on the 7 = Many of the radionuclides produced at islands are Cesium-137 ( 1 3 cs ;T112 30years), 0 = detonation and induced in the ships' structure Strontium-90 (9 sr ;T112 28 years), Cobalt-60 6° = 23 (by the resulting neutron flux) have very short < Co ;T112 5.3 years), Plutonium209 ( 9p u ;T 1 = 24065 years), Plutonium-240 (240 Pu ;T11 half-lives, (Ttf2), ranging from seconds to a few 1 2 2 = 2 1 weeks. Consequently, most of the radioactivity 6537 years), and -240 ( 4 Am ;T112 decayed away very early. Those radionuclides = 432 years). We rarely can detect other with half-lives in the range of several years or radionuclides in island soil; however, in lagoon more are the only ones still present and that sediments, we often detect one of the 2 7 have the potential of causing exposure. nuclides or 0 Bi. Moreover, even 60co is found The estimates of the radiological dose will be in very low concentrations because it has been calculated for 1990 which is 44 years after the through at least 6 half-lives from 1958 to 1990 Baker test and 32 years after the last test at and even more from 1946. Bikini Atoll. (Any dose received after 1990

179 Gamma-Emitting Radionuclides ( 137cs and Victor Noshkin of the Lawrence Livermore 60co) National Laboratory (LLNL) in 1979 and 1983. Additional sediment samples were The average 1 3 7 cs , 60co, and 2 07 Bi collected between Bikini Island and the sunken concentrations in the lagoon sediment around the ships in December 1983. The locations of the sunken-ship area are between 0.1 and 1.0 pCi/g samples are shown in Figure 4. The results from (for sampling locations se Figures 1 - 3). These the analysis of these samples are listed in 1 unpublished data are from an extensive survey Table 1. The concentration of 37cs is below 0.2 of the radionuclide concentrations in the pCi/ g for all samples and below 0.1 pCi/ g for sediments across Bikini lagoon conducted by Dr. most samples.

1 Table 1. Concentrations of 37cs (in for sediments collected near Bikini Island.

1 Site No. Core Depth 1 37cs Site No. Core Depth 37cs em em

1 0-25 0.03 8 0-10 0.13 25-50 0.04 10-20 <0.08 2 0-25 0.10 20-30 <0.07 25-50 0.03 30-37 <0.07 3 0-25 0.03 9 0-10 <0.07 25-50 0.03 10-20 <0.08 6 0-25 0.08 20-30 <0.06 7 0-25 0.09 30-40 <0.08 25-50 0.06 40-50 0.13 4A 0-10 <0.06 5� <0.07 10-20 <0.07 60-70 <0.09 20-30 0.16 70-75 <0.07 30--40 <0.05 10 0-10 <0.06 40-7 <0.08 10-20 <0.08 4B 0-1 0 0.16 20-30 <0.07 10-20 <0.08 30--40 <0.07 20-30 <0.08 40-50 <0.06 30-37 <0.09 5� <0.08 5 0-10 <0.07 60-70 <0.08 10-20 <0.07 70-80 <0.09 20-30 <0.08 80-90 <0.06 30-0 <0.07 90-100 <0.08 40-50 0.14 5� <0.06 60-65 <0.06

180 pCI/g 137Cs fine + coarse fraction

0.1-J

Fi gure 1. Cesi um- 137 concentrati on contours in the lagoon surface sediments at Bi kini Atoll in 1979.

181 60 pCI/g Co In total sample

� "'\_4.0 4.0 2 2.0

1.0 General area of the ships � � c: Eneu

Figure 2. Cobalt-60 concentration contours in the lagoon surface se diments at Bi ki ni Atol l in 1979.

182 pCI/g 207BI-207 1n total sample

Figure 3. Bismuth-207 Concentration contours in the lagoon surfa ce sediments at Biki n i Atol l in 1979 .

183 Figure 4. The locations of sediment areas col l ected in 1983 near Bikini and Eneu Islands at Bikini Atol l.

184 7 Samples of sediment and algae plus fine, are listed in Table 2. The 13 cs, 60co, 1 55Eu, 7 rusty metal were collected from several of the and 20 Bi concentrations are generally about a sunken ships in 1989 by a Navy dive team. The few tenths of a pCi/g; only two samples from the samples were analyzed at LLNL and the results hanger deck of the Saratoga showed h!Rher concentrations of 60co and 2 0 B i.

Table 2 results for taken fromsunken the in Bikini

Type of Location of Radionuclide Concentration, pCi/g Co-60 Cs-137 Eu-155 Bi-207 Am-241

Algae + Rust from Gilliam <0.01 <0.01 <0.19 <0.01 <3.45 Sediment Gilliam Stern 0.78 0.17 0.66 0.96 10.9 Sediment Gilliam Starboard Beam 0.09 0.17 0.38 0.25 6.7 Sediment Gilliam Starboard Inboard Beam 0.17 0.13 0.34 0.32 4.6 Sediment Gilliam Bow 0.67 0.13 0.63 0.67 13.0 Sediment Gilliam Stern Outboard 0.06 0.13 0.42 0.29 4.2 Sediment Gilliam Port Beam 0.84 0.16 0.64 0.94 11.8

Algae + Rust from Pilot Fish 0.36 0.11 0.09 0.42 0.9 Algae + Rust EOD Collection Pilot Fish 0.27 0.14 0.15 0.50 2.3 Wood from Pilot Fish 0.11 0.18 <0.05 0.17 1.1 Elec. Wire Electical Wire from Pilot Fish <0.12 <0.11 <0.28 <0.09 <0.4

Algae + Rust from Carlisle 0.49 0.08 <0.04 0.47 1.4 Sediment Carlisle 1.16 0.21 0.44 1.24 6.1

Sediment Saratoga Hanger 10.82 0.88 2.75 14.22 56.5 Sediment Saratoga Fight Deck 2.18 0.26 1.07 3.79 14.4 Algae + Rust Saratoga Hanger 0.20 0.47 <0.29 0.18 <0.4

Sediment Arkansas Port Side 0.06 0.08 0.43 0.17 8.7 Sediment Arkansas Bow 0.10 0.16 0.38 0.24 7.1 Algae + Rust Arkansas 0.38 0.14 0.17 0.49 1.7 Sediment Arkansas Starboard Midship <0.02 <0.03 0.16 0.18 3.5 Sediment Arkansas Port Bow 0.09 0.14 0.32 0.15 4.9 Sediment Arkansas Stem Outboard 0.12 0.07 0.32 0.28 5.1 Sediment Arkansas Stern Inboard 0. 11 0.08 0.38 0.30 5.0

Algae + Rust Nagato 0.41 0.26 0.17 0.29 3.3

185 The gamma-emitting radionuclide external exposure because the emanating concentrations observed in the sediment samples radiations are totally absorbed in a few from all of these sources are very low ranging millimeters or less of water and thus cannot between 0.03 and 1 pCi/g for 137cs. For expose peopleswimming nearby. perspective, the average concentration of 137cs The primary potential route of exposure of in the surface soil across the United States due people from alpha- and beta-emitting to world-wide fallout ranges from about 0.4 to radionuclides is by inhalation. There is no 1.2 pCi/g. For additional perspective, the 137cs chance of inhalation of these radionudides concentration in lagoon sediment is much less while diving on the ships or swimming in the than the 137cs concentration in surface soil in lagoon near the ships. The other potential route the and Northern Europe from of exposure is ingestion and it is not as the Chemobyl accident (9). significant a pathway as inhalation; it is In addition, the gamma rays associated unlikely that a diver would ing est sediment. with 137cs, 60co, and 207Bi are attenuated Even if small amounts of sediment could be exponentially as they traverse through water. ingested through the mask and regulator, the The half-thickness, i.e., the thickness of water intake would not be significant and the very low that will attenuate half of the radiation, is transfer of plutonium and americium across the about 10 em (4 inches) of water (10). gut wall to the blood (fraction ingested Consequently, the dose from 137cs, 60co and transferred to blood = 0.001)would produce an 207Bi in the sediments on the ships and in the insignificant dose. lagoon bottom while swimming near the ships is so low that it is, for all practical purposes, zero. Activation Products in the Ships The dose to a person on land anywhere in the world for a specific period of time would be The activation products produced by the higher than the dose from swimming in the neutron flux from the Baker test interacting with lagoon and diving near the ships for the same the steel, iron, and other metals of the ships all period of time. have a short half-life. Most of the activation products have long since decayed and are no Alpha, Beta, and Very Low Energy Gamma­ longer present. The major activation product Emitting Radionuclides that is still present is 60co, with a half-life of 5.27 years. Consequently, the 60Co produced at The concentration of 24 1 Am in the sediments the time of detonation in 1946 has decayed to from the ships is higher than for the other 0.35% of its original value; in other words, it is radionuclides and ranges from 1 to SO �i/�. We also essentially gone or will be in very few more have sufficient data on the ratios of 39+ 40pu years. If diving does not begin at Bikini until to 24 1 Am at the atoll to know that the 1995 or 1996, then 60co will have decayed one 239+240pu concentration would be about 20% whole half-life, or by 50%, from the values higher than the 24 1 Am. The concentration of listed in Table 2. In the same time period, 137cs 90sr in the lagoon sediment would be expected to will have decayed by another 13%. The 6°Co be somewhat higher than the observed in the samples listed in Table 2 are 137cs concentration. primarily the result of 60Co induced in the The other radionuclides found in the sediments metal components of the ship and the subsequent are 240Am, 239+241pu, 90sr and europium-155 deterioration and oxidation producing a fine, (155Eu). The primary radiation from 90sr and rusty material that spalls from the metal 155£u is beta particles, which can only surfaces and becomes mixed with the sediment penetrate a few millimeters of water. Plutonium and algae on the ships and lagoon bottom. and 241 Am are primarily The very short half-life associated with emitters and can only penetrate a few microns (1 activation products has essentially eliminated micron = 0.001 em) of water. The x radiation or them as an exposure source over the last 43 gamma radiation associated with these nuclides years. The small gamma flux still present is are so low energy that they too do not penetrate absorbed by the water as described in the any significant distance in water. Consequently, previous section. radionudides such as 239+240pu, 241Am, 90sr, and 155Eu do not contribute to underwater 186 Summary of the Potential Radiological the Bikini Lagoon around or through the sunken Dose while Swimming in Bikini ships is so low fromboth the activation products originally induced in the ships and from Lagoon radionuclides in the lagon sediment that it can The potential dose to a person swimming in be considered essentially zero.

TheRad iological Dose while Livingon Bikini Island for Two Weeks

Inhalation Dose aircraft for about 800 miles is 4 mrem (9).

The only radionuclides on the island that External Gamma Dose are of any via the inhalation pathwa are and 241Am. The dose The external gamma dose equivalent rate .r, 1 from 13 Csand 90sr are of no consequence, being4 from 37cs on Bikini Island is estimated to be or more orders of magnitude less than plutonium about 11.8 mrem/year. Thisestimate is based on and americium via inhalation (11). a scenario of 12 hours every day inside the The estimated effective committed dose schoolhouse (bunk and mess hall building), 4 equivalent for 239+240pu and 241 Am at Bikini hours/ day around the schoolhouse, 1 hourI day Atoll is based on resuspension studies conducted in the interior of the island, and 7 hours/ day in at Bikini Atoll (12). The estimate is based on a or on the lagoon. Consequently, for a person scenario of 9 hours on the island in a resting state visiting for only two weeks, the dose equivalent in which 4.8 m3 of air are breathed, 5 hours would be about0.45 mrem. For perspective, this active time in which 6.0 m3 of air are breathed, can be compared to the U.S. background and 10 hours on or near the lagoon and beaches, committed dose equivalent rate of 300 which are not relevant to inhalation of mrem/yearor about 12 mrem/2 weeks. resuspended Pu orAm. The calculated committed effective dose Summary of the Total on Island equivalent for a two-week stay on Bikini Island Radiological Dose is 0.02 mrem for 239+240Pu. The contribution from 24 1 Am would be about 70% of the The estimated effective committed dose plutonium dose, or about 0.014 mrem. The total equivalent for two weeks residence on Bikini effective committed dose equivalent is, Island or the United States are listed in Table 3. therefore, 0.03 mrem. For perspective, the The net result is that the estimated dose for annual committed doseequivalent in the United Bikini Island, for the scenario outlined above States is 300 mr em/y. For additional including natural background, is about 1/10 that perspective, the increased dose equivalent for a similar period of residence in the received flying at altitude in a jet United States.

Table 3. The estimated dose equivalent for two weeks at BikiniIsland and the average United States. Committed Effective Dose Equivalent, mrem/2 weeksresidence

Source . Marshall Islands United States Natural Background 0.85 12 137Cs External 0.45 239+240Pu + 241Am Inhalation 0.03 Total -1.3 12

187 REFERENCES • 1. W.L. Robison, V.E. Noshkin, W.A. Phillips, and R.J. Eagle, The Northern Marshall Islands Radiological Surveys: Rad ionuclide Concentrations in Fish and Clams and Estimated Doses Via the Marine Pathway, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-52853, Part 3 (1981).

2. W.L. Robison, M.E. Mount, W .A. Phillips, M.L. Stuart, S.E. Thompson, and A.C. Stokes, An Updated Radiological Dose Assessment of Bikini and Eneu Islands at Bikini Atoll, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-53225 (1982).

3. W.L.Robison, M.E. Mount, W.A. Phillips, C.A. Conrado, M.L. Stuart, and C.E. Stoker, The Northern Marshall Islands Radiological Survey: Terrestrial Food Chain and Total Doses, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report, Livermore, CA, UCRL-52853 Part 4 (1982).

4. W .L. Robison, "Radiological Dose Assessments of Atolls in the Northern Marshall Islands," in Proc. Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the National Council on and Measurements: Environmental Radioactivity, No. 5 (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Bethesda, MD, 1983), pp. 40-82.

5. W.L. Robison, C.L. Conrado, and W.A. Phillips, Enjebi Is land Dose Assessment, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-53805 (1987).

6. W.L. Robison, C.L .. Conrado, and M.L. Stuart, Radiological Conditions at Bikini Atoll: Radionuclide Concentrations in Vegetation, Soil, Animals, Cistern Wa ter, and Ground Water, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-53840 (1988).

7. W.L. Robison and W.A. Phillips, Estimates of the Radiological Dose from Ingestion of 137Cs and 90 Sr to Infants, Children, and Adults in the Marshall Islands, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-53917.

8. J.H. Shinn, D.N. Homan, and W.L. Robison, Resuspension Studies at Bikini Atoll, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCID-18538, Rev. 1 (1989).

9. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiations (United Nations, New York, 1988).

10. Robley D. Evans, The (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1955).

11. International Commission on Radiological Protection, Limits for Intakes of Radionuclide by Workers, Pergamon Press, New Your, Pub. 30, Part 1 and Supp. (1979).

12. J. H. Shinn, D. N. Homan, and W. L. Robison, Resuspension Studies at Bikini Atoll, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCID-18538 (1980).

188 APPENDIX IV: Archeological Site Record Forms for the Documented Shipwrecks

National Maritime Initiative Shipwreck/Hulk Database !NIT #10596

Popular Name: APOGON Location: BIKINI ATOLL LAGOON Nearest City: BIKINI ISLAND

Owner/Manager: REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS Address: C/0 HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE ALELE MUSEUM/BOX #629 MAJURO, MH 96960 Phone: 3264

Is Site on the Shoreline? NO; Underwater? YES; Depth: 180 Percent Present: 76-100%

Present Remains are Intact? YES; Scattered? NO; Buried? NO; Excavated? NO

Present Remains consist of: Hull? YES Decks? YES Superstructure? YES Masts? NO Rigging? NO Engines/Boilers? YES Auxiliary Machinery? YES Ballast? NO Armament? YES Anchors? UNKNOWN Cargo? NO Associated Material? YES

Wreck Date: 20TH CENTURY

Archeological Survey? YES; Date: 1990 Surveyor: DANIEL J. LENIHAN, NPS Publication Resulting? YES Publication Name: NPS CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT NO. 37

Vessel Identity Firmly Established? YES Source: Archeological? YES; Oral History/Tradition? NO; Archival? YES

Vessel Name: USS APOGON (SS-308) Vessel Type: SUBMARINE, BALAO CLASS

# of Masts: 0; Rigging: UNRIGGED Length: 311.90; Beam: 27 .30; Draft: 15.30 Displacement: 1526.00

Hull Materials: STEEL Engine: DIESEL Propulsion: SCREW Armament: 10X21-INCH TT; 2X40MM

Year Built: 1943; Place of Construction: PORTSMOUTH, NEW HAMPSHIRE Builder: PORTSMOUTH NAVY YARD

Wreck Year: 1946 Use at Loss: TARGET SHIP, OPERATION CROSSROADS Cargo at Loss: TEST EQUIPMENT

Contact: DANIEL LENIHAN/SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT Phone: 505-988-6750 or FTS-476-1750

189 National Maritime Initiative Shipwreck/Hulk Database INIT #10570

Popular Name: ARKANSAS Location: BIKINI ATOLL LAGOON Nearest City: BIKINI ISLAND

Owner/Manager: REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS Address: C/0 HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE ALELE MUSEUM/BOX #629 MAJURO, MH 96960 Phone: 3264

Is Site on the Shoreline? NO; Underwater? YES; Depth: 180 Percent Present: 76-100%

Present Remains are Intact? YES; Scattered? NO; Buried? NO; Excavated? NO

Present Remains consist of: Hull? YES Decks? YES Superstructure? YES Masts? YES Rigging? YES Engines/Boilers? YES Auxiliary Machinery? YES Ballast? NO Armament? YES Anchors? YES Cargo? NO Associated Material? YES

Wreck Date: 20TH CENTURY

Archeological Survey? YES; Date: 1990 Surveyor: DANIEL J. LENIHAN Publication Resulting? YES Publication Name: NPS CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT NO. 37

Vessel Identity Firmly Established? YES Source: Archeological? YES; Oral History/Tradition? NO; Archival? YES

Vessel Name: USS ARKANSAS (BB-33) Vessel Type: BATTLESHIP; ARKANSAS CLASS

# of Masts: 2; Rigging: UNRIGGED Length: 562.00; Beam: 106.00; Draft: 32.00 Displacement: 31900.00

Hull Materials: STEEL Engine: Propulsion: SCREW Armament: 12X12", 6X5", 10X3", 9X40MM QUADS, 36X20MM

Year Built: 1912; Place of Construction: CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY Builder: NEW YORK SHIPBUILDING CO.

Wreck Year: 1946 Use at Loss: TARGET SHIP, OPERATION CROSSROADS Cargo at Loss: TEST EQUIPMENT

Contact: DANIEL LENIHAN/SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT Phone: 505-988-6750 or FTS-476-1750

190 National Maritime Initiative Shipwreck/Hulk Database INIT #10595

Popular Name: CARLISLE Location: BIKINI ATOLL LAGOON Nearest City: BIKINI ISLAND

Owner/Manager: REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS Address: C/0 HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE ALELE MUSEUM/BOX #629 MAJURO, MH 96960 Phone: 3264

Is Site on the Shoreline? NO; Underwater? YES; Depth: 180 Percent Present: 76-100%

Present Remains are Intact? YES; Scattered? YES; Buried? NO; Excavated? NO

Present Remains consist of: Hull? YES Decks? YES Superstructure? YES Masts? YES Rigging? YES Engines/Boilers? YES Auxiliary Machinery? YES Ballast? NO Armament? YES Anchors? YES Cargo? YES Associated Material? YES

Wreck Date: 20TH CENTURY

Archeological Survey? YES; Date: 1990 Surveyor: DANIEL J. LENIHAN, NPS Publication Resulting? YES Publication Name: NPS CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT NO. 37

Vessel Identity Firmly Established? YES Source: Archeological? YES; Oral History/Tradition? NO; Archival? YES

Vessel Name: USS CARLISLE (APA-69) Vessel Type: ATTACK TRANSPORT/GILLIAM CLASS

# of Masts: 2; Rigging: UNRIGGED Length: 426.00; Beam: 58.00; Depth: 37.00; Draft : 15.60 Displacement: 6800.00

Hull Materials: STEEL Engine: STEAM TURBINES Propulsion: SCREWS Armament: 1X5-INCH/38; 4X40MM; 10X20MM

Year Built: 1944; Place of Construction: WILMINGTON, CALIFORNIA Builder: CONSOLIDATED STEEL CORPORATION

Wreck Year: 1946 Use at Loss: TARGET VESSEL/OPERATION CROSSROADS Cargo at Loss: TEST EQUIPMENT

Contact: DANIEL LENIHAN/SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT Phone: 505-988-6750 or FTS-476-1750

191 National Maritime Initiative Shipwreck/Hulk Database INIT #10572

Popular Name: GILLIAM Location: BIKINI ATOLL LAGOON Nearest City: BIKINI ISLAND

Owner/Manager: REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS Address: C/0 HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE ALELE MUSEUM/BOX #629 MAJURO, MH 96960 Phone: 3264

Is Site on the Shoreline? NO; Underwater? YES; Depth: 180 Percent Present: 76-100%

Present Remains are Intact? YES; Scattered? YES; Buried? NO; Excavated? NO

Present Remains consist of: Hull? YES Decks? YES Superstructure? YES Masts? YES Rigging? UNKNOWN Engines/Boilers? YES Auxiliary Machinery? YES Ballast? NO Armament? UNKNOWN Anchors? UNKNOWN Cargo? YES Associated Material? YES

Wreck Date: 20TH CENTURY

Archeological Survey? YES; Date: 1989 Surveyor: DANIEL LENIHAN, NPS Publication Resulting? YES Publication Name: NPS CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT NO. 37

Vessel Identity Firmly Established? YES Source: Archeological? YES; Oral History/Tradition? NO; Archival? YES

Vessel Name: USS GILLIAM (APA-57) Vessel Type: ATTACK TRANSPORT/GILLIAM CLASS

# of Masts: 0; Rigging: UNRIGGED Length: 426.00; Beam: 58.00; Depth: 37 .00; Draft : 15.60 Displacement: 6800.00

Hull Materials: STEEL Engine: STEAM TURBINE Propulsion: SCREW Armament: 1X5-INCH/38 4X40MM 10X20MM

Year Built: 1946; Place of Construction: WILMINGTON, CALIFORNIA Builder: CONSOLIDATED STEEL CORPORATION

Wreck Year: 1946 Use at Loss: TARGET SHIP/OPERATION CROSSROADS Cargo at Loss: TEST EQUIPMENT

Contact: DANIEL LENIHAN/SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT Phone: 505-988-6750 or FTS-476-1750

192 National Maritime Initiative Shipwreck/Hulk Database INIT #10568

Popular Name: NAGATO Location: BIKINI ATOLL LAGOON Nearest City: BIKINI ISLAND

Owner/Manager: REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS Address: C/0 HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE ALELE MUSEUM/BOX #629 MAJURO, MH 96960 Phone: 3264

Is Site on the Shoreline? NO; Underwater? YES; Depth: 180 feet Percent Present: 76-100%

Present Remains are: Intact? YES; Scattered? NO; Buried? NO; Excavated? NO

Present Remains consist of: Hull? YES Decks? YES Superstructure? YES Masts? YES Rigging? NO Engines/Boilers? YES Auxiliary Machinery? YES Ballast? NO Armament? YES Anchors? YES Cargo? NO Associated Material? YES

Wreck Date: 20TH CENTURY

Archeological Survey? YES; Date: 1990 Surveyor: DANIEL J. LENIHAN, NPS Publication Resulting? YES Publication Name: NPS CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT NO. 37

Vessel Identity Firmly Established? YES Source: Archeological? YES; Oral History /Tradition? NO; Archival? YES

Vessel Name: HIJMS NAGATO (BB-9) Vessel Type: BATTLESHIP/NAGATO CLASS

# of Masts: 2; Rigging: UNRIGGED Length: 708.00; Beam: 95.00; Draft: 30.00 Displacement: 38500.00

Hull Materials: STEEL Engine: STEAM TURBINE Propulsion: SCREW Armament: 8X16", 20X5.5", 4X3.1"AA, 3MGS, 8X21"TT(4 AW/4 VW)

Year Built: 1912; Place of Construction: KURE, JAPAN Builder: KURE DY

Wreck Year: 1946 Use at Loss: TARGET SHIP, OPERATION CROSSROADS Cargo at Loss: TEST EQUIPMENT

Contact: DANIEL LENIHAN/SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT Phone: 505-988-6750 or FI'S-476-1750

193 National Maritime Initiative Shipwreck/Hulk Database INIT #10571

Popular Name: PILOTFISH • Location: BIKINI ATOLL LAGOON Nearest City: BIKINI ISLAND Owner/Manager: REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS Address: C/0 HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE ALELE MUSEUM/BOX #629 MAJURO, MH 96960 Phone: 3264

Is Site on the Shoreline? NO; Underwater? YES; Depth: 170 Percent Present: 76-100%

Present Remains are Intact? YES; Scattered? NO; Buried? NO; Excavated? NO

Present Remains consist of: Hull? YES Decks? YES Superstructure? YES Masts? NO Rigging? NO Engines/Boilers? YES Auxiliary Machinery? YES Ballast? NO Armament? YES Anchors? UNKNOWN Cargo? NO Associated Material? YES

Wreck Date: 20TH CENTURY

Archeological Survey? YES; Date: 1989 Surveyor: DANIEL J. LENIHAN, NPS Publication Resulting? YES Publication Name: NPS CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT NO. 37

Vessel Identity Firmly Established? YES Source: Archeological? YES; Oral History/Tradition? NO; Archival? YES

Vessel Name: USS PILOTFISH (SS-386) Vessel Type: SUBMARINE, BALAO CLASS

# of Masts: 0; Rigging: UNRIGGED Length: 311.80; Beam: 27.30; Draft: 15.30 Displacement: 1525.00

Hull Materials: STEEL Engine: GE/GM DIESEL-ELECTRIC Propulsion: SCREW Armament: 10X21-INCH TT; 1X20MM; 1X40MM

Year Built: 1943; Place of Construction: PORTSMOUTH, NEW HAMPSHIRE Builder: PORTSMOUTH NAVY YARD

Wreck Year: 1946 Use at Loss: TARGET VESSEL/OPERATION CROSSROADS Cargo at Loss: TEST EQUIPMENT

Contact: DANIEL LENIHAN/SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT Phone: 505-988-6750 or FTS-476-1750

194 National Maritime Initiative Shipwreck/Hulk Database INIT #10569

Popular Name: PRINZ EUGEN Location: KWAJALEIN ATOLL LAGOON Nearest City: CARLSON ISLAND

Owner/Manager: U.S. NAVY Address: C/0 NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER WASHINGTON NAVY YARD WASHINGTON, DC 20374 Phone: 202-433-6437

Is Site on the Shoreline? YES; Underwater? YES; Depth: 120 Percent Present: 76-100%

Present Remains are Intact? YES; Scattered? NO; Buried? NO; Excavated? NO

Present Remains consist of: Hull? YES Decks? YES Superstructure? YES Masts? YES Rigging? YES Engines/Boilers? YES Auxiliary Machinery? YES Ballast? NO Armament? YES Anchors? YES Cargo? NO Associated Material? YES

Wreck Date: 20TH CENTURY

Archeological Survey? YES; Date: 1989 Surveyor: DANIEL J. LENIHAN Publication Resulting? YES Publication Name: NPS CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT NO. 37

Vessel Identity Firmly Established? YES Source: Archeological? YES; Oral History/Tradition? YES; Archival? YES

Vessel Name: USS PRINZ EUGEN (IX-300) Vessel Type: CRUISER, HIPPER CLASS

# of Masts: 2; Rigging: UNRIGGED Length: 654.50; Beam: 71.00; Draft: 15.00 Displacement: 10000.00

Hull Materials: STEEL Engine: GEARED TURBINES Propulsion: SCREW Armament: 8X8", 12X4.1", AA, 12X37MM AA , 12X21"TT, 4AC/6X8" SUNK

Year Built: 1936; Place of Construction: KIEL, GERMANY Builder: KRUPP AT GERMANIA WERFT SHIPYARD

Wreck Year: 1946 Use at Loss: LAID UP AFTER OPERATION CROSSROADS Cargo at Loss: TEST EQUIPMENT

Contact: DANIEL LENIHAN/SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT Phone: 505-988-6750 or FTS-476-1750

195 National Maritime Initiative Shipwreck/Hulk Database INIT #10576

Popular Name: SARATOGA Location: BIKINI ATOLL LAGOON Nearest City: BIKINI ISLAND

Owner/Manager: REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS Address: C/0 HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE ALELE MUSEUM/BOX #629 MAJURO, MH 96960 Phone: 3264

Is Site on the Shoreline? NO; Underwater? YES; Depth: 180 Percent Present: 76-100%

Present Remains are Intact? YES; Scattered? NO; Buried? NO; Excavated? NO

Present Remains consist of: Hull? YES Decks? YES Superstructure? YES Masts? YES Rigging? YES Engines/Boilers? YES Auxiliary Machinery? YES Ballast? NO Armament? YES Anchors? YES Cargo? YES Associated Material? YES

Wreck Date: 20TH CENTURY

Archeological Survey? YES; Date: 1990 Surveyor: DANIEL J. LENIHAN, NPS Publication Resulting? YES Publication Name: NPS CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT NO. 37

Vessel Identity Firmly Established? YES Source: Archeological? YES; Oral History/Tradition? NO; Archival? YES

Vessel Name: USS SARATOGA (CV-3) Vessel Type: AIRCRAFT CARRIER/LEXINGTON CLASS

# of Masts: 1; Rigging: UNRIGGED Length: 880.00; Beam: 106.00; Draft: 24.10 Displacement: 33000.00

Hull Materials: STEEL Engine: STEAM TURBINES Propulsion: SCREW Armament: 8X8", 12X5", 4-6 PDRS. 81 AC

Year Built: 1922; Place of Construction: CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY Builder: NEW YORK SHIPBUILDING CO.

Wreck Year: 1946 Use at Loss: TARGET SHIP, OPERATIONS CROSSROADS Cargo at Loss: TEST EQUIPMENT

Contact: DANIEL LENIHAN/SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT Phone: 505-988-6750 or FTS-476-1750

196 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Andrade, John M., U. S. Military Aircraft Designations and Serials Since 1909, Midland Counties Publications, ----

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Bradley, David J., No Place to Hide, 1946!1984, Hanover and London: University Press of , 1983.

Bush, Vannevar, Mo dern Arms and Free Men : A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949.

Chesnau, Roger, ed., Conway's All the World's Figh ting Ships, 1922-1946, New York: Mayflower Books, 1980.

Cressman, Robert, That Gallant Ship: USS Yo rktown (CV-5) , Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories, 1985.

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Ellis, Major L. F., C. R. G. Allen, A. E. Warhurst, and Sir James Robb, Victory in the We st: Vo lume I: The Battle of Normandy, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1962.

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197 ------, The Postwar Naval Revolution, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1986.

Fuchida, Mitsuo, and Masatake Okumiya, Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan; The Japanese Navy's Story, Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1955.

Glasstone, Samuel, ed., The Effe cts of Nuclear We apons, Washington, D.C.: United States Atomic Energy Commission, June 1957.

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Halsey, William F., and Joseph Bryan III, Admiral Halsey's Story, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947.

Hacker, Barton C., The Dragon 's Tail: Radiation Safe ty in the Manhattan Project, 1942-1946, Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1987.

Hansen, Chuck, US Nuclear We apons: The Secret History, Arlington, Texas: AeroFax, Inc., 1988.

Howarth, Stephen, The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun: The Drama of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1895-1945, New York: Atheneum, 1983.

Humble, Richard, U. S. Fleet Carriers of World War II, Poole: Blanford Press, 1984.

Ito, Masanori, and Roger Pineau, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy, New York: Jove Books, 1986.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1920, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., 1920.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1935, New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1935.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1944-45, Corrected to April 1946, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947.

Jentschura, Hansgeorg, Dieter Jung, and Peter Mickel, Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869-1945, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1986.

Jolie, E. W., A Brief History of U. S. Navy Torpedo Development, Newport, Rhode Island: Naval Underwater Systems Center, 1978.

Jones, Vincent C., Manhattan: the Army and the Atomic Bomb: the Un ited Statess Army in Wo rld War II, Sp ecial Studies, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1985.

Jungk, Robert, Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956.

Lott, Arnold S., Robert F. Sumrall, and Robert S. Egan, USS Texas (BB-35): Ships Data, Annapolis: Leeward Publications, 1976.

Mooney, James L., ed., Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, eight volumes, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959-1981.

198 Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of Un ited States Naval Op erations in World War II, Volume XIV: Victory in the Pacific, 1945, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975.

Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon, At Dawn We Slept: The Un told Story of Pearl Harbor, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982.

Prange, Gordon W., Miracle at Midway, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983.

Roscoe, Theodore, Un ited States Submarine Operations in World War II, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1949.

Shurcliff, W. A., Bombs at Bikini: The Offi cial Report of Op eration Crossroads, New York: Wm. H. Wise & Co., Inc., 1947.

------, Op eration Crossroads: The Pictorial Record, New York: Wm. H. Wise Co., 1947.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret, To ward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and th e World Scene, 1918-1922, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940.

Stern, Robert C., U. S. Subs in Action, Carrollton, Texas: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1983.

Submarine Sonar Op erator's Manual, NavPers 16167, Washington, D.C.: Standards and Curriculum Division, Training, Bureau of Naval Personnel, November 1944.

Swanborough, Gordon, and Peter M. Bowers, Un ited States Navy Aircraft Since 1911, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1969.

Tibbets, Paul, The Tibbets Story, New York: Stein and Day, 1988.

U.S. Division of Naval Intelligence, ONI-54 Series: U. S. Naval Vessels, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy, 1943.

War Shipping Administration and Maritime Commission, U.S. Anny and U.S. Navy Floating Equipment, Landing Craft and Misc. Vessels, For Sale, Washington, D.C.: War Shipping Administration, n.d. [ca. 1955].

Weart, Spencer R., Nu clear Fear: A History of Im ages, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Wyden, Peter, Day One: Befo re Hiroshima and After, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

ARTICLES

Alexander, Lieut. Commander J. T., USN, "Trial Trip Data of the U.S.S. Saratoga," Transactions of th e Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Vol. XXXVII, New York: Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1929.

"Atomic Age Angel Food," Time Magazine (November 18, 1946).

199 Cochrane, Vice Admiral E. L., USN, "Crossroads and Ship Design," Shipmate (September 1946).

Cook, C. Sharp, "The Legacy of Crossroads," Naval History, Vol. II, No. 4, (Fall 1988).

Cousins, Norman, "The Standardization of Catastrophe," Saturday Review of Literature (August 10, 1946).

Delgado, James P., "What's Become of Sara?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 116, No. 10, (October 1990).

Dickey, Captain George L., Jr. USN, "The End of the Prinz," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol 87, No. 8, (August 1969).

"The Effect of the Atomic Bomb on Naval Power," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of , Vol. 1, No. 5, (February 15, 1946).

Ellis, William S., "A Way of Life Lost: Bikini," National Geographic, Vol 169, No. 6, (June 1986).

Graybar, Lloyd J., "Bikini Revisited," Military Affairs (October 1980).

"Helen of Bikini," Time Magazine (August 5, 1946).

Kinkaid, Eugene, "Bikini: The Forthcoming Atomic Bomb Test in the Marshalls Will Determine the Future of Man, Animals, Birds, Fish, Plants, and Microorganisms," Life , Vol. XX, No. 1, (July 1, 1946).

Noel, Capt. John V., Jr., USN (Ret.) "Homeward Bound," Shipmate (May 1984).

Patch, Irwin, Jr., "USS Saratoga at Iwo Jima," Shipmate Volume LII, No. 5, (June 1989).

"Prinz Eugen," Our Navy, (July 1969).

Rigg, E. H., "The Launch of the Airplane Carrier U.S.S. Saratoga," Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Vol. XXXIII, New York: Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1925.

Rock, Rear Admiral George R., USN, "Some Observations on the Design of Airplane Carriers and Notes on the Saratoga and Lexington," Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, Vol. XXXVIII, New York: Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1928. ,

Schmalenbach, Paul S., and Commander James E. Wise, Jr., USN, "Prinz Eugen Album,'' U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 87� No. 8, (August 1969).

Weisgall, Jonathan M., "The Nuclear Nomads of Bikini,'' Foreign Policy, Vol. XXVIV (Summer 1980).

MANUSCRIPTS

Address by Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, U.S.N., Commander Joint Task Force One, on New York Herald-Tribune Youth Forum, over Columbia Broadcasting System, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, April 13, 1946: "Why Test the Atom

200 Bomb?," Joint Army-Navy Task Force One, Crossroads Release No. 36, Department of Energy Archives, Las Vegas, document #101008.

Anderson, Action Report, , June 5, 1942, Serial 0109, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

"Atomic Bomb National Monument, Proposed," S.2054, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., March 5, 1946, copy found in "Trinity Site" file, National Historic Landmark Program, History Division, Washington, D.C.

Battelle, Inc. "Summary Report on Salvage Survey of Prinz Eugen, Supsalv Report No. 6-74, to US Navy, Supervisor of Salvage, Naval Ships System Command," (June 1974), copy on file with Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

"Bikini Resurvey Operation Plan 1-47" National Archives Record Group 374, Entry 4B, Box 156, Folder A4, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Ships, "History of USS Anderson (DD-411)," (May 26, 1948), Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Commander, Joint Task Force One, "Report on Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker (Operation Crossroads) Conducted at Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands, 1 July 1946 and 25 July 1946," Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Contract No. 97, Arkansas, in the New York Shipbuilding Corporation Collection, Philadelphia Maritime Museum, Philadelphia.

Contract No. 199, Saratoga, in the New York Shipbuilding Corporation Collection, Philadelphia Maritime Museum, Philadelphia.

Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, "Final Report for Tests Able and Baker, Bureau of Aeronautics," (October 11, 1946), copy on file with National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia.

------, Joint Task Force One, "Historical Report: Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker Operation Crossroads," (1947) Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., Volume 1.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Anderson (DD411), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Apogon (SS308), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force Om�, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Apogon (SS308), Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS ARDC13, Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

201 ------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS ARDC13, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Arkansas (BB33), Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Beached Landing Craft, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Carlisle (APA69), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Gilliam (APA57), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Lamson (DD367), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS LCT's 705, 816, 818, 874, 1013, 1078, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1115, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Nagato (Ex-Jap BB), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Nagato (Ex-Jap BB), Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Pilotfish (SS386), Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, Sakawa (Ex-Jap CL), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Saratoga (CV3), Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Y0160, Test Able, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

------, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report, USS Y0160, Test Baker, Operation Crossroads," National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

202 Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One, Bureau of Ships Group, "Technical Inspection Report: Radiological Decontamination of Target and Non-Target Vessels," Vol. I, copy on file with National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia.

"The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon: The Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads," (June 30, 1947), CCS 471.6, 10-15-46, National Archives Record Group 218, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Frederick, Col. J. D., "Final Report of Army Ground Group (Task Group 1.4), Operation Crossroads Atomic Bomb Tests," (1946), copy on file with National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia.

Log Book, USS Lamson, entries for May 30, June 30, and July 1, 1946, National Archives Record Group 24, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Memorandum, CNO to Chiefs of the Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Aeronautics, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, "Handling and Control of Radiologically Contaminated Material from CROSSROADS," June 10, 1947, Serial 0138P36, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Memorandum, CNO to CINCPAC, "Removal of Equipment and Supplies from Contaminated CROSSROADS Target Ships," February 18, 1947, Serial 034P36, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Memorandum, Op-33 and Op-38 (Parsons) to Op-36, April 9, 1947. Serial 106P36, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Protest Answers, Joint Task Force One, Records of the Defense Atomic Support Agency, National Archives Record Group 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Records of the Manhattan Engineer District, National Archives Record Group 377, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

"Remarks by Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, U.S.N., Commander, Joint Task Force One, Before the 47th National Encampment, Veterans of Foreign Wars, at Boston, Massachusetts, September 5, 1946," Joint Army-Navy Task Force One, Crossroads Release No. 67, Department of Energy Archives, Las Vegas, Nevada, Document #100967.

Saratoga Report, serial 007 of 21 February 1945, Box 616, World War II Action Reports, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Saratoga, War Damage Report, Final report, Torpedo Damage, 11 January 1942, no serial, Box 615, and Saratoga, War Damage Report, 21 September 1942, serial 0120, World War II Action Reports, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Ships Section, Office of Public Information, Navy Department, "History of the USS Saratoga (CV-3)," August 29, 1946, copy on file with the Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

"A Short Historical Sketch of the "Prinz Eugen" IX-300, also General Statements Involving the Ship's Characteristics," Serial 10-00C, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

203 Shurcliff, W. A., "Technical History of Operation Crossroads," (1946) copy on file with the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia. • "Statement of Vice Admiral Blandy, U.S.N., Commander Joint Army-Navy Task Force Number One on Purposes of Atomic Bomb Tests," Joint Army-Navy Task Force Number One, Crossroads Release No. 37, Department of Energy Archives, Las Vegas, Document No. 101007.

"Technical Report, Bikini Scientific Resurvey," Washington, D.C.: Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 1947, copy on file with the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia.

INTERVIEWS

Henderson, Robert W., Albuquerque, New Mexico, telephone interview by James P. Delgado, December 19 and 20, 1990.

Meade, Roger W., Los Alamos, New Mexico, interview by James P. Delgado, December 19, 1990.

Smith, Leon D., Albuquerque, New Mexico, telephone interview by James P. Delgado, December 19, 1990.

Swancutt, Woody P., San Antonio, Texas, telephone interview by James P. Delgado, December 20, 1990.

204 SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT REPORT AND PUBLICATION SERIES

The Submerged Cultural Resources Unit was Cultural Resources established in 1980 to conduct research on submerged cultural resources throughout the A document that discusses, in detail, all known National Park System with an emphasis on underwater archeological sites in a given park. historic shipwrecks. One of the unit's primary This may involve test excavations. The responsibilities is to disseminate the results of intended audience is managerial and research to National Park Service managers, as professional, not the general public. well as the professional community, in a form that meets resource management needs and Cultural Resources Site adds to our understanding of the resource base. A report series has been initiated in Exhaustive documentation of one archeological order to fulfill this responsibility. The site which may involve a partial or complete following are the categories of reports that site excavation. The intended audience is comprise this series. primarily professional and incidentally managerial. Although the document may be Cultural Resources Assessment useful to a park's interpretive specialists because of its information content, it would First line document that consists of a brief probably not be suitable for general distribution literature search, an overview of the maritime to park visitors. history and the known or potential underwater sites in a park, and preliminary Cultural Resources recommendations for long-term management. Series It is designed to have application to GMP/DCP's and to become a source document These may be in published or photocopy for a park's Submerged Cultural Resources format. Included are special commentaries, Management Plan. papers on methodological or technical issues pertinent to underwater archeology, or any Cultural Resources miscellaneous report that does not appropriately fit into one of the other Comprehensive examination of blocks of park categories. lands for the purpose of locating and identifying as much of the submerged cultural Published of the Southwest Cultural resources base as possible. A comprehensive Resources Center literature search would most likely be a part of the Phase I report but, in some cases, may 1. Larry E. Murphy, editor, Submerged be postponed until Phase II. Cultural Resources Survey: Portions of Point Reyes National Seashore and Point Phase I -- Reconnaissance of target areas with Reyes-Farallon Islands National Marine remote sensing and visual survey techniques to Sanctuary, Submerged Cultural Resources establish location of any archeological sites or Unit, 1984. anomalous features that may suggest the presence of archeological sites. 2. Toni Carrell, Submerged Cultural Resources In ventory: Portions of Point Reyes National Phase II -- Evaluation of archeological sites or Seashore and Point Reyes-Farallon Is lands anomalous features derived from remote sensing National Marine Sanctuary, Submerged inst�uments to confirm their nature and, if Cultural Resources Unit, 1984 possible, their significance. This may involve exploratory removal of overburden. 3. Edwin C. Bearss, Resource Study: Lyndon B. Johnson and the Hil Country, 1937-1963, Division of Conservation, 1984.

205 4. Edwin C. Bearss, Historic Structures 15. James E. Ivey, In the Mist of A Loneliness, Report: Texas White House, Division of Division of History, 1988. Conservation, 1986. 16. Richard W. Sellars and Melody Webb, An 5. Barbara Holmes, Historic Resource Study Interview with Robert M. Utley on The of the Barataria Un it of Jean Lafitte History of Historic Preservation in the National Historical Park, Division of National Park Service--1947-1980, Santa Fe, History, 1986. 1988.

6. Steven M. Burke and Marlys 17. Laura S. Harrison and Beverley Spears, Bush-Thurber, Southwest Region Historic Structures Report, Ch inle Trading Headquarters Building, Santa Fe, New Post, Thunderbird Ranch and Custodian's Mexico: A Historic Structure Report, Residence, Division of History, 1988. Division of Conservation, 1985. 18. James P. Delgado and Stephen A. Haller, 7. Toni Carrell, Submerged Cultural Resources Submerged Cultural Resources Assessment: Site Report: NOQUEBAY, Apostle Islands Golden Gate National Recreation Area, National Lakeshore, Submerged Cultural Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Resources Unit, 1985. Sanctuary and Point Reyes National Seashore, 1989. 8. Daniel J. Lenihan, editor, Submerged Cultural Resources Study: Isle Royale 19. Judith K. Fabry, Guadalupe Mountains National Park, Submerged Cultural National Park: An Administrative History, Resources Unit, 1987. Division of History, 1988.

9. J. Richard Ambler, Archeological 20. Peter J. McKenna and Scott E. Travis, Assessment: Navajo National Monument, Archeological In vestigations at Thunderbird Division of Anthropology, 1985. Lodge, Division of Anthropology, 1989.

10. John S. Speaker, Joanna Chase, Carol 21. Peter J. McKenna and James E. Bradford, Poplin, Herschel Franks, and R. The T. J. Ruin, Gila Cliff Dwellings, Christopher Goodwin, Archeological Division of Anthropology, 1989. Assessment: Barataria Un it, Jean Lafitte National Historical Park, Division of 22. C. Patrick Labadie, Submerged Cultural Anthropology, 1986. Resources Study: Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore, Submerged Cultural Resources 11. James E. Ivey, Marlys Bush-Thurber, Unit, 1989. James T. Escobedo Jr., and Tom Ireland, The Missions of San Antonio: A Historic 23. Daniel J. Lenihan, editor, Submerged Structures Report and Administrative Cu ltural Resources Study: USS Arizona History, Divisions of Conservation and Memorial and Pearl Harbor National History, 1987. Historic Landmark, Submerged Cultural Resources Unit, 1989. 12. Roger E. Coleman, The Arkansas Post Story, Division of History, 1987. 24. Robert H. and Florence P. Lister, Aztec Ruins National Monument: Administrative 13. Toni Carrell, editor, Submerged Cultural History of an Archeological Preserve, 1990. Resources Site Report: Charles H. Sp encer Mining Operation and Paddle Wheel 25. Jill-Karen Yakubik, Archeological , Glen Canyon National In vestigations of Six Sp anish Colonial Recreation Area, Submerged Cultural Period Sites: Barataria Un it, Jean Lafitte Resources Unit, 1987. National Historical Park and Preserve, Division of Anthropology, 1989. 14. Hal Rothman, The Bandelier National Monument: An Administrative History, 26. Herschel A. Franks and Jill-Karen Division of History, 1988. Yakubik, Archaeological Survey on 65 Acres

206 of Land Adjacent to Bayou des Families: 37. James P. Delgado, Daniel J. Lenihan, and Barataria Un it, Jean Lafitte National Larry Murphy, The Archeology of the Historical Park and Preserve, Division of Atomic Bomb: A Submerged Cultural Anthropology, 1989. Resources Assessment of the Sunken Fleet of Op eration Crossroads at Bikini and 27. Walter K. Wait and Peter J. McKenna, Kwajalein Atoll Lagoons, Republic of the Quarai Parking Lot Rehabilitation: Marshall Islands, Submerged Cultural Arch eological Testing Program, Salinas Resources Unit, 1991. National Monunment, 1990. 38. George Sabo III, Randall L. Guendling, 28. Diane Taylor, Lyndi Hubbel, Nancy Wood, W. Fredrick Limp, Margaret J. Guccione, and Barbara Fielder, The 1977 La Me sa Susan L. Scott, Gayle J. Fritz, and Pamela Fire Study: An In vestigation of Fire and A. Smith, Archeological Investigations at Fire Suppression Impact on Cultural 3MR80-Area D in the Rush Development Resources in Bandelier National Monument, Area, Buffa lo National River, Arkansas, Division of Anthropology, 1990. Division of Anthropology, 1990.

29. Wesley R. Hurt, The 1939-1940 Excavation 39. Larry E. Murphy, 8SL 17: Natural Project at Quarai Pueblo and Mission Site-Formation Processes of a Buildings, Salinas Pueblo Missions Multiple-Component Un derwater Site in National Monument, Division of Florida, Submerged Cultural Resources Anthropology, 1990. Unit, 1990.

30. Roger E. Coleman, Archeological In vestigation for Construction of a Pedestrian Trail and Identification of Laundress Row, Division of Anthropology, A Note About the National Maritime Initiative 1990. Production of this document was coordinated 31. James E. Ivey, Presidos of the Big Bend by the National Maritime Initiative. The Area, Bilingual publication, English and Initiative was created under a 1984 Spanish, Division of History, 1990. Congressional request to the National Park Service, asking it to "conduct a survey of 32. Neil C. Mangum, In the Land of Frozen historic maritime resources, recommend Fires: A History of Occupation of El standards and priorities for the preservation of Malpais Country, Division of History, 1990. those resources; and recommend appropriate Federal and private sector roles in addressing 33. Jack B. Bertram, Archeological those priorities." In 1987, a special office In vestigations Along the Proposed Alibates within the History Division in Washington, Tour Road Improvement Construction D.C., was created to conduct activities Route, Alibates Flint Quarries National associated with the Initiative. The Initiative is Monument, Potter , Texas , Division a cooperative effort involving the Service's of Anthropology, 1990. numerous cultural resource programs, other Federal Agencies dealing with cultural 34. Robert Wooster, Ph.D., History of Fort resources, State Historic Preservation Offices, Davis, Texas, Division of History, 1990. the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and the maritime community at large. For 35. Bruce A. Anderson, The Wupatki more information, contact National Maritime Archeological In ventory Survey Project: Initiative, History Division (418), National Park Final Report, Division of Anthropology, Service, P.O. Box 37127, Washington, DC 1990. 20013-7127.

36. Toni L. Carrell, Submerged Cultural Resources Assessment of Micronesia, Submerged Cultural Resources Unit, 1990.

207

Mission: As the Nation·s principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has responsibility for most of our nationally-owned public lands and natural and cultural resources. This includes fostering wise use of our land and water resources, protecting our fishand wildlife, preserving the environmental and cultural values of our national parks and historical places, and providing for the enjoyment of life through outdoorrecrea tion. The Department assesses our energy and resources and works to assure that their development is in the best interests of all our people. The Department also promotes the goals of the Take Pride in America campaign by encouraging stewardship and citizen responsibility for the public lands and promoting citizen participation in their care. The Department also has a major responsibility for American Indian reservation communities and for people who live in Island Territories under U.S. Administration.

208

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