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Assured Access Paratroopers from 82nd Airborne Division prepare to load C-130Js from 317th Airlift Group as part of Joint Access Operation Exercise, Pope Field, NC, June 2013 U.S. Air Force (Damon Kasberg) U.S. Air Force he Nation and its allies face Assured Access a strategic turning point that necessitates the optimization T of joint and multinational Building a Joint and airborne joint forcible entry (JFE) capabili- ties to meet future security challenges. The security environment has been shaped more Multinational Airborne by surprise than inevitability, and the future presents “a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change Forcible Entry Capability 1 continues to accelerate” —thus the ability for the United States and its multinational By JOHN W. NICHOLSON, JR., JASON W. partners to respond quickly with assured CONDREY, and CLAUDE A. LAMBERT access to introduce the capabilities required to secure its interests. After more than a decade of ground As we end today’s wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we will ensure that our combat with its tremendous investment of military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies. In particular we national blood and treasure, many poli- will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success, including intelligence, cymakers are unable to envision a future surveillance, and reconnaissance; counter terrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in anti-access environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber. Major General John W. Nicholson, Jr., is —President Barack Obama Commanding General of 82nd Airborne Division, Fort st Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 Century Defense Bragg, North Carolina. Lieutenant Colonel Jason W. Condrey is G5 Chief of Plans, 82nd Airborne Division. Major Claude A. Lambert is a Strategic Plans Officer, 82nd Airborne Division. 8 JFQ / issue 71, 4 th quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu NICHOLSON, CONDREY, and LAMBERT requiring the commitment of ground forces. response forces of their respective nations, in Airborne JFE is such a powerful instru- However, the contrary is more likely, with full recognition of the likelihood of operat- ment of national power that the threat of scenarios that could arise from traditional ing side-by-side should our countries choose its employment can be as compelling as the state-based military threats, “disorder” from to act in concert against future threats. Thus, reality. The multinational military interven- intrastate conflict and failing governments, as one peers into the future, it is clear that the tion in Haiti clearly demonstrated this strate- transnational threats, violent extremist orga- United States must maintain a diverse GRF gic deterrent value. In September 1994, Presi- nizations, disasters, and hybrid combina- that is rapidly deployable to the source of a dent Bill Clinton approved Operation Uphold tions. Clearly, most of these circumstances, crisis, highly trained and ready, able to assure Democracy to forcibly remove the military particularly those involving the loss of access in any environment, and fully interop- regime installed by the 1991 coup d’état control of weapons of mass destruction or erable with potential partners and allies. that overthrew Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the the protection of threatened American lives elected president. The plan centered on an or interests, will require the rapid introduc- Prevailing in Defense airborne JFE operation—distributing nearly tion of ground forces, employed in uncertain Since its inception, the employment or 4,000 paratroopers from 82nd Airborne to nonpermissive conditions as part of a suite threat of employment of airborne units as Division over two drop zones to achieve of interdependent joint force capabilities. the spearhead of an operation has repeat- 40 tactical objectives.3 With 82nd Airborne Fiscal constraints increasingly limit edly proved its strategic value by demon- Division en route in an air armada of over overseas basing options and access to strating compelling political resolve. This 60 planes, former President Jimmy Carter volatile regions. As a result, our adversaries reinforces the old military adage that in and General Colin Powell had the strategic will employ asymmetric capabilities and order to deter an adversary, a nation must leverage to force the capitulation of an ille- antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies in have the ability to defeat that adversary, and gitimate regime and avert a U.S. invasion of the global commons and possible operating airborne forces are one of the most effective Haiti.4 A close synchronization of diplomatic areas to limit, delay, or degrade the employ- tools for doing so. Airborne JFE operations efforts with a ready, responsive, and impos- ment of joint and coalition forces. Conse- achieve tactical or operational surprise by ing airborne JFE capability provided the U.S. quently, ground forces employed in crisis making any spot in the world accessible and administration with a powerful deterrence response scenarios must be agile, responsive, forcing an adversary to defend in all direc- tool to decisively confront and defeat aggres- and capable of JFE, operational maneuver tions. During the last four decades, airborne sion without firing a single round. from strategic distance, fighting imme- JFE has proved itself as a credible option to Airborne JFE is most effective because diately on arrival to seize lodgments, and demonstrate U.S. resolve by introducing sig- its associated forces are always in a high exploiting the initiative gained when our air nificant combat power into both contested state of readiness, operationally adaptable, and naval partners defeat the in-depth A2/ and uncontested operational environments. and ready for immediate employment. AD efforts of our adversaries. It remains the fastest way to introduce However, they are not limited to parachute To ensure a robust and credible crisis large numbers of ground forces—4,500 assaults and lethal operations. They are agile response capability, the Department of paratroopers in 30 minutes. As part of the forces prepared to meet myriad potential Defense (DOD) directed the establishment GRF, the U.S. joint force has maintained crises thanks to a training regimen for the of a joint Global Response Force (GRF), and the ability to deploy a brigade-size airborne full spectrum of operations against hybrid the Army’s contributions are centered on force anywhere in the world within 96 hours enemy threats. the unique capabilities of the 82nd Airborne of notification and, if needed, conduct forc- The following three operations Division—rapidly deployable, forcible entry ible entry parachute assault to secure key clearly demonstrate the broad utility of 82nd capable, tailorable in composition, scalable objectives and execute follow-on combat Airborne Division and its rapid response in size, adaptable to multiple missions, and operations ranging from deterring or capability. In 1988, when the Sandinista always at a high state of readiness. Through- defeating adversaries, protecting American government of Nicaragua threatened the out its history, the 82nd Airborne Division and allied citizens and interests, securing borders of Honduras, President Ronald has answered the Nation’s “911 call.” key infrastructure, maintaining peace, or Reagan launched Operation Golden Pheas- With troop deployments to Afghani- conducting stability operations or humani- ant to counter Nicaraguan military incur- stan waning, the 82nd regains focus on its tarian assistance. sions into the border areas of Honduras. core mission of airborne JFE. It does so in The 1983 intervention in Grenada Airborne JFE forces departed home on a full recognition that this is an inherently during Operation Urgent Fury and the 1989 short-notice deployment exercise consisting joint mission requiring the regeneration of invasion of Panama in Operation Just Cause of an airborne assault and air-land opera- core competencies to guarantee the capabili- are notable airborne JFE operations that tions followed by combined patrols along ties necessary to conduct airborne JFE. Addi- resulted in the restoration of legitimate gov- the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. The tionally, the last decade of war has certainly ernments.2 When diplomatic efforts failed deployment was publicly described as a joint reinforced the importance of interoperability to achieve policy objectives, our joint force maneuver exercise, but the show of force, with our allies, who we cannot afford to meet quickly achieved air superiority and rapidly covered by international media, caused the for the first time in combat. As a result, we projected land power for the decisive effect Sandinistas to rapidly withdraw across their must continue to foster relationships and of removing hostile regimes. The success border, effectively deescalating the situation. train with the airborne forces of our multi- of these operations undoubtedly deterred Six days after his invasion of Kuwait, national partners, who are typically the rapid future aggressors across the globe. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein massed ndupress.ndu.edu issue 71, 4 th quarter 2013 / JFQ 9 FORUM | Assured Access his armored forces on the Saudi Arabian understanding, fell in on mature infrastruc- in the weapons, technologies, and methods border, threatening the Kingdom’s sover- tures, and enjoyed unchallenged access to necessary to fulfill their A2/AD strategies. eignty. President George H.W. Bush ordered
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