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POLITICS Pre-Election TV Debates: Content and Interest Investigation POLITICS Pre-election TV debates: content and interest Investigation into the Malaysian Boeing crash: who is to blame, and what consequences to Russia? Electoral ratings after elections PRE-ELECTION TV DEBATES: CONTENT AND INTEREST September 3-4, 2016 Twenty-three percent of Russians report to have watched live the TV debates of State Duma candidates; a further 2% watched them in the Internet; 14% did not watch tape-delayed broadcasts but heard about the participants and topics raised. Education drew wide discussions (14% of those who watched or are aware of the debates’ content); this is followed by economy (11%) and healthcare (9%). At the start of active pre-election campaign the interest towards TV debates of candidates for the State Duma deputies was higher than now. 2 23 25 2 14 34 I watched these debates on TV I watched these debates in the Internet I did not watch these debates but I am aware of their content, participants and topics I heard that there were debates but I know nothing about their content, participants and topics This is the first time I hear about that Don’t know Figure 1 Televised debates of candidates for the State Duma deputies were launched. Did you watch these debates on TV or not? (closed-ended question, one answer, %) LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) 50 “United Russia” 46 CPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) 38 “A Just Russia” 30 “Yabloko” 26 “Russian Pensioners For Justice Party” 21 “Communists of Russia” 17 “Rodina” 15 “Russian Ecological Party "The Greens" 15 PARNAS (Party of People's Freedom) 15 Party of Growth 14 “Patriots of Russia” 12 "Civic Platform" 10 “Citizens’ Force” 7 Don’t know 31 Figure 2 Can you specify the political parties debates of which you watched or heard about? (closed- ended question, any number of answers, % of those who watched the TV debates or are aware of their content) “United Russia” 19 LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) 18 CPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) 16 “A Just Russia” 12 “Russian Pensioners For Justice Party” 5 “Rodina” 3 Russian Ecological Party "The Greens" 3 “Yabloko” 3 “Communists of Russia” 2 Party of Growth 2 “Patriots of Russia” 2 PARNAS (Party of People's Freedom) 1 "Civic Platform" 1 “Citizens’ Force” 0 I did not like any party 17 35 Don’t know Figure 3 Can you specify the political parties debates of which you liked? (closed-ended question, any number of answers % of those who watched the TV debates or are aware of their content) Education 14 Economy 11 Pensions 9 Healthcare 9 Population well-being / salaries 7 Foreign policy 6 Social sphere 5 Agriculture 3 Security 2 Housing and public utilities 2 Internal policy 2 Sport 2 Army 2 Inflation / price increase 2 Fighting corruption 2 International relations 1 Unemployment 1 Culture 1 Ecology 1 Housing 1 Loan services 1 Industry 1 Science 1 Roads 1 Food quality 1 Fighting terrorism 1 Other 4 All 1 None 16 Don’t know 36 Figure 4 What political topics’ discussions did you like in particular? (open-ended question, any number of answers, % of those who watched the TV debates or are aware of their content) INVESTIGATION INTO THE MALAYSIAN BOEING CRASH: WHO IS TO BLAME, AND WHAT CONSEQUENCES TO RUSSIA? October 1-2, 2016 Half of Russians (50%) believe that the Malaysian Boeing shot down over Donbass was attacked by the Ukrainian military. Versions about the involvement of the DPR and LPR insurgents or Russian Special Forces in the airplane crash are extremely unpopular: the shares of those who think so are 4% and 1, respectively. Sixty-four percent of Russians are aware of the announcement of the international investigation team that the airplane was shot down with missile launch vehicle brought in from Russia. Ukrainian army, Ukrainian special forces 50 Insurgents, self-defense groups of 4 Eastern Ukraine People's republics Russian army, Russian special forces 1 Terrorists who are not involved in the 8 Eastern Ukraine conflict Western special forces 14 This is the first time I hear about the 0 crash Other 7 Don't know 16 Figure 5 In July 2014, a Malaysian Boeing crashed in Donetsk region. Most of experts agree that the airplane might have been hit by a missile. In your opinion, who is to blame for this crash? (closed-ended question, one answer, %) 2 26 34 38 I am well aware of that I heard something but I do not know any details This is the first time I hear about that Don't know Figure 6 This week, the international investigation team declared that the airplane was shot down over the territory controlled by Donbass insurgents, with a missile launch vehicle brought in from Russia. Do you know/heard, or do you hear for the first time about this announcement? (closed-ended question, one answer, %) Nothing will change 21 Strengthening of sanctions 14 Russia will be blamed; Russia will have to make… 7 Aggravation of relations with other countries 6 Military conflict is possible 6 Russia' s fault will be proved 5 Everything depends on the results of the investigation 3 Negative consequences 2 Problem will be tackled 1 Additional isolation 1 Economic crisis/ Financial blockade 1 Other 3 Don' t know 40 Figure 7 In your opinion, what consequences for Russia may the international team investigation into the downing of the Malaysian Boeing have? (open-ended question, not more than four answers, answers of at least 1% of respondents) ELECTORAL RATINGS AFTER ELECTIONS September – October 2016 The federal elections for the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of VII convocation made Russians make their choice: “United Russia” is gaining more support; the rest of parliamentary parties also show increase or remain stable proving their “Duma” status. According to the latest data, the LDPR support levels are 13.7%; they were 12 % before the elections and soared to 15.7% right after them. The CPRF approvals have increased after the voting: today they make up 8.4%, whereas they were 7.4% one week before the elections. “A Just Russia” rating gained 6.3% one week before the elections, and then went down to 5%; over the recent two weeks it has been steadily growing: today the party support is equal to its level one week before the elections (6.3%). Table 1 Which of the following parties would you vote for, if State Duma elections took place next Sunday? (closed-ended question, one answer, %) 04.09.2016 11.09.2016* 25.09.2016 02.10.2016 09.10.2016 “United Russia” 39.3 41.1 43.1 43.5 44.6 CPRF 8.7 7.4 10.0 8.9 8.4 LDPR 10.4 12.6 15.7 15.0 13.7 “A Just Russia” 5.3 6.3 5.0 5.8 6.3 Non-parliamentary parties 6.0 7.9 8.7 7.4 8.2 I will come and spoil the ballot 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.7 1.3 Don’t know 14.6 13.0 2.8 3.9 3.8 I would not take part in 14.7 10.9 13.8 13.8 13.7 elections * The data of the September 10-11 survey is mixed household and CATI surveys. The combination method is arithmetic mean. .
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