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|#20 | March 2015 © ilia pitalev / ria novosti

By Yury Korgunyuk

available for subscribers only Free issue Mapping Russia’s political landscape after Nemtsov | #20 | MARCH 2015

Editor’s note The murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov fundamentally changed the landscape of Russian politics. In the month that has passed since his murder, both Western and Russian commentators have weighed in on what this means – not just for the fledgling Russian opposition movement, but also for the Kremlin. What follows is a comprehensive overview of the landscape of political Ekaterina forces in Russia today and their reaction to Nemtsov’s murder. Zabrovskaya The author of this Brief is Yury Korgunyuk, an experienced political ana- Editor-in-Chief lyst in Moscow and the head of the political science department at the Moscow-based Information Science for Democracy (INDEM) Foundation. Also, we would like to inform you, our loyal readers, that later this spring, Russia Direct will introduce a paid subscription model and will begin charging for its reports. There will be more information regarding this ini- tiative on our website www.russia-direct.org and weekly newsletters. We are thrilled about this development and hope that you will support us as the RD editorial team continues to produce balanced analytical sto- ries on topics untold in the American media. Keeping the dialogue between the United States and Russia going is a challenging but important task today. Please feel free to email me directly at [email protected] with any questions or suggestions.

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Yury Korgunyuk, INDEM Foundation

Executive Summary The murder of prominent opposition liberal politician Boris Nemtsov in the center of Moscow was, in many ways, the ulti- mate black swan event for Russia’s political scene, introducing new uncertainty both for the Kremlin and its opposition in how to approach issues related to both foreign and domestic policy. What follows below is a sizing up of current political sentiment in Russia and a detailed analysis of the state of both the “sys-

re u ters temic” and “anti-systemic” opposition in Russia. Based on this analysis, it appears that the Kremlin has done a remarkable job of neutralizing dissent with Russian political society — either by co-opting the political platforms and ideas of its rivals, or by taking steps to keep the “anti-systemic” opposition off-guard. As a result, figures such as Alexei Navalny or Mikhail Prokhorov, both of whom may be recognizable in Western political circles, have little or no ability to influence current political outcomes within Russia. Instead, figures from political parties (and splin- ter groups of those parties) that express solidarity with the Kremlin’s stance on Ukraine and the economy may hold greater sway but at the cost of their political prospects in the future. This Brief wraps up with a look ahead to the Russian Duma elections of 2016, handicapping the chances of the various opposition parties to make inroads with Russia’s electorate.

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AP he killing of prominent opposition liberal poli- Is the murder of Nemtsov tician Boris Nemtsov on the night of Feb. 27 a classic black swan event? Tshocked literally everyone — the government, the opposition, the media and society at large. The murder of Nemtsov is sure to become something Over the past year, the liberal opposition has grown of a landmark in the political life of modern Russia. The accustomed to living in an atmosphere of hatred and country’s recent history is replete with political assas- direct threats, but never did it expect that its oppo- sinations, including ones that have been politically mo- nents would move so quickly from word to deed. The tivated. Recall the murder of the State Duma deputy Russian opposition understands the need to rebuild Galina Starovoitova in 1998, journalist Anna Politkovs- itself and adapt to the new conditions, but does not kaya in 2006, and the numerous murders of opponents quite know how to go about it. of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov in Russia and Ever since the start of its activities in Crimea and East- abroad. ern Ukraine, the Kremlin has resorted to unconvention- However, none of them was ever preceded by an al methods from a “peacekeeping” point of view, but extensive propaganda campaign to legitimize physi- is not ready to import these methods back to Russia cal elimination as a political tactic. This time around, a just yet. These methods are good for stoking tension campaign to that effect was in full swing. Russia’s air- on foreign soil, but it is clearly not in the interests of the waves were teeming with talk shows on which panelists Russian authorities to recreate such chaos back home lavished threats on Putin’s opponents, the “national in their own dominion. traitors” and “fifth columnists.” The media, especially TV, has managed to adapt to And although they themselves are unlikely to be ca- living in an information war against “internal and exter- pable of real action, many of their supporters outside nal enemies,” but they too were not prepared for the the studios have long been ready to move from word fact that these “enemies” would be murdered — not to deed. Some of them even have combat experience in the wilderness of Ukraine, but right in the center of from operations in “Novorossiya” and the Donetsk and Moscow, a stone’s throw from the Kremlin. Luhansk regions of Ukraine. No wonder the first reaction of even the most loyal Whether the physical elimination of opponents be- government media to the assassination was one of ut- comes common practice remains to be seen. Much ter perplexity. They clearly had no idea how to cover depends on the position of the authorities. If they the news and, contrary to established protocol of re- are savvy enough to realize that not only direct pro- cent years, opted to cover the situation using only facts motion of such actions, but also failure to reprimand in the early aftermath. the paymasters and foot soldiers threatens their own

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existence, there is every chance of pulling back from umnists” and “national traitors” — are the natural con- the brink of civil war. However, if the Kremlin continues sequences of that decision. Stopping Russia’s gradual to sit idle, or, worse, tacitly encourages violence, sooner slide into a new Cold War with the West to the drum- or later the situation is likely to spin out of control, in- beat of militaristic hysteria is now beyond even Putin cluding the Kremlin’s. himself. Any step that could be interpreted as willing- If the real sponsors of Nemtsov’s murder escape pun- ness to compromise (i.e. weakness) threatens to under- ishment, and the versions that somehow Nemtsov him- mine his domestic position. self provoked the crime through his “anti-Islamic” state- After all, Putin’s 86 percent approval rating is that ments and/or its paymasters are outside of Russia (in of a military leader, one that is resisting the “hostile” Ukraine or in the West) are allowed to hold sway, then attempts to diminish his country’s role on the world it is possible that we have on our hands a situation that, stage. The owner of such a rating cannot allow it to fall; ever since the publication of the book by Lebanese- for it is no longer a question of poorer electoral pros- American scholar Nassim Taleb has been described as pects, but of his very image and, therefore, power. A a “black swan” event. It is a situation governed by un- decline would mean that Putin has suffered a defeat predictability. and is in retreat. The present situation demands that Putin remain The Kremlin has two options balanced on the edge, without ever stepping over. It after Nemtsov’s murder seems that Putin has come as close to the edge as he can get. No wonder his rating, although rising, is start- For the Kremlin, the situation is made complex by the ing to level off: up 1-1.5 percent in recent months, ac- lack of options. It made its choice a year ago, when cording to leading Russian public opinion research President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea. Everything centers. else — the outbreak of war in southeastern Ukraine, Nemtsov’s murder is a nuisance for the Kremlin, be- sanctions and counter-sanctions, the “information war” cause the crime has nudged it towards having to take with the West, including the fight against “fifth col- a decisive step: Either backwards toward reconciliation

Russian public opinion Question: Do you think Russia is going in the right direction? (1993-2015) Yes No Percent 80 78

70 66 62 58 60 60 60 54 50 58 55 48 40

29 30 35 22 31 20 26 22 19 10 7 0 Feb. 2011 Feb. Mar. 1997 Mar. Jan. 2015 Jan. 1996 Jan. 2014 July 2014 May 2014 May Mar. 1994 Mar. Oct. 2014 Oct. Feb. 1995 Feb. Feb. 2012 Feb. Feb. 2013 Feb. Feb. 2015 Feb. Feb. 1998 Feb. Feb. 1999 Feb. Feb. 2014 Feb. Nov. 2014 Nov. Feb. 2010 Feb. Feb. 2001 Feb. Dec. 2014 June 1993 Apr. 2014 Apr. June 2014 Feb. 2007 Feb. Feb. 2000 Feb. Feb. 2002 Feb. Feb. 2003 Feb. Feb. 2005 Feb. Feb. 2008 Feb. Feb. 2009 Feb. Feb. 2006 Feb. Feb. 2004 Feb. Sept. 2014 7-10 Mar. 2014 Mar. 7-10 1-4 Aug. 2014 1-4 Aug. 21-24 Mar. 2014 Mar. 21-24 Source: Levada Center 2014 Aug. 22-25

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Nemtsov’s murder is a nuisance for the Kremlin, because the crime has nudged it towards having to take a decisive step

with the opposition and the restoration of “peace” in the “white ribbon” movement. At the same time, the the country, or forwards over the edge, whereupon increase in state funding for political parties — from 50 Russia’s version so-called “sovereign democracy” will rubles per vote in 2012 to 110 rubles in 2015 — showed morph into outright dictatorship. that it was not only ready to punish “bad” but also en- What the Putin regime can no longer do is stand still, courage “good” behavior. but a step in either direction leads to its downfall. A However, the primary cause was the hijacking of the “peaceful” retreat would be an admission of defeat on agenda, which began long before the annexation of the part of the Kremlin and a signal to the elite that Crimea. Consider the following example. The Commu- the time had come to side with its opponents. At the nists in the State Duma had long lobbied for a ban on same time, a step forward risks either taking the word the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens (the “cold” out of the war with the West, or the de facto so-called “Dima Yakovlev law” introduced in December acknowledgement that the military conflict is primarily 2012 in response to the “Magnitsky Act” in the United a vehicle through which Putin is seeking to remain in States). For a while the ruling party justifiably called power for as long as possible. the measure “populist” and “harmful.” However, after Since neither option is acceptable for the Kremlin, its those linked to the Magnitsky case were denied entry only hope is to remain balanced precariously on the to the United States, the ban all of a sudden ceased to edge without taking a step back — or a step forwards be either harmful or populist. across the point of no return. Likewise, there is the example of the law on non-gov- From a purely technical point of view, it means that ernmental organizations (NGOs) or “foreign agents,” the Kremlin will offer no clemency to the immediate which stipulates a special procedure for the registration perpetrators of the crime, thereby demonstrating that and financial reporting of non-commercial organiza- in today’s Russia only one man has the right to decide tions in receipt of funding from foreign and internation- which way to point the thumb (and that man is not al bodies. This blends seamlessly into the worldview of Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya). Yet, at the the Communist Party (CPRF) and the Liberal Democrat same time, it will continue to excoriate members of the Party (LDPR). “fifth column” and stress its hardliner approach to the The annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in opposition at every opportunity. Ukraine represented the actualization of the most radical and dangerous slogans of the Russian parliamenta- Russia’s systemic opposition ry opposition. The de facto reconstruction of the Soviet at a deadlock Union had been advocated by the CPRF and the LDPR long before the events of Crimea and Ukraine. It was a Nemtsov’s murder poses some serious problems for pet project of theirs, and the more unlikely it looked, the opposition, too. It should be clarified that the the more cherished it became. The two parties empha- only true opposition today is anti-systemic. As for sized nostalgia for the Soviet Union when they wanted the “systemic” opposition, i.e. parliamentary, it most to highlight their differences with the government. So likely ceased to exist as an independent force after when Putin suddenly began to implement their pro- the start of the intervention in Crimea. The Kremlin gram, they could hardly oppose it. effectively brought it to heel, and did so less through The assertions of CPRF and LDPR members that it intimidation and bribery than through hijacking its was not they that cozied up to the government, but agenda. the Kremlin that went over to their side, are certainly Although the first two cannot be dismissed out of valid. That is indeed the case: the Kremlin deliberately hand: By stripping A Just Russia MP Gennady Gud- adopted the most radical and dangerous slogans of kov of his parliamentary mandate in 2012, the Kremlin the “left-patriotic” opposition. But little good it did the made it clear that it would not tolerate overtures to “left-patriots” themselves. As always, it is not about

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who conceives the idea, but who extracts the highest on the other hand, put them into practice, so who if not dividends from it. Seizing upon the slogans of the op- him should reap the rewards? position, the Kremlin monopolized the political capital Today the CPRF and LDPR are struggling to stand out from them. from the crowd of Putin supporters. For instance, the In the mouths of the parliamentary opposition, the Communists overemphasize their Stalinism and slate slogans sounded like run-of-the-mill populism. Putin, the “liberals” in the government’s economic bloc, while LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky continues to shock audiences with ever more outrageous exhortations. Party factions in the State Duma of Russia But for them it is verbal bluster, whereas for Putin it is very much the real deal. If another “left-patriotic” idea catches Putin’s eye as a potential ratings winner, he will expropriate it as before. And it will serve him, not its 56 United Russia creators. Communist Party The only hope that the CPRF and LDPR have left is 64 of the Russian Federation electoral inertia when it comes to voting preferences, 238 seats A Just Russia the unpopularity of the ruling party United Russia and Liberal Democratic the exclusion of the anti-systemic opposition from the Party of Russia (LDPR) electoral process. If these conditions remain in place, 92 they have every chance of preserving their support in the next elections to the regional assemblies (on the Source: State Duma second Sunday of September 2015), but certainly not of increasing it. Major political parties in Russia Of all the parties that make up the parliamentary opposition, the one in the tightest spot is A Just Rus- 77 political parties were registered in Russia as of Feb. 5, 2015. sia (JR). The party was established as a pro-Kremlin According to the results of 2011 parliamentary elections, alternative to the Communist Party, and indeed it the most popular parties were: was assumed that it would take votes from the CPRF. However, in the elections to the regional assemblies Right Cause – 0.6% Current leader: Vyacheslav Maratkanov in March 2007 JR managed to cause more problems United Russia - 49.3% Registered: February 4, 2009 for the ruling party, failing to land a glove on the Current leader: Dmitry Medvedev Communists. As a result, the project was shelved. Registered: Nevertheless, the party was allowed to continue to December 18, 2001 Patriots of Russia – 1% participate in elections, and in the Duma elections Current leader: Gennady Semigin that same year, 2007, it scraped over the 7 percent Registered: April 25, 2002 threshold. JR’s performance in the elections of 2011 was better — Russian United Democratic Party largely because it was able to take advantage of the ris- “Yabloko” – 3.4% ing protest sentiment in society, building its campaign Current leader: Sergey Mitrokhin on harsh criticism of United Russia. During the protest Registered: April 25, 2002 rallies of 2011-2012, many prominent party members (Gennady and Dmitry Gudkov, Ilya Ponomarev and Liberal Democratic Party of Russia others) took an active part in the “white ribbon” move- (LDPR) – 11.7% ment. Current leader: Vladimir Zhirinovsky Perhaps that is why the Kremlin, in an attempt to Registered: April 4, 2002 sever ties between State Duma members of parliament (MPs) and the Bolotnaya Square protesters, struck JR a major blow in the autumn of 2012 by stripping Gennady Gudkov, who effectively represented the party in the Communist Party – 19.2% A Just Russia – 13.2% “white ribbon” movement, of his parliamentary man- Current leader: Gennady Zyuganov Current leader: Sergei Mironov date (the official reason being that as an MP he had Registered: March 6, 2002 Registered: December 17, 2002 allegedly broken State Duma rules by continuing to do Source: The Central Election Commission, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation business in the area of security). JR’s leaders got the

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hint, and by 2013 the party was “cleansed” of all who The reaction of the systemic opposition to the killing had been in contact with the protest movement. of Boris Nemtsov was quite characteristic. Two years By spring 2015 the party was rid not only of those back, neither the CPRF nor JR would have let slip an in favor of maintaining ties with the non-systemic op- occasion to harangue the Kremlin for creating a climate position, but also of anyone at all who aspired to an conducive to the murder of opposition politicians (the independent political role. The most prominent scalp LDPR was a special case, since Zhirinovsky’s relations belonged to Oksana Dmitrieva, first deputy chair of the with Nemtsov were somewhat strained). Today all par- State Duma Committee on Budget and Taxes and an liamentary opposition parties are victims of their own outspoken left-populist critic of the government, who compliance with the official line. Having delivered a few was removed from her post as head of JR’s St. Peters- platitudes on the iniquity of the murder, the leaders of burg division. Put simply, the party must now support the CPRF, LDPR and JR immediately piped up about only Putin, in which regard the yardstick of loyalty to the damage done to the country by the liberals and the party line is unanimity with the Kremlin-serving that the killing was certainly the doing of the omnipres- Sergei Mironov. ent West. But that condemns A Just Russia to inevitable defeat in the upcoming 2016 elections to the State Duma. Suf- The anti-systemic opposition has fice it to recall that after the party’s successful show- splintered in two ing in the 2011 State Duma elections, where it picked up 13.24 percent of the vote, leader Sergei Mironov fell Speaking of the anti-systemic opposition, one should flat on his face in the presidential elections of March first of all take into account the split position that it 4, 2012, coming in last with 3.85 percent of the vote. found itself in at the onset of the new, post-Crimea pe- A similar result can be expected next time around, es- riod. pecially when one considers that at least half of JR’s The protest movement of 2011-2012 had involved electoral support in 2011 came from voters protesting representatives of all the major sectors of the political against the election becoming a procession. The party spectrum: liberals, socialists and nationalists alike. The can no longer rely on the protest vote. Coordinating Council of the Opposition (CCO), elected in October 2012, set “ideological” quotas for each of these strands, which, if truth be told, had a deleterious Russian attitudes toward impact on the fate of the body. It turned out that, whereas the liberals and the so- the “anti-systemic opposition” cialists could grudgingly negotiate with each other, Question: Do you sympathize with the there was no compromise to be had with the nationalists by definition. The first to realize that basic premise leaders of the “anti-systemic opposition”? was the non-partisan faction of the CCO, the so-called “general civil list.” They simply stopped attending CCO 2% Certainly yes 3% meetings, leaving it without a quorum. As a result, the 3% council wound up its activity ahead of time (it had been elected for one year). 10% More likely 12% The annexation of Crimea divided the anti-systemic yes than no 12% opposition into those who welcomed the move and those who condemned it (there was no intermediate 31% position, save for the odd “no comment” in answer to More likely 33% the question). no than yes 37% Among those in favor of the annexation were most 28% of the socialists, including representatives of the Left Deﬁnitely no 33% Front, whose leader Sergei Udaltsov, having been ini- 31% tially under investigation for the events of May 6 (he 28% was one of many arrested at a rally on 6 May, 2012 Hard to say 19% that turned violent) and then in detention, expressed 18% total solidarity with the Kremlin’s position on Crimea and Novorossiya (it didn’t do him much good, though:

– December 2011 – January 2012 – February 2015 Center Levada Source: On July 24, 2014 a court found him guilty of organizing

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mass unrest and sentenced him to 4.5 years in prison). aided by the authorities’ crackdown on a number of There were exceptions here, too. For example, some their leaders. A particular case occurred on Oct. 15, leftists condemned the actions of Russia in Crimea and 2014, when the Ministry of Internal Affairs detained southeastern Ukraine. Alexander Belov (Potkin), leader of the most prominent The nationalists were in the most difficult situation of organization of Russian nationalists — the ethno-politi- all. The bulk of their supporters welcomed the annexa- cal association “Russkie” (Russians), on highly dubious tion of Crimea and the actions of the separatists in No- charges. He was accused of complicity in the embez- vorossiya. However, some not only refused to support zlement of funds from Kazakh BTA Bank, which was the position of the Kremlin, but also actually took part very odd indeed: Belov, though marginal, was a public in the hostilities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on politician, whereas banking fraud generally requires a the side of the Ukrainian army. Supporters of various non-public role and involvement in activities of a com- nationalist organizations formed their own column in pletely different nature. the anti-war march in Moscow on Sept. 21, 2014, and Lastly, almost entirely opposed to the Crimea-Ukraine op- the traditional “Russian march” in Lyublino (Moscow) eration were the liberals. The only exception was the Civic on Nov. 4, 2014, was effectively split into two columns: Platform party, but this exception merely proves the rule. supporters and opponents of Novorossiya. Civic Platform was created in 2012 by billionaire Mikhail The rising skepticism among Russian nationalists in Prokhorov, who in March of that same year came third in relation to the Kremlin’s Crimea-Ukraine policy was the presidential elections with 7.98 percent of the vote. CIVIC PLATFORM The situation surrounding Civic Platform is made es- a convenient pretext to step away from party affairs. pecially interesting by the fact that Prokhorov formed Thereupon, leadership of Civic Platform was trans- the party literally under duress. He delayed the regis- ferred to former State Duma MP for the LDPR Rifat tration of regional branches (as a result the party was Shaykhutdinov, who led the party down the path of least unable to take part in the 2012 regional elections) and resistance — complete loyalty to the Kremlin. On Feb. 21, discussed the desirability of setting up a compact or- 2015, Civic Platform took part in a rally in support of Pu- ganization consisting of 500 lawyers to provide free le- tin’s policies organized by the “Anti-Maidan” movement. gal services to those wishing to participate in the elec- It was then that Mikhail Prokhorov expressed concern tions. All this suggests that Prokhorov himself did not over Civic Platform’s overly sharp about face, and called wish to partake in politics, while the Kremlin could not for a meeting of the party’s Federal Civil Committee to decide whether or not they needed his participation. discuss the further development of the party. However, In the end, they decided that such a party was indeed later Prokhorov behaved quite according to form. necessary, and Civic Platform took part in the elec- On March 13, at the meeting of the Federal Civil Com- tions to the regional assemblies in 2013 and 2014. But mittee, he got Rifat Shaykhutdinov displaced from his Prokhorov felt burdened by party affairs and gradually position as the party’s head, expressed his willingness shifted responsibility to his sister Irina, who undoubt- to dissolve the party and, after some time, announced edly possessed some of the qualities needed in a public his withdrawal from the party. It cannot be ruled out politician, but had even less desire than her brother to that between the last two steps Prokhorov received a engage in politics in modern Russia. call from the President’s administration stating that, In July 2014 Irina Prokhorova resigned as head of the “You can leave, but don’t touch the party.” party’s Federal Policy Committee, citing the fact that As a result, by the end of that day, Shaykhutdinov most of the leaders of its regional divisions did not calmly returned to his former post. It’s not hard to no- support the government’s position on the critical issue tice, that in any case Prokhorov was fighting for his own of Crimea and Ukraine. This excuse, however, did not reputation, rather than for Civic Platform. The latter, in sound very convincing, since most of the well-known turn, is expected to follow the path of the Right Cause regional politicians who had joined the party did sup- party, which continued to work after Prokhorov’s exit port the official position, and most of those against in September 2011, but did not achieve any successful were gray functionaries in the party for money. Most results in elections and, in the end, disappeared from likely, Prokhorova, like her brother, took advantage of the Russian political scene.

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The liberals not only organized the march in memory of their ally, but spoke of the need to unite forces in the fight against the regime

All other liberal parties — from the publicly funded Ya- panding its circle of supporters and electors than of bloko to Alexei Navalny’s unregistered Progress Party basic survival. For this reason, the party prefers not to and the Party of December 5 of Konstantin Yankauskas quarrel with the Kremlin, fearing that close ties with and Sergei Davidis — have adopted a sufficiently clear anti-systemic liberals could see it barred from the elec- stance on the issue of Ukraine and Crimea. tions, which would call into question Yabloko’s very The reaction of the various strands of the anti-system- existence (as a party that won more than 3 percent of ic opposition to the murder of Boris Nemtsov essential- the votes in 2011, it is mostly funded by the state). And ly reflected their position in Ukraine. The left followed since it is not in the interests of the Kremlin to allow a the CPRF in condemning the murder, but immediately union of liberals, Yabloko will not join it — at any rate began to talk about the scheming of the West and the not until there is a shift in the present balance of forces. harm caused by Russia’s liberals. Proponents of Novo- Of course, the liberals outside Yabloko may try to rossiya inside the nationalist movement could barely unite by themselves. And signals to that effect sound contain their glee at the crime, while opponents, on the quite regularly. For instance, in early March Ilya Yashin, contrary, sharply condemned it (in particular, Alexan- a prominent figure in the Republican Party of Russia der Belov, one of Russia’s most prominent nationalists, (RPR-PARNAS), said that he had recently made peace sent a letter from prison expressing shock at what had with former party cochairman Vladimir Ryzhkov, whom happened and urging his comrades-in-arms to take he himself had effectively forced out of the party a year part in the March 1 public demonstration in memory of ago. Nemtsov). Naturally, the liberals not only organized the Moreover, representatives of the unregistered Pro- march in memory of their ally, but spoke of the need to gress Party and the Party of December 5 could well take overcome their differences and unite forces in the fight part in future elections on the lists of RPR-PARNAS, against the regime. which presently has no trouble with registration. The Such unity is an indispensable condition if the libe same applies to Democratic Choice under Vladimir Mi- rals are to make any headway at all in the State Duma lov, who was once cochairman of the People’s Freedom elections of 2016. But a question mark now hangs over Party (PARNAS), but departed in October 2011 over a whether it will take place at all. disagreement with the party’s other leaders regarding For starters, it is simply not possible to unite all liberals tactics in the upcoming State Duma elections. Alone, under one banner. Quite simply, the goal is obscured by Democratic Choice is unlikely to achieve any significant the country’s oldest liberal party, Sergei Mitrokhin and success. But within a united coalition, the chances of Grigory Yavlinsky’s Yabloko. This party has long called the liberals passing the threshold look more realistic. for the unification of all democrats (i.e. liberals), but But there are other significant obstacles blocking the only on its terms — on the basis that all others join Ya- path of the formation of this theoretical coalition, the bloko. most important being that a union is only possible if ac- Moreover, the party’s agenda seeks to cast off the companied by a rise in popularity — otherwise quarrels right wing of the liberal movement responsible for and disagreements will come to the fore. Such a rise is the market reforms carried out in the 1990s (to which not on the horizon. Nemtsov himself belonged), as well as politicians open As things stand, Russia’s liberals have nothing to of- to dialogue with the nationalists (for example, Alexei fer voters. They are united by their opposition to the Navalny). Hence, Yabloko’s leaders refused to take part war in Ukraine, but on this matter, the Kremlin has so in the “Spring” anti-crisis march slated for March 1 in far managed to stamp its position on the majority of Lyublino (which did not go ahead due to the murder of the population. The liberals should, in principle, see Nemtsov), stating its intention to stage an alternative their stock rise from the decline in living standards on event in the center of Moscow. the back of the economic crisis caused by the fall of In actual fact, Yabloko has long thought less of ex- the ruble. However, the left has long exploited eco-

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anton novoderezhkin / tass

nomic slogans (and without much success), and sim- hind bars), while its position on Crimea and Ukraine is no ply parroting the same is no guarantee of automatic different from that of the CPRF.1 The Communist voter is success for the liberals. more likely to cast his ballot in favor of the latter, whose Furthermore, the liberals currently have no leverage members he or she regularly sees on television. with the electorate. On TV, they are not panelists in The nationalists will not be able to take part in the elec- discussions, only victims of an aggressive propaganda tions for legal reasons at the very least. None of the par- campaign. Online, they are able to attract only those ties it created after its 2012 reform (Konstantin Krylov’s people who already agree with them on the Crimea- National Democratic Party, Dmitry Demushkin’s Party of Ukraine issue. Essentially the liberals just have to wait Nationalists) is registered, and the likelihood now of such until the propaganda machine begins to yield a coun- registration is minimal. So, as before, the nationalist field terproductive effect, and audiences start to change is set to be dominated by Zhirinovsky’s LDPR. the channel at the mention of the words “Ukraine,” The liberals’ only chance of success lies in there being “Donbas” and “Novorossiya.” No one can say for sure a radical shift in public mood in their favor and their when that will happen. It might take several years. In own consolidation. It should be noted in that regard the meantime, the State Duma elections edge ever that a liberal union of any kind would almost certain- nearer. ly not involve Yabloko, which for its part is unlikely to achieve anything more than its 2011 State Duma elec- Predicting the electoral tion result of 3.43 percent — and only then if other lib- chances of Russia’s opposition in eral parties do not take part. 2016 At present the most likely union of liberals looks to be centered on RPR-PARNAS, which could be joined by Today the overall electoral chances of the various anti- representatives of other parties, including Alexei Na- systemic opposition groups look something as follows. valny’s Progress Party. Navalny himself is in any case The non-systemic left has been disemboweled by the barred from the forthcoming elections in light of two attack on the Left Front (its leader Sergei Udaltsov is be- outstanding criminal convictions. Therefore, it is logi-

1 In July 2014 Sergei Udaltsov told the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets: “As things stand, I fully support the right of residents of Crimea, Donbas, Luhansk and other southeastern territories to self-determination. Those who describe sincere patriots as ‘rabble’ and ‘cattle’ are repellent to me.” Sergei Udaltsov on the eve of his jail sentence: “In prison, you first need to make yourself at home” / Moskovsky Kom- somolets, #26580, July 24, 2014. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/07/23/sergey-udalcov-nakanune-prigovora-v-tyurme-snachala-nado- obzhitsya.html

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The Kremlin is afraid to lock Navalny up under a real, not suspended, sentence, bearing in mind the phenomenon of Khodorkovsky

cal that he would encourage his supporters to vote for Navalny from the political field, which explains the end- another party. less stream of criminal cases brought against him, each Navalny’s voice in this respect carries weight. Although one more absurd than the previous. On the other, the polls by even the most “liberal” of Russia’s three leading Kremlin is afraid to lock Navalny up under a real, not sociological research institutes, the Levada Center, give suspended, sentence, bearing in mind the phenomenon him just 2 percent of the vote were a presidential elec- of Khodorkovsky, who before prison was an “ordinary” tion to be held in the near future2, Navalny still has more oligarch with no political face, but in prison became not potential than any other non-systemic politician in Rus- only a social figure, but a political one. sia (and, in the greater scheme of things, any opposi- As of now, Navalny engages in politics as circum- tion politician at all). That explains the Kremlin’s actions stances permit. The authorities have stymied his parti against him (he is presently under house arrest pending cipation in the elections by not registering his Progress a criminal investigation). Party, obstructing his anti-corruption foundation and On one hand, the government would like to eliminate blocking his online blog. But each time Navalny finds a way to take part in the country’s public and political The electoral rating of political parties life. He cannot participate in elections, but can urge his supporters to back other candidates. He cannot regis- Question: For which of the following parties ter his own party, but can lend weight to another and would you be most likely to vote campaign for it on the Internet. Navalny has one simple option: Look to the future and if there were elections to the State Duma wait for the moment when the situation in the country next Sunday? changes dramatically. However, another danger lies in wait for the liberals. It I’d spoil the voting sheet is not ruled out that the Kremlin will once again return 1.3% Not going to vote Mikhail Prokhorov to the political scene, with the aim Other party – 13.1% of splintering the liberal vote. That being the case, the 0.4% oligarch may return to Civic Platform, whereupon many Communist Party of the A Just Russia – Russian Federation liberally minded voters uninformed of the situation in- 3.3% 6.8% side the party could cast their votes for Prokhorov — all Liberal Democratic the more so, given that this time around he would likely United Russia Party of Russia (LDPR) be given airtime on national TV. Today Prokhorov’s 59.5% 5.4% rating is low3, but primarily because TV viewers have partially forgotten him. If he returns to the screen, his Can’t say – ratings will go up. 8.7% Generally speaking, it would be premature to predict the outcome of the next elections to the State Duma. It is quite possible that by December 2016 the country will have seen some radical changes accompanied by a shift in the balance of forces and the appearance of

Public opinion data for March 8, 2015 WCIOM Source: new players on the political scene.

2 Press release “February electoral ratings.” Levada Center website, March 5, 2015. http://www.levada.ru/05-03-2015/fevralskie-elektoralnye-reitingi. However, it should be noted that these surveys measure public sentiment as a whole, rather than its most active part. Moreo- ver, other representatives of the anti-systemic opposition do not feature at all in surveys carried out by sociological centers. 3 2 percent according to polls by the Levada Center. Press release “February electoral ratings.” Levada Center website, March 5, 2015. http://www.levada.ru/05-03-2015/fevralskie-elektoralnye-reitingi

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valery sharifulin / tass

Conclusion dividing line between the systemic and non-systemic The killing of Nemtsov exploded a bombshell in the left in Russia today has been almost completely effaced. Russian political space. But the question remains as to Crimea and Ukraine have removed any significant differ- whether the country’s political forces can extract any ences not only between the two sides themselves, but gains from the event. also between them and the authorities. All things considered, the Kremlin and the systemic op- For the nationalists, their bread has been literally taken position seem unable to do so, even if they wanted to. away by the question of Crimea and Ukraine. Their cam- They made their choice a year ago during the annexa- paign, based on stirring up xenophobic feelings towards tion of Crimea. The only difference between the Kremlin migrants of non-Slavic origin, has ceased to interest the and the systemic opposition is that retreat is out of the general public. Thanks to TV stations, the “hordes” of question for the former as a matter of principle, while Caucasians and Central Asians have been supplanted by the latter can try to alter its position but only if there is a the “Ukrainian fascists” as enemy number one. fundamental shift in public attitude, by which time it will To wrap up, the liberal opposition has an opportunity be too late to change anything. to bury past differences and unite for the sake of its own Nor do the prospects of the left and nationalist sectors political future. Whether or not they take advantage of it of the anti-systemic opposition inspire confidence. The will become clear over the coming months.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Yury Korgunyuk, Ph.D. in history, Doctor of political science, is the head of political science department at the Moscow-based Information Science for Democracy (INDEM) Founda- tion. Since 2012, he has been chairman of the Scientific Council of the Russian Association of Political Science for the comparative study of party and electoral systems. Korgunyuk is the author of numerous publications on the Russian political system and domestic politics.

Yury Korgunyuk

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Recommended Books and Top 10 Twitter accounts for articles on the russian political Russian domestic politics system

1. Anna Politkovskaya. Putin’s Russia: Life in a Failing @GovernmentRF Democracy. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2007. News on the work of the Prime Minister and the Government of Russia. 2. richard Sakwa. Putin Redux: Power and Contradiction in Contemporary Russia. Oxon and New York: Routledge, @Navalny 2014. Tweets in Russian from Alexey Navalny, one of the most prominent figures in the “anti-systemic” opposition and the 3. r ichard Rose and Neil Munro. Elections Without Order: leader of the Progress Party. Russia’s Challenge to Vladimir Putin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. @MedvedevRussiaE Dmitry Medvedev is the Prime Minister of Russia and the 4. Konstantin Simonov. Three Myths of the Opposition. leader of the ruling party United Russia. Valdai Discussion Club, December 26, 2014. http://val- daiclub.com/inside_russia/74800.html @MD_Prokhorov Mikhail Prokhorov is a Russian billionaire and the former 5. Alexander Baunov. The Killing of Boris Nemtsov and ideological leader of the Civic Platform party. the Degradation of Russian Authoritarianism. Carnegie Moscow Center, March 1, 2015. http://carnegie.ru/ @MBK_center eurasiaoutlook/?fa=59212 News and views from the official support team behind Mikhail Khodorkovsky, founder of the democratic movement 6. Samuel Greene. Moscow in Movement: Power and Open Russia. Opposition in Putin’s Russia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014. @Levada_ru Levada Center is a Russian independent, non-governmental 7. Eduard Limonov. Neo-Bolshevism: Will Putin Reject polling and sociological research organization. Tweets in Liberal Democracy? Moscow: Algoritm, 2014. (in Rus- Russian. sian) @CarnegieRussia 8. Andrei P. Tsygankov. The Strong State in Russia: Op-eds and analysis on Russia from the Carnegie Moscow Development and Crisis. New York: Oxford University Center. Press, 2014. @KPRFnews 9. Alena V. Ledeneva. Can Russia Modernize? Sistema, Tweets in Russian from the Communist Party of Russia. Power Networks and Informal Governance. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. @ER_novosti Official Twitter account of the ruling United Russia party. 10. Maria Lipman and Nikolay Petrov. Russia 2025: Tweets in Russian. Scenarios for the Russian Future. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. @YablokoRu Updates from the Russian United Democratic Party Yabloko (“Apple”). Tweets in Russian.

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