RUSSIA-DIRECT.ORG |#20 | MARCH 2015 © ILIA PITALEV / RIA NOVOSTI © ILIA PITALEV BY YURY KORGUNYUK AVAILABLE FOR SUBSCRIBERS ONLY FREE ISSUE Mapping Russia’s political landscape afteR neMtsov | #20 | MaRcH 2015 EDITor’s noTE The murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov fundamentally changed the landscape of Russian politics. In the month that has passed since his murder, both Western and Russian commentators have weighed in on what this means – not just for the fledgling Russian opposition movement, but also for the Kremlin. What follows is a comprehensive overview of the landscape of political Ekaterina forces in Russia today and their reaction to Nemtsov’s murder. Zabrovskaya The author of this Brief is Yury Korgunyuk, an experienced political ana- Editor-in-Chief lyst in Moscow and the head of the political science department at the Moscow-based Information Science for Democracy (INDEM) Foundation. Also, we would like to inform you, our loyal readers, that later this spring, Russia Direct will introduce a paid subscription model and will begin charging for its reports. There will be more information regarding this ini- tiative on our website www.russia-direct.org and weekly newsletters. We are thrilled about this development and hope that you will support us as the RD editorial team continues to produce balanced analytical sto- ries on topics untold in the American media. Keeping the dialogue be- tween the United States and Russia going is a challenging but important task today. Please feel free to email me directly at [email protected] with any questions or suggestions. 2 r ussia direct brief www.russia-direct.org Mapping Russia’s political landscape afteR neMtsov | #20 | MaRcH 2015 MAPPING RUSSIA’s politicAL LANDSCAPE AFTER NEMTSOV Yury Korgunyuk, INDEM Foundation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The murder of prominent opposition liberal politician Boris Nemtsov in the center of Moscow was, in many ways, the ulti- mate black swan event for Russia’s political scene, introducing new uncertainty both for the Kremlin and its opposition in how to approach issues related to both foreign and domestic policy. What follows below is a sizing up of current political sentiment in Russia and a detailed analysis of the state of both the “sys- RE U temic” and “anti-systemic” opposition in Russia. Based on this TERS analysis, it appears that the Kremlin has done a remarkable job of neutralizing dissent with Russian political society — either by co-opting the political platforms and ideas of its rivals, or by taking steps to keep the “anti-systemic” opposition off-guard. As a result, figures such as Alexei Navalny or Mikhail Prokhorov, both of whom may be recognizable in Western political circles, have little or no ability to influence current political outcomes within Russia. Instead, figures from political parties (and splin- ter groups of those parties) that express solidarity with the Kremlin’s stance on Ukraine and the economy may hold great- er sway but at the cost of their political prospects in the future. This Brief wraps up with a look ahead to the Russian Duma elections of 2016, handicapping the chances of the various op- position parties to make inroads with Russia’s electorate. 3 r ussia direct brief www.russia-direct.org Mapping Russia’s political landscape afteR neMtsov | #20 | MaRcH 2015 AP he killing of prominent opposition liberal poli- IS THE MURDER OF NEMTSOV tician Boris Nemtsov on the night of Feb. 27 A CLAssIC BLACK SWAN EVENT? Tshocked literally everyone — the government, the opposition, the media and society at large. The murder of Nemtsov is sure to become something Over the past year, the liberal opposition has grown of a landmark in the political life of modern Russia. The accustomed to living in an atmosphere of hatred and country’s recent history is replete with political assas- direct threats, but never did it expect that its oppo- sinations, including ones that have been politically mo- nents would move so quickly from word to deed. The tivated. Recall the murder of the State Duma deputy Russian opposition understands the need to rebuild Galina Starovoitova in 1998, journalist Anna Politkovs- itself and adapt to the new conditions, but does not kaya in 2006, and the numerous murders of opponents quite know how to go about it. of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov in Russia and Ever since the start of its activities in Crimea and East- abroad. ern Ukraine, the Kremlin has resorted to unconvention- However, none of them was ever preceded by an al methods from a “peacekeeping” point of view, but extensive propaganda campaign to legitimize physi- is not ready to import these methods back to Russia cal elimination as a political tactic. This time around, a just yet. These methods are good for stoking tension campaign to that effect was in full swing. Russia’s air- on foreign soil, but it is clearly not in the interests of the waves were teeming with talk shows on which panelists Russian authorities to recreate such chaos back home lavished threats on Putin’s opponents, the “national in their own dominion. traitors” and “fifth columnists.” The media, especially TV, has managed to adapt to And although they themselves are unlikely to be ca- living in an information war against “internal and exter- pable of real action, many of their supporters outside nal enemies,” but they too were not prepared for the the studios have long been ready to move from word fact that these “enemies” would be murdered — not to deed. Some of them even have combat experience in the wilderness of Ukraine, but right in the center of from operations in “Novorossiya” and the Donetsk and Moscow, a stone’s throw from the Kremlin. Luhansk regions of Ukraine. No wonder the first reaction of even the most loyal Whether the physical elimination of opponents be- government media to the assassination was one of ut- comes common practice remains to be seen. Much ter perplexity. They clearly had no idea how to cover depends on the position of the authorities. If they the news and, contrary to established protocol of re- are savvy enough to realize that not only direct pro- cent years, opted to cover the situation using only facts motion of such actions, but also failure to reprimand in the early aftermath. the paymasters and foot soldiers threatens their own 4 r ussia direct brief www.russia-direct.org Mapping Russia’s political landscape afteR neMtsov | #20 | MaRcH 2015 existence, there is every chance of pulling back from umnists” and “national traitors” — are the natural con- the brink of civil war. However, if the Kremlin continues sequences of that decision. Stopping Russia’s gradual to sit idle, or, worse, tacitly encourages violence, sooner slide into a new Cold War with the West to the drum- or later the situation is likely to spin out of control, in- beat of militaristic hysteria is now beyond even Putin cluding the Kremlin’s. himself. Any step that could be interpreted as willing- If the real sponsors of Nemtsov’s murder escape pun- ness to compromise (i.e. weakness) threatens to under- ishment, and the versions that somehow Nemtsov him- mine his domestic position. self provoked the crime through his “anti-Islamic” state- After all, Putin’s 86 percent approval rating is that ments and/or its paymasters are outside of Russia (in of a military leader, one that is resisting the “hostile” Ukraine or in the West) are allowed to hold sway, then attempts to diminish his country’s role on the world it is possible that we have on our hands a situation that, stage. The owner of such a rating cannot allow it to fall; ever since the publication of the book by Lebanese- for it is no longer a question of poorer electoral pros- American scholar Nassim Taleb has been described as pects, but of his very image and, therefore, power. A a “black swan” event. It is a situation governed by un- decline would mean that Putin has suffered a defeat predictability. and is in retreat. The present situation demands that Putin remain THE KREMLIN HAS TWO OPTIONS balanced on the edge, without ever stepping over. It AFTER NEMTSOV’S MURDER seems that Putin has come as close to the edge as he can get. No wonder his rating, although rising, is start- For the Kremlin, the situation is made complex by the ing to level off: up 1-1.5 percent in recent months, ac- lack of options. It made its choice a year ago, when cording to leading Russian public opinion research President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea. Everything centers. else — the outbreak of war in southeastern Ukraine, Nemtsov’s murder is a nuisance for the Kremlin, be- sanctions and counter-sanctions, the “information war” cause the crime has nudged it towards having to take with the West, including the fight against “fifth col- a decisive step: Either backwards toward reconciliation Russian public opinion Question: Do you think Russia is going in the right direction? (1993-2015) Yes No Percent 80 78 70 66 62 58 60 60 60 54 50 58 55 48 40 29 30 35 22 31 20 26 22 19 10 7 0 Feb. 2011 Feb. Mar. 1997 Mar. Jan. 2015 Jan. 1996 Jan. 2014 July 2014 May 2014 May Mar. 1994 Mar. Oct. 2014 Oct. Feb. 1995 Feb. Feb. 2012 Feb. Feb. 2013 Feb. Feb. 2015 Feb. Feb. 1998 Feb. Feb. 1999 Feb. Feb. 2014 Feb. Nov. 2014 Nov. Feb. 2010 Feb. Feb. 2001 Feb. Dec. 2014 June 1993 Apr. 2014 Apr. June 2014 Feb. 2007 Feb. Feb. 2000 Feb.