The End of the Putin Consensus Ben Judah and Andrew Wilson

Home , Alexander Lebedev, Ilya Ponomarev, Leonid Parfyonov, Mikhail Prokhorov, Oleg Kashin, Putinisation

M E O P O L I CY

Since December, Russia has been rocked by mass protests SU The “Putin consensus” of the 2000s is over. demanding clean elections and an end to the culture of Although Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is immunity on corruption. After a decade of over-control, certain to win a hollow victory in the Russian Russia is undergoing a process of re-politicisation. After presidential elections in March, the current the financial crisis exposed Russia’s chronic governance MMARY electoral cycle has weakened his authority and crisis and its dashed dreams of being a rising economic shown the fragility of his regime. Russia is undergoing a process of re-politicisation and is power, as ECFR argued in Dealing with a Post-BRIC entering a phase of “late Putinism” that is likely Russia, the “Putin consensus” has broken down and to be characterised by elite divisions, continued the “Putin majority” in society has decayed.1 However, protests and a gradual ebbing away of popular although Russia is restless, it is not yet revolutionary. support. The protest movement that erupted There is still a passive Putin plurality, largely drawn from after the falsified vote in the parliamentary the older, poorer and more provincial parts of society election in December has not yet challenged that are frightened of change and see no alternative to Putin’s grip on power but is nevertheless a symptom of an increasingly unstable Russia. Putin. The protest movement remains a minority, but it is concentrated in the country’s most dynamic demographics The European Union should see the current – particularly among Muscovites the new middle classes, crisis as a clear signal that the Putin system will the young and the cultural elites. Mobilisation and political not last forever. Since December, the Kremlin activism are increasing from below, with an unprecedented has already faked counter-demonstrations, 16,300-plus volunteers to be election observers and online harassed the media, indulged in ritualistic but activism gathering steam. corrosive anti-Westernism, and splurged on social spending to try to re-consolidate support. Putin has also talked of reform, but his weakness While only slightly over a fifth of Russians agree with the will more likely make him more dependent on slogan “Not a single vote for Putin”, the old principles of his oligarchic allies. The EU should begin a the Putin consensus are no longer popular. More Russians long-term dialogue with the Russian opposition now think the “vertical of power” does more harm than focusing on improving anti-corruption practices good and want power to be shared between institutions inside the EU and take measures such as passing a pan-EU “Magnitsky List” to threaten those involved in egregious human rights abuses and corruption with visa bans and asset freezes. 1 Ben Judah, Jana Kobzova and Nicu Popescu, “Dealing with a Post-BRIC Russia”, European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2011, available at http://www.ecfr. eu/page/-/ECFR44_RUSSIA_REPORT_AW.pdf. 2 ECFR/50 March 2012 www.ecfr.eu The End of the Putin Consensus 4 3 2 This memo will argue that the current protest movement is movement protest current the that argue will memo This The protests have made it clear that Putin’s rule is time- is rule Putin’s that clear it made have protests The Russia. The EU must be constructive and avoid being being avoid and constructive be must EU The Russia. Russians think Putin is the (only) leader who can solve the the solve can who leader (only) the is Putin think Russians Both Russia and the EU will therefore have to deal with a with deal to have therefore will EU the and Russia Both Putin may have personalised power, but he has failed to to failed has he but power, personalised have may Putin and constituency for reform but did not deliver. It argues argues It deliver. not did but reform for constituency and Medvedev’s Dmitry of consequence unintended an actually a restless, uncertain period of “late Putinism”, which will will which Putinism”, “late of period uncertain restless, a opponents. significant out weeded has he because and contract – “stability after chaos” and prosperity instead of of instead prosperity and chaos” after “stability – contract country’s problems. country’s only because an element of fraud is built into the system system the into built is fraud of element an because only reform. The EU should therefore be prepared to engage engage to prepared be therefore should EU The reform. will leverage a hitherto unrealised aspect of the EU’s latent EU’s the of aspect unrealised hitherto a leverage will red lines for any post-election crackdown. The current crisis remains the first choice of around 40 percent of Russians if Russians of percent 40 around of choice first the remains rather than held by one man alone. man one by held than rather regime popularity, is clearly over. Russia is now entering entering now is Russia over. clearly is popularity, regime began which Putinism”, “high of period The Putin. weaker more broadly with a re-politicising but less predictable predictable less but re-politicising a with broadly more who is believed to be a close ally of Putin, has positioned positioned has Putin, of ally close a be to believed is who that Putin’s next term will be characterised by anti-Western those “against all,” undecided and not voting are accounted are accounted and not voting undecided all,” “against those the absence of meaningful opposition, low activism and high institutionalise Russia’s semi-authoritarian state for the the for state semi-authoritarian Russia’s institutionalise social pessimism and an increasingly unpopular regime. regime. unpopular increasingly an and pessimism social consensus, elite by characterised was and mid-2000s the in home, butwantstoprotectitsextensiveassetsintheEU. to unwillingness or inability and spending social high short, Putin’s power is now past its peak. peak. its past now is power Putin’s short, re- creeping is There debated. being is question succession power: the Russian elite is nervous about its prospects at at prospects its about nervous is elite Russian the power: clear set also but tactics, survival short-term by provoked harassment, media consumption, domestic for propaganda climate intellectual an up built which presidency, phantom participation –isbeginningtobreakdown. social Putin’s age. its showing is regime The term. longer himself himself as a with go-between the The protesters. once taboo politicisation and re-positioning amongst the oligarchs. In In oligarchs. the amongst re-positioning and politicisation limited and exposed splits in the elite. Alexey Kudrin, Kudrin, Alexey elite. the in splits exposed and limited for. be characterised by elite divisions, continued protests, protests, continued divisions, elite by characterised be ozhidayut-pobedy-v-putina-na-prezidentskikh-vyborakh. 1 February2012,availableathttp://www.levada.ru/01-02-2012/78-naseleniya- “Nasleniya ozhidayutpobedyvPutinanaprezidentskikh vyborakh”,LevadaCenter, byurokratii. at http://www.levada.ru/09-02-2012/rossiyane-o-vertikali-vlasti-korruptsii-i- vertikali vlasikorruptsiibyurokratii”,Levada Center,9February2012,available at http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/02/07_a_3991893.shtml; “Rossiyaneo Sergey Smironov,“DvukhSrokovDostatochno”, Gazeta.ru prezentatsii-chast-2. 2011, availableathttp://www.levada.ru/24-02-2012/vybory-prezidenta-dopolnenie-k- “Vybory prezindentadopolneniekprezentatsii chast2”,LevadaCenter,24February 4 He may claim a first-round win on polling day, but but day, polling on win first-round a claim may He 3 Independent polls indicate that Putin Putin that indicate polls Independent 2 Only 14 percent of of percent 14 Only , 7February2012,available “legitimacy crisis” as Putin’s post-Soviet rhetoric and the the and rhetoric post-Soviet Putin’s as crisis” “legitimacy As the Putin system declined under Medvedev, Russian Russian Medvedev, under declined system Putin the As How Medvedev’spresidency 5 7 6 The current wave of discontent is the unintended unintended the is discontent of wave current The undermined Putinism BRIC economy was damaged when it suffered the deepest deepest the suffered it when damaged was economy BRIC mtie peitd n pig 01 te eie ae a faced regime the 2011, spring in predicted Dmitriyev Putin consensus – admitted that “there is no real vertical of vertical real no is “there that admitted – consensus Putin and forest fires. In 2011, Putin himself conceded that 80 80 that conceded himself Putin 2011, In fires. forest and relied Kremlin the as state exposed was strong power” a of “vertical and rebuilt have to claim His boast. idle an as Medvedev presidency, as the financial crisis undermined its the during lustre its lost consensus Putin the Meanwhile, greatly develop a fifth “I”: ideas. Medvedev was articulate articulate was Medvedev ideas. “I”: fifth a develop greatly enough to do much to solve them. He denounced “legal “legal denounced He them. powerful solve not to but much do to problems, enough Russia’s define to enough consequence of Medvedev’s phantom presidency. Medvedev catch-all design of the ruling United Russia party looked looked party Russia United ruling the of design catch-all Kremlin’s the emerged, had aspirations distinct with class post- to reduced population the of swathes large with class, dysfunctionality of the system. Even the former Kremlin Kremlin former the Even system. the of dysfunctionality of journalist Oleg Kashin. Medvedev built up the case for for case the up built Medvedev Kashin. Oleg journalist of on “manual control” to micro-manage industrial disputes disputes industrial micro-manage to control” “manual on seen increasingly also was Caucasus north the in order o fly implemented. fully not return aspresident. reform but left reformers bitterly disappointed when he was think- the patronising by establishment the in thinking new nihilism”, corruption and the “signs of stagnation”, fostered recession in the G20 in 2009. His claim to have restored restored have to claim His 2009. in G20 the in recession middle classin2011butwasscuttledbyeliteinfighting. tank INSOR and the Skolkovo research centre, visiting the visiting centre, research Skolkovo the and INSOR tank investment, innovation and infrastructure. But he did did he But infrastructure. and innovation investment, nraigy outdated. increasingly lower-middle overwhelmingly was society Russian 1999 in society was changing from below. When Putin took power power took Putin When below. from changing was society hip online TV station Dozhd and denouncing the beating beating the denouncing and Dozhd station TV online hip key claims one by one. His claim that Russia was a growing a was Russia that claim His one. by one claims key percent of Kremlin orders to the regions were ignored or or ignored were regions the to orders Kremlin of percent institutions, “I”s: four modernise to failed but promised political system did not adapt. As academic Mikhail Mikhail academic As adapt. not did system political party project briefly promised to reconnect with the new new the with reconnect to promised briefly project party power inRussia,onlyaverticalofloyalty”. loyalist and spin doctor Gleb Pavlovsky – an architect of the the exacerbating “tandem” the with administrator, poor Soviet penury. But although by 2011 a new urban middle middle urban new a 2011 by although But penury. Soviet forced to announce in September 2011 that Putin would would Putin that 2011 September in announce to forced http://csis.org/files/attachments/110330_CSR_Political_Crisis_in_Russia.pdf. Develop”, CenterforStrategic Research,30March2011,abridged version availableat Sergey BelanovskyandMikhailDmitriev,“Political CrisisinRussiaandHowitMay David Hearst,“Putin:wehavelostRussia’strust”, the available athttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/12/putin-russia-lost-trust. Unless otherwisestated,quotationsarefrom interviewswiththeauthors. 7 The Kremlin-linked Right Cause Cause Right Kremlin-linked The 5 evdv a wdl se a a as seen widely was Medvedev Guardian

6 , 12November2011, Putin is now most unpopular amongst internet users and The protest movement is made up of new and old faces, the newly mobile middle class – the economic “winners of dissenting members of former Kremlin-controlled parties, Putinism”, who now feel like losers. The Centre for Strategic media elites, hipster activists and radicals. New political Research estimates that the middle class now accounts faces include the thirty-something anti-corruption activist for at least 25 percent of the population – about one third Alexey Navalny and the environmentalist Evgenia Chirikova, of the adult population and nearly half of the employed whose star status and “honest” appearances have helped the residents of large cities.8 The middle class believes it movement attract the apolitical. Navalny also flirts with faces stagnation and fears its gains under Putin will be nationalism. Old videos show him arguing for migrants to undermined unless there are proper courts, improved be expelled from Russia like a dentist removes teeth or for policing and an end to rampant corruption and the elite’s Caucasian terrorists to be shot like one swats cockroaches. oligarchic monopolisation of state resources. Falling real But it is not his nationalism that makes him popular. incomes after the 2009 recession have sharply decreased Ironically, his main appeal lies in his promise that Russia tolerance of corruption and nepotism. At the same time, the can become the modern, democratic country that Medvedev Putin majority has been eroded from below by lower-middle promised. class disgruntlement at uncontrolled mass migration, which totalled over 13.8 million in 2011, primarily from Central Alongside Navalny are 1990s democrats such as Boris Asia and the Caucasus.9 Nemtsov, Garry Kasparov and Vladimir Ryzhkov, who have helped to create an organisational structure but are To make matters worse, the Kremlin mismanaged the election. not as popular. MPs from the formerly tightly Kremlin- During the long build-up to the election, Medvedev hoped controlled party Just Russia, including the well-connected to secure a second term as president and built up a strong Ilya Ponomarev, have given the movement the credibility “modernisation” narrative. In December’s election, however, of having former regime forces onside. The protests neither Putin nor United Russia had a strong message to have also been fronted by members of the cultural elite sell. They could also no longer rely on “political technology” such as the TV star Leonid Parfyonov and the writer – the distinctive post-Soviet mix of PR and fraud. In fact, its Boris Akunin, who have given the movement its sparkle two most prominent practitioners, Pavlovsky and the “grey and “trustworthiness” to Russians deeply distrustful of cardinal” Vladislav Surkov, supported Medvedev to varying politicians and revolutionaries. The movement’s rallies degrees because Putin was becoming harder to sell. It was have been promoted not by the politicians but by young elite easy to expose the lazy and unsophisticated election fraud Moscow hipster Facebook activists and the editor of glamour in December. As a result, instead of producing a resounding magazine Afisha, Ilya Krasilshchik, and the editor of online majority to demonstrate Putin’s strength in the run-up to TV station Dozhd, Mikhail Zygar. Representative of a young, the presidential election, the Kremlin’s mismanagement of trendy and aspirational generation of Muscovites, they have the December election simply demonstrated how unpopular grabbed the attention of the capital’s youth. For them, the the system had become. movement is about making Russia modern, pluralistic and “liveable”.

Who are the anti-Putin protesters? The movement also includes newly prominent radical neo-Communist leftists like Sergey Udaltsov and “new The movement is in fact a coalition of movements that have nationalists” like Vladimir Tor and Konstantin Krylov, surged at the same time but not yet coalesced. There is a which has given it “street cred”. The new nationalists see single organisation committee for the rallies and a new the movement as a way to stop Putin’s policies of “flooding “League of Voters”, but no one party or long-term plan. This the country with immigrants” and integrating with Muslim coalition may be organising the rallies, but they are wooing states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Navalny straddles rather than leading the protesters, most of whom are making both liberal and nationalist strands: he calls for Russia to a moral not a party political stance. The protests have been “stop feeding the Caucasus” and to introduce a visa regime designed to appeal to the widest audience possible with for Muslim former Soviet states. online voting for speakers and a rock-concert atmosphere. They are also home-grown: unlike the “coloured revolutions” The protest movement is not a government in waiting, nor is or the Arab Awakening, the Russian rallies are notable for it currently capable of seizing power. There is no united long- their complete lack of interest in the outside world. There term plan, united policy programme or economic strategy. are no cries for help, or anger at foreign powers, or desire to This has led much of the Moscow elite to see the protesters join the EU or emulate the United States. as lightweight. “We are reacting, seeing how things go and working out how to respond to them,” says Chirikova. Navalny is a hero for some within the movement but has not emerged as a dominant leader. In terms of organisation and influence, the centre of gravity lies more with the media 8 Sergei Belanovsky, Mikhail Dmitriev, Svetlana Misikhina and Tatyana Omelchuk, “Socio-Economic Change and Political Transformation in Russia”, Center for Strategic elites and young Facebook activists who deplore the attempt Research, 7 November 2011, available at http://csis.org/files/attachments/111107_ CSR_Report_November_2011.pdf. to “hijack” the movement by the unpopular old democrats 9 Statistics from the Russian Federal Migration Bureau, available at http://www.fms.gov. and the “disruptive role” of the dissenting Just Russia MPs. ru/about/statistics/data/. 3 4 ECFR/50 March 2012 www.ecfr.eu The End of the Putin Consensus “insiders” and “outsiders” is increasingly blurred. To quote quote To blurred. increasingly is “outsiders” and “insiders” A draft manifesto has already been privately circulated. But circulated. privately been already has manifesto draft A Alongside the protest movement, there are also sudden sudden also are there movement, protest the Alongside Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, Igor Sechin, and Mikhail and Mikhail and Sechin, Igor Rotenberg, Boris and Arkady Yury Kovalchuk). Others are gravitating towards “super “super towards gravitating are Others Kovalchuk). Yury For now, the hipster activists are unsure about what to do do to what about unsure are activists hipster the now, For Kudrin and/or billionaire “liberal” Mikhail Prokhorov. The Prokhorov. Mikhail “liberal” billionaire and/or Kudrin Putin’s inauguration on 8 May. Other activists prefer to to prefer activists Other May. 8 on inauguration Putin’s Navalny has also gone quiet as he builds up his team for the Ponomarev, have built links to prominent oligarchs, one- oligarchs, prominent to links built have Ponomarev, new the with disgruntled increasingly are Aven) Pyotr president next the be to wanting on taboo “the Pavlovsky, as the murder of the journalist Hryhoriy Gongadze caused Gongadze Hryhoriy journalist the of murder the as and are less likely to remain loyal to Putin to the bitter bitter the to Putin to loyal remain to likely less are and oligarchic one as though, themselves, re-positioning and re-politicising oligarchs of talk with abuzz also is Moscow go on holiday in January to Mexico instead of keeping up up keeping of instead Mexico to January in holiday on go concentrate onbuildinguptheirownbrands. célèbre for the opposition to rally around in the same way way same the in around rally to opposition the for célèbre generation of “Putin’s friends” (such as Gennady Timchenko, ground –forexample,inthethink-tankINSOR. of a “tent city” in front of the Kremlin to block (or mock) mock) (or block to Kremlin the of front in city” “tent a of end. Many opposition politicians, including Navalny and and Navalny including politicians, opposition Many end. officials” who have resources due to their state positions positions state their to due resources have who officials” next. Ilya Ponomarev from Just Russia says he is thinking thinking is he says Russia Just from Ponomarev Ilya next. o-eortc oite lk Rsi eey atr s a is master every Russia like societies non-democratic within the Russian elite are gravitating towards Alexey Alexey towards gravitating are elite Russian the within and interests their protect to same the stay to him want mid-term and avoids spending his political capital too soon. too capital political his spending avoids and mid-term the pressure. The opposition will survive, however, although “opposition the transcended not has he that accusation the the influential state-owned bank VTB has called for Putin to “In candidate: presidential one to adviser economics the to Putin (such as Viktor Vekselberg, Mikhail Fridman and and Fridman Mikhail Vekselberg, Viktor as (such Putin to those that want to sacrifice him to save the system.” Some system.” the save to him sacrifice to want that those in danger if he creates his own Gongadze” – that is, a cause a is, that – Gongadze” own his creates he if danger in it catapult to mistakes making Putin on depend now may it in Ukraine2004. serve onlyonemoreterm. signs of life within the elite: the bureaucracy is gridlocked, gridlocked, is bureaucracy the elite: the within life of signs idea of “Medvedevism without Medvedev” is also gaining gaining also is Medvedev” without “Medvedevism of idea his critics have shifted from questioning his nationalism to nationalism his questioning from shifted have critics his source put it, “we are creating options, not making choices”. making not options, creating are “we it, put source has gone.” Pavlovsky believes the elite is now divided divided now is elite the believes Pavlovsky gone.” has party scene”. Navalny was widely ridiculed for choosing to choosing for ridiculed widely was Navalny scene”. party protests in 2000–01 – a prelude to the “Orange Revolution” “Orange the to prelude a – 2000–01 in protests person removed. Billionaire Alexander Lebedev has put put has Lebedev Alexander Billionaire removed. person to According Putin. after life imagining are people place: between line the and bets, their hedging are players leading Some of the 1990s oligarchs who do not owe their wealth wealth their owe not do who oligarchs 1990s the of Some forward. A popular refrain in Moscow is that “Putin is only is “Putin that is Moscow in refrain popular A forward. forward Navalny to the board of Aeroflot and the director of taking now is unthinkable previously The puppet.” former between “those that want to transform Putin, those that that those Putin, transform to want that “those between Why aweakerPutinwillstruggle A weaker Putin could also mean escalating corruption and and corruption escalating mean also could Putin weaker A Although Putin promised to reform Russia, the Putin system – percent. 5–6 11 10 This means Moscow is likely to be more withdrawn and less He doesnotmentiontheword“reset”inrelationtoUS. However, Putin has campaigned in defiantly populist populist defiantly in campaigned has Putin However, Putin’s pre-election article “Russia in a changing world” has to reformRussia On the other hand, Putin is hinting at a belated round of of round belated a at hinting is Putin hand, other the On and Latvia and Estonia of policies language the attacks and assets are vulnerable, but without their support Putin is also mutually are allies his and Putin property, with fused and vulnerable. Therefore neither can afford genuine political political genuine afford can neither Therefore vulnerable. co-operative on foreign-policy issues, from frozen conflicts frozen from issues, foreign-policy on co-operative corporate governance, privatisation, infrastructure infrastructure privatisation, governance, corporate coming to a close. In short, Putin’s next term is unlikely to unlikely is term next Putin’s short, In close. a to coming is rule his sense they as oligarchs Putin the by flight capital the into cut to able less thus loyalty, elite on dependent over, growing by 3–4 percent of GDP. But with improved improved with But GDP. of percent 3–4 by growing over, oligarchic monopolisation that defines Russian corruption. corruption. Russian defines that monopolisation oligarchic employees, including teachers, policemen and university university and policemen teachers, including employees, of shale gas and liquid natural gas are mid-term challenges mid-term are gas natural liquid and gas shale of made it clear there is unlikely to be a new Putin in foreign in Putin new a be to unlikely is there clear it made will be less willing to tackle mounting economic challenges, economic mounting tackle to willing less be will maintaining the “social contract”, keeping the oligarchs oligarchs the keeping contract”, “social the maintaining mode, promising dramatically increased salaries for state state for salaries increased dramatically promising mode, to the Middle East. Russia’s obstructive Syria policy has has policy Syria obstructive Russia’s East. Middle the to the financial crisis. Without reform, the economy will tick tick will economy the reform, Without crisis. financial the before experienced it that percent 7 almost of growth the to the West’s “punishment” of countries in which it intervenes. though delaying reform only makes him more vulnerable vulnerable more him makes only reform delaying though the pension system and increasing utility prices to repair repair to prices utility increasing and system pension the to beinshortsupply. investment and liberalisation, it could grow at between between at grow could it liberalisation, and investment interdependent, and without Putin at the top, his friends’ friends’ his top, the at Putin without and interdependent, is too entrenched to change. Power in Russia is personalised is higher. Cutting back on one or the other would require require would other the or one on back Cutting higher. is state or resources. In fact, a weaker Putin will be more more be will Putin weaker a fact, In resources. or state in the long run. Outstanding issues include reforming reforming include issues Outstanding run. long the in strong leadership and political capital, which are both likely infrastructure at constant risk of breakdown. The emergence policy. liberal economic reform. Russia needs to return its economy loyal and funding modernisation are only possible if growth happy: everyone keep cannot Russia growth, of levels lower liberalisation, which would contest their control over the the over control their contest would which liberalisation, lecturers, and more money for healthcare. A weaker Putin Putin weaker A healthcare. for money more and lecturers, been presented domestically as standing up to the West. West. the to up standing as domestically presented been be asstablehisprevioustenuresinoffice. NS4053_908.pdf. Journal ofInternational Affairs,Spring2010,available athttp://relooney.info/0_ Sergei GurievandEkaterinaZhuravskaya,“Why RussiaisNotSouthKorea”, available athttp://mn.ru/politics/20120227/312306749.html. Vladimir Putin,“RossiaiMenyaushisyaMir”, 10 In it, he highlights threats posed by “pseudo-NGOs” 11 The difference may sound small, but, at at but, small, sound may difference The Moskovskie Novosti

, 27February2011, to the Russian economy’s energy overdependence, and the According to Konstantin Sonin: “Doing something with regime’s budget is highly vulnerable to a collapse in oil prices. Hungary is the best way of helping Russia. In Hungary Economist Nouriel Roubini predicts that “the economy will they’re doing what Putin did in two years.” The EU should stagnate, reform efforts will stumble and Russia will trail also pass a European version of the US “Magnitsky List”, its BRIC peers in development when Putin returns to the which imposed visa bans and assets freezes on Russians Kremlin.”12 involved in the killing of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. This would demonstrate that crimes committed within Russia Putin is also likely to restrict political freedom. The regime threaten the elite’s assets in Europe. “The single most does not have the strength for a violent crackdown, but important thing the EU could do is pass the Magnitsky list,” it is likely to continue to harass independent media such says Chirikova. “Putin is a family man, and those on the list as the radio station Ekho Moskvy, the newspaper Novaya are part of his extended Mafia family.” Gazeta and Russian MTV. A weaker Putin is also likely to create the appearance of making concessions to the protest The EU should also engage with the opposition. In movement. One possibility is that a weak Medvedev, or particular, it should engage with those among the Russian a stronger Kudrin, will be instructed to head a “coalition” elite who want “Medvedevism without Medvedev”. Co- government – probably confined to politicians from the operation with them on practical issues, which could make loyalist parties already represented in parliament. Other the country less corrupt and more efficient, can easily be possibilities include starting an open-ended dialogue with done through the current policy matrix of “Partnerships unpopular old democrats in the opposition movement or for Modernisation”. The EU should signal its willingness to appointing the oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, who has been help Russia improve its state tender system and reporting running for president with Putin’s consent to gather liberal on government contracts. The EU should not repeat the votes, as a deputy prime minister. mistake it made in the Arab world, where it began serious engagement with opposition leaders too late to influence The mid-term consequences of a weaker Putin and a re- their views. Corruption is a major issue for the Russian politicising Russia will be the emergence of a new wave protest movement and protest leaders have rightly argued of opposition and quasi-opposition leaders, especially if that the EU is not doing enough to investigate where this the government announces pre-term elections for a new money comes from. “The EU needs to help Russia fight parliament in 2014. This might suit the interests of all sides: corruption and not just see the money coming in as good for it would build on the reforms announced by Medvedev its economy,” says Ponomarev. in December 2011, channel the opposition’s energies into party-building, and allow the elite to carry on trying to The EU should launch a new anti-corruption dialogue with create artificial parties from above. According to opposition Russia, including opposition leaders, government officials leader Vladimir Milov therefore, “Navalny is just the first. and anti-corruption activists. The EU delegation in Moscow A new political generation is planning to enter the fray.” should host regular workshops, and the EU should arrange But, he warns, “the new generation of Russian democrats working visits of Russian participants to consult EU and will not be pro-Western but populists like (Boris) Yeltsin member state officials on reforming EU legislation to make and (Vladimir) Zhirinovsky. There will be a new wave of it harder for corrupt Russian money to find a safe home leftist and nationalist feelings.” Even hitherto loyal Kremlin inside the EU. Such a dialogue would also provide the EU parties, Zhirinovsky’s nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, with an apolitical platform through which it can engage Just Russia and the Communists are likely to be less easy to emerging new opposition leaders. Navalny’s team thinks control. that the EU national governments already have sufficient information to investigate current or former members of the elite. The EU should support the development of a How the EU should deal with pan-European anti-bribery act modelled on the 2010 UK a weaker Putin Bribery Act, which would change business practices by EU companies in Russia. The EU should refrain from counter-productive loud support for the opposition movement but at the same time Ironically, many Russians – including both those in brace itself for, but not be frightened of, a new wave of anti- government and those in the protest movement –see the EU Western propaganda. If Kremlin smears start to focus on old as an unprincipled power in decline. The EU must largely targets such as the UK and the Baltic states, the EU should remain a bystander to the course of Russian domestic events, calmly refute such accusations and express solidarity with but it now has an opportunity to reverse that impression any member state that comes under pressure. At the same and shape the incentives of all sides. The paradox of a time, the EU should also put its own house in better order corrupt Russian elite spreading its assets in the EU used – for example, by resisting the “Putinisation of Hungary”. to be a factor undermining EU principles and solidarity at home. Used skilfully, it can now be used to opposite effect, and could help nudge a divided elite into making the right calls as their once unquestioned power begins to fade. 12 Tai Adelaja, “A looming ‘lost decade’?”, the Moscow News, 20 February 2011, available at http://themoscownews.com/politics/20120220/189472454.html. 5 6 ECFR/50 March 2012 www.ecfr.eu The End of the Putin Consensus Acknowledgements In London, the authors would like to thank William Rice, Rice, William thank to like would authors the London, In Pappas, without whose hospitality we would not have been at Nicu Popescu and Jana Kobzova for commenting on earliercommentingon forKobzova Jana andPopescu Nicu Morozovfor his insights and introductions as well as Garrett versions of this draft. In Moscow, we are grateful to Alexander Sakharova. About the authors the About Andrew Wilson Andrew Unexpected NationsUnexpected Ben Judah Ben Eastern Neighbourhood

Last European Dictatorship European Last (2011) and(2011) (SSEES) at University College London. He has previously previously has He London. College University at (SSEES) Foreign Relations. Previously he was a reporter based in in based reporter a was he Previously Relations. Foreign Kyrgyz revolution of 2012 – has also featured in publications with a post-BRIC Russia Standpoint Popescu). and Cambridge. His most recent books are are books recent most His Cambridge. and Moscow with Reuters.reportingformerMoscowwithacrossHisthefrom Council on Foreign Relations and a reader in Ukrainian Ukrainian in reader a and Relations Foreign on Council including the the including heldacademic positions LondontheatSchool Economics of StudiestheSchoolat Slavonic of andEastEuropean Studies Soviet Union - including on the Georgian War and the the and War Georgian the on including - Union Soviet for ECFR include include ECFR for and is a Policy Fellow at the European Council on on Council European the at Fellow Policy a is Turning Presence into Power: Lessons from theLessonsTurningPower: fromPresenceinto Financial Times Financial is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European European the at Fellow Policy Senior a is ForeignPolicy verdict Tymoshenko the after Ukraine (third edition, 2009). His publicationsHis 2009).edition, (third (with Nicu Popescu). report (with Jana Kobzova and Nicu (2011) and and (2011) . He co-authoredHe. the , , The Economist The The Ukrainians: Ukrainians: The Belarus: The The Belarus: , , Prospect Dealing , Among members of the European Council on Foreign Relations are Jerzy Buzek (Poland) Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Denmark) Michiel van Hulten Member of the European Parliament; Chairman, Baltic Development Forum; (The Netherlands) former prime ministers, presidents, former President of the European former Foreign Minister European commissioners, current Course leader of the FutureLab Europe Parliament; former Prime Minister programme, European Policy Centre, and former parliamentarians and Steven Everts (The Netherlands) Brussels; former Member of the ministers, public intellectuals, Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) Adviser to the Vice President of the European Parliament business leaders, activists and cultural Minister for International Development European Commission and EU High Cooperation Representative for Foreign and Security Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) figures from the EU member states Policy and candidate countries. Maria Livanos Cattaui Member of the European Parliament (Switzerland) Tanja Fajon (Slovenia) Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) Former Secretary General of the Member of the European Parliament Former Ambassador and former Asger Aamund (Denmark) International Chamber of Commerce Executive Director, Crisis Management President and CEO, A. J. Aamund A/S Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Initiative and Chairman of Bavarian Nordic A/S Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) President, Chamber of Deputies; former Director of Melak Investments/Journalist Foreign Minister Toomas Ilves (Estonia) Urban Ahlin (Sweden) President Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Carmen Chacón (Spain) Joschka Fischer (Germany) Affairs Committee and foreign policy Minister of Defence Former Foreign Minister and vice- Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) spokesperson for the Social Democratic Chancellor Chairman, Munich Security Conference; Party Charles Clarke (United Kingdom) Global Head of Government Affairs Visiting Professor of Politics, University Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) Allianz SE Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) of East Anglia; former Home Secretary Business Leader; former CEO Carnegie Chairman of the Board, Crisis Investment Bank Minna Järvenpää (Finland/US) Management Initiative; former Nicola Clase (Sweden) International Advocacy Director, Open President Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Lykke Friis (Denmark) Society Foundation former State Secretary Member of Parliament; former Minister Giuliano Amato (Italy) for Climate, Energy and Gender Equality Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) Former Prime Minister and vice Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany) Professor, London School of Economics President of the European Convention; Member of the European Parliament Jaime Gama (Portugal) Chairman, Centre for American Studies; Former Speaker of the Parliament; Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey) Chairman, Enciclopedia Treccani Robert Cooper (United Kingdom) former Foreign Minister Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister Counsellor of the European External of Turkey on foreign policy and public Gustavo de Aristegui (Spain) Action Service Timothy Garton Ash diplomacy Member of Parliament (United Kingdom) Gerhard Cromme (Germany) Professor of European Studies, Sylvie Kauffmann (France) Gordon Bajnai (Hungary) Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Oxford University Editorial Director, Le Monde Former Prime Minister the ThyssenKrupp Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) Olli Kivinen (Finland) Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) Daniel Daianu (Romania) Chairman of the Portuguese Institute Writer and columnist Member of Parliament; former Foreign Professor of Economics, National School of International Relations (IPRI) Minister of Political and Administrative Studies Ben Knapen (The Netherlands) (SNSPA); former Finance Minister Teresa Patricio Gouveia Minister for European Affairs and Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland) (Portugal) International Cooperation Professor of Economics at the Warsaw Massimo D’Alema (Italy) Trustee to the Board of the Calouste School of Economics; former Deputy President, Italianieuropei Foundation; Gulbenkian Foundation; former Gerald Knaus (Austria) Prime Minister President, Foundation for European Chairman of the European Stability Progressive Studies; former Prime Foreign Minister Initiative and Carr Center Fellow Lluís Bassets (Spain) Minister and Foreign Minister Deputy Director, El País Heather Grabbe (United Caio Koch-Weser (Germany) Marta Dassù (Italy) Kingdom) Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; Marek Belka (Poland) Under Secretary of State for Foreign Executive Director, Open Society Institute former State Secretary Governor, National Bank of Poland; Affairs – Brussels former Prime Minister Bassma Kodmani (France) Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) Charles Grant (United Kingdom) Executive Director of the Arab Reform Roland Berger (Germany) Foreign Minister Director, Centre for European Reform Initiative Founder and Honorary Chairman, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Rem Koolhaas (The Netherlands) GmbH Poet and Cultural Critic Director of the Centre on International Architect and urbanist; Professor at the Conflict Resolution, Columbia University Graduate School of Design, Harvard Erik Berglöf (Sweden) Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) (New York); Senior Fellow, Brookings University Chief Economist, European Bank for Member of the European Parliament; Institution; former Under-Secretary- Reconstruction and Development former Prime Minister General for Peacekeeping Operations Bernard Kouchner (France) at the UN Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Gianfranco Dell’Alba (Italy) Chairman, Prime Minister’s Economic Director, Confederation of Italian Fernando Andresen Guimarães Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria) Council; former Prime Minister Industry (Confindustria) - Brussels (Portugal) Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal office; former Member of the European Head of the US and Canada Division, Strategies Carl Bildt (Sweden) Parliament European External Action Service Foreign Minister Aleksander Kwas´niewski (Poland) Pavol Demeš (Slovakia) Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Former President Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German President, Polish Confederation of Marshall Fund of the United States (Germany) Mart Laar (Estonia) Private Employers – Lewiatan (Bratislava) Former Defence Minister Minister of Defence; former Prime Minister Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Kemal Dervis (Turkey) István Gyarmati (Hungary) Founder, Communitas Foundation and Vice-President and Director of Global President and CEO, International Centre Miroslav Lajcˇák (Slovakia) President of Venture Equity Bulgaria Ltd. Economy and Development for Democratic Transition Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia, European External Action Emma Bonino (Italy) Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) Service; former Foreign Minister President, DEMOS Hungary Chairman, Defence Commission; Vice President of the Senate; former EU former Defence Minister Commissioner Alexander Graf Lambsdorff Hanzade Dog˘an Boyner (Turkey) Heidi Hautala (Finland) (Germany) Han ten Broeke Chair, Dog˘an Gazetecilik and Dog˘an Member of the European Parliament On-line Minister for International Development (The Netherlands) Pascal Lamy (France) Member of Parliament and Andrew Duff (United Kingdom) Steven Heinz (Austria) Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, Honorary President, Notre Europe and spokesperson for foreign affairs Member of the European Parliament Director-General of WTO; former EU and defence Lansdowne Partners Ltd Mikuláš Dzurinda (Slovakia) Commissioner John Bruton (Ireland) Foreign Minister Annette Heuser (Germany) Executive Director, Bertelsmann Bruno Le Maire (France) Former European Commission Minister for Food, Agriculture & Fishing Ambassador to the USA; former Prime Hans Eichel (Germany) Foundation Washington DC Minister (Taoiseach) Former Finance Minister Diego Hidalgo (Spain) Mark Leonard (United Kingdom) Co-founder of Spanish newspaper Director, European Council on Foreign Ian Buruma (The Netherlands) Rolf Ekeus (Sweden) Relations Writer and academic Former Executive Chairman, United El País; President, FRIDE Nations Special Commission on Iraq; Juan Fernando López Aguilar Erhard Busek (Austria) former OSCE High Commissioner on Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (The Chairman of the Institute for the Danube National Minorities; former Chairman Netherlands) (Spain) and Central Europe Stockholm International Peace Former NATO Secretary General Member of the European Parliament; Research Institute, SIPRI former Minister of Justice Danuta Hübner (Poland) Member of the European Parliament; Adam Lury (United Kingdom) former European Commissioner CEO, Menemsha Ltd 7 8 ECFR/50 March 2012 www.ecfr.eu The End of the Putin Consensus Ltd. Director, GlobalPartners&Associated ( Andrew Puddephatt Deputy Director, RealInstitutoElcano ( Charles Powell Minister Member ofParliament;formerForeign Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) Committee Bundestag ForeignAffairs Member ofParliament;Chairmanthe Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) Paris-Dauphine Director, Bruegel;Professor, Université Jean Pisani- Historian andauthor D former EUCommissioner chair oftheInternationalCrisisGroup; Chancellor ofOxfordUniversityandco- Chris Patten ( Chairman, PeopleinNeedFoundation S World BankGroup President andGeneralCounselofthe Former ForeignMinister;formerSenior Ana Palacio ( Party) Leader, Bündnis90/DieGrünen(Green Cem Özdemir (Germany) Commissioner Construcciones yContratas;formerEU Member oftheBoard,Fomentode Marcelino CEO, TheElders N Mabel van Amnesty International Relations; formerEuropeDirector, CEO, EuropeanCouncilonForeign D Former ForeignMinister Andrzej Editorialist Christine International andEuropeanAffairs Director-General, Instituteof D University ofOxford Professor ofInternationalRelations, (Greece/ Kalypso President, EurointelligenceASBL Wolfgang Münchau (Germany) der Energie-undWasserwirtschaft Chairwoman, BDEWBundesverband H Research Institute,UniversityofLatvia Director, AdvancedSocialandPolitical N for EuropeanAffairs Member ofParliament;formerMinister Pierre Moscovici ( Senior Adviser, IFRI D European Parliament Minister; formerMemberofthe Foreign Minister;formerDefence N chairman, LeMonde President ofAMConseil;former Alain Minc ( Commonwealth Affairs ofStateforForeignand Secretary Member ofParliament;Former D President, Confindustria E U S mma Marcegaglia ( imon Panek (Czech Republic) iana Pinto ( ick aithi ominique Moïsi ( avid Miliband ( etherlands) ildegard Müller (Germany) ils Muiznieks (Latvia) ickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) pain/ nited Kingdom) O O osting (The U ’Ceallaigh ( O N nited Kingdom) F O rance) lechowski (Poland) icolaïdis O ckrent (Belgium) O F reja Aguirre ( F rance) F ranje (The S erry ( U rance) pain) nited Kingdom)

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taly) S pain) (The ( George Robertson Director, McKinsey&Company (The Robert Reibestein Foreign Minister Vesna Pusic´ (Croatia) George GeneralofNATOEU; formerSecretary oftheCouncil Secretary-General Common ForeignandSecurityPolicy& Former EUHighRepresentativeforthe Javier Foundation Chairman oftheBoard,StefanBatory Aleksander Foreign Minister Radosław President oftheSpanishGovernment Chair ofCIDOBFoundation;formerVice N UniCreditSpa Affairs, Executive VicePresident,HeadofPublic Giuseppe Foreign Minister Karel Chancellor Member ofParliament;former Wolfgang SRSG toCoted’Ivoire former DirectorGeneral,FRIDE; Chair ofOlofPalmeMemorialFund; Pierre Member oftheEuropeanParliament Marietje European Commission Director GeneralforEnlargement, S ENI Affairs, Vice President,InternationalInstitutional Pasquale CEO, Proventus D Florence Professor, EuropeanUniversityInstitute, O andNuclearSafety Conservation Minister fortheEnvironment, N Euro-Atlantic SecurityInitiative Matters,Commissionerof on Difficult Co-Chairman ofPolish-RussianGroup Former MinisterofForeignAffairs; Adam Affairs GeneralforForeign Former Secretary Albert Rohan (Austria) GeneralofNATOFormer Secretary Moldova Prime MinisteroftheRepublic President, GreenLightInvest;former I Chief Correspondent,DieWelt Michael Minister formerForeign European Affairs; Minister forForeignTrade and Alexander Member ofParliament Rory Playwright andAcademic Goran Journalist Teresa de Foundations Founder andChairman,OpenSociety (Czech Republic) on U tefano aniel arcís orbert Röttgen (Germany) livier Roy ( nited Kingdom) S N N turza (Romania) S S tewart ( etherlands) etherlands) S S D S S S chwarzenberg olana ( chori ( erra ( tefanovski (Macedonia) . Rotfeld (Poland) S achs ( S S S oros ( annino ( türmer (Germany) S S chaake S S S S alzano ( cognamiglio ( ousa (Portugal) ikorski (Poland) chüssel (Austria) F S tubb ( rance) molar (Poland) S S S U S pain) H weden) weden) nited Kingdom) pain) ungary/ I F

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US I taly) A) Foreign Minister S CEO, ZeusCapitalManagersLtd S Ambassador toBrazil Carlos Alonso Zaldívar ( Director Strategy, MercatorHaus Director MercatorCentreBerlinand Andre Wilkens (Germany) Lawyer; formerEUCommissioner Antonio Vitorino (Portugal) Former President Vaira Vike- Education Former DeputyPMandMinisterof D Foreign Minister E President, ELIAMEP Professor, UniversityofAthensand Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece) International Relations Director, FinnishInstitutefor Teija Tiilikainen ( European Strategy President, DemosEUROPA -Centrefor Paweł rkki Tuomioja ( amuel Žbogar ( telios Zavvos (Greece) aniel Valtchev, (Bulgaria) S ´ wieboda (Poland) F reiberga (Latvia) F F inland) S inland) lovenia) S pain) Also available Supporting Moldova’s Egypt’s Hybrid Revolution: Ukraine after the Tymoshenko from ECFR Democratic Transition a Bolder EU Approach verdict Nicu Popescu, October 2009 Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski Andrew Wilson, December 2011 New World Order: The Balance (ECFR/17) and Nick Witney, May 2011 (ECFR/47) of Soft Power and the Rise of (ECFR/32) Herbivorous Powers Can the EU rebuild failing European Foreign Policy Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, states? A review of Europe’s A Chance to Reform: How the Scorecard 2012 October 2007 (ECFR/01) Civilian Capacities EU can support Democratic February 2012 (ECFR/48) Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, Evolution in Morocco A Power Audit of EU-Russia October 2009 (ECFR/18) Susi Dennison, Nicu Popescu The Long Shadow of Relations and José Ignacio Torreblanca, Ordoliberalism: Germany’s Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, Towards a Post-American May 2011 (ECFR/33) Approach to the Euro Crisis November 2007 (ECFR/02) Europe: A Power Audit of Sebastian Dullien and Ulrike EU-US Relations China’s Janus-faced Response Guérot, February 2012 (ECFR/49) Poland’s second return to Europe? Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, to the Arab Revolutions Paweł Swieboda, December 2007 October 2009 (ECFR/19) Jonas Parello-Plesner and (ECFR/03) Raffaello Pantucci, June 2011 Dealing with Yanukovych’s (ECFR/34) Afghanistan: Europe’s Ukraine forgotten war Andrew Wilson, March 2010 What does Turkey think? Daniel Korski, January 2008 (ECFR/20) Edited by Dimitar Bechev, June (ECFR/04) 2011 (ECFR/35) Beyond Wait-and-See: Meeting Medvedev: The Politics The Way Forward for What does Germany think of the Putin Succession EU Balkan Policy about Europe? Andrew Wilson, February 2008 Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus Edited by Ulrike Guérot and (ECFR/05) and Daniel Korski, May 2010 Jacqueline Hénard, June 2011 (ECFR/21) (ECFR/36) Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy A Global China Policy The Scramble for Europe Nick Witney, July 2008 (ECFR/06) François Godement, June 2010 François Godement and Jonas (ECFR/22) Parello-Plesner with Alice Can the EU win the Peace in Richard, July 2011 (ECFR/37) Georgia? Towards an EU Human Rights Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and Strategy for a Post-Western Palestinian Statehood at the Andrew Wilson, August 2008 World UN: Why Europeans Should (ECFR/07) Susi Dennison and Anthony Vote “Yes” Dworkin, September 2010 Daniel Levy and Nick Witney, A Global Force for Human (ECFR/23) September 2011 (ECFR/38) Rights? An Audit of European Power at the UN The EU and Human Rights The EU and Human Rights at Richard Gowan and Franziska at the UN: 2010 Review the UN: 2011 Review Brantner, September 2008 Richard Gowan and Franziska Richard Gowan and Franziska (ECFR/08) Brantner, September 2010 Brantner, September 2011 (ECFR/24) (ECFR/39) Beyond Dependence: How to deal with Russian Gas The Spectre of a Multipolar How to Stop the Pierre Noel, November 2008 Europe Demilitarisation of Europe (ECFR/09) Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard Nick Witney, November 2011 with Dimitar Bechev, Jana (ECFR/40) Re-wiring the US-EU relationship Kobzova & Andrew Wilson, Daniel Korski, Ulrike Guerot and October 2010 (ECFR/25) Europe and the Arab Mark Leonard, December 2008 Revolutions: A New Vision for (ECFR/10) Beyond Maastricht: a New Democracy and Human Rights Deal for the Eurozone Susi Dennison and Anthony Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge Thomas Klau and François Dworkin, November 2011 Daniel Korski, March 2009 Godement, December 2010 (ECFR/41) (ECFR/11) (ECFR/26) Spain after the Elections: the A Power Audit of EU-China The EU and Belarus after “Germany of the South”? Relations the Election José Ignacio Torreblanca and John Fox and Francois Godement, Balázs Jarábik, Jana Kobzova Mark Leonard, November 2011 April 2009 (ECFR/12) and Andrew Wilson, January (ECFR/42) 2011 (ECFR/27) Beyond the “War on Terror”: Four Scenarios for the Towards a New Transatlantic After the Revolution: Europe Reinvention of Europe Framework for Counterterrorism and the Transition in Tunisia Mark Leonard, November 2011 Anthony Dworkin, May 2009 Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, (ECFR/43) (ECFR/13) Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney, March 2011 (ECFR/28) Dealing with a Post-Bric Russia The Limits of Enlargement-lite: Ben Judah, Jana Kobzova and European and Russian Power in European Foreign Policy Nicu Popescu, November 2011 the Troubled Neighbourhood Scorecard 2010 (ECFR/44) Nicu Popescu and Andrew March 2011 (ECFR/29) Wilson, June 2009 (ECFR/14) Rescuing the euro: what is The New German Question: China’s price?’ The EU and human rights at the How Europe can get the François Godement, November UN: 2009 annual review Germany it needs 2011 (ECFR/45) Richard Gowan and Franziska Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard, Brantner, September 2009 April 2011 (ECFR/30) A “Reset” with Algeria: the (ECFR/15) Russia to the EU’s South Turning Presence into Power: Hakim Darbouche and Susi What does Russia think? Lessons from the Eastern Dennison, December 2011 edited by Ivan Krastev, Mark Neighbourhood (ECFR/46) Leonard and Andrew Wilson, Nicu Popescu and Andrew September 2009 (ECFR/16) Wilson, May 2011 (ECFR/31)

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