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Yaroslavl Roadmap 10-15-20 10 Years to Implement 15 Steps to Take 20 Pitfalls to Avoid International Experience and the Path Forward for Russian Innovation Policy Israel Finland Taiwan India USA Russia The New York Academy of Sciences is the world’s nexus of scientific innovation in the service of humanity. For nearly 200 years—since 1817—the Academy has brought together extraordinary people working at the frontiers of discovery and promoted vital links between science and society. One of the oldest scientific institutions in the United States, the Academy has become not only a notable and enduring cultural institution in New York City, but also one of the most significant organizations in the international scientific community. The Academy has a three-pronged mission: to advance scientific research and knowledge, support scientific literacy, and promote the resolution of society’s global challenges through science-based solutions. Throughout its history, the Academy’s membership has featured global leaders in science, business, academia, and government, including U.S. Presidents Jefferson and Monroe, Thomas Edison, Louis Pasteur, Charles Darwin, Margaret Mead, and Albert Einstein. Today, the New York Academy of Sciences’ President’s Council includes 26 Nobel Laureates as well as CEOs, philanthropists, and leaders of national science funding agencies. For more information on The New York Academy of Sciences, please visit www.nyas.org. Ellis Rubinstein, President and CEO The New York Academy of Sciences 7 World Trade Center 250 Greenwich Street, 40th floor New York, NY 10007-2157 212-298-8600 ©The New York Academy of Sciences, August 20, 2010, All Rights Reserved Authors and Contributors Principal Authors: Dr. Karin Ezbiansky Pavese, The New York Academy of Sciences Dr. Christopher Hayter, The New York Academy of Sciences Daniel M. Satinsky, Esq., MALD, Russia Innovation Collaborative and BEA Associates Authors: Ben Levitan, The New York Academy of Sciences Christopher Cooke, Yale University Contributions from the following groups of business, academic, and government leaders provided valuable insights and knowledge. Mr. Chet Bowling, Managing Partner, Alinga Mr. John T. Preston, Founder, C Change Investments, Consulting Group and President and CEO, Continuum Energy Dr. Michael Crow, President, Arizona State University Technologies, LLC Ms. Maria Douglass, President, ImPart Mr. John Rose, Chief Executive Officer, Rose Creative Strategies Ms. Esther Dyson, Founder, EDventure Holdings Inc. Mr. Ellis Rubinstein, President and CEO, New York Mr. Alexei Eliseev, Managing Director, Maxwell Biotech Academy of Sciences Ms. Yoanna Gouchtchina, General Manager, Dr. Blair Ruble, Director, Kennan Center, Woodrow Investment Advisory Group Wilson Center for International Scholars Dr. Trevor Gunn, Director Eastern Europe, Medtronic Dr. AnnaLee Saxenian, Dean and Professor, School of Inc. Information, University of California, Berkeley Dr. Alexandra Johnson, Managing Director, DFJ VTB Mr. Michael Sohlman, Executive Director, Nobel Aurora Foundation Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, Chairman, President, and Chief Dr. Nam Pyo Suh, President, Korea Advanced Institute Executive Officer, Alcoa Inc. of Science and Technology Dr. Martti Launonen, Chief Executive Officer, Vantaa Dr. Alexis Sukharev, Chief Executive Officer and Innovation Institute Founder, Auriga Inc. Dr. Richard Lester, Director, Industrial Performance Mr. Johan Vanderplaetse, Vice President & Chief Center, and Professor and Head, Department of Executive Officer, Emerson CIS Nuclear Science and Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Dr. Jeroen van der Veer, Former Chief Executive, Royal Dutch Shell Ms. Randi Levinas, Executive Vice President, U.S.- Russia Business Council Mr. Ed Verona, President, U.S.-Russia Business Council Dr. Tidu Maini, Executive Chairman, Qatar Science & Technology Park Mr. Vivek Wadhwa, Senior Research Associate, Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard Law School Mr. Valentin Makarov, President, RUSSOFT Russian Software Developers Association Mr. Kendrick White, Managing Principal, Marchmont Capital Mr. Sam Pitroda, Chairman, National Knowledge Commission Dr. Ernst-Ludwig Winnacker, Secretary General, Human Frontier Science Program Dr. William Pomeranz, Deputy Director, Kennan Center, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Dr. Philip Yeo, Special Advisor for Economic Scholars Development (Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore) and Chairman, SPRING Singapore Honorable Ilya Ponomarev, Chair of the High Tech Subcommittee of the Russian State Duma Special thanks to Vladislav Surkov. Timothy Post, Founder and Managing Director, Runet Labs ii Prologue The New York Academy of Sciences presents the Yaroslavl Roadmap 10-15-20 as a contribution to the historic transformation that Russia is undertaking under the leadership of President Medvedev. The Yaroslavl Roadmap 10-15-20 takes as its timeframe the ten-year period up to 2020 in accord with Russia’s own planning horizon. Ten years for accomplishing the transition to an innovative economy is actually quite short. A recent study prepared by RUSNANO put the time frame for achieving sustainable innovative development at twenty-five years for the United States of America and Taiwan Province, China, twenty years for Israel and ten years for Singapore and Finland. By these standards, if Russia achieves this status by 2020, it would be a relatively rapid transition and one that will require both perseverance and patience. The Yaroslavl Roadmap 10-15-20 is an overview and summary of the historical experience of innovation policy in five locales – Israel, Finland, Taiwan Province, China, India, and the United States of America. It then summarizes the current state of the innovation economy in Russia and makes fifteen specific recommendations for Russia based on comparing international experience with the current state of the Russian innovation economy and President Medvedev’s priorities. It also highlights twenty pitfalls for Russia to avoid. The New York Academy of Sciences sincerely believes that by implementing the recommendations contained in the Yaroslavl Roadmap and avoiding the pitfalls, the road to an innovation economy will be shortened. At the same time, it accepts that these recommendations are not an exclusive list and there may be other possible steps to take. Therefore, these recommendations are meant to be indicative and subject to further refinement. In preparing the report, work which began on May 24th and finished on August 18th, 2010, the New York Academy of Sciences carefully limited its scope to focus on innovation. The New York Academy of Sciences recognizes that there is a parallel process of modernization of Russian society that is also a focus of Russian government policy. The New York Academy of Sciences understands the importance of creating modern and transparent institutions, establishing an effective legal system and developing democratic procedures; however, this was not the topic of the Yaroslavl Roadmap 10-15-20. Those issues can and should be addressed separately. It is important to state that the pursuit of innovation does not imply that every aspect of the existing Russian economy is obsolete. Significant portions of Russia’s productive base should be preserved and strengthened as partners with new technology companies in a diversified and modernized economy. Russia does not need another period of destruction of the existing economic mechanism in pursuit of a new ideal future. The adoption of what might be technologically disruptive innovations should be a means of increasing the productivity of Russia and increasing the well- being of its people. The achievement of an innovative, knowledge-based economy in Russia should be understood as an ongoing process, not an end in itself. It is a process that will assist in resolving Russia’s fundamental issues, while raising Russia into the leading ranks of countries contributing to overall human welfare and solution of global problems. iii Table of Contents Authors and Contributors .......................................................................................ii Prologue ................................................................................................................iii Introduction 1 Innovation System ................................................................................................. 2 Project Description ................................................................................................ 3 Report Methodology .............................................................................................. 4 Report Layout ........................................................................................................ 4 Israel 5 Israel’s National Innovation System at a Glance ................................................... 6 Early Beginnings .................................................................................................... 9 The 1973 War ...................................................................................................... 11 Creation of BIRD .................................................................................................. 13 Changes in the Early 1980s ................................................................................. 14 Analysis and Lessons Learned ............................................................................ 17 Finland 19 Finland’s National Innovation System at a Glance ............................................
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