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United Russia Russian Election Campaign in Media Methodology and preliminary results Prof. Victor Vakhshtayn, Moscow school of social and economic sciences, University of Manchester (SEED) 18/09/2016 Parliamentary Elections • The elections will be held via a mixed voting system: from the 450 MP, 225 will be elected through party list (proportional voting system), while the other 225 will be elected from single-mandate constituencies (majoritarian voting system). • The electoral threshold for political parties has been lowered from 7 to 5%. • There is currently no minimum voter turnout requirement. 18/09/2016 Parliamentary Elections Parties that received at least 3% of the votes during the last Duma elections, as well as those that are represented in at least one of the regional parliaments of the Russian Federation are exempt from collecting a minimum amount of signatures (prior to being accepted to the election). The following parties currently meet either of both requirements: • United Russia • Yabloko • CPRF • Patriots of Russia • LDPR • Right Cause (Party of Growth) • A Just Russia • PARNAS • Communists of Russia • Pensioners’ Party • Motherland • Civic Force • Green Party “Medialogy” Data Base - 22 598 media weighed by regions. - Federal (6 013) and regional (14 221) media + blogs (2364). - TV (237), Radio (39), Press (2471), News agencies (412), Internet media agencies and blogs (19 439). - 234 000 messages in February-March. - Media sources updated 24 hours a day. Dynamics of Mentions The total dominance of 20000 the ‘United Russia’ party United Russia in the media. 18000 16000 Compared to the other 14000 parliamentary parties, the frequency of media 12000 mentions of the ruling 10000 party has been 2,5 to 5 times higher for the 8000 CPRF month of March. 6000 4000 LDPR For non-parliamentary parties its 15 times 2000 A Just Russia higher and more. 0 01.03-07.03 08.03-14.03 15.03-21.03 22.03-29.03 Start of Campaign 65930 2 363 59510 13 640 10 495 10 929 1651 41867 459 United Russia LDPR Right Cause Март Февраль Март Март Февраль Март Март Февраль Март 2015 2016 2016 2015 2016 2016 2015 2016 2016 Though the electoral campaign officially starts in June, the growing frequency of campaign-related media reports in March suggest that – compared to the same period last year – the unofficial campaign has already started for a number of parties. The number of mass media mentions of the ‘United Russia’ party, compared to March last year, has grown by a third. The ‘Right Cause’ party underwent a rebranding, changed its name and has also already entered the race. Start of Campaign 11 955 558 2 869 520 7 255 283 4 626 962 733 PARNAS PPSJ Civic Platform Март Февраль Март Март Февраль Март Март Февраль Март 2015 2016 2016 2015 2016 2016 2015 2016 2016 Some non-parliamentary parties are clearly off the media campaign. At least for now. Regionalization Region Mentions Region Mentions Moscow 38566 Saratov Region 2438 Moscow Region 6268 Stavropol Region 2116 Sverdlovsk Region 4666 Chelyabinsk Region 1805 Hanty Region 4273 Novosibirsk Region 1614 St. Petersburg 3987 Republic of Tatarstan 1569 Federal vs. Regional 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 Партия "ЯБЛОКО"Yabloko PARNASПАРНАС Comparison of federal Партия "ПравоеRight Cause дело" and regional media coverage shows: ПартияMotherland "Родина" Non-parliamentary Партия "ПатриотыPatriots of России" Russia parties are no more present in regional Партия "КоммунистыCommunists of России" Russia media than in federal ПартияCivic "Гражданская Platform … РППЗСPPSJ Партия "ГражданскаяCivic Forceсила" ФедеральныеFederal РегиональныеRegional Federal vs. Regional 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 For parliamentary United Russia parties situation is different. CPRF LDPR A Just Russia ФедеральныеFederal СМИ РегиональныеRegional СМИ Type of Mentions Positive Negative United Russia 9% 89% 2% CPRF 7% 89% 4% LDPR 4% 95% 1% A Just Russia 5% 94% 1% General framework for media coverage of parties activities remains neutral. Type of Mentions Positive Negative Yabloko 9% 87% 4% PARNAS 5% 80% 15% Right CauseRight (Party Cause of… 14% 85% 1% Motherland 5% 92% 2% Patriots of Russia 4% 96% 0% Communists of Russia 3% 94% 3% Pensioners’ Party 4% 96% 0% Civic Force 8% 92% 0% MI/Mentions United Russia MediaIndex CPRF LDPR A Just Russia Right Cause Yabloko Mentions MI/Mentions Right Cause Yabloko MediaIndex Motherland Communists of Russia PPSJ Patriots of Russia Civic Platform PARNAS Civic Force Количество сообщений MediaIndex 45000 40000 United Russia 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 CPRF 10000 5000 LDPR 0 -5000 Parnas 01.03-07.03 08.03-14.03 15.03-21.03 22.03-29.03 MediaIndex 108 797,51 101 927,82 49 245,79 United Russia Март 2015 Февраль 2016 Март 2016 MediaIndex 8287,7 RIA NEWS (Russia Today) is №1 in RIA NEWS positive framing of United Russia 3955,04 2227,77 998 PARNAS United CPRF LDPR Right Russia Cause -435,56 MediaIndex 5363,17 Just for comparison: TASS official website of United Russia MI= 3800. 1454,16 1384,44 1314,22 Which is twice less than Russia Today PARNAS and 1.5 times less United CPRF LDPR Right than TASS. Russia Cause -734,05 Qualitative analysis: frames of propaganda • A ‘person of distinction’ of Chechnya, journalist and public figure has issued a formal accusation of malicious slander against Ilya Yashin. • Members of the ‘Chechen Youth Union’ have called for an investigation into the activities of opposition member Yashin. Thank you for your attention! Prof. Victor Vakhshtayn, Moscow school of social and economic sciences, University of Manchester (SEED).
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