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Seitu Coleman Dr. Hemalata Dandekar City and Regional Planning 428 March 16, 2017

Issue

China’s rapid economic growth has caused a need to expand its transportation capacity. As its already large population continues to grow and become more productive, China’s existing transportation network will become increasingly strained and congested, decreasing the quality of life and holding back further economic growth. In reaction to this, China has rapidly developed a domestic high-speed rail network and industry by importing advanced technology from abroad. China’s domestic high-speed rail industry has matured and, arguably, has become as advanced as those of the countries that it imported technology from. China’s leadership is also using its advancements in high-speed rail to push forward its foreign policy by providing generous financing and technology transfers to developing countries around the world. The implications of this pattern should be of great interest to those interested in economic development.

History and Context

Constraints to Growth

As China progressed in its economic development in the 1990s, its transportation infrastructure was pressured to keep up with the corresponding increase in travel demand. Railways were first introduced in China in 1874, when the Songhu Line was opened in Shanghai (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 18). After 75 years, when the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the railway mileage had increased to 21,800 kilometers (km) (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 18). By 1995, the amount of track laid had increased to 62,615 km (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 18). The large amount of railway mileage was made necessary by the fact that China has a huge population and a geographically unequal distribution of natural resources that must be transported over a vast territory (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 18). The importance of rail’s role in the transportation network of 2

China is illustrated by the fact that “rail accounts for 45 [percent] of all passenger mileage and 40 [percent] of all freight mileage” (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 18). In 1994 and 1995, the sum of passenger-km and freight metric ton-km numbered 30.066 million and 30.317 million, respectively (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 18). By comparison, railways in the United States carried 0.6 percent of all passenger-km and 26 percent of all freight ton-miles in the country in 1997 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, n.d.). Additionally, 43 percent of passenger-km and 90 percent of freight ton-km were carried by railways in Russia in 2000 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). Figure 1 shows a variety of development indicators with respect to railways. Nevertheless, a gap existed between the travel demands and the level of service of the then current railway system. Only 50 percent to 70 percent of the overall freight demand in the country was being met; similarly, only 60 percent to 80 percent of the total passenger demand was being met (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 18). In addition, it was projected that by 2000 the travel demand on railways would increase 1.6 billion passengers and 2 billion metric tons, requiring a railway network mileage of 80,000 to 90,000 km (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 18). Due to constraints, however, the network would only reach 70,000 km by 2000, and would only be able to serve 1.5 billion passengers and 1.8 billion metric tons of freight (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 19). Given these conditions, the national railways adopted two major strategies, including 1) making improvements to existing infrastructure and 2) building new lines (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 19). These projects were conducted under the slogan “‘Speed up for passenger need, increase freight weight,’ pointing to the need to provide faster transportation with greater carrying capacity” (Zhongyong, 1997, p. 19).

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Population of China, 1960-2015 Gross Domestic Product of China, 1960-2015

1,600 12,000.00 1,400 10,000.00 1,200 1,000 8,000.00 800 6,000.00 600 4,000.00

400 GDP (billion $US) (billion GDP

Population (millions) Population 200 2,000.00

0 0.00

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Year Year

Gross National Income per capita (current LCU), Length of Railway Network in China, 1980-2014 1960-2014 80,000 60,000 70,000 50,000 60,000 40,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 30,000 20,000 Total route km route Total 20,000 10,000 10,000

0 0

GNI per capita (current LCU) (current capita per GNI

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Year Year

Goods Transported by Railways in China, 1980- Passenger Traffic Carried by Railways in China, 2014 1980-2014

3,000,000 1,000,000

2,500,000 km

- 800,000 km

- 2,000,000 600,000 1,500,000 400,000 1,000,000

Million ton Million 500,000 200,000 Million passenger Million

0 0

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Year Year

Figure 1. Various economic development metrics with respect to railways in China. Note: LCU = local currency unit. (World Bank Group, 2016). 4

The Plan to Speed-Up and Expand

The national 1997 Ninth-Five-Year Plan established a goal for existing lines to accommodate a maximum speed for passenger trains of 160 km/hr by April 2004 (Takagi, 2011, p. 38). An additional speed-up goal was established for passenger trains to reach a maximum speed of 200 km/hr by April 18, 2007 (Takagi, 2011, p. 38). Up to 2003, the research and development that went into meeting these goals was based on China’s domestic knowledge and skills (Sone, 2015, p. 769). It was determined, however, that the speed-up goal for 2007 would not be met with such a strategy (Takagi, 2011, p. 38; Sone, 2015, p. 769). The decision was then made to import high-speed rail technology from abroad in order to meet the speed-up goal (Takagi, 2011, p. 38; Sone, 2015, p. 769). In 2004, a construction plan was announced to have more than 13,000 km of high-speed rail track in China by 2012, and 20,000 km or more by 2020 (Takagi, 2011, p. 36). The construction plan and network are shown in Figure 2, Appendix A, and Appendix B. By 2015, the length of the high-speed rail network in China had reached 16,000 km in route length, making it longer than all other high-speed rail networks in the world combined (e.g., Japan = 2,800 km, France = 2,100 km, Germany = 1,800 km) (Sone, 2015, p. 769). In the same year, the Chinese government planned to maintain an annual investment of 850 billion yuan, or $133.6 billion, per year from 2016 to 2020 as a way to stimulate the economy (Tan & Zhou, 2015). 5

Figure 2. Railway map of China. The colored lines indicate high-speed rail lines and upgraded- conventional lines. (Howchou, 2016).

Performance thus Far

In terms of ridership, China’s high-speed rail network has surpassed other countries that have decades more experience. To illustrate, Table 1 and Table 2 compare the high-speed rail networks of China and Japan. In less than ten years (from 2008 to 2014), the annual ridership of China’s high-speed rail network has grown to more than double that of Japan’s, which has been in operation since October 1964. The traffic volume, measured in passenger-km, and the number of rail vehicles used by the high-speed rail network in China are both more than three times the comparative figures for Japan. 6

Japan China Year Route Passengers carried Transported passenger- Route Passengers carried Transported passenger- (km) (thousands) km (millions) (km) (thousands) km (millions) 1965 553 30,970 10,700 - - - 1975 1,177 157,220 27,800 - - - 1985 2,012 179,830 55,400 - - - 1995 2,037 275,900 70,800 - - - 2005 2,387 301,400 77,900 - - - 2008 2,387 310,240 81,700 1,077 7,340 1,600 2010 2,620 324,440 76,900 5,133 133,230 46,300 2012 2,620 322,000 86,000 9,356 388,150 144,600 2014 2,848 339,690 91,000 16,456 703,780 281,500 Table 1. Comparison of ridership of high-speed rail networks in China and Japan. (Sone, 2015, p. 770).

Land Populatio Route Passengers Transported Number of Maximum number of trains Area n (km) carried passenger-km vehicles per day* 25 11 5.8 2.1 3.1 3.3 1.0 (average 330) Table 2. Ratio of ridership figures of high-speed rail networks in China and Japan. For all ratios, China’s figures are divided by those of Japan’s. *The Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rail line is compared to the Tokaido Shinkansen (Tokyo-Osaka) line. (Sone, 2015, p. 770).

As Sone (2015, p. 769) notes, these impressive figures are gaining the attention of railway experts and enthusiasts around the world, putting China head-to-head with other railway leaders like Japan, France, and Germany.

Project Description and Design

Learning from Experience

While China is at a disadvantage in terms of experience with high-speed rail, it has the advantage in the sense that it can learn from the experiences of other countries that have been operating high-speed rail systems for decades. Given this, the technical specifications of China’s railway system are of great interest because, as mentioned previously, it uses technologies that 7 are imported from a variety of manufacturers that are located abroad. China has imported technology that is not limited to just trainsets, but encompasses all of the elements of a railway system. To note, there are three general elements of a railway system, including the 1) infrastructure (i.e., tracks, signaling equipment, stations, and electric power distribution system), the 2) rolling stock (i.e., cars and locomotives), and the 3) operating rules and procedures to ensure safe and efficient operations (Pachl, 2009, p. 1).

The Infrastructure

In regard to the first element, the infrastructure, China’s system will be able to learn from the experiences of Japan. For example, Japan’s high-speed rail system, which was the first in the world, suffers from too little spacing between adjacent tracks of 4.2 meters (m) to 4.3 m, a small cross-section in double-track tunnels of 64 m2, a single-direction per track signaling system, a low maximum speed of 70 km/hr at turnouts approaching stations, and a high axle-weight of 16 metric tons (Sone, 2015, p. 771, p. 774). The lack of spacing between adjacent tracks causes a risk of derailment to trains because the aerodynamic forces at the front of two oncoming trains could “push” each train sideways and off the tracks. The small cross-section in tunnels results in trains needing to “push” air out as they proceed through the tunnels, leading to higher energy consumption. A low maximum speed at turnouts forces trains to slow down more than they need to while approaching and departing stations, causing greater travel times. Finally, a high-axle weight means that the infrastructure must be built and maintained to support larger weights than otherwise, leading to higher construction and maintenance costs. All of these “weaknesses,” however, are attributable to the fact that Japan’s system was the first ever built, meaning that it could not learn from the mistakes of others and had to remain conservative in its design to minimize failures and keep costs down, especially when it was still rebuilding from World War II and was economically weak (Sone, 2015, p. 771, p. 774).

The Rolling Stock

Regarding the second element, the rolling stock, China has taken a mixed approach by using many technologies from different countries. Its CRH1, CRH2, CRH3, and CRH5 trainsets 8 are based off technologies from Germany, Japan, Italy, and Germany, respectively, as shown in Figure 4. In fact, a Financial Times article in 2010 stated that “roughly 90 percent of the high- speed technology used in China is derived from partnerships or equipment developed by foreign companies” (Kratz & Pavlićević, n.d, pdf-p. 7). One major consideration when designing trainsets is how to distribute traction motors along the length of the train. Traditionally, traction effort would be provided by a steam-powered, diesel-electric, or electric locomotive located at the front of a train. The locomotive would in effect pull the cars behind it. While in the past this system was the only practical method to move trains, the system is antiquated by today’s standards. The problem with concentrated traction is that the axle load (due to the weight of the power unit) of the locomotive tends to be much larger relative to the rest of the train, as shown in Figure 3. While this situation is favorable in freight trains (i.e., the weight of the locomotive prevents the wheels from slipping), in passenger trains, the performance of the entire train and the weight capacity of the infrastructure is limited by the locomotive. Additionally, since high- speed trains serve urban areas, they are constrained to utilizing electric traction motors over steam power and diesel-electric technology because the latter technologies emit a great amount of pollution and noise. The latter technologies also cannot operate at the high speeds that electric motors can. With distributed traction, the weight of the traction motors can be spread along the length of the train, allowing for higher performance from both the trainset and the infrastructure. Other benefits from distributed traction, shown in Table 3, include higher passenger capacity (due to the fact that the first and last cars of the train can accommodate passengers), higher acceleration (resulting from more powered wheels contacting the rail which allows for more driving force to be applied), better braking performance from regenerative braking (i.e., the motors act like electric generators and convert the kinetic energy of the train into electrical energy that is then sent back to the electric distribution system for other trains’ use, all the while braking), and higher reliability (e.g., if one car’s motors failed, the other cars would still provide driving force).

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Figure 3. Distributed traction vs. concentrated traction. Note: EMU = electric multiple unit. (Central Japan Railway Company [JR Central], 2014, p. 14).

Characteristics Advantages

Reduction of construction cost and track maintenance cost Low axle load Low noise and ground-borne vibration

High acceleration and deceleration Stable adhesion performance Reliable service in bad weather conditions Energy saving Effective regenerative braking Reduction of brake maintenance Effective use of floor Large capacity Redundancy of traction system High reliability Table 3. Characteristics and advantages of distributed traction. (JR Central, 2014, p. 14). 10

Figure 4. Comparison of trainsets used in China (left) and trainsets used in other countries (right). Note that the bodies of the trainsets are practically identical, besides the liveries, highlighting the technology transfer agreements between Chinese and foreign companies. 11

Top left: CRH1 trainset. (Bombardier, 2017). Top Right: Regina trainset. (Bombardier, 2017). Upper middle left: CRH2 trainset (DF4D-0070, 2011). Upper middle right: E2 trainset. (Toshinori baba, 2011). Lower middle left: CRH3 trainset. (Jucember, 2011). Lower middle right: ICE 3 trainset. (Terfloth, 2007). Bottom left: CRH5 trainset. (Suhang, 2008). Bottom right: ETR 600 trainset (Kopka, 2012).

Some disadvantages of distributed traction that should not go unlisted are less availability of undercarriage space, and higher noise levels and greater maintenance needs from a greater number of motors all along the train. A particular difference between Japanese high-speed trains and European high-speed trains in past decades was the fact that EMUs (with distributed traction) were used from the beginning in Japan, while locomotive-hauled trains remained popular in European until the past decade (Sone, 2015, p. 776). The reason for this is due to improvements in electric motor technology. In the past, direct current (DC) motors, which require much maintenance, were used to provide traction for trains. In the 1990s, AC motors, which have a much smaller mass for the same power output and require virtually no maintenance relative to DC motors, began to be introduced as railway traction motors (Sone, 2015, p. 776). In 2003, China decided to adopt EMU technology as its standard over locomotive-hauled trains for its high-speed train network (Sone, 2015, p. 776). Additional considerations to take when deciding which bogies should be powered has to do with electromagnetic compatibility and wheel slip concerns. An example of a bogie is shown in Figure 5. In order for signaling systems to detect when a train is present along a section of track, an electric signal is sent down one of the rails, as displayed in Figure 6. When a train runs over the track, its wheelset conducts the electric signal and allows the signal to reach the other rail, thereby completing the electric circuit. A powered bogie tends to present problems in this situation because it emits electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) that interferes with other electric signals, and therefore hinders the ability of a signaling system to detect where the train is (Sone, 2015, p. 772). Two solutions that have been implemented in Japan to avoid this problem are to modify the design of the first and last bogie on a train so that it does not generate EMPs, or to not 12 power the bogies on the first and last car altogether (Sone, 2015, pp. 772-773). The latter solution has the additional benefit of avoiding wheel slip in wet conditions, making unpowered bogies ideal points to place speed sensors (Sone, 2015, p. 772).

Figure 5. An example of a powered bogie. (Railway Technical Web Pages, 2016a).

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Figure 6. Track circuit that allows a signaling system to detect a train. (Pachl, 2009, p. 83).

Of China’s imported trainsets, only the CRH2, which is of Japanese origin, uses driving trailers, or unpowered cars at the ends of a trainset (Sone, 2015, pp. 771-772. The imported trainsets, CRH1, CRH3, and CRH5, are of European origin, and use driving motors (Sone, 2015, pp. 771- 772). Interestingly, China’s newest and domestically engineered trainset, the CRH380A, which is shown in Figure 7, uses driving trailers and motored intermediate cars, similar to Japan (Sone, 2015, p. 772). Additional attention in the future will be needed to understand how trainset development progresses in China.

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Figure 7. China’s new domestically engineered trainset, the CRH380A. (Khalidshou, 2010).

The Operating Rules and Procedures

Finally, China’s progress in the third element of railway systems, the operating rules and procedures, is also taking a mixed approach in implementation. Two topics of interest within this element are the automatic train control (ATC) system, the power feeding system, and the train scheduling. ATC systems are used by railroads for a variety of reasons. Traditionally, railroads relied on signals interspersed along lines to control the movement of trains, shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. The reliability and safety of the system was entirely dependent on the train engineer to see and interpret each signal. With the introduction of high-speed railway systems, it was recognized that the trains would be traveling too fast for the train engineer to reliably see any lineside signals. Given this, the signals were placed inside the driver’s cabin and were electronically relayed to each train. Further developments in signaling systems resulted in the introduction of ATC, which has the following functions:

 Indicates to the train engineer of any speed restrictions in track territory ahead of the train; 15

 Automatically slows down a train if a speed restriction is violated;  Automatically stops a train if it gets too close to another train (Pachl, 2009, p. 94).

Figure 10 displays the logic of such an ATC system. Each country has its own characteristics in regard to the application of ATC. For example,

Japan’s ATC is not intended for driverless operation but the braking operation is almost automatic with manual operation left for final stopping at a designated position at a train speed of below 30 km/h[r]. The French TGV has a different philosophy . . . . [Its automatic train protection (ATP) system] help[s] the driver’s operation by showing a forthcoming situation and only if the driver fails to react safely does the ATP system intervene. [The] German philosophy is a little different to that of France but does not differ that much (Sone, 2015, p. 774).

Figure 8. Lineside signals for railroads. (Pachl, 2009, p. 15).

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Figure 9. Signals placed along a double-track railroad line. (Pachl, 2009, p. 29).

Figure 10. The logic of a continuous ATP system while slowing down a train approaching another train. Note: Vmax = maximum velocity. (Pachl, 2009, p. 101).

China has introduced multiple signaling systems from European countries and Japan (Sone, 2015, p. 774). At the moment, they coexist on the same track and correspond to use by specific trainset types (Sone, 2015, p. 774). This situation is not optimal because the presence of multiple signaling systems could cause confusion to the train engineer, require more maintenance, and interference between the different signaling systems (Sone, 2015, p. 774). Future efforts will be needed to sort the different signaling systems by area, line groups, speed ranges, climate conditions, etc. to rationalize the situation (Sone, 2015, p. 774). Concerning the power feeding system, China has gone in the direction of the European model. On an electric railway system, trains get their power from an overhead catenary system (OCS) via a pantograph, as shown in Figure 11, which is the part of the train that makes contact 17 with the OCS contact wire. The OCS consists of the string of wires and support towers that distribute electric current above the tracks, as presented in Figure 12. With this system, it is imperative that the pantograph maintains a good connection with the contact wire, and that the electric current along the contact wire remains strong. In order for maintenance of the OCS to occur without shutting down the entire railway line, the OCS is separated into sections, as Figure 13 and Figure 14 show. The separation of the contact wire becomes a problem for train operations because trains require a continuous supply of electricity in order to run smoothly.

Figure 11. A pantograph on a German high-speed train. (Terfloth, 2008).

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Figure 12. A model of an OCS. (Railway Technical Web Pages, 2016b).

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Figure 13. A section insulator at a section break in Amtrak’s catenary. (Mcg10, 2010).

Figure 14. An image of a quasi-continuous power feeding system, as a part of an overhead catenary system. (Sone, 2015, p. 772).

The solution in Japan to work around this problem has been to deploy two pantographs along the length of the train. As Sone (2015, p. 772) explains, suppose the train in Figure 14 moves from Section A to Section C via Section B. Switch D remains closed (to maintain electrical contact) while the train transitions from Section A to Section B (Sone, 2015, p. 772). Once the train has transitioned to Section B, Switch D opens to cut electrical contact (Sone, 2015, p. 772). A period of 0.3 seconds passes before Switch E closes to re-establish electrical contact (Sone, 2015, p. 772). During this period, Section B is unpowered (Sone, 2015, p. 772). If the train only had a single pantograph raised, it would not have power during this time (Sone, 2015, p. 772). However, if the train had two pantographs, with one pantograph in the unpowered Section B, and the other pantograph in the still-powered Section A, the train would still have power (Sone, 2015, p. 772). Both pantographs connect to a bus wire, which distributes power to every car of the train. After Switch E closes, Section B regains electrical power, and both pantographs are powered as they transition from Section B to Section C (Sone, 2015, p. 772). In contrast, high-speed trains in Europe are permitted to raise only one pantograph at a time (Sone, 2015, p. 775). This is because the European high-speed train network traverses through several different electrical distribution systems that utilize different voltages (Sone, 2015, p. 775). In order to prevent interference or short-circuiting while a train transitions from one electrical grid to another, only one contact point is allowed. Japan has the advantage in this 20 respect because while it does have different electrical grids, a change between grids does not take place within a rail line. China has studied the quasi-continuous power feeding system, but has instead moved towards improving electrical switches to reduce their delay times (Sone, 2015, pp. 772-773). It has also adopted the European model of having only one pantograph raised during operations. On the topic of train scheduling, Sone (2015, p. 775) does not discuss how China has approached this issue. Sone (2015, p. 775) does, however, note that China can choose between the Japanese model and the French model of scheduling trains. In Japan, scheduling procedures assume a train schedule to accommodate the heaviest travel demands every day, with trains canceled on lighter demand days. In France, scheduling procedures assume a train schedule to accommodate the minimum demand, with additional trains scheduled when demand rises (Sone, 2015, p. 775). Changes in scheduling patterns are determined in Japan up to one month in advance, while those of France are determined about two days in advance (Sone, 2015, p. 775).

Spatial Effects on China’s Transportation Network

Beyond the technical aspects of China’s high-speed rail network, there is also its potential to shift its domestic travel patterns. In fact, one of the biggest reasons for pursuing any transportation project is to increase the relative accessibility between origins and destinations. To elaborate, access is generally defined “as the extent to which land-use and transport systems enable (groups of) individuals to reach activities or destinations by means of a (combination of) transportation mode(s)” (Geurs & van Wee, quoted by Cao, Liu, Wang, & Li, 2013, p. 12). In more succinct terms, access is the ability to reach a specific place. Given this understanding, accessibility is the relative ability to reach a specific place. By looking at the network design of China’s high-speed rail network, shown in Figure 2, one can observe that it is in the form of a lattice (Cao et al., 2013, p. 19). Indeed, the shape of China’s high-speed rail network has taken on the nickname “4 + 4,” referring to the four north-south lines and four east-west lines that extend throughout the country (Cao et al, 2013, p. 19; Wangshu, 2016; Wangshu, 2017). Interestingly, the lattice structure is like the gridded street pattern of traditional American cities, which provides the greatest accessibility to land uses, and allows land uses and street traffic to be distributed in an organized fashion. The concept is shown in Figure 15. 21

Figure 15. A dendritic street pattern of contemporary suburban street networks is displayed on the left, while a gridded street pattern of traditional urban street networks is shown on the right. (Walker, 2012, p. 62)

In the same manner, China’s high-speed rail network is expected to increase the accessibility of cities that are connected to the network. Cao et al. (2013) do just this in their study of the effects on accessibility of China’s high-speed rail network. Cao et al. (2013) use four metrics to measure to measure the accessibility that the high-speed rail network provides, as shown in Table 4.

Distance Weight according to size of Indicator Measure units Value meaning decay destinations Weighted average The lower value, the greater the No Yes Travel time travel time accessibility Daily accessible Number of The higher value, the greater the No No cities reachable cities accessibility Daily accessible The higher value, the greater the No Yes Population population accessibility Potential The higher value, the greater the Yes Yes Economic activity accessibility accessibility Table 4. Accessibility metrics for China’s high-speed rail network. (Cao et al., 2013, p. 16).

The weighted average travel time (WATT) generally refers to the total travel time of all travelers between an origin and a destination. As Table 4 notes, distance is a factor that is not 22 considered when calculating WATT. Figure 16 below shows the spatial results of WATT calculations for China’s high-speed rail network.

Figure 16. WATT of 38 major cities connected by China’s high-speed rail network. (Cao et al., 2013, p. 16).

As expected, the cities located on the fringes of the high-speed rail network have higher WATT figures due to the greater travel times (from greater distances) that their travelers must undergo to reach other cities. Cities in the center of the network have lower WATT figures, indicating that they have a higher accessibility compared to cities in the periphery of the network. These cities are likely to benefit more than those located in the periphery. The second metric, daily accessible cities, refers to the number of cities that can be traveled to within specified travel times. Figure 17 shows the calculations of the daily accessible cities for each city on the network in a spatial context. 23

Figure 17. Daily accessible cities by travel time of 38 major cities by China’s high-speed rail network. (Cao et al., 2013, p. 17).

A number of corridors become prominent with respect to each maximum travel time. For daily accessibility within two hours, cities in the northeastern portion of the network demonstrate the highest figures, indicating that they will enjoy the highest accessibility relative to other cities on the network. For daily accessibility between two hours and four hours, the northeastern corridor and urban agglomerations in central China show the highest figures. Since daily business trips generally have a maximum cutoff point of four hours, the cities with the highest figures in this category will likely enjoy the benefits of economic activity that requires frequent face-to-face meetings (Cao et al., 2013, p. 15). Daily accessibility over four hours generally caters to travelers who are traveling long-distance and not regularly. Cities in the central part of China and the periphery of the network fall within this category. In fact, for travel times of six to ten hours, three urban corridors become prominent: Urban agglomerations in 1) the extended northeast, 2) the west-central, and 3) the southeast. The cities that are shown in each of these agglomerations are likely more co-dependent on cities within their own respective agglomerations rather than to cities outside of their own respective agglomerations. Also to note is the observation that cities in 24 the northeast corridor appear in three of the four tested travel times. This indicates that the northeast corridor will enjoy the greatest accessibility benefits from the high-speed rail network. The third metric, the daily accessible population, is similar to the previous metric, except that it refers to the number of people that are accessible within specified travel times versus the number of cities. Figure 18 shows the spatial results of the metric applied to China’s high-speed rail network.

Figure 18. Daily accessible population by travel time of 38 major cities by China’s high-speed rail network. (Cao et al., 2013, p. 18).

The circular points in Figure 18 represent the cities that had high indicators for both daily accessible cities and daily accessible population (Cao et al., 2013, pp. 17-18). The triangular points represent the cities that performed to a lesser extent compared to the cities represented by circles, but still performed well overall (Cao et al., 2013, pp. 17-18). Two polygons are drawn around each set of cities to distinguish them from the other cities. The cities within each polygon are likely to enjoy the greatest accessibility benefits from the high-speed rail network. 25

Finally, the last metric is potential accessibility, which considers not only the attractiveness of a destination, but also the distance (or friction) to the destination (Cao et al., 2013, p. 15). Figure 19 shows the spatial distribution of potential accessibility scores for each city on the high-speed rail network.

Figure 19. Potential accessibility of 38 major cities connected by China’s high-speed rail network. (Cao et al., 2013, p. 18).

Once again, the northeast corridor in the network appears to have the highest figures, suggesting its relatively advantageous location. Also to note, again, cities in the periphery of the network have relatively low potential accessibility figures, showing their low relative benefits from connection to the high-speed rail network. Overall, China’s high-speed rail network will result in a benefit for all regions. Some regions, however, will benefit more than other regions. Cities in the northeast corridor and the central part of China will likely enjoy the greatest accessibility benefits from the high-speed rail network, while cities in the periphery will enjoy residual benefits of being connected to the national network. 26

Underlying Development Theory and Idea

High-Speed Rail within Rostow’s Five Stages of Development

The expansion of China’s high-speed railway network falls snugly into Rostow’s (1956) self-sustained growth theory of economic development, as well as Frank’s (1966) theory of underdevelopment. The Rostow model of economic development

requires a country to identify its distinctive or unique economic resources. The model puts forth the idea that a country can develop economically by concentrating on resources in short-supply to expand beyond local industries to reach the global market and finance the country’s further development (Tuser, 2010).

Within the Rostow model are five distinct phases of economic development, as shown in Figure 20. Tuser (2010) defines the five stages as follows:

1. Traditional Society – Refers to a country that has yet to begin developing, where a high percentage of people are involved with agriculture and a high percentage of the country’s wealth is invested in activities such as the military and religion, seen as “nonproductive” by Rostow. [These societies] have pre-scientific understandings of gadgets, and believe that gods or spirits facilitate the procurement of goods, rather than man and his own ingenuity. 2. Transitional Stage – [Also known as] preconditions for takeoff. Under the model, the process of development begins when an elite group initiates innovations [in] economic activities. Under the influence of these well-educated leaders, the country starts to invest in new technology and infrastructure, such as water supplies and transportation systems. These projects will ultimately stimulate an increase in productivity likely increasing the [gross domestic product]. There is a limited production function, and therefore a limited output. There are limited economic techniques available and these restrictions create a limit to what can be produced. Increased specialization generates surpluses for trading. 27

There is an emergence of a transport infrastructure to support trade. External trade also occurs concentrating on primary products. 3. Takeoff – Rapid growth is generated in a limited number of economic activities, such as textiles or food products. These few, takeoff industries achieve technical advances and become productive, whereas other sectors of the economy remain dominated by traditional practices. After takeoff, a country will take as long as fifty to one hundred years to reach maturity. Globally, this stage occurred durng the Industrial Revolution. Industrialization increases, with workers switching from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector. The level of investment reaches over 10[ percent] of [gross national product]. The growth is self-sustaining as investment leads to increasing incomes in turn generating more savings to finance further investment. 4. Drive to [M]aturity – Modern technology, previously confined to a few takeoff industries, diffuses to a wide variety of industries, which then experience rapid growth comparable to the takeoff industries. Workers become more skilled and specialized. The economy is diversifying into new areas[. T]he economy is [also] producing a wide range of goods and services and there is less reliance on imports. 5. High Mass Consumption – [Also known as] age of mass consumption. The economy shifts from production of heavy industry such as steel and energy, to consumer goods, such as motor vehicles and refrigerators (Tuser, 2010). 28

Figure 20. Rostow’s five stages of economic development. (Tuser, 2010).

As the charts in Figure 1 indicate, China is currently in the take-off stage and will move into the drive-to-maturity stage in the future. China’s high-speed railway system is a very good indicator of the stage of development that its economy is in because high-speed rail is a relatively advanced railway technology. Having the ability to manufacture high-speed rail technology requires advancements in a variety of specialized and technical fields. The fact that China has acquired this ability demonstrates its progression towards the drive-to-maturity stage in Rostow’s (1956) model. But the path that China took to get to that level of economic development also reveals the increasing relevance of Frank’s (1966) theory of underdevelopment in its foreign policy objectives. To illustrate, Rostow (1956, pp. 45-46) noted that

[t]he introduction of the railroad has been historically the most powerful single initiator of take-offs . . . . First, it has lowered internal transport costs, brought new areas and products into commercial markets and, in general, performed the Smithian function of widening the market. Second, it has been a prerequisite in many cases to the development of a major new and rapidly enlarging export sector[, ]which, in turn, has served to generate capital for internal development . . . . Third, and perhaps most important for the take-off itself, the development of railways has led on to the development of modern coal, iron and engineering industries. In many countries the growth of modern basic 29

industrial sectors can be traced in the most direct way to the requirements for building and, especially, for maintaining substantial railway systems. When a society has developed deeper institutional, social and political prerequisites for take-off, the rapid growth of a railway system with these powerful triple effects has often served to lift it into self-sustaining growth. Where the prerequisites have not existed, however, very substantial railway building has failed to initiate a take-off, as, for example, in India, China, pre-1895 Canada, pre-1914 Argentine, etc.

As discussed in the History and Context section of this paper, China had built an extensive railway network long before its rapid economic growth took place. What then initiated the take- off of its growth? The answer appears to be trade, as Chang (2008, pp. 80-81) explains:

It is hard to believe today, but North Korea used to be richer than South Korea. It was the part of Korea that Japan had developed industrially when it ruled the country from 1910 until 1945. The Japanese colonial rulers saw the northern part of Korea as the ideal base from which to launch their imperialist plan to take over China. It is close to China, and has considerable mineral resources, especially coal. Even after the Japanese left, their industrial legacy enabled North Korea to maintain its economic lead over South Korea well into the 1960s. Today, South Korea is one of the world’s industrial powerhouses, while North Korea languishes in poverty. Much of this is thanks to the fact that South Korea aggressively traded with the outside world and actively absorbed foreign technologies while North Korea pursued its doctrine of self-sufficiency. Through trade, South Korea learned about the existence of better technologies and earned the foreign currency that it needed in order to buy them. In its own way, North Korea has managed some technological feats. For example, it has figured out a way to mass-produce Vinalon, a synthetic fibre made out of – of all things – limestone, invented by a Korean scientist in 1939. Despite being the second-ever man-made fibre after Nylon, Vinalon did not catch on elsewhere because it did not make a comfortable fabric, but it has allowed North Koreans to be self-sufficient in clothes. But there is a limit to what a single developing country can invent on its own without continuous importation of advanced technologies. 30

Thus, North Korea is technologically stuck in the past, with 1940s Japanese and 1950s Soviet technologies, while South Korea is one of the most technologically dynamic economies in the world. Do we need any better proof that trade is good for economic development? In the end, economic development is about acquiring and mastering advanced technologies. In theory, a country can develop such technologies on its own, but such a strategy of technological self-sufficiency quickly hits the wall, as seen in the North Korean case. This is why all successful cases of economic development have involved serious attempts to get hold of and master advanced foreign technologies . . .

China’s path to develop high-speed rail was strongly reliant on trade with other advanced countries, as explained earlier in this paper. China is also using trade to increase its economic influence and diplomatic leverage through the export of its high-speed rail technologies to other developing countries. As a part of its “Going Out” strategy, which is “based on a mix of technical proficiency, price and time competitiveness, and readily available financing on favourable terms,” China has exported its high-speed rail technology to Turkey (Kratz & Pavlićević, n.d., pdf-p. 3). It is also currently engaged in a number of other high-speed rail projects in Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Russia, India, and the United States (Kratz & Pavlićević, n.d., pdf-pp. 3-6). These developments are by no means an accident on China’s part, as its leadership has been very active in promoting its high-speed rail technology abroad (Kratz & Pavlićević, n.d, pdf-p. 4).

China’s international [high-speed rail] strategy emerged in two separate waves. The first began in 2010 during Liu Zhijun’s leadership of the Chinese Ministry of Railways. Liu Zhijun promoted [high-speed rail] domestically as a new paragon of China’s development and also started pushing its development abroad as a symbol of China’s technological advancement.

Investment in domestic HSR declined significantly following what became known as the 7.23 Accident but picked up again quickly in late 2013 in conjunction with a strong overseas push. This second (current) wave of HSR “Going Out” is characterized by its 31

strong political backing from high-level Chinese leaders. Wen Jiabao was the first Chinese leader to act as China’s high-speed rail representative abroad during an official visit to London and was soon followed by the new generation of leaders. By the end of 2014 Li Keqiang had clearly referred to China’s HSR in four out of five official visits as had Xi Jinping during his visits to Europe, Latin America, and India. This trend continued well into 2015 with Xi Jinping promoting Chinese HSR during state visits to the UK and Iran, and Li Keqiang praising Chinese HSR proficiency in Malaysia and during the December 16+1 Summit (Kratz & Pavlićević, n.d, pdf-p. 4).

Beyond the economic advantages that exporting high-speed rail technology, with generous financial packages, provides for China, it also gives the country an opportunity to pump its own currency into international markets, thus raising its global profile (Kratz & Pavlićević, n.d, pdf-p. 12). The high-speed rail deals, while appearing to be cooperative, are likely to be in China’s favor structurally. For example, “agreements for deepening cooperation in military affairs, culture, research and education, or other areas, are often negotiated simultaneously with – or in the aftermath of – the railway deals (Kratz & Pavlićević, n.d, pdf-p. 12). In the case that a high-speed rail system built in a foreign country and financed by China is not successful due to the failure for ridership to materialize, China will still benefit from the additional economic and strategic developments that were ancillary to the high-speed rail project (Kratz & Pavlićević, n.d, pdf-p. 16). The foreign (and usually underdeveloped) country, on the other hand, will be

faced with the need to subsidize an [high-speed speed] line where population and income conditions are sub-optimal. The frequent downsizing of projects reduces the financial burden but, even with costs pushed down, [high-speed rail] projects weigh on host countries’ budgets and increase their international debt exposure and dependency on China” (Kratz & Pavlićević, n.d, pdf-pp. 16-17).

Examples of downsizing include projects in Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Kunming City in China (Razak, 2015; Martin, 2016). These countries are likely to stay within China’s economic influence for decades to come, replicating Frank’s (1966) satellite-metropolis relationship. 32

Comparison to California High-Speed Rail System

A review of the California High-Speed Rail Project is conducted to provide a comparative, or contrasting, case of the implementation of high-speed rail projects. An introduction to California’s efforts, its appropriateness to the State, and the challenges that it faces are discussed.

Introduction to the California High-Speed Rail System

The California High-Speed Rail System is planned to be an 800-mile network with 24 stations extending to all of California’s major population centers (California High-Speed Rail Authority [Authority], 2017). The system will be capable of accommodating train services that operate at a maximum speed of 220 miles per hour, or 354 km/hr (Authority, 2017a). Figure 21 shows a map of the system at full-buildout. Upon completion of the system, the travel times between a number of California’s major city centers are expected to be reduced from current driving times, as shown in Table 5. Note that the high-speed rail travel times represent maximum non-stop travel times as designated by the Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act for the 21st Century. While the high-speed rail system must be designed to be capable of achieving the travel times shown in Table 5, actual travel times may differ due to the fact that a private operator will ultimately determine the timetable. The private operator may include additional stops for different train services.

Distance Estimated Driving Time (hr:min, Estimated Travel Time with High-Speed Rail (hr:min, City to City (mi) depending on traffic) assuming fastest service) San Diego to Los 120 1:58 to 2:50 1:20 Angeles Los Angeles to San 382 5:50 to 7:10 2:40 Francisco San Jose to San 49.4 0:55 to 1:20 0:30 Francisco San Francisco to 87.3 1:35 to 2:10 N/A Sacramento Table 5. Travel times between city centers by automobile and high-speed rail. (Subramani, 2008, p. 2; California S.H.C. § 2704.09). 33

Figure 21. The Proposed Statewide Alignment of the California High-Speed Rail System. Note that several sections are still under environmental review and the alignment may still change. (Authority, 2017b). 34

History of High-Speed Rail in California

The concept of high-speed rail in California was first proposed as far back as 1981 when Japanese investors expressed an interest to export Shinkansen technology to the United States (Authority, 2017). Needless to say, the deal never materialized. Years later during the late-1980s to early-1990s, state leaders and politicians became aware of the limitations of the existing highway and airport network to accommodate California’s increasing travel demands (Subramani, 2008, p. 2). In 1993, the California Intercity High Speed Rail Commission was created and tasked with drafting a plan to establish high-speed rail service between northern and southern California (Subramani, 2008, pp. 2-3). The final studies from the Commission concluded that high-speed rail in California was “technically and environmentally feasible, economically viable, and strongly supported by the public” (Subramani, 2008, p. 3). The cost was estimated to be $25 billion in 1993 dollars, and the project was projected to be completed in 2013 (Subramani, 2008, p. 3). In 1996, the Authority was created “as a ‘state entity responsible for planning, constructing and operating a high-speed train system serving California’s major metropolitan areas’” (Subramani, 2008, p. 3). For the next 12 years, beyond conducting environmental studies for the alignment, the Authority would find itself politically wrangling to prolong the high-speed rail project’s and its own existence. Originally, legislation that established the Authority gave it a sunset date of 2001, and then another date of 2003, before finally granting the organization permanent existence (Subramani, 2008, pp. 6-10). The Authority also tried to pass funding for the construction of the project several times, including a sales tax increase in 2000 and a $9.95 billion bond act in 2004 and 2006 (Subramani, 2008, p. 6, p. 10). In 2008, California voters (finally) passed Proposition 1A, also known as the Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act for the 21st Century (Authority, 2017a). The bond act authorized the State to sell $9 billion in general obligation bonds to fund “pre- construction activities and construction of a high-speed passenger train system” and $950 million to fund “capital projects that improve other passenger rail systems in order to enhance these systems’ capacity, or safety, or allow riders to connect to the high-speed rail system” (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2008). Additionally, California successfully secured $3.3 billion in federal funds authorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to match its sale of 35 general obligation bonds under Proposition 1A. In 2012, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., praised the benefits of high-speed rail and declared the project to be a priority of his Administration (Authority, 2017a). Finally, in 2014, Governor Brown and legislative leaders agreed to dedicate 25 percent of all cap-and-trade revenues to fund the high-speed rail program (Siders, 2016). This funding source is important because it provides the Authority with a funding stream on an annual basis (or a cash flow) that can be used to debt finance the implementation of the rest of the high-speed rail project. Regarding construction, the Authority (2017c) strategically divided the statewide network into segments for environmental review and construction, including the following:

 San Francisco to San Jose  San Jose to Merced  Merced to Sacramento  Merced to Fresno  Fresno to Bakersfield  Bakersfield to Palmdale  Palmdale to Burbank  Burbank to Los Angeles  Los Angeles to Anaheim  Los Angeles to San Diego

Since each segment is geographically, environmentally, and economically unique, dividing up the network allows the Authority to progress on the environmental review on multiple sections simultaneously. If one section requires specialized knowledge for study and additional time to complete the review, the other sections will not be affected. Additionally, the Authority identified construction segments within the statewide network in its 2012 Business Plan, as shown in Figure 22. The dark green portion at the center of the network was dubbed the “Initial Operation Segment” (IOS) and was identified as the part of the network that would begin construction first. The reasoning behind the decision was that building the center of the network allows for the option to build north to the San Francisco Bay Area, or south to the Los Angeles Basin, depending on the readiness of each corridor. It should also be 36 noted that the Authority (2014, p. 14) identified the IOS and the section south to Los Angeles as the preferred segment to implement initial commercial train operations in its 2014 Business Plan, as displayed in Figure 23.

Figure 22. Sections of the statewide high-speed rail network in the 2012 Business Plan. Note: IOS = Initial Operating Segment. (Authority, 2012, p. 2-2). 37

Figure 23. Sections of the statewide high-speed rail network in the 2014 Business Plan. (Authority, 2014, p. 14). 38

Figure 24. Sections of the statewide high-speed rail network in the 2016 Business Plan. (Authority, 2016a, p. 27). 39

Between January 2013 and January 2016, the Authority awarded four construction packages to consortiums of contractors to build sections of the IOS (Authority, 2016, p. 23). In January 2015, Governor Brown held a symbolic groundbreaking ceremony in Fresno, California, one day after his State of the State Address (Siders, 2015). The ceremony marked the official start of construction of the California High-Speed Rail System. Finally, in May 2016, the Authority (2016a, p. 12) released its 2016 Business Plan, showing that the preferred direction to begin construction and initial train operations had shifted from south to the Los Angeles to north to the San Francisco Bay Area, as shown in Figure 24.

Appropriateness to State

While the reasons to build high-speed rail in California are many, only the fundamental rationales will be discussed here. Like in China, California’s economy and population are continuing to grow, as shown in Figure 25. In general, economic and population growth are expected to lead to higher productivity growth, which leads to a greater number of trips in the State overall. In its 2012 Business Plan, the Authority estimated that if the State of California built the same amount of capacity that the high-speed rail network would provide, but in the form of highways and airports, the State would need to build 4,300 new lane-miles of highway and 115 additional airport gates (Authority, 2012, p. 3-15). This would result in an expenditure of an estimated $124 billion in 2011 dollars (Authority, 2012, p. 3-15). In its 2016 Business Plan, the Authority (2016a, p. 67) showed that the updated cost to construct the high-speed rail system had risen to $55.295 billion in 2015 dollars. While the price tag is no small sum of money, it is significantly less than the noted above alternative, and simply making no changes to the transportation network to accommodate the extra travel demand will inevitably lead to greater congestion and a decrease in the quality of life. The California High-speed Rail System is also expected to improve connectivity between different regions of the State and allow economic growth to be distributed more evenly across the State. A report conducted by the Authority (2015, pp. 1-3 – 1-5) revealed that the California Central Valley chronically suffered from higher unemployment rates, lower median household incomes, and lower educational attainment rates relative to the rest of the State. The same report also noted that stakeholders of the Central Valley repeatedly characterized the region as an 40

“‛island’ that is isolated from the rest of the [S]tate by transportation, geographic and economic barriers, and the high-speed rail system is seen as a means to help break down those barriers” (Authority, 2015, p. ES-7). The key findings of the report noted that opportunities for workforce improvement, transportation connectivity and integration, business development, tourism, station area development, education, research and technology, and regional partnerships existed for the Central Valley with the implementation of high-speed rail (Authority, 2015, pp. 2-8 – 2-14).

Population of California, 1900-2016 Gross Domestic Product California, 1997-2015

50,000 2,500 40,000 2,000 30,000 1,500 20,000 1,000

10,000 500 $US)

Population (thousands) Population 0 0

1900 1907 1914 1921 1928 1935 1942 1949 1956 1963 1970 1977 1984 1991 1998 2005 2012

1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

Year Year Gross Domestic Product (thousands (thousands Product Domestic Gross

Maintained Lane Miles in California, 2001-2014 Vehicle Miles Traveled in California, 1972-2016

400,000 250 395,000 390,000 200 385,000 380,000 150 375,000 100

Lane Miles Lane 370,000 365,000 50 360,000

355,000 0

1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Year (billions) Traveled Miles Vehicle Year

Figure 25. Various economic development metrics with respect to development in California. (California Department of Transportation [CALTRANS], 2017a; CALTRANS, 2017b; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis [FRED], 2017a; FRED, 2017b).

The State of California also benefits from the fact that its major population centers form somewhat of a linear corridor, as shown in Figure 26. 41

Figure 26. Statewide high-speed rail network overlaid on a population density map. (Authority, 2017b). 42

In fact, California’s geographic population distribution is perfect for high-speed rail for two reasons. Firstly, as Walker (2012, p. 185) states:

An efficient transit line—and, hence, one that will support good service—connects multiple points but is also reasonably straight so that it’s perceived as a direct route between any two points on the line . . . . Even if it’s a U, O, or L shape, an efficient line is at least locally straight and thus able to be the most direct route between two points on a long portion of the line. (Again, this is not always a geometrically straight line; it may be a path defined by existing roads or rail corridors that everyone perceives as reasonably direct given the terrain and natural chokepoints.) For that reason, good transit geography is any geography in which high-demand transit destinations are on a direct and operable path between other high-demand transit destinations. A bad geography for transit, then, is one that indulges in cul-de-sacs on a large scale. It sets destinations a little back from the line, so that transit must either bypass them or deviate to them, where deviating means delaying all the other passengers riding through this point . . . .

With California’s major cities along a relatively straight line, transit modes like high-speed rail can operate in an efficient manner by focusing services on a single corridor, rather than having to spread services along multiple lines. The concept is also shown in Figure 27. 43

Figure 27. Ideal and terrible transit route geometry. (Walker, 2012, p. 185).

Secondly, the corridor between San Francisco and Los Angeles is just under 400 miles (from Table 5), allowing for a travel time of under three hours to be possible. Many intermediate cities along the high-speed rail alignment are even shorter distances from the major cities and other intermediate cities, allowing for even shorter travel times. This is condition is perfect for high-speed rail, because as Figure 28 shows, high-speed rail tends to capture mode share from airlines in the same travel market when the travel time is under three hours. 44

High-Speed Rail vs. Airline Modal Split 100%

90%

80% Airline

70%

60%

50%

40% ModeShare 30% High-Speed Rail y = 2.5663e-0.009x 20% R² = 0.7336 10%

0% 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Travel Time (min)

Figure 28. Mode share between high-speed rail and airlines by travel time. (Nash, 2013, p. 12).

Finally, high-speed rail will be consistent with California’s efforts to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and promoting sustainable lifestyles. In a 2016 report, the Authority discussed the benefits of passengers choosing to travel with high-speed rail as opposed to automobiles and airlines. The Authority (2016b, p. 20) forecasted that the High-Speed Rail System would cumulatively reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 58.70 and 71.84 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent depending on a low ridership scenario and a high ridership scenario, respectively.

Challenges Due to Ideology

Differences abound between the implementation of high-speed rail in China and in California. In China, the central government has taken the lead in implementing the high-speed rail network on a nationwide basis, and has also assumed the expenditures of between $400 billion and $500 billion in its 11th, 12th, 13th Five-Year Plans (Railway Gazette, 2015; China.org.cn, 2011). This equates to about expenditures of $100 billion per year. 45

By contrast, the State of California itself has had to take the lead in implementing high- speed rail. During the Obama Administration’s tenure from early 2009 to early 2017, the federal government authorized $8 billion under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and $2.1 billion under the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 to develop high-speed intercity passenger rail in America (Federal Railroad Administration, n.d.). In other words, the federal government provided a meager $10.1 billion to fund all high-speed rail efforts in the United States in an eight-year span. The low amount of funds provided to high-speed rail reflects the general opposition to federal funding of any kind for any purpose by the Republican Party in Congress. A popular argument that is raised against high-speed rail is the notion that the private sector provides goods and services better than the public sector. Since the private sector has not invested in high-speed rail, it must mean that high-speed rail is not a worthwhile service to provide in the first place. The problem with this argument, however, is that the public sector has historically provided the necessary catalyst for goods and services of all kinds to be researched, developed, and administered before the private sector becomes involved (Block & Keller, 2011; Mazzucato, 2014; Chang, 2008). In fact, a very good example of this phenomenon is what former President of General Electric, Charles E. Wilson, called the “permanent war economy,” in which the United States pumped huge sums of public funds into the defense industry after the Second World War in light of concerns that the economy might slump back into a depression (Noble, n.d.). As a result of this funding, the defense industry developed technologies such as “computers, the internet, complicated software, information technology, lasers, microelectronics, pharmaceuticals” and others that form the basis of today’s hi-tech economy (Chomsky, quoted by Noble, n.d.). Many of these technologies were in the public sector for 30 years before being handed over to the private sector for further developing and commercialization (Chomsky, quoted by Noble, n.d.). The phenomenon is a great display of the relationship between states and markets, in which states socialize risk and cost, while the private sector commercializes and profits (Chomsky, quoted by Noble, n.d.). As opposed to countries in western Europe or East Asia, the United States has no central planning agency to coordinate research and development efforts (Block & Keller, 2011, p. 168). What it does have is akin to Mao Zedong’s “let a hundred flowers bloom” approach, in which a decentralized network of dozens of federal agencies fund “laboratories whose technologists have 46 strong incentives to work with private firms and find ways to turn their discoveries into commercial products” (Block & Keller, 2011, p. 168). Examples of such agencies and programs include the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, the Central Intelligence Agency’s In-Q-Tel, the defunct Advance Technology Program, Advance Research Agency-Energy under the Department of Energy, National Institutes of Health, Department of Agriculture, Department of Homeland Security, and National Science Foundation, among others (Block & Keller, 2011, pp. 167-168). As Block and Keller (2011, p. 168) put it:

Because these programs contradict the market fundamentalist ideology that celebrates private enterprise and denigrates the public sector, they have remained largely unknown to the public. Journalists rarely write about government technology initiatives; for example, the New York Times has mentioned the [Small Business Innovation Research] program in its news coverage fewer than ten times over the last twenty-seven years. To be sure, Congress periodically debates the design and funding for these programs, but reports on these discussions are rarely covered in the Wall Street Journal or other general, widely circulated business publications. Since the programs are largely unknown, they simple do not figure in public policy debates . . . .

Whereas countries in East Asia and western Europe may have what is called the highly visible Developmental Bureaucratic State, the United States has what is dubbed as the “hidden developmental network state,” which largely goes unnoticed by the American public, despite playing a huge role in the United States’ technological competitiveness with the rest of the world (Block, 2008; Block & Keller, 2011). Since the nature of the California High-Speed Rail Authority’s developmental efforts requires a great amount of public outreach and attention, it has drawn much scrutiny and opposition from widely-circulated newspapers and Republican lawmakers (Vartabedian, 2017; Alexander, 2017). Whether California’s efforts can overcome this opposition remains to be seen.

47

Results and Conclusions

China has expanded, and is continuing to expand its high-speed rail network. It has aggressively imported technologies from abroad to accelerate its domestic capabilities in manufacturing and developing high-speed rail technologies. Its efforts have allowed it to catch up with the rest of the world in the high-speed rail industry, and compete in global markets by outbidding countries that have decades more experience of operating high-speed rail systems in the procurement processes of developing countries that wish to build high-speed rail systems. China’s leadership has also engaged in global sales pitch campaign to export high-speed rail technology in an effort to increase its economic and diplomatic influence. These actions demonstrate Rostow’s (1956) self-sufficiency model and Frank’s (1966) underdevelopment model at play. The California High-Speed Rail Project was discussed as a comparative example to the projects in China. In terms of purpose, California’s efforts are similar to China’s. A growing population and economy will lead to higher travel demands, which strains the capacity of existing transportation infrastructure. Investing in a high-speed rail system will allow the State to avoid congestion that constrains economic growth and a higher quality of life. On the other hand, the ideological contexts that each project is being implemented in could not be any more different. In China, the central government has taken a lead role in implementing and funding high-speed rail across the entire country. In the United States, the federal government has been limited to support States in implementing high-speed rail due to the Republican Party’s opposition in Congress. California has been forced to move forward alone in bringing high-speed rail to America. 48

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Appendix A No. Line Length (km) Design speed (km/hr) Start/scheduled start of work Startup/scheduled startup Affiliated lines 1 Beijing-Shenyang 676 350 Scheduled for 2010 2012 2 Tianjin-Qinhuangdao 261 350 November-08 December-11 Beijing-Harbin passenger line 3 Qinhuangdao-Shenyang 405 250 August-99 October-03 (north-south line) Beijing -> Chengde -> 4 Harbin-Dalian 904 350 August-07 December-11 Shenyang -> Harbin 5 Panjin-Yingkou 90 350 May-09 2011 Beijing-Shanghai passenger line (north-south line) 6 Beijing-Shanghai 1,318 350 April-08 June-11 Beijing -> Tianjin -> Jinan -> Xuzhou -> Nanjing -> Shanghai 7 Beijing-Shijiazhuang 281 350 October-08 June-11 Beijing-Hong Kong passenger line 8 Shijiazhuang-Wuhan 838 350 October-08 June-11 (north-south line) Beijing -> Shijiazhuang -> 9 Wuhan-Guangzhou 1,069 350 June-05 December-09 Shengzhou -> Wuhan -> 10 Guangzhou-Shenzhen 116 350 August-08 December-10 Changsha -> Guangzhou - > Shenzhen -> Hong 11 Shenzhen-Hong Kong 26 200 Scheduled for 2010 2016 Kong 12 Shanghai-Hangzhou 202 350 September-08 October-10 Southeast coast passenger 13 Hangzhou-Ningbo 150 350 April-08 December-11 line 14 Ningbo-Wenzhou 351 250 December-04 September-09 (north-south line) Shanghai -> Hangzhou -> 15 Wenzhou-Fuzhou 230 250 October-05 September-09 Ningbo -> Wenzhou -> 16 Fuzhou-Xiamen 275 200 September-05 April-10 Fuzhou -> Xiamen -> Shenzhen 17 Xiamen-Shenzhen 502 250 November-07 2013 18 Qingdao-Jinan 364 250 January-07 December-08 Qingdao-Taiyuan passenger line 19 Jinan-Shijiazhuang 319 250 Scheduled for 2010 2012 (east-west line) Qingdao-Jinan -> 20 Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan 212 250 June-06 April-09 Shijiazhaung -> Taiyuan

21 Xuzhou-Zhengzhou 357 350 Scheduled for 2010 2013 Xuzhou-Lanzhou 22 Zhengzhou-Xian 505 350 September-05 February-10 passenger line (east-west line) 23 Xian-Baoji 148 350 November-09 December-12 Xuzhou -> Zhengzhou -> 24 Baoji-Lanzhou 403 350 Scheduled for 2010 2013 Xian -> Baoji -> Lanzhou China’s high-speed rail construction as of October 2010. Note: Yellow = Completion by October 2010; Green = Completion by 2012; Blue = Completion by 2020. (Takagi, 2011, p. 37). 54

Appendix A (contd.) No. Line Length (km) Design speed (km/hr) Start/scheduled start of work Startup/scheduled startup Affiliated lines 25 Shanghai-Nanjing intercity railway between Shanghai and Nanjing 26 Nanjing-Hefei 166 250 June-05 April-08 Shanghai (Nanjing-Hefei- 27 Hefei-Wuhan 359 250 August-05 April-09 Wuhan-Chongqing) 28 Wuhan-Yichang 293 200 September-08 January-12 Chengdu passenger line (east-west line) 29 Yichang-Wanzhou 377 200 December-03 November-10 Shanghai -> Nanjing -> 30 Lichuan-Chongqing 264 200 December-08 December-12 Hefei -> Wuhan -> Chongqing -> Chengdu 31 Chongqing-Suining 132 200 January-09 January-12 32 Suining-Chengdu 148 200 May-05 June-09 12 Shanghai-Hangzhou Southeast coast passenger line/Shanghai-Hangzhou Shanghai-Kunming passenger line 33 Hangzhou-Changsha 933 350 January-09 2013 (east-west line) Shanghai -> Hangzhou -> 34 Changsha-Kunming 1,175 350 Scheduled for 2010 2014 Nanchang -> Changsha -> Guiyang -> Kunming 35 Beijing-Tianjin 114 350 July-05 August-08 36 Chengdu-Dujiangyan 57 220 November-08 May-10 37 Nanchang-Juijiang 131 250 June-07 September-10 25 Shanghai-Nanjing 301 350 July-08 July-10 38 Guangzhou-Zhuhai 117 200 December-05 October-10 39 Hainan Eastern Ring Railway (Haikou-Sanya) 308 250 September-07 December-10 40 Changchun-Jilin 109 250 May-07 December-10 41 Tianjin-Binhai Xingu 45 350 October-09 December-11 Extension of Beijing-Tianjin 42 Bengbu-Hefei 131 350 January-09 December-11 43 Hefei-Fuzhou 806 250 September-09 2013 44 Guangzhou-Foshan-Zhaoqing 87 200 September-09 March-11 45 Nanjing-Anqing 257 250 December-08 June-12 46 Dongguan-Huicheng 97 200 May-09 October-12 47 Nanjing-Hangzhou 251 350 December-08 December-12 48 Jiangyou-Chengdu-Leshan 319 350 December-08 December-12 China’s high-speed rail construction as of October 2010. Note: Yellow = Completion by October 2010; Green = Completion by 2012; Blue = Completion by 2020. (Takagi, 2011, p. 37). 55

Appendix A (contd.) No. Line Length (km) Design speed (km/hr) Start/scheduled start of work Startup/scheduled startup Affiliated lines 49 Xian-Jiangyou 519 350 March-10 June-14 50 Wuhan urban area 160 250 March-09 2013 51 Luizhou-Nanning 226 250 December-08 2012 52 Beijing-Tangshan 160 350 Scheduled for 2010 2012 53 Tianjin-Baoding 145 250 Scheduled for 2010 2012 54 Qingdao-Yantai-Rongcheng 299 250 Scheduled for 2010 December-12 55 Beijing-Zhangjiakou 174 200 Scheduled for 2010 2013 56 Chongqing-Wanzhou 250 350 Scheduled for 2010 2013 57 Harbin-Qiqihar 286 300 July-09 2013 58 Shenyang-Dandong 208 350 Scheduled for 2010 2013 59 Chengdu-Chongqing 305 350 Scheduled for 2010 - South corridor 60 Guangzhou-Qingyuan 68 200 Scheduled for 2010 - 61 Guangzhou-Guiyang 857 250 October-08 2012 62 Dandong-Dalian 159 250 Scheduled for 2010 - China’s high-speed rail construction as of October 2010. Note: Yellow = Completion by October 2010; Green = Completion by 2012; Blue = Completion by 2020. (Takagi, 2011, p. 37). 56

Appendix B

High-speed rail construction in China as of October 2010. The numbers correspond to the projects shown in Appendix A. (Takagi, 2011, p. 38).