Israel An Enduring Union

Efraim Inbar

he strategic partnership between the U.S. and Israel has been the object of substantial criticism over the years, and again of late. Opponents have blamed the strong ties between the U.S. and T 1 Israel for resentment of America in the Arab and Muslim worlds. But the proposition that the U.S. would be better off not lending its support to Israel betrays ignorance of what the Middle East really is, and of the real causes of anti-Americanism both there and elsewhere.2 In fact, negative attitudes toward the United States and the West are deeply rooted in Arab and Muslim culture, and have little to do with American aid to Israel.

Indeed, the case for supporting Israel—built around Israel’s strategic location in the region, its political stability, and its technological and military assets—is almost self-evident. Nevertheless, even self-evident truths some- times need enunciation.

The ties that bind Since the mid-1960s, Israel has adopted an American orientation in its foreign policy. One of the chief proponents of such a policy direction was Yitzhak Rabin, then chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. For the follow- ing three decades, Rabin remained a major force in Israeli foreign policy—as prime minister (1974-77), defense minister (1984-90), and again as prime minister (1992-95)—and so did his views about the prudence of partnership

Efraim Inbar is professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University in Tel Aviv, Israel, and Director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. Efraim Inbar

with the United States.3 For Rabin, lent course of action that they have as well as for all of his successors, unambiguously adopted.) strategic coordination with Washing- Indeed, Israel reluctantly accepts ton was of paramount importance. its unequal status in its bilateral rela- Prime Ministers Benjamin Netan- tions with the U.S., and is invariably yahu (1996-99) and Ehud Barak sensitive to American preferences. (1999-2001) intensively engaged Perhaps the best known example the Clinton administration in trying of this acquiescence was Israel’s to promote peace-making in the restraint in response to unprovoked region. Even Prime Minister Ariel missile strikes from Iraq during Sharon (2001-2006), long a skeptic of Operation Desert Storm in 1991—a the merits of alliance with the U.S., decision which served to undermine quickly learned the need for strate- Israel’s deterrence.4 Similarly, at gic coordination with Washington. America’s request, Israel halted dip- He and his successor, Ehud Olmert, lomatic overtures to North Korea in made sure that their planned unilat- 1994, and canceled a planned $1 bil- eral withdrawals were presented to lion sale of Phalcon airborne early Washington even before obtaining warning systems to China in 2000. the approval of their own cabinets. The contours of the Gaza withdrawal in 2005 were likewise defined in the Israel is one of the few countries framework of Israel’s initial dialogue in the world that does not see U.S. with Washington.5 Bilateral relations between primacy in international affairs as a the two countries are occasionally troubling phenomenon. If anything, marred by passing tensions stem- Israelis fear that the U.S. may ming from differing perspectives on succumb to isolationist impulses developments in the Middle East— and from a mismatch between Isra- and as a result give up its activist el’s regional agenda and America’s posture in the Middle East and global strategic calculus. Neverthe- other parts of the world. less, with the advent of the 21st cen- tury, Israel is one of the few countries Similarly, the gradual increase in the world that does not see U.S. in Israel’s use of force, primarily primacy in international affairs as a against the Palestinians since Sep- troubling phenomenon. Moreover, tember 2000, has been continuously in contrast to much of the rest of the calibrated to a level that the U.S. world, Israel is not preoccupied with has been ready to tolerate, despite how to tame American power. To the the fact that more muscular Israeli contrary, Jerusalem counts on the responses to Palestinian terrorism U.S. to fend off unbalanced Euro- would have probably been more pean policies towards the so-called effective and less costly to all sides Middle East peace process, and in the long run. (It can be argued looks to Washington for support (and that a more forceful response also compensation) for the risks it takes would have better served American in attempting to make peace with its interests in the long run, signal- neighbors. If anything, Israelis fear ing minimum tolerance of terrorist that the U.S. may succumb to isola- activities and demonstrating to the tionist impulses and as a result give Palestinians the futility of the vio- up its activist posture in the Middle

 The Journal of International Security Affairs Israel: An Enduring Union

East and other parts of the world. The A preference for unipolarity difficulties that the U.S. has faced in The unipolar nature of the con- Iraq have reinforced such apprehen- temporary international system sions. Simply put, the relationship where the U.S. holds a dominant with Washington has been and will position will probably end some day, continue to be a central pillar of Isra- when a powerful-enough competitor el’s national security orientation. arises. Several major powers, includ- Israel’s pro-American foreign ing Russia, France, China and even policy orientation is also buttressed India, eagerly await such a moment, by cultural trends. Few societies in preferring a multi-polar world where the world tend to consume Ameri- American influence is diminished can products of all kinds—from TV and curtailed. Not so Israel. While programs and films to cars and cui- it does not carry enough weight to sine—so avidly. American sports make much of a difference in this cal- are watched regularly in Israel. culus, Israel is highly unlikely to aid American English has penetrated in the evolution of an anti-American Hebrew discourse, with little oppo- alliance, either now or in the future. sition. American politics are fol- Jerusalem clearly prefers the current lowed intensely with great interest distribution of power in the interna- and admiration, and American uni- tional system, intuitively realizing versities are preferred by Israelis that a competitor to American inter- seeking to attain higher degrees. ests in the Middle East will in all In 2006, the United States was the likelihood seek to court the enemies top destination for Israeli tourists, of Israel. Israel also backs the Ameri- while America became the larg- can policy of limiting foreign power est market for Israeli exports a full involvement in the Middle East, and decade ago. All of the above make rejects demands from European and democratic Israel the most stable other countries for a more active and reliable ally in the region for the role in the peace process. In other United States. words, Pax Americana, not only in the Middle East but also on the Korean An overlapping peninsula and in Central Asia, seems strategic agenda to suit Israeli interests. The alliance between Israel and the U.S. is not based on a defense Common threats treaty. Israel, in particular, has been Today, the major challenges to reluctant to enter into a formal alli- U.S. security—among them threats ance, instead preferring to preserve to the free flow of oil, the proliferation its freedom of international action. of weapons of mass destruction, and Islamic terrorism—all originate in Israeli leaders have emphasized that 6 no American soldiers are needed the Middle East. Deepening Ameri- to defend Israel, echoing Winston can involvement in the region has Churchill’s refrain: “Give us the tools reflected this fact. The U.S. invaded and we will finish the job.” Rather, the Afghanistan in 2001 in order to root current burgeoning strategic relation- out al-Qaeda, and overthrew the ship is based on a common strategic regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq agenda that has survived and tran- two years later in order to put an end scended the end of the Cold War. to its quest for WMD and support for anti-American forces in the region.

The Journal of International Security Affairs  Efraim Inbar

Similarly, although actual American after the death of current President policy remains in flux, Washington’s Hosni Mubarak. Both also hope that antagonism toward Iran reflects the Egypt will play a positive, moderat- understanding that Iran’s deep sup- ing role with the Palestinians, par- port for Islamic terrorism, its pursuit ticularly in Gaza. Another regional of WMD, and its growing regional power whose foreign policy has elic- ambitions have put it on a collision ited some alarm in Washington and course with the U.S. Jerusalem is Turkey, which under Israel clearly shares both Ameri- the proto-Islamist Justice and Devel- can goals and American perceptions opment Party (AKP) has begun to on these issues. Thus, although drift away from cooperation with Jerusalem had considerably less both countries. enthusiasm than the U.S. about the Syria has become a similar prospects for democracy in Iraq, point of convergence. The United Israeli officials strongly supported States, deeply enmeshed in Iraq, has the war against Saddam Hussein on struggled with Syrian support for the the grounds that it removed a major insurgency there, as well as with the strategic threat to Israel and the Assad regime’s stubborn grip on Leb- West. Israel also shares the Ameri- anon, which endures (albeit in altered can objective of resurrecting a uni- form) in spite of the 2005 “Cedar Rev- tary Iraqi state that can serve as a olution.” Israel, for its part, wishes balancing force against Iran in the to minimize the difficulties that the Gulf region. For, while Iran consti- United States is experiencing in Iraq, tutes a major international challenge and remains concerned about Syrian for the U.S., it represents an existen- sponsorship of Hezbollah, Hamas and tial threat for Israel.7 And although the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The Israel is pleased with the belated two countries also obviously compare international realization that Iran’s notes on the Syrian regime and its ayatollahs are after a bomb, it is alliance with Iran. And while so far skeptical that diplomacy or economic Washington has displayed caution pressure can contain or end Tehran’s about exerting pressure on Damas- nuclear dreams. Instead, Jerusalem, cus, if and when the U.S. government like most other capitals in the Middle chooses to do so, Israel could prove to East, ultimately looks to American be a useful tool. determination to prevent the strate- Consensus also exists regard- gic nightmare of a nuclear Iran. Con- ing Hashemite Jordan, which is seen versely, if Israel should find the need by both Washington and Jerusalem to undertake unilateral measures as a reliable ally in fighting radical against this threat, officials in Jeru- Islam and Palestinian extremism. salem know that they can probably In 2003, King Abdullah displayed count on American indulgence and self-confidence and political adroit- at least tacit support. ness in supporting the American invasion of Iraq (in contrast with his Shared concerns father’s performance under similar Other areas of strategic com- circumstances in 1991). For its part, monality are also visible. Both Israel has traditionally played an countries are concerned about the important role in providing an insur- stability of the Egyptian regime and ance policy to the pro-Western regime hope for a smooth transition of power in Amman.

10 The Journal of International Security Affairs Israel: An Enduring Union

Even the Palestinian issue elicits U.S. adopted military preemption much mutual understanding nowa- as part of its official menu of policy days. Washington is inching toward options.9 Such action has been an Israel’s minimal territorial demands integral part of Israeli strategic think- by accepting the incorporation of ing and policy since the 1950s. In the “settlement blocs” in the final, yet wake of 9/11, Israel’s preemptive pos- to be determined, borders of Israel. ture, once a source of tension in the The need for a security zone along bilateral relationship, is now met with the Jordan River to defend Israel (and better understanding in Washing- Jordan) is also accepted by American ton. Indeed, the dilemmas involved policymakers. Moreover, despite spo- in combating terrorists, particularly radic lip service to the “roadmap” and in urban settings with large civilian the “two-state” paradigm by some in populations, are no longer academic Washington, the current Administra- questions for the U.S. tion has made clear that its backing for any compromise is conditional America’s increasingly upon the emergence of a Palestinian proactive strategic posture leadership willing to live in peace with Israel and establish effective control is very much in tune over its territory by dismantling the with Israel’s own defense myriad militias that operate there doctrine, which stresses today. But since there is little chance of Palestinian society producing such self reliance and which is a responsible leadership in the near skeptical of the effectiveness future, the U.S. has thrown its weight of multilateral action. behind Israel’s adoption of a conflict management strategy.8 The gap between Washington and Jerusalem has even narrowed on National security doctrine a traditional area of disagreement: In the post-Cold War era, there nuclear posture. While the U.S. was is also greater compatibility between and remains committed to the 1968 the U.S. and Israel in terms of national Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty security doctrine. As a superpower, (NPT), Israel has consistently opposed the U.S. has always had great free- joining this international regime. To a dom of action, but this latitude has great extent, Israel’s nuclear ambigu- been magnified by the unipolar state ity has helped to minimize tensions of the international system. America’s surrounding this issue. Nevertheless, perceived unilateralism has garnered the 1995 NPT Review Conference criticism from many corners, but could have exacerbated relations by Israel has not been averse to this pre- providing an opportunity for Egypt dilection. Indeed, America’s increas- and its allies in the Third World to ingly proactive strategic posture is pressure the U.S. to force Israel into very much in tune with Israel’s own adherence by threatening not to sup- defense doctrine, which stresses self- port the Treaty’s extension. Yet, the reliance and which is skeptical of the U.S. did not apply pressure on Israel to effectiveness of multilateral action. change its position, and by eventually The U.S. also has grown closer securing the extension of the NPT, to Israel in terms of its approach to it actually lent legitimacy to Israel’s the use of military force. In 2002, the exceptionalism on the nuclear issue.10

The Journal of International Security Affairs 11 Efraim Inbar

Strategic cooperation companies in order to penetrate the Security cooperation between American weapon market. But these Israel and the U.S. goes back a long partnerships have proven beneficial— way, and much of it takes place away and profitable—over the long run. from the public eye. One such area is Among other positive aspects, such the exchange of intelligence; while business alliances have enabled Israel American data collection capabilities to purchase arms based on Israeli tech- are staggering, Israel itself excels nology from the U.S. using U.S. mili- in several areas, including eaves- tary aid funds. And American-Israeli dropping and human intelligence industrial partnerships can sell weap- (humint). It is a testament to Israel’s ons to third parties, expanding export security contributions to the bilat- opportunities for both countries. eral relationship that strategic ties Yet this collaboration is not between the two countries have never without its creative tensions. In been stronger. the shrinking post-Cold War arms On the military front, the U.S. market, Israeli and American firms armed forces have intensified joint often compete fiercely—a fact that training with Israeli air, sea and land has, on occasion, injected tensions units, and avail themselves of contin- into the larger relationship between uous access to Israeli military experi- Washington and Jerusalem. The U.S. ence and doctrine. In particular, since opposes unrestricted Israeli arms the start of the War on Terror, Israel’s sales to a number of countries for expertise in Low Intensity Conflict political-strategic reasons. For exam- (LIC) operations has been a boon to ple, in the past it has vetoed Israeli the U.S. military. So has Israel’s vast arms sales to China and Venezuela. combat experience and an array of Neither does Washington hesitate to weaponry specifically tailored for the use its international leverage to pro- situations confronting the U.S. today. mote its own military industries at Similarly, a greater American focus the expense of those of other coun- on homeland security has naturally tries (including Israel), though not intensified cooperation with Israel, always successfully. a country that has coped with such threats for decades. In turn, Israeli A partnership preserved agencies, experts, and manufactur- Over the years, the strategic ers of equipment for counter-terror ties between Washington and Jeru- purposes have been happy to aid salem have survived changing inter- American efforts to improve home- national circumstances and many land defense. bilateral tensions. Throughout, the Another area of synergy is visible U.S., unquestionably the senior part- in the defense-industrial arena. While ner, repeatedly has had the option of the U.S. dominates the global arms ending or scaling down the relation- market in the post-Cold War era,11 ship. But Washington has generally Israel enjoys a relative technological understood the advantages of having advantage in several niches—a superi- close ties with Jerusalem. Perhaps ority which American firms have capi- Dov Zakheim, a former senior Pen- talized upon. Moreover, most of Israel’s tagon official who has been deeply home-made weapon systems are battle involved in the bilateral relationship, proven. Initially, Israeli firms entered put it best in a recent interview: “On into partnerships with American balance, if the relationship was not

12 The Journal of International Security Affairs Israel: An Enduring Union in U.S. interests, it would have been Review 4, no. 1 (1996), 17-29. diluted years ago.”12 11. Stephanie G. Neuman, “Defense Industries and Global Dependency,” Orbis 50, no. 3 Yet today, the alliance remains as (2006), 429-451. vibrant as ever. The reason is clear; 12. As cited in Barbara Opall-Rome, “U.S.-Israel the Middle East is still a troubled Alliance Proves Demanding, Yet Durable,” neighborhood—one that will con- Defense News, May 22, 2006, 15. tinue to generate sources of global instability into the foreseeable future. In confronting these challenges, the strategic bonds that bind the United States and Israel together have proven to be both useful and durable.

1. For a recent example of this phenomenon, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s controversial paper on The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, which is available online at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/ wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011. 2. See Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism. The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (London: Penguin Books, 2004); Barry Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002), 73-85. 3. Efraim Inbar, Yitzhak Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Washington: Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 34-57. 4. Efraim Inbar, “Israel and the Gulf War,” in Andrew Bacevich and Efraim Inbar, eds., The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 67-89. 5. Author’s private communication with senior Israeli official, June 21, 2006. 6. See Steven David, “American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East: A Neces- sary Change,” in Efraim Inbar, ed., Isra- el’s National Security in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2006, forthcoming). 7. See Efraim Inbar, “The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Review of Interna- tional Affairs 10, no. 1 (2006), http://meria. idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7. html. 8. For the elements of such a strategy, see Efraim Inbar, “The Palestinian Challenge,” Israel Affairs 12, no. 4 (2006, forthcoming). 9. White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 6. 10. Gerald M. Steinberg, “The 1995 NPT Exten- sion and Review Conference and the Arab- Israeli Peace Process,” Non-Proliferation

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