Justice As Fairness and Ubuntu: Conceptualizing Justice Through Human Dignity

Justice as Fairness and Ubuntu: Conceptualizing Justice through Human Dignity

Paul Nnodim Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts, US Austin Okigbo University of Colorado, Boulder, US

Abstract. This article examines the moral understanding of Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ and the pre-colonial Nguni concept of ubuntu in the search for both areas of convergence and dissonance, and to see what scholars of justice might learn in the process. While Rawls’s justice as fairness is the product of a con- structivist approach in Western philosophy along the lines of the traditional social contract theory, ubuntu is a philosophy with backgrounds in the communal, ethical practices of some Eastern and Southern African societies. Beyond the juxtaposition arising from differing methodologies, historical or theoretical developments, and jurisprudential applications, our findings demonstrate that both justice as fairness and ubuntu reflect the commonality of shared human conditions and experiences that attempt to answer moral questions arising from the quiddity of persons.

Keywords. Communalism, egalitarianism, self-identity, Siphithemba Choir, social contract

I. Introduction

ustice as fairness is the general designation of the theory of justice Jchampioned by the late American philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002) in his renowned book A Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls leverages the social contract theory of modern Western philosophy to develop a system of justice that celebrates the subjectivity of the human being as the quintes- sence of inalienable rights. The ensuing liberal individualism bequeaths human liberty an unparalleled ‘sacredness’ such that even the collective interests of the community cannot override it. The principles of justice

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 27, no. 1 (2020): 69-91. © 2020 by Centre for Ethics, KU Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.27.1.3288829 ethical perspectives – march 2020 as fairness recognize the integrity of persons as self-authenticating sources of valid claims against all forms of social organization and cohesion. Although the liberty of the individual has priority over the community in justice as fairness (‘the priority of the right over the good’), nevertheless, it is only a well-ordered and functioning society that can guarantee liberty for individuals. Social justice entails levelling the playing fields of social, economic, and political institutions for individuals to engage productively in a system of cooperation. However, to arrive at the desired stage of egalitarianism, the talents of individual persons must be treated as common assets to achieve efficient distributivism and lessen the disadvantages or hardships of those at the bottom of the social and economic strata. Thus, the question of justice that Rawls sets out to answer in his theory borders, more or less, on how individuals in the modern state distribute the burdens and benefits of social and economic cooperation in order to uphold human dignity and guarantee decent life prospects. Indigenous African peoples have organizational systems that articulate the idea of justice as that which guarantees individual rights and responsi- bilities in a community and as a means to safeguard a peaceful, stable, and sustainable society. In Eastern and Southern Bantu cultures of Africa, justice as an ethical paradigm is captured in the social philosophy of ubuntu. Ubuntu etymologically derives from the Bantu word for person umuntu (plu- ral abantu). In IsiZulu (one of Bantu languages of the Nguni group), umuntu is formed from a combination of the noun class, one subject prefix umu- and the concept root -ntu. In the same language, ubu-, or noun class, eight subject prefix designates an abstract noun or concept. Hence ubuntu is an abstract concept that merely translates as ‘humanity’. The African concept of ubuntu revolves around a sense of community that celebrates human dignity, value, and worth, and which sees the development of self-identity as the result of a dialectical back and forth or give and take action between an individual and his or her community. The human person is thus a creative expression of individuality within the matrix of the social community. It is the community that shapes the individual and ubuntu is the thread that

— 70 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 paul nnodim and austin okigbo – justice as fairness and ubuntu links one member of the community with the other regardless of their social or economic background. It is the essence of human-ness and a concretely lived philosophy within the human society. The concept of ubuntu, though similar in meaning across Bantu cultures, varies in its practical application as an ethical principle. In Southern Africa, the idea, its interpretation, and applications in the domains of politics, economics, and social relations have also evolved, especially since the 1950s (see Samkange 1980; Gade 2011; Swanson 2012). Its South African (Nguni) usage gained discursive ascendancy in international intellectual circles, following especially its ‘theologization’ by Archbishop Des- mond Tutu, who as the co-chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) located ubuntu at the core of the founding principle and process of the TRC (see Gade 2017). As ubuntu becomes systema- tized in the philosophical literature, it also shoulders multiple interpretive voices, thus leaving its meaning and contemporary applications open to intellectual contestations. That said, there is something that stays fundamental to ubuntu as an African social philosophy and ethical principle despite the multiple interpretive voices, one that allows us to examine it within a specific context of social praxis, to highlight its similarities with Rawls’s justice as fairness and perhaps in so doing explore questions about its universalizability. Drawing from a research work with the Siphi- themba Choir1, an HIV/AIDS support group and choral ensemble in Durban, South Africa, we will present ubuntu as a lived philosophy by investigating how the group understands and applies the principles of ubuntu in the context of their organizational practice.

II. rawls’s Justice as Fairness, Integrity of Persons, and the Community

Rawls’s Justice as fairness, like other forms of social justice, aims to empower the state to re-distribute the benefits of social and economic cooperation in a way that does not disenchant individuals disadvantaged

— 71 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 ethical perspectives – march 2020 by the bad outcome of unregulated market forces.2 For Jackson, the term ‘social justice’ has a ‘substantive political content’ because it calls on the state to alleviate poverty and reduce the economic and social inequalities existing among citizens (Jackson 2005, 360). Since the mainstay of the social justice debate is the distributive procedures of social and economic institutions, social injustice then arises from the failures of these institutions to achieve an efficient and fair distribution of social and economic goods. As Simmons notes: “[…] social injustice will typically involve a defect in institutional rules that aim at or results in a morally improper distribution of basic social goods and burdens (hence the term distributive justice)” (2008, 69). Rawls’s A Theory of Justice rejuvenated the discourse on social justice in contemporary political philosophy when it was published in 1971. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls declares that:

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust (1971, 3).

His aim, he says, is to develop a viable conception of social justice implicit in the social contract tradition, which, however, “[…] general- izes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant” (1971, 3). Following the principle of liberal legitimacy, Rawls thinks that social, economic, or political cooperation must be predicated on the assump- tion that cooperating individuals consent to the terms of cooperation for their mutual benefit. Although he locates the ideals of justice in the classical tradition of virtue ethics, the principle of liberal legitimacy forms the moral basis for his contractarian approach, that is, “[…] the liberal idea that the legitimacy of social rules and institutions depends on their being freely and publicly acceptable to all individuals bound by them” (Freeman 2007, 17).

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In A Theory of Justice, Rawls presents the concepts of persons and society. Persons are free and equal citizens living in a society they see as a fair system of cooperation for their mutual benefit. In Rawls’s human society, citizens practice ‘reciprocity of perspectives’ by treating each other fairly in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of socio-economic cooperation. Given the nature of humans as free and equal cooperating agents, citizens of Rawls’s society must freely choose the principles of justice to regulate the basic structure (the social, economic, and political institutions) of their society. A foreign agent cannot impose the principles of justice on free citizens nor should these principles derive from a higher, independent moral order. In the words of Samuel Freeman:

Rawls’s parties conceive of themselves as free, not in the sense that they may act on any desire they happen to have but in the sense that they are able to control, revise, and take responsibility for their final ends and desires by acting on and from reasonable and rational principles. Recognizing the deep-seated effects of basic social institutions on these capacities and on their interests, they have a basic concern for how such institutions are designed. Not satisfied with the idea that these institutions answer to their desires for the accumulation of objects, Rawls’s parties have a deeper interest in whether the institutions are structured so as to enable them to realize their reasoning capacities and whether the principles supporting these institutions can serve as a basis for the public justification among persons like themselves (2007, 30).

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls further explores conditions under which free and rational individuals would agree to uphold cooperative institutions that are mutually advantageous to everyone (Freeman 2007, 9), and thus find moral grounds for the public justification of their institutions. One way to articulate this arrangement is to design a hypothetical situation or thought experiment, which could then be applied to an actual society by using the method of reflective equilibrium. Although Rawls’s social contract doctrine does not presuppose the existence of an anthropological or historical condition, but rather a purely hypothetical one, it does call for

— 73 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 ethical perspectives – march 2020 some ‘bracketing’. However, we do “[…] devise basic institutions” (Free- man 2007, 42) in the real world. That is to say, “We cooperatively decide, through laws and willing acceptance of social and legal conventions, how the constitution, the economy, property, and so on are designed and fit together into one social scheme” (Freeman 2007, 42). The importance of Rawls’s contractarian condition lies in its underlying phenomenological attitude, which enables citizens of modern democratic society to express their autonomy as rational and reasonable persons working together to design a just society by being fair to everyone. If we are to think about justice as fairness, says Rawls, then we must first immerse ourselves (mentally) in a condition of strict equality. For example, Rawls would want us to imagine a gathering of the representatives of opposing parties or groups in society. The parties have come to choose principles that would govern the collective interest and wellbeing of all members of their organization or society. They have been drawn from all demographics, reflecting the diversity of modern democracy. They are moral agents with conflicting or even rival political, economic, and reli- gious ideologies. Now imagine that these representatives of the various interest groups were to pass through a ‘veil of ignorance’ before entering an ‘original position’, one that inflicts some serious form of temporary amnesia. Like the dead who drank from the mythological River Lethe (the river of for- getfulness or concealment) in Hades, these representatives spontaneously forget all particularities relating to their identities. They no longer know their political affiliations, economic interests, race, gender, sexual orien- tation, position in society, religion, talents, psychological dispositions, advantages or disadvantages, etc. All that the parties now know is that they are members of a given society or representatives of interest groups choosing principles to govern a democratic society. Rawls thinks that in this ‘original position’ of equality, these representatives would only choose principles of justice that further their rational interest since no one knows how he or she would fare in real life. The veil of ignorance and its

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bracketing effects ensure that the representatives adopt an unadventurous attitude toward risk and thus choose principles that allow the least, unde- sirable conditions for the worst-off members of society. Rawls calls principles chosen in this hypothetically strict condition of equality or original position, the two principles of justice as fairness:

i. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. ii. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions of offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and second, they are to be to the greatest benefits of the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1996, 5-6).

The two principles of justice have implications for policymakers. The first principle of justice, which is also known as ‘the equal basic liberty principle’, ensures that under reasonably favorable conditions, that is, in a functioning society with enough resources to permit the full exercise of these liberties, citizens are guaranteed the same amount of basic liberties. Rawls’s basic liberties are precisely political liberties – the right to vote and to be voted for, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of con- science, freedom of person, and the right to hold property, as well as freedom from arbitrary arrest (Rawls 1971, 61). The first principle of justice has lexical priority over the second principle. This means that in a society governed by justice as fairness, none of these essential liberties can be traded off for other valued ends. As Sunstein observes:

We might treat equal liberty as a reflection of the foundational commitment to equal dignity and respect and believe that we do violence to the way we value that commitment if we allow it to be compromised for the sake of greater social and economic advantages. On this view, the lexical priority of equal liberty is structurally akin to the refusal to allow a child to be traded for cash […] (1997, 96).

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These fundamental liberties, for example, cannot be taken away from a given social group, even if doing so promotes economic efficiency. The priority of these liberties, however, does not imply that they cannot be limited in any form. Rawls says that the basic liberties can be restricted among themselves in order to achieve a coherent scheme of liberties for all citizens. In other words, should the basic liberties come into conflict with one another, the institutional rules that define them must be adjusted to enable these liberties to fit into a coherent scheme (Rawls 1996, 295). Therefore, one can be denied a basic liberty in society for the sake of one or more basic liberties. Nevertheless, no one will be denied his or her liberty for the sake of other public goods or valued ends, other than liberty itself. The first principle of justice also grants priority to the rights of individuals over the demands of the political majority. As Rawls puts it:

[…] the priority of the basic liberties implies that they cannot be justly denied to anyone, or to any group of persons, or even to all citizens generally, on the grounds that such is the desire, or overwhelming preference, of an effective political majority, however strong and enduring (1996, 365).

The second principle of justice has two sections. The first section is generally referred to as the ‘fair equality of opportunity principle’, while the second section is known as the ‘difference principle’. Again, among the second principles of justice, ‘fair equality of opportunity’ has priority over the ‘difference principle’. The fair equality of opportunity principle regulates, for instance, political offices, job openings, and products for sale in society. It guarantees that all positions are accessible to all citizens. Furthermore, it authorizes the government to make sure that employers meet the requirements of fairness and equality when adver- tising jobs. Some right-oriented scholars, students of Robert Nozick (1974) or Milton Friedman (1962), for instance, would object to the last section of the second principle of justice (the difference principle) because it seems to

— 76 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 paul nnodim and austin okigbo – justice as fairness and ubuntu infringe not only upon individual liberty, but goes against the logic of the economics of natural endowments. Ostensibly, the difference principle seems to condone social and economic inequalities, if doing so improves the situation of the worst-off in society. In our interpretation, however, we contend that the difference principle does not call for inequalities as such but instead recognizes the human condition in which through sheer brute luck and natural contingencies, social and economic disparities exist among citizens in modern societies. It looks for ways to remedy some of the effects of these inequalities. The underlying idea is that Rawls sees society as a system of cooperation, where citizens reciprocally share the burdens and benefits that result from this cooperation. Rawls states that citizens’ chances in life must neither be explicitly determined by the social position in which they are born nor must a person’s natural talents or lack of such determine his or her prospects in life. Rather, society should see one’s place of birth and the distribution of natural talents as a matter of capricious eventuality, and as such, mitigate the adverse effects they may have on citizens’ life prospects (Rawls 1971, 74-75). The unequal distribution of natural dispositions, which results in une- ven distribution of wealth and positions in society, rather than being erased altogether, may even be acceptable under the condition that it benefits the least advantaged members of society. Thus, Rawls regards the distribution of natural talents as a shared (common) societal asset because it is by nature arbitrary. We do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments. “Who would deny it?” Rawls further asks:

Do people really think that they (morally) deserved to be born more gifted than others? Do they think that they (morally) deserved to be born a man rather than a woman, or vice versa? Do they think that they really deserved to be born into a wealthier rather than into a poorer family? No (2001, 74-75).

But to see the distribution of natural talents as a shareable asset does not mean that gifted people are not permitted to benefit from their

— 77 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 ethical perspectives – march 2020 exceptional abilities. Instead, the difference principle, as a principle of reciprocity, seeks ways to diminish the effects of this random distribution by re-ordering the basic structure of society. As a result, those who have many talents and those who have less complement each other in ways that benefit society as a whole:

Note that what is regarded as a common asset is the distribution of native endowments and not native endowments per se. It is not as if society owned individuals’ endowments taken separately, looking at individuals one by one. To the contrary, the question of the ownership of our endowments does not arise; and should it arise, it is persons themselves who own their endowments: the psychological and physical integrity of persons is already guaranteed by the basic rights and liberties that fall under the first principle of justice (Rawls 2001, 75).

In real-world terms, ‘common asset’ signifies the different talents and dispositions that cooperating individuals have. Irrespective of whether these differences are variations in talents of the same kind or not, they serve a balancing function in a society reminiscent of the “principle of comparative advantage” (Rawls 2001, 76). Consequently, justice as fairness, as an egalitarian principle of justice, could allow the government to tax wealthy individuals to alleviate the situation of the worst-off if they are active and contributing members of society. What the difference principle does not allow is an alteration of the basic structure of society to augment the situation of the super-rich or those already at the top of the social and economic ladder, but adds no value to the quality of life of those at the bottom or even make their situation worse. Rawls’s theory rejects the idea that it is wrong for the government to intervene in society by re-ordering the basic structure of society to alleviate the adverse effects of the unequal distribution of natural talents and other fortuities of social life. Society does not have to be complacent about natural inequalities in order to be fair. A society that practices justice as fairness, Rawls believes, would be advantageous to both the rich and the poor. The rich will benefit from such a society by living in a less

— 78 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 paul nnodim and austin okigbo – justice as fairness and ubuntu hostile atmosphere, while the poor will equally be satisfied with the arrangement by having decent life prospects. Therein lies the incentive for cooperation and the meaning of justice as fairness.

III. ubuntu: An (Nguni) African Communal Practice of Human- ness

Ubuntu is a natural existential philosophy of human-ness with social and spiritual configurations. The meaning of the concept is succinctly captured in the Zulu expression Umuntu ungumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person because of other persons). According to Mathole Motshekga, a philosopher and founding director of the Kara Heritage Institute in Mam- elodi, Pretoria, ubuntu explains a sense of community, wherein one’s humanity is caught up in the humanity of others, irrespective of their race, gender, economic, or political class (SABC 2007) As a social principle, ubuntu establishes the mutual interdependence of human beings in the community, without the recognition of which the society easily dissolves into a state of chaos (Samkange 1980). It is also a philosophy of wellbeing. In Zulu, ukuphila ‘wellbeing’ is tied to ubuntu because the collective humanity of the community consists in the wellbeing of every member of the community. For the people to achieve collective wellbeing, fierce individual competitiveness is mitigated through the communal ownership of land, which enables all members of the community to have the means to earn a living and to raise a family. In a radio programme hosted by Xolani Gwala on SAFM, Mathole Motshekga explained:

You cannot enjoy ubuntu if you have no access to land, if you have no access to economic development. So ubuntu must be the fountainhead of social and economic rights. So, when we talk about moral regen- eration, we must talk about uplifting people from their subhuman conditions and giving them access to socio-economic rights, which would include access to land [and] participation in the economy.

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But, the sense of community and collective wellbeing does not necessar- ily guarantee the continued safeguard and sustainability of ubuntu. Accord- ing to Thokozane Nene, a veteran broadcaster on Zulu Radio Ukhozi and social commentator, the Zulu understand that the flow in the humanity of the community can easily be threatened by unforeseen states of economic, social, political, and even environmental emergencies; or still by personal avarice and ego (2006). Collective effort must address such emergent situations through the process of indaba. Indaba in IsiZulu means meeting, consultative forum, and dialogue. It refers to the process in which competing or complementing parties engage to resolve or to pre- vent new crises in the community. It provides the people the means to evaluate continuously the conditions that affect the community and to ensure the sustenance of ubuntu through a collective ukuphila. In the 1990s, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the champion of the post-apartheid reconciliation efforts, further adapted the philosophy as an ideology to bring about reconciliation and harmony among South Africa’s racial and ethnic groups. Under the reconciliation project, “[…] the ethical values of ubuntu include respect for others, helpfulness, community, sharing, caring, trust and unselfishness.” Under these patterns, “[…] ubuntu underscores the importance of agreement or consensus, and gives priority to the wellbeing of the community as a whole by ensuring the wellbeing of individuals” (New World Encyclopedia 2018). Earlier on in the 1970s, Archbishop Tutu, following the trend of Black Theology, articu- lated the African sense of ubuntu as “[…] corporate personality, [the] idea of solidarity, a social consciousness […] a caring concern that seeks to embrace all, a love that suffers selflessly for others” (Tutu 1973, 21). Tutu inserted the concept of imago Dei into the discourse. For him, the fundamental factor in the formation of the human community is the recognition of oneself and other persons as created in the image of God, irrespective of our physical differences, and that God created the human community as a mutually interdependent system, where everyone is born with potentials that must be realized in the context of others and God

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(Battle 1997, 44). Thus, ubuntu in Tutu’s thoughts on Black Theology entails that every individual is helped, and not hindered, to realize his or her full human potentials. This theology seeks to protect the oppressed, the weakest, and most vulnerable. It teaches that every individual is creative and illustrious, and must have the chance to attain the self-worth and fulfilment that come with industry and productivity. Unfortunately, apartheid deprived black South Africans of education and the benefits of economic freedom that might have come with it. Fast-forward to the period of the AIDS crisis; economic marginalization would conspire with the virus to compound the conditions of depravity such as a poor living state of affairs, poor nutritional habits, vulnerability to HIV infections, and opportunistic infections.3 In fact, prolonged poverty has been linked to depression and behaviours that increase the risk of contracting HIV, such as drug use, alcoholism, prostitution, and transactional sex (see Okigbo 2016). It is in this light, therefore, that one must appreciate the transformative experience of the individuals who comprise the membership of the Siphithemba group, which functions as a community of mutual support in all of its spiritual, social, and economic dimen- sions.

IV. ubuntu as a Lived Philosophy: The Case of the Siphithemba Choir

The research work that informs this article was conducted with the Siphi- themba Choir4 between 2007 and 2013. The choir came out of the HIV/ AIDS support group that was founded in 1997 at the McCord Mission Hospital in Durban. The group served as alternative care in the form of spiritual counselling, prayers, and a social support group for HIV positive individuals at the time when, due to the slow dissemination of antiretro- viral therapy, doctors and caregivers had little medical help that they could render to patients. Additionally, most members of the support group were not gainfully employed (some for lack of skills), and those

— 81 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 ethical perspectives – march 2020 who were employed risked losing their jobs. This was the fate of Zinhle Thabethe, whose nosy colleague, curious about her constant ill health at the time and without her permission, gained access to her diagnosis result from her office filing cabinet and revealed her status to her employers thus leading to her being fired from her job (Hainsworth 2006). As a result, the majority of the support group members had no incomes. Lack of a robust financial base resulted in deficient nutritional habits that were inimical to their immune system, occasioning opportunistic infections such as tuberculosis, pneumonia, and meningitis. However, Nohlanhla Mhlongo, who coordinated the support group, believed that while HIV-positive persons are still active, they could be industrious and able to earn some living by themselves. She used the opportunity of the support group meetings to encourage members in need to look inwards and figure out any talents or skills they have that might benefit their economic conditions: “[…] what we are trying to inculcate to people is that they have to work and not beg. Because of their status, they shouldn’t go around begging; instead, they should give something in return.” Mhlongo’s encouragement resulted thus in the establishment of a micro-industry of bead making, which would later grow big, and to which other skills acquisition projects such as knitting, sewing, woodworks, and the making of mosaics were added. It was in the context of the income-producing ventures that the Sinikithemba choir was born. All choir members spoke passionately about the times when they hummed hymn tunes and sang gospel choruses while working on their projects. It was through work that the group eventually gained consciousness about themselves as a potential musical group. Thus, and thanks to Mhlongo’s guidance, the group transformed into a tri-functional entity: a choral ensemble, an HIV support group, and a microeconomic project. The choir performed at hospital events and around Durban. Over the years, they travelled overseas to international AIDS conferences in the United States as well as used their tours to raise funds for building the Sinikithemba Clinic, a world-class HIV/AIDS research clinic and first of

— 82 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 paul nnodim and austin okigbo – justice as fairness and ubuntu its kind in Africa. They also travelled once to perform with Sir Elton John in the United Kingdom. Through their international tours and their micro-economic projects, many of the choir members acquired skills, some went back to school, and became either gainfully employed or run- ning private businesses, thus maintaining a standard of living above South Africa’s poverty index. Worthy of note, therefore, and in regards to the topic of this paper, is the transformation that members of the group experienced from being redundant, stigmatized, ‘coffin-bound’ individuals, to productive members of society, who now meaningfully and actively engage in the economic, social, and political life of the society, and the broader human community. We suggest, therefore, that the choir’s story represents an example of the contemporary practice of ubuntu as a lived philosophy or principle with socio-economic ramifications. In interviews, Nonhlanhla Mhlongo, who founded the Sinikithemba Support Group and the Siphithemba Choir, emphasizes the communal spirit and sense of family that characterized the operation of the group from its inception, which were particularly manifest on two levels. First, members looked out for one another to forestall the chances that members would sicken and die without getting the spiritual support they needed. In her words, “[…] the group was like a family. They were sup- posed to come only on Tuesdays, but people will come on Monday to Friday because of family environment […] If a member doesn’t show up, Siphokazi [pseudonym], she will say ‘where is so and so?’” To strengthen their effort to look out for one another, the members of the support group divided themselves into small groups according to their townships and areas of residence. These groups visited sick or bereaved members in their neighborhoods and provided them with the support of prayers and help with housekeeping. Second, when members began to generate incomes through their beadwork, other crafts, and concert tours, the support group created a trust fund, which, according to Mhlongo, was designed to support the education and sustenance of deceased members’ children and spouses.

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Mhlongo insisted that the support group and choir’s way of operating were informed by their underlying ethics as Zulu people and therefore amounted to the practice of ubuntu. Phumlani Kunene, the conductor of the choir, gave an interpretation of ubuntu that was more global than the way Mhlongo spoke about it. His idea of ‘community’ transcended the local support group and the choir to encompass communities in Durban, beyond South Africa and even Africa. He explained that “[…] anything you do to help anybody, anywhere is the same as ubuntu. Ubuntu just means that we have to work together all the time.” Another member, Phakamile Shabane explained her understanding of ubuntu in relation to the choir thus:

Ubuntu actually refers to the good actions or deeds that a particular someone do [sic] to the other to show how much he or she cares about him or her in that particular situation. Based on the history of the choir, there are things which happened or [are] still happening. To mention a few, to be on each other’s back [i.e. to be supportive] when he or she is in a hard situation, to get someone a job if you are in an appropriate position. With the case of the choir members alone, there are a couple of things which we did or [are] still doing for each other.

Phakamile’s explanation is in line with the dimension of communal wellbeing that Mathole Motshekga described earlier. It was partly the sense of individual and communal wellbeing that motivated Xolani Zulu, another member of the choir, to establish the African Vision Shop, through which he employed members who had no source of income. The same sense of wellbeing accounted for the transformation of the support group into an income-generating project when a member offered to teach others how to make beads. In effect, the members of the Siphithemba Choir showed a clear understanding of what they did and how they did it, as stemming from their background and worldview as Zulu. It was this worldview that stirred their ability to function as a support group that provides spiritual and emotional care to members primarily through songs. But the operation of the choir became a source of income for

— 84 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 paul nnodim and austin okigbo – justice as fairness and ubuntu members through their national and international tours. Members continued to make bead projects, which they marketed overseas, especially in the US. They also accumulated income from the sale of the CD record- ings. It was the same worldview that inspires their commitment to bring- ing the message of hope to their local community through their songs, and to educate people on the need for disease prevention and treatment.

V. Justice as Fairness and Ubuntu: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

From the preceding discussion, it should be easy to see moments of convergence and resonance between justice as fairness and ubuntu. First, both systems of justice derive from the respect and recognition of the human- ness, dignity, and integrity of persons and the human community. While it may seem that the liberal individualism underlying the principles of justice as fairness may have weakened the priority of the community vis- à-vis the individual, it is Rawls’s way of safeguarding the liberty of individuals, who in aggregation, form the basis of the community. Justice as fairness recognizes that it is only within the functioning community of humans that the question of rights and liberty may be asked. The individuals who inhabit societal spaces are not unencumbered selves but exist interdependently with others in a system of cooperation from one gen- eration to another. Similarly, ubuntu’s emphasis on communalism does not deny Africans a sense of individuality nor point to unanimism. This misconception of ubuntu, as Thaddeus Metz rightly points out, is a significant basis for criticism:

A second common criticism of ubuntu is its apparent collectivist orien- tation, with many suspecting that it requires some kind of group-think, uncompromising majoritarianism or extreme sacrifice for society, which is incompatible with the value of individual freedom that is among the most promising ideals in the liberal tradition. Here, again, self-described adherents to ubuntu have done little to dispel such

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concerns, for example, an author of an important account of how to apply ubuntu to public policy remarks that it entails ‘the supreme value of society, the primary importance of social or communal interests, obligations and duties over and above the rights of the individual (2011, 533).

Umuntu ungumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person because of other persons) inherently includes an idea of moral excellence, as well as point to a normative dimension of personhood. This normativity regarding persons is a procedural, status-oriented, self-realization of a human being, which is actualized by individuals in ‘companionableness’ with other human beings and things in the world. In most Sub-Saharan African societies, self-identity is a relational and transactional category of being. Thus, a person is a creative articulation of his or her individuality within the matrix of the social community (Nnodim 2015, 88-90). The normative status of personhood is attained through the acquisition of morals, through one’s being in time and space in the course of a human being’s journey from childhood through elder-hood or even ancestor-hood. Normative personhood is neither a guaranteed status nor a permanent condition of an adult human being. An adult, whose moral psychology fails to adopt the standard norms of his or her community, loses the normative status of personhood, and maybe normatively said to be ‘not a person’. That someone is not a person in this uniquely African context is a judgmental statement describing an individual (entity) whose behaviours are clearly anti-reason or anti-community. It points to the perversion of a normative persona or some form of pathological disunity (Nnodim 2015, 88-90). The community, with its historicity, culture, and spaces for creativity, becomes second nature to the human person and closes any existing sufficiency gap generated by humanity’s first or basic nature. Therefore, the human person in the African context is complete within the community. While the community plays an indispensable role in shaping the identity of the individual in Africa, self-identity or individuality partly transcends the

— 86 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 paul nnodim and austin okigbo – justice as fairness and ubuntu community. This partial transcendence of the social is compatible with communitarian ethics in African societies since the individual remains a self-authenticating source of legitimate claims outside the group. The community does not rob one of his or her individuality. What deprives persons of their personality or individuality in Africa include dehumanizing acts, the disrespect for human rights, and the denial of human dignity. In both justice as fairness and ubuntu, we see that lack of justice manifests in the form of abject poverty, disrespect for the dignity and liberty of persons, which threaten the stability of society. Hence ukuphila (wellbeing), as discussed above, assumes that collective wellbeing lies in the welfare of individual members of the community, for example, through the communal ownership of land. It is in this light that landless- ness (see articulation by Mathole Motshekga above) and disempowerment of various kinds pose dangers to the realization of ubuntu. In the same vein, market failures resulting from unfettered or unregulated markets or turbo-capitalism make justice as fairness unattainable. Such market forces create extreme inequality, alienation of workers, poverty, and the dehu- manization of persons. By treating the various talents of individuals that make up society as shared assets, justice as fairness, like ubuntu, embodies the spirit of communalism. A question that may arise in the light of modern economic realities is how individually owned lands or other material resources may be legitimately treated as common assets. We opine that equal distribution and equal opportunity do not necessitate dispossessing individuals of their natural talents and hard-earned resources. Instead, both systems recognize that excessive concentration of resources and means of livelihood in the hands of a few, notwithstanding that some individuals either by share natural or social circumstances contribute less to the society than others, would ultimately result in acrimony, which then leads to social disintegration. A quick revisit of how individual talent and resources may be treated as collective assets is exemplified in Siphithemba Choir’s establishment

— 87 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 ethical perspectives – march 2020 of a common fund drawn from the proceeds from products made by individuals members, the coffers of which was used to support the education and sustenance of deceased members’ children and spouses. Whereas there is the possibility that some members contributed more to the trust fund by virtue of their own beadworks, for example, fetching more money than others, it is equally possible that some who contributed less may have benefitted more from the fund than others. What is more important, however, is that every member of the choir and support group, in addition to keeping a part of the proceeds from their own beadworks, had equal access to the trust fund according to how and when the need arose for them. Imagine a contrary situation where individuals kept all of the proceeds from their beadwork. Some would have had many more resources than others. If those who had less had been the key voices in the choir, they could have felt that being part of the group did not pro- vide them equal benefits as others. Imagine what would have happened had they left the group. The choir and support group would have disin- tegrated soon enough, thus dissolving the platform which afforded everyone the opportunity to become productive members of the group and the larger society, with the resulting improved health conditions, livelihood, and even insurance for the education of their children and main- tenance of their families. Similarly, in justice as fairness, the ‘difference principle’ makes it possible for cooperating members of society to share the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. It allows those who are well-off to contribute effectively towards lessening the potential hardships of those at the bottom; while allowing those at the top to enjoy the fruits of their labour without the antagonism that income disparity engenders. At the same time, every member of society under justice as fairness has a decent pros- pect in life to pursue their individual or collective goals. Another moment of convergence is that both systems recognize that factors of time and changing circumstances can impact justice and equal opportunity. Therefore, they both envisage a monitoring process that

— 88 — Ethical Perspectives 27 (2020) 1 paul nnodim and austin okigbo – justice as fairness and ubuntu safeguards and ensures the continuation of the just society. In ubuntu, this is guaranteed through the process of indaba. As already stated above, the flow in the humanity of the community can easily be threatened by unforeseen states of economic, social, political, and even environmental emergencies; or still by personal avarice and ego. Therefore indaba, in addition to comprising the domain or process for negotiating the terms of the collective wellbeing, also encompasses the means of monitoring and continuously evaluating the conditions that affect the community to ensure the sustenance of ubuntu through collective wellbeing. Similarly, Rawls, in anticipation of the need to secure justice as fairness for all, suggests that should the basic liberties come into conflict with one another, the institutional rules that define them must be adjusted to enable these liberties to fit into a coherent scheme (Rawls 1996, 295). This can be done through a system of political deliberation informed by public reason.

VI. conclusion

We have so far demonstrated that Rawls’s justice as fairness and ubuntu stem from the commonalities of human experience, despite seeming divergences in approach and application. In this modern age, world cultures are no longer isolated bubbles or the distant whimpers from travellers’ literature. We contend that the schematic divides among peoples, such as individualism versus communalism, no longer define the foundational properties of personhood across the globe. What is strictly Western or African now collides with what was previously alien, and out of this confluence of ideas arises the metissage of cultures. Such is also the fate of justice as fairness and ubuntu. We think that the ideals of these two moral and philosophical concepts are compatible, can complement each other, and together, perhaps, form the basis for the future discourse on human-ness, humanity, and justice for Africa, the West, and the rest of the world.

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Works Cited

Battle, Michael. 1997. Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu. Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim. Battle, Michael. 2009. Ubuntu: I in You and You in Me. New York: Church. Freeman, R. Samuel. 2007. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Phi- losophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. Gade, Christian B.N. 2011. “The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on Ubuntu.” South African Journal of Philosophy 30/3: 303-329. Gade, Christian B.N. 2017. A Discourse on African Philosophy: A New Perspective on Ubuntu and Transitional Justice in South Africa. Lanham, MD: Lexington. Jackson, Ben. 2005. “The Conceptual History of Social Justice.” Political Studies Review 3/3: 356-373. Metz, Thaddeus. 2007. “Ubuntu as a Moral Theory: Reply to Four critics.” South African Journal of Philosophy 26/4: 369-387. Metz, Thaddeus and Joseph B.R. Gaie. 2010. “The African Ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for Research on Morality.” Journal of Moral Education 39/3: 273-290. Metz, Thaddeus. 2011. “Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa.” African Human Rights Law Journal 11/2: 532-559. New World Encyclopedia. “Ubuntu” (Philosophy). In http://www.newworldencyclopedia. org/p/ index.php?title=Ubuntu (philosophy) [accessed May 28, 2018]. Nnodim, Paul. 2015. “The Concept of Person in African Philosophy.” In Life, Body, Person, and Self: A Reconsideration of Core Concepts in Bioethics from an Intercultural Perspective. Edited by Stephan Grätzel and Eberhard Guhe, 87-99. Freiburg: Karl Alber. Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Okigbo Austin C. 2011 “Siphithemba – We Give Hope.” In The Culture of AIDS in Africa: Hope and Healing Through Music and the Arts. Edited by Gregory Barz and Judah Cohen, 285-298. London: Oxford University Press. Okigbo, Austin C. 2016. Music, Culture, and the Politics of Health: Ethnography of a South African AIDS Choir. Langham, MD: Lexington. Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York. Columbia University Press. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Samkange, Stanlake J.T. 1980. Hunhuism or Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwe Indigenous Political Philosophy. Salisbury: Graham. Simmons, A. John. 2008. Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Sunstein, Cass R. 1997. Free Markets and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Swanson, Dalene M. 2012. “Ubuntu, African Epistemology and Development: Contri- butions,

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Contradictions, Tensions, and Possibilities.” In The Dialectics of African Education and Western Discourses: Counter-Hegemonic Perspectives. Edited by Handel Kashope Wright and Ali A. Abdi, 27-52. New York: Peter Lang. Tutu, Desmond. 1973. “Some African Insights and the Old Testament.” In Relevant Theology for Africa. Edited by Hans-Jurgen Becken, 21-29, Durban: Lutheran.

Notes

1 The research data being used here was collected between 2007 and 2013. 2 See Jackson (2005). 3 See Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness Factsheet No. 52 (2004). 4 For more details on the history of the Siphithemba Choir and the Sinikithemba Support Group at the McCord Hospital, see Okigbo (2011, 285-298).

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