Ntie Items-In-Cyprus - General - Notes for the Files

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ntie items-in-Cyprus - general - notes for the files

Date Created 03/02/1978

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0903-0001: Peackeeping-Cyprus 1971-1981

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit To: The Secretary-General I U The Greek Cypriots have informed me that the draft concerning the "Committee on Cyprus" which I showed to you is entirely "the invention of the non-aligned contact group". The Greek Cypriots realize that interference by the Committee in your mission of good offices would give rise to serious objections (including many negative votes on the resolution itself). They understand your concern, and are trying to get the non-aligned to modify the draft to make it acceptable. *

Sherry 15 November 1979

*This information comes from Mr. Stephanides. WE SECRETARY-GENERAL

V;-

w-^"^ CONFIDENTIAL // \UJ 22 November 1978 To: The Secretary -GeneAa\ Prom: Brian E. Urquhairt >'lyvA&V" '

Mr. Gorg£ has reported on the current strong support on the part of the Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL) for the Makarios/ Denktash guidelines of February 1977 and for the resumption of the intercomraunal negotiating process. This may be related to fears that the perpetuation of the present situation might lead to the creation of two separate, independent States and eventually to "double Enosis". Recent contact established by AKEL with workers' organizations in the north has also contributed to this policy. It is noted in this connexion that AKEL together with Mr. derides* party, the Democratic Rally, which follows a similar line in favour of negotiations, command approximately 75 per cent of the electorate, leaving Mr. Kyprianou's Democratic Party and its only ally, Dr. Lyssarides' EDEK, which favour "internationalization", in clear minority. Mr. Gorgfe further refers to recent press reports about a malaise between Nicosia and Athens. The Greek Cypriots are unhappy that Prime Minister Caramanlis is giving top priority to Greece joining the European Community rather than to the Cyprus problem. This as well as Greece's efforts to become again a full member of NATO causes Mr. Caramanlis to maintain a low profile so as not to anger his future European partners, who, Greek Cypriots feel, favour Turkey. AKEL, for ideological reasons, is cool toward Caramanlis' Greece with her Western orientation. It is felt further that Mr. Caramanlis is reluctant to get too involved with Cyprus and would not intervene militarily in the event of Turkish military pressure in the island. Further causes for friction include Mr. Caramanlis' recent offer to Mr. Ecevit to conclude a "non-aggression pact", and the speculation that Mr. Kyprianou's meetings with Greek leaders in August were not entirely successful and that, in particular, Athens has been trying to slow him down in his drive for "internationalization" . TO, WE SECRETARY-GENERAL

(VVN

\j-" ,^o-J^T ,-4-^ /'

CONFIDENTIAL / n 22 November 1978 fA TO: The Secretary-Ger4e4r

Mr. Gorge has reported on the current strong support on the part of the Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL) for the Makarios/ Denktash guidelines of February 1977 and for the resumption of the intercommunal negotiating process. This may be related to fears that the perpetuation of the present situation might lead to the creation of two separate, independent States and eventually to "double Enosis". Recent contact established by AKEL with workers' organizations in the north has also contributed to this policy. It is noted in this connexion that AKEL together with Mr. Clerides' party, the Democratic Rally, which follows a similar line in favour of negotiations, command approximately 75 per cent of the electorate, leaving Mr. Kyprianou's Democratic Party and its only ally, Dr. Lyssarides' EDEK, which favour "internationalization", in clear minority. Mr. Gorgfe further refers to recent press reports about a malaise between Nicosia and Athens. The Greek Cypriots are unhappy that Prime Minister Caramanlis is giving top priority to Greece joining the European Community rather than to the Cyprus problem. This as well as Greece's efforts to become again a full member of NATO causes Mr. Caramanlis to maintain a low profile so as not to anger his future European partners, who, Greek Cypriots feel, favour Turkey. AKEL, for ideological reasons, is cool toward Caramanlis' Greece with her Western orientation. It is felt further that Mr. Caramanlis is reluctant to get too involved with Cyprus and would not intervene militarily in the event of Turkish military pressure in the island. Further causes for friction include Mr. Caramanlis' recent offer to Mr. Ecevit to conclude a "non-aggression pact", and the speculation that Mr. Kyprianou's meetings with Greek leaders in August were not entirely successful and that, in particular, Athens has been trying to slow him down in his drive for "internationalization". cc : Socr.cn BEU Central(2) Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office at 8.30 a.m. on Friday, 29 September 1978 Present: Secretary-General Mr. Urquhart President Kyprianou, Cyprus Foreign Minister Rolandis Ambassador Pelaghias Ambassador Rossides Ambassador Jacovides

Missing persons President Kyprianou raised the question of missing persons. The families were dissatisfied with the Red Cross as a representative on the Committee because they wanted the third representative to chair the meetings and to be in a position to reach an independent view and to report to the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the General Assembly. This was why they preferred the representative of the Secretary-General. This arrangement could either be made on the basis of existing resolutions or be a new resolution in the First Committee. The Secretary-General said it was his understanding that the Turks opposed this idea. He would be seeing the Turkish Foreign Minister and would discuss the question with him. He would also discuss it with Denktash. He fully understood and sympathised with the enormous human tragedy of missing persons. The Secretary-General asked why the representative could not simply report to him. Mr. Kyprianou said that the reason for reporting to the Security Council and the General Assembly was because this would be the only way to make the Turkish side take the Committee seriously. The Red Cross would report to no one, He regarded reporting as a safeguard. The Secretary-General pointed out that in any case he made a report every six months to the Security Council in which this item was always mentioned. 2.

president Kyprianou said that as regards the political situation there was little change. Mr. Gromyko had told him that the Turkish Foreign Minister had been very negative. It was impossible for him to agree to resume the talks on a basis which Cyprus disagreed with fundamentally. There must be proposals which were really negotiable as the basis for the talks. The Turks wanted a resumption but would not abandon their philosophy of partition. It was possible that the Turks did not really want to do anything. The Cyprus problem would again be debated in the General Assembly and the President was also considering a recourse to the Security Council. The Council must face its responsibilities and find a concrete way to break the deadlock on the basis of resolution 3212. The Secretary-General asked what could be done in practical terms. He suggested that Mr. Galindo-pohl might convene the two interlocutors in order to search for a basis for a meaningful resumption of the talks. Mr. Galindo-Pohl was a first class diplomat and was on the spot. He should be used to try to clarify the attitude of the parties and in particular the attitude of the Turkish Cypriot side. If it was then agreed that there was sufficient clarification to resume the talks, the Secretary-General would reconvene them. The best resolutions were useless if it was impossible to negotiate meaningfully. The international community was becoming very uneasy at the lack of progress on the Cyprus problem and there was a clanger that they would begin allotting blame for this lack of progress. President Kyprianou said that if Mr. Galindo-Pohl 3. convened meetings it would create the impression that the negotiations had been renewed. It was not necessary to convene a meeting, and for Cyprus it would be tactically very dangerous unless there was a prior indication that the meeting would be productive. It was therefore necessary to find out if there was any positive development on the Turkish side going beyond the last proposals. Mr. Galindo-Pohl should therefore meet with the interlocutors separately, otherwise the chances of Cyprus in the General Assembly and the Security Council would be compromised. The Secretary-General said that Mr. Galindo-Pohl's approaches could be after the General Assembly debate and need not be in the shape of formal meetings,, President Kyprianou said that in the meantime Mr. Galindo-Pohl could discuss with the Turkish side what they were prepared to offer. The Secretary-General pointed out that the Turks had said'they would only do this in the framework of resumed intercommunal talks. Mr. Galindo-Pohl would continue his soundings and wait for the General Assembly and^ Security Council debate. TO; THE SECRETARY-GENERAL GLS/lb/ch

.) CONFIDENTIAL j/ •''' L-A;' 22 September 1978

Note on the status of the Cyprus fproblem

The past three months have shown no advance toward an agreed, just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem, and the parties have displayed considerable reluctance to move in the direction of a resumption of the existing negotiating process. In the light of the experience gathered since 1975, the time may be ripe for a review of that process. The basic feature of the situation is that on the whole, and for totally different reasons, each side finds the status quo preferable to any solution that might conceivably be acceptable to the other side, and neither seems capable of generating proposals that could serve as a basis for negotiations. It is evident that the Turkish side will accept a settlement only if it results in dismantling the present Cyprus Government while maintaining and legitimizing virtually complete partition and offering only insignificant territorial concessions. This is totally unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots, as it might jeopardize their favourable economic and political situation, which depends on continued control of the internationally recognized Government of Cyprus. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots feel that the Greek Cypriots will accept a settlement only if it maintains the latter's control of the Government, reduces the military presence of Turkey and enables the Greek Cypriots to assert economic supremacy throughout the island, including the Turkish Cypriot areas. This would tend to endanger once again the political and economic position and the security of the Turkish Cypriot community and of its leadership. Facing near total economic stagnation and political isolation, the Turkish Cypriots cling to territory and separatism as their sole tangible assets. Negotiating process The formal position has remained since May 1978 that the Greek Cypriots, having rejected the Turkish Cypriot proposals of April 1978 as a basis for discussion, are refusing any resumption of the negotiating process based on those proposals. —2 —

President Kyprianou has gone even further. In a somewhat bewildering series of statements, he has generally taken the position that it would be pointless to resume the intercommunal talks unless these were based on the provisions of the United Nations resolutions. The Turkish Cypriots, he says, should set aside their April 1978 proposals and submit new ones that would ensure the unity of the State and the "three freedoms" (of movement, settlement, and property). Mr. Kyprianou has made derogatory remarks about Mr. Denktash, questioning his status as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and declaring that he "will never meet with him" (speech of 20 July). He has stated that a meeting between himself and Mr. Ecevit is essential if negotiations are to be resumed fruitfully. Even concerning Famagusta, he has taken the position (conversation with Galindo- Pohl on 28 July) that there is nothing to discuss with the Turkish Cypriot side and that the Turks should evacuate the city and hand it over to United Nations control unconditionally. The official Greek Cypriot strategy, as voiced by Mr. Kyprianou himself, as well as by Foreign Minister Rolandis and others, has been to emphasize the "internationalization" of the Cyprus problem so as to keep up international political pressure on the Turks to give up their conquests. This was done at the recent Belgrade meeting of non-aligned Foreign Ministers (which adopted a strongly pro-Greek resolution) and is to be continued during the coming months within the United Nations framework by a "recourse to the Security Council" and by debate in the General Assembly. The Council would be asked to adopt concrete measures to implement the substantive provisions of past General Assembly resolutions (withdrawal of Turkish troops, return of all refugees to their homes, etc.). However, following Mr. Kyprianou's talks with Prime Minister Karamanlis in Athens in August, initial plans for a Security Council debate on Cyprus in September were abandoned. When he comes to New York toward the end of the month, President Kyprianou will explore whether a Security Council debate at a later date would be likely to produce the desired result. —3 —

•There are of course many Greek Cypriots who question the effectiveness of trying to solve the Cyprus problem by United Nations resolutions rather than by negotiations. The sceptics include not only Mr. Clerides but also former Foreign Minister Christophides and Mr. Papadopoulos. The latter was dismissed by President Kyprianou in July as the Greek Cypriot interlocutor in the intercommunal talks. No successor has been appointed so far. In recent months Mr. Kyprianou and his Foreign Minister have stated publicly and privately that the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1978 have lost their validity. Perhaps as a result of strongly critical reaction to this position in various quarters (including an expression of concern by the Secretary-General, which was conveyed to Kyprianou by Galindo-Pohl), Mr. Rolandis on 29 August somewhat retreated from it. He stated that his side continued to adhere to the guidelines, but that these must be interpreted on the basis of the United Nations resolutions. He further argued that the Turkish Cypriot proposals of April 1978 were totally inconsis- tent with the guidelines. Furthermore, the guidelines cannot supersede the resolutions of the General Assembly, and the negotiators, as-well as the Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices, are bound by their terms. In the face of Mr. Kyprianou's intransigent position, Mr. Denktash has followed a policy of conciliatory statements and appeals for the resumption of intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General, on the basis of the February 1977 guidelines (without mentioning his proposals of April 1978), or with an "open agenda" within the framework of the guidelines (conversation with Galindo-Pohl, 27 July). Famagusta In view of the incompatibility of the positions of the two sides on a comprehensive settlement, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council of 31 May 1978, suggested a new approach. This would involve "a concrete attempt to deal -4- with some important aspects of the existing stalemate on the ground" with special reference to Varosha, and also to the Nicosia International Airport (S/12723, paras. 78-79). After discussions with the United States and consultation with the Secretary-General (meeting with Ambassador Turkmen, 15 July), the Turkish side made public its proposal on Varosha on 2O July in the form of an "open message to the Greek Cypriot leadership" by Mr. Denktash (S/12782). This proposal calls for the establishment of an "interim administration" in Varosha under the aegis of the United Nations simultaneously with the resumption of the intercommunal talks on the basis of the February 1977 agreement. Initially, Mr. Kyprianou reacted by denouncing this proposal in harsh terms. After public criticism of this position (especially by the AKEL party, which is part of his coalition), he made a counter-proposal on 24 July which accepted the principle of resettlement of the Greek Cypriot sectors of Famagusta under interim United Nations security and police control, to be followed by resumption of the intercommunal talks with an "open agenda". Actual administration of the town would be in Greek Cypriot hands, and no prior negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots were envisaged. At the request of the Secretary-General, Mr. Galindo-Pohl has been exploring the thinking of the two leaders concerning the inter-related questions of Varosha and the resumption of the intercommunal talks. Judging by his reports, the gap between the positions of the parties, while substantial, does not appear too wide for negotiation. The outstanding issues concern such matters as territorial coverage, status of Varosha under the "interim administration" and its possible inclusion in the buffer zone, the nature of the United Nations role, the number of Greek Cypriots who might be resettled there and their freedom of access, the link between these arrangements and the resumption of the talks, and the question of whether the arrangements could be terminated and the "interim administration" abolished if the talks collapsed. However, the real issue does not concern these formal differences. It rather concerns the apparent unwillingness of President Kyprianou to envisage at this stage a negotiating process with the Turkish Cypriote to bridge those differences, lest this compromise his position in the General Assembly and the Security Council next month on the broader Cyprus problem. Apparently he considers that the quest for additional United Nations resolutions poses fewer risks for him than the resumption of negotiations. In a conversation with Mr. Galindo-Pohl on 1 August he recommended that the United Nations should "lie low" until well after the meeting of the Security Council. After this phase of "open diplomacy", a "strengthened mission of good offices" by the Secretary-General and "productive quiet diplomacy" could ensue. Missing persons The Greek Cypriots have proposed that the third member of the proposed joint investigatory body should be designated by the Secretary-General (rather than by the International Committee of the Red Cross)? the Secretary-General would receive reports from him and would convey these to the Security Council (quarterly) and to the General Assembly (annually). On 2O September, Denktash rejected this as an attempt to turn a humanitarian operation into a propaganda exercise. Nicosia International Airport There has been no progress on, and there seems to be little interest in this problem. (It will be recalled that Denktash revived this matter in the paper he issued after he spoke to the Secretary-General in New York on 22 May). Nimetz visit Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counsellor of the U.S. State Depart- ment, visited Nicosia from 3 to 7 September. He informed Brian Urquhart on 2O September that President Kyprianou did not depart from his well-known positions, including his demand for the unconditional return of the Greek Cypriot part of -6-

However, Mr. Nimetz indicated neither side wished to deal with the Pamagusta interim arrangements in isolation from the broader Cyprus problem. Kyprianou fears that "Famagustization" would cause the world to lose interest in a comprehensive solution for Cyprus. Denktash fears that if he returned Varosha to the Greek Cypriots, he might get nothing in return. Neither side is inclined to negotiate on the basis of the other side* s proposals on Varosha or, for that matter, on the broader problem. Consequently, Mr. Nimetz questioned the utility of pursuing the present negotiating method, based on the submission of mutually unacceptable proposals by the two parties. He suggested that a high-level Mediator, appointed by the Secretary-General, might be able to generate new ideas and proposals, engage in negotiation by "shuttle" diplomacy and obtain the necessary political support from governments to induce the parties to accept compromise suggestions. Mr. Urquhart explained to Mr. Nimetz that the notion of a Mediator had been anathema to the Turkish side since 1965, on account of the Galo Plaza experience. The function envisaged by Mr. Nimetz could well be performed by Mr. Galindo-Pohl. The important thing was to create a machinery which would generate ideas and produce negotiating papers that might be the basis for progress, within the framework of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and of the intercommunal talks.

Observations In -fiie present circumstances, we may have to accept the fact that the negotiating method followed since 1975 has outlived —7 — its usefulness. Because of the nature of the problem and the positions of the parties, it is inevitable that all the proposals produced by the parties have been one-sided, mutually incompatible, and totally unsuitable for generating a meaningful negotiating process. The Secretary-General has made it plain (most recently in his report to the Security Council of 31 May 1978) that he is not prepared to call for a resumption of the intercommunal talks unless and until a basis of negotiations acceptable to both sides has been established. Since the parties are clearly incapable of devising such a basis, either on the broader question or on individual limited issues, they will have to be provided with the necessary assistance if any progress is to be achieved. This might involve presenting the parties with informal negotiating papers which would attempt to bridge the differences between them. In view of the apprehensions of the Turkish Cypriot side about "mediation", it may be wise to initiate this procedure in a low key. Thus the Secretary- General might ask his Special Representative, acting on his behalf within the framework of his mission of good offices, to assist the parties in devising an agreed basis of negotiations, as necessary, on procedural questions, on individual practical problems (such -as Varosha) and on elements of a comprehensive solution. The Secretary-General may wish to take advantage of the presence in New York of President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash, and of the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, to explore the feasibility of the adjusted negotiating method outlined above. This would of course remain within the framework of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and would not require any change in the existing Security Council mandate. The first application of the proposed method might deal with the framework for a combined approach to the problems of Varosha and of the resumption of the intercommunal talks. Certain preliminary ideas in this regard have been explored during the past three months, on a very informal basis, with the -8- parties and with interested governments. Essentially, these call for an "interim arrangement" that would place Varosha irreversibly within the UN buffer zone. To this end the intercommunal talks would be officially resumed. After one or two formal statements by the interlocutors on the broader Cyprus problem, the Secretary-General would ask them to take up the concrete practical problem of interim arrangements for Varosha,and to agree to set up a committee consisting of their deputies, which would negotiate details of the arrangements in Nicosia. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General would exercise good offices on the Secretary-General's behalf and would assist the committee as appropriate along the lines indicated above. The committee would submit its agreed report to the plenary intercommunal talks. Meanwhile, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would also engage in consultations with both sides on aspects of a comprehensive settlement and would endeavour to develop negotiating papers on them. ra GLS/lb/Gh '- ;5

CONFIDENTIAL '^^ ^\ 2f September 1978

Note on ttje status of the cvpgus mroblem

The past three months have shown no advance toward an agreed, just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem, and the parties have displayed considerable reluctance to move in the direction of a resumption of the existing negotiating process. In the light of the experience gathered since 1975, the time may be ripe for a review of that process. The basic feature of the situation is that on the whole, and for totally different reasons, each side finds the status quo preferable to any solution that might conceivably be acceptable to the other side, and neither seems capable of generating proposals that could serve as a basis for negotiations. It is evident that the Turkish side will accept a settlement only if it results in dismantling the present Cyprus Government while maintaining and legitimizing virtually complete partition and offering only insignificant territorial concessions. This is totally unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots, as it might jeopardize their favourable economic and political situation, which depends on continued control of the internationally recognized Government of Cyprus. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots feel that the Greek Cypriots will accept a settlement only if it maintains the latter1s control of the Government, reduces the military presence of Turkey and enables the Greek Cypriots to assert economic supremacy throughout the island, including the Turkish Cypriot areas. This would tend to endanger once again the political and economic position and the security of the Turkish Cypriot community and of its leadership. Facing near total economic stagnation and political isolation, the Turkish Cypriots cling to territory and separatism as their sole tangible assets. Negotiating process The formal position has remained since May 1978 that the Greek Cypriots, having rejected the Turkish Cypriot proposals of April 1978 as a basis for discussion, are refusing any resumption of the negotiating process based on those proposals. —2 —

President Kyprianou has gone even further. In a somewhat bewildering series of statements, he has generally taken the position that it would be pointless to resume the intercommunal talks unless these were based on the provisions of the United Nations resolutions. The Turkish Cypriots, he says, should set aside their April 1978 proposals and submit new ones that would ensure the unity of the State and the "three freedoms" (of movement, settlement, and property). Mr. Kyprianou has made derogatory remarks about Mr. Denktash, questioning his status as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and declaring that he "will never meet with him" (speech of 20 July). He has stated that a meeting between himself and Mr. Ecevit is essential if negotiations are to be resumed fruitfully. Even concerning Famagusta, he has taken the position (conversation with Galindo- Pohl on 28 July) that there is nothing to discuss with the Turkish Cypriot side and that the Turks should evacuate the city and hand it over to United Nations control unconditionally. The official Greek Cypriot strategy, as voiced by Mr. Kyprianou himself, as well as by Foreign Minister Rolandis and others, has been to emphasize the "internationalization" of the Cyprus problem so as to keep up international political pressure on the Turks to give up their conquests. This was done at the recent Belgrade meeting of non-aligned Foreign Ministers (which adopted a strongly pro-Greek resolution) and is to be continued during the coming months within the United Nations framework by a "recourse to the Security Council" and by debate in the General Assembly. The Council would be asked to adopt concrete measures to implement the substantive provisions of past General Assembly resolutions (withdrawal of Turkish troops, return of all refugees to their homes, etc.). However, following Mr. Kyprianou«s talks with Prime Minister Karamanlis in Athens in August, initial plans for a Security Council debate on Cyprus in September were abandoned. When he comes to New York toward the end of the month, President Kyprianou will explore whether a Security Council debate at a later date would be likely to produce the desired result. -3-

There are of course many Greek Cypriots who question the effectiveness of trying to solve the Cyprus problem by United Nations resolutions rather than by negotiations. The sceptics include not only Mr. Clerides but also former Foreign Minister Christophides and Mr. Papadopoulos. The latter was dismissed by President Kyprianou in July as the Greek Cypriot interlocutor in the intercommunal talks. No successor has been appointed so far. In recent months Mr. Kyprianou and his Foreign Minister have stated publicly and privately that the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1978 have lost their validity. Perhaps as a result of strongly critical reaction to this position in various quarters (including an expression of concern by the Secretary-General, which was conveyed to Kyprianou by Galindo-Pohl), Mr. Rolandis on 29 August somewhat retreated from it. He stated that his side continued to adhere to the guidelines, but that these must be interpreted on the basis of the United Nations resolutions. He further argued that the Turkish Cypriot proposals of April 1978 were totally inconsis- tent with the guidelines. Furthermore, the guidelines cannot supersede the resolutions of the General Assembly, and the negotiators, as well as the Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices, are bound by their terms. In the face of Mr. Kyprianou1s intransigent position, Mr. Denktash has followed a policy of conciliatory statements and appeals for the resumption of intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General, on the basis of the February 1977 guidelines (without mentioning his proposals of April 1978), or with an "open agenda" within the framework of the guidelines (conversation with Galindo-Pohl, 27 July). Famaqusta In view of the incompatibility of the positions of the two sides on a comprehensive settlement, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council of 31 May 1978, suggested a new approach. This would involve "a concrete attempt to deal -4- with some important aspects of the existing stalemate on the ground" with special reference to Varosha, and also to the Nicosia International Airport (S/12723, paras. 78-79). After discussions with the United States and consultation with the Secretary-General (meeting with Ambassador Turkmen, 15 July), the Turkish side made public its proposal on Varosha on 2O July in the form of an "open message to the Greek Cypriot leadership" by Mr. Denktash (S/12782). This proposal calls for the establishment of an "interim administration" in Varosha under the aegis of the United Nations simultaneously with the resumption of the intercommunal talks on the basis of the February 1977 agreement. Initially, Mr. Kyprianou reacted by denouncing this proposal in harsh terms. After public criticism of this position (especially by the AKEL party, which is part of his coalition), he made a counter-proposal on 24 July which accepted the principle of resettlement of the Greek Cypriot sectors of Famagusta under interim United Nations security and police control, to be followed by resumption of the intercommunal talks with an "open agenda". Actual administration of the town would be in Greek Cypriot hands, and no prior negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots were envisaged. At the request of the Secretary-General, Mr. Galindo-Pohl has been exploring the thinking of the two leaders concerning the inter-related questions of Varosha and the resumption of the intercommunal talks. Judging by his reports, the gap between the positions of the parties, while substantial, does not appear too wide for negotiation. The outstanding issues concern such matters as territorial coverage, status of Varosha under the "interim administration" and its possible inclusion in the buffer zone, the nature of the United Nations role, the number of Greek Cypriots who might be resettled there and their freedom of access, the link between these arrangements and the resumption of the talks, and the question of whether the arrangements could be terminated and the "interim administration" abolished if the talks collapsed. -5-

However, the real issue does not concern these formal differences, it rather concerns the apparent unwillingness of President Kyprianou to envisage at this stage a negotiating process with the Turkish cypriots to bridge those differences, lest this compromise his position in the General Assembly and the Security council next month on the broader Cyprus problem. Apparently he considers that the quest for additional United Nations resolutions poses fewer risks for him than the resumption of negotiations. In a conversation with Mr. Galindo-Pohl on 1 August he recommended that the United Nations should "lie low" until well after the meeting of the Security Council. After this phase of "open diplomacy", a "strengthened mission of good offices" by the Secretary-General and "productive quiet diplomacy" could ensue. Missing persons The Greek Cypriots have proposed that the third member of the proposed joint investigatory body should be designated by the Secretary-General (rather than by the International Committee of the Red Cross); the Secretary-General would receive reports from him and would convey these to the Security Council (quarterly) and to the General Assembly (annually). On 2O September, Denktash rejected this as an attempt to turn a humanitarian operation into a propaganda exercise. Nicosia International Airport There has been no progress on, and there seems to be little interest in this problem. (It will be recalled that Denktash revived this matter in the paper he issued after he spoke to the Secretary-General in New York on 22 May). Nimetz visit Mr. Matthew Nimetz, counsellor of the U.S. State Depart- ment, visited Nicosia from 3 to 7 September. He informed Brian urquhart on 2O September that President Kyprianou did not depart from his well-known positions, including his demand for the unconditional return of the Greek cypriot part of -6-

Famagusta district (including Kato Varosha, to the west of Varosha proper) to Cyprus Government jurisdiction, subject only to UN police and security control. According to Nimetz, Denktash showed flexibility on the territorial aspect and did not rule out concessions even on Kato Varosha. However, Mr. Nimetz indicated neither side wished to deal with the Famagusta interim arrangements in isolation from the broader Cyprus problem. Kyprianou fears that "Famagustization" would cause the world to lose interest in a comprehensive solution for Cyprus. Denktash fears that if he returned Varosha to the Greek Cypriots, he might get nothing in return. Neither side is inclined to negotiate on the basis of the other side's proposals on Varosha or, for that matter, on the broader problem. Consequently, Mr. Nimetz questioned the utility of pursuing the present negotiating method, based on the submission of mutually unacceptable proposals by the two parties. He suggested that a high-level Mediator, appointed by the Secretary-General, might be able to generate new ideas and proposals, engage in negotiation by "shuttle" diplomacy and obtain the necessary political support from governments to induce the parties to accept compromise suggestions. Mr. Urquhart explained to Mr. Nimetz that the notion of a Mediator had been anathema to the Turkish side since 1965, on account of the Galo Plaza experience. The function envisaged by Mr. Nimetz could well be performed by Mr. Galindo-Pohl. The important thing was to create a machinery which would generate ideas and produce negotiating papers that might be the basis for progress, within the framework of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and of the intercommunal talks. Ob s ervations In "Hie present circumstances, we may have to accept the fact that the negotiating method followed since 1975 has outlived -7-

its usefulness. Because of the nature of the problem and the positions of the parties, it is inevitable that all the proposals produced by the parties have been one-sided, mutually incompatible, and totally unsuitable for generating a meaningful negotiating process. The Secretary-General has made it plain (most recently in his report to the Security Council of 31 May 1978) that he is not prepared to call for a resumption of the intercommunal talks unless and until a basis of negotiations acceptable to both sides has been established. Since the parties are clearly incapable of devising such a basis, either on the broader question or on individual limited issues, they will have to be provided with the necessary assistance if any progress is to be achieved. This might involve presenting the parties with informal negotiating papers which would attempt to bridge the differences between them. In view of the apprehensions of the Turkish Cypriot side about "mediation", it may be wise to initiate this procedure in a low key. Thus the Secretary- General might ask his Special Representative, acting on his behalf within the framework of his mission of good offices, to assist the parties in devising an agreed basis of negotiations, as necessary, on procedural questions, on individual practical problems (such as Varosha) and on elements of a comprehensive solution. The Secretary-General may wish to take advantage of the presence in New York of President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash, and of the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, to explore the feasibility of the adjusted negotiating method outlined above. This would of course remain within the framework of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and would not require any change in the existing Security Council mandate. The first application of the proposed method might deal with the framework for a combined approach to the problems of Varosha and of the resumption of the intercommunal talks. Certain preliminary ideas in this regard have been explored during the past three months, on a very informal basis, with the -8- parties and with interested governments. Essentially, these call for an "interim arrangement" that would place Varosha irreversibly within the UN buffer zone. To this end the intercommunal talks would be officially resumed. After one or two formal statements by the interlocutors on the broader Cyprus problem, the Secretary-General would ask them to take up the concrete practical problem of interim arrangements for Varosha, and to agree to set up a committee consisting of their deputies, which would negotiate details of the arrangements in Nicosia. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General would exercise good offices on the Secretary-General's behalf and would assist the committee as appropriate along the lines indicated above. The committee would submit its agreed report to the plenary intercommunal talks. Meanwhile, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would also engage in consultations with both sides on aspects of a comprehensive settlement and would endeavour to develop negotiating papers on them. Notes of a meeting held in the Secretary-General's office on Tuesday,

27 June 1978 at 11:20 a.m.

In attendance: The Secretary-General H.E. Mr. William Barton, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations H.E. Mr. James Leonard, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed

Ambassador Barton referred to the strong interest of his Foreign

Minister in having informal and private meetings of the Security Council at the ministerial level. He informed the Secretary-General of the meeting that the five Western members of the Council had last week in which they agreed that the meeting should be completely unstructured with a limited number of issues to be discussed, restricted participation, and no note takers. It should start with an oral report from the Secretary-General, and it would be up to him to decide what he wants to cover in that report. The Secretary-General repeated what he had said to Mr. Maynes earlier with regard to the past experience with such a meeting, as well as the question of items and format for the discussion. Ambassador Barton emphasized that Canada, as President for the month of July, will sound out the other members about this proposal and only proceed with the initiative if there was a positive response. They would start their consultations with the Soviet Union and China.

* # * * * - 2 -

Ambassador Leonard stayed "behind after the conclusion of the conversation regarding the proposed high-level Security Council meeting.

He informed the Secretary-General about the consultations the United States Government was undertaking with the Turks regarding the possibility of allowing Greek Cypriots to return to Varosha under an interim administration by the United Nations. If the Turks responded positively, the United States would try to get support from other Western as well as non-aligned countries. The objective was to stimulate dialogue and help in the resumption of inter-communal negotiations in

Cyprus. Further, if the Turks give a positive response, it would help in the removal of the embargo, and this may in turn assist them in taking a more forthcoming position. The arrangements would call for a United Nations interim administration to be set up in Varosha at the same time as the inter-communal talks resume. This would include municipal services and police functions. The area to be covered would include the southern-most city limits to allow for connexion between Varosha and the buffer zone which would give free access to the Greeks. They expected that 10-15,000 Greek Cypriots would return to Varosha within six months of resumption of talks. This proposal was being made without prejudice to whatever final arrangements are made for Varosha. He amplified that at this time, the United States was not requesting an intervention by the Secretary-General, but they wished him to be informed and would welcome any comments from him. - 3 -

The Secretary-General recalled that his latest report to the

Security Council referred to concrete, practical measures in relation to Varosha, and the U.S. initiative is accordingly in line with his thinking. He was ready to fully co-operate in this regard, but first both parties must agree on the arrangements; then would come the question of whether an additional mandate is necessary from the Security Council before resuming these additional responsibilities. Ambassador Leonard said that the Secretary-General's colleagues dealing with this matter had felt that the new arrangements could be put into effect in the same way as present arrangements had been made regarding the buffer zone without seeking a fresh mandate from the Security Council. The Secretary-General pointed out that the two

27 June 1978 at 11:20 a.m.

Ambassador Barton referred to the strong interest of his Foreign

Minister in having informal and private meetings of the Security

Council at the ministerial level. He informed the Secretary-General of the meeting that the five Western members of the Council had last

•week in which they agreed that the meeting should be completely unstructured with a limited number of issues to be discussed, restricted participation, and no note takers. It should start with an oral report from the Secretary-General, and it would be up to him to decide what he wants to cover-in that report. The Secretary-General repeated what he had said to Mr. Maynes earlier with regard to the past experience with such a meeting, as well as the question of items and format for the discussion. Ambassador Barton emphasized that Canada, as President for the month of July, will sound out the other members about this proposal and only proceed with the initiative if there was a positive response. They would start their consultations with the Soviet Union and China.

***** - 2 -

Ambassador Leonard stayed "behind after the conclusion of the conversation regarding the proposed high-level Security Council meeting.

He informed the Secretary-General about the consultations the

United States Government was undertaking with the Turks regarding the possibility of allowing Greek Cypriots to return to Varosha under an interim administration by the United Nations. If the Turks responded positively, the United States would try to get support from other Western as well as non-aligned countries. The objective was to stimulate

dialogue and help in the resumption of inter-communal negotiations in' Cyprus. Further, if the Turks give a positive response, it would help in the removal of the embargo, and this may in turn assist them

in taking a more forthcoming position. The arrangements would call for a United Nations interim administration to be set up in Varosha at the same time as the inter-communal talks resume. This would include municipal services and police functions. The area to be covered would include the southern-most city limits to allow for connexion between Varosha and the buffer zone which would give free access to the Greeks. They expected that 10-15,000 Greek Cypriots would return to Varosha within six months of resumption of talks. This proposal was being made

without prejudice to whatever final arrangements are made .for Varosha. He amplified that at this time, the United States was not requesting

an intervention by the Secretary-General, but they wished him to be informed and would welcome any comments from him. _ 3 —

The Secretary-General recalled that his latest report to the

Security Council referred to concrete, practical measures in relation to Varosha, and the U.S. initiative is accordingly in line with his thinking. He vas ready to fully co-operate in this regard, "but first both parties must agree on the arrangements; then vould come the

question of whether an additional mandate is necessary from the

Security Council before resuming these additional responsibilities.

Ambassador Leonard said that the Secretary-General's colleagues

dealing with this matter had felt that the new arrangements could be

put into effect in the same way as present arrangements had been made

regarding the buffer zone without seeking a fresh mandate from the

Security Council. The Secretary-General pointed out that the two

Ambassador Leonard very much hoped that the Greek Cypriots would

not reject this idea because it could make a real contribution towards

having the negotiations resumed.

The Secretary-General agreed and mentioned that he had again told

Ambassador Rossides of Cyprus that the two sides must begin direct

contacts again. ir-r-^-f ce '

C-C- CONFIDENTIAL 22 February 1978 FMG/sr Original: SG cc: Mr. F.T. Liu bf: RA/AR

Notes on a meeting in the office of the Secretary-General on 21 February 1978 at 6.45 p.m.

Present; The Secretary-General Mr. F. Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel

Ambassador I. Turkmen Mr. T. Ulucevik, Mission of Turkey

The Ambassador paraphrased a message from Prime Minister Ecevit: As the Secretary-General knows, Prime Minister Karamanlis has accepted Mr. Ecevit's proposal to meet at an early date. This meeting is now scheduled to take place "in the first half of March in a neutral country". Mr. Ecevit hopes that it will initiate a constructive dialogue about bilateral issues. Prime Minister Karamanlis has informed Mr. Ecevit that in his view it would be better to defer the submission of the Turkish Cypriot proposals on the Cyprus question until after this summit meeting. Mr. Ecevit shares this opinion and hopes that the meeting will have a positive impact on the negotiations to come. Mr. Ecevit hopes that the Secretary-General agrees, that the submission of the proposals would be more appropriate after the summit. The Secretary-General felt that such a delay would be justified since the two leaders had agreed upon it. He hoped that the ground would be prepared at the meeting of the Prime Ministers and that soon thereafter the proposals would be submitted. Did the Ambassador know of any reaction in Cyprus to the deferring? - 2 -

The Ambassador assumed that Prime Minister Karamanlis would have consulted with Nicosia before making his suggestion, He believed that the gist of the proposals would be send to the Secretary-General in the second half of March and inquired about possible dates for the intercommunal talks. The Secretary-General mentioned the week of 27 March or a date after 12 April. Both interlocutors agreed that the earlier date would probably not give sufficient time for the necessary preparations.

^^L^^gsgf;^"i^,w;^-^ / • >-' i-c-'' SecGenNx^* cc: REG BED • " Central CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE FILE

I spoke with Mr. Nimetz, Counsellor of the State Department, '*• Washington, on Friday, 3 February, about current developments in Cyprus. I explained to him the procedure that was agreed by the Secretary-General with the parties in Cyprus and subsequent questions which have been raised about the procedure on the Turkish side. I told him that we were anxious not to get into a hassle about the procedure and would play it by ear until we saw what form and how the Turkish proposals.would be put forward.

Mr. Nimetz had the impression, which we also have, that the Greek Cypriots are anxious not to give any impression of progress during the period of March and April when the Congress (U.S.) will be considering the various assistance proposals for Turkey. He agreed that probably the best course would be to await the Turkish proposals and then to engage in quiet diplomacy between the parties in Cyprus in an effort to establish a basis for a constructive negotiating session of the intercommunal talks. It would be most undesirable to rush into a seventh round of intercommunal talks and for the talks to immediately break up on the basis of the unacceptability of the Turkish proposals.

I also mentioned to Mr. Nimetz the problem of the level of future intercommunal rounds.

Brian E. Urquhart

3 February 1978 BEU/MD SecGeri'V"*" cc: REG BEU ' Central CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE FILE

I spoke with Mr. Nimetz, Counsellor of the State Department, Washington, on Friday, 3 February, about current developments in Cyprus. I explained to him the procedure that was agreed by the Secretary-General with the parties in Cyprus and subsequent questions which have been raised about the procedure on the Turkish side. I told him that we were anxious not to get into a hassle about the procedure and would play it by ear until we saw what form and how the Turkish proposals would be put forward.. Mr. Nimetz had the impression, which we also have, that the Greek Cypriots are anxious not to give any impression of progress during the period of March and April when the Congress (U.S.) will be considering the various assistance proposals for Turkey. He agreed that probably the best course would be to await the Turkish proposals and then to engage in quiet diplomacy between the parties in Cyprus in an effort to establish a basis for a constructive negotiating session of the intercommunal talks. It would be most undesirable to rush into a seventh round of intercommunal talks and for the talks to immediately break up on the basis of the unacceptability of the Turkish proposals. I also mentioned to Mr. Nimetz the problem of the level of future intercommunal rounds.

Brian E. Urquhart

3 February 1978 BEU/MD . e-L '* r J1 CONFIDENTIAL 22 February 1978 FMG/sr Original: SG cc: Mr. F.T. Liu bf: RA/AR

Notes on a meeting in the office of the Secretary-General on 21 February 1978 at 6*45 p.m.

Present: The Secretary-General Mr. F. Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel

Ambassador I. Turkmen

Mr. T. Ulucevik, Mission of Turkey

The Ambassador paraphrased a message from Prime Minister Ecevit: As the Secretary-General knows, Prime Minister Karamanlis has accepted Mr. Ecevit«s proposal to meet at an early date. This meeting is now scheduled to take place "in the first half of March in a neutral country". Mr. Ecevit hopes that it will initiate a constructive dialogue about bilateral issues. Prime Minister Karamanlis has informed Mr. Ecevit that in his view it would be better to defer the submission of the Turkish Cypriot proposals on the Cyprus question until after this summit meeting. Mr. Ecevit shares this opinion and hopes that the meeting will have a positive impact on the negotiations to come. Mr. Ecevit hopes that the Secretary-General agrees, that the submission of the proposals would be more appropriate after the summit. The Secretary-General felt that such a delay would be justified since the two leaders had agreed upon it. He hoped that the ground would be prepared at the meeting of the Prime Ministers and that soon thereafter the proposals would be submitted. Did the Ambassador know of any reaction in Cyprus to the deferring? The Ambassador assumed that Prime Minister Karamanlis would have consulted with Nicosia before making his suggestion. He believed that the gist of the proposals would be send to the Secretary-General in the second half of March and inquired about possible dates for the intercommunal talks, The Secretary-General mentioned the week of 27 March or a date after 12 April. Both interlocutors agreed that the earlier date would probably not give sufficient time for the necessary preparations.

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