Notes

Introduction

1. There is, of course, no consensus on the precise meaning of democracy, much less dem- ocratic values. 2. Also sometimes known as the Constitution of . The original document has not survived, but a number of different versions can be found in early Muslim sources. 3. The word caliph is derived from the khalifa, which means both “successor” and “deputy.” 4. In Arabic, Shari’a literally means the “path leading to the watering place.” 5. The word “Shia” is derived from the Arabic Shiat , meaning “party of Ali.” While “Sunni” means those who follow the , the exemplary words and practices of the . The names are misleading, as Ali is revered by the Sunni—albeit not to the same extent as by the Shia—and the Shia also attach great importance to the Sunnah. 6. Starting with Ali through to Muhammad al-, who received the in 874 at the age of five. Muhammad was taken into hiding to protect him from his Sunni enemies. However, in around 940 he is regarded as having left the world materially but to have retained a spiritual presence through which he guides Shia divines in their interpretations of law and doctrine. believe that he will eventually return to the world as the Mahdi, or “Messiah,” and usher in a brief golden age before the end of time. There have also been divisions within the Shia community. In the eighth century, during a dispute over the rightful heir to the sixth , Jafar al-Sadiq, the Twelvers backed the candidacy of a younger son, Musa al-Kazim. The supporters of his eldest son, Ismail, subsequently broke away to form what is now known as the Ismaili commu- nity. The Ismailis themselves then became divided between a minority, called Sabiyah or “,” who held that Ismail was the last imam, and the majority, who continued to recognize Ismail’s descendants as . There is also a Mahdi tradition in Sunni , although many orthodox Sunni theologians have dismissed the concept on the grounds that it is not mentioned in the Qur’an. 7. The travelogue of the fourteenth-century Moroccan explorer Ibn Battutah (1304– 68/69), who visited almost every Muslim country during thirty years of traveling, reveals not only the cultural diversity of the Islamic world but also its many shared features. For example, Ibn Battutah’s training in Islamic jurisprudence enabled him to serve as a judge, each time under a different political authority, not only in his native Morocco but as far afield as Delhi and the Maldives. See Tim Mackintosh-Smith, ed., The Travels of Ibn Battutah (: Picador, 2000). 220 NOTES

8. Starting in the eighth century, several schools of thought, most famously the Mutazilah, held that the Qur’an could not be the coeternal word of because God is indivisible. Therefore, the Qur’an could only be created by God. After enjoying a brief popularity in the ninth century, the doctrine gradually lost favor and is now disavowed by Sunni . 9. One consequence is that translations can only be paraphrases, which lack the absolute sanctity of the original Arabic. Another is that most Muslims refuse to accept that the Qur’an contains textual variants or loanwords from other languages. For example, most non-Muslim scholars believe that the textual variants in the seventh- and eighth-cen- tury copies of the Qur’an found in 1972 during the restoration of the Great in Yemen suggest an evolving text. Such a claim is anathema to Muslims. 10. From the Arabic for “news” or “story.” 11. Al-Bukhari collected about 600,000 traditions but included in his collection only 7,275 which he deemed completely reliable. Muslim’s collection comprises approximately 9,200 traditions. The other four compilers—Abu Dawud (817–889), al-Tirmidhi (died 892), al-Nasai (830–915), and ibn Maja (824–886)—included whose provenance was less clear-cut, and many of the traditions in their collections are graded into differ- ent degrees of likely authenticity. 12. Shia Muslims tend to follow the Jafari school of Islamic jurisprudence, named after the sixth imam, Jafar al-Sadiq (702–65). Like the main Sunni schools, the Jafari derive their Shari’a from the Qur’an and the sunnah of the Prophet, although there are occasional differences in interpretation. The Twelver doctrine of the of the imamate means that an authenticated pronouncement by an imam is also considered binding. 13. The school has the most adherents, accounting for 40–45 percent of all Sunni Muslims, and is the dominant school in the Indian subcontinent, Egypt, , the , Bosnia-Herzegovina, and parts of West Africa. Approximately 30 percent of Sunnis follow the school, which is mainly concentrated in north, central, and parts of West Africa. The Shafi school accounts for another 20–25 percent, mostly in southeast Asia. The remainder are followers of the school, the majority of whom live in Arabia. 14. They include , which is based on the puritanical teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (c.1703–92) and is today the official doctrine of Saudi Arabia. For a detailed exposition of Wahhabi doctrine, see http://www.Islam-qa.com. For an unapol- ogetically antagonistic critique, see Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002). 15. The precise balance between predestination and freewill in remains prob- lematic. The very name of the religion—in as much that Islam means submission— would appear to necessitate at least a modicum of free will. The degree to which human free will is circumscribed by divinely predestined fate was one of the most divisive issues in early Islamic theology and has arguably yet to be fully resolved. See William Montgomery Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002), 82–118. 16. Curiously, there are examples in the Shari’a where, faced with an apparent contradiction between the Qur’an and the hadith, Islamic jurists have favored the latter. For example, the Qur’an (Surah 24:2) clearly states that the punishment for , meaning “adultery” or “fornication,” as the same Arabic word is used for both, is one hundred lashes. How- ever, there are numerous hadith that claim that the punishment is to death (for example, al-Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 23, No. 413; Volume 4, Book 56, No. 829; Volume 8, Book 82, Nos. 803–6; and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Book 17, Nos. 4194, 4196, 4198, 4199, NOTES 221

4201, 4202, 4205, 4206, 4207 and 4209 http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/ hadithsunnah/bukhari/082.sbt.html-008.082.814). Classical jurists attempted to bridge this gap by claiming that the verse in the Qur’an refers to premarital sex (fornication) while the hadith refers to extramarital sex (adultery). Yet this would mean that the Qur’an made no mention of adultery, which is arguably a much more socially disruptive act than fornication. There are several hadith (for example, al-Bukhari, Volume 8, Book 82, Nos. 816–7) that maintain that the punishment of stoning for adultery was part of the original revelation of the Qur’an to the Prophet Muhammad but was lost before the compilation of the ‘ codex. If the claim is true, it would demolish one of the central tenets of the Muslim ; namely, that the Qur’an is perfect and complete. 17. For example, in 1970, Saudi Arabia supplemented its Shari’a courts with administrative tribunals to hear cases related to traffic regulations and business and commercial law. 18. To give an extreme example, many Muslims in Africa and Arabia view female circum- cision as a religious requirement. Yet the practice appears to date back at least to the time of the ancient Egyptians some two thousand years before the birth of the Prophet Muhammad and is not mentioned at all in the Qur’an. 19. But see also Note 16 above. 20. For example, al-Bukhari, Volume 9, Book 83, Nos. 19, 20, 36, and 47. 21. However, there are many hadith that explicitly state that the punishment for apostasy is death: al-Bukhari, Volume 9, Book 83, No. 17; Volume 9, Book 83, No. 37; Volume 9, Book 84, No. 57; Volume 9, Book 84, No. 58; Volume 9, Book 84, No. 64; Volume 9, Book 89, No. 271. 22. For example, the Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh (1615–69) argued that the Hindu Upani- shads were a “storehouse of monotheism.” Mainstream Buddhism does not, of course, subscribe to the monotheistic belief in a creator God. This broadening of the definition of the People of the Book has not been accepted by most Muslims. 23. Translation by N. J. Dawood, The Koran (London: Penguin, 1999). The identity of the Sabaeans (also sometimes spelled Sabeans or Sabians) has been the subject of consider- able scholarly debate. They appear to have been members of a now-extinct monothe- istic faith with a scripture and similar, though not identical, to the Jews and Christians. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. For example, Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Ladin (born 1957) used the verse to pref- ace his 1998 World Islamic Front Statement, Holy War against Jews and Crusaders, in which he called on Muslims to kill “Americans and their allies, both civilians and military.” 27. For example, Muhammad’s favorite wife Aisha quotes him as saying that for women the best form of is to participate in the (al-Bukhari, Volume 4, Book 52, Nos. 43, 127, and 128). 28. The hadith collection of al-Bukhari devotes an entire book (Volume 4, Book 52) to jihad. Several name jihad as the next best deed for a Muslim after believing in God and his Apostle Muhammad: for example, al-Bukhari, Volume 1, Book 2, No. 25; Volume 1, Book 10, No. 505; Volume 2, Book 26, No. 594. 29. “When you meet the unbelievers on the battlefield strike off their heads and, when you have laid them low, bind your captives firmly. Then grant them their freedoms or take a ransom from them, until War shall lay down her burdens. Thus shall you do.” (Surah 47:4); Dawood, The Koran. 30. See also Surah 4:190: “If they keep away from you and cease their hostility and offer you peace, God bids you not to harm them.” 222 NOTES

31. Muslims also often cite Surah 5:32 as containing an injunction against killing all inno- cents. In fact, although this is conceivable as an inference, the verse is a reference to an instruction to the Jews rather than a general rule for all believers. In an allusion to the story of Cain and Abel, God says: “That was why We laid it down for the Israelites that whoever killed a human being, except as punishment for murder or other villainy in the land, shall be regarded as having killed all mankind” (Surah 5:32); Dawood, The Koran. 32. For example, Muslim, Book 19, Nos. 4319 and 4320. 33. Apologists frequently claim that Islam foresees the eventual abolition of slavery. This may be so, but it is not stated anywhere in the Qur’an. 34. The Arabic word translated here as “fields” is probably more accurately rendered as “tillage” or “ploughed land.” 35. Surah 4:128 allows a woman wife to seek a decision to divorce if she fears ill-treatment or desertion by her husband, but does not explicitly permit her to dissolve the marriage unilaterally. 36. Surah 4:34 states that a husband should first admonish a disobedient wife. If that is unsuccessful, he should refuse to sleep with her, and if that too fails to persuade her to mend her ways, he should beat her. However, once the wife has pledged her obedience, the husband should not persist with the punishment. 37. The Arabic word jilbab, which is rendered here as “outer garments,” is sometimes mis- leadingly translated as “veil,” which suggests a covering merely for the face or head. A more accurate translation would probably be “cloak,” although the word is also used to describe a long gown covering the whole body. 38. These include their fathers, fathers-in-law, sons, stepsons, brothers, nephews, women servants and male servants “lacking in natural vigor” (Surah 24:31). 39. More conservative jurists cite a hadith (Abu Dawud, Book 32, No. 4092) in which Muhammad is said to have stated that once a woman reached puberty she should cover all but her hands and face. 40. is also condemned in Surah 3:130, 4:161 and 30:39. 41. The question of whether it is possible for a Muslim to live in a predominantly non-Mus- lim society that is not governed by Islamic precepts was one that taxed early genera- tions of Islamic jurists; with most, though not all, believing that it is not. However, the emphasis today is more on the specifics of the society concerned and whether or not it allows Muslims to practice their faith without restriction. 42. The Qur’an only refers to prayers three (Surah 11:114) or four (Surah 17:78–79) times a day. 43. A list of those eligible to receive is given in Surah 9:60. 44. Those who are ill or on a journey are allowed to break the fast provided that they com- pensate by fasting for the same period of time at a later date (Surah 2:185). 45. The Arabic of dates to pre-Islamic times and can also be used as a term of veneration or respect for someone with political, rather than religious, authority. 46. For example, al-Husayn ibn-Mansur al-Hallaj (born 857), who was executed in in 922. 47. A succinct description of this accommodation between and orthodox theology can be found in Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 156–82. 48. An exception is probably the Bektashi tariqah, which is today mostly concentrated in the former territory of the . Named for Haji Bektash (died before 1295), an Iranian-born Sunni mystic who settled in , the Bektashi are today probably closer to Shia ideology and include a large number of the Turkish heterodox minority known as Alevis. NOTES 223

49. Ulema or is the plural of the Arabic word alim, meaning those who possess , or “learning.” 50. The doctrine of imamology has meant that Shia have traditionally not only enjoyed a higher status in their communities than their Sunni counterparts but have also tended to be more actively involved in politics.

Chapter 1

1. These reforms are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 2. Although it is today most commonly associated with the racist theories of Nazi Ger- many, the idea that a person’s ethnic origins could be determined by measuring his or her skull was widespread in Europe at the time. Details of the Turkish “racial type” are given in Tarih I (: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), 17. 3. The Great Hun Empire (204 BCE–216 CE), Western Hun Empire (48–216), the Euro- pean Hun Empire (375–469), the White Hun/Hephalite Empire (420–552), the Göktürk Empire (552–745), the Avar Empire (565–835), the Khazar Empire (651–983), the Uygur state (745–1368), the Karahanid state (940–1040), the Ghaznavid state (962–1183), the Great (1040–1157), the Khwarazm-shah state (1097–1231), the Golden Horde (1236–1502), the Great Empire (1368–1501), the Babur Empire (1526– 1858), the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922), and the Turkish Republic (1923–present). 4. A English translation of the inscriptions can be found in Kemal Silay, An Anthology of (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1996), 1–9. 5. The states of the Göktürks, , Uygur, Karahanids, Ghaznavids, Seljuks, , Ottomans, and the modern republic. The Avars appear to have spoken Mongolian and the Harzemshahs a form of Persian. The Golden Horde and the Babur Empire prob- ably spoke a mixture of Mongolian and Turkish. The languages of the first four states claimed by the Turkish History Thesis are simply unknown. 6. For example, a research team headed by Professor Nihan Erginel Unaltuna of the Department of Genetics, Institute for Experimental Medical Research, Istanbul Uni- versity, found close genetic similarities between mainland Turks and the population of the Greek island of . Nihan Erginel Unaltuna et al., “Distribution of the M129V polymorphism of the prion protein gene in a suggests a high risk for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease,” European Journal of Human Genetics, 9, no. 12 (2001): 965– 68. Among others, see also N. Erginel-Unaltuna, K. Peoc’h, E. Komurcu, T.T. Acuner, H. Issever, J.L. Laplanche, “Cystic Fibrosis Mutation and Associated Haplotypes in Turkish Cystic Fibrosis Patients,” Human Biology, 73, no. 2 (2001): 191–203; A. Arnaiz-Villena, E. Gomez-Casado, J. Martinez-Laso, “Population Genetic Relationships between Medi- terranean Populations Determined by HLA Allele Distribution and a Historic Perspec- tive,” Tissue Antigens 60, no. 2 (2002): 111; F. Uyar, M. T. Dorak, G. Saruhan-Direskeneli, “Human Leukocyte Antigen-A, -B and –C Alleles and Human Leukocyte Antigen Hap- lotypes in Turkey: Relationship to Other Populations,” Tissue Antigens 64, no. 2 (2004): 180–87. For the common origins of the “” and “Turks” on the divided island of , see Geoffrey Dean, Hatice Aksoy, Turgay Akalin, Lefkos Middleton, Kyria- cos Kyriallis, “Multiple Sclerosis in the Turkish- and Greek-Speaking Communities of Cyprus: A United Nations (UNHCR) Bicommunal Project,” Journal of Neurological Sci- ences 145 (1997): 163–68. 7. Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Apolo Menozzi, and Alberto Piazza, The History and Geog- raphy of Human Genes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 243. 224 NOTES

8. Some, of course, continued to speak a language other than Turkish as their mother tongue; most notably the , who today account for around 15 percent of the total population of Turkey and speak variants of a member of the Indo-European family of languages. 9. İlköğretim Sosyal Bilgiler 5 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 2004), 155. 10. For a fiercely robust defense of the argument that the conversion of the Turks to Islam was much bloodier than portrayed in official Turkish historiography, see Erdoğan Aydın, Nasıl Müsülman Olduk? (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitap Külübü, 2000). 11. There is no agreement on when this took place. As noted above, there is no evidence to support—or refute—the claim that the Great Hun Empire was Turkic speaking. Chi- nese chronicles record that a subject people of the Juan-juan empire known as the T’u- chüeh, which many Western scholars have assumed is a rendition of “Turk,” rebelled and seized power in 552 CE. Yet there is no suggestion that the T’u-chüeh formed a discrete linguistic or racial entity. 12. One of the manuscripts is in the Royal Library in Dresden and contains twelve sto- ries, and the other is in the Vatican library, which includes only six of the stories. Both manuscripts are believed to date from the sixteenth century but have so many variants that they are unlikely to be based on a single original and may even be the products of separate oral traditions. 13. Geoffrey Lewis, The Book of Korkut (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 16–22. 14. For example, the text includes phrases such as: “in the days of the Oghuz, it was the custom”; Lewis, Dede Korkut, 68 15. Although horsemeat is not explicitly banned by the Qur’an, most Muslims regard it as unclean. However, the Qur’an does allow polygamy (Sura 4:3), while forbidding wine (Sura 2:219); an injunction which is usually interpreted as extending to all fermented drinks. 16. The word dede literally translates as “grandfather,” although it is frequently used in Turkish as an title denoting wisdom or holiness. 17. Usually this trance is spontaneous—and sometimes the product of medical conditions such as epilepsy—although the presence of cannabis seeds in some shamanistic burial sites suggests that it may occasionally have been chemically induced. 18. In around 740, the head of Turkic-speaking Khazar state and most of its ruling class officially adopted Judaism. The reasons for this decision remain obscure. Unlike other conversions, there is no evidence of Jewish missionary activity or extensive personal contact between the Khazars and the Jews. 19. The bow, rather than the sword, was still the main weapon of the Turkic-speakers who invaded Anatolia in the late eleventh century. The Alexiad of Anna Comnena (Har- mondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 479–80. 20. The Umayyad dynasty was established by Muawiya, who seized the after kill- ing Ali, the fourth caliph and Muhammad’s cousin, in 661. In 750 the Umayyads were overthrown by the Abbasids. In the mid-eleventh century, the Seljuks replaced the Abbasids as the most powerful military force in the , but the caliphate remained in Baghdad until 1258, when the city was sacked by the Mongols. 21. Not all of the movement was westward. In the late tenth century, other Turkic-speak- ing converts to Islam began to raid south into in the first stage of a process that eventually resulted in the entire subcontinent coming under Muslim control. 22. The capital was moved several times, but during the period from the late eleventh cen- tury through to the end of the twelfth century, when the Seljuk Empire was at its peak, the capital was in Esfahan. NOTES 225

23. In the Qur’an the term sultan is used to denote moral or spiritual authority, although it later assumed political connotations. 24. The Byzantines described themselves as Romanoi, the Greek for “Romans,” rather than Byzantines, Greeks, or Hellenes. As a result, contemporary Muslims referred to both the Byzantines and their territory as “Rum.” The word is still used in modern Turkey to describe both Greek Orthodox Turkish citizens and, more frequently, . 25. In 451, at the Council of Chalcedon (the modern Istanbul suburb of Kadıköy), church leaders from the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches adopted a decree declaring that Jesus was duophysite, with both a human and a divine nature. Other churches (including the Armenian Apostolic, Coptic Orthodox and Syrian Orthodox) believe that he only had a single divine nature and was thus monophysite. 26. Quoted in Claude Cahen, The Formation of Turkey (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001), 131. 27. Mevlana is the Turkish rendition of the Persian Mawlana, meaning “Our Master,” the title by which was known to his followers. See Reynold A. Nicholson, Rumi: Poet and Mystic (Oxford: Oneworld, 1995), 19. 28. Also sometimes translated as or Mesnevi, its full name of -i Ma’navi means “Rhyming Couplets of Deep Spiritual Meaning.” 29. The late M. Fuad Köprülü argued that this adherence to exoteric Islam was an attempt to avoid official presecution and disguise the true nature of Rumi’s philosophy, which he described as essentially pantheistic Islam. M. Fuad Köprülü, Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993), 19. However, mod- ern members of the claim that Rumi was working within an exclusively Islamic tradition, a link in a silsilah stretching back to the Prophet Muhammad. Şefik Can, Fundamentals of Rumi’s Thought (Somerset, NJ: The Light, 2004), 295–304. 30. The literal translation of is “father,” although, like dede, it is also used as an honor- ific title. 31. The word “horde,” the collective noun by which the Mongol forces are usually known in English, is derived from the Turkic-Mongol ordu, meaning “army.” 32. In Turkish, the state founded by Osman is known as Osmanlı. The English term Otto- man is derived from ‘Uthman, the Arabic form of his name. 33. For example, Halil İnalcık, Essays in Ottoman History (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık), 230. 34. The Arabic term originally referred to those who fought alongside the Prophet Muhammad, although it subsequently became associated with those who participated in battles to expand Muslim territory. 35. The Kemalist historian Mehmet Fuad Köprülü notes that it was only when they had moved into towns and come under the influence of the ulema—such as when they were no longer actively engaged in frontier duties—that the warlords of the Seljuk marches began to refer to themselves as ghazis. M. Fuad Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 92–93. 36. They even consciously imitated the Christians. For example, almost all of the coinage of the early Turkic states in Anatolia is based on Christian, usually Byzantine, mod- els; to the point where the Turkic-speaking Danishmend dynasty, which established an independent principality in eastern Anatolia from 1071 to 1178, minted coins bearing the image of Jesus, the Christian Messiah. John Kingsley Birge, The of (London: Luzac, 1965), 28. 37. The Seljuks even employed Frankish mercenaries to assist with the suppression of the Baba Ishaq revolt. Cahen, The Formation of Turkey, 70. 38. Modern Turkish historiography dates the foundation of the Ottoman Empire to 1299, when Osman is said to have declared independence from the suzerainty of the remnants 226 NOTES

of the Mongol empire. Sosyal Bilgiler 6, 154. In fact, this is impossible to verify from contemporary sources. In the absence of any firm evidence, any date for the foundation of the has to be an approximation. 39. Herbert A. Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1916). 40. These lectures were later updated and published as Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire (Albany: State University of New York, 1992). 41. Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1938), 14. 42. Sosyal Bilgiler 6, 154–55. 43. A small number of Turkish scholars have attempted to merge the ethnic and ghazi the- ses. For example, Halil İnalcık, “The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 2 (1980): 71–79. 44. The transliterated text and English translation of the Bursa inscription are given in Heath Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 145–6. 45. An English translation and critical edition of Ahmedi’s entire text is given in Kemal Silay, “Ahmedi’s History of the Ottoman Dynasty,” Journal of Turkish Studies 16 (1992): 129–200. 46. See Feridun Emecen, “Gazaya Dair: XIV. Yüzyıl Kaynakları Arasında Bir Gezinti,” in Hakkı Dursun Yıldız’a Armağan, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 191–7. 47. See the Akıncı Defter (Register of the Akıncıs), which is housed in the National Library in Sofia. Boris Nedkov, Osmano-turska diplomatika i paleografiia, vol. 2 (Sofia, 1972), 175–7. 48. Askeri means “military,” while reaya can be translated as “subjects.” Until the mid-six- teenth century, reaya was used to describe both Muslims and non-Muslims, although it subsequently became associated with the non-Muslim subjects of the sultan. 49. See, for example, Heath Lowry’s study of the Ottoman tax registers for the island of Limnos. Heath W. Lowry, Fifteenth Century Ottoman Realities: Christian Peasant Life on the Aegean Island of Limnos (Istanbul: Eren, 2002). 50. Köprülü argued that millions of Turkic speakers migrated into Anatolia during this period. Not only is there no evidence for this, but, given the nature and demands of the nomadic lifestyle, it is difficult to see how the land could have sustained such a sudden, massive influx. 51. Ulrich Schlemmer (ed.), Johannes Schiltberger: Als Sklave im Osmanischen Reich und bei den Tataren, 1394–1427 (Stuttgart, 1983), 118. 52. Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, 137. 53. This legend is detailed in, and has given its name to, a recent history of the Ottomans. See Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream (London: John Murray, 2005), 2. 54. For example, in Salih Muslim, Book 041, Nos. 6924 and 6979, and Sunan Abu-Dawud, Book 37, Nos. 4281–3, the fall of the city is supposed to presage the imminent appear- ance of the Dajjal, the Islamic equivalent of the Antichrist. 55. The largest of these can still be seen in the modern Istanbul neighborhood known as Fatih, or “Conqueror,” in his honor. 56. This was also the explanation accepted by Ottoman jurists in the sixteenth century when first Selim I (reigned 1512–20) and then Süleyman I (reigned 1520–66) tried to seize several of these churches. However, their successors were less inclined to honor Mehmet II’s promises. By the eighteenth century, only three of the churches remained NOTES 227

in Greek Orthodox hands. Steven Runciman, The Fall of (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 199–204. 57. The Turkish word is derived from the Arabic millat, which is often translated as “com- munity of faith,” although in the Qur’an it is more commonly used to describe the monotheistic faith of the Abrahamic tradition. For example, Sura 16, Verse 123; Sura 2, Verse 135; Sura 3, Verse 95; Sura 4, Verse 125. 58. Separate Roman Catholic and Protestant millets were added in 1830 and 1847, respec- tively, shortly before the system became effectively moribund following the Hattı- Hümayun Imperial Rescript of 1856, which introduced the principle of legal equality for all Ottoman subjects regardless of religious persuasion. 59. After centuries of growing estrangement, the Christian Church had finally split into Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox branches in 1054. During the early fifteenth cen- tury, the Byzantines had frequently petitioned their coreligionists in for military support against the Ottomans. The price that was invariably demanded was the reunification of the Church under the leadership of the Papacy. During the final years of the , Scholarios had been the leader of the anti-unionist faction, arguing that Orthodoxy and Catholicism were doctrinally incompatible. There seems little doubt that his appointment by Mehmet II as Greek Orthodox Patriarch was designed to preserve the between Orthodoxy and Catholicism and ensure the Patriarchate’s dependence on the Ottoman state. 60. Both Constantinople patriarchates also had regional rivals: for the Armenians the patriarchates in Ejmiadzin and Cilicia; for the Orthodox, the patriarchates in Antioch, and . Under Ottoman rule all lost influence relative to the Con- stantinople patriarchates. 61. Heath Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, 99. 62. However, the few communities which converted en masse maintained elements of their language and culture for centuries, particularly if they were geographically isolated. For example, in the Of valley on Turkey’s eastern Black Sea coast the older generation of Muslims still speak a dialect of Pontic Greek. While in the next valley many of the Muslim villages speak a dialect of Armenian. Author interviews in the Black Sea region, April 2001. 63. Later Safavid court historians claimed that the order had always been Shia and that Safi od- was a or descendant of Ali, the fourth caliph. Neither claim was true. 64. The honorific shah is a pre-Islamic Iranian title which had not been used for nine hun- dred years before it was resurrected and co-opted by Ismail in 1501 to try to associate his new regime with the glory of ancient . 65. Although the most serious revolts occurred in the period 1510–30, some kızılbaşı com- munities remained restive into the seventeenth century. 66. Sunni Turks sometimes still use the term kızılbaşı to describe Alevis, usually in a derog- atory fashion. 67. Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 104–5. 68. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 241–3. 69. Since the 1960s, fears of separatism have meant that questions related to minorities have been excluded from state censuses in Turkey. Previously the Alevis were simply grouped together with Sunni Muslims. Fuat Dündar, Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar (Istanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1999), 64–5. The second largest community of for- mer kızılbaşı is in , where what are generally known in English as account for around 25 percent of the total population of approximately 18.5 million. A compara- tive study can be found in Marianne Aringberg-Laanatza, “Alevis in Turkey—Alawites 228 NOTES

in Syria: Similarities and Differences” in Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives, ed. Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga, and Catharina Raudvere (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1998), 151–65. 70. An overview of the numerous attempts to define can be found in Gloria L. Clarke, The World of the Alevis (New York: AVC Publications, 1999), 9–35. 71. In the Mevlevi sema, the dancers, who are almost always men, remain in the same place rotating on their own axes. The pluralism of the Alevi tradition was vividly illustrated at a conference on 8–9 November 2003, organized by the Cem Foundation, one of the two main Alevi organizations in Turkey, and bringing together regional representatives from across the country. Towards the end of the first morning, a number of Alevis took to the stage to perform the sema. When the sema started, some of the watching regional representatives started clapping along in time to the music, prompting others to shout: “Be quiet! Stop clapping! This is a prayer!” Author’s observation, Istanbul, 8 November 2003. 72. This shamanistic legacy has led some Alevis to claim that they are more purely “Turk- ish” than Sunni Turks. However, a substantial proportion of Alevis speak one of the three dialects of Kurdish as their mother tongue, particularly the Zaza dialect; which suggests considerable cultural interaction—and probably intermarriage—between the new arrivals and the indigenous population. 73. Even today it is still not unusual for Sunni parents to object to one of their children mar- rying an Alevi, and vice versa. Author observations, 1989–2007. 74. Modern Turkish Sufis claim that Haji Bektash was a Sunni mystic whose message has been distorted by the order which now bears his name. Author interview with a leading member of the tariqah, Istanbul, October 2004. 75. There is no reliable information about Haji Bektash’s life, although he is generally agreed to have been born in Khorasan in modern Iran during the first half of the thirteenth century and migrated into Anatolia with Turkic nomads. The order was founded by his followers. Haji Bektash is believed to be buried in the Anatolian town to which he has given his name, Hacıbektaş in the central Anatolian province of Nevşehir. His tomb is a place of pilgrimage for Bektashis and Alevis. Since 1964 it has been the site of a three- day festival in his honor held on 16–18 August each year. 76. Suraiya Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation and Long-Term Survival: The Bektashi Order and the Ottoman State (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries),” in Bektachiyya: Études sur l’ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach, ed. Aleandre Popov and Gilles Veinstein (Istanbul, Isis Publications, 1995), 174–80. 77. The figure is based on Ottoman surveys conducted in 1520–35, the accuracy of which it is impossible to verify. Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, “Ottoman Society,” in History of The Ottoman State, Society and Civilisation Vol. 1, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (Istanbul: Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 2001), 518–19. 78. The practice of supplementing the Shari’a was common in other Islamic states. The word örfî literally means “customary,” although in reality the system was one of statute law. 79. For example, in the sixteenth century, the severity of punishments under örfî law for crimes such as rape, adultery, and certain forms of theft and homicide clearly contra- vened the Shari’a. Mehmet Âkif Aydın, “The Ottoman Legal System,” in History of The Ottoman State, Society and Civilisation Vol. 1, 443–44. 80. The first capitulation treaty was signed with in 1536. By the end of the eigh- teenth century, virtually all the European powers had obtained capitulation treaties. Initially, the capitulations were probably intended merely to reduce the workload of the Ottoman courts. However, the decline in Ottoman power enabled the European powers NOTES 229

to use the treaties to provide their citizens with a measure of de facto legal immunity against the Ottoman judicial system. 81. Their descendants include several prominent members of modern Turkey’s business and academic communities. However, in 2007 widespread anti-Semitism and the dan- ger posed by militant Islamists meant that it was impossible to assess how many, if any, of these secret Jews had survived. 82. The Ottomans had first laid siege to in 1529 during the reign of Süleyman I. At the time, the failure to capture the city was regarded by both the Ottomans and their enemies as merely a temporary setback. Although its full importance did not become clear until several years later, the Ottoman defeat in 1683 proved more decisive, effec- tively marking the end of the Ottoman Empire as an expansionist power. 83. Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 213. 84. Abu Dawud, Book 40, No. 4590. 85. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of in Turkey (London: Hurst and Company, 1998), 40. 86. The khanate’s independence was short-lived. In 1783, it was annexed by Russia. 87. Russia later claimed that the treaty gave it the right of protection over all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. This is not true. Article 14 of the treaty gave Rus- sia the right to build a church in the Galata neighborhood of Constantinople. Article 7 allowed the Russian government to represent the interests of the church; a right which Russia subsequently disingenuously interpreted as extending to all Orthodox Chris- tians in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, Article 7 explicitly states it was the Ottoman state which was responsible for protecting the Christians of the empire. Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London: John Murray, 1993), 45–47.

Chapter 2

1. The British subsequently withdrew and returned Egypt to nominal Ottoman control, albeit with considerable autonomy. 2. Revolts in Serbia had finally resulted in it being granted autonomy in 1830, although it did not become fully independent until 1878. 3. It has also been argued that the ulema had come increasingly under the influence of the hard-line orthodox teachings of the Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandi tariqah. Butrus Abu-Manneh, Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century (1826– 1876) (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2001), 65–68. 4. Abu-Manneh, Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire, 184. 5. The name comes from the gate, known in Turkish as Babıali, meaning “High Gate” or “Gate of the Eminent,” which led to the block of buildings in Constantinople housing the main government departments. 6. Members of the Ottoman elite began to dress like Europeans as early as what is now known as the Tulip Era (1718–30), after the predilection of Sultan Ahmed III (reigned 1703–30) for tulips. 7. Ironically, over the next century the fez—which is of ancient Greek origin—became so closely associated with Islam in the minds of Turkish Muslims that Mustafa Kemal’s decision to outlaw it in 1925 was widely condemned as an assault on religion. See Chap- ter 3. 8. Uriel Heyd, “The Ottoman Ulema and in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II,” in Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, ed. Uriel Heyd (Jerusalem: Publications of the Hebrew University, 1961), 96. 230 NOTES

9. The title of , which is believed to be derived either from the Persian padshah meaning “king” or “emperor,” or the Turkish baş ağa, meaning “head lord” or “tribal chief,” was bestowed by the sultan as an honorific on military commanders or high- ranking state officials. Officially, the title fell into disuse following the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. In practice, it is still commonly used as an honorific when addressing or referring to serving or retired generals. 10. An English translation of the Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerifi can be found at http://www.bilkent .edu.tr/~genckaya/documents1.html 11. Some Turkish secularists have even—misleadingly—seen it as the first step towards a secular state. For example, Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (London: Hurst and Co., 1998), 144. 12. They were less enthusiastic about applying the same principle to their own religious minorities. For example, Catholics in Britain received full civic and political rights in 1829, and Jews only in 1858. 13. By 1839, not only was Muhammed Ali effectively autonomous but his army, under his son Ibrahim Pasha (1789–1848), had extended the territory under Egyptian control deep into what is now Syria before being restrained by a military intervention by the European powers in 1840. 14. The terms were set out in the 1840 Treaty of London and backed up by British and Austrian military , including a blockade of the Nile delta. 15. This has been erroneously interpreted by some as advocating the legal equality of all of the Ottoman’s sultans. After all, classical Islamic jurisprudence provides for the protec- tion of the lives, honor, and property of Peoples of the Book and women without regard- ing either as being legally equal with Muslim men. 16. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 110. 17. In 1850, the Ottoman Empire had become caught in a tug-of-war between the govern- ments of France and Russia—each of which was anxious to boost its public support by courting domestic religious sentiments—over ecclesiastical control over the Christian Holy Places in Palestine; with France arguing that it should rest with Catholic priests and Russia maintaining that it should be given to Greek Orthodox monks. In February 1853, Tsar Nicholas I of Russia raised the stakes by demanding that Sultan Abdülmecit also explicitly acknowledge Russia’s right to protect Orthodox Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire; a right that Russia had frequently, and erroneously, claimed had already been effectively granted by the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. When Abdül- mecit refused, Russia invaded Moldavia and Walachia. The result was the Crimean War, which ended in Russia’s defeat by an alliance between France, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire. 18. An English translation of the Hatt-i Hümayun can be found at http://www.bilkent.edu .tr/~genckaya/documents1.html 19. Reşit Pasha’s memorandum is quoted in Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, Tezakir (: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1953), 76–82. 20. Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876 (Princeton, NJ: Princ- eton University Press, 1963), 101–102. 21. There is evidence to suggest that a handful of Christians served in mixed Cossack regi- ments in the 1860s, although the total number of non-Muslims in the army was so small as to be negligible. When the issue was raised in the first Ottoman parliaments of 1877 and 1878, there was more enthusiasm amongst the Muslim deputies than their non- Muslim counterparts, most of whom remained firmly opposed to the idea. Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876, 95–96. NOTES 231

22. Ebül’ulâ Mardin, Medenî Hukuk Cephesinden Cevdet Paşa, 1822–1985 (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1946), 63. 23. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (London: Hurst and Co., 1998), 168. 24. With the exception of the Caucasus, where they were used in agriculture, the majority of slaves in the Ottoman Empire were employed domestically. However, there is no evi- dence to support the casual acceptance by many historians of the “humane” nature of Ottoman slavery. What little we know about the treatment of Ottoman slaves—includ- ing the castration of boys prior to their sale in slave markets as eunuchs and the wide- spread sexual abuse of young girls as concubines—appears to indicate otherwise. For a detailed discussion of the use of Circassian slaves in agriculture, see Ehud R. Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 81–111. 25. The Register of the Biographies of the Imperial African Eunuchs, dated 6 May 1903. Ehud R. Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East, 42. 26. As early as the sixteenth century, Sheikhulislam Ebussuud Effendi had tried unsuccess- fully to legalize a moderate rate of interest, but the overwhelming majority of the ulema continued to argue that all forms of usury were banned by the Qur’an. Edhem Eldem, A History of the Ottoman Bank (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Historical Research Center, 1999), 18. 27. Şevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism 1820–1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 57. 28. Edhem Eldem, A History of the Ottoman Bank, 11–53. 29. Such as the Italian Carbonari. Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 21–22. 30. For example, Kemal cited Sura 3, Verse 159, in which the Prophet Muhammad is instructed not to ignore the views of his companions in battle. Charles Kurzman (ed.), Modernist Islam 1840–1940: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002), 144–48. 31. Sura 3, Verse 26. 32. In 1870, Ali Suavi wrote an article in the journal Ulûm Gazetesi which was published by the Turkish exile community in in which he argued: “Democracy is a nightingale that can sing loudly only in the rose garden of good morality.” Kurzman, Modernist Islam 1840–1940: A Sourcebook, 139. 33. In Britain, a campaign of public speeches by the former Liberal Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone (1809–98) denouncing the British government’s alleged moral com- plicity in what he described as the Bulgarian Atrocities led to him being reelected to parliament and eventually being reappointed as prime minister. Curiously, some Turk- ish historians have chosen to attribute Gladstone’s anti-Ottoman campaign to the debt default (for example, Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 224). This is not true. 34. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 234. 35. Article 11. Tuncer Özyavuz, Osmanlı Türk Anayasaları (Istanbul: Aklım Yayinevi, 1997), 303. A rough English translation of the 1876 Constitution can be found at http:// www.bilkent.edu.tr/~genckaya/documents1.html 36. Mithat Pasha was later allowed to return to Constantinople, only to be murdered in prison on Abdülhamit’s orders in 1884. 37. Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B.Tauris, 1994), 80. 38. Abdülhamit’s pan- alarmed the European colonial powers, particularly the British, who in India ruled over three times as many Muslims as there were in the entire 232 NOTES

Ottoman Empire. Perhaps not surprisingly, during the late nineteenth century the Brit- ish actively explored the possibility of promoting an alternative to Abdülhamit as caliph, such as the of , the steward of the Holy Places of the Hijaz. 39. Zurcher, 85 40. Also known in the West as the “howling dervishes,” the Rifāīyah became famous for self-mortification such as the piercing of the skin with sharp objects. Only a handful of Rifāīyah survive today, although in the late nineteenth century the order had thirty- five lodges in Constantinople alone. Hür Mahmut Yücer, Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2003), 392. 41. Particularly against British-backed notions of an Arab caliphate (see earlier). Şerif Mar- din, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 127. 42. Although it only ever established a relatively minor presence in Anatolia or the Bal- kans, today the Shādhilīyah remains the most popular Sufi order across most of North Africa. 43. Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimization of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 65. 44. Nearly 9,100 books were published in the period 1876–1908, of which around 1,300 were on religious subjects. This compares with approximately 2,470 books, of which 682 were religious , published in 1840–76. Orhan Koloğlu, Avrupa Kıskacında Abdülhamit (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998), 406. 45. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, “Ottoman Educational and Scientific Institutions,” in History of The Ottoman State, Society and Civilisation Vol. 2 (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2002), 468–9. 46. M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 44. 47. The Yezidi (also sometimes spelled Yazidi) religion appears to be a syncretic combina- tion of several Middle Eastern religions, including , Manichaeism, Juda- ism, Nestorian Christianity, and Sufi Islam. Most Yezidis are ethnic Kurds and practice endogamy. An undeserved reputation for devil worship has made them one of the most persecuted religious minorities in the region. Fewer than 500,000 Yezidis, perhaps many less, survive today, mostly in northern . 48. John S. Guest, Survival Among the Kurds: A History of the Yezidis (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), 124–45. 49. For example, in 1898, Ottoman officials in Yemen sent a report to the Imperial Palace stating that: “The program of elementary schools in the region should be of a nature to reinforce the Hanafi school of law and instill the feeling of obedience towards the sultan.” Quoted in Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 77. 50. Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 97. 51. Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, 27. 52. Also known as the Thirty Day’s War, the conflict ended in defeat for . It was the only occasion in a century of war between the two sides that the Greeks were forced to cede territory, albeit only twenty villages. 53. Although the religion developed out of Ismaili , it appears to have incorporated elements from Judaism, Christianity, Gnosticism, and Neoplatonism. Most Muslims regard the Druze as heretics or infidels. 54. The precise number of Armenians in Anatolia is disputed, but there seems little doubt that, although they formed the majority in some districts, they were always a minority on a provincial level. 55. The name is taken from the organization’s newspaper Hunchak, meaning “bell,” which members took as representing awakening, enlightenment, and freedom. NOTES 233

56. Three Dashnaks were killed and six wounded. Four policemen guarding the bank were killed in the initial assault and two bank employees died in the firefight. No reliable figures are available for the casualties among the Ottoman security forces. 57. Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 87–88. 58. French missionaries had begun proselytizing in as early as the seventeenth century, although it was only in the 1820s that they were joined by British and American missionaries. 59. Telegram No. 177, Mehmet Cevat Bey, Governor of Ankara, to the Imperial Secretariat on 10 May 1902. Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 80. 60. Resentment at the Greek monopoly of the higher echelons of the Orthodox hierarchy also helped fuel the rise of in the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria, which was anxious to establish its own ecclesiastical independence from the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. 61. There are no reliable figures for the total number of missionary schools. The 1897 sta- tistical yearbook of the Ottoman Empire puts the number of missionary schools at 383, of which 131 were run by Americans, 127 by the French, and 60 by the British. The First Statistical Yearbook of the Ottoman Empire (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1997), 98. In 1900, there were reported to be 331 U.S.–run missionary schools, rising to 450 in 1913. Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda 19. Yüzyılda Amerikan Yük- sek Okulları,” in Bahri Savcı’ya Armağan (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları, 1988), 305–6. 62. For example, in a letter to his sister, Ahmet Rıza attacked Islam for its attitude towards women before declaring: “Keep this religion away from me.” M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The in Opposition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 200. 63. Hadd-ı Te’dib, 65–66, “Bir Mükaleme,” Şark ve Garb, No 1. (Paris: March, 1896), 24. 64. Charles Kurzman (ed.), Modernist Islam 1840–1940: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002), 172. 65. “Mezheb-i Bahaullah Din-i Ümem”, İctihad, No. 144, 315–6. 66. Nor is there any indication that the non-Muslims would have welcomed such an ini- tiative. The Armenian organizations in particular were almost exclusively concerned with securing greater autonomy for the Ottoman Armenians, particularly in the six provinces in eastern Anatolia with large Armenian populations. In contrast, most of the Young Turks advocated a centralized, unitary state. 67. “Osmanlı İttihadı,” Meşveret, No. 5, February 1, 1896. 68. Tunalı Hilmi, Bir Geçmişin Yadigarı: Onuncu Hutbe (, 1901). 69. to İshak Sükûti, 6 December 1899. 70. Yusuf Akçura was born in Simbirsk, the modern Ulyanovsk, in Russia. His father died when he was a small child and his mother moved to Constantinople, where Akçura trained to be an officer at the Ottoman War Academy. In 1897 he was expelled and sent into exile on suspicion of sedition. In Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset, Yusuf Akçura argued there were three alternative foundations for the state: a supraethnic, suprareligious ; Islam; and ethnic . An English translation of Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset by David Thomas is available at vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-2/cam9.html 71. Many had been influenced by the writings of the French sociologist Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931), who argued that democracy ran counter to “the natural laws of evolution.” Gustave Le Bon, “The Laws of Evolution, the Democratic Ideal and the Social Soli- darity,” in The Psychology of Socialism 5 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899), 277–301. 72. There is evidence to suggest that elements in the Young Turk movement did attempt to exploit popular discontent during the popular unrest that swept Anatolia in 1905–7. 234 NOTES

However, such attempts focused on exploiting practical grievances (such as conscrip- tion and taxation) rather than mass mobilization on ideological grounds. 73. For example, Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Turkish republic, was a leading mem- ber of a group called Vatan ve Hürriyet, or “Fatherland and Freedom.” However, there is no indication that the organization had any impact. Its members were all absorbed into the İTC long before the latter seized power in 1908. 74. By 1908 the Salonica branch of the İTC had 505 members, of whom 319 were army officers and 186 civilians. 75. Ryan Gingeras, “A Break in the Storm: Reconsidering in Ottoman Macedonia during the ,” MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies 3 (2003): 27–35. web.mit.edu/cis/www/mitejmes 76. Niyazi had been born in Resen in 1873 and retired there after the 1909 Islamist upris- ing in Constantinople. He rejoined the army during the 1912–13 and was assassinated by Albanian nationalists in 1913. 77. The Times (London) recorded joint celebrations as far apart as Salonica, Skopje, , and Jerusalem. The Times, 27 July 1908; 11 August 1908; and 14 August 1908. 78. Ahmet Rıza ran successfully as a candidate for the İTC in the elections of fall 1908 and was even appointed President of the Chamber of Deputies. But he enjoyed more status than power and was excluded from the increasingly narrow circle of individuals who effectively ruled the empire until its demise. 79. Although most Panhellenes advocated the territorial expansion of the Kingdom of Greece, others opposed too close an identification with political authority and advo- cated a Panhellenic unity that transcended state boundaries through the cultural “Hel- lenization” of all Greek communities. 80. The comment has proved impossible to verify and may be apocryphal. But it has been frequently quoted and undoubtedly captures the attitude of many Ottoman non- Muslims. Feroz Ahmed, “Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914,” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 409. 81. Ironically, one of the few concrete demands made by the İTC after Abdülhamit’s announcement of the restoration of the constitution was the replacement of the Küçük Mehmet Sait Pasha (1830–1914) with Mehmet Kamil Pasha, who was believed to be more amenable to reform. 82. The İMC was not officially inaugurated until 3 April 1909, with a prayer service in the mosque of Aya Sofya, the former Byzantine church of Saint Sophia. M. E. Düzdağ, İkinci Meşrutiyetin ilk ayları ve 31 Mart olayı için bir yakın tarih belgesi Volkan gazetesi, 11 Aralık 1908–20 Nisan 1909: tam ve aynen metin nesri (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1992), 455–66. 83. See Sura 3: 110 and Sura 42:38. 84. M. Naim Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks, Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 158. 85. At the time, the Ottoman Empire was using the Julian calendar, which was thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar. As a result, Turkish sources usually refer to the insur- rection as the 31 Mart Vak’ası, or “incident of 31 March.” 86. The rising began with a mutiny on the night of 12–13 April by soldiers from the Third Army who had recently arrived in Constantinople and whose pay was in arrears. 87. Many of the students had been alarmed by rumors that the İTC was planning to make them liable to conscription; something from which they had previously been exempt. NOTES 235

88. Eric J. Zürcher, “The Ides of April: A Fundamentalist Uprising in Istanbul in 1909?” in State and Islam, ed. C. Dijk and A.H. de Groot (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1996) 69. 89. Feroz Ahmed, op. cit., 410. 90. For example, Yılmaz Öztuna, “The Political Milieu of the Armenian Question” in The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period, Türkkaya Ataöv (Ankara: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 2001), 59. 91. Even official Turkish sources admit to a huge disparity in casualties, estimating that 17,000 Armenians died compared with just 1,850 Muslims. Öztuna, op. cit., 59. 92. Some of the many eyewitness accounts are included in Donald E. Miller and Lorna Tou- ryan Miller, Survivors: An Oral History of the (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999), 63–66. 93. Abdülhamit returned to Constantinople in 1912, shortly before Salonica seceded from the Ottoman Empire. But he made no attempt to regain his throne. He died in February 1918. 94. Faik Reşit Unat, İkinci Meşrutiyetin İlânı ve Otuzbir Mart Hârdisesi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), 82. 95. Mehmet had spent the previous thirty years confined to the imperial palace in Yıldız. An accomplished poet, he appears to have had neither the ability nor the desire to exer- cise political power. 96. Unless they took foreign , the only way left for non-Muslims to avoid military service was to pay the bedel-i nakdi by which Muslims could buy exemption. However, this was so expensive that only a tiny minority in either community were able to afford it. 97. Arthur B. Geary to Sir Gerard A. Lowther, Future Policy of Committee outlined in speeches of Talaat and Djavid, Monastir, 18 August 1910. Communication No. 38 FO 294/47, Public Record Office, London. 98. There were occasions when the motions submitted by provincial deputies to parlia- ment were dismissed simply because their Turkish was so poor that nobody else could understand what they were saying. Hasan Kayalı, and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908–1918 (Berkeley: University of Cali- fornia Press, 1997), 79. 99. Tanin, 11 February 1911, quoted in Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, 92. 100. The Turkish word yurt, from which yurdu comes, is also used to describe the large tents used by Turkic nomads. 101. Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkish: From Irredentism to Cooperation (London: Hurst and Co., 1995), 40–41. 102. Even today it remains the largest and most influential ultranationalist organization in Turkey, with sixty-seven branches scattered throughout the country. http://www .turkocagi.org.tr 103. The Balkan states had been encouraged by the Ottomans’ failure to prevent Italian troops from invading Tripolitania in October 1911 and the Dodecanese islands in May 1912. Both were formally ceded to Italy on 17 October 1912. 104. Under the Treaty of London, the province of was ceded to Bulgaria. However, the Ottoman Empire was able to take advantage of another round of fighting—this time between the Balkan states in what has become known as the Second Balkan War (1913)—to regain the province of Edirne. 105. Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 115 106. From February 1917, Talat also served as Grand Vizier. 236 NOTES

107. Little is known about the internal workings of the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa, although it appears to have been mostly composed of volunteers, had close links with the İTC Committee, and been headed by a leading İTC member called Bahaeddin Şakir (c. 1880–1922). 108. Like most of the Young Turk ideologues, Gökalp grew up in an environment in which ethnic Turks were in the minority. He was born Mehmet Ziya in the predominantly Kurdish city of Diyarbakır and began to use the penname Gökalp, or “celestial hero,” when he started writing for Young Turk publications. 109. Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959), 133. 110. Ibid. 111. Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, 134. 112. Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, 138. The same sentiment underlies Mustafa Kemal’s famous dictum Ne mutlu Türküm diyene, or “How happy is the one who says ‘I am a Turk.’” 113. Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, 137 114. Ibid. 115. The reasons why the İTC leaders took the decision to enter remain obscure. However, it appears likely that they—particularly Enver, who seems to have been the main architect of the alliance with Germany—miscalculated that a swift victory by the Central Powers over Russia would allow the Ottoman Empire to reassert itself in the Balkans and the Caucasus. 116. An English translation of the fatwa can be found at http://www.firstworldwar.com/ source/ottoman_fetva.htm 117. This sense of resignation can be seen in Orga’s exquisite memoir Portrait of a Turkish Family (London: Eland, 1993), 65–74. 118. For example, the Ottoman soldiers who died in the successful defense of Gallipoli, many of whom were actually Arabs, are described as being “motivated to defend the honor of the Turkish nation.” Official Web site of the Turkish embassy in Washington, DC. http://www.turkishembassy.org 119. Recruits to the modern Turkish army are still taught the same battle cry today. Author’s observation during a visit to the Commando Training Center, Eğirdir, May 1998. 120. Sura 2:230. 121. Halide Edip, House With Wisteria: Memoirs of Halide Edip (Charlottesville: Leopolis, 2003), 319–20. 122. Yavuz Selim Karakışla, Society for the Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women 1916– 1923 (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2005), 51. No such orga- nizations were formed for non-Muslim women. 123. Arab Bureau Papers, Foreign Office 882, Vol. 18. Public Record Office, London, . 124. The British promised Hussein that they would help install him as ruler of an Arab empire covering virtually the entire territory between Egypt and modern Iran. However, at the same time, the British and the French drew up a secret treaty, which is known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement after the names of its two main architects, the British diplomat Sir Mark Sykes and his French counterpart François Georges-Picot, dividing between themselves most of the territory promised to Hussein. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945), 413–34. 125. Hussein remained in secret contact with the İTC throughout almost the entire war. There is little doubt that he would have agreed to lay down his arms if the İTC had NOTES 237

been prepared to grant him official pre-eminence in the empire’s Arab provinces. David Fromkin, A Peace To End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East (London: Pen- guin, 1991), 220–1. 126. Reported in the Arabic language newspaper al-Sharq, 23 January 1917. Translation by George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 208. 127. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935). 128. Elie Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpreters 1914–1919 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 201. 129. For example, Sosyal Bilgiler 7 (Istanbul: Devlet Kitapları Müdürlüğü, 2004), 134–8. 130. Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914–1918 (Princeton: Princ- eton University Press, 1968), 203. 131. Enver’s ambitions often outstripped his ability. Poor leadership and a failure to equip his army for a Caucasian winter meant that 80,000 out of a total of 90,000 Ottoman troops lost their lives, mostly as the result of frostbite and exhaustion. 132. The order was not always immediately implemented, as there are records of Armenians in fighting units in Palestine as late as 1916; perhaps because the local commanders were reluctant to lose frontline troops. However, within eighteen months, virtually all of the Armenians serving in the Ottoman army had disappeared. Some managed to desert. Others died of disease or hunger as conditions in the labor battalions were even worse than in Ottoman fighting units. But contemporary accounts leave no doubt that the majority were executed. 133. Some of the many eyewitness accounts of those who survived the deportations have been collected in Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, Survivors: An Oral His- tory of the Armenian Genocide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 134. Hürriyet, 25 April 2005. The list presumably did not include Armenian males already drafted into the Ottoman army. 135. BOA. DH. ŞFR, nr. 54/406. The full text of the telegram in modern Turkish script can be found at http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/yayin/osmanli/o_b_ermeniler/2b_071.htm 136. At the very least, the phrase appears to suggest that Talat was less concerned about atrocities against Armenians than those against other Christians. Others have inter- preted it as an implicit admission that orders had been given to massacre Armenians. Taner Akçam, From Empire to Republic, 175. However, there were cases where local Muslims took Armenian children from the convoys: sometimes for utilitarian motives, such as taking young girls as concubines or maids; sometimes for purely humanitarian ones. In rural areas, there were also instances of Armenians saving their children from deportation by giving them to Muslim acquaintances, who passed them off as their own. In most cases the children grew up as Muslims and concealed their true identities from everybody outside their adopted families. The author has seven Muslim Turkish acquaintances who discovered relatively late in life that one of their grandparents was an Armenian who had survived the massacres; perhaps significantly, always a grand- mother. The story of one such revelation is movingly documented in Fethiye Çetin, Anneannem (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004). 137. The revenge killings returned in the 1970s and 1980s when an extremist group call- ing itself the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) staged a series of attacks against Turkish targets, killing a total of thirty-one Turkish diplomats, embassy staff, and members of their families. 138. Enver first cooperated with and then turned against the Bolsheviks. Bülent Gökay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism 1918– 1923 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 67 and 120–22. 238 NOTES

Chapter 3

1. Known for most of his life as Mustafa Kemal, he adopted the surname Atatürk, meaning “Father Turk” or “Ancestor Turk,” when he made it compulsory for all Turkish citizens to have a hereditary family name from January 1935. 2. Preamble and Article 2, Turkish Constitution. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site. http://www.mfa.gov.tr. 3. In addition to various provisions of the Turkish Penal Code, the Law on Crimes Against Atatürk (Law No. 5816 of 1951) outlaws any abuse of Atatürk’s memory. 4. The event is still commemorated each year across Turkey and in Samsun itself, where a bust of Atatürk is ceremonially brought ashore from a boat. 5. Author’s observation during a visit to military academies, May 1998. 6. For symbolic reasons, Atatürk later suggested that it might have been spring, although either January or February appears more likely. Andrew Mango, Atatürk (London: John Murray, 1999), 26. 7. Ibid, 36–37. 8. Elliott Grinnel Mears, Modern Turkey (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), 557. 9. Mango, Atatürk, 33. 10. Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation (: Rustem, 1990), 6. 11. To reinforce the sense of Mustafa Kemal’s eternal immanence, each year on 13 March, the anniversary of his enrollment in 1899, at morning roll-call in the War College an officer calls out Mustafa Kemal’s name and the cadets respond in unison: “Present!” 12. Atatürk later credited his history teacher at the military preparatory school, a pas- sionate Turkish nationalist called Major Mehmet Tevfik, with opening “a new horizon before my eyes.” Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Sınıf Arkadaşım Atatürk (Istanbul: İnkılâp, 1981), 9 13. For example, Sami Karaören, “Under the light of Atatürk,” in Atatürk: From the Past to the Future, ed. Türkan Saylan (Istanbul: Association for Contemporary Living, 1996), 58. 14. Mango, Atatürk, 147–55. 15. Particularly in preventing the Allied forces from breaking out of their beachhead in the early days of the campaign. Overall command of Ottoman forces at Gallipoli belonged to the German General Otto von Sanders (1855–1929). 16. Apart from a caption under a photograph in the December 1915 issue of the official Ottoman War Ministry magazine Harp Mecmuası, or “War Review,” showing Mustafa Kemal standing under a tree at Gallipoli, his name did not even appear in the press until March 1918, when he was interviewed for Yeni Mecmuası, or “New Review”; and even then the interview was buried on page 130. Mango, Atatürk, 159. 17. Though undoubtedly spiced with a fair degree of artistic license, a vivid description of Atatürk’s mood and machinations during this period is given in H. C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf: An Intimate Study of a Dictator (London: Arthur Baker, 1939), 114–21. 18. The main exceptions were in the south, where the Ottomans were later forced to relin- quish possession of what is now the province of Mosul in Iraq. The Hatay, which was not under Ottoman control at the end of the war, was annexed by the Turkish Republic in 1939. 19. The negotiations took so long that, by the time the treaty was finally signed, the Allies were no longer able to enforce it, as they had long since demobilized their wartime armies. An copy of the text can be found at http://www.lib.byu.edu/ ~rdh/wwi/versa/sevindex.html. Even though it was superseded by the 1923 , Sèvres continues to haunt the Turkish national psyche. Many Turks believe it still represents the true intentions of the West today. NOTES 239

20. These organizations often took slightly different names. For example, the local orga- nization in İzmir was called the Mudafaa-i Hukuk-u Osmaniye Cemiyeti, or “Society for the Defense of Ottoman Rights,” in the Trakya Pasaeli Cemiyeti, or “Society for the Defense of Thrace,” and in eastern Anatolia the Vilayat-i Sarkiyye Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti, or “Society Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Eastern Provinces.” 21. In an interview with G. W. Price, the Constantinople correspondent of the Daily Mail of London, Mustafa Kemal offered his services to the Allies, commenting that: “If the British are going to assume responsibility for Anatolia they will need the cooperation of experienced Turkish governors to work with them.” G. Ward Price, Extra-Special Cor- respondent (London: George G. Harrap, 1957), 104. Although he was to excoriate him repeatedly in the Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal also appears to have enjoyed a good relation- ship with Sultan Mehmet Vahdettin (1861–1926), who had succeeded to the throne as Mehmet VI in July 1918. He accompanied the then–crown prince on an official visit to Germany in December 1918. During his six months in Constantinople in 1918–19, Mustafa Kemal had four audiences with the sovereign, although the content of their discussions remains unclear. 22. In the Nutuk, Atatürk claimed that there was a conspiracy to arrest him or sink his ship on the way to Samsun but that he preferred to risk death rather than become a prisoner. Atatürk, The Great Speech (Ankara: Atatürk Research Center, 2005), 24–25. There is no evidence of any such plot. In fact, when he was in Constantinople, British intelligence knew him only as one of a large number of Ottoman officers with links to the İTC. FO. 371/4173, E. 5811, Public Record Office, London. After he arrived in Samsun, Mustafa Kemal held cordial meetings with locally based British military officials to discuss his tour of inspection “with the object of maintaining tranquility.” Captain L. H. Hurst to Vice-Admiral Sir. A. Calthorpe on 21 May 1919. FO 371/4157 Public Record Office, London. 23. On 13 October 1921, the resistance movement signed the Treaty of Kars with the Soviet republics of Armenia, , Georgia, and the Russian Federation, formalizing what was to become the eastern border of the modern Turkish republic. An English translation of the treaty is available at groong.usc.edu/treaties/kars.html 24. Letter of 20 July 1915, from Mustafa Kemal to Corinne Lütfü, a young widow in Con- stantinople with whom he regularly corresponded while on active service, quoted in Mango, Atatürk, 150. 25. Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı, “Atatürk, Religion and Laicism,” in A Handbook of Kemalist Thought (Ankara: Atatürk Research Center, 2001), 109–15. 26. Mango, Atatürk, 46 27. For example, local religious officials known as were included as founding mem- bers in 130 of the 140 societies for the defense of national rights established across Anatolia. Recep Çelik, Milli Mücadelede Din Adamları Cilt 2 (Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2004), 241. 28. Ibid. 244. 29. Ibid, 243. 30. Atatürk, The Great Speech, 9. 31. Atatürk, The Great Speech, 208. 32. In the Ottoman Empire the title of was given to the leading Muslim cleric, and thus also the person best qualified to express an opinion on issues of Islamic law, in a particular region or large city. 240 NOTES

33. After he had been deposed, Sultan Mehmet Vahdettin issued a proclamation from exile in the Hijaz claiming that he had always known that the leadership of resistance “bore ill will towards my person and my authority.” Mango, Atatürk, 285. 34. In a declaration issued on 2 July 1920, Mustafa Kemal explicitly referred to the military campaign against the Greeks in terms of a holy war, stating: “The jihad, once it is prop- erly preached, will, with God’s help, result quickly in the rout of the Greeks.” Quoted in Mango, Atatürk, 282. 35. Mango, Atatürk, 278. 36. Ergün Aybars, İstiklal Mahkemeleri (Istanbul: AD Kitapcılık, 1998), 34–41. 37. Article 3 of the Teşkilât-ı Esasiye Kanunu. The full Turkish text of the law can be found at http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1921tek.htm. 38. Mango, Atatürk, 280. 39. Contrary to the claims of modern official Turkish historiography, which portrays the resistance as an enthusiastic popular uprising, recruitment was always difficult and desertion a constant problem. In his memoirs, Kılıç Ali (1888–1971), who became one of the most feared of the judges, made no secret of the fact that intimidation of the local populace was one of main purposes of the courts. Hulûsı Tur- gut (ed.), Kılıç Ali’nin Anıları (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006), 367. 40. Ergün Aybars, İstiklal Mahkemeleri, 52–59. 41. In the period September 1920 to June 1922, the Independence Tribunals passed 3,993 death sentences, of which 243 were in absentia. 1,054 people were hanged. Almost all of the 2,696 who were condemned to death but subsequently spared were deserters whose lives were saved—at least temporarily—by them being sent straight to the front. Turgut, Kılıç Ali’nin Anıları, 373. 42. Author’s translation. Çerkes Ethem, Anılarım (Istanbul: Berfin Yayınları, 1998), 80. 43. Green has traditionally been seen as the color of Islam. The choice of name may have been influenced by reports of the Green Army of Ukrainian irregulars, which was active in the Russian Civil War and which many Muslims mistakenly believed to be composed of their coreligionists. 44. There was also an independent Turkish communist party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi or TKP), which had been founded in Baku in September 1920 by Mustafa Suphi (1883– 1921), a former journalist who had fled to Russia before the outbreak of World War I. Suphi returned to Anatolia in late December 1920. On 28 January 1921, Suphi and twelve of his comrades were arrested by members of the resistance in the eastern Black Sea, taken offshore in a boat and murdered. Whether or not Mustafa Kemal was impli- cated in the killings remains unclear. What is undoubted is that no measures were taken to punish the perpetrators. 45. Çerkes Ethem, Anılarım, 122. 46. Çerkes Ethem, Anılarım, 119–27. 47. The Treaty of Sèvres foresaw the creation of a Kurdish state. However, the British gov- ernment in particular remained wary of fomenting Kurdish nationalist feeling for fear that it might spread to what is now Iraq, particularly the oil fields in the predominantly Kurdish north of the country. But there were exceptions. The maverick British offi- cer Major Edward Noel, who had already spent four years with the Kurds in what is now Iran before being sent to Anatolia to investigate the prospects for a Kurdish state, appears to have been genuinely committed to . Such was viewed with distrust by Noel’s colleagues, one of whom referred to him as “another fanatic . . . I am afraid Noel may turn out a Kurdish Col. Lawrence.” (J. B. Hohler to Til- ley, Constantinople, 21 July 1919, Public Record Office, London, FO 371/4192.) If Noel ever did have such ambitions, they were to be frustrated. He never succeeded in inciting NOTES 241

a Kurdish nationalist uprising or changing a society which he described in April 1919 as “clannish” rather than “nationalist.” 6 April 1919, Memorandum on Mesopotamia’s future constitution, Enclosure No. 8, Public Record Office, London, FO 371/4149. 48. The Kurds of Anatolia did not even share a unified language but spoke a number of mutually unintelligible dialects. The majority spoke the dialect of Kurdish known as Kurmanji, but, particularly amongst Alevis, there were large numbers of Kurds who spoke another dialect called Zaza. In southeast Anatolia there were also pockets of other Kurdish dialects, such as Surani, which today is the main Kurdish language used in Iran and Iraq. 49. Admiral John de Robeck, British High Commissioner in Constantinople, to Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, 29 March 1920. Public Record Office, London, FO 371/5068. 50. Cited in McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 187. 51. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclis, Gizli Celse Zabıtları II (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1983–5), 270. 52. Vahdettin eventually took refuge in Sanremo, Italy, where he died on 16 May 1926. 53. The full English text of the Lausanne Treaty can be found at http://www.lib.byu.edu/ ~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html. 54. Many Muslims had long referred to the city as Istanbul, which is believed to be derived from the Greek eis tin polin meaning “to the city.” However, the new name was not for- mally adopted by the Turkish Post Office until 1930. 55. Laz is a South Caucasian language distantly related to Georgian, which is now primar- ily spoken in rural communities along Turkey’s eastern Black Sea coast. There are no reliable figures for their number of Laz speakers today. Estimates range from 50,000 to 500,000, although the true figure is probably considerably closer to the former than the latter. 56. The full English text of the convention can be found at http://www.hri.org/docs/straits/ exchange.html. 57. A further exemption was added for the approximately 11,500 Greek Orthodox Chris- tians on the islands of Imbros and Tenedos (now known in Turkish as Gökçeada and Bozcaada respectively). The number of Muslims in western Thrace was around 100,000. No reliable figures are available for the Greek Orthodox population of Constantinople. In 1920, the British military in the city estimated the number at around 200,000, or approximately 20 percent of a population of one million. The first census of the new republic’s population, which was conducted in 1927, suggested that just under 92,000 (or 11.6 percent) of the city’s population of 795,000 spoke Greek as their mother tongue. Fuat Dündar, Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1999), 156–7. 58. For an account of the human toll of the exchange see Bruce Clark, Twice A Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece And Turkey (London: Granta Books, 2006). 59. A handful of members of the Karamanli community supported Mustafa Kemal during the resistance in Anatolia. They were led by the maverick Pavlos Karahisarithis (1884– 1968), who in 1924 had himself appointed Papa Efthimiou, the patriarch of what he called the Turkish Orthodox Church. The new church received the backing of Mustafa Kemal, presumably because he saw it as a means of weakening the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. However, Papa Efthimiou never succeeded in attracting more than a few hundred supporters and by 2007 the church had effectively ceased to exist. 60. A survey conducted by the İTC in 1915, which was admittedly far from comprehensive, identified 264 industrial enterprises in the empire, of which approximately half were in Constantinople and most of the remainder divided between Izmir and Bursa. A total of 172 (80.4 percent) of the privately owned companies belonged to non-Muslims, while 242 NOTES

42 (19.6 percent) were owned by Muslims. In terms of advanced technology, the gap was even wider. For example, Muslims owned twenty-four of the twenty-nine individu- ally owned flour mills but only one of the nine pasta factories and two of the eighteen sugar refineries. All of the canned food factories were owned by non-Muslims. Ayşe Buğra, State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study (Albany: State Uni- versity of New York, 1994), 38–39. 61. Çağlar Keyder, “The Consequences of the Exchange of Populations for Turkey,” in Cross- ing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, ed. Renée Hirschon (Oxford: Berghahn, 2003), 46. 62. The foundation of the Halk Fırkası, or “People’s Party,” was originally announced on 9 September 1923, although it was not formally registered until 23 October 1923. It was renamed Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası, or “Republican People’s Party,” on 10 October 1923. On 9 May 1935, fırka, the Arabic-origin word meaning “party,” was replaced by the French loan word parti. 63. Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, Türkiye’de Din Eğitim Ve İmam Hatipler (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 132–3. 64. Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), 49. 65. In 1920 the Ottoman government had brought the Shari’a law courts back under the control of the sheikhulislam. 66. Author’s translation of Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution. The full Turkish text can be found at http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1924tek.htm. An English translation is available at http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~genckaya/1924constitution.pdf. 67. Article 2, ibid. In addition to symbolizing a break with the past, there were also strategic reasons for locating the capital in Ankara, which was considerable less vulnerable than Istanbul to foreign attack from the sea. 68. “After the abolition of the caliphate, Turkish Islam became exiled within its own culture. It became like a body without organs or, perhaps more accurately, organs without body.” Author interview with Dr. Yasin Aktay, , May 2003. 69. The enthusiasm with which rebel forces looted the Kurdish cities of Elazığ, Diyarbakır, and Mardin did little to inspire feelings of national and religious solidarity amongst the towns’ inhabitants. British intelligence reports, April 1925. FO 684, Public Record Office, London. 70. FO 371, Public Record Office, London. 71. However, some took advantage of the outbreak of fighting to try to settle old scores. For example, the Alevi Khormek and Lolan tribes took the opportunity to attack their long-time enemy the Sunni Jibran tribe. Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State (London: Zed Books, 1992), 303. 72. “Open rebellion by a conservative Moslem peasantry was freely prophesied.” Edward Mead Earle, “The New Constitution of Turkey,” Political Science Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1925): 86. 73. Modern Kemalist historiography still claims that the rebellion was encour- aged and supported by foreign powers, particularly the British. Aybars, İstiklal Mah- kemeleri, 217–18) In fact, British diplomatic and military archives make it clear that the British authorities not only consistently rejected pleas from the rebels for support but were vigorously opposed to the uprising; not least because they feared that any upsurge in Kurdish nationalist sentiment might spill over into British-occupied Iraq. FO 684, Public Record Office, London. While France transported more than 10,000 Turkish troops across French-occupied Syria by train in order to suppress the revolt. AIR 23/236, Public Record Office, London. NOTES 243

74. Author’s translation, Article One, Takrir-i Sükün Kanunu. 75. No accurate figures are available for the number of rebels. At his trial, Sheikh Said claimed that only 3,000 actively participated in the revolt. The Turkish government put the number at 5,000. Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 303. 76. No precise figures are available for the number of those executed for their part in the Sheikh Said rebellion, although it was probably at least 700. Under the Takrir-i Sükün Kanunu, the Independence Tribunals handled a large number of cases unrelated to the rebellion. While military courts were also used to prosecute and execute a significant number of rebels. Aybars, İstiklal Mahkemeleri, 405. Many more Kurds died as the result of a scorched earth policy implemented by the Turkish military in areas believed to be sympathetic to the rebels. Over 20,000 Kurds were forcibly relocated, mostly to western Anatolia. 77. Aybars, İstiklal Mahkemeleri, 307. 78. Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation, 31–32. 79. Atatürk, The Great Speech, 713–714. 80. Author’s translation. Article One, Şapka İktisasi Hakkında Kanun, Official Gazette No. 230 of 28 November 1925. 81. Aybars, İstiklal Mahkemeleri, 345 82. Houchang Chehabi, “Dress Codes for Men in Turkey and Iran,” in Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization Under Atatürk and , ed. Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 215–16. 83. The reason for the uncertainty is that, in addition to the Independence Tribunal, some of the demonstrators were sentenced by other courts, such as military tribunals, whose archives have still not been thoroughly studied. 84. The order was included as a clause in the 2 September 1925 decree making the wearing of Western- clothing compulsory for all male civil servants. 85. Law No. 677 of 30 November 1925, published in the Official Gazette No. 243 of 13 December 1925. The full Turkish text of the law is available at http://www.mevzuat .adalet.gov.tr/html/390.html. 86. Atatürk, The Great Speech, 714. 87. Law No. 698, Takvimde Tarih Mehdeinin Tebdili Hakkında Kanun, or “Law on the Change to the Calendar,” of 26 December 1925. In order to complete the transition, thirteen days were omitted from the calendar at the end of December 1926. 88. Law No. 698, Günün Yirmi Dört Saat Taksimine Dair Kanun, or “Law on the Division of the Day into Twenty-Four Hours,” of 26 December 1925. 89. The new civil code was published as Law No. 743 in the Official Gazette No. 339 of 4 April 1926 and came into force from 4 October 1926. 90. One was Abdülkadir, who had escaped the initial roundup of suspects but who was captured on 13 August 1926 and hanged in Ankara on 31 August 1926. The other was Kara Kemal (1868–1926), one of the leaders of the Karakol Cemiyeti, which had played such a critical role in supplying the Anatolian resistance during the War of Liberation. Kara Kemal had gone into hiding. When he was discovered, he shot himself rather than face the ignominy of a public hanging. 91. Turgut, Kılıç Ali’nin Anıları, 479–84. 92. The hanged men included Cavit (1875–1926), a liberal and former Ministry of Finance under the İTC, who was in semi-retirement but against whom Mustafa Kemal had long held a personal grudge. 93. It was actually called the second congress after the party retrospectively appropriated the Congress of September 1919 in a disingenuous attempt to present itself as a continuation of the Anatolian resistance movement. 244 NOTES

94. The Qur’an does not explicitly prohibit the depiction of humans or animals, although there are several hadith which inveigh against them (for example, al-Bukhari, Vol- ume 3, Book 34, No. 428; Volume 4, Book 55, No. 570; and Volume 7, Book 62, No. 110). Although there was a tradition of human representation in Ottoman court art, depictions of living creatures remained anathema to the majority of Ottoman Islamic scholars. 95. Although they are often referred to as Arabic, and more formally as Hindu-Arabic, the numerals used in European languages have their origins in India but were introduced to Europe by Arab mathematicians in the tenth century CE. 96. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 49. 97. Ahmet Ünsür, Kuruluşundan Günümüze İmam-Hatip Liseleri (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2005), 89–90. 98. The process is entertainingly described in Geoffrey Lewis, The Reform: A Catastrophic Success (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). It continues today. Despite its many absurdities, the reform has been so successful that the Nutuk now needs to be translated into modern Turkish in order to make it comprehensible to younger generations of Turkish schoolchildren. 99. For example, explicit claims to particular developments have been replaced by phrases crediting Turks with unspecified but significant contributions to the development of civilization. See İlköğretim Sosyal Bilgiler 4 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 2004), 131. 100. Author’s translations from the high school textbook Tarih IV (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934), 206. It is sometimes claimed that the new history textbooks ignored the Otto- man period. This is not true. Virtually all of Tarih III, the third volume in the series, is devoted to the Ottoman Empire; albeit often in unfavorable contrast to the progress being made in post-Reformation Europe. 101. The chador, usually called çarşaf, or “sheet,” in Turkish, is a full-length monochrome body cloak, usually black, which covers the woman from head to ankle, leaving only the face exposed, though this is also sometimes covered by a veil. The , known as başörtü, or “headcovering,” in Turkish, is a headscarf which covers the hair and neck but leaves the face clear. Unlike the chador, the hijab is often ostentatiously, and fashionably, decorative. 102. Law No. 2525 of 21 June 1934, published in the Official Gazette No. 2741 of 2 July 1934. 103. Articles 3 of the . Translation by Meltem F. Türköz, The Social Life of the State’s Fantasy: Memories and Documents on Turkey’s 1934 Surname Law (unpublished Ph.D. thesis). 104. Until the advent of television in the 1960s, the celebrations were almost exclusively confined to the Kemalist elite. But, particularly from the late 1980s onwards, the New Year has been celebrated more widely and more publicly; often with all the trappings of a Christian Christmas, including Santa Claus, Christmas trees, and—perhaps most bizarrely—the playing of Christmas carols in large stores. 105. Unusually for a member of the Young Turk movement, Alp was born to a Jewish family as Moise Cohen. He adopted the name Tekin Alp, which means “Auspicious Hero,” to demonstrate his commitment to Turkishness. 106. Known as the CHF until 1935. 107. Even before the global depression that started in 1929, Turkey had been economically crippled by the loss of the majority of the non-Muslim mercantile class and had yet to develop sufficient numbers of Muslim entrepreneurs. As a result, the state was seen as the only viable motor of economic development. NOTES 245

108. A detailed account of the uprising based on contemporary military reports was pub- lished by the War History Department of the Turkish General Staff in 1972. Reşat Hallı, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde ayaklanmalar (1924–1938) [Rebellions in the Republic of Tur- key, 1924–1938] (Ankara: T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarihi Dairesi, 1972), 365–480. However, the numerous candid accounts of summary executions and indis- criminate massacres led to the book being immediately recalled and destroyed. Only a small number of clandestine copies have survived. Martin van Bruinessen, “Genocide in ? The suppression of the in Turkey (1937–38) and the chem- ical war against the Iraqi Kurds (1988),” in Conceptual and Historical Dimensions of Genocide, ed. George J. Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 148. 109. Author’s translation, Özyavuz, Osmalı Türk Anayasaları, 289. 110. For example, in 1925 all non-Muslim employees of the Üsküdar-Kadıköy Water Utility Company in Istanbul were dismissed following a request by the Ministry of Reconstruc- tion and Development in Ankara. Soner Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk? (London: Routledge, 2006), 28. 111. Memuin Kanunu No. 788 of 16 March 1926, published in the Official Gazette No. 336 of 31 March 1926. 112. İskan Kanunu No. 2510 of 14 June 1934, published in the Official Gazette No. 2733 of 21 June 1934. 113. Ibid. 114. Sir G. Clerk (Constantinople) to M. A. Henderson MP, 6 March 1930, Public Record Office, London, FO 371/14567. 115. Berna Pekesen, “The exodus of Armenians from the Sanjak of Alexandretta in the 1930s,” in Turkey Beyond Nationalism, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 63. 116. Vakit newspaper of 27 April 1925. Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey, 25. 117. Ibid., 148. 118. Cem Emrence, “Politics of Discontent in the Midst of the : The Free Republican Party of Turkey (1930),” New Perspectives on Turkey 23 (2000): 31–52. 119. Author’s translation. Milliyet, 19 September 1930. 120. Law No. 2007 of 11 June 1932, published in the Official Gazette No. 2126 of 16 June 1932. 121. Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey, 70. 122. Türköz, The Social Life of the State’s Fantasy. 123. Law No. 2762 of 5 June 1935, published in the Official Gazette No. 3027 of 13 June 1935. 124. Council of Ministers’ Decree No. 2/5042 of 17 July 1936, published in the Official Gazette No. 3371 of 1 August 1936. 125. Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes, 16 126. Baha Sait, “Türkiyede Alevi Zümreleri,” Türk Yurdu No. 21, September 1926. 127. Ziya Bey, “Bektaşilik,” Yeni Gün, 8 March 1931. 128. Erik J. Zürcher, Two Young Ottomanists Discover Kemalist Turkey: The Travel Diaries of Robert Anhegger and Andreas Tietze. (Available Online) Leiden University (cited December, 2007); Available from http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/tcimo/tulp/Research/ diaries.htm. 246 NOTES

Chapter 4

1. Can Dündar, Köy Enstitütleri (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2000), 22–23. 2. Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945, two months before the final German collapse, in order to secure a seat in the United Nations, which was formally established by the victorious Allies on 24 October 1945. 3. There were even instances of Nazi officers being allowed to give propaganda lectures in Turkish schools. Interview with İshak Alaton in Rıdvan Akar, Aşkale Yolcuları: Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları (Istanbul: Mephisto, 2006), 243. 4. The most famous example is that of the Struma, a dilapidated passenger ship that arrived in Istanbul in December 1941 with 790 Romanian Jews who were hoping con- tinue on to Palestine, which was still under a British mandate. On its arrival in Istanbul, the Struma’s engine broke down. The British refused to guarantee that all the passen- gers would be allowed to enter Palestine. The Turkish authorities refused to allow them to disembark in Istanbul. On the evening of 23 February 1942, as negotiations were still continuing, the Turkish police abruptly seized control of the Struma, towed it into the Black Sea, and cast it adrift. At first light, the Struma was sunk by a Russian submarine, which was apparently under orders to attack all neutral ships on suspicion that they could be carrying raw materials to Germany. A total of 769 men, women, and children were drowned. 5. They include Necdet Kent (1911–2002) and Namık Kemal Yolga (1914–2001) in France and Selahattin Ülkümen (1914–2003) in Greece. 6. Corinna Görgü Guttstadt, “Depriving non-Muslims of citizenship as part of the Turki- fication policy in the early years of the Turkish Republic: The case of Turkish Jews and its consequences during the Holocaust,” in Turkey Beyond Nationalism, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 52–53. 7. All of the figures are taken from Turkish state archives and cited in Corinna Görgü Guttstadt, op. cit., 54–56. 8. Rıdvan Akar, Aşkale Yolcuları, 181–4. 9. Author’s translation. Ayhan Ahtar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikları (Istanbul: İletişim, 2000), 148. 10. In his groundbreaking study of Turkish rural life in 1949–52, Paul Stirling noted that most villagers had little use for literacy as they had no access to books or newspapers. Paul Stirling, Turkish Village (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965), 278. 11. Zürcher, Turkey: Modern History, 216. 12. Over the years that followed, İnonü’s willingness to allow greater political pluralism appears to have been bolstered by Turkey’s desire to ingratiate itself with the United States. The end of World War II had left Turkey feeling dangerously exposed. With the Soviet Union eyeing northeast Anatolia, İnonü was anxious to seek the protection of alignment with the Western democracies and access to the largesse foreseen in the Marshall Plan of 1947. 13. The counting was conducted in secret, leading to widespread allegations of fraud at the time and considerable confusion over the precise results in later sources. The figures used here and for subsequent elections are taken from the official results published by the Turkish Statistical Institute. Cumhuriyet’ten Günümüze Milletvekili Seçimleri 1923–2002 (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2004). 14. Author’s translation of the minutes of the Third Sitting of the 104th Session of the Turk- ish Grand National Assembly on 10 June 1949. 15. Its full name was also changed from Diyanet İşleri Reisliği to Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığıi. NOTES 247

16. It supplemented Article 9 of the 1938 Cemiyetler Kanunu, or “Law of Associations,” which banned all organizations based on “principles of religious, creed and religious orders.” Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 154 17. Büyük Doğu survived numerous court cases, closures, and confiscations and was last published in 1978, by which time a change in the political climate meant that Kısakürek’s poems were feted by the Turkish state. Kısakürek also served as an inspiration for the violent İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar - Cephesi (Islamic Raiders of the Great East–Front or İBDA-C). See Chapter 6. 18. The ÇKP, AKP, and İKP were founded in 1946; the TMP in 1947; and the TESTP in 1949. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 75. 19. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, İslamcilik Cereyanı (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962), 190–92. 20. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 78–79. 21. This alienation is graphically portrayed in the accounts by Mahmut Makal (born 1930) of his experiences as a graduate of the Köy Enstitütleri, most famously in Bizim Köy (Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1950). 22. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 81–82. 23. Mustafa Aydın, “Süleymancılar,” in İslamcılık, ed. Yasin Aktay (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 311. 24. All figures taken from Ahmet N. Yücekök, Türkiye Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1971), 133. 25. Said Nursi, Risale-i Nur No. 126, quoted in Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: the Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 95. 26. Nursi appears only to have been in contact with the leaders of the revolt, which his fol- lowers claim he was trying to prevent. See Şükran Vahide’s gushing hagiography Islam in Modern Turkey: An Intellectual Biography of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 180–82. 27. M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 161. 28. For example, he insisted that women should wear headscarves to discourage immoral- ity and reveal their “inner moral beauty.” Camilla T. Nereid, In the Light of Said Nursi (Bergen: University of Bergen, 1997), 39. 29. Author’s translation. Faruk Güventürk and Fuad Kadıoğlu, Din Işığında Yobazlık ve Atatürkcülük (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967), 101. 30. The full Turkish text of the law is available at http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/ html/956.html. 31. Mustafa Bayrak, Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti (1946–1960) (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2004), 496–7. 32. Dilek Güven, 6–7 Eylül Olayları (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 76 33. Author’s translation of evidence presented at the subsequent trial. 6–7 Eylül Olayları, Fotoğraflar Belgeler Fahri Çoker Arşivi (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005), 422. 34. There were also attacks on the Greek Consulate and twenty properties belonging to non-Muslims in Izmir. 35. Many of the photographs taken during the pogrom clearly show the security forces merely observing the destruction. 6–7 Eylül Olayları, Fotoğraflar Belgeler Fahri Çoker Arşivi, 192–5. 36. Güven, 6–7 Eylül Olayları, 54–55. 37. 6–7 Eylül Olayları, Fotoğraflar Belgeler Fahri Çoker Arşivi, 260. 38. Güven, 6–7 Eylül Olayları, 48–50. 248 NOTES

39. The DP initially blamed the pogrom on a communist conspiracy. Even though there was no evidence against them, sixty-seven known left-wing sympathizers were arrested and held for three months before being released. 40. The HP merged with the CHP in November 1958. 41. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 86. 42. Vahide, Islam in Modern Turkey: An Intellectual Biography of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, 338–40. 43. Author’s interviews with retired officers who were posted abroad in the late 1950s. Istanbul, March and September 1997. 44. William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994), 123. 45. Author’s translation. 46. Vatan, 11 November 1960, translation by Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960–1961 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1963), 133. 47. The Turkish text of the 1961 constitution is available at http://www.anayasa.gen .tr/1961ay.htm. 48. Author’s translation. http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961ay.htm. 49. Ibid. 50. The full Turkish text of Law No. 211 is available at http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/ html/1044.html. 51. The closest equivalent to the MGK under the previous regime had been the thirteen- person Milli Savunma Yüksek Kurulu (National Defense Supreme Council, or MSYK), comprising the president, the prime minister, nine government ministers, and the chief of staff. 52. The president, the prime minister, and the ministers of defense, interior, and justice on the civilian side and the chief of staff and the commanders of the land forces, navy, air force, and gendarmerie from the military. 53. The CKMP was the result of a merger between the CMP and a minor party known as the Türkiye Köylü Partisi (Turkish Peasant Party or TKP) in October 1958. 54. A former general, Gümüşpala had been forced into retirement during a purge of the armed forces in August 1960. Although his relations with his former colleagues in the high command were often strained, there is little doubt that the presence of an ex- officer at the head of the AP made it more palatable to the military than if the party had been led by one of Menderes’s close associates. 55. Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 145–7. 56. Author’s translation from the program quoted in Ruşen Çakır, İrfan Bozan, and Balkan Talu, İmam Hatip Liseleri: Efsaneler ve Gerçekler (Istanbul: TESEV, 2004), 61. 57. Author’s translation http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/1085.html. 58. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 264. 59. Merdan Yanardağ, MHP Değişti Mi? (Istanbul: Gendaş, 2002), 52. 60. M. Çağatay Okutan, Bozkurt’tan Kur’an’a: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği: 1916–1980 (Istan- bul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), 190. 61. Author’s translation, Alparslan Türkeş, Milli Doktrin: Dokuz Işık (Istanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1997), 124. The Hira Mountain was where Mohammed is believed to have received the first revelation of the Qur’an. The Celestial Mountains are in the Tien Shan range in Central Asia. 62. The term Turkish-Islamist Synthesis is rarely used by its proponents, who regard it as implying that the ideology is an artificial creation rather than a historical reality. 63. Türkeş, Milli Doktrin: Dokuz Işık, 122. 64. Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 184–5. 65. Author’s translation. http://www.belgenet.com/dava/mnp_dava.html NOTES 249

66. Ruşen Çakır, Alet ve Slogan (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2002), 19–20. 67. Birol Yesiada, The , in Political Parties in Turkey, ed. Barry Rubin and Metin Heper (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 64–65. 68. Author’s translation from the MNP program at http://www.belgenet.com/parti/ program/mnp.html. 69. Author’s translation from the indictment at the subsequent court case against the MNP at http://www.belgenet.com/dava/mnp_01.html. 70. Author’s translation, ibid. 71. , Meclis’te Ortak Pazar (Izmir: MNP Gençlik Teşkilatı, 1971), 17–18. 72. At the time of writing, the southern 63 percent of the island is administered by the Greek-Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus, which the international com- munity continues to recognize as having de iure sovereignty over the entire island. The northern 37 percent of the island is administered by the . In 1983 the north declared its independence as the Turkish Republic of (TRNC), which to date has only been recognized by Ankara. 73. Necmettin Erbakan, Milli Görüş (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975), 38–9. 74. Ibid. 235–64. 75. Author’s interviews with European Commission officials, Ankara, January and May 1997. 76. The complete text of the OIC charter is available at http://www.oic-oci.org. 77. Paragraph Seven of the Final Declaration of the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. http://www.oicun.org/articles/33/1/Islamic-Conference-of-Foreign-Ministers -ICFM/1.html 78. The center usually uses the acronym IRCICA because it is easier to pronounce, although it admits that the individual letters do not have a precise meaning. http://www.ircica.org 79. Again, this would appear to conflict with Turkey’s constitutional status as a secular state. 80. http://www.oicun.org/articles/33/1/Islamic-Conference-of-Foreign-Ministers-ICFM/1 .html 81. Erbakan attended the groundbreaking ceremonies for approximately 200 factories, only seventy of which eventually entered production. Fehmi Çalmuk, “Necmettin Erbakan,” in İslamcılık, 555. 82. Faik Bulut and Mehmet Faraç, Kod Adı: Hizbullah (Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık, 1999), 50. 83. Akıncı magazine No 5, quoted in Soner Yalçın, Hangi Erbakan (Ankara: Basak Yayınları, 1994), 151. 84. The figure of nearly 600 branches is taken from a report entitled “Anarchy and Terror,” published by the Turkish General Staff in 1981 and reproduced in Faik Bulut, Ordu ve Din (Istanbul: Tumzamanlar Yayıncılık, 1995), 171–179. The paramilitary activities of Ak-Der are discussed in Chapter 6. 85. Private companies in West Germany had begun to recruit Turkish workers in the late 1950s. The practice was formalized by the opening of a Liaison Office in Istanbul in July 1961. Over the next twelve years, a total of 865,000 Turkish workers arrived in West Germany, approximately 70 percent of whom were unskilled. 86. In 1994 the organization’s name was changed to İslam Toplumu Milli Görüş (National View Islamic Community or İTMG). Although still based primarily in Germany, today the İTMG has a branch in almost every European country with a Turkish community. 87. Author’s interviews with members of the Milli Görüş movement, Frankfurt, June 1995. 88. Author’s translation. Soner Yalçin, Hangi Erbakan (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1994), 146–7. 89. In fact, although they were undoubtedly alarmed by the rally in Konya, the high com- mand had initiated preparations for the seizure of power as early as 1979. Author’s 250 NOTES

interviews with retired former high-ranking army commanders, Istanbul, February 1997 and September 2000. 90. On 13 March 1956, three female deputies unsuccessfully tried to persuade parliament to debate a motion calling for the chador to be outlawed. Murat Aksoy, Başörtü-Türban: Batılaşma-Modernleşme, Laiklik ve Örtünme (Istanbul: Kitapyayınevi, 2005), 138. 91. In 1960, a nongovernmental organization called the Mustafa Kemal Association unsuc- cessfully tried to launch a campaign to provide free loose-fitting overcoats to women who abandoned the chador for the başörtüsü. Ibid., 141. 92. Aksoy, Başörtü-Türban: Batılaşma-Modernleşme, Laiklik ve Örtünme, 155. 93. The full text of the ruling is given in Yuna Reyna and Ester Moreno Zonana, Son Yasal Düzenlemelere Göre (Istanbul: Gözlem, 2003), 554–7. 94. Fears of another pogrom prompted another exodus from the Greek Orthodox com- munity following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974. There were similar fears in the Armenian community after members of the Armenian Diaspora, particularly a group calling itself the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), launched a terrorism campaign to try to force Turkey to admit responsibility for the massacres of 1915–16 and to cede territory for the creation of a “Greater Armenia” in eastern Anatolia. Over a period of ten years, ASALA killed forty-six people, most of them Turkish diplomats. However, with the exception of a bomb attack on the Arme- nian Patriarchate on 19 October 1979, there were no violent reprisals against either the Armenian or the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey. 95. This is still the case today. For example, the Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front or DHKP-C), which is currently the most powerful violent leftist organization in Turkey, recruits primarily, though not exclusively, from Alevis. Author’s interviews with members of the DHKP-C, Istanbul, 1997–2006.

Chapter 5

1. Soner Kızılkaya, “Bir 12 Eylül bilancosu,” NTV Mag, September (2000), 77. 2. Mehmet Ali Birand, Hikmet Bila, and Rıdvan Akar, 12 Eylül Türkiye’nin Miladı (Istan- bul: Doğan Kitap, 1999), 232. 3. Author’s translation, Article 4, Political Parties Law No. 2820 of 22 April 1983, pub- lished in the Official Gazette No. 18027 of 24 April 1983. 4. The predominantly Kurdish regions of Anatolia have also traditionally been amongst the most conservative. However, at the same time as Turkish nationalism and Sunni Islam were being combined in the Turkish-Islamist thesis, the Kurdish nationalist groups and organizations that began to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s were almost all led by Marxist atheists. The consequences of the Turkish state’s attempts to counter this combination of Marxism and separatist nationalism by tolerating the activities of extreme Islamists are discussed in Chapter 6. 5. Milli Kültür Raporu (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1983). 6. Atatürkçülük (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1984). 7. Author’s translation of the Turkish text of the constitution at http://www.tbmm.gov .tr/Anayasa.htm. 8. Ibid. 9. Din Bilgisi Öğretimi (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1981). 10. Author’s translation of the Turkish text of the constitution at http://www.tbmm.gov .tr/Anayasa.htm. NOTES 251

11. Ibid. 12. For example, Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi 4 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 2004), 34. 13. Author’s translation of Article 2 of Law No. 2876 of 11 August 1983, published in Offi- cial Gazette No 18138 of 17 August 1983. http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/635 .html 14. Under Article 111 of the 1961 constitution, the MGK informed the Council of Ministers of its views. On 20 September 1971, the military-appointed technocrat government amended Article 111 so that the MGK “advised” the Council of Ministers of its views. Author’s translation of the Turkish text of the 1961 constitution at http://www.anayasa .gen.tr/1961ay.htm. 15. Author’s translation of Article 4 of the National Security Council and National Secu- rity Council Secretariat General Law No. 2945 of 9 November 1983, published in the Official Gazette No. 18218 of 11 November 1983. On 7 August 2003, Article 4 was amended and the explicit reference to Atatürk was removed, although Article 2 con- tinued to include “the constitutional order,” which implicitly includes , in its definition of national security. The Turkish text of the amended law is available at the MGK Web site at http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/kanun.html. 16. In addition, the military maintained a network of informal contacts with leading politi- cians and bureaucrats through which it could make its views known. These control mechanisms are discussed at greater length in Gareth Jenkins, Context and Circum- stance: The Turkish Military and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 49–55. 17. Diyanet statistics quoted in Rüşen Çakır and İrfan Bozan, Sivil, Şeffaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Mümkün Mü? (Istanbul: TESEV, 2005), 87. 18. Ibid., p. 73. 19. Population Planning Law No. 2827 of 24 May 1983, published in the Official Gazette No. 18059 of 27 May 1983. 20. Author’s translation from the Regulations Concerning the Appearance and Clothing of Students and Employees in Schools Run By the Ministry of Education and Other Minis- tries, published in the Official Gazette No. 17537 of 7 December 1981. 21. Aksoy, Başörtü-Türban: Batılaşma-Modernleşme, Laiklik ve Örtünme, 165–6. 22. The seats were distributed according to the double-threshold (provincial and national) d’Hondt system. A clerical error in the party’s list of candidates for the eastern province of Bingöl meant that ANAP was only able to take up 211 seats. 23. In addition to banning all but three parties, the junta also debarred 719 parliamentary candidates: 475 independents, eighty-nine from the PP, eighty-one from ANAP, and seventy-four from the NDP. 24. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 75. 25. Although the 1987 election was free, it could hardly be described as fair. See following. 26. Unless otherwise indicated, all economic statistics are taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute. http://www.turkstat.gov.tr. 27. Erinc Yeldan, “On the Structural Sources of the 1994 Turkish Financial Crisis: A CGE Modeling Analysis,” International Review of Applied Economics 12, no. 3 (1998): 397–414. 28. By the time of the 1987 elections, both the NDP and the PP had ceased to exist. The PP had merged with the SHP on 3 November 1985, while the NDP had been dissolved on 4 May 1986, with its parliamentary deputies joining either ANAP or the DYP. 29. For example, positive depictions of other religious and portrayals of non-Muslim reli- gious devotion were frequently cut from foreign feature films. Author’s observations. 252 NOTES

30. A full list of its activities can be found on DİTİB’s Turkish/German Web site http:// www.ditib.de. DİTİB also serves as an umbrella for Turkish cultural and religious non- governmental organizations (NGOs) active in Germany. By early 2007, a total of 870 NGOs were members of DİTİB, up from 230 in 1984. 31. Author’s translation, YÖK Decision No. 84.35.527 of 10 May 1984, quoted in Aksoy, Başörtü-Türban, 166. 32. Under Article 89 of the Turkish Constitution, the president has the right to return a law to parliament for reconsideration but has to ratify if it parliament once again approves it without making any changes. 33. Author’s translation. Aksoy, Başörtü-Türban, 180. 34. Author’s translations. İmam-Hatip Liseleri Öğretim Programları (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basimevi, 1985), 14–17 35. The full Turkish text of the decree can be found at http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/ ekutup98/erogluza/malimev.html#VIII. 36. Sheikh Kamel of the Al Baraka Group, which was the majority shareholder in Al Baraka Türk, was a business associate of ’s younger brother Korkut. 37. Author’s translation, Supplementary Clause 17, Law No. 3670, published in the Official Gazette of 28 October 1990. 38. It was several years before the state monopoly on broadcasting was formally lifted. Pri- vately owned radio stations were legalized on 8 July 1993 and privately owned television channels on 16 April 1994. 39. In August 1984, the PKK launched an armed insurgency in an attempt to create an inde- pendent Marxist ethnic Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. By the early 1990s, it effec- tively controlled large swathes of the countryside, particularly after dark. However, the Turkish security forces gradually regained the initiative. In 1998, Turkey forced Syria to expel PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from his longtime headquarters in . Öcalan was eventually captured in Kenya in February 1999, brought to Turkey, tried, and sentenced to life imprisonment. In August 1999, Öcalan announced a unilateral ceasefire and declared that the organization would pursue its goals by political means. The PKK resumed its insurgency in June 2004. However, by late 2007 it posed more of a threat to law and order than to the integrity of the Turkish state. 40. Author’s translation. The Struggle against Terrorism Law No. 3713 of 12 April 1991, published in the Official Gazette No. 20843 of 12 April 1991. 41. Many of Özal’s supporters still maintain that he was murdered by opponents of his reform program. Author’s interview with a leading Naqshbandi, Istanbul, October 2005. However, Özal was very overweight, had a history of heart problems, and was clearly ailing in the months leading up to his death. Author’s observations, Ankara, January 1993 and Istanbul, March 1993. 42. Erol Yarar, A New Perspective of the World at the Beginning of the 21st Century (Istanbul: MÜSİAD, 1996), 47. 43. In 1991, Abdurrahman Dilipak, one of the RP’s leading ideologues, wrote: “It is impossi- ble for anyone to be a Muslim and not support the introduction of the Shari’a.” Author’s translation. Abdurrahman Dilipak, Bu Din Benim Dinim Değil (Istanbul: İşaret-Ferşat, 1991), 31. 44. Author’s translation. Necmettin Erbakan, Adil Ekonomik Düzen (Ankara: Refah Partisi, 1991), 14–15. 45. Ibid. 46. Author’s translation. Abdurrahman Dilipak, Sorular, Sorunlar ve Cevaplar (1) (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınlar, 1993), 93. NOTES 253

47. Ali Bulaç, İslam ve Demokrasi, Teokrasi ve Totaliterizm (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1993), 65. 48. See, for example, the memoirs of Süleyman Arif Emre, one of Erbakan’s close associates. Süleyman Arif Emre, Siyasette 35 Yıl (Istanbul: Akabe Yayınları, 1990), 224–25. 49. Author’s translation. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt 26, Dönem 19, Yasama 2 of 25 December 1992. 50. The annual festival is named after the semi-legendary sixteenth-century Alevi poet Sultan , who was hanged for his part in a rebellion against Ottoman rule. 51. A total of 122 people were charged with involvement in the massacre, of whom eighty- five were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from two years to life. Kazan continued to visit the convicted in prison after he was appointed Justice Minister in June 1995. Yıldırım Türker, “Madımak!” Radikal, 3 July 2006. 52. During the festival of Eid al-Adha, Muslims traditionally sacrifice an animal—typically a sheep—in remembrance of the willingness of Ibrahim (the Jewish/Christian Abraham) to sacrifice his son Ismael (the Jewish/Christian Isaac) as related in Sura 37:102–111 of the Qur’an. The Jewish/Christian story can be found in Genesis Chapter 22. 53. Directive on Amendments to Law No. 2860 of 23 June 1983 on the Collection of Dona- tions, published in the Official Gazette No. 21216 of 2 May 1992. 54. Including violent organizations such as the İlim group. See Chapter 6. 55. The RP’s opponents frequently claimed that the party was receiving large sums of money from Saudi Arabia. However, although there is evidence to suggest that there were some donations, they were insignificant when compared with the funds the RP raised through its support organizations. 56. Author’s interviews with RP female party workers. Istanbul, March–April 1994. 57. İzzedin Yıldırım, the leader of a less explicitly nationalist splinter from Med-Zehra, was kidnapped and murdered by the İlim group in late 1999. See Chapter 6. 58. The Gülen activist Hakan Yavuz described his appeal as: “Thus he arms his follow- ers with an emotional map of action to translate their heart-guided conclusions into actions.” Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 184. 59. Bayram Balcı, Orta Asya’da İslam Misyonerleri: Fetullah Gülen Okulları (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 191. 60. Author’s interviews with military officials. Istanbul, November 1996 and Ankara, March 1997. 61. To the bewilderment of long-term acquaintances. “She used to be almost an enemy of religion. She never fasted, didn’t even know how to pray and never covered her head.” Author’s interview with Nazlı Ilıcak, Istanbul, July 1995. 62. The agreement, which came into force on 1 January 1996, eliminated customs barriers between Turkey and the EU and required Turkey to adopt the same tariffs as the EU on trade with all other countries. 63. Author’s observations during visits to DYP branch offices, Istanbul, September– October 1995. 64. In the period 1993–95, Çiller also opened thirty multiple-program high schools, which included İmam Hatip departments. Halis Ayhan, Türkiye’de Din Eğitimi (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınlar, 1999), 576. 65. The CHP was officially reopened on 9 September 1992. On 14 February 1995, it was merged with the SHP and the latter was dissolved. 66. In 2000 the agreement was extended to twenty-five years. 67. In July 1997, the U.S. State Department ruled that the August 1996 agreement did not violate the ILSA because Turkey had promised that the proposed pipeline would be 254 NOTES

used to transport Turkmen natural gas and that it would thus not directly benefit the Iranian energy sector. However, the United States did not attempt to impose sanctions when Iranian gas began to be pumped through the pipeline in 2001. 68. The G-7 became the G-8 in 1997 with the inclusion of Russia. 69. Author’s translation. Hürriyet, “Adak, Yahudilerle de iş yaparız,” 19 January 1997. 70. In August–November 1996, Erbakan announced three of what he promised would eventually be five packages worth a total of $58 billion. No reliable figures are available for the total revenue they generated, but it appears to have been considerably less than $10 billion, mostly from the sale of state-owned real estate. 71. This speech is cited in the judgment by the European Court of Human Rights, Case of Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, Strasbourg, 31 July 2001. 72. Author’s interview with former Navy Commander Admiral Güven Erkaya, Istanbul, August 1998. 73. On 16 October 1997, Bekir was sentenced to three years and nine months in prison. 74. The military estimated that by early 1997, a total of 1,685,000 students were attending privately run Qur’an courses, a large proportion of them organized by the tariqah. 75. Author’s interviews with RP officials, Istanbul, 20–21 March 1997. 76. Briefing by the Turkish General Staff to the media on 11 June 1997. Cumhuriyet, 12 June 1997. There has been no independent confirmation of the military’s figures. 77. Author’s interview with retired General Doğan Beyazit, Istanbul, March 1997. 78. Author’s interview with leading trade union official, Istanbul, April 1997. 79. Some accepted, some declined. Author’s interviews with former leftist extremists, Istanbul, May 1997. 80. Author’s interviews with leading members of the RP, Istanbul, and Ankara, March–June 1997. 81. Most of the MGV’s branches were closed in 2000, although the foundation itself was not outlawed until 2004. 82. No reliable figures are available, However, in March 1998, there were reported to be twenty-four private courses with 2,459 students just in the Fatih neighborhood of Istan- bul. Yeni Yüzyıl, “Kuran kursları yeraltına indi,” 31 March 1998. 83. Author’s interview with General Doğan Beyazit, Istanbul, February 1998. 84. Milliyet, “Fazilet’te Batı reçetesi,” 24 January 1999. Places at university are awarded on the basis of a universal entrance examination. However, the marks of İmam Hatip grad- uates are weighted to make it difficult for them to study anything except theology. 85. Throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s, Öcalan had divided his time between Damascus and the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. In fall 1998, Turkey threatened to invade Syria unless it expelled Öcalan. The Syrian government eventually complied. Öcalan spent several months unsuccessfully seeking a safe haven in Russia or Europe before taking refuge in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, from where he was handed over to Turkish special forces by the Kenyan authorities. 86. “Of course they won’t do anything. They can’t. It is my human right to wear a headscarf.” Kavakcı, interviewed by the author, Istanbul, 4 April 1999. 87. Extracts from the transcript of the cassettes (in Turkish). Hürriyet, “Fethullah şoku,” 20 June 1999. 88. At the time of writing, Gülen remained in self-imposed exile in the United States. 89. Interview with Tayyip Erdoğan in 2. Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları, ed. Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1993). 90. Cumhuriyet, 17 September 1994. 91. Milliyet, 29 November 1994. 92. Milliyet, 8 January 1996. NOTES 255

93. Akit, 5 February 1996. 94. Even when asked repeatedly. Author’s interview with Erdoğan, January 2002. 95. The program was published in English and Turkish. The extracts are taken from the English-language version. Development and Democratization Program (Ankara: AKP, 2001), 5. 96. Ibid., 6. 97. Ibid., 6. 98. The Turkish parliament nevertheless approved the reform package on 3 August 2002. 99. Author’s translation. Radikal, “Erdoğan temkinli,” 30 September 2002. 100. Her Şey Türkiye İçin (Ankara: AKP, 2002), 68. 101. Author’s translation. Ibid., 78. 102. Author’s translation. Ibid., 78. 103. Author’s translation. Ibid., 78. 104. Survey by Tarhan Erdem published in Radikal, “İki parti seçmeni AKP’ye gitti,” 6 November 2002. 105. Milliyet, 15–18 November 2002. 106. Radikal, “AKP’li Arınç: Başörtüsü sorunu namus borcumuz,” 18 October 2002. 107. Milliyet, “Devlette 13 bin irticacı,” 10 December 2002. 108. Law No. 4778 on Amendments to Various Laws of 2 January 2003, published in the Official Gazette No. 24990 of 11 January 2003. 109. The Turkish text of the statement is available on the lodge’s Web site at http://www .iskenderpasa.com. 110. Law No. 4709 on Amendments to some Clauses of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic of 3 October 2001, published in the Official Gazette No. 24556 of 17 October 2001. 111. The first civilian MGK secretary general was appointed in October 2004. 112. Law No. 4963 on Amendments to Various Laws of 30 July 2003, published in the Official Gazette No. 25192 of 7 August 2003. 113. Author’s translation. Turkish General Staff Press Statement No. BN-19/03 of 14 Sep- tember 2003. 114. Hürriyet, “Askerden imam hatip muhtırası,” 14 October 2003 115. Radikal, “Komutanlı hilafet paneli,” 4 March 2004. 116. Author’s translation. Turkish General Staff Press Statement No. BN-07/04 of 6 May 2004. http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2004/ BA_07.html 117. Turkish Daily News, 12 May 2004. 118. Radikal, “Erdoğan: YÖK’ü zorlamayız,” 4 July 2004. 119. The package included the abolition of capital punishment even in wartime and was promulgated as Law No. 5218 on the Abolition of the Death Penalty and Amendments to Various Laws of 14 July 2004, published in the Official Gazette No. 25529 of 21 July 2004. 120. Commonly known as the “” after Kofi Annan (born 1938), the UN Secretary General at the time. 121. Radikal, “Erdoğan: Zina gündemden kalktı,” 23 September 2004. 122. Author’s interviews with AKP officials, Istanbul and Ankara, September 2004. 123. , Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2004). 124. Not least, of course, AKP sympathies for the Muslim insurgents in Chechnya. 125. Author’s translation. Milliyet, “Erdoğan Darfurda soykırım yapılmadı,” 20 March 2006. 126. Anadolu Ajans, “Sağlık Müdürlüğü’nde imam devri,” 23 August 2004. 256 NOTES

127. Hürriyet, “TRT’de dini yayın patlaması,” 22 April 2006. 128. Opinion poll by the Turkish A & G company, published in Milliyet, “Halk AB’ye güven- miyor,” 24 October 2006. 129. The full English text of the Convention is available at conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ Treaties/Word/005.doc. 130. Leyla Şahin vs. Turkey (Application No. 44774/98), Judgment (Strasbourg: ECHR, 2004), 25. 131. Tarhan Erdem, Milliyet, “Türban Dosyasi—1,” 27 May 2003. 132. Hürriyet, “Erdoğan Türbanda söz hakkı ulemanındır,” 16 November 2005. 133. Author’s interview with a leading member of the Naqshbandi order, Istanbul, October 2005. 134. Author’s translation. Radikal, “İlköğretim hala Darwin’siz,” 14 October 2006. 135. “We are addressing the issue and will introduce a solution very soon.” State Minister Ali Babacan in conversation with the author, Florence, May 2004. 136. Author’s translation. İlköğretim Din Kültürü Ve Ahlak Bilgisi 6 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 2005), 50. 137. Turkish Daily News, “Missionaries the new crusaders,” 24 February 2005. 138. Anka News Agency, “Diyanet’in kitabı: Hıristiyanlıgı İsa kurmadı,” 12 April 2005. 139. Through early summer 2007, elements within the AKP unsuccessfully tried to prevent Büyükanıt from becoming by launching a defamation campaign of e-mails, faxes, and stories planted in the Islamist press. Significantly, the most damning calumny that they could invent was that Büyükanıt was of Jewish origin. 140. Author’s translation, NTV, 28 August 2007. 141. When the AKP took power in November 2002, the ECHR had yet to rule on Hayrünisa Gül’s application; which she subsequently withdrew to avoid political embarrassment to her husband, who, as a member of the government, would effectively have been one of the defendants. 142. The CHP’s successful candidates included thirteen members of the DSP, who had run on the CHP ticket in order to overcome the 10 percent threshold for representation in parliament. For similar reasons, twenty of the twenty-six independent MPs were members of the pro-Kurdish Demokratik Toplum Partisi (, or DTP).

Chapter 6

1. Exceptions to this rule include the of Diyarbakır Police Chief Gaffar Okkan on 25 January 2001, by the Turkish Hizbullah (see following) and the amateur- ish, though occasionally murderous, activities of the Islamic Raiders of the Great East– Front (İBDA-C) (see following). 2. Author’s translation. Soner Yalçın, Hangi Erbakan (Ankara: Basak Yayınları, 1994), 151. 3. Cumhuriyet, 25 February 1981 4. No details were given about the bureaucrats’ identities, although the assumption has always been that they had been appointed to their posts while the MSP was in power. Faik Bulut and Mehmet Faraç, Kod Adı: Hizbullah (Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık, 1999), 52. 5. The reasons for the relatively low level of violence are unclear. Former members of Ak- Der have attributed it to the tight control of the organization by the MSP and the latter’s belief that the time for an armed campaign had not yet come. Author interview with source close to Ak-Der, June 2004. NOTES 257

6. For example, the Türkiye İslam Kurtuluş Cephesi (Turkish Islamic Salvation Front or TİKC), the Evrenesel Kardeşlik Cephesi–Şeriatcı İntikam Mangaları (Universal Broth- erhood Front– Retribution Platoon or EKC-ŞİM), and the Evrensel İslam Kurtuluş Savaşının Türkiye İslam Mücahitleri (Turkish Islamic Warriors of the Universal War of Islamic Liberation or EİKSTİM) 7. The Shah of Iran fled the country on 16 January 1979. On 1 February 1979, Khomeini returned to Tehran from exile in Paris to head the new regime. 8. In 2004, an İlim militant using the name İ. Bagasi wrote a book entitled Kendi Dilinden Hizbullah Ve Mücadele Tarihinden Önemli Kesitler (Hizbullah in Its Own Words and Important Cross Sections from the History of the Struggle), which was circulated by e- mail. İ. Bagasi is believed to be a pseudonym for İsa Altsoy, Velioğlu’s successor as leader of İlim. It was the first time the organization had publicly referred to itself as Hizbul- lah. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, İlim usually referred to itself as the Cemaat, or “Community.” 9. On 9 May 1978, Velioglu successfully applied to the court in Batman to change his official date of birth from 1952 to 1955 (Decision No. 1978/27-1978/61 of the Batman Court of First Instance). The reasons are obscure. It is possible that he was actually born in 1955. 10. Gungor was active in the MTTB until 1978, when he joined the administrative staff at the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). He left TRT in the wake of the 12 September 1980 coup. 11. Gercüş Court of First Instance Decision No. 1981/65-1981/78 of 7 May 1981. Ercan Çitlioğlu, Tahran-Ankara Hattında Hizbullah (Ankara: Ümit Yayınları, 2001), 70. 12. Statements to police by captured militants Edip Gümüş, Cahide Kılıçaslan, Cemal Üçar, and Abdülaziz Tunç. Emin Demirel, Hizbullah (Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2001), p. 98. 13. Demirel, Hizbullah, 187. 14. Article 3 of the Iranian Constitution requires the republic to devote “all of its resources” to achieving sixteen goals, including “framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the freedom fighters of the world.” Iranian Constitution, Article 3, Paragraph 16. http://www.mclibrary.edu.mn/intlaws/constitutions/iran.htm. 15. Çitlioğlu, Tahran-Ankara Hattında Hizbullah, 268. 16. Interview by Turkish journalist Ruşen Çakır with Abdülaziz Tunç, who had worked in the İlim archives. Ruşen Çakır, Derin Hizbullah (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001), 155. 17. Author interviews, Bingöl and Diyarbakır, November 2003. 18. Author interviews with journalists working for the radical Vakit newspaper, 1993–94. When the full extent of the atrocities perpetrated by İlim became public, the conserva- tive daily Zaman attempted to blame the already persecuted Yezidi minority. Faruk Arslan and Sadullah Özcan, “Vahşette Yezidi Parmağı,” Zaman, 10 February 2000. 19. A survey by the Turkish police of 2,834 suspected İlim members or sympathizers detained in 2000 found that: 210 (7.4 percent) had no formal education, 683 (24.1 per- cent) had only primary school education, 348 (12.3 percent) were middle school gradu- ates, 1,002 (35.4 percent) were high school graduates (including 200 graduates from preacher-training İmam Hatip High Schools), and 591 (20.9 percent) were graduates of universities or similar. In terms of age, 9 percent were 11–14 years old, 14 percent were 15–20 years old, 19 percent were 21–24 years old, 21 percent were 25–28 years old, 20 percent were 29–34 years old, and 17 percent were 35–41 years old. Çakır, Derin Hizbullah, 93–94. 258 NOTES

20. “It was accepted that the leader of the organization was implementing orders received virtually directly from God. He could never be wrong. Everything done by Hizbullah was religiously permissible, right, appropriate and guiltless.” Author’s translation of interview by Ruşen Çakır with Abdülaziz Tunç. Çakır, Derin Hizbullah, 152. 21. Sins to which potential recruits confessed included: attending village weddings, sitting next to and talking with girls, listening to music, and going to the cinema. 22. Although he was monogamous, Velioğlu encouraged polygamy amongst İlim members up to the religiously permitted maximum of four wives. Velioğlu is believed to have fathered at least six children, possibly ten. They are now being raised by other militants under assumed names. 23. The number of boys who attended Qur’an courses in southeast Turkey run by imams sympathetic to İlim is unknown but is conservatively estimated to run into the tens of thousands, many of whom later formed a pool of radicalized young men which could be tapped by other militant Islamist organizations. Author interviews, Diyarbakır and Bingöl, November 2003. 24. Interview by Ruşen Çakır with Abdülaziz Tunç. Ruşen Çakır, Derin Hizbullah (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001), 151. 25. In cities and towns, this was calculated as 10 percent of wages, salaries, or profits. In the countryside, members were expected to contribute 10 percent of the annual har- vest. In areas where the organization was particularly strong, it was also able to extort contributions by imposing a 10 percent levy on the earnings of those who were not İlim members or sympathizers. İlim classed these contributions as zakat (also sometimes written in English as zaka or zakah), the alms that all Muslims who are able to do so are required to give to the needy or the cause of as one of the . See Introduction. 26. It is likely that in the early 1990s İlim received some financial assistance from Iran. However, no firm evidence has yet emerged and the sums involved were probably rela- tively small. 27. As early as April 1993, Yeni Ülke, a Kurdish nationalist newspaper with close links to the PKK, ran a story claiming that the PKK was looking for an end to hostilities. Yeni Ülke, “PKK’den Hizbullah’a Çağrı,” 4 April 1993. However, Sait Çürükkaya, the former PKK commander in Diyarbakır province, denies that a ceasefire was ever agreed, claiming that the PKK leadership merely sought to create the impression that it had reached an accord with İlim for propaganda purposes. Article by Sait Çürük- kaya posted on the Internet on 14 August 2004. http://www.rizgari.org/modules .php?name=News&file=article&sid=7875 28. The number of these killings is conservatively estimated to run into several thousand. Most appear to have been conducted by so-called “confessors,” captured PKK members who were offered early release from prison in exchange for carrying out an assassi- nation. Although the killers were often identified by witnesses, none was ever pros- ecuted. Author interviews with security officials and victims’ relatives. Istanbul 1996 and Diyarbakır 1997. 29. In January 2000, FP Chairman Recai Kutan accused the security forces of creating Hiz- bullah. http://www.belgenet.com/belge/fpgb25gr.html. 30. The leaflets included an abbreviated quotation from Sura 2, Verse 190, which exhorts Muslins to: “Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not attack first. God does not like aggressors.” The leaflets omitted the phrase about not attacking first but concluded with a reminder that it was: “The duty of every Muslim like you to fight against them.” Author’s translations. Hikmet Çiçek, Hangi Hizbullah (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000), 21. NOTES 259

31. Author’s translation. Çiçek, Hangi Hizbullah, 27. 32. On 9 July 1992, General Teoman Koman (born 1936), the head of the Milli İstibahrat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence Organization or MİT), told journalists: “This is just a name which has been given to the reaction of the local people again the PKK. There is no organization called Hizbullah.” Author’s translation. http://www.belgenet.com/ belge/fpgb25gr.html. 33. During his term as Interior Minister in the 1987–91 ANAP government, Abdülkadir Aksu (born 1944) had overseen the appointment of a large number of police officers from religious backgrounds. After ANAP’s defeat in the 1991 general election, there was an extensive purge of the Interior Ministry. Turkish law makes it very difficult to dismiss a civil servant. As a result, many of Aksu’s appointees were simply reassigned to the relative obscurity of southeast Turkey. 34. Author interviews with military sources. Diyarbakır and Ankara May 1997, Istanbul, September 1999. 35. Interviewed by Soner Yalçın in 1993, Major Cem Ersever, a recently retired former high- ranking member of JİTEM, said: “They always told us: ‘Hizbullah is the PKK’s enemy. My enemy’s enemy is my friend. The security forces should not interfere with Hizbullah but help them.’” Soner Yalçın, Binbaşı Ersever’in İtırafları (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 162. 36. Author interviews. Istanbul, August 1998 and May 1999. 37. Ay died in bizarre circumstances in March 2000, after suffering a heart attack while hav- ing sex with a Moldavian prostitute in an Istanbul hotel on the third day of Eid al-Adha. Hürriyet, “Nataşa kaçamağında ölen Hizbullahçıymış,” 25 March 2000. 38. Interview by Ruşen Çakır with Abdülaziz Tunç. Ruşen Çakır, Derin Hizbullah, 156. 39. The criteria for what constituted suspicious behavior were often very broad. For exam- ple, a report to the İlim leadership stated that: “It is clear from Hasan’s actions that he is a MİT agent. He takes the young boys to football and trains them. What should we do to Hasan? Should we shoot him?” Author’s translation. Çitlioğlu, Tahran-Ankara Hattında Hizbullah, 186. 40. Execution was usually by strangulation, although some victims were beaten to death or even buried alive The victims included Konca Kuriş (1960–98), a prominent female Islamist. Kuriş had attended some İlim meetings during the early 1990s but had become disillusioned by the group’s advocacy of violence. She had later become increasingly liberal and frequently appeared on nationwide television to argue that Muslim women were not required to cover their heads and could pray alongside men. On 16 July 1998, she was kidnapped from outside her home in the eastern Mediterranean port of Mer- sin. She was tortured for thirty-eight days before being strangled. Her tearful last hours were captured on a videotape which was sent to Velioğlu and then stored in the İlim archives. Her corpse was discovered on 22 January 2000, when a captured militant led police to an İlim graveyard in the province of Konya, 340 kilometers from Mersin. 41. İ. Bagasi, Kendi Dilinden Hizbullah Ve Mücadele Tarihinden Önemli Kesitler, 233–4. 42. Author interview with members of the Turkish security forces, September 2004. 43. Almost all of the other members of the İHÖ were Kurds, most of them from the prov- ince of Batman. İrfan Çağrıcı himself came from the Turkish Black Sea province of Kastamonu. 44. Emin Demirel, Terror (Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2001), 476–7. 45. In a statement to police following his capture in 1996, Çağrıcı said that he believed that the Rizai Group comprised members of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Secu- rity, initially known by the acronym SAVAMA and later renamed Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar or VEVAK. 260 NOTES

46. Demirel, Teror, 479. 47. There has been speculation that Iran was looking to avenge ’s assassination of Sheikh Abbas Musawi, the leader of the Lebanese Hizbullah, on 16 February 1992. However, Sadan appears to have been put under surveillance several months before Musawi was killed. Demirel, Kudüs Savaşcıları (Istanbul: IQ Kultur Sanat Yayıncılık, 2003), 83–85. 48. Author interviews with Turkish counterterrorism police, Istanbul, December 2004. 49. Tevhid magazine was first published in January 1990. However, despite financial back- ing from Iran, it soon folded. In 1993, Kılıç started publishing the Zamana Selam news- paper, later changing its name to Selam. 50. A total of twelve Iranian dissidents are known to have been killed by, or on the orders of, Iranian intelligence in Turkey in the period 1985–96. Several other Iranian dissidents who disappeared during the same period are believed to have met the same fate. 51. Following their arrest, members of the Istanbul cell told police that in January 1993, they were asked by their Iranian handlers to arrange for the assassination of Jak Kamhi (born 1925), a leading Turkish Jewish businessman. They were provided with weapons and began to conduct surveillance. However, they were unable to agree whether to stage an ambush or use a roadside bomb. The Iranians transferred the assignment to a group of Islamists at another radical Islamist magazine called Yeryüzü. On the morning of 28 January 1993, four militants from Yeryüzü unsuccessfully tried to ambush Kamhi on his way to work. One of the militants was arrested at the scene and the others were captured soon afterwards. 52. Although he was born in Istanbul, Kısakürek’s family came from the Kurdish province of Maraş. In 1938 he met, and fell under the influence of, Abdülhakim Arvasi (1865–1943), a leading Kurdish member of the Naqshbandi order from the province of Van. İBDA-C literature cites Arvasi, Kısakürek, and Erdiş as the movement’s three ideologues. 53. Erdiş’s nom de guerre of Mirzabeyoğlu is taken from one of his grandfathers, Mirzabeyoğlu İzzet Bey, who was reportedly killed by the Kemalist security forces in 1926 during a failed Kurdish/Islamist rebellion. 54. Akıncı Yol, June 1997, 12. 55. All the quotations are the author’s translations from Dünü, Bugünü, Yarınıyla: Kısaca İBDA! (Its Past, Present, and Future: the İBDA in Brief!), a clandestine guide which appeared on a now closed İBDA website. http://members.fortunecity.com/akademya6/ makbeyan.htm. 56. This principle of individualized dialecticism is explained in Salih Mirzabeyoğlu, İBDA Diyalektiği—Kurtuluş Yolu (Istanbul: İBDA Yayınları, 1984). 57. Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Book 1, No. 79. 58. Akıncı Yol, May 1997, 10. For example, the organization claimed responsibility for the series of suicide bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 (see following). However, it is possible that İBDA-C sympathizers were involved in the attempted assassination of Matild Manukyan (1914–2001), the Turkish-Armenian owner of a string of brothels in Istanbul, on 27 September 1995. Manukyan survived, but her driver, Necati Akça, and bodyguard, Mehmet Urhan, were both killed. 59. For example, the eleven operations claimed by the İBDA-C in April 1997 comprised: six demolitions of busts of Ataturk, two fire-bombings of premises selling alcohol, and the bombings of an Armenian church, a bank, and a Kemalist magazine. Akıncı Yol, May 1997. 60. The riot broke out when prison officers tried to move sixty-four İBDA-C inmates who were being housed in a single wing and undergoing ideological and martial arts training under Erdiş’s supervision. Radikal, “İBDA-C Yine İsyanda,” 26 January 2000. NOTES 261

61. For every month of 1999 through to November, the cover of the İBDA-C monthly mag- azine Furkan was still emblazoned with the promise that 1999 was going to be the Year of Liberation. http://members.fortunecity.com/akademyaarsiv/dergi7.htm. 62. http://www.ozgurlukprojesi.cjb.net. 63. Salih Mirzabeyoğlu, Telegram-Zihin Kontrolü (Istanbul: İBDA Yayınları, 2003). 64. Mirzabeyoğlu, Telegram-Zihin Kontrolü, 21. 65. Hürriyet, “Tarikat cinayeti zanlıları yakalandı,” 17 May 2004. 66. “Islam is both the Muslim’s state and his government. The Qur’an is his constitution and Shari’a his law.” Author’s translation from the now closed website http://seriat.net/ veciz%2002.htm. 67. Muhammad Anwar, Jochen Blaschke, and Åke Sander, State Policies Towards Muslim Minorities: Sweden, Great Britain and Germany (Berlin: Edition Parabolis, 2004). The full text of the report is available at http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte/pdf/MusPol _Buch.pdf. 68. http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,351858,00.html. 69. Such as http://www.seriat.net. 70. Where they would not only propagandize but frequently rally their audiences to join with them in chanting “Allahu ekber.” Author’s observations, Istanbul 1994–97. 71. Author’s interviews with members of the networks, Istanbul, May 1997, and Izmit, Sep- tember 1999. 72. Also known as Muhammad Atef, al Masri was killed by a U.S. hellfire missile in Novem- ber 2001. 73. Author’s copies of transcripts of police interrogations of some of the arrested militants and their later statements in court. A comprehensive, and largely reliable, account of the plot is given in Şaban Arslan and Devrim Tosunoğlu, Dehşet Senaryosu (Istanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2004). 74. It was the third time in less than twenty years that the Neve Shalom synagogue had been targeted. On Sunday, 1 March 1992, two suspected Islamist militants hurled a hand grenade at the building causing minor damage but no casualties. On 6 November 1986, two members of the Palestinian Abu Nidal group stormed into the synagogue during Saturday morning prayers, killing twenty-three worshippers and seriously wounding five others. 75. On 16 February 2007, all of the captured leading members of the group, including Yiğit, İlhan, Ersöz, and al-Saqa, received life sentences. 76. There are around 200 Masonic lodges and more than 13,000 freemasons in Turkey, including many leading politicians, bureaucrats, and members of the media, military, and judiciary. Freemasons are viewed with great suspicion by Turkish Islamists and are often lumped together with Zionists and Christians in an improbable conspiracy which is allegedly secretly running the world. 77. In late 2007, the trial of Vural and several associates was still continuing. However, Vural continued to insist that he and Doğruel had been solely responsible for planning and executing the attack and had not received any assistance from radical groups inside or outside Turkey. 78. Testimony of Harun İlhan during his trial. In the aftermath of the November 2003 bombings, many, led by Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, described them as attacks on Turkey. This is not true. The targets were Jews and British interests. 262 NOTES

Conclusion

1. “In my grandfather’s day, we worried about being hanged, and in my father’s about going to prison. I’ve also had problems, but it has usually involved me sitting drinking tea in a police station for a few hours and being home by evening.” Leading member of the Naqshbandi order, interviewed by the author. Istanbul, October 2004. 2. Such as the veneration of saints and the sanctity of place in Islamic shrines and tombs. 3. Author’s conversation with Bülent Arınç, Istanbul, September 2003. Many conservative Anatolian businessmen underwent a similar process when they began exporting in the 1980s and early 1990s and found themselves establishing not only contacts but friend- ships with their counterparts in Europe and the United States. Author’s interview with leading Islamist businessman, Konya, May 2003. 4. The extent to which the Turkish state is truly secular is open to debate. The principle of secularism is enshrined in the constitution and none of the Turkish statute book is based on the Shari’a. However, neither is it possible to call the state fully secular when, through the Diyanet, it supports and controls the propagation and practice of a specific religious belief or when, through compulsory education in Sunni Islam, it forces all chil- dren to be inculcated with the same belief. Perhaps most bewildering is the membership of an ostensibly secular state of the OIC, which defines itself as being an organization of “Islamic countries” committed to “the development of the .” See the Web site of the OIC’s Federation of Consultants from Islamic Countries (FCIC), which is based in Istanbul: www.fcic-org.com. 5. AKP members of parliament in conversation with the author, Istanbul, June 2006. 6. Since the AKP took power in 2002, the levels of nepotism and corruption in the award- ing of state contracts have steadily increased to the point where they are comparable with previous administrations. 7. Author’s observations, Ankara, September 2005. In Turkish, the word kardeş, which was used to describe , can mean either “brother” or “sister.” 8. Author’s interviews with AKP members, Istanbul and Ankara 2003–7. 9. These are discussed in more detail in the Introduction. Index

Abbasid dynasty, 20 228n73, 228n75, 241n48, 242n71, Abdülaziz, 53, 57 250n95, 254n50 Abdülhamit II, Sultan, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, , 27, 156 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, Ali, nephew of Prophet Muhammad, 38, 74, 131 39, 219n5, 219n6 Abdullah Beyefendi, 85 Ali Pasha, 52, 54, 56, 57 Abdullah Cevdet, 66, 67 Ali Rıza, 82 Abdülmecit, Crown Prince, 89 Ali Suavi, 57 Abdülmecit, Sultan, 50, 53, 230n17 Allenby, Edmund (General), 78 Abode of Islam (Dar al-Harb), 9, 210 Alp, Tekin, 102, 244n105 Abode of War (Dar al-Islam), 9, 22, 25, Alparslan, Sultan, 21–22 210 Al Qaeda, 183, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, Abu Dawud, 220n11 221n26 Action Army, 72, 131 Altıkulaç, Tayyar, 145 Adak, Fehim, 161 Altsoy, İsa, 195, 257n8 Anadolu Ajans, 121 (call to prayer), 99, 100, 117, 122, Anatolian Tigers. See Islamist 159 bourgeoisie, rise of , 18, 23, 183, 184, 204, 205, Anıtkabir, 120, 167, 204 206, 208, 209 Annan, Kofi, 255n120 Ahmedi, 27 anti-Semitism, 106, 106–7, 112–13, 132, Ahmet Anzavur, 87 156, 160, 161, 176, 199, 201, 206–10, Ahmet Cemal. See Cemal Pasha 229n81, 256n139 Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, 54, 59 Arab Revolt, 78–79 Ahmet Niyazi (Major), 69 Arınç, Bülent, 170, 172, 181 Ahmet Rıza, 65, 67, 233n62, 234n78 Armenian Secret Army for the Akbulut, Yıldırım, 152 Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), Akça, Necati, 260n58 237n137, 250n94 Akçura, Yusuf, 67, 74, 76, 233n70 Armenians, 18, 22, 24, 26, 32, 33, 34, 36, Akdaş, Habib, 206, 207, 208 58, 60, 63–64, 66, 70, 72, 73, 76, 78, Akgönenç, Oya, 164, 165 79–80, 83, 84, 85, 92, 105, 106, 107, akıncı (raider), 27, 28 122, 180, 225n25, 227n60, 227n62, Akkoyunlu, 37 232n54, 233n66, 234n80, 235n91, Aksoy, Muammer, 199 237n132, 237n134, 237n136, Aksu, Abdülkadir, 259n33 237n137, 239n23, 250n94, 260n58, Alevis, 18, 37, 38–39, 64, 89, 90, 93, 103, 260n59 104, 108, 127, 129, 130, 139–40, 143, Arvasi, Abdülhakim, 260n52 149, 156, 179, 201, 222n48, 227n66, Askeri class, 28, 40, 42, 226n48 227n69, 228n70, 228n71, 228n72, Aslan, Alparslan, 180 264 INDEX

Aslan, Tamer, 197 Bosnia, 36, 57, 70, 155, 156, 199, 200, Assad, Bashar al-, 175 205, 220n13 Asset Tax (Varlık Vergisi), 113–14 Boussios, Giorgos, 70 Association for Human Rights and Bozkurtlar. See Grey Wolves Solidarity with the Oppressed Britain, 47, 51, 53, 55, 58, 60, 68, 73, 77, (Mustaza-Der), 195 78, 79, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 114, 121, Association for the Struggle against 123, 156, 167, 207, 229n1, 230n12, Communism (KMD), 128, 130 230n14, 230n17, 231n33, 231n38, Atalay, Beşir, 170 232n41, 233n58, 233n61, 236n124, Atatürk: Mustafa Kemal, 17, 81–109; 239n21, 239n22, 240n47, 241n57, passim, 114, 116, 117, 120, 121, 123, 242n73, 246n4, 261n78 126, 127, 131, 132, 136, 138, 140, Bukhari al-, 4, 220n11 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 161, Bush, George W., 176 167, 168, 172, 173, 182, 202, 213, Buyruk, 38 215, 234n73, 238n1, 238n3, 238n4, Büyükanıt, Yaşar, 180 238n5, 238n12, 238n17, 239n22, Büyükdeniz, Adnan, 177, 181 251n15, 260n59 Atıf Hoca, 96 Çabuk, Mesut, 207 Austria-Hungary, 51, 58, 68, 70, 77, Çağlayangil, Sabri, 135 230n14 Çağrıcı, İrfan, 195, 196, 197, 198 Çakmak, Fevzi, 116 Ay, Zekeriya, 192 Çakmaklı,Yücel, 129 Aytufan, Rüştü, 199, 200 Çaldıran, Battle of, 37 caliphate, 2, 3, 12, 17, 20, 21, 45, 46, 56, Baba Ishaq, 24 59, 60, 77, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, Baba Ishaq revolt, 24, 225n37 94, 95, 103, 108, 114, 138, 173, 203, -ı Âli Baskını (Raid on the Sublime 219n3, 224n20, 227n63, 231n38, Porte), 75 232n41, 242n68 Baç, Gurcan, 207, 208 Calp, Necdet, 146 Bahçeli, Devlet, 182 Canning, Viscount Stratford, 53 Balkan War, First, 75, 76, 79, 234n76 Capitulations, 41, 62, 70, 92, 228n80 Balkan War, Second, 235n104 Cavit, 243n92 Bangladesh, 160 Çelik, Hüseyin, 179 Banker Kastelli, 146 Cemâl Bey (Colonel), 72 Başbuğ, İlker, 173 Cemal Pasha, 68, 69, 75, 76, 78, 80 Bayar, Celal, 114, 116, 124 Çerkes Ethem, 87, 88 Baykal, Deniz, 160, 169 Çetinkaya, Hüseyin, 190 Bayru, Mikalil, 190 Chechnya, 205, 206, 208, 255n124 Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, 120 China, 3, 18, 153 Bedawi, Abdul Ghani, 198 Christian missionary activity, 61, 64, 179, Bedel-i asker, 53 180, 233n58, 233n61 Bektashi, religious order, 40, 47, 66, 108, Çiçek, Cemil, 180 222n48, 228n74 Çiller, Tansu, 153, 159, 160, 163 Berat system, 62 Cohen Moise. See Alp, Tekin Berlin, Treaty of, 58–59 Committee for Union and Progress Beth Israel Synagogue, 207 (İTC), 65–79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, Beyazit I, Sultan, 28, 29 98, 234–235n72, 234n73, 234n74, Beyazit II, Sultan, 33, 37 234n78, 234n81, 234n87, 236n107, Bin Ladin, Osama, 206, 221n26 236n115, 236n125, 239n22, 241n60, Borkluce Mustafa, 30 243n92 INDEX 265

Comte Auguste, 65 Dursun, Turhan, 197, 198 Constitutional Court, 125, 131, 150, 152, 162, 164, 165, 167, 170, 182 Ecevit, Bülent, 133, 134, 135, 142, 148, Coşan, Nureddin, 171 159, 164, 165, 167, 168, 172 Council of State (Danıştay), 161 Edib, Eşref, 116 countryside, tensions with city, 22–23, Egypt, 33, 47, 51, 78, 160, 186, 199, 24, 30 220n13, 229n1, 230n13, 236n124 Crimean War, 52, 55 Elaltuntaş, Gökhan, 207 Crypto-Christians, 64 Elkatmış, Mehmet, 176 Çürükkaya, Sait, 258n27 Emeç, Çetin, 196, 197, 198 Cyprus is Turkish Association (KTC), , 68, 69, 75, 76, 79, 80, 83, 121–22 236n115, 237n131, 237n138 Cyprus, 121, 133, 135, 156, 174, 175, 178, Erbakan, Necmettin, 131–32, 133, 134, 223n6 135, 136, 137, 138, 142, 145, 148, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, Dalar, Ubeydullah, 192 166, 167, 249n81, 254n70 Dalmaz, Muzaffer, 197 Ercan, Sinan, 197 Danıştay. See Council of State Erdiş, Salih İzzet, 201–3 Darfur, 176 Erdoğan Emine, 181 Dashnaks, 63–64, 79, 233n56 Erdoğan, Tayyip, 165–66, 167, 168, 171, Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 175 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, Dede Korkut, Book of, 19–20, 39 180, 181, 261n78 Demir, Oğuz, 199, 200 Ergun, Sadettin Nüzhet, 108 Demirağ, Nur, 114, 116 Erim, Nihat, 131 Demirel, Süleyman, 127–28, 130, 131, Ersever, Cem, 259n35 133, 134, 135, 142, 146, 148, 153, Ersöz, Adnan, 206, 208 163, 170 of, 84, 85 Demiröz, Şenol, 177 Esat, Mahmut, 107 Democratic (DSP), 148, 153, European Economic Community (EEC), 159, 163, 164, 165, 256n142 131, 135, 147, 155. See also European Democratic Turkey Party (DTP), 163 Union (EU) Democrat Party (DP), 114, 115, 116, European National View Organization 117–24, 125, 126, 128 (AMGT), 137, 145, 157, 203 Dervish Mehmet, 102–3 European Union (EU), 155, 159, 160, Dervish Wahdeti, 71, 72 164, 168, 169, 174, 175, 176, 177–78, Devşirme, 35–36, 40 215, 216 , 14, 96 Evren, Kenan, 141, 142, 145, 146, 147, Dinçerler, Vehbi, 151 148, 150 Dink, Hrant, 180 Din Tabrizi, Shams al-, 23 Farmer’s and Peasant’s Party (ÇKP), 116 Din-ü devlet, 41 Fatherland and Freedom organization, Diyanet, 92, 96, 99, 115, 118, 127, 129, 82, 234n73 133, 137, 143, 145, 149, 150, 158, Fatwa, 41, 42, 66, 72, 77, 85, 86, 87, 89, 162, 163, 173, 179, 246n15, 262n4. 93, 150, 203, 236n116 See also Turkish-Islamic Union for (SP), 167, 169 Religious Affairs (DİTİB) Feriha Tevfik, 101 Doğruel, Nihat, 208, 209 Fermans, 40 , 30 Fevzi Pasha, 86 Durman, Hüseyin. See Velioğlu, Hüseyin Feyzioğlu, Turhan, 133 Dürrîzade Abdullah Beyefendi, 85 fez: made compulsory, 50; outlawed, 94 266 INDEX

France, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 60, 77, Gümüşpala, Ragıp, 126, 127 85, 87, 90, 105, 106, 112, 113, 174, Günaltay, Şemsettin, 115, 122 228n80, 230n17, 233n58, 233n61, Güngör, Fidan, 186, 187, 192 233n71, 236n124, 242n73, 246n5 Gürsel, Cemal, 124, 125 Freedom Party (HP), 123 Gürses, Muharrem, 129 Freemasons, 132, 208, 261n76 Güven, İhsan, 203 Free Republican Party (SCF), 102, 107 Güven, Sibel, 203 Fuad Pasha, 52, 56, 57 Haji Bektash, 40, 228n75 Galata bankers, 55 hajj, 2, 13, 39, 60, 115, 128, 149, 198, Gastarbeiter, 137, 145, 150 221n27 Genç Kalemlar, 75 Hajjaj, Muslim ibn al-, 4 Gendarmerie Intelligence and Struggle Halide, Edip, 78 Against Terrorism (JİTEM), 191, 193 Hamas, 176 Germany, 77, 106, 112, 113, 137, 145, Hamidiye regiments, 63 150, 157, 195, 203, 204, 223n2, Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, 236n115, 239n21, 246n2, 246n4, 41, 220n13, 232n49 249n85, 249n86, 252n30 Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, Ghazali, Abu Hamid al-, 13 3, 5, 220n13 ghazi thesis, 25–29, 225n34, 225n35, Hasan, son of Ali, 3 226n43 Hasan Fehmi Efendi, 54 Gholizade, Abbas, 197, 200 Hatay, 105, 238n18 Gibbons, Herbert A., 26 Hat law, 95–96 Gladstone, William Ewart, 231n33 Hatt-i Hümayun (Reform Edict), 52, 53, Gobineau, Arthur, 17, 100 54, 58, 62, 63, 64, 230n18 Gökalp, Ziya, 76–77, 90, 166, 236n108 headscarf. See Islam: and clothing Gorbani, Ali Akbar, 197, 198 Hijaz, 35, 46, 60, 78, 231n38, 240n33 Great (BBP), 158 Hilafet Devleti. See Union of Islamic Greece, 33, 48, 70, 75, 83, 91, 105, 106, Communities and Congregations 121, 133, 135, 232n52, 234n79, (İCCB) 246n5 Hilâfet Ordusu (Army of the Caliphate), Greek Orthodox Christians, 22, 24, 31, 87 32, 33, 49, 58, 60, 63, 64, 66, 70, Hijra, 2, 81 72, 76, 91, 92, 105, 106, 107, 122, Hizbullah (Turkish), 185–95, 211; 139, 179, 225n24, 224.25, 227n56, ideology, strategy, and tactics of, 227n59, 230n17, 233n60, 241n57, 186–87, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 241n59, 250n94 195; organization, 187–88, 189, 190; Green Army, 240n43 origins of, 186; rebuilding of, 195; Grey Wolves, 130, 184. See also recruitment by, 188–89; relations Nationalist Action Party (MHP) with Iran, 187; relations with Gül, Abdullah, 166–67, 170, 172, 175, Turkish state, 191–92, 193; strength 181, 182 of, 188, 193–94, 195; unravelling of, Gül, Hayrinüsa, 167, 181, 256n141 193–95; war with Menzil, 192, 193; Gülen movement, 158, 159, 165, 253n58. war with PKK, 190–91, 192, 193 See also Nurcu movement Homo Islamicus, 154 Gülen, Fethullah, 158–59, 165, 254n88 Hunchak Party, 63, 232n55 Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerifi (Noble Rescript Hürriyet, 196, 197 of the Rose Garden), 50, 51, 52, 58, Hüseyin Cahid, 74 230n10 Hüseyin Hilmi, 71, 72 Gümüş, Edip, 194 Huseyin, son of Ali, 3 INDEX 267

Hussein bin Ali, 78, 236n124, 95, 101, 138–39, 145, 150–51, 152, 136–237n125 159, 163, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 174, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, Ibn Battutah, 219n7 217, 222n37, 222n39, 244n101, Ibn Maja, 220n11 247n28, 250n90, 253n61, 254n86, Ibrahim Pasha, 51, 230n13 259n40; and depictions of living İbrahim Şinasi Efendi, 57 creatures, 244n94; as ideology İbrahim Temoi, 67 of protest, 154; and secularism, Ibtidâî schools, 61 compatibility of, 14–15; and slavery, Idâdî schools, 61 231n24. See also Qur’an: precepts of Idealists’ Hearths, 130 Islamic banking, 11, 136, 151–52, 154, İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin, 175 155, 169, 222n40, 231n26 (consensus), 5 Islamic broadcasting, 149, 155, 162, 177 (theological interpretation), 3, Islamic cinema, 129 4, 5, 6 Islamic Federal State of Anatolia (AFID), İlhan, Harun, 207, 208 203 Ilıcak, Nazlı, 164, 165, 253n61 Islamic Law. See Shari’a İlim. See Hizbullah (Turkish) Islamic Movement Organization (İHÖ), İmam Hatip courses, 115, 117 195–98, 200 İmam Hatip schools, 93, 99, 117–18, Islamic publications, proliferation of, 126–27, 128–29, 136, 145, 149–50, 116, 129, 149, 154 151, 159, 162, 163, 164–65, 166, 169, Islamic Raiders of the Great East–Front 172, 173, 178, 179, 253n64, 254n84, (İBDA-C), 200–203, 204, 247n17 257n19 Islamist bourgeoisie, rise of, 153–54, Imperial Ottoman Bank, 55, 62–63, 70 162, 163, 214 Independence Tribunals, 87, 94, 96, 97, Islamist media, 155, 159, 162 98, 240n41, 243n76, 243n83 Ismail, 219n6 Independent Industrialists’ and Ismail, Shah, 37, 227n64 Businesspersons’ Association (MÜSİAD), 154 İsmail, Enver. See Enver Pasha India, 3, 100, 199, 224n21, 231n38 Ismailis, 219n6, 232n53 , 3, 160 Israel, 132, 136, 138, 156, 160–61, 199, İnönu, Erdal, 148 176, 207, 208, 209, 260n47 İnönü İsmet (İsmet Pasha), 90, 102, 105, Istanbul bombings (2003). See Al Qaeda 107, 111, 114, 116, 122, 126, 133, Istanbul Expres, 121 148, 246n12 Iran, 13, 19, 20, 21, 23, 36, 37, 38, 160, Jafari school of Islamic jurisprudence, 161, 175–76, 183, 184, 185, 187, 196, 220n12 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 205, , 35, 36, 40, 44, 47, 48 206, 215, 227n64, 241n48, 253n67, Janjaweed, 176 257n7, 257n14, 258n26, 259n45, Jerusalem Warriors (Kudüs Savaşcıları), 260n47, 260n49, 260n50, 260n51 198–200 Iraq, 20, 61, 136, 155, 160, 171, 172, Jews, 2, 7, 8, 18, 24, 29, 31, 32, 33–34, 43, 175, 176, 190, 208, 209, 210, 211, 58, 60, 62, 70, 90, 106–7, 112–13, 216, 217, 232n47, 238n18, 240n47, 122, 132, 161, 199, 206, 207–8, 209, 241n48, 242n73 221n23, 221n26, 222n31, 224n18, Irmak, Sadi, 133 229n81, 230n12, 244n105, 246n4, İshak Süküti, 67 253n52, 256n139, 260n51, 261n78 Islam: and architecture, 42–43; and Jihad, 8–9, 13, 27, 38, 77, 78, 93, 130, clothing, 11, 26, 44, 49–50, 69, 70, 138, 183, 186, 192, 195, 203, 205, 268 INDEX

206, 210, 211, 221n27, 221n28, 138, 139, 142, 143, 144, 149, 150, 240n34. See also Qur’an: precepts of 162, 166, 168, 170, 173, 178, 183, Jilani, Abd al-Qadir al-, 13 202, 203, 213, 214, 215, 225n35, JİTEM. See Gendarmerie Intelligence 242n73, 244n104, 251n15, 260n53, and Struggle Against Terrorism 260n59 , 7, 22, 28, 35, 36, 40, 63 Kemalpaşazade, 38 Justice and Development Party (AKP), Kent, Necdet, 246n5 167–82, 214, 215, 216, 217 Keshmiri, Abdulrezzak, 199 (AP), 126, 127, 128, 130, Kılıç, Hasan, 200 131, 132, 133, 134; attitudes of Kılıç Ali, 240n39 supporters, 169, 178; confrontations Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl, 116, 201, 260n52 with the secular establishment, 170, Kışlalı, Ahmet Taner, 200 172–73, 180, 181–82; domestic Kızılbaşı belief system, 38–39 policy, 170, 172, 173, 174, 176, Kızılbaşı revolts, 35, 36–38, 39, 40, 139 180, 182, 215; economic policies, Koman Teoman, 259n32 177, 182; election victory (2002), Köprülü Mehmet Fuad, 26, 28 168–69; election victory (2007), Kotku, Mehmet Zahit, 131, 144, 149 181–82; foundation, 167; Ottoman Kubilay, Mustafa Fehmi, 103 nostalgia, 175, 215; program before Küçük Kaynarca, Treaty of, 45, 46, taking power, 168; relations with 230n17 EU, 172, 174–75, 176, 177–78, 215, Küçük Mehmet Sait Pasha, 234n81 216; relations with other Muslim Kuleli Incident, 53 countries, 175–76, 215, 216; Kumar, Yaspar, 199 relations with United States, 171–72, Kuncak, İlyas, 208 175, 176, 216–17 Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), 175 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 152, Ka’bah, the, 2, 12, 13 156, 165, 175–76, 187, 190, 191, 192, Kadızade Mehmet, 44 193, 216 Kamhi Jak, 260n51 Kuriş, Konca, 259n40 Kamil Pasha, 71 Kutan, Recai, 164, 166, 167, 169, 258n29 Kaplan, Cemalettin, 203 Kutlu, Fehmi Hüsrev, 173 Kaplan, Metin, 203–4 Kuva-yı İnzıbatiye (Disciplinary Forces), Karaaslan, Şerif, 190 87 Karabıyıklıoğlu Hasan Halife Şahkulu, 37 Kuva-yı Muhammediye (Muhammad’s Karadayı, Hakkı, 164 Forces), 87 Karahisarithis, Pavlos, 241n59 Kuwait, 151, 155, 171 Kara Kemal, 243n90 Karakol Cemiyeti (Guard Association), Land, Real Estate, and Free Enterprise 83, 243n90 Party (TESTP), 116 Karatepe, Şükrü, 161, 164 Lausanne, Treaty of, 89–90, 91, 104, 105, Kars, Treaty of (1921), 239n23 107, 139, 238n19, 241n53 Kashmir, 156, 199, 206 Lawrence, T. E., 78 Kavakcı, Merve, 165 Le Bon, Gustave, 233n71 Kazan, Şevket, 156, 160, 164 London, Treaty of (1840), 230n14 Kazıdadelı, 44 London, Treaty of (1913), 75 Kazim, Musa al-, 219n6 Keçeciler, Mehmet, 152 Madımak Hotel, 156 Kemalism, 26, 81, 83, 84, 102, 103, 104, , 23, 29, 42, 49, 53, 71, 77, 92, 108, 109, 111, 117, 118, 120, 124, 93, 96, 234n87 125, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, Mahdi, 102 INDEX 269

Mahdi, Muhammad al-, 219n6 MİT. See National Intelligence Mahmud II, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 99 Organization Mahmut Şevket Pasha, 72, 73 Mithat Pasha, 58 Makal, Mahmut, 247n21 Mongolia, 18, 19 Makbule, 82 Mongols, 23, 24, 25, 223n5, 224n20, Malaysia, 3, 160 225n31, 226n38 Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, Moradi, Abdul-Ali, 200 3, 5, 220n13 Motherland Party (ANAP), 146, 147, Manichaeism, 20, 38, 39, 232n47 148, 151, 152, 153, 157, 158, 159, Manukyan, Matild, 260n58 160, 163, 165, 167, 169, 215n23, Manzikert, Battle of, 21–22, 30 215n28, 251n22, 259n33 Marshall Plan, 246n12 Muhammad, Prophet, 2–4, 7, 9, 11, 12, Marwick, Victor, 199 14, 19, 20, 29, 31, 39, 45, 81, 86, 87, Masnavi, 23, 225n28 123, 156, 215, 219n5, 219n6, 220n16, Masri, Abu Hafs al-, 206 220n18, 221n27, 221n28, 222n39, Mecca, 2, 12, 13, 35, 39, 45, 46, 49, 115, 224n20, 225n29, 225n34, 231n30 128, 149, 198, 231n38 Mumcu, Erkan, 170 Mecelle, 54, 59 Mumcu, Uğur, 199 Medina, 2, 35, 45, 46, 49, 60, 156, 219n2; Murat IV, Sultan, 44 constitution of, 2, 156, 219n2 Murat V, Sultan, 57 Musawi, Sheikh Abbas, 260n47 Med-Zehra, 158, 253n57 MÜSİAD. See Independent Mehmet II, Sultan, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 138, Industrialists’ and Businesspersons’ 226n56, 227n59 Association Mehmet V, 72, 77 Muslim Brotherhood, 187. See also Mehmet Kamil Pasha, 234n81 , Sayyid Mehmet Rifat, 86 Mustafa IV, 47 Mehmet Talat. See Talat Pasha Mustafa Kemal. See Atatürk Mehmet Vahdettin (Sultan Mehmet VI), Mutazilah, 220n8 85, 86, 89, 239n21, 240n33 Mehmet Vehbi, 89 Namık Kemal, 56–57, 58, 62 Melen, Ferit, 132 Naqshbandi: religious order, 14, 48, 60, Menderes, Adnan, 114, 116, 117, 120, 71, 88, 93, 94, 95, 96, 102, 115, 116, 121, 122, 123, 124 131, 144, 146, 149, 151, 158, 166, Menemen Incident, 102–3 171, 179, 183, 229n3, 260n52 Menzil Group, 186, 187, 190, 192, 193 national cinema, 129 Meshaal, Khaled, 176 National Development Party (MKP), Mevlana. See Rumi, Mevlana Jalal al’Din 114, 116 Mevlevi: religious order, 4, 14, 24, 66, 96, National Economy, 76. See also Asset 225n29, 228n71 Tax Michael the Syrian, 22 National Intelligence Organization military service, 52, 53, 69, 73, 103, 123, (MİT), 191, 193, 259n32 124, 235n96 Nationalist Action Party (MHP), 130, Millet system, 32–35, 85, 227n57, 132, 133, 134, 158, 165, 167, 168, 227n58 182, 184 Milli Görüş. See National View Nationalist (MDP), Milli İktisat. See National Economy 146 Mirzabeyoğlu, Salih. See Erdiş, Salih Nationalist Labor Party (MÇP), 148, İzzet 153, 157. See also Nationalist Action Misak-ı Milli (National Pact), 85 Party (MHP) 270 INDEX

National Order Party (MNP), 131–32 Özal, Ahmet, 152 National Salvation Party (MSP), 132, Özal, Hafize, 145, 169 133, 134, 135–38, 142, 145, 146, 166, Özal, Korkut, 145 183, 184, 185, 186, 200, 201, 203 Özal, Semra, 149 National Security Agency, 203 Özal, Turgut, 145, 146–47, 148, 149, 150, National Security Council (MGK), 126, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158 144, 161, 162, 172, 248n51, 251n14, Özbilgin, Mustafa Yücel, 180 251n15, 255n111 Özkök, Hilmi, 170, 172, 173, 180, 181 National Turkish Student Union Özmen, Ferhan, 198–200 (MTTB), 130, 136, 166, 170, 184, 185, 186, 257n10 Pakistan, 160, 183, 184, 205, 206, 208, National View, 135, 137, 157, 214. See 209, 216, 262n7 also Erbakan, Necmettin Palestine, 43, 51, 136, 156, 230n17, National Youth Foundation (MGV), 157, 237n132, 246n4, 261n74 163 Pan-Islamism, 59–60, 76, 158, 231n38 Nation Party (MP), 116, 120, 121, 128 Pan-Turkism, 67, 74–75, 80, 112, 130, Nâzim Pasha, 75 153 Nesin, Aziz, 156 Paris, Treaty of, 52 Neve Shalom Synagogue, 207, 261n74 Party for the Protection of Islam (İKP), New Ottomans. See Young Ottomans 116 New Turkey Party (YTP), 126, 128 Party of Freedom and Entente (HİF), 75 Nigeria, 160 Party of Ottoman Liberals (OAF), 70, 71 Nizâmiye courts, 54 Patriotic Alliance (İttifak-ı Hamiyyet), 56 Noel, Edward, 240n47 Penal Code, Article 163 of, 115–16, 118, Notaras, Lucas, 32 125, 152 Nur, 71, 119, 168 Penal Code, Article 312 of, 166 Nurcu movement, 119, 128, 131, 133, People’s Houses (Halk Evleri), 108 134, 158, 165, 167 Peoples of the Book, 7–8, 9, 28, 36, Nursi, Said, 119–20, 123, 125, 133, 158, 221n22, 230n15 168, 194 Pilavoğlu, Kemal, 120 Nutuk, 81, 95, 96, 98, 239n21, 239n22, pilgrimage. See hajj 244n98 Polatkan Hasan, 124 population exchange (1923–24), 91–92 Obysi, Hamed, 209 population resettlement, 31, 33, 37, 79, Öcalan, Abdullah, 165, 176, 252n39, 91, 103, 105, 243n76 254n85. See also Kurdistan Workers’ (HP), 146 Party (PKK) positivism, 65, 66, 84, 119 , 19, 20, 21, 22, 29 Progressive Republican Party (TCF), Okan Gaffar, 194, 195, 256n1 94–95, 97–98 Önal, Kamil, 121 Protestants, 64, 179, 227n58 Örfî law, 40, 41, 228n78, 228n79 Purification Protection Party (AKP), 116 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 135, 136, 175, 249n76, 262n4 (religious judges), 23, 41–42, 77 Orhan, 27, 29 Qisas, 7 Orkhon inscriptions, 18, 19 Quraby, Abdullah Hussein al-, 199 Osman, 25, 29, 31, 225n32, 225n38 Qur’an courses, 115, 118, 127, 143, 145, Ottomanism, 66, 67, 70, 73, 74, 216, 150, 162, 163, 179, 254n74, 258n23 233n70 Qur’an, precepts of: on clergy, 12; Ottoman Freedom Society (OHC), 68 on crime and punishment, 7; on Ottoman Unity Society (İOC), 65 excessive aggressiveness in war, 9; INDEX 271

on female clothing, 11; on finance 229n87, 230n17, 233n70, 236n115, and interest payments, 11; on 239n23, 240n43, 240n44, 246n4, gender issues, 10–11; on personal 254n68, 254n85 obligations, 12–13; on political systems, 5–6, 11–12; on slavery, , 43–44 9–10; on treatment of and attitudes Sabiyah (Seveners), 219n6 to non-Muslims, 7–8, 9; on war and Sadan, Ehud, 199 jihad, 8–9 Sadiq, Jafar al-, 38, 219n6, 220n12 Qutb, Sayyid, 189 Safavids, 36–37, 38, 40, 44, 227n63 Safi od-Din, 37 Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami, 145 Şahin, Leyla, 178 Raiders’ Association (Ak-Der), 137, 184, Samanyolu television channel, 159 185, 201 Samast, Ogün, 180 Rajabi, Zahra, 200 San Stefano, Treaty of, 58, 59, 60 Reaya, 28, 40, 226n48 Santoro, Andrea, 180 religious broadcasting, 117 Saqa, Loa’ al-, 207, 209–10 religious education, 23, 29, 42, 48, 49, Saraçoğlu, Şükrü, 113 60–62, 64, 82, 92–93, 99, 115, 116, Sarıkamış, Battle of, 79 117, 125, 129, 135, 143, 151, 173, Saudi Arabia, 145, 151, 167, 198, 199, 179, 217, 232n49, 233n61. See also 215, 220n14, 221n17, 253n55 Ibtidâî schools; Idâdî schools; İmam Savaş, Vural, 162 Hatip courses; İmam Hatip schools; Schiltberger, Johann, 29 madrasas; Qur’an courses; rüşdiye Scholarios, Georgios (Patriarch schools; Sultânî colleges Gennadios II), 32 religious foundations, 23, 29, 42, 49, 77, Sebilürreşad, 116 92, 107, 118, 120, 137, 139, 157, 159, secularism, 6, 14–15, 17, 27, 32, 42, 49, 170, 180, 194, 195, 228n71 52, 59, 61, 72, 76, 77, 78, 82, 90, 93, religious nongovernmental 98, 99, 102, 103, 108, 111, 112, 114, organizations, 118–19 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, Republican (CMP), 120, 123 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, Republican Peasants’ National Party 137, 139, 140, 142, 143, 149, 150, (CKMP), 126, 128, 130. See also 151, 152, 155, 158, 159, 161, 162, Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, Republican People’s Party (CHP), 92, 98, 172, 173, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 102, 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 182, 183, 190, 193, 196, 197, 198, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 199, 200, 202, 205, 214, 215, 230n11, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 249n79, 262n4 133, 134, 139, 148, 160, 169, 173, Selam, 200 181, 182, 248n40, 253n65, 256n142 Selim I, 37, 46, 226n56 Republican Reliance Party (CGP), 132, Selim III, 47, 48 133, 134 Seljuks, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 223n3, Reşit Pasha, 50, 51, 52 224n20, 224n22, 225n35, 225n37 Rifāīyah, religious order, 60, 232n40 Sephardic Jews, 33 Risale-i Nur, 119 Serbia, 32, 59, 75, 199, 200, 229n2 Rumi, Mevlana Jalal al’Din, 14, 23–24 Sèvres, Treaty of, 83, 89, 238n19, 240n47 rüşdiye schools, 48, 49, 61 Seyit Rıza, 104 Rushdie, Salman, 156 Sezer, Ahmet Necdet, 170, 173, 177, 179, Russia, 45, 47, 51, 52, 58, 59, 63, 67, 68, 180 77, 79, 80, 107, 175, 205, 229n86, Shādhilīyah: order, 60, 232n42 272 INDEX

Shafi-i school of Islamic jurisprudence, Sufism, 8, 13–14, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 37, 3, 5, 220n13 38, 39, 222n47, 228n74, 232n42, Shamanism, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 39, 232n47. See also tariqah 224n17, 228n72 Şükrü, 97 Shari’a, 3–5, 6, 7, 14, 23, 24, 36, 40, 41, Süleyman I, 38, 41, 44, 145, 226n56, 42, 43, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 229n82 68, 71, 73, 77, 87, 89, 93, 103, 116, Süleymancılar, 115, 118, 127, 145 119, 120, 131, 136, 138, 145, 149, Sultânî colleges, 61 155, 161, 162, 186, 196, 201, 203, Sunni Islam, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 18, 21, 23, 214, 219n4, 220n12, 220n16, 221n17, 24, 29, 30, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 60, 88, 93, 94, 108, 117, 127, 129, 130, 228n78, 228n79, 242n65, 252n43, 136, 139, 140, 143, 156, 179, 187, 261n66, 262n4 201, 219n5, 219n6, 220n8, 220n12, Shari’a courts, 7, 41–42, 52, 93, 77, 220n13, 220n15, 222n48, 223n50, 221n17 227n66, 227n69, 228n72, 228n73, Sheikh Abul Huda al-Sayyadi, 60 228n74, 242n71, 250n4, 262n4 Sheikh Ahmed, 53 Surname Law, 101–2 , 30 Syria, 23, 33, 37, 51, 79, 80, 105, 160, 175, Sheikh Hamza Zafir al-Madānī, 60 205, 207, 227n69, 230n13, 242n73, Sheikh Mekkeli Ahmet Hamdi, 95–96 252n39, 254n85 Sheikh Muharrem, 96 Sheikh Osman Hoca, 96 Talat Pasha, 68, 69, 72, 73, 75, 76, 79, 80, Sheikh Said Revolt, 93–94, 95, 96, 103, 83, 235n106, 237n136 116, 119, 201, 242n73, 243n75, Talayhan, Sabahattin, 192 243n76 Talu, Naim, 132 Sheikhulislam, 41, 42, 49, 50, 54, 66, 72, Tanin, 74, 78 74, 77, 85, 86, 87, 92, 120, 231n26, , 50–53, 68 242n65 tariqah, 13–14, 20–21, 23, 39, 43, 48, 53, Shia Islam, 3, 23, 36, 37, 38, 39, 201, 60, 66, 71, 77, 84, 88, 89, 93, 96, 102, 219n5, 219n6, 220n12, 222n48, 108, 109, 111, 115, 116, 118, 119, 223n50, 227n63, 232n53 127, 143, 146, 155, 158, 161, 166, Shrewi, Abdurrahman, 199 171, 179, 183, 213, 222n48, 229n3, Simavi, Sedat, 197 254n74. See also Bektashi; Mevlevi; Simich, Zivorad, 199 Naqshbandi; Rifāīyah; Shādhilīya; Sinan, 36 Süleymancılar Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa (Special Singapore, 160 Organization), 76, 80, 83, 236n107 Sivas, Congress of, 85 Tevfik Pasha, 89 6–7 September, pogrom of, 121–22 Tevhid, 200 Social Democracy People’s Party (SHP), 31 March, Incident of, 234n85 148, 152, 153 Ticani, 120 Society for Muslim Unity (İMC), 71, 119 Tirmidhi al-, 220n11 Society for the Employment of Muslim Translation Bureau, 49, 56, 65 Women, 78 True Path Party (DYP), 148, 152, 153, Sofu, Halil Ibrahim, 203, 204 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, Speak Turkish Campaign, 105 165, 167, 169, 251n28 Special Finance Institutions (ÖFKs). See Tunahan, Süleyman Hilmi, 115. See also Islamic banking Süleymancılar Sublime Port, 49, 75 Tunalı Hilmi, 67 Sudan, 176 Tunç, Abdülaziz, 193 INDEX 273

Turcomans, 22, 24, 25, 37 Ülkümen, Selahattin, 246n5 Türk Derneği, 73, 75 Ülkü Ocakları. See Idealists’ Hearths Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Ulusu, Bülend, 141 Association), 100 Union of Islamic Communities and Türkeş, Alparslan, 130, 133, 134, 142 Congregations (İCCB), 203–4 Turkey Unity Party (TBP), 129, 132 United Kingdom. See Britain Turkish Citizenship, Law on, 112–13 United States, 26, 64, 114, 130, 147, 153, Turkish Conservative Party (TMP), 116 155, 156, 160, 161, 164, 169, 171, Turkish History Thesis, 17–18, 100–101, 172, 176, 179, 184, 198, 199, 202, 123, 223n5 203, 206, 207, 210, 216–17, 221n26, Turkish Industrialists’ and 233n58, 233n61, 246n12, 254n67, Businesspersons’ Association 261n72 (TÜSİAD), 153 Unity Party (BP). See Turkey Unity Party Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, 130, 139, 140, (TBP) 142, 143, 149, 150, 151, 154, 214, Urbanization, 118, 129, 138, 154, 188, 248n62 213 Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Ürgüplü, Suat Hayri, 126, 127 Affairs (DİTİB), 150, 252n30 Urhan, Mehmet, 260n58 Turkish Labor Party (TİP), 128, 131 Turkish military, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, Vahdet bookshop, 186 61, 62, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 75, Varlık Vergisi. See Asset Tax 77, 79, 82, 83, 86, 89, 95, 103, 104, Vasat, 204 123–24, 125, 126, 131, 134, 140, Vasıf Bey, 93 141–45, 161, 162, 163, 164, 170, Velioğlu, Hüseyin, 186, 187, 188, 189, 172, 173, 174, 180, 181, 182, 248n52, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 211, 257n8, 248n54, 251n14, 251n16, 261n76 257n9, 258n22, 259n40 Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), Village Institutes, 111, 114, 118 129, 177, 257n10 Virtue Party (FP), 164, 165, 166, 167 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Volkan, 71 (TRNC), 174, 249n72 Von der Goltz, Colmar Freiherr, 67, 68 Türkiye Komünist Fırkası (Turkish Vural, Engin, 208, 209 Communist Party or TKF), 88 Türk Kultur Kurumu (Turkish Cultural Wahhab, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-, 45, Society), 98 220n14 Türk Ocağı (Turkish Hearth), 75, 78, 105, Wahhabism, 45, 145 106, 108 Wahhabist revolt, 45 Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish History Warriors of the Turkish Army of Islamic Association), 100 Liberation (TİKMO), 185 Türk Yurdu, 75, 76, 108 Waqf. See religious foundations Tutar, Cemal, 194 (RP), 148, 167, 169, 214; 28 February Process, 160–64, 179, 214, and anti-Semitism, 156, 160, 161; 216 and democracy, 156, 166; and Developing Eight (D-8), 160; and Uthmanic codex, 3, 220n16 domestic policy, 161–163; financing Uçok, Bahriye, 199 of, 157; and economic policies of, Uğurlu, Feridun, 208 155–56, 254n70; and EEC, 156; and Ulema, 14–15, 23, 29, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, foreign policy, 156, 160–61; and 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 60, 61, Ottoman nostalgia, 157; and party 62, 71, 77, 92, 93, 99, 178, 213, 214, organization, 156–57; in power, 223n49, 225n35, 229n3, 231n26 160–63 274 INDEX

Western Working Group, 161, 162 Yılmaz, Durmuş, 177 Wingate, Reginald, 78 Yılmaz, Mesut, 152, 160, 163, 164 Wittek, Paul, 27, 28 Yolga, Namık Kemal, 246n5 World War I, 76, 77, 79, 90, 92, 98, 104, Young Arab Society, 74 105, 119, 121, 236n115, 240n44 Young Ottomans, 56–57, 59 World War II, 109, 112, 113, 246n12 Young Raider Association (Ak-Genç), 185 Yahya, Yasef, 209 Young Turks. See Committee for Union Yalman, Aytaç, 172, 173 and Progress Yarar, Erol, 154 Yugoslavia, 199, 200 Yassin, Sheikh Ahmed, 176 Yüksel, Necdet, 199, 200 Yazıcıoğlu, Muhsin, 158 Yürüm, Yuda, 199, 200 Yeni Gün, 108 Yeni Osmanlılar. See Young Ottomans Zaman, 159, 257n18 Yeni Safak, 176 Zarqawi, Abu Musab al-, 209 Yeryüzü, 260n51 Zehra Foundation, 194 Yeşil Ordu Cemiyeti (Green Army Ziya Bey, 108 Association), 88 Ziya Hürşit, 97 Yezidis, 61, 232n47, 257n8 Ziya Pasha, 57, 58 Yigit, Baki, 206, 207, 208 Zorlu, Fatin Rüştü, 124 Yıldırım, İzzettin, 194 Zoroastrianism, 7, 20, 21, 39, 232n47 Yıldız, Bekir, 161 Zübeyde, 822