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Crossing the Green Line to “Interim”Conference, Held Last November, Which Thebysouth) Crossing the Green Line BY Kyna Rubin reeks, Turks, PoliTics, Cypriots on both sides from their homes. higher education history, brainwashing, buffer Today a United Nations buffer zone still zone, suffocation, opportunity. runs west to east, separating Greek Cy- These are the words that domi- priots in the southern two-thirds of the on the divided Gnate conversations about higher island, known as the Republic of Cyprus education on the divided island of Cyprus‚ (ROC), from minority Turkish Cypriots island of Cyprus an emotionally inflamed entity of less than in the North, which in 1983 declared a million people that lies 45 miles south itself the Turkish Republic of Northern of Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea. “As Cyprus (TRNC). Of the island’s 780,000 is both a conduit a mediator, I was stunned by how little people, 77 percent are Greek Cypriots had been done to deal with the raw emo- and 18 percent are Turkish Cypriots. of change and, tions felt on both sides about the atroci- In an April 2004 referendum Greek ties committed by both between 1955 and Cypriots rejected the United Nations re- 1974,” says arbitrator Edward Costello in unification initiative known as the Annan at times, a stark describing the conflict resolution work Plan, sparking ire on the part of Turkish he did on Cyprus as a Fulbright scholar Cypriots who had approved the plan. in 2005. “Those emotional wounds appear The next month, the Republic of Cyprus reminder of to have been passed down to later genera- joined the European Union (EU)—an tions in the schools.” event that has brought both benefits the difficulties Cyprus’s wounds are born from its and challenges to southern Cyprus, but complex history. The island, the size of little change to the trade-embargoed and Connecticut, is a horseshoe-crab-shaped economic underdog North, which is rec- that remain strip of land whose strategic importance ognized by no nation but Turkey. and mineral wealth historically has The fact that full-fledged universities acute across spawned its occupation by every power have a short history on the island—its in the region. Part of the Ottoman Em- oldest university is only 26 years old—is pire in the 16th century, the island whose tied to this troubling backdrop. Tangled the cultural and name means copper in Greek became a political relationships with Greece and British colony in 1878 and gained inde- Turkey and the 1974 war inhibited de- political divide. pendence in 1960. Unrest between its mand for home-based universities. Be- M AR+APR .06 Greek and Turkish communities plagued fore the 1980s Greek and Turkish Cy- OR t the nation from the get-go. A 1974 coup priot parents typically sent their children CA against the Cyprus government by abroad to study—to Greece and Turkey, u eD Greece’s military dictatorship resulted respectively, and when they could afford in the intervention of Turkish troops, it, to the United Kingdom (UK), Europe, IONAL followed by division of the island and and the United States. Financially able t formation of ethnic enclaves that forced young Cypriots continue to prefer these RNA te N I Crossing the Green Line destinations for university education. In- deed, over half of all Greek Cypriot and 15 percent of all Turkish Cypriot college students studied abroad in 2004-2005. But the 1980s and 1990s saw a prolifera- tion of local private institutions, which now number almost 40, and two flagship public universities, one on each side. These now provide opportunities for quality higher education at home—par- ticularly in technical and business fields, but increasingly in the traditionally less popular humanities and social sciences. Key to the island’s ability to sustain so many colleges and universities, relative to its small population, is the same factor that has shaped its history for centuries: geography. Cyprus’s proximity to the Middle East—it is 60 miles from Syria— coupled with competitive tuition rates makes it an attractive destination for the region’s university students, whose fees are sorely needed. Politicians on both sides of the island are keen to educate foreign students who, beyond revenue, create goodwill once they return home. Students from Muslim countries share MAR+APR.06 a special cultural affinity with northern Cyprus, but plenty of them also enroll in Greek Cypriot institutions. I N the Genesis of an Industry te RNA In the South, development priorities t have included goals to become a regional IONAL hub for medical, educational, high-tech, eD es and business service centers. These aims u could not be met without a more robust CA imag t OR etty etty G higher education infrastructure. North of the buf- Cyprus’s proximity common to traditional societies, some is due to fer zone, higher education is one of the few eco- politics. “Cypriot college and university students nomic engines available to Turkish Cypriots. The to the Middle often prefer to be ‘lectured at’ and given the ‘right’ blossoming of private universities is due in part answer,” she says. Education is also colored by the to Turkey’s recognition of degrees provided by East—it is 60 miles “distorted perspective” that the educational sys- these northern Cyprus institutions, and to excess tems on both sides of the green line encouraged. demand for higher education among students in from syria—coupled “Each side was taught to see their side as right, the Turkey, who occupy a large portion of slots on other as wrong.” Given the almost complete lack of Turkish Cypriot campuses. “Higher education contact between 1974 and 2003, when checkpoint is more than just education for us,” says Osman with competitive restrictions were lifted, she says, “an entire genera- Ertug, Washington representative of the Turkish tion grew up deprived of the firsthand experiences Republic of northern Cyprus. “It’s an industry, a tuition rates makes that would have encouraged them to moderate and pillar of economic development, and a way out of revise these stereotypes.” Efforts on both sides are our current isolation.” it an attractive now underway, she notes, to create a more bal- The result of these changes is a plethora of anced presentation of the island’s history. universities, many still in their adolescence, on an destination for the Old world mentalities, and perhaps political island that not so long ago had none. Quality is prejudices, may slowly give way as Cypriot aca- variable, which is to be expected in a young in- region’s university demic officials seek to expand and modernize their dustry. But many institutions hire faculty who are institutions—in the South to meet EU standards, foreign or foreign-trained and enjoy some form students, whose in the North to engage in a precious trade oppor- of exchange or joint degree agreement with over- tunity, and on both sides to bolster national pride. seas counterparts. Generally recognized leaders fees are sorely Part of an opening process on Cyprus would, bi- are Eastern Mediterranean University (which is communalists hope, also include increased Turk- state-run) and Near East University in the North, ish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot interaction. Cyprus and the University of Cyprus (state-run), Intercol- needed. politics preclude official collaboration between lege, Cyprus College, and Fredericks Institute of Greek and Turkish Cypriot universities, but in- Technology in the South. These two sets of insti- formal links among researchers north and south tutions operate on completely separate tracks. of the green line, and at conferences off the island, The 30-plus colleges in the South follow the Greek university are not uncommon. Phone calls, e-mail, and neutral meeting spaces system and teach in Greek, though the more prominent private within the buffer zone are channels for people-to-people discussions schools stick to English. The official languages of the University and cooperative projects. of Cyprus are Greek and Turkish, but Greek is used most (English is limited to the English department) and, as such, is a deterrent Stepping up to the Eu Plate to foreign students, admits the ROC’s Ministry of Education and The biggest news for the Greek Cypriot academic community is the Culture. Greek is also the instruction language of two new public benefits and obligations ensuing from the ROC’s May 2004 ascen- institutions—the Technological University of Cyprus (opening in sion to the European Union. According to Spyros Spyrou, assistant 2007) and the Open University of Cyprus (2006). But the Ministry of professor of anthropology and sociology at Cyprus College in Nico- Education and Culture notes that the laws governing these schools sia, a slew of EU regulations that local institutions are expected to might be revised to include English as the language of instruction follow if they are to remain competitive will help improve higher “in order to attract foreign students.” All university instruction in education. For instance, many schools are expected to introduce the the North is in English. European Credit Transfer System, which will facilitate Cypriot stu- M AR+APR .06 The Ministry of Education and Culture accredits institutions in the dents taking courses in EU universities. Other regulations, he says, OR t South; Turkey’s Higher Education Council recognizes northern uni- require setting up national quality assurance agencies. “These are CA versities. Shared by schools on both sides is an adherence to authority big challenges for the country and for higher education institutions,” u eD and hierarchal systems that some foreign faculty on the island report- says Spyrou, who received his Ph.D. from SUNY/Binghamton. edly are trying to loosen. Critical thinking and skepticism toward Cyprus’s EU membership has brought significant drops in tuition IONAL received wisdom and authority are not as integral to Cyprus primary fees for Cypriot students studying in EU countries, says Spyrou, mak- t education as they can be in the United States, found Karin Costello, ing higher education in places like the UK even more attractive to RNA a Santa Monica College English professor who spent six months as Cyprus’s young people.
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