Kemalism in the Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse Showed Goal Thefactlevel There That Atatürk’S Civilization’

CEU eTD Collection A POSTSTRUCTURALIST APPROACH TO APPROACH A POSTSTRUCTURALIST KEMALISM IN THE TURKISH FOREIGN THE TURKISH IN KEMALISM In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophy of IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY: ANDFOREIGN IDEOLOGY Department of International Relations and European Studies Supervisors: Supervisors: Nicole ReneeLindstrom and Paul Roe POLICY DISCOURSE POLICY Doctorate in Political Science Central European University European Central Özlem Demirta Word Count: Word Count: 90,082 Budapest, Hungary Submitted to Submitted 2008 By ú Bagdonas CEU eTD Collection material material ideas from authors. or other unreferenced contains does thesis the my nor adegree.To knowledge towards from CEU I hereby declare that no parts of the thesis have been submitted to no other institution different DECLARATION Özlem Demirta ú Bagdonas CEU eTD Collection integrationistin the approaches role Kemalism to foreign of policy,followedTurkish by the is and what identified defensive asthe as wellbetween discourses, individual party and the discourse governmental between the differences were remarkable There template. Kemalist single a than rather Kemalism, of objectives the of constructions competing periodsthree –1960-1979,1980-1989, and1997-2007. Kemalism during by to each other recourse linked to policies military establishment these analyze in-depth parties analysisdiscourse waytheleadersof to government and the the Kemalism inthis the study relationship, follows adiscursive epistemology and conductsan Cyprusallegedly policy – two incompatible foreign policies. In toinvestigate the roleorder of toreconcilediscourse andcounterpoiseWestern/European-orientation Turkey’s andthe official Turkish in the a template as served has Kemalism how of question the on focuses herebroadly theset ideasas of and objectives attributed tofollowing Atatürk’s path. It or rationality. foreign policy ideology discourse, is intrinsically not of suggestive a particular policy,identity of the Beingaconstruct iscausal. it than rather co-constitutive, constructed; discursively in relationship the foreign ideology policy foreign is and between argues that policy and ideology role framework forstudying atheoretical the of thisdissertation presents approach, how interests andidentities are reconstituted foreignthrough making.policy Building onthis study research indeterministic adiscursiveto approach agenda employs and poststructuralist contrast, In orientation. or policy action foreign a specific ideas on and identities factors in foreign policy. Most of these works aim to show the independent impact of It is found that both policies have been reconciled and counterpoised by means of means by counterpoised and reconciled been have policies both that found is It conceptualized Kemalism, ideology, a particular of therole examines The dissertation ideational in interest so-called the witnesses arenewed literature policy The foreign A BSTRACT CEU eTD Collection policies are inherently opposite to or compatible inherently with each other. to or policiesopposite are these that and goal specific a towards policy foreign Turkish directs Kemalism that claim to construction and continuous the change ideology the Kemalism. of isof it Thus, problematic tothe has alsocontributed thestudy reveals, Western/European as orientation. Thisprocess, these to ascribed definitions discourse competing each policies, were usedin of legitimization the elements Kemalism of elements same the While affiliation. political their of regardless leaders party as well as to the relationship between the Cyprus policy and the CEU eTD Collection W RATIONALIST C APPROACHES TO C C I L NTRODUCTION IST OF HAPTER HAPTER HAPTER EST 3.2. Deconstructing the official discourse...... 91 3.1. The official discourse (1960-1979)...... 82 Introduction...... 80 2.3. From the rational/ideational dichotomy to their discursive ...... 69 construction 2.2. Ideas/ideologies as factors in foreign ...... 56 policy 2.1. Ideas as a ‘trifle’ of foreign policy...... 48 Introduction...... 47 1.3. Conceptualizing ...... 39 Kemalism the objectives of Kemalism and the principles of Kemalistforeign policy...... 29 1.2. Beyond the ‘six arrows’ and reforms: 1.1. The origins of Kemalism...... 24 Introduction...... 21 Structure ...... 16 of the dissertation Research design...... 15 ...... 11 Methodology The theoretical approach...... 5 3.1.3. The Cyprus issue: a brief overview ...... 87 of the discourse 3.1.2. ‘Peace in the world, Turkey in the West’...... 84 3.1.1. Peace at home, generals in the parliament: the officers’ take on Kemalism...... 82 2.3.3. A poststructuralist approach to ideology and foreign policy...... 76 analysis...... 75 2.3.2. Methodological in considerations poststructuralism and the use of discourse 2.3.1. Poststructuralist approaches to foreign policy...... 72 2.2.2. Ideationalist approaches to Turkish foreign policy...... 61 2.1.1. (Neo)realist approaches to Turkey’s Western-orientation ...... 51 and Cyprus policy 1.3.1. Conceptualizing ideology and Kemalism ...... 41 as an ideology 1.2.2. Modernization/ civilizationism/ Westernism and the idealistforeign policy...... 36 1.2.1. Full-independence and the realist foreign policy...... 31 1.1.1. The ‘six arrows’ of Kemalism and ...... 26 Atatürk’s reforms /E the Turkish-Islamic ...... 111 synthesis 3.2.3.1. The discourse of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP): 3.2.2.2. A pro-Western foreign policy: Western and/or national interests?...... 104 3.2.2.1. Demirel’s ....100 ‘Justice Party’: Western democracy fulfillto Atatürk’s vision 3.2.1.2. Flexible foreign policy and Turkey’s role as a guardian of democracy...... 95 the view of the Republican People’s ...... 91 Party (RPP) 3.2.1.1. Kemalism from the ‘left of center’ to the ‘democratic left’: A UROPE AND THE BBREVIATIONS I:T III: I T II: :C I: / IDEATIONALIST DIVIDEA TOWARDS POSTSTRUCTURALIST FRAMEWORK ONCEPTUALIZING IDEOLOGY HE ROLEOFIDEOLOGY INFOREIGN POLICY HE CLASHOF ...... 1 K EMALISM C ...... iv YPRUS ISSUE YPRUS ...... 21 K T EMALISMS? T ABLE OF (1960-1979) K : HE FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE ON THE EMALISMAS AN IDEOLOGY AND BASIC i C ONTENTS ...... 80 : FROM THE ...... 47 CEU eTD Collection CONTEMPORARY DEBATE C C HAPTER HAPTER 5.1. The defensive approach...... 175 Introduction...... 170 ocuin...... 165 Conclusion 4.2. The civilian diplomacy and the Özal-Evren era (1983-1989)...... 142 4.1. The military ...... 131 era (1980-1983) Introduction...... 129 ocuin...... 126 Conclusion the ‘EU and Cyprus ...... 186 as Turkey’s rights’ 5.1.3. The elements of ‘reciprocity’, ‘equity’, and ‘respect for past-agreements’: countering further integration with the ...... 177 Muslim countries principle: policy foreign a as Secularism 5.1.2. Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Westernism’...... 176 5.1.1. ‘National struggle against Customsthe Union’ vs. ‘national struggle against 4.2.3. Kenan Evren’s reconstitution of Kemalism ...... 154 and foreign policy Kemalism as a pursuit of a realist, rationalist and active ...... 144 foreign policy 4.2.2. Putting the ‘national interests’ on the front: ‘sovereignty belongs to the nation’...... 143 4.2.1. The Motherland Party’s moves to claim legitimacy: 4.1.2. Kemalism and foreign policy during the ...... 136 military era 4.1.1. Kemalism from a ‘battle-zone’ to a ‘buffer-zone’...... 131 Westernist foreign policy under ...... 162 the ‘sword of Damocles’ andhervocation: European 4.2.3.4. The ‘West’ infringing upon Turkey’s sovereignty and the pursuit of Atatürk’s goals...... 159 Turkey’s4.2.3.3. presencein community Western the 4.2.3.2. Multidirectional foreign policy, and ‘peace at home, peace in the world’....155 4.2.3.1. Kemalism as a condition for achieving ‘peace at home’...... 154 European identity...... 151 ‘reachingthrough the level modernof the civilization’ and inherent Turkey’s 4.2.2.4. Legitimizing Western/European the vocation the challenging An Cyprusissue:4.2.2.3. activeto the approach and conciliatory as a condition for ‘peace at home, peace in the world’...... 147 4.2.2.2. Playing active: sustainable economic development advancing ‘peace at home, peace in the world’...... 145 4.2.2.1. Pursuing the traditional foreign policy: 4.1.2.3. Kemalism,non-submission, and the Western-orientation...... 140 swallow policy’ of the imperialist West...... 138 4.1.2.2. Domestic unity through Kemalism against the ‘divide, dismember, and principle...... 136 4.1.2.1. Reconstituting the elements of the ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ 3.2.4.2. The ‘national view’ and orientation towards the Muslim world...... 122 the discourse of the National Salvation Party (NSP)...... 120 3.2.4.1. Thepath ‘nationaltowards salvation’: 3.2.3.2. A multi-directional foreign policy: towards anti-Westernism...... 115 :K V: V K IV: EMALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY EMALISMAND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE status-quo ...... 170 policies...... 149 ii (1997-2007): 1980 S AN ANALYSIS OFTHE ...... 129 CEU eTD Collection C B ONCLUSION IBLIOGRAPHY ocuin...... 225 Conclusion 5.2. The integrationist approach...... 206 Concluding remarks...... 240 ...... 232 The findings Resolving the puzzle...... 230 The goals of the study...... 229 projecting the Kemalist principles and ‘civilization’ ...... 218 beyond Turkey 5.2.4. The elements of Kemalism as a ‘model’ to other countries: ‘independence’, ‘non-interference in the domestic affairs’ ...... 215 and ‘sovereignty’ 5.2.3. Projecting the EU vision on the Cyprus issue: revising the concepts of civilization’...... 212 5.2.2. The EU reforms as a primary means to ‘reach the level of the contemporary towards a pluralist and national security-free conception of Kemalism...... 207 Restoring 5.2.1. ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘participatory democracy’: approach to ‘peace at home, ...... 197 peace in the world’ and ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’: ‘No submission to the EU’, and a bolder 5.1.5. The elements of ‘full-independence’, ‘national sovereignty’ 5.1.4. ‘The EU is not the only address of the contemporary ...... 193 civilization’ ...... 229 ...... 247 iii CEU eTD Collection WP VP U.S. UN TRNC TPP RoC RPP RPNP OIC NUC NSP NSC NATO NAP MP JDP JP IR EU EEC EC DP DLP CENTO L ISTOF A BBREVIATIONS Welfare Party Party Virtue United States Nations United Turkish Republic CyprusNorthern of True Path Party RepublicCyprus of People’s Republican Party Nation Party Peasant Republican Conference Islamic of the Organization Committee Union National National Salvation Party National Security Council Organization Treaty Atlantic North Nationalist Action Party Motherland Party Justice and Development Party Party Justice Relations International European Union European Economic Community European Commission Party Democratic Democratic Left Party Organization Treaty Central iv CEU eTD Collection (accessed December1, 2007). policies? irreconcilable these of both affirm Kemalism, odds with her Western/European-orientation? If so, how can a single ideology, namely demand ananswer in this thefollowing:context are Is Cyprus indeedTurkey’s policy its at study explore the theoreticalto ideology linkbetween and policy. foreign questions The that Western/European-orientation. interesting Turkey’scase an Cypruspolicy and Thisprovides both for criterion legitimating aself-evident been has Kemalism since moves policy foreign ExaminingKemalistideologyis in role of vital understand the the thiscontext Turkey’s to the suspensionthe of EUmembershipnegotiations.Turkey’s Rehn’s words, as failing tocomply with the terms of the Association Agreement couldlead to Olli Commissioner Enlargement EU in the crash” “train a signalled statement This lifted. was (RoC) for trade unless the trade embargo to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) herCyprus tothecomply Republic to open of not ports Turkey EU’sdemands would with the revealed this tension when Turkishthe Prime RecepTayyip Minister Erdo eventA recent Cyprusissue. the regardto with conflictresolution, especially countries to of affairs domestic in the interfere to institutions international of right the from ranging as Turkey has been in anumberdivergedboth issues, theway tumultuous of they approached and EEC/EU the between the relationship Yet, four decades. more than for then EU the 1 it helps as discourse, policy foreign Turkish in the legitimized been have objective EU the and policy isprocess important andinteresting, itis important toexamine equally Cyprus howboth EUaccession Turkey’s could derail that such attempt an undertook government Turkish Ian Traynor and Nicholas Watt, “Turkey clashes with EU overCyprus,” Turkey showed remarkable persistence in her quest to be a member of the EEC and member EEC bethe a her of in quest to persistence remarkable showed Turkey understanding Turkey’s actions rather than rather actions Turkey’s I NTRODUCTION 1 assuming 1 While the question as to why the why to as question the While Guardian, June 16, 2006, possible causes for them. ÷an declared that CEU eTD Collection posing one of the greatest obstacles for Turkey’s future EU membership. On the one hand, membership. one On the future EU for Turkey’s obstacles greatest posing of the one to Western-orientation, cherished Turkey’s from deviations as are declared that policies the Kemalism rangedfrom reaching thelevel Western the of civilization and theEU, affirmingto by whathassignified However, been Atatürk’s principles. to declared allegiance their diverging articulations of the policy makers. Indeed, all governments that camepower to have Kemalismnotforeignfixed a from been policy, been single has to or definition exemptthe foreign policy? and ideology between relationship the about example this from learn we can what Moreover, signify? it does What policy? foreign Turkish for Kemalism of significance is the what in Turkish foreign makespolicy following the discourse tooimportant tooverlook: questions presence Kemalism of thepersistent place. in since 1930suntil In first context, this today the general the notitpublic,in havebeen present would foreign Turkish the policy discourse role in foreign Turkish policy—ifhad itlegitimate no meaning for the makers for policy or precisely the reason why Kemalism should capture the and the and the between is nodifference there conclusion: epistemologically, an at opposite arrive then we would context, of discursive the a policy meaningoutside ascribe a to to impossible has the sort of rationality maker apolicy know whether to itis possible that assumption the ifwequestioned However, we attribute to foreign wouldanalyzing amountto policy discourse the him or her, and if we suggested Turkish the Kemalism have structured called objectives ideas/ideals and of the set how instead thatrather than itcertain ideas,ideologies isor ideals. If we accept this conventional view,focusing on interests national the pursuing about mainly is policy foreign as extraneous seems ideology Despite its endurance as one of the most referred legitimating criteria of of criteria Turkish legitimating referred most as the of one endurance its Despite To the realist school in International Relations (IR), the examination of the role of role the of examination the (IR), Relations International in school realist the To core . Ironically, the fact that Kemalism is an important an is Kemalism that fact the Ironically, . 2 core façade of our attention in ofourattention its studying of Turkish foreign policy. façade , then becomes , then façade CEU eTD Collection Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük 2 orientation as the intervention 1974 was undertaken unilaterally and warningsthe against of submission to EU’s wishes on the matter is taken as a deviation from it Kemalism,consequence while of is asadirectissue, presented the EU’sposition on the Atatürk’s path. Indeed, according tosome, Turkey’sin Cyprus it policy, diverges that from be discussed indetail in the firstchapter, these are elements also attributed tofollowing imperialism implementedand forthefull-independence right of oppressedthe nations. Aswill Western against directed foreign policy Realist and ofan active anexample as beenseen has evolution of between relations Turkey and the West/European Union. Turkey’s Cyprus policy early fact despiteit the 1960s created thatacontinuing source of tension throughout the Cyprus policy, whichhas remained asthe ‘national cause’ Turkey of 1950s since late and the Western-orientation, Turkey’s from deviations so-called the of one on articulations the policy orientation of a country? foreign a specific have impacton generally, a causal ideology can an More membership? Alternatively,policy West/Europe? the itimpedefordoes towards EU Turkey’s quest thisother, brings thefollowing tothefront: questions Does Kemalism directforeign Turkish the over one choose to has one If elsewhere. look to European too but EU the enter to enough European lockingbeingnot Turkey’s Turkey to EUpath, of to facilitator as an obstacle and for position Turkey of one mostwhere as Kemalism,both adheredideologies,the a appears a rathertragic irreconcilable suggest articulations two these Taken together, vocation. EU and principles. On the other Atatürk’s reforms of and advancement is the the protection EU the towards regardedas path hand, Kemalism is also Kemalism and the seen central to aspiration are and European Western-orientation Turkey’s presented as an anti-thesis of Turkey’s Ergun Aybars, Ergun Turkey’s Cyprus is from policy seen a also Western-as Turkey’s disengagement in a template as alsobeenemployed has notin end Kemalism here. The puzzle does Atatürkçülük ve Modernle , 13th ed., (Istanbul: ú me ø leri Yay (Izmir: Ercan Kitabevi,2000), 109-122; Yekta GüngörÖzden, Õ nlar 3 Õ , 2005), 117. 2 . CEU eTD Collection Foreign Policy,” 5 Relations,” Quarterly Euro-Turkish and Greek-Turkish for Union European the to of Cyprus Accession 4 2000 (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), 149. New Prospects War,” official discourse, we get a more complex picture. To the present government, there isneither there government, Tothepresent picture. a more complex weget discourse, official views on the matter. However, if we focus on how both policies are legitimized in the Turkish discourse. in the they are articulated how of independently and from separately be identified EU)can the assumed that the interests and the identity of a state (as well as those of larger entitiesjoining theEU.2)Turkey’s ispursued Cyprus policy manner. inanon-European it is Thus, such as conclusions:for two Cyprus important irrational, isquest Turkey’s 1)Turkey’s policy given issue. with doesit nor member, with accord the of European style the dealing traditional in Cyprusbe neitherserves relation policy to pursued to goal an EU Turkey’s 3 of. she isa part herconducts blackmailing complying policy ratherwith thethrough than terms of treaties the Turkey areconsidered of RepublicmanifestTurkish Cypriots the that co-founders asthe keeping the Turkish military introops islandthe andher refusal recognizeto the RoC until insistence AccordingTurkey’s on thisfrom view, to West. the temporary disengagement Cyprusincompatible heras with policy European-orientation than rather itseeing a simply as herconsider Turkey’s Cypruspolicy,has conducted Turkey which thestylereferring with to foreign especially since thebeginningof pursued policy, Coldthe War. pro-Westernist ofthe parameters regular from the adivergence itas seen have scholars Western the bloc, tobe which Turkey chose latea partas of 1940s.In regard,somethis Ibid. Tar Mustafa AydÕ Õ k O Middle Eastern Studies Indeed, these arguments center on an apparent clash between the EU’s and Turkey’s ÷ 17, 1 (Winter 2006): 73-101. uzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratisation in the Context of the EU Accession Process’ on Turkish (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 114; Williamand Hale, n, “Determinantsn, of TurkishForeign Policy: ChangingPatterns and Conjunctures during Coldthe Mediterranean Politics, 9,1 (Spring 2004): 108; Costas Melakopides,“Implications of the 4 It is hence argued that Turkey’s insistence on giving no concessions on her on concessions no giving on insistence Turkey’s that argued hence is It 36, 1(January 2000): 37; YaseminÇelik, 4 Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkish Foreign Policy 1774- 3 Some, however, Mediterranean 5 This suggests CEU eTD Collection the Present Politics of Kemalism in Turkish Political Discourse,” 8 (accessed February 12, 2008). ve Kalk Adalet yoktur,’ sapma bir ufak en 7 available from (accessed December1, 2007). 6 EU, and the Cyprus towards policy between Turkey’s an incompatibility deviation from Turkey’s EU-orientation. Turkey’s from deviation suitable venuefor answering these Most questions. of Turkishforeignthe policy analyses are The theoretical approach other? each with and against reconciled areposed policies certain in that a way discourse foreign policy the ideology structure an can How foreign policy? inTurkey’s role ithave acausal does Kemalism beideology followingthe Can asan researchquestions: conceptualized and ifso, rolethe Kemalism of in Western/European-orientation Turkey’s and Cyprus policy and raises contributeaims tothe on to discussions in byfocusing rolethe ofideology policy foreign on dissertation present The policy? Cyprus the and Western/European-orientation Turkey’s to precarious. but also Kemalismsnot only complicates the linkbetween Cyprus Turkey’s policy and the EUgoal makes these between clash the Kemalism.The of content the interpreted in government the part relationshiptook that parties the way inthe difference is alsoa there is more, What them. counterpoised reconciled Cyprus in the Turkey’s EUobjectivepolicy as traditional those and aswell that between that in articulations both the beenemployed has Kemalism Furthermore, with EEC/EU. the Kemalism Turkey’saccelerate integration torevisehave Cypruspolicy Turkey’s as to beenattempts and Turkish foreign policy rather The term was first used in Özlem Demirta Özlem in used first was term The Recep Tayyip Erdo Adalet ve Kalk Given its exclusive focus on interests, the Realist school in IR does not provide a Kemalisms” “clash of can make apparent senseof the we How Õ nma Partisi, “Bakanlar Kurulu Toplant an, “Ba÷an, ú bakan Erdo an: ‘Aç÷an: Õ nma Partisi, November 5, 2006, available from available 2006, 5, November Partisi, nma ú Bagdonas, “The Clash of Kemalisms? Reflections on the Past and Past the on Reflections of Kemalisms? Clash “The Bagdonas, 7 Õ However, as we will see in our discussion, there k ve söylüyorum,net kim dersene desin, AByönelimimizde 5 ÕVÕ ,” Adalet ve Kalk Turkish Studies Õ nma Partisi, December11, 2006, 9, 1 (March 2008): 99-114. 8 especially with regard especially 6 nor even a slightest a even nor CEU eTD Collection Identity: AConstructivist Approach the Cold War Eastern Studies Mustafa Ayd Quarterly Aras, “Turkish Foreign Policy and Jerusalem: Toward a Societal Construction of Foreign Policy,” Making: Turkey as anExample, 1991–2002,” 11 eds., Keohane, O. Robert International Relations in the Modern World and Foreign Policy,” of Communist Studies & Transition Politics 10 during the Cold War”; Çelik, ømge Kitabevi,1998); Ayd Changing Role inWorld Politics Policy 1774-2000 ; Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Ayd a Changing Europe Power 9 preferences. policy ‘rational’ these for reasons political and security, refer certain economic, to policy that Cyprus and Western-orientation of Turkey’s determinants studies onthe are numerous andthere based onthis approach, respect, the ideational approach does also not present a suitable framework to analyze the how to framework presenta suitable alsonot does ideational approach the respect, this In policy. foreign on Kemalism of impact the show that inanalyses ideology Kemalist the interests as a variable for foreignnational defending the takes approach toit. WhileRealistthe character anideational ascribes policy, the same reason merely as but approach takes an interest, what Realist the to from refrain acausalrole giving emerges as one of the elements not ideational in approach the does it Furthermore, means foreign approach a cautious ofpolicy. others for narrowly Westernist, Kemalism—for is someit or inherently of boundaries defined loosely the to according vary approach ideational the of arguments the interests, of definition guiding Turkishforeign policy practices. some studies on Turkish analysis. policy foreign policy assign in asa foreign variable emerge ideologies causal ideas and however, school, ideational the a place to Kemalism, referring to its role in See for instance, Barry Rubin, and Kemal Kiri For instance, Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, “The Impact of Institutionalized Ideas in Coalition Foreign Policy Foreign Coalition in Ideas of Institutionalized Impact “The Özkeçeci-Taner, Binnur instance, For See, for instance, Rick Fawn, “Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies,” (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); Meltem Müftüler Baç, Nevertheless, just as the conclusions of the Realist approach pre-given onthe depends approach Realist of the conclusions justasthe Nevertheless, 22, 4 (Fall 2000): 31-58; Aras, Õn, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” (London: Hurst & Co., 2003), 139; Yücel Bozda 35, 4 (1999): 171; Philip Robins, 10 (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997); Hale, 1997); Press, University Manchester NewYork: and (Manchester In a quest to point out the role of the ideational factors in foreign policy, foreign in factors ideational the of role the out point to aquest In International Studies Quarterly Ideas and Foreign Policy Õ n, “Determinantsn, of Turkish ForeignPolicy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects. (Cornwall: Ashgate,2003); Oral Sander, (New York: Routledge, 2003). Turkey 19, 3(September 2003): 1-41; Werner Levi,“Ideology, Interests, (London Newand Routledge,York: 1996);Judith Goldstein, and Foreign Policy Analysis ú çi, eds., 11 and theGreater Middle East Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since theend of (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,1993). 14, 1(March 1970): 1-31; Alan Cassels, Õ n, 6 9 Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A From the perspective of what can be called as Turkey inWorld Politics: An Emerging Multiregional ÷OÕR÷lu, 1,3 (November2005): 249-78; Bülent Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Türkiye’nin D (Istanbul: TASAM, 1994); Turkey’s Relations with Õú Politikas Turkish Foreign Ideology and Arab Studies Arab Õ (Ankara: Journal Middle CEU eTD Collection 13 Hansen and Ole Wæver(London: Routledge, 2002), 20-49. Policy Theory,” in Routledge, 2006); Ole Wæver, “Identity, Communities, and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign 12 reproduced. and produced are interests material and identities the that policy foreign of formulation their through is also it policy, foreign a certain of in representations their material interests or identities tocertain recourse This isapproach basedon viewthe that while theforeign policy makers havedecision Hansen. Lene and Wæver Ole of works the mainly and analysis policy foreign to approaches a pre-discursivelyidentity. defined interest or it In so, doing draws onpost-structuralist discourse theory of ideology and foreign policy. role of Kemalism in this relationship on the other provide a good case for an application of the hand, the compatibility and of her Cypruspolicy Turkey’s with European-orientation and the foreign on Kemalism relationship Turkish onepolicy contested between the the and discourse and and in the interests process foreign identities of the produced making.policy Moreover, compatibility their of extent the policies, foreign ideologies, between relationship the study to framework be asavaluable theoretical analysis can utilized discourse argumentthat the foreign policy ratherdiscourse than independently producing it. by the andideas areconstituted interests that ignore approaches Both overtime. changes same ideology can lead to contradictory foreign policies or how the definition of Kemalism there canbethere foreign between nocausal can relationship and identity:policy relationship their interests, identitiesand of certain definitions we have tothe access discourse that is itthrough these identities and rationalities do not exist outside of the discursive sphere. In other words, if as vocation) EU for Turkey’s causes of as Turkey increase importance strategic to the interest discursive identity rationality or for aforeign policy (Turkey’s inherentEuropeanness or Hansen, 1. Lene Hansen, Lene The dissertation takes foreign policy as a discursive construct rather than an output of on centers and divide from rationalist/ideationalist this moves away This dissertation Security asPractice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States 13 This suggests that itisimpossible define Thissuggeststhat apre- to 7 (London and New York, , ed. Lene 12 CEU eTD Collection Journal Turkey’s ‘Western’ Identity During the Cold War: Discourses of ‘Intellectualsthe of Statecraft’,” Narratives of the Cold War University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Campbell, Theory”; David Campbell, 14 the at perpetuate their power elite to by governing the employed atool as usually considered also ideologies as a discursive construct. In most of the studies on ideology, ideology is policy and ideology. This takingrequires identities, notonly interests andforeign policies but agenda inforeign policy by studies studying the co-constitutive relationship foreign between discourse. policy by foreign the alsoreconstituted ideologiesanalyze are how itto possible makes identity and rationality is by constructed ideology-drivenan is Whatdiscourse. more, italso examineideology foreignmakesitsort offoreign policy alsopolicy towhat possible and focusing between on relationship the foreign makers, of policy the identity-based articulations and interest the from exempt not are ideologies As rationality. and identity national/regional a particular with compatible found is in ‘ism’question whether the as to statements involve also articulations their ‘isms’, certain to recourse by policies foreign legitimize makers policy When policies. foreign their justifying in makers policy the by employed templates main ofthe alsoone are ideologies Indeed, interests. and identities variational of construction discursive the or policy foreign for criteria legitimating main the examining for identities identity and policy foreign between leaders, etc.). NGO academics, media representatives, parties, governments, of makers (heads policy the of articulations foreign in policy the are reconstituted identities certain exactly how analyze and discourse policy foreign the of structures main the only be argued to be co-constitutive. Therefore, what is interestof of this approach is to reveal See especially, Wæver,“Identity, Communities, and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy 61 (Winter 2005-2006): 39-59. In this sense, this study In this extendsense, this study aims the scope to of poststructuralistthe research relationship co-constitutive the on centered mainly is agenda research this While Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity (Boulder, Colo.:L. Rienner, 1993); P 14 , one does not need to have an exclusivefocus on Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics,and the 8 Õ nar Bilginnar andEylem Y Õ lmaz, “Constructing (Minneapolis: International CEU eTD Collection Greenwood Press, 1997); Franz Schurmann, Publishers, 1993), ix; Will Fowler, ed., 1990), 4; RogerEatwell and Anthony Wright, eds., 15 society. thatis sharedby asa beliefs genuinely andthoughts the expensesystem or of rest the of construct, constituted by construct, whostruggle hegemonicthe ofpolitical actors, attempts with one adiscursive as studies in these taken issimilarly ideology discourse, policy foreign in ideology focus While role isnot the authors’ chapter. of in in these first bethe discussed detail Laclau, will LousePhillips, and which mainly,of discourse, andErnesto Mouffe Chantal that for it. its assign actors componentscontending toandcompeting meanings construct compositions remain in and bytheintellectuals, cannot individual the actors as policy asone representations competing foreign In policies. ideology, this sense, being as despite structured a single ‘ism’ which is certain exposed to redefine as changes its actors policy the elements justifying while of content the various ideas, hereasarepertoireis of ideology taken Rather, direction. certain second chapter,this study not ideology does take afixed as ideas setof direct that policies ina the and first inthe in detail bediscussed will which particular, in Kemalism and ideology to approaches conventional the to contrary Hence, policies. formation certain of the for variable andidentities, ideology and that interests aproduct acausal arguments take of as certain society and/or by publicthe politicalthe against elite. imagery,ideology appears as a medium of eitherpower used bythepolitical elite the against this In identity. a certain with affiliation of their as aresult of society somethe or segments by as is adhered all a system beliefsor ‘real’genuinely interests that of againsttheir actually is adhere what to leading people society, the of part on the false-consciousness creates that See for instance, John Thompson, John instance, Seefor This ideology deconstructivist approach toseveralto owes works hegemonyon and In line its with poststructuralist however, approach, from this study departs those 15 In these studies, ideology is conceptualized either as a negative system of beliefs Studies in the Theory of Ideology Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America The Logic of World Power Contemporary Political Ideologies 9 (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 188. (Westport, Conn.: (London: Pinter CEU eTD Collection orientation and/or deviations from it also allows for studying how an ideology it studying orientation deviationshow anideology from and/or for allows also aspecific (and policy foreign a particular of constitution the into an analysis sense, In this discourse. foreign policy the they how structure and are constituted ideological templates variational to-be-acquired identity or should-be-held rationality. Rather, the focus should be to show how ideologies andforeign policies, or of the to take comparingtask policies the of a a country to same ‘ism’, then the focus of the of name the to ideas by recourse different analysis emphasize and policies different legitimize should not be to revealto attempt asactors discourse by policy foreign the reproduced if arealso and ideologies a causal relationship between a certain policy, to ideology an of directives link that so-called the a system of statements to refers discourse foreign policy If in question. ideology mainof the contours the reconstitutes articulations,foreign policy (in discourse a defining specific identity rationality)and/or in turn ideology While providesmainideology. one of makers repertoires for the for the decision their foreign policy or interests material identity, specific a from deviation a constitutes foreign policy acertain whether rather than identifying foreign policy debate the structure that narratives the and policy of criteria legitimating basic the on focusing requires orientation this study studyingargues that the continuity discontinuity and a certainof foreign policy constitution. ideology through sphere policy foreign this focusesstudy on politicalthe actors’ discursive struggle for establishing legitimacy in the the later party discourses and the initial concepts of concepts initial andtheThatcherism. later party discourses the of terms composed of the discourse, itas amixed bydefining to this contributes discussion (November, 1998):855. 17 16 establishing afixed fordefinition is it impossible. discussion hegemonyof ideology and that ideologysuggests is a dynamic and discourse hence another’s formulation of the key concepts of the ideology in question. Laclau and Mouffe’s Louse Phillips, “Hegemony and Political Discourse: The Lasting Impact of Thatcherism,” Impact Lasting The Discourse: Political and “Hegemony Phillips, Louse Mouffee, Chantal and Laclau Ernesto Bringing intoliteraturein ofideology thisconceptualization the poststructuralist IR, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 10 16 Phillips’ analysis of Thatcherism of analysis Phillips’ (London: Verso, 1985), 105. 17 Informed bythis approach, Sociology 32, 4 CEU eTD Collection 18 discourses” “basic ideology in ToreferHansen’squestion. to terminology, can be partly this done byidentifying the reconstitute to serve dynamics these andhow discourses different between interactions the in analyzing interested is it Second, ideology. and policy foreign a particular of goals the to areattributed meanings howvariational show to actors by the political articulated of key concepts constellations in the is interested Hence, ituncovering interests). material analysis, such as contentdiscourse to approaches positivist other the by it)meant whatthey or or particular statement analysis (tryinga formed why find they to out actors inminds of get the discourse to (attempting to approach to measure the relativeconstructed importance in foreign of ideologypolicypolicy), discourses. to In this traditional the move from away to need the articulate or orientation policy of a general respect, then part a as it policies certain does (present policies their not articulate makers policy that followdiscourse discourse through a psychoanalytic ideologies reside interests, sinceis placeandthat, do not it inanon-discursive identities, analysis is theMethodology best meansin time. to study marginalized ideology are that of some constructions while ideology, ‘same’ tothe reference by thelegitimized be also could policies irreconcilable apparently even process, discursive ideological this of affirms the previous or alternative templates of thatideology. Thus, given the contested nature templatesbe andas once ‘fixed’ and for all,buteach maker asserted reasserted challenges policy or of by then foreign ideology the constructed attempts can hegemonic actors, the never policy is ideology If reconstituted. and is constituted it) with together rationality and/or identity Hansen, 52. How could one study this complex process? This dissertation is based on based is view the on Thisdissertation couldthis process? complex onestudy How 18 within the general foreign policy discourse to trace the change of the of change the trace to discourse policy foreign general the within 11 CEU eTD Collection 21 Selected Essays and Interviews 20 Press, 1985), 112. 163-168; 161-187; AlexanderNehamas, Theories of International Relations trans.Robert Hurley al. et.(London: Penguin Books, 2002), 225; Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism”, in 19 not beyond history. be practices totallyfrom to thatthey if considered are usually exemptchange evolution and in asits daily object institutionstakes thathavebecome andpractices our soself-evident those Foucaultian genealogy. This method,which can be as‘thereferred history present’,the of itof followsthe crux the marginalized, were representations and alternative how constituted Kemalism in foreign Turkish backpolicy discourse init understand history how to was discourses. by formulations provided responds other to the each discourse intime. in analyzeideology a alsoneeds Yet,one how within discourse certain to question action of courses legitimize present the to inhistory been has remembered question what the of struggles and this inthis strategies the crux approach asasking can besummarized process, of was inunravel various his power continuing to the works mainattemptWhile Foucault’s effects. varied power-knowledge eachhaving histories, interwoven multifarious trajectories, rather but them of history grand and a single not is there that reveal to and objects and identities, how they changes, disciplines,institutionsconstitute practicesundergo subjects and does not provide a separate or alternative definition of Kemalism showto how this ideology is In other. it Kemalism takingas a associated path, following with Atatürk’s set of elements toeach are juxtaposed that policies legitimize particular to served have Kemalisms contending objective history of Kemalism in foreign policy Turkish butdiscourse various analyzes how an objective and a single history of events. Devetak, 167. in History,” Genealogy, “Nietzsche, Foucault, 163; SeeDevetak, See Michael Foucault, SeeMichael 21 Insofar as this dissertation traces the constitution of the present construction of construction present the of constitution the traces dissertation this as Insofar In line with this approach, the present dissertation attempt provide In line not does dissertation presentto the with approach, this an ; in other words, asking how we came to this point without taking the task of of writing without taking task the point came tothis askinghowwe words, ; in other 19 Power: The main focus of genealogical analysis is to show how these how show is to analysis genealogical of focus main The , ed.D.F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139-164. Essential Works of Michael Foucault , 3rd ed., ed. Scott Burchill et. al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Nietzsche: Life as Literature as Life 12 Language, Counter-Memory,Practice: (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University , 1954-1984, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, 20 CEU eTD Collection power during the period—single-party Here duringrule).power main the period—single-party the focus isnot only circulation the on was in of party that the and that military establishment of the discourse the analyzes (which highly polarized of composed coalitional governments (astheanalyzederainvolves five basic discourses parties—multi-partyis around whilechapter structured political Hence,the third polarization the period. during not necessarily,albeit on, depends time a given at rule), discourses basic of number the onseen, be will it as thestudies, number chapter of parties thatprecariousness four take part focuses in the the and show plurality the government servesto While this conservative. or democratic, social onof and twothe the levelbasicofficial in i.e. arestructured nationalist, political terms they the identity discourses of that represent, of discourses discourse parttake in governmentthe and of that militarythe establishmentduring period,andbasic the that parties of discourses the is, that which discourse, official the on focuses analysis The another). is usually legitimacy for one with on clash is discourses’ dependent also discourse within a particular analyzed changes how show (to discourses alternative the delegitimize to as attempting by legitimacy its one in most establishes each of andhow discourse possible) madearticulations certain which developments the reveal (to periods case the during place take that events main the to both given is attention of with andtheir eachother relations thehistorical particular In developments. respect, this interested in how these discourses change in time, both in terms of their content and as a result is itas approach follows thegenealogical study present Kemalism, the by legitimized of source knowledge. only asthe possible thediscourse relies on dissertation the respect, this In discourse. particular that of Kemalism the as Kemalism as to refer study analyzesinstead thedefinitions by makersprovided policy the andwhat accepts they Kemalism it, with meanings the construction of than associated another this rather examining being or misinterpreted stretched by policythe makers. Since thiswould yet contribute to In its identification of ‘basic discourses’ in Turkish foreign policy discourse that is that discourse policy foreign in Turkish discourses’ ‘basic of identification its In 13 CEU eTD Collection reaction to an alternative formulation of that ideology; how ideology is hence constituted by a is hence ideology ideology; constituted how that of an formulation alternative to reaction a is infact anideology to attributed term how aspecific in understanding iscrucial discourses contending between dynamics the studying this regard, In alternative discourses. previous or changes. Thisto gain legitimacy process, for a particular policy study in is change discourse showing by continuity. within Each actors’ struggle constructed and asgive a newthe meaning to studyideology as moves undertaken by in political the actors givesperiod each the afurther analytical tothe reach contextshows, discursive the on focusing in time, changes certain to exposed was alsoKemalism of constitution involves actors’ delegitimizationwhole canbereadas and history the defensive toKemalism.integrationist of approaches the Kemalismby discourses, developed thestudy depend on as a previous also the terms the of the of constructions present Second, asthe other. bythe initiated theterms capture of to each andthe attempt between parties of blurredasaresult clash competing the gets approaches parties many involved different are in makingit of the and how the divide between two these show how the present politics ofmeanings attributed to them. Structuring analysis the these around two discourses servesKemalism to canthe and beprioritized, being read Kemalism of elements as the a represent, clash they identity/rationality of two Kemalisms while two main discourses policies). these in de-linking used were Kemalism of elements which and orientation, that are identified madeit‘linking’ situate Cyprus possible to as compatible with policy Western/European- between Kemalism, as Cypruspolicy Western/European-orientationand (to findwhich out ‘integrationist’ isestablished what beingsort of words, relationship in other Western/European-orientation; elementsKemalism both being Cyprusof the are linkedand to policy Turkey’s and ‘defensive’,of various constructions of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse but alsobased on how the on the While analyzing the official discourse in three time periods helps showing how the In lastthe case chapter, the study moves analyzeto the party/military discourses under 14 CEU eTD Collection establishment at times of modern/postmodern military coups) as a unit of modern/postmodern as military establishmentat timescoups) The of a unitanalysis. of orientation/EU vocation were linked to each other through the elements of Kemalism. how theso-called these and incompatiblediscourses, of policies Western- Cyprus and Cyprusthe issue,how competingidentities Kemalist inand rationalities were constructed and Turkey’s Western/European-orientation in to involvingrelation moments period decisive partinin took 1980-1989, governmentthe and periodsthe 1960-1979, 1997-2007,each that ofthe parties in discourse the pathwerepropagated Atatürk’s following with associated elements the how analyze I Kemalism of role the to framework this Applying policy. Cyprus Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse on Western-orientation/EU vocation and chapters, the following part of the dissertation is devoted to the detailed analysis of the role of Research design a givenpolicy at evolve.time structures andhow these foreignforbut mainlegitimating nodal examining the provide also criteria points which justifypolicies) both is to employed point nodal same case the (in each other with reconciled same venue Thisprovides period. not onlyanalyzinga promising for policies howcertain are by of in era basic previousthe previous the chainconstructed the and the other discourses that both on dependent are discourse each of points nodal the how show is to focus main the and inCyprus policy case) our legitimized have by been tothese nodal recourse Here points. discourses in each period and how various policies (with regard to Turkey’s EEC/EU vocation basic the by Kemalism to tied been have points nodal which investigate I framework, points’ to refer the to of theposition the Thestudy discourse speak for. they term draws on Laclau useof the and‘nodal Mouffe’s from contingent actors political the by made additions and definitions delegitimizations of series provided for a certain ideology. Based on this Hence, this part study took thatin parties the takes (and thegovernment themilitary is in two first the approach presented andmethodological While this theoretical 15 CEU eTD Collection on the Realist and ideationalist approaches, the chapter turns to the poststructuralist approach, turns poststructuralist to the chapter the approaches, Realistideationalistandthe on draw studies andthe problemsthe of that After arguments mainassumptions, discussing the ideology of Kemalism, aliterature review, and the first part of the theoretical framework. In secondas chapterservesboth the respect,this chapter. a historical introduction to the isof ideology conceptualization in developed theoreticalframework the that integrated in the analternative andprovides approach’, and‘integrationist i.e. ‘defensive approach’, inAtatürk’s literaturepath onKemalism, the basic identifies literature, in approaches two the following with associated objectives policy foreign and elements main the reviews chapter Structure of the dissertation articulations and the elements of Kemalism. policy foreign the between made links the to regard with them among differentiation identity) Kemalism and analyze forstarting allows agood to of point thesource this sense, the examining way each andparty governmentdefines its political view (political In foreignsphere. on policy to the discourse political the of is projection the discourse policy foreign that premise the based on is study also the Moreover, parties. among different those than bedebate on public the reflected to arelesslikely parties variations within the opinion the that analysisassumes the themselves, within parties existthe also differences argue that is fair it to level. while Second, atthegovernmental maybereconciled while thesedifferences factions political betweendifferent of contestation the points allows examining leaders party focusing assumption that individual on party the and deliveredby programs the statements the books written and theinterviews by given leaders. party the based This choice is the on asthe aswell conferences, press leaders, party of the statements public declarations, military governmentand programs, sources: party awide rangeanalysis encompasses primary of Chapter 2continues by discussion the the roleanalyzing ofideology in foreign policy. 1introduces definitions contested the Chapter onKemalismin This literature. the 16 CEU eTD Collection of competing example henceperiod excellent servesasan This governments composed parties. polarized of representations andmilitarycoup, 1971and interventions an 1973 era of and and instability political coalition Turkey. werealso domesticthree There mainly crisesthisperiod, during 1960military the of KemalismCyprus followedby American which was military embargo andeconomic sanctions on and in amilitary member the EEC intervention Turkey and undertook to became anassociate diverging period, this each During linkedother. to legitimized and were these how policies 1980, and partydebate on Turkey’s Western/European-orientation and theCyprusissuebetween 1960 and discourses. The of a specificideology. components chapter policy or foreign asingle for objectives the than assuming rather discourse foreign policy the examine to has one then reality, unchallengeable an than rather constructs discursive are ideologies as well as policy foreign certain a from if deviations 7) and policy; proposed the orientation linkthe through its established constituentelements between and the objective of policy foreign a general of an affirmation or from deviations as policies certain denote to its alternatives, ideology is never linked to a single foreign policy direction; 6) ideology serves certain identity and rationality; 5) as a certain constitution of ideology and foreign policy bear ideology 4) foreignconstruction involves alsothrough discourse policy a constitution of foreign policy discourse with the elements tobe used for the legitimization of certain policies; foreign andideology causal policy are not but co-constitutive; ideology 3) provides the between relation 2)the inforeign policy; ideology of role analyze the theoretical to tool isHere it argued that:1)discourse analysis can be both used as a methodological and within agendain framework theproposed of theoretical andsituates this IR. this approach, role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse by building on some of the assumptions presents the main theoretical and methodological framework to be employed to analyze the Chapter 3 discusses how the elements of Kemalism structured the foreign policy 17 CEU eTD Collection Second, the analysis shows that these competing approaches suggested divergent policies to policies divergent suggested approaches thatthese competing shows analysis the Second, propagating rolesustainablethe development. rationalism thatelevated aneconomic of and other the threats, security emphasizing approach and undertakingone adefensive Kemalism, to approaches twosignificant makers by decision reveals speeches delivered the analysis the the of in period, reached this consensus significant the Despite approaches. policy Western-orientation, cherished Turkey’s notwithstandingwithin in differences the Cyprus the integrated that elements Kemalist the of re-ordering the and Kemalism of reading membership as it turned intoan indirect condition forit. Here itis argued that it was a specific change in Turkey’s position on Cyprusissuethe became linkedclosely toTurkey’s EEC partially because wasrejected, EEC the full membershipto for application Turkey’s and when established of Turkey’s Cyprusstable policy, single as political factions butan statedera of bya de-politicization long followed period military coup bya party in the ECgovernment. report.anda different 1980s picturenot which colored the 1970s,the isby present pole-apartthe In this respect,The period a a singleproduce link encompasses between /European-orientation.Cyprus and Turkey’sWestern not did Kemalism of elements identities, Kemalist competing constructed discourse contested the time whenwhileforeign is pursuing this It argued that ascribedelements topolicy. aKemalist rationalist the and ideational the with associated each TRNCEuropean-orientation, Western/ and policy Cyprus was linkthe anindirect between constructed that template discursive a triangular reveals analysis by governments and howthese ofKemalism. werestructured discourses elements the The staff, headselements of the basic domestic discourses representedof by the chief officials of thegovernments military and the Cyprus causeweremade by makers decisionthe during this period, examining the Western-orientation Turkey’s between link the way in the anddifferences significant identifies chairmen of the parties that took part in the coalition Chapter 4 turns to discuss another crisis period for Turkey. In contrast tothe 1960s Turkey. contrast for crisis In discuss period another to Chapter 4turns 18 CEU eTD Collection a number of theoretical conclusions derived from the analysis of the role of Kemalism in Kemalism of role the of analysis the from derived conclusions theoretical of a number discussed in the first two chapters, a review of findingsthe of the case chapters, and discusses policy. Cyprus the and vocation European Turkey’s to in relation makers policy the of path structure with foreignassociated Atatürk’s continued pursuing to the articulations policy elements The part in took governments. that theparties by are employed butall staff military of the within discourse the circulate only not path do Atatürk’s accomplishing to attached called as the ‘post-Kemalist’ era. Itis shown that despite the claims tothe contrary, objectives and the role how Kemalism during in of foreign is was policy Turkish what reconstructed how Turkey’s European-orientation and Cyprus policy have been withinsituated debate, this It analyzes with theEU. integration tofurther democracy conditioned whiletheother power, neo-colonial a as EU the taking and freedoms individual than rather threats on focusing context, specific Turkey’s on dependent as democratization the viewing one approach, integrationist and defensive the between divide main the structured Kemalism of elements democratization measures inTurkey period. This this examinesduring chapter howthe and liberalization extensive also been have There dispute. the of resolution the for conditions no RoCasamemberwith of the approve Turkey’s and acceptance candidacy EU’s failure to Turkey,i.e. so-called the ‘postmodern coup’ of February military 28 memorandum, andthe for moments crisis several involved period The member. a became then and membership for EU applied RoC asthe inseparable becamepolicies each other,two these be linked to not official thatTurkey’s discourse position on Cyprusissue the membershipand the EU should integration the insistenceof regard toTurkey’sissue.and theCyprus European the Despite rationalities for Turkey. beinWest relation pursued toCyprus competing and and reproduced identities and The conclusion provides a summary of the theoretical and analytical arguments and analytical theoretical the The conclusion of a summary provides Chapter 5focusesmarked on which isalso recentperiod the bysignificantevents with 19 CEU eTD Collection in foreign policy. in foreign ideology of research future for role the on anumberquestions research chaptersuggests the of Turkish foreign Finally,policy. theweaknessesandstrengths upon reviewing of approach, the 20 CEU eTD Collection Ero et. al.,250-51; Yusuf Ziya Ara “Atatürk Yolu: Ak Politika Sempozyumu: Bildiriler Bo 27 ù Atatürk 26 Baykal, eds., 25 Destekleme Vakf Do Destekleme Vakf Demokrasi” in Demokrasi” 1996), 21-22; An others Kemalism means resistance to Western imperialism. Western to resistance means Kemalism others itself. renews continually that movement modernization is a but ideology an into developed never Eastern society into a Western one and is intrinsically democratic a Western society oneandisintrinsically into Eastern an of thetransformation represents that ideology by asarational definedpragmatic some circumstances and, therefore, it is an embodiment of social and political isprogress. itof and political social anembodiment circumstances and, therefore, ishas it changing apotentialtoberenewedFor others, the that to an ideology according elites, who preserve their power at the expense of the will of the majority of the population. model. military-bureaucratic For some, Kemalism represents a type of regime and governance,Introduction given its similarities to a 24 Do Mehmet Hakan Yavuz, “Turkey’s Fault Lines and the Crisis ofKemalism,” Crisis the and Lines Fault “Turkey’s Yavuz, Hakan 23 ed. Erguned. Özbudun andAli Kazanc 22 ahinler, Giritli and Baykal, 128; Turhan Feyzio See for example Halide Pek, “Atatürkçü Dü K See forexample, Ahmet Taner K See Cengiz Çandar, “Atatürk’s Ambiguous Legacy,” See Ergun Özbudun, “The nature of the Kemalist Political Regime,” in Regime,” Political Kemalist ofthe “The nature Özbudun, SeeErgun ÷aziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk ÷Xú ÷lu, úWÕ Õúlal rma Merkezi, 1995), 37-38;Mehmet Gönlübol,“Atatürk’ün D u,” in u,” 26 , ed. Ça, Gerçek Yönüyle Atatürkçülük: Türk Devriminin Prensipleri ve Cumhuriyet Rejimi Õ Some argue that a Kemalist cannot be against the Westerncivilization bea againstthe Kemalistcannot that Some argue , “Kemalizm’in Günümüzdeki Anlam The role of Kemalism as well as what it signifies is largely contested in the literature. in the contested largely is signifies it what as well as Kemalism of role The Atatürkçülü C ÷ Geçmiú HAPTER an, Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük ÷da Geçmiú Kemalizm Õ Õ Õ , 1993),, 75-92. l Çeçen, , 1993), 33; Ahmet Taner K Õlc ú Ya ten Gelece Õ ÷ün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelli , Bilimci, Gerçekçi Yol,” in ten Gelece ú am :C I: Kemalizm (Istanbul: Üniversite, 1993), 12. Õ ønan, Destekleme Vakf AND BASIC APPROACHES TO ølkeleri ve ONCEPTUALIZING IDEOLOGY ÷ e Atatürk (østanbul: Bo Atatürk’te Temel Prensipler ÷ 22 e Atatürk, ed. Ça÷ Õú Õ gil (London: Hurst and Company,1981),79-102. For some,ideology,it is byaminority an defended extinct of (Istanbul: Ça lal (Istanbul: Der Yay Õ , ønkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde (1923-1938) D ÷ , ed. Ça Atatürk’e Sald lu, “Atatürk’ün D Õ Õú aziçi ÷aziçi Üniversitesi Yay (Ankara: Ça ú Õ ünce Sistemi ve Ça ya da Yeniden Do lal ÷ da Õ Atatürk Yolu ÷da , “Kemalizm’in Günümüzdeki Anlam ÷i ú daú Yaú (Istanbul: Ça ú Yay 21 The Wilson Quarterly Yaú Õ Õ rman nlar am ÷ Õ da Õú amÕ nlar Õ (Istanbul, Ak Õ Destekleme Vakf Politikas , 2001), 7; Çeçen, 20. Õ ú n DayanÕ , ed. Turhan Feyzio Ya Destekleme Vakf Õ , 1998); Toktam ÷Xú ÷ ú Current History Current ÷ am da Õú da Õ u,” 92; Ate K ú Politikas nlar K : Õ Türk Bireyi,” in ú 28 ÕQÕ Destekleme Vakf Yay lmaz Hafifli EMALISM Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State a Modern of Founder Atatürk: n Özellik, Õ Õ EMALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY AS EMALISM , 1984), 11; Turhan Feyzio n Yay Õ nlar 24, 4 (Autumn 2000): 88-96; M. Õ Õ (Ankara: Ça : Amaçlar, ú Õ Õú Õ , 27; Õ 25 nevi, 1971), 10;Hamza , 1996), 6. ÷lu et.al. (Ankara: Atatürk (Ankara: Ça Ate 99 (January 2000): 33-38; D. ÷ ; while for others it has ø i lke ve Amaçlar (Ankara: øsmet Giritli and Hülya ú , “Atatürk ve Geçmiú Õ Õ ya da Yeniden , 1993), 146;Menter (Ankara: Karde ølkeler,” in Feyzio ÷ daú ÷ ten Gelece ø daú mge Kitabevi, Yaú 27 Yaú , while for while , Õ,” in am ÷lu, Õú am Õ 24 ú ÷ It is It Õ e ÷lu , 23 CEU eTD Collection 30 Kemalizm Atatürk’e Sald 29 1993), 5. Geçmi 28 ønalc ascribing a negative meaning to ideology,ascribing to useAtaturkism anegative meaningto prefers instead,andargues that personality. Atatürk’s idolization meansof theextensive latter the while path Atatürk’s following for name is thescientific former as the Ataturkism, Matbaas K For ideology. itan asoncalling well as ‘Kemalism’ term the on consensus of a lack is also There essence. ‘true’ its distort intentionally or overlook interpretations other how is and Kemalism ‘genuine’ the what of definition another yet by followed is usually observation this Nevertheless, Kemalism. of narratives multiple are there that confirm scholars many original; not is to direction. policy foreign a specific propels that Kemalism single a not is there that dissertation, the of contentions main the of one to contributes interpretations range withindefinitions seemto awidespectrum.However, thisof very diversity available asthe is task difficult, The literature? Kemalism inthe with associated are principles and objectives, ideas, which rather, or Kemalism; of principles the and objectives, ideas, the are What discourse: policy foreign in the enunciated being is it how examining before Kemalism to attached andmeanings concepts the define has to one However, orientation. Kemalism/Ataturkism as a set of ideas that either propels or obstructs a specific foreign policy beyond is Kemalismregime take atype of viewsthat the as Turkish foreign regard, policy.In this the scope of this study and we will focus on those works that take K For instance, see instance, For SeeÖzden, Õú Õ k, “Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük,” lal ú ten Gelece Õ, Õ Indeed, the argument that there are different interpretations of what Kemalism refers Kemalism what of interpretations different are there that argument the Indeed, This dissertation aims to examine how Kemalism is used as a reference to legitimize , 1965), 62;BediaAkarsu, (Istanbul: BeyanYay Atatürk’e Sald Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük; Õrman ÷ e Atatürk Õú ù Õn Dayan ahinler, lal Õ Õrman , for instance, one must make a clear distinction between Kemalism Kemalism between makeand a clear mustfor instance, one distinction , , ed., Ça Atatürkçülü Õ lmaz Hafifli÷ Õn Dayan Õ nlar Do÷u Bat ÷ Atatürk Devrimi ve Temelleri Õ , 1988), 12. daú Nermin Abadan, “Laiklik ve “Laiklik Abadan, Nermin Õlmaz Hafifli Yaú ÷ün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelli i, 21; Çeçen, 117-18;Abdurrahman Dilipak, am Õ 7,29 (August, September, October2004): 101. Õ Destekleme Vakf ÷ i, 86;Çeçen, 20. 22 (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitapevi,1995), 229; Halil Õ (Ankara: Ça ø kinci Cumhuriyet Tart Cumhuriyet kinci ÷i 30 , 5; Do On the other hand, hand, other Onthe ÷ ÷ da an, ú Yaú Kemalizm Bir Ba am Õ Destekleme Vakf Õú malar ú , p. 14; K ka Aç ,” in Õ,” Õ dan ù ahinler, Õú lal Õ , Õ, 29 CEU eTD Collection of Kemalism (‘defensive’ and ‘integrationist’ approach), each suggesting a diverse reading of reading adiverse each suggesting approach), ‘integrationist’ and Kemalism of (‘defensive’ objectives main to the approaches identify two foreign and policy Kemalist of the parameters principles We discussreforms.and Atatürk’s to willthenturn main foreign the policy Kemalist Kemalism, of origins historical the out lay sections two first The Kemalism. of meaning the analysisof than an exhaustive rather later chapters for the clarification as ideology.conceptualized an chapter provides In a introductionthis sense, the brief and path in Atatürk’s on KemalismKemalism and be literature the can examine whether ‘full-independence’ attaining contemporary the civilization’ and the levelof mainhere:‘raisingtwo to Turkey objectives the to in relation mainly discussed articulated, visibly most is policy foreign in the relevance Kemalism’s that ishere it chapter, inthis shown be As will vision. Atatürk’s accomplish principles, it alsoinvolves a linear dimension as opposed to the circular logic of the former: to isAtatürk’s path as strictly maintainingunderstood theinitial interpretation of these People’s in 1931 Party and officially described asKemalismfollowing in1935.While populism, statism,incorporated into revolutionism, and program the of Republican the secularism, nationalism, republicanism, representing arrows’, ‘six so-called the – principles institutionalizedideas six Theseasthe later under leadershipwere Atatürk. the carried out of led that andthefollowing theNational measures War(1919-1923) Independence reform objectives and ideas of set the to pathandattributed followingAtatürk’s with is associated it movement, asanideology or Ataturkism,is it or Kemalism or called Indeed, whether here. 31 Ataturkism. of characteristic Kemalism refers to a doctrine, afrozen set of principles, which does not capture the renewable See ù ahinler, Contrary to the views above, Kemalism and Ataturkism will be used interchangeably used be will Ataturkism and Kemalism above, views the to Contrary The purpose isThe of purpose review chapter mainthis to the elements with following associated Atatürkçülü ÷ün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelli 31 . 23 ÷i , 6 CEU eTD Collection Diplomasisi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Bas 34 33 32 Kemal. Mustafa followers of in tothe De Robeck relation 1923, butafter of Turkishestablishment Warof the (1919-1922) Republicin the Independence 1.1. The origins of Kemalism Kemalism. Turkish foreign policy assigning withoutdiscourse adirective and to causal attribute the structured Kemalism how examine to us allow will This articulations. policy foreign constitutedideology dynamic a as bybut construction thea once-and-for-all as hegemonic Kemalism take not does attempts of beoffered Kemalism that will of conceptualization thealternative an studiesonideology, other political actors whoFinally, building on Chantal Laclau’s Moufffe and Ernesto discussion hegemony,on and claim legitimacy idealistpackage thatproducesaspecific foreign policy orientation. realist and principles of to their fixed a as Kemalism treat both policy, foreign Kemalist the of objectives the interpret they in way divergewhilewill approaches the these bearguedthat Atatürk’s followingpath. It Empire, includingAnatolia,Empire, waspartitioned among these countries. Britain, France, Tsarist Russia, and, later, Italy between the years 1915 and 1917, the Ottoman Great of representatives by the signed treaties secret War.In anumberof World First the in Treaty, Ottoman and the government between following signed forces Allied defeat the the Ottoman territories initiallyby French, referred to as Italian,an ideology, but a movementand againstBritish the occupation forces of several underparts of the terms of the Mudros were later formalizedwere by Treaty, Sevres the on August signed20, 1920by representatives the For further details about the secret treaties, see Abdülhalat Ak see Abdülhalat treaties, secret the about details further For Hamza Ero Suna Kili, Suna 32 the term first the ‘Kemalists’ be interm began used 1920byaBritishto High Commissioner While it is generally agreed that Kemalism was not an ideology an ideology Kemalism is While it developed generally agreed that was not prior that to Kemalism ÷lu, Atatürkçülük (Istanbul: Mente (Ankara: Olgaç Matbaas ú Matbaas Õ mevi,1991), 19-22. Õ , 1969), 5. 24 Õ , 1981), 10-11. ú in, Atatürk’ün D 33 Indeed, Kemalism was not was Kemalism Indeed, Õú Politika 34 These secret treaties Thesesecret ø lkeleri ve CEU eTD Collection a dictator, yet no resolution would without pass hissignature.(1996, 157). Assembly (Aydemir 1973, 315; Karaosmano 40 39 38 37 Eczac “Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün Atatürk’ün Kemal “Mustafa 36 113-39. Politikas 35 principles underlying thecontrol over politicalsocial/political developments. reforms, upon foundationthe of Republicthe in president1923, the of Republic,the had asignificant as well as the goals presidentof the new state. of the The National anewafter temporary was foundedingovernment 1920. Mustafa Kemal,whowas the Assembly, the chairman(RPP) in 1924 of the only partybe Party in Republican namedas People’s the Party 1922,to establishment People’s of the in the parliament, and, place. Kemalism name took of the under asystemization long before sovereignty,nationalism, andrepublicanism populism, asthe developedearliest principles sovereignty. onpopular newregime the Republic from and grounding tothe of Turkey,of Turkishthe Empire that Ottoman state the independence,modernization,commitment total to civic identity nationalism, changingthe of full- important: most the as following the lists Kili Suna Kemalism. of principles the of some revealed inAnatolia authorities military and civilian to the sent letters circular and meetings civilian and military authorities in Anatolia and, eventually, tofound a new state. These secret with groups his close by meansmeetingsassociates oforganizing secret formed by the defense military unify regional to the Ottoman Government for the General Inspector the of the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Government. Mustafa Kemal began to be considered the leader of this movement. Do Ibid., 33-35. Ibid., 6. Kili, 2. On how Mustafa Kemal secured the leadership after his reputation in Dardanelles, see especially Sina Ak Sina see especially Dardanelles, in reputation his after leadership the secured Kemal Mustafa Onhow Under this treaty, most of the areas where Turks had the majority were to be lost. See Bask ÷ Õ an, ba Õ The turning point in the institutionalization of Kemalism, however, was with the with was however, Kemalism, of institutionalization in the point turning The úÕ Yay : Kurtulu Kemalizm Õ nlar 39 ú . This party became the central political entity newmeasures the out carrying entity political became. This central party the Sava Õ , 81. While some suggest that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk respected the resolutions of the , 1993),49-80. úÕ’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, I(1919-1980) ø ktidar Yolu,” in Yolu,” ktidar 40 ÷lu 1998, 87), Ça The early political programs of the RPP outlined the ÷daú 37 Düú Hence she defines anti-imperialism, popular anti-imperialism, defines she Hence 25 ünceninI ù ahinler points out that eventhough Atatürk was not 35 It was during these crisis years that úÕ÷Õ nda Atatürk 36 38 (Istanbul: Dr Nejat F. Heused his authority as (Istanbul: Õ n Oran,n øleti ú im, 2002), Türk D ú in, Õú CEU eTD Collection 45 44 43 AmericanAcademy of andPolitical Social Science, 1939), 307-309. 42 41 which Kemalismwere referredastheprinciples of asof 1935. representing party arrow program, oneeach of fundamental party, with the of principles the in inscribed the emerged was and of concept ‘sixarrows’ the the Thus, of each. explanation added to formerthe of principles republicanism,nationalism, populism and with a broader were revolutionism and statism, secularism, of principles the congress, this At Kemalism. third congress of held Party,the in a crucial1931, was also step in institutionalization the of irrespective of ideairrespective religious of and all ethnic belonging, of their the origin or rejecting law the before citizens all of equality the recognizing all populism, and nationalism group. dynasty, or people’s efforts, so it had to be defended for the good of the people, not for a particular class, ideal popularof sovereignty. andrepresent accomplish that republican regime best the the could republicanism stipulated preparation of Kemal Atatürk playedwhich role adominant in before his death 1938, Reforms. asAtatürk’s referred thereafter, place intimatelyof thattook with connected reforms which the principles, these were denominator common the constituted integrity territorial and anti-Pan-Islamism Ottomanism, anti- full-independence, sovereignty, national of concepts be The stressed. to ones earliest the 1.1.1. The ‘six arrows’ ofKemalism andAtatürk’sreforms well. was declared as the foundation of the state, not only for a few years, but for the future as Kili, 80. Kili, 80. Kili, 40. Ibid., 76. For the whole text of the program, see Donald E. Webster, E. Donald see program, the of text whole the For 76. Ibid., Kili, 66-67. 42 in the RPP, the of 1935 program in the explanations provided the According to were populism and nationalism republicanism, Kemalism, of arrows’ ‘six the Among 45 In this sense, one can observe a close relationship between republicanism, 44 The establishment of through Republicwasattained of the Theestablishment 43 26 TheTurkey of Atatürk 41 In this program, Kemalism (Philedelphia: The CEU eTD Collection 49 Modern State see Turkey, in secularism Oxford University Press, 1987), 462. For further discussion about the role of religion in Ottomanthe state and existence possible.” make would lose that the twomajor its newstate andrevolutionism, supports secularism the Recep introductory speech he Peker’s deliveredin in General Assembly the 1931:“Without sphere. from whole public the of religion that also but religion and state of separation the mean only not did secularism Kemalist sense, of of series lawsof toguaranteedesigned state dominance over religious movements. enforcement the and in of attention official both propagation terms utmost received the later principle in The 1923. caliphate the of abolition led the to that state new the of characteristic complete developed into the cornerstone of Kemalism by Secularism1930s. was initially defined as the Partyin Union the and early Progress the 20 Turanianist/Turkist (merging with Turks) outer the trait of Turkish nationalism embraced by pan- the from also but nationalism Ottoman the from diverged only not nationalism Kemalist bewould based not on familyany class, anindividual, or buton civic nationalism. Therefore, sovereignty national the that in ascertaining principle this complemented Populism sultanate. 48 the official religion that ofstating the Turkish provision the stateas well as was oath Islam was official the in removed. ‘Allah’ to See Kili, reference 45-47. amendments, these With society. and amendments were made to the Constitution to complete the move toward the secularization of the Turkishstate prohibiting the wearing of the fez. All the religious orders and sects were abolished.European In system. 1928, several the The into Arabic changed were Alphabet system numbers and was replaced measures The byCalendar. the Latin International alphabet.by the replaced was In 1925,calendar the Hat Law was passed changed from Friday, which was the weekly holiday accepted in Muslim countries, Ministry of Justice.to BetweenSunday;1926 and 1930, European andcodes theof law Moonwere adopted. The weekly holiday was 47 46 the dictatorship of In another. classover one this sense,republicanism was thesecurity forbelt Binnaz Toprak, “The Religious Right,” in Along these lines, the Sheria courts were abolished in 1924 and the entire court system Giritli and Baykal, was attached 89. to the C.H.P. Genel Sekreteri Recep Peker’in Söylevleri type The principle of secularism also found great emphasis in the party found The secularism emphasis inand of party also principle great the documents of the new regime in protecting it against any attempts to restore monarchy or separation of the state and religion, a statement that revealed theanti-caliphate revealed that statement a and religion, state the of separation , ed.Özbudun andKazanc 49 ù erif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in inTurkey,” Secularism and “Religion Mardin, erif Õ gil (London: C. Hurst &Company,1981),191-220. Turkey inTransition Turkey 48 (Ankara: Ulus Bas The importance of this principle was indicated in indicated was principle this of importance The th Century. 27 , ed. I. C. Schick and A. E. Tonak (New York: 46 Õ mevi,1935), 102; cited in Kili, 76. Atatürk, the Founder of a 47 In this In CEU eTD Collection 55 54 53 52 a Nation of world-wide economic depression of the late 1920s the (Kiliand 1969,101). See also policy, Lord Kinross, economic a liberal with experiment ofthe results discouraging the of entrepreneurship, lack the workers, of skilled lack the domestic, and foreign both of capital, lack the to due retracted later was initiative 51 50 of earliest the applications practical canbeseenas of early Republic the reforms While the between this andprinciple theexpressedmodernization ideal Atatürk’s of underlyingreforms. be forbidden. not workand private by andwould activity initiated state, the undertaken economic reforms to lead the country to prosperity as quickly as possible. sectionimmediate asitinvolved in party program the hand,on aseparate other the the bore statism, of principle the state, the Ottoman of that to in opposition new state the of ideology abreast with the new developments. new the with abreast tokeep in order new reforms for necessity asthe well as theRepublic, years of early the As many suggest,authors this protection meantthe reforms the of had that taken during place changeif radical,reformist, modernization necessary, the for Turkey. of revolutionary and, competition. foreign from market protect local the to socialism,designed state statism Atatürk, particularly meant of presidency Bozkurt,Mahmut Esat one of leadingtheoriststhe ideology of Kemalistthe during the to according instance, For time. the at available also were principle this of interpretations different radically liberal. However, nor wasneither socialist state Kemalist the this sense, public interest. inleading wereconsidered economicthat matters modernization, the quick vital activity the to as guideforthe state which the theparty,considered of policy economic was declaredasthe For example, see Kili, 109; Kili, 108. See Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Esat Mahmut See Kili, 8-19. Ibidem. In fact, while liberal economic policy was experimented in the early years of the Republic, Citedthis inKili, 78. While the aforementioned principles underlined the main characteristics and the and characteristics main the underlined principles aforementioned the While As for the sixth arrow of Kemalism, revolutionism was defined as the commitment to commitment the as defined was revolutionism Kemalism, of arrow sixth the for As (London: Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1964), 457. 51 According this to definition statism,of while the economic activity would be Atatürk ù ahinler, ø htilali Atatürkçülü 53 55 (Istanbul: As Matbaas In this regard, itis possible to observe a close relation ÷ ün Kökeni, Etkisi veGüncelli 28 Õ , 1967), 317-318. ÷ i , 115; Giritli and Baykal, 28. 50 Atatürk: The Rebirth In1931,statism 52 In 54 CEU eTD Collection 59 Karaosmano instance, for See of ‘Kemalism’. instead ‘Realism’ 58 57 56 foreign pursuingpolicy (as opposed as realist futileto ideals) foreign policy. Kemalist the guiding objective main the as declared such as and civilization’ contemporary former principle; ‘civilizationism’,and whichis defined as‘raising Turkey to the level of the policy; the principle ‘adherenceof to the international law’, which is seen as dependent on the foreign Kemalistof the characteristic and non-aggressive the as non-adventurist the taken whichis in peace home, world’, the at ‘peace of principle War; the Independence the during Atatürk: mainly,speeches of the principle of originatedobjective‘full-independence’, an that basedonthe in regard, this for accounts several principles literature Kemalism The particular. in policy foreign Kemalist the and Kemalism of objectives the as to referred also principles’, pursuing hisvision and defendinghis principles” path, as whatis it [Atatürk’s] Çeçen as“following alsobroadly regulations, calls understood principles of Kemalist foreign policy 1.2. Beyond the ‘six arrows’ andreforms: the objectives ofKemalism andthe in principle. secured revolutionism of principle the which concepts of Kemalism, they were also the guiding projects of modernization and civilization and civilizationism. and main full-independence, the nations,towards of and directed oppressed exemplary to the goals obligations, international law country’s the and respectful of international the rationalist, Feyzio term the use and ofKemalism elements core as the ofKemalism characteristics realist these see works Some K 20. Çeçen, Õú lal Õ, Based on these agreed principles, Feyzio principles, agreed these Based on RPP in the explained as principles six the upon based initially was Kemalism While ÷ Atatürk’e Sald lu, “Atatürk’ün D 57 59 Õrman Other works also the cite Otherworks and‘pursuing of principles thehonor national Õú Politikas Õn Dayan ÕQÕ Õlmaz Hafifli n Özellik, ø ÷ lke ve Amaçlar i, 56; Çeçen, 122; Abadan-Unat, 5. 29 ÷ lu lists the characteristics of the Kemalist of the characteristics the lu lists 56 ÷ , thereby involving the so-called ‘side lu, 140. lu, Õ ,” 1-11. 58 , non-adventurist,pacifist, CEU eTD Collection (accessed August 6, 2007). Constitution], draft the in arrows six no but Atatürk, is konu today,as revolutionism implies an imposed change upon the public.See, “Tasla ÷Õ the principle of revolutionism is not congruent with the methods of reaching the ‘dynamic ideal’ of Atatürkdrafting the new Constitution in2007, are illustrative. In an interview with the daily reach dynamic ‘the ideal’. The ofremarks Prof.Dr. Ergun Özbudun, who participated in thecommittee for 62 50. Y 61 Uluslararas status-quo in primary foreignnot only of goal policy terms Kemalistthe of the protecting was defined ‘reaching the level of ‘reaching the level contemporary the of civilization’ and the principle of revolutionism. is also possibleit same token, By the foreign policy. Kemalist the of definitions of the kept out were matters religious the how shows also reach, toIslam’s extending or nations observeMuslim other the with an intimatehaving realist and rationalist as goals, to opposed being guided bya utopian ideamerging of as relation was described foreign policy Kemalist the that fact The aswell. secularism of that also between in stressed not butcan be of nationalism only as seen the principle, definitions the concepts anti-pan-Islamism and the anti-pan-Turkism the Similarly, Atatürk. of speeches the and oft-statedprograms RPP in the defined was it as nationalism, of that and Kemalism of concepts earlier the of dynamicextension asthe both read be can This borders. Turkey’s extending of goal imperial an goalhaving of territorial protecting the with adventurist preoccupied integrity andnon-aggressive, than rather to the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalistforeign policy was defined as anti- instance, link and as For shows between ‘domestic’ theopposed ‘foreign’. the inseparable the which principles’, ‘side the and arrows’, ‘six initial the integrity), territorial and Islamism anti-pan- anti-pan-Turkism, anti-Ottomanism, independence, national sovereignty, (national 60 states’ Western the among respectability interest’ and‘non-submissiveness in conducting theforeign policy’, It should be noted here that the principle of revolutionism is also taken as a See for instance, instance, Seefor For instance, see Aybars, instance, For ú ÕOÕ Anma Kitab tu: Anayasa tasla Indeed, it is possible to observe a close link between the earlier concepts ofKemalism concepts between earlier the link observe is ita close to Indeed, possible Õ Ili that was established in the mid-1920s, but also complemented with the dynamic ú kilerAnlay ø Õ nan, 21; Mustafa Akda Mustafa 21; nan, (Ankara Üniversitesi, 1973), 398; Giritli Baykal,and 159. ÷Õ nda Atatürk var alt ÕúÕ Atatürkçülük ve Modernle ,” in Ça ÷daú Dü ÷ Õ ok yok” [Özbudun, who prepared draftthe speaks to Radikal: There , “Türkiye’nin Bat “Türkiye’nin , ú üncenin IúÕ÷Õ 61 as the objectives of Kemalist foreign policy. foreign Kemalist of objectives asthe ú Radikal, August 6, 2007, me 30 , p. 132; nda Atatürk ÕOÕ la ú øzettin Do mas , 173; Çeçen, 45. ÕQÕ Zorunlu K Zorunlu an, “Atatürk’ün÷an, D revolutionary haz 60 Radikal Õ Õ and Turkey’s ‘raising lan Tarihsel Ko Tarihsel lan rlayanÖzbudun Radikal’e change change orderin to , he commented that commented , he Õú Politikas ú ullar,” in ullar,” 62 Õ The ve CEU eTD Collection aspects of the Kemalist foreign policy, mainly: a) preserving the territorial integrity, b) integrity, territorial preserving the a) mainly: foreign of policy, Kemalist the aspects is refer realist assigned generally a special andusedto place principle tothe independence’ 1.2.1. Full-independence and the realist foreign policy Turkey. for foreigndivergent policy orientations suggested two weredefined way twoobjectives these howthe observe clearly can one is more, What aspects. idealistic and realist its stress to also but policy, foreign Kemalist the of principles general the of terms in only not defined were objectives two foreign these policy, Kemalist the of primary goals as the Identified principles. foreign onthe Kemalist logicin can be articulations linearthe that noticed diverging the best and circular the and ‘civilizationism’ represent seem to of objectives ‘full-independence’ the ‘main objectives’ focus to on purposes itmakesfor our sense more islegitimate, andrevolutionism secularism of the Kemalist foreign policy asarrows’. stated in the literature.dynamic ideal of being on par with iswhat identified asmore civilized of countries) ‘six the the for Indeed, conditions new the of in terms objectives policy foreign the (revising logic thelinear the established the (defending circular the both involve policy foreign Kemalist policyforeign a have to argued dimension be can revolutionism and secularism, nationalism, of principles asthe policy, foreign Kemalist well. the of characteristics civilizationist and pacifist, rationalistic, In a similarsovereign, the on placed emphasis the given sense, this In revolutionism. of vein,principle the we can also of main components asthe were stated that objectives to, referred civilization contemporary argue that with involved andcontinuously redefining abreast newdevelopments whatthe keeping the the principles the level ideal civilization’,‘raising contemporary the of to whichinevitably of Turkey of the In the studies that focus on the objectives of the Kemalist foreign policy, the ‘full- nationalism, of principles the of interms policy foreign Kemalist reading While 31 status-quo ) and ) CEU eTD Collection 65 ølkeleri,” in Feyzio Politikas 64 were during the Independence War. The pro-Western (and pro-European in particular) (and pro-European War. The pro-Western Independence were during the just against interests Turkey continue advancing theirimperial asthey European countries notwithstanding that the Kemalistforeign policy is oriented towards Europe (the West), the 63 of independenceattainment from complete the West. and taking arespectful amongplace them,conditions approach this thisobjective upon the ‘raising accordingly priority the level gives to Turkey of to countries’ Western/European the policy foreign Kemalist the that and pro-Western inherently is Kemalism that acknowledging independence, Kemalistforeign is policy predominantly Whileanti-imperialistic. generally Turkey. imposed on not are alliances long asthese Western ones), so with the countries (especially principleinherently isnot incongruentwith practicethe forming of alliances with other this that andsuggests former, thanthe lessradically ‘full-independence’ takes The other Western). imperialism (especially any of type astanceagainst takes which foreign policy foreign andits principleof‘full-independence’policy requires a non-allied oractive-neutral Independence Warand foreign Turkey’s contemporary policy, arguing that the Kemalist the of conditions the between analogy direct a establishes One viewed. is West the how and War, Independence the of characteristic anti-imperialistic the sovereignty, on put emphasis in of interpretations of this principle, degreeof involvesthe twodivergentterms literature national the interests. conducting andd)implementing politics and the of pursuing foreign balance affairs, power accepting no interference in domestic affairs, c) maintaining the freedom of choice in Do Çeçen, 145, Aybars, Atatürkçülük: AtatürkçüDü an, “Atatürk’ün÷an, D ÕQÕ From the perspective of what could be termed as the ‘defensive approach’ to full- to as the ‘defensive approach’ becould termed what of From perspective the ‘full-independence’, Notwithstanding to dimension attributed thisdefensive the 64 n Özellik, ÷lu et.al., 248; Giritli and Baykal,96. ø lke ve Amaçlar Atatürkçülük ve Modernle Õú Politikas ú ünceSistemi Õ ve Uluslararas Õ,” 10-11; Mehmet Gönlübol, “Atatürk’ün D (Ankara: Onkur Bas ú me Õ Ili , 131, Kili, 117; Pek, 112; Abadan-Unat, 5. ú 32 kilerAnlay Õ mevi, 1983), 59. ÕúÕ ,” 151-197; Feyzio 65 According to this approach, Õú Politikas lu, “Atatürk’ün÷lu, D Õ : Amaçlarve Õú 63 CEU eTD Collection 68 67 66 known. became Allied countries the of treaties secret the after to this orientation,but abalancing act which was due to the mistrust that developed especially a substitute in The of he with wasnot rapprochement Sovietthe Turkey Union argues, 1920, be in afully-fledgedcountry. Western of to colonization West plans the order against the erahad struggle For Çeçen,during Atatürk been mainconcern the of the foreign the policy to integration with West/Europe the is viewed with suspicion. leadsdividing it, theformulation to ofa foreign of type indefensive which policy, idea of any viewsfrom Turkey lensesof the Sevres the Treaty (1920) and subdue aims to Turkey by still ‘West’ thatthe presumption Thus, the of threat. asasource hence enemy, a potential understood in a binary way,both as an idea, as a source of civilization, and as a rival and even is West becausethe mainly foreign policy, Westernist an into unconditional translate doesnot foreign policy thereby Kemalist of the totheobjectives attributed characteristic exemplify,for Aybars, how the Turkish foreign policy lostits character of standinghonorably Algeria,independence and of submitting the EU’s to wishes ontheCyprus dispute,all the against West the with siding NATO, the Joining line. Kemalist initial its from deviant civilization’. contemporary from foreign Kemalistthe policy and the objective ‘raisingof to thelevelof Turkey the nationaldisregard honorfull-independence, andfundamental for the and, assuch,a departure integrating with Westernthe countries by submitting to their demands isnothing buta is aforeign to indexed In policy that them as afullysuchcontext, independent state. with relationship a respected establishing with incongruent as seen aimstheir were only that meanwas viewedanenemy, as didnot West by the West the that makerecognized Turkey Ibid., 146. Ibidem. Ibid., 152. Çeçen’s ‘full-independence’ inthis and Aybars’ on are illustrative discussions regard. By the same token, Aybars sees the foreign policy after Atatürk as increasingly Atatürk foreign policy after the Aybars sees By sametoken, the 68 33 67 Therefore, the struggle to 66 CEU eTD Collection (accessed May 10, 2004). 71 70 Turkey from the ‘claws’ of imperialism. of ‘claws’ the from Turkey foreignnot only asthebasisfor anindependentbutalso atool fortaken policy, rescuing reconstructs the crisis situation that had been present during that period. As such, Kemalism is was of encircled country wasmatter andthedefenseof survival,a the approach this The following remarks areillustrative in this regard: route. civilized her from Turkey divert to attempt neo-colonial asimilar as Kemalism against criticisms see to Aybars leads even Kemalism to attributed position powerful This Kemalism. of ideal dynamic the reach to way only the as is cherished West the from independent is with is West the strippedandits off character, civilized the suggested foreign that policy route civilized character from the West to the Kemalistforeign policy. With a similar twist, alliance mostthe advanced civilization. The emphasis on taking astandimperialism against shifts the it West, which considers the on take the other dominates Treaty Sevres resurrect the aims to by civilization contemporary path pointed Atatürk. the to contrary as it considers and full-independence, and honor, national indivisibility, security, national interests, national Turkey’s of ignorant being of policy foreign oriented Turkey, the EU- accuses which to standards applies double power EUasaneo-colonial the 69 against imperialism model and its for therole “oppressed nations.” Aybars, “Kemalizm ve AB,” Özden, 117. Aybars, As seen above, in bringing up the imagery of the Independence War, when the country the when War, Independence the of imagery the up in bringing above, seen As serious threat against their passions in the Middle East. and reaches modern civilization the goal itimperialistis prescribed by bythe seen forces asa independence and modernization. Turkey draws that her strength from the ideologyKemalist Aegean, andArmenian addinghaving focused on impoverishing Turkey and thereby rendering herand inneed of debtsforeign Kurdish It seems that theEU,which had not refrained from putting newpressure on the Ottoman state, issues, criteria is now targeting next Kemalismto the – Turkey’sCopenhagen formula forCriteria, such as the so-called Cyprus, that power as aneo-colonial West the of demonization the it how is remarkable Here Atatürkçülük ve Modernle Kemalist Dü ú me , 109-122. ú ünce E-Dergisi 34 , April 3, 2003, 70 71 69 Similarly, Özden, seeing Özden, Similarly, CEU eTD Collection interests at the given conjuncture. at the interests as in 1952areregarded foreign maximized forthe Turkey policy hernational preferences that League of andtheSadabatNations in1932,theBalkan Pact Entente theNATO 1934, and the in participation Turkey’s Accordingly, ‘imperialist’. as West the view it does nor interests national the from given concessions as alliances considers neither it approach’, ‘defensive foreign‘defensive in adifferent suggesting approach’ policy orientation. tothe In contrast it from the diverges sovereignty, and state interest national such as concepts, realist/nationalist interests. national to the contrary considers authority state the which alliance an into forced isnot a country that sovereignty, but 75 74 73 72 that argues vein,Gönlübol upon. In this draws former perspective the that crisis situation reconstructing foreign policy,withoutduringera and Turkish a Atatürk’s contemporary the interests. national the andprotecting potential threats against aguarantee as serving a country, independence of secure theitis full- but that from thealliances alliances, established total the disengagement country. of the interests and national state the of basedon sovereign countries withauthority the relations inmulti-faceted other engaging WorldAccordingmeansamong thisfull-independence Third to approach, the countries. dynamic ideal of ‘reaching the level of civilization’, contemporary asitthe places Turkey independence and anti-imperialism Atatürk,maxims does of worstthe toKemalism’s however,independence,non-alliedforeign a suggesting based thefull-policy, on oft-referred Ibidem. Giritli and Baykal, 96. Gönlübol, 248. Giritli and Baykal, 96. In regard,whilethis the‘integrationist also relies approach’ heavily on Similarly, this approach thisSimilarly, approach foreigndraws afull between the continuity conducted policy full- approach’ to be couldas the‘integrationist called of what From perspective the 73 In this sense, what is the key in full-independence is not anti-imperialism, not is full-independence in key is the what sense, this In 75 74 72 35 As requirenot such, full-independence does a CEU eTD Collection 80 79 78 77 76 during War World the Second itthat was who Atatürk laid the allying foundations for Britain with and France in 1939 whothose find allying with Westincongruentthe with ‘full-independence’ gloss over fact the the occasionthe tenth the of anniversary of Turkishthe Republic in 1933: on gave Kemal Mustafa that indicated speech inthe further was reforms the and Kemalism, modernization, between relation intimate This programs. RPP the in orientation policy foreign Turkey’s and Kemalism of principles the reforms, Republican early the for rationale common the provided civilization’ contemporary of the requirements ‘the Indeed, modernization. with interchangeably ideal this use and Kemalism of objective primary the as civilization’ ‘raising the level Both attach valuea fundamental Turkey contemporary the to of to Kemalistforeign policy as realist,idealist elements are not absent from their analyses either. 1.2.2. Modernization/ civilizationism/ Westernism andthe idealist foreign policy levelcivilization’. contemporary the goal the of of the ‘reaching accomplishing joining symbol to amount viable integration andWesttoday, EUwould the the legitimate of themost As theEUrepresents are unthinkable. for Turkey path an alternative orientation Thus, disengaging from the Western-orientation, diverting from goal. final thethe as EU West goal, the with and lookingintegration for indicated Atatürk since policy, foreign Kemalist Turkey’s national foreign policy. Ibid., 159. Giritli and Baykal, 148. Ibid., 250. Gönlübol, 248. Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri shortest possible time, ideas and actionsmust proceed together. reforms notonly in her institutions but also in her ideas. Inorder to realize idealthis in the nation. Thisdynamic isthe of ideal great the nation Turkish implemented hasthat fundamental Our greater causeis to ourselvesraise to become mostthe civilized and the most prosperous It is remarkable although that, both of approachesthe outlined above envision the 1919-1938, vol.1 (Ankara: Türk Kurumu Bas 76 , and that the Western-orientation has always been a part of 77 In this sense, there has been no deviation from the from deviation no been has there sense, this In 36 80 Õ mevi,1961), 344. 79 78 CEU eTD Collection 82 ve Modernleú contemporary civilization is unmistakably the West, and particularly Europe, as and it represented particularly isEurope, unmistakably West, civilization contemporary the ismeant bythe instance, what for Baykal, and For Giritli of reservation. degrees predominantly with Westernistthe values,albeitfrom different viewpoints and with varying idealisassociated this civilizational that consensus is a considerable also there independence, nations. oppressed the for model servingas analternative to byrecourse civilization’ level contemporary the the of ‘reaching of maxim the following explains it – making policy foreign for explanation idealist bestthat maximizes Turkey’s national interests andsecurity),provide can also be argued to an of Kemalistforeign it the (infully that being independentpolicy explains asaforeign policy foreign aspects besides emphasizingthe pragmatic aspect of approach’, The‘defensive policy. idealist the constitutes Kemalism’ of ‘objective the how is, –that ideal an by legitimized depend upon a Western-oriented foreign policy. countries. non-Western all the to asamodel serve and of nations within community the state modern democratic a measures mergeat home,modernization universal the nationalism, ideal become with thereby 81 community of world nations.” “the is Kemalism in civilization of source implied the and temporal, merely was this some, whilerepresented theadvanced the West levelof during 1920sandcivilization 1930s, mentioned the ‘full-independence’ inthecontextof forto ‘defensivethe approach’ principle, As itwas interpretationsspurred divergent intheliterature. civilization to the refers what to as ambiguity the and programs, RPP the in and speech above-mentioned in the West Aybars, See, for instance, K instance, for See, As was discussed in the context of the ‘integrationistFor our purposes, what is important here is how the foreign policy orientation is perspective’ to full- However, while this link is rarely questioned, the absence of direct reference to the Atatürkçülük ve Modernle me, 131. Õú lal Õ , Atatürk’e SaldÕ 82 In this sense, being a civilized democracy does not necessarily not does beingdemocracy acivilized sense, Inthis 81 ú me Accordingly, the dynamic aim Kemalismof is continueto the , 131. rmanÕ n Dayan 37 Õ lmaz Hafifli ÷i , 57; Özden,295; Aybars, Atatürkçülük CEU eTD Collection 90 89 250-51. Gönlübol, See comprehensive. in the 19 involve a Western-oriented foreign policy orcultural Westernization. As Gönlübol states, the reforms undertaken European system back date to 19 the 88 87 the West?” towards has notturned tobecivilized nation wanted “Which that following: wherehe saidthe Western tothe civilization.civilization from Eastern the Turkey’s transition ideal implies and an as aprocess modernization 86 85 84 83 theWest”. towards as theincorporation values but Western Turkishculture. the represents, of within Westernization. time. the at advanced civilization mostand the of humanism Renaissance-Reformation, the the from this perspective, they consider the ‘level’ of the EU as “the contemporary civilization “the contemporary as theEU of ‘level’ the consider they perspective, this from advanced themostare still countries, which pluralist democracies. home measures withby at modernization harmonizing the European levelreached the the ideal be thiscan accomplished best linethought, modernization/civilization the through transformation and self-discovery inseparable from its foreign policy dimension. According to this vein, we see an underlying assumption that these two are not in contradiction with each other. In the EU. the full integration with the West and, under the present circumstances, the goal of membership in Giritli and Baykal, 159. ù ø Ibid., 128. Quoted in Enver Ziya Karal, Ziya Enver in Quoted Giritli and Baykal, 125. Gönlübol, 251;Çeçen, 152. Giritli and Baykal, 131. nan, 10.nan, It should be noted thathere while modernizationthe reforms and Turkey’s becoming a part of the ahinler, 83 For Gönlübol and Çeçen too, Atatürk used modernization as equivalent to th This Westernist interpretation of civilizationism takestheabove-mentioned 90 Century were not systematic and remained superficial, whereas the Atatürk reforms were more were reforms Atatürk the whereas superficial, remained and systematic not were Century In this context, Giritli and Baykal’s remark is revealing. Viewing Turkey’s EU quest ø Atatürkçülü÷ nan describes objectivethe ofKemalism backas “turning to selfthe and orientation 86 This, however, is not taken as a blind adherence to all values West the of to the adherence as ablind taken is not however, This, 84 Thus, contrary to the ‘defensive approach’, from this from perspective, this approach’, ‘defensive the to Thus,contrary 88 ün Kökeni, Etkisi veGüncelli Atatürk ve Devrim th Century Ottoman Empire, the Westernism of the Ottoman Empire did not did Empire Ottoman ofthe Westernism the Empire, Ottoman Century 85 The most referred speech of Atatürk in this context is (Ankara: ODTÜ, 1998), 56-7. ÷i 38 , 165. 89 Ultimately, this means this Ultimately, 87 Here CEU eTD Collection of of Atatürk’s reforms and principles can be only viable integration through with EU.” the advancement the and protection the that is obvious “It civilization’: contemporary the of level the ‘reaching with be associated might that orientation policy foreign other any denounce 93 92 91 in of Republic Turkish the defense the whether requiring characteristic: directive determinable 1.3. Conceptualizing Kemalism foreign policy, the EU is not taken as the only way to accomplish this maxim. in linkideal thatseeaninseparable discussions the between this and Western-oriented the discussionour showed, this has bynomeans theonly remained available interpretation. Even as West, the with civilization contemporary associating the to may havecontributed speeches is tofollowing in attributed path Atatürk’s conductingWhile foreign own policy. Atatürk’s ininterpretation programs arrows’ the RPP(both Atatürk’s speeches) and ‘six the of and what initial the between a fixed link not there is that argue wecan In regard, this literature. the countries. Western with the stable of relations EU,anddevelopment the membership in levelintegration the West, with the with civilization’ the contemporary the of can also be seen in the ‘integrationist approach’,in that it associates the objective of ‘reaching whether the EU supports us or not.” idealreaching this and argues “thereisnothat way back ideal, from modernization the with them, depends on establishing and stable withrelations Western the countries and beinginharmony hand, other ‘reachinglevel the the that contemporary civilization’ acknowledging the of path”. Atatürk’s byfollowing the has reached society stage Turkish ù Ibid., 160. Ibidem. ahinler, Wehave seen thethat studies here reviewedKemalism presuppose upto that hasa in contested largely is policy foreign inTurkish Kemalism of role the that shows This Atatürkçülü÷ ù ahinler does not view the ‘membership’ in the EU as a necessary condition for ün Kökeni, Etkisi veGüncelli 93 Hence, the idealist element in the foreign policy making policy foreign in the element idealist the Hence, ÷i 39 , 315. 91 The authors also 92 On CEU eTD Collection ideology ideology anilluminatingin provide studies point starting this respect. principles of Kemalism in the context of the Turkish foreign policy discourse. The critical Kemalism before proceeding todiscuss the role theof above-discussed objectives and the side to regard with position clarify conceptual the is to ahead, task the path. Hence, Atatürk’s without leaving any room to examine multiple constructions associated with following a specific asall orientation, to literature definition inthe theprovided tie conceptualizations very indeed plurality discourse, then this of we cannot drawuponthe available Kemalism is associated with a certain type of foreign policy, that is, if we want to focus on the as there are multiple constructions of what Kemalism refers to. If we want to focus on how leadsto, Kemalism direction foreign policy of sort what of interpretation accepted commonly discourse. policy foreign Turkish inthe Kemalism examine roleof the to dissertation of present the purposes the serves conceptualization Yet, foreign towhich question inthe remains,specific output. policy producing as a either facilitates or blocks a certain definedtype of foreign as an ideologypolicy; in otheror a movement,words,the objectives allof Kemalism/Ataturkism. On seethe other allhand, regardlessit of whethereffective Kemalismworks is cited here consider to contrasted frozen which setinprinciples are as latter andof a utopian understood rather the it as a set of ideas that progressive thought system,ideology. While todefine some prefer as Kemalism an ideology, understanding ideology as a others see it as a movementKemalism/Ataturkism, is which due divergingto views on functionsthe and characteristics of or a set of ideas since regard to with involves alsoliterature conceptualizations adiverserangeof the Second, ideology is against the Western imperialism in or integrationpropelling Turkey towards with West.the As our non-exhaustive review of the literature on Kemalism showed, there isno there showed, Kemalism on literature the of review non-exhaustive As our 40 CEU eTD Collection 97 95 96 188. Praeger, 1992), 1; Edward, Weisband, Mardin, 1973; Michael Hunt, 94 isfollowing remark of illustrative this approach: and show how one ideology becomes dominant as opposed to another. dissidents its Terry with Eagleton’s relation its to ideology of dynamism internal the connect hand, other the on studies, ideology critical The civilization’. contemporary the level of the ‘reaching at directed ideas of set progressive a as it in taking Kemalism of objectives the to characteristic positive worksthatdefinethe Kemalism ideology asan draw on also approach.They this a attribute andimperatives. prescriptions, of beliefs, which are capable of providing their adherents with goals, motivations, it other. on the propagate what is against their the‘real’ basic interestsdivisions in onforms it latter, the of the to action, course legitimate a andpropels the society integrates theideology society one hand, and creates and securing a ‘false’ theunity power by motivating of those peoplewho to adhere embedded positions: One that 1.3.1. Conceptualizing ideology andKemalism asanideologytakes ideology as a system of beliefs and thoughts that is socially of elites to secure their power at the expense of the rest. the of at the expense secure their power to of elites minority a by used thoughts of system ‘negative/false’ a as it takes that other the and moment; Terry Eagleton, See Thompson, 4; Eatwell and Wright, ix; Fowler, Martin Seliger, See for instance, Jie Chen, ed., ødeoloji ideologies, similarly, usually reflect aprovisional alliance of diverse radical forces. of sites, andin this subtlediffuseness presents no targetsingle its to antagonists. Oppositional Part of the strength of the bourgeois ideology lies in the fact itthat speaks from multiplicitya Following a neutralist position, Martin Seliger defines ideologies as action-oriented set Much of the traditional discussion on ideology has been couched in terms of two 94 , and/or providing the needs of the society to reach at a better stage than itis at the (Istanbul: Ideology and Politics Ideology: An Introduction Ideology and øleti ú im, 1993),186. Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy: Case Studies in U.S. China Policy U.S. Foreign Policy 96 The Ideologyof AmericanForeign Policy As our review of the literature on Kemalism showed, most of (London: Free Press, 1976). (London andNew York: Verso, 1991), 45. Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987); 41 95 While according to the former, tothe Whileaccording (Beverely Hills, Califf.: Sage, , 2; Schurmann, 97 (London: ù erif CEU eTD Collection 2003%20(En)%205%206%202003.pdf> (accessed January 13, 2007). 2003, FINAL A5-0160/2003, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, 99 A similar observation was also emphasized in a European Commissioner’s report on Hence, the critical perspective integrates the action-oriented-ness and the dynamism of dynamism and the action-oriented-ness the integrates perspective critical the Hence, On the other hand, the primary function of ideology, for Antonio Gramsci, is not to 98 Hence, the ‘falsity’ attributed to ideology is not due to its 100 Here too, we see that Kemalism is taken as a fixed 42 ÷an, Kemalizm , 63-79. Indeed, this negative , European Parliament Session Parliament , European CEU eTD Collection 104 Stavrakakis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), 193. Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change 103 102 Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith (London, Lawrence and Wishard, 1991). thishegemony isregard, not a and Thatcherite discourse, constituting newmeanings in line with elements the of both. Welfare ofboth discourse which elements contained within discourse, a mixed re-articulated itwas Thatcherism. Rather, to antagonistic whichwascompletely within adiscourse concepts involve these integrating not did thatthis appropriation states He terminology. Thatcherite Thatcherism withinits discourse through appropriating thatbelonged the concepts to the incorporated Party how Labor the byshowing discourse later into political the penetrated Thatcherism how on focuses Phillips Thatcherism, of attempt hegemonic initial the showing leftby central the political agency. spaces the conquer to seeks thatalso experience counter-hegemonic bearsbutby itself, a exist limits of Kemalism and its gradual dissolution. Yet, itignores the fact that hegemony does not allows for amore dynamic and symbolic constitution of ideology by focusing on receding the activities.” political and social all of meaning the totally fix to unable floating amongmediate political in elements to the order produce and “hasbeen consensus” to ability its lost has “Kemalism 1990s, since that, argues Çelik Betül Nur Kemalism, analyze 101 imaginary. of political texture thewhole restructure to because itbutalsoattempted legitimize policies, some economic it to only sought because not Hall,hegemonic from to According was a hegemonic Thatcherism this perspective. attempt of society. leadershipintellectual inby life social ‘worlddiffusing one’s view’over thewhole panorama as hegemony.win hegemony, To this to according view,establishismoral, to political, and Phillips, 855. Nur Betül Çelik, “The Constitution and Dissolution of the Kemalist Imaginary,” in Stuart Hall, “Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al.,” Forfurther informationon hegemony, especially see Antonio Gramsci, Louse Phillips’ discussion of Thatcherism is worth reviewing here. Rather than reviewinghere. worth Rather is Thatcherism of Louse Phillips’discussion 101 Stuart Hall’s analysis of ‘Thatcherism’ is illustrative of considering ideology as ideology considering of illustrative is ‘Thatcherism’ of analysis Hall’s Stuart state ofideological but domination a continuous 43 , ed. David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis New Left Review 102 Applyingframework asimilar to Selection from Prison Notebooks 151 (1985):119. Discourse Theory and 103 This observation struggle 104 , ed. for In CEU eTD Collection liberalism, and social democracy are some of the other concepts thathavebeenintegrated concepts other some of are the democracy and social liberalism, political democracy, participatory is Similarly, friendly. foreign investment statism more that economic protectionism duringAtatürk’s presidency, laterledsuggesting this to atype of Atatürk’s vision. Asdiscussed above,while Kemalist was statism usedas a meanstofurther of fulfillment tothe anchored arestill discourse political current of the concepts floating a ideas,fixedmakepresuppose also but setof helpsus of fact thatmany sense the the of ideology. political actors, who provide plausible explanations and justifications to the elements of an constructed by the hegemonic by constructed the redefine themwhilejustifying competing foreign policies. In ideology is regard, this changes as theideology is legitimate:policy ideology is a set of elements, the content of which is exposed to certain actors, of conceptualization following the Therefore, a process. but achievement, once-and-for-all in their hegemonicis never a because consent eliciting andreasserted, be asserted needsto then always Ideology strugglealternative forms of which is,thoughts, given all practical neverconsiderations, possible. with the win has to succeed, ideology over hegemony For to of nature. a dynamic lived practice alternative discourses, ideology ideology butunderlies its dynamic constitution. of an dissolution the represent not hegemonize does to whatan ideology seeks on discourses Hence, atthelevel emergenceof arefought alternative the struggles significations. of counter-hegemonic discourses cannot be shown as evidence to Kemalism’s dissolution. toKemalism’s evidence as be shown cannot discourses counter-hegemonic 106 105 is not ideology simply a perspective, inmeanings participatewhich albeit groups different unequally. ideological dominationbut in From this perspective, Kemalism can be regarded as a hegemonic discourse, not in not discourse, ahegemonic as be regarded can Kemalism perspective, this From Ibid., 847. This not only uswith ideology provides a dynamicunderstandingdoes not of that Thus, ideologies arenot ideologies Thus, 106 attempting attempts true to ‘fix’ the political order. Based on this view, the emergence of or tool false of between and struggle thecontinuingthe of political of a governing power, but refersbut the power, to of a governing , or either hegemonic or non-existent, but rather a rather but non-existent, or hegemonic either , or 44 105 accomplishing Takenfrom this way an power- CEU eTD Collection 109 108 Atatürk’e Sald 107 fissures. close the to try to hegemony” of “surgeons the from efforts endless requiring open, is permanently skin a body, of whose metaphor drawonthe Laclau andMouffee term, With this give meaning. to fixations partial through is constructed but chains ideas, of discourse, separated or set of afixednot isideology wellhow captures ‘suture’ sense. term popular Their revealing in this ‘full-independence’.or civilization’ contemporary level the of the to ‘raising Turkey of objective the to has beentied that discourse itis of another remain out needto the EUor the amemberof being Similarly, within theKemalist being with chain through following associated path. Atatürk’s doing so. Each articulation of a policy in terms of the ideas/principles of Atatürk, each Atatürk, of theideas/principles of in terms a of policy Each articulation so. doing previous discursive chain of Kemalismspecific meanings tothem;but they not only are constrained interms of of concepts the the but attributing alsofor or others than in rather concepts termsparticular selecting for of intentions thevarious have discourses of other actors may Actors discourses. their constructing for pieces different select in actors political which from asarepertoire, meanings, ofvarious it asapackage comes Rather, direction. consistent a in action the drives that system a unified not is Kemalism sense, this In constitution. its in bring changes actors the of practices logic - the strictstructuralist according to operate not an exist.without fixation,ongoing cannot ‘fixed’, it only exists as an effort toconstruct that impossible object. In other words,ideology, points’. ‘nodal asthe call Mouffe Laclau and what constitute attempts by to‘fix’ politicalmeaning.the These its actors fixation discursive points of partial Laclau and Mouffee, 105. Michele Barrett, Michele See Giritli and Baykal, 149. On how Kemalism is associated withsocial democracy, see, forinstance, K Ernesto Laclau and Chantal LaclauErnesto hegemony of andChantal conceptualization isMouffee’s also Building on conceptualization,this wecanargue anideology, Kemalism, that as does Õrman The Politics of Truth: From Marx toFoucault Õn Dayan 108 This implies the ‘unfixed’ character of ideology as continuous well the ofideology as character ‘unfixed’ implies the This Õ lmaz Hafifli÷ i, 93. 45 (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), 66. 109 Hence, if ideology cannot be cannot ideology if Hence, Õú lal 107 Õ , CEU eTD Collection 598-613. ‘Europe’: The Politics of The Politics of IntegrationDiscourse,” 110 another. to translatable is fixation each that way a such in chain, existing already an to chain ‘fixation’ vision, Atatürk’s the of constitutes therefore another nodal addingpoint, another foreign policy discourse. This is the subject of the next chapter. typeforeign examine of policy conceptualization would allow to intheTurkish theirrole what identify to is now remains what policy, foreign conducting in path Atatürk’s following with concepts. objectives Havingalsoassociated distinguished principles the the and these from a deviation as seen are policies foreign certain how and orientation, policy foreign path have offollowingwith Atatürk’s as are associated identified representative a certain previous nodal altogether. point arguingthrough version Kemalism their that of is one, delegitimizing the orthrough true the For a discussion on the translatability of different discourses with one another, see Thomas Diez, “Speaking Diez, Thomas see another, one with discourses different of translatability onthe a discussion For This conceptualization provides a better perspective to examine how the concepts we concepts the examinehow perspective abetter to provides This conceptualization 110 Political actors then have to capture what an opposing discourse useseither discourse an opposing whatcapture thenhaveto actors Political 46 Journal of European Public Policy 6,4 (1999): CEU eTD Collection build upon build upon by previousbringing our discussion on ideology and Kemalism into the debate. wewill which approach post-structuralist inideology the clarify therole of dichotomy to rationalist/ideationalist divide toformulate theproblem, wewill movethen beyond this so-called the revisit first will we while regard, this In orientation. this from deviation a as seen are policies foreign certain how and conceptualized is orientation policy foreign Approaching from foreign angleliterature. policy alsoallowsthis ussee Turkey’show to and inthe policy foreign of main determinant as the identities seen all, or at considered as not are either ideas, such factors’, ‘ideational other the with is it as just ideologies, equation, the side of for problem the as Indeed,lookinga starting chapter. the point from otherend the of andideology place thewithin and group of ‘ideational factors’, focus on foreign the policy set andof makesconcepts it principles, more senseforloosen purposes our to definition our Turkishthe foreign policy discourse. in Kemalism of role the explain to order in policy foreign in have may ideology an influence of whattype be clarified has to Yetit two. between the link the examine to necessary tools foreign already orientation? policy The previous chapter some of provided conceptual the from a general adeviation or of seen asanaffirmation is foreign a particular policy that influence doesideology foreign policy? How structure foreignthe discourse in policy a way Introduction RATIONALIST While the previous already chapter defined asanideology Kemalism itas and took a This chapter focuses on the following question: How does ideology as a set of ideas C HAPTER / IDEATIONALIST DIVIDE TOWARDS A DIVIDE TOWARDS POSTSTRUCTURALIST IDEATIONALIST I T II: HE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORK 47 : FROM FROM THE CEU eTD Collection constraining effects system the and in the maindrive forsuch states the a way focus shiftthat their on the of the system, how it encourages certain behaviors and penalizes those system to the interacting units. from both interacting and the outcomesto the from produced, of (states) units structure the the ideational. the and material/rational the between divide drawn the emphasize hence occupy thatdraw on this spaceinthestudies factors ideational approach,the and a trivial also but domestic the only not how show to want we as long so legitimate is purpose our Yet, consideration.intoit not take does which anapproach ideology within rolethe a domestic of 114 politics”. international not aspire i.e.ideas,to states, subjective andAs norms, influences, events. such, unique does neorealism to be a foreigninternal everything from picture the abstracts exercise Thissystematic asconstant. attributes policy domestic the takes and level the systemic at onthecausation focuses mainly neorealism theory, of producing them, from actors infer attributes the exceptionally outcomes that perspectives but as put by Kenneth Waltz, “the theory of 113 and Patrick J. Haney (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1995), 3. Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation 112 Constructed World 111 states. between explains interaction the what uniform theory: descriptive casestudies, explainingwhy individual actsan instate a a particular way, towards approach finds its sharp contrastin neorealism, inwhich the aim has been to move away from accomplishgovernments and means theirchoice of to theseobjectives. involvingprocess, the objectivesgovernments that pursuein their with relations other 2.1. Ideas asa‘trifle’ of foreign policy Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Neorealist and Thought “Realist Waltz, See Kenneth Waltz, SeeKenneth See Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, Patrick J. Haney, “Generational Change in Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Vendulka Kubalkova, “Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism,” in From the neorealist lenses, the causality in international politics runs in two directions, in two runs politics international in causality the lenses, neorealist the From According to most definitions, foreign policy refers to a complex, multilayered , ed. Vendulka Kubalkova (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 19. Theory of International Politics 113 It might therefore appear as a foregone attempt to begin examining 114 Yet, both realism and neorealism assume the attributes of Journal of International Affairs 48 (New York: Random House, 1979), 106. , ed. Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, 112 Hence, contrary to the other the to contrary Hence, 44 (1990): 31. 111 This comprehensive Foreign Policy in a CEU eTD Collection interests. 35, where he describes the most important contribution of Realism to IR theory as its focus onthe relative 120 1 (Summer1990): 44, 45. 119 118 International Security 117 International Organization Security Policy,” Industrial Japanese to Response America’s Matter? Interests “Do Relative Mastanduono, 116 1989). International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory cooperation is also possible as states seek to increase their absolute gains. On this view see Robert O. Keohane,115 interests relative with its in preoccupation of terms understood generally is scarce. security when gains their relative about become concerned more states that argues interests, andsecurity economic the between drawingnot asharp contrast interest.” political gain to economic subordinate security of considerations system, a self-help “in that argues Waltz hand, one the On approach. their dependency. preventoutsideinterferences, andcontrolling they lessening what depend onor extentof the to power the and wealth, material their borders, territorial their of defense the mainly wealth, in material capabilities. differences the their despite undifferentiated functionally balanceof that states: for unavoidable ofhence rational, is policy power.of type one only which in insecurity Anarchy, therefore,states). appears capabilities material their seek for relative (increase to gains requires states as a homogenizer,mightanyone, be againstforce used possibility that constant the implies anarchy the As security. which their enhance and borders) territorial their within makessovereignty each state actors operating andinsurvive environment, striving ananarchic to national (protecting their rational and areunitary states realism, (neo) For encouragement. the respond to not who do See Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Many Theories,” World, One Relations: “International Walt, SeeStephen John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” Cold the After Europe in Instability Future: the to “Back Mearsheimer, John p. 107. Theory,” Neorealist and Thought “Realist Waltz, Waltz, See Arnold Wolfers, SeeArnold system self-help a under even that who argue by neo-liberals, challenged been has assumption This 16 (Summer 1991): 73-113; R. Harrison Wagner, “Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives,” 116 In this imagery, states are such entities that are preoccupied with their security and security their with are preoccupied that entities aresuch states imagery, In this Theory of International Politics In this regard, the assumption of rationality and anarchy conveys a system mutualof 117 20, 3 (Winter, 1995-1996): 121. Discord and Collaboration However, it should be noted that there are also varying views within this viewswithin varying arealso there beitthat should noted However, 28, 3(1974): 435-66. , p. 106. See also Stephen Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia,” (Baltimore:Hopkins John Press,1962); Michael 49 118 On the other hand, Mearsheimer, hand, other the On Foreign Policy Foreign 115 (Boulder, Col.: Westview, securing survival the International Security 120 119 , for Mastanduno, 110 (Spring1998): While realism is realism While vis-à-vis International other 15, CEU eTD Collection Foreign Policy,” of Theories and Realism “Neoclassical Rose, Gideon see especially, policy, foreign to approach neoclassical the balance by recourse or to a combination bandwagon to chooses of state domestic certain why a factors, explain that amongworks which realist identities also neoclassical also are take there part. action, For a state’s review of 126 125 1985), 94 124 123 122 121 within it only still produces identity one type for of states, the that of self-help, without means tooperate material system the and international of base the placed material on the ones. ideal the over arestill material prioritized interests of approach that realism and dominated power- the within trivial rather remains ideals of consideration the argue that is fairto motivesthese areseen only exceptional and rarely sought underthe anarchic environment, it as a means, even when glory or prestige are considered as an end for a state action, and that income) real (welfare, gain future absolute towards for bealso directed wealth could economic relative striving since relative, andthe absolute the between divide necessary such noa is there however, “glory “glory imperial drives expansion.” realistconclusions. of characteristic gainsasa absolute of maximization take the typically itrealists then is (survival,consider security,autonomy), prosperity, to legitimate motive for a state action, albeit rarely action,sought. rarely for albeit astate motive motives that cannot be seen as purely material.For Morgenthau, for instance, prestige is also a some consideration into take realists some interests, material of matter a entirely almost as politics view international to inclination Waltz’s Despite all? idealsat of consideration also bandwagon (pursue absolute gains) with a more powerful one. but gains) (pursuerelative otherstates of balance the power donotonly states perspective, It should be added here that, apart from the classical realists that consider certain ideas as a motive for a for asamotive ideas certain consider that realists classical the from apart that, here be added should It Donnely, 69. Morgenthau, Hans Ibidem. Jack Donnely, Mastanduno, 75-77. 126 Can we argue then, that realism exceptionally considers material interests, with no with interests, material considers exceptionally realism that then, argue we Can While one can extract an ideal as a motive from realism as well, the exceptional focus World Politics Realism andRealism International Relations Politics Among Nations: Struggle forPower andPeace 121 . For Donnely, too, if one focuses on the principal that objectives focuses principal the if on one Donnely,. For too, 51, 1(1998): 144-172. 125 Yet, given that accumulation of power is still considered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 61. 50 124 Machiavelli,For asDonnely notes, too, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 123 122 From this From CEU eTD Collection 130 and and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 103-139; Çelik, Florida: BrownWalker Press, 2004), 79-95; Ayd World in the 21st Century,” in Century,” 21st the in World (1993), accessed from (accessed June 5, 2005); Faruk Sönmezo Sayari, “Turkey: Changing the EuropeanSecurity Environment and Gulfthe Crisis,” 129 128 Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwill (Boulder, Col.: Lynee Rienner, 1989), pp: 123-24. ‘National’: Towards an Identity Agenda in Neorealism,” in Mershon InternationalStudies Review 127 not if asarational depicted and War politics Coldto the contingent as taken isthereby policy area.” important geopolitically insuch a possible powersituated a middle-range realisticforlike acountry Turkey, or very neutrality not as“the Western was the of argued, pushedTurkey tutelage, policy towards this orientation. Turkey’s integration bloc,Western with particular the fluctuations and foreign policy from some scholars have examined the describedapproach above, realist/rationalist Drawing assumptions of the West. on (neo) the effect of the international ‘real’ causes choices, particular forsystem policy foreign towardthe Turkey’s mainlyherorientation during the Cold War on 2.1.1. (Neo)realist approaches toTurkey’s Western-orientationandCyprus policy it? In other words, “considerations of power dominatebalance considerations would policy which and of ideology.” sovereignty, national the threatens power which conjuncture, given this at interests material the maximizes policy which asks: mainly who maker, not something that occupies the questioning regard, aparticularwhether is policy ideology compatible an with anidealor is central place among the ‘rational’allowing any room for the constructionquestions or the reconstruction of these identities.of the decision William Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis,” The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe Ayd See, for example, Steve Smith, “Foreign Policy 31. Theory Theory,” and the Neorealist Newand Thought Europe,”“Realist in Waltz, See K. Krause and M. G. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies? Politics and Method,” Õ n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 106. This rationalist framework can be observed in the analyses that endeavor to reveal the reveal to endeavor that analyses the in observed be can framework rationalist This 129 The evolution of the international system into a bipolar structure, it is it structure, a bipolar into system international the of evolution The Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post ColdWar Era 130 40, 2 40, (1996): 239-42; Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwill,“Revisiting the In most of the analyses Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign , ed. Walter Carlsnæs and Steve Smith (London: Sage, 1994); Õ n, “Determinantsn, of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns 51 Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy The Return of Culture and Identity inIR Theory International Affairs , ed. 68, 4(1992): 679-92; Sabri European Foreign Policy: Middle East Journal ø dris Bal (Boca Raton, ÷lu, “Turkey and the . 128 127 In this 46, 1 , ed. CEU eTD Collection 114; Çelik, 135 HooverInstitution Press, 1972), 77-78. control the international to passagesright the and Turkey, from from the Straits.provinces Ardahan and See Kars the F. Váli,demanded Stalin Joseph Turkey, and Union Soviet 134 124. 133 War,” War,” 110, Çelik, 132 Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy. “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during Coldthe War”; Çelik, Cyprusinher 1963 finaland intervention induring whichtheforeign Turkish 1974 is policy in intervene to attempt failed Turkey’s Western-orientation, the from deviations so-called the its peak. place was Soviettook between Union during arms-race United when the and the at the States World during countries of theinthatthey Bandung1955 fit Conference well thiswithin role in in Lebanon in 1958,and siding with non-allied West the opposing the ofthe policies Third in theKorean War, allowing the United States to use her bases forintervening in the civil war blocWestern southwestern flank inTurkey’s of the threat. containing the Soviet participation asthe role Turkey’s confirm that actions foreign policy of asaseries appears orientation during the ColdWar wasthebipolar structure of international the system, Turkey’s Western- sovereignty. national her and territory Turkish the against threat great a posing was interest increase herrelative to chose becauseTurkey rational; substantial offinancialamounts and military withaid Turkey for together Greece. inTurkey need for MarshallAidand the thewas agreat Truman which Doctrine provided interests: economic absolute maximized Turkey’s because this rational; option behavior was the Cyprusthe issue. over leverage necessary the her give not would arena international in the isolation Turkey’s 131 policy foreign only the Ayd As a condition for renewing the Friendship and Non-Aggression Agreement signed in 1921 between the Ayd See AydÕ See for instance, Rubin, and Kiri and Rubin, instance, Seefor Õ Õ n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” Cold the during Conjunctures and Patterns Changing Policy: Foreign of Turkish “Determinants n, n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” Cold the during Conjunctures and Patterns Changing Policy: Foreign of Turkish “Determinants n, From From perspective,this for which mainthe factor constraining of Turkish foreign policy 135 Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy n, “Determinantsn, of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during Coldthe Indeed, the systemic factors receive such predominance in these analyses that even Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy 133 Last, but not the least,it was driven towards survival, as the Soviet Union choice ú çi; Baç; Hale, Baç; çi; . 131 Hence,follows argument the bandwagoning this that , 37. Turkish Foreign Policy 52 , xii. Turkish Straits and NATO Straits Turkish ; Ismael Aydand vis-à-vis (Stanford, Cal.: Õ n; Sander;n; Ayd Greece, since Greece, 134 132 It was Õ n, CEU eTD Collection Turkey enjoyed inthe1960s. takes into consideration how the unification of Cyprus and Greece would this change advantageous position many troops under arms as did Greece.(Castlebarry 1964, 119). However, the argument is valid so long as one interests relative her increase to need not did Turkey 138 allies” (Çelik 1999, xiii). if Union Soviet the against Turkey Turkey takes astep protect whichto results in Soviet obligation have interventionthey withoutwhether the full consent consider to and understandingchance a had of not have its NATO to intervene in the conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1963. Johnson wrote that “NATO allies 120; Sabahattin 139 LyndonJohnson to TurkishPrime Minister 137 114; Çelik, 136 was hence an open defiance, realized despite the was intervention 1974 although the this approach, According to systemicattributes. reach of warnings of the United from itsargued tohavestrayedparameters, regular States and the Western European countries and Turkey from from sea. open Turkey the foroff Turkey important cut since a Cypruswould wasstrategically Greek-led Mediterranean interest destruction.was rational; It since Turkey by was driven motivethe ofincreasing her relative limits of self- bipolar presencethe which her of the system,would during to action amount inintervention Cyprus in 1974 wasrational; because,Turkey not constrainedwas by the from Turkey’s viewed from glasses: realist is the orientation also disengagement this military providedsupport byitwhile undertaking such an action. financial nordependenton of the or by the West, interests the constrained was henceneither superpowers weresomehow abated. Having her diversified foreign policy Turkey partners, the between whenthehostilities period, place Détente the during Cypruscrises took Republic inRepublic whichGreek Cypriots andTurkish wouldshare the and securedthe power, Zurich Agreements and which the 1960Treaty Guarantee of createdanindependentCyprus Çelik, Ayd The most common reference in this context is the so-called Johnson letter, sent by the President of the U.S., of the President by the sent letter, Johnson so-called the is context this in reference common most The Ayd Õ Õ n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” Cold the during Conjunctures and Patterns Changing Policy: Foreign of Turkish “Determinants n, n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” Cold the during Conjunctures and Patterns Changing Policy: Foreign of Turkish “Determinants n, Therefore, similar to Turkey’s orientation towards the West, hercontextual the towards Turkey’s orientation similar to Therefore, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy vis-à-vis Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy øsmail, Greece: The geographical position of the island of Cyprus in the Eastern Cyprus islandof of position geographical the Greece:The 150 Soruda KÕ 139 Indeed, this was ruled out as a possibility with the London and 137 br it was still responsive to the encouragements of the system. Õ s Sorunu (Istanbul: Kesta øsmet , xiii. , ø , 37; Hale, nönü, upon Turkey’s notification that revealed her intentions vis-à-vis 53 Turkish Foreign Policy Greece as she maintained about three times as times three about maintained she as Greece 136 ú Yay are situated within the explanatory within the aresituated Õ nevi, 1998),nevi, 49. fact In some argue that 138 , 149. CEU eTD Collection 146 desire to defend her sovereignty. From this perspective, which values relative interests over interests defend relative values which desirethis perspective, hersovereignty.From to Based on this approach, itisBased on it this approach, argued; was Turkey’s an independent in policy, intervene. with alreadyacquiredthe accordance rights pursued to the issue not only a matter of national security for Turkey, but also that of national pride. the United States. ismaneuver, from that Turkey’s action independently and regardedashaving been pursued for room country’s the to obstacle serious is actas a seen failure to the that given especially exerciseforeign independent an lessenpolicy, andthe ability to the degree of dependency, is power understandingit of to the of territory’, another sovereignty, however representative given within the of sovereignty control degree ‘the exercised of as conceptualization in 1960. established the order torestore power guarantor 145 144 120. 140 Athens-instigated the andlater of RoC, the President The thirteen constitutional madeamendments in 1963 by Makarios, Archbishop the the powersGreece, Kingdom. the Turkey,United and amongbalance guarantor the of power 143 142 Mediterranean 141 Affairs to protect her security interests in the region. living in islandthe wastherefore what Turkey topreventattempted from happening in order community the Turkish of assimilation the and Empire), the Byzantium of establishment in seen as the step (unification achieving Greece), first with the Turkish community, this balance of power at the expense of Turkey’s interests, in limiting the political rights of the Çelik, Atasoy, 259; Ibidem. Seyment Atasoy, “Cyprus, Turkey, and the EU: The Need fora Gradual Approach,” Ayd Atasoy, 258-59. Stephens Robert see details, For 10, 1 (Fall 2003): 258. Õ n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” Cold the during Conjunctures and Patterns Changing Policy: Foreign of Turkish “Determinants n, Second, Turkey’s action is considered to confirm the realist approach in representing approach realist the confirm is to considered action Turkey’s Second, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy (London:Pall Mall, 1966), 168-94. ù ahinler, 146 In this regard, ‘deviation’this was rational; asitwas by driven Turkey’s 141 Türkiye’nin 1974 K and in seeking to unify Cyprus with Greece. unify Cypruswith andinseekingto , Cyprus, a Place of Arms: Power Politicsand Ethnic Conflict inthe Eastern Õ br , xiii. , Õ s Siyaseti (Istanbul: Yeni KararMatbaas 143 54 With a twist, Ayd With atwist, coup d’état right 145 Whilefit this not indoes the tounilaterally intervene as a of however, changed of 1974, Õ n arguesthat 142 Megali Idea Megali Brown Journal of World Apossible Õ , 1979), 53. Enosis (there- turned Enosis 144 140 CEU eTD Collection Post Cold War Era: New Problems and Opportunities,” in Opportunities,” and New Problems Era: War Cold Post 151 Studies 150 ødris Bal (Boca Florida: Raton, BrownWalker Press, 2004), 105. 149 148 “Turkey and the World in 21stthe Century,”90. ideology. 147 following a sakeof the issue for Cyprus the over pressures Western accede tothe not membership isnot doubted, forissueCyprus While the EU herEUmembership and quest rationality goal. of Turkey’s an ‘ideal’, based not shouldforeign ‘interest’, in thatsuggest policy be Turkishan that upon the studies be policy asanirrational Thiscan seen itin views ideologically observeddriven howone. an one. rationalist a and a realist as action the qualify system international the of constraints diminishing the and motives honor and security national of presence mere The intervention. the upon security national the and of power balance the securing gainsof supersede the that something seen not as are operation the in undertaking interest economic a clear of as absence well the as operation, the inof aftermath the sanctions andeconomic American embargo subsequent the island, inthe troops Turkish the maintaining intervention, the of costs the absolute, the incompatible with interests. incompatible national Turkey’s with itsense, canhinderTurkey’smaneuver freedom as of a Westernist policy be may EU. the with negotiations Turkey’s in a stalemate leadsit to that thefact despite interests, hernational with incompatible Sönmezo Atasoy, 257; Ahmet O. Evin, “The Future of Turkish-Greek Relations,” Southeast European and Black Sea Sönmezo ù ø smail Cem, smail ahinler, 5, 3(September2005): 400. The tendency of this approach to prioritize the material over the ideational can be also be can ideational the over material the prioritize to approach this of tendency The According to this rationalist view, if Western-orientation is taken in its ideological its in istaken Western-orientation if view, rationalist this to According 148 ÷ ÷ Türkiye’nin 1974 K 147 lu, “Turkey and the World in the 21st Century,” 93. lu, Similar arguments are also provided in relation to Turkey’s present policy on the on policy present Turkey’s to in relation provided also are arguments Similar Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya and that praise Turkey’s Cyprus intervention as not having followed an followed having not as intervention Cyprus Turkey’s praise that and Türkiye’nin 1974 K Õ br Õ s Siyaseti Õ 149 br Õ Turkey’s holding on to her Cyprus cause is not seen s Siyaseti, 89; Hüseyin Ba (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2004), 258; Sönmezo 150 , 76;Sönmezo 55 151 Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era For this reason, it is argued, Turkey should ÷lu, Türkiye’nin 1974 K ÷FÕ and ø dris Bal, “Turkish Foreign Policy in Õ br Õ s Siyaseti, 93. ÷lu, ed. CEU eTD Collection 324. 155 154 153 152 are interests) and identities (anarchy, works realist in the constant is taken whatever Thus, agents. interacting the of interests the thereby and identities the both constitutes setting this operate as material; andarguethat than social inrather agents/states environment which the forces”. than material rather bysharedideas primarily relations are“determined inter-state relations, international to approach constructivistAccordingthe to between states. identities relations inshapingthe the constructivistfactors in as important foreign research Withinconducting ideas-oriented policy. this agenda, studiesunder the material interests, we can now move to consider another approach which treats ideas are noteworthy in2.2. Ideas/ideologies asfactors in foreign policy their focus on in of Turkey longinterests the term. the role national the serve to happens decision if the even one, of conducted irrationally an action ideas,policy norms foreign a certain ideology render can only pursuit an orientation herCyprus policy.as Its or and haveKemalism, thisnoview, to according simplyappears role in Western- to Turkey’s ideology be from anaffirmationforeign seenasadeviation ofaspecificcan policy.or falls of providingframework toexamine an how short approach a ideals, rationalist/realist the As a consequence, in thatit does not assign a central position to the pursuit of ideology or power at the international and regional systemic levels and Turkey’s own national interests. relation the Cyprus beto requirementsthe of issueshouldalsobasedupon of balance the as longbe animportant strategic astheEUcontinues partner,Turkey’s to in andtrade policy or European foreign Westernist policy. Joseph K. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” Relations International in Turn Constructivist “The Checkel, K. Joseph Wendt, Alexander Ibid., 90; Cem, Ibidem. Having discussed the realist approach that relegates the role of ideas andideology therole of relegates that approach therealist Having discussed Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya Social Theory of International Politics 154 In contrast to the (neo) realist works, constructiviststudies consider realist works, (neo) tothe Incontrast , 235. 152 Justas membershipinthe the EUshould be pursued 56 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. World Politics 50(1998): 155 153 CEU eTD Collection Studies Quarterly 1986): 673-705; Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity Contemporaryin Europe,” forms of power, and the role of domestic ideas and ideologies in foreign policy making. policy in foreign ideologies and ideas domestic of role the and power, of forms bring revolutions in norms international through identity and constitution inchanges social international norms are filtered through domestic norms and ideologies, how domestic ideas body of work that focuses on national identity construction in particular cases, how Technological Autonomy: Brazil’s Domestic Computer Industry,” Politics 157 structures (international norms) and the resulting with identity formation (Checkel1998, interaction 326). states’ to endogenous are system, international ofthe nature anarchical ‘fixed’ onthe dependent and given as works realist by the taken are which interests, state show how and formation” identity and 156 states. within the from aregenerated norms these norms ininternational ratherthan politics questionthe as howthemeaningsto assigned to system. (normative) international the transform and construct interests their on based actions states’ how 3) and interests, actors’ transform and construct identities how 2) identities, their affect system (normative) international hence focuses on states’ 1) how expectations producedby interaction their with the process of change as and the operate, in states which a structures the of characteristics ideational the emphasizes result of this interaction. latter the however, inboth directions; inruns causality the constructivism neorealism, A constructivist structure. ideational and international agents the the between analysis of stateinteraction as aswell the agents the between interaction to the here ascontingent shown behavior 159 Making? in History,” with Struggling Scientist aSocial Wendt: 158 Organization Constructionof (World) Politics,” Cambridge University Press, 1989); Andreas Antoniades, “Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and the the Conditions of Practical Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Friedrich Kratochwill, 319-59; Nicholas Onuf, Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” Politics: Essays on International Institutionalization Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” ofPower Construction Social The ofit: Make States What is “Anarchy Wendt, AsCheckel states, by outpointing this mutual constitution, constructivists open upthe “black-box ofinterest See, for instance, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., “Alexander Ringmar, Erik 21-22; policy,” foreign and communities “Identity, Wæver, see also view, Onthis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Adler, “Ideological ‘Guerrillas’ and Questthe for ed. Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver(London: Routledge, 1997), 269-89. Indeed, mostIndeed, of constructivistthe are on studies centered rolethe international of 46, 2 (Spring 1992): 417. Forother constructivist works, see John Ruggie, 43(1999): 83-114; Checkel,“Why Comply? SocialLearning and EuropeanIdentity Change,” World of Our Making; Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations Global Society The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 17, 1 (2003): 21-38. European Journal of International Relations (London: Routledge, 1998); Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the The Future of International Relations: Masters in the 57 157 158 On the other hand, there is also a large International Organization 156 Rules ,Norms and Decisions: On In this respect, just as in Constructing the World International (Cambridge: 40, 3 (Summer 3, 3(1997): International 159 CEU eTD Collection ideology as a significant cause for foreign cause policy: as asignificant ideology ideology. of butthat interests, realm notof the of emanation is sincean it growth, ideological an is inherently (interests). Schurmann, to according Imperialism, world material the from separated somewhat is which sphere, ideational the within freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war,” cold of the end the and structures, domestic coalitions, transnational freely: International Studies Quarterly Douglas W. Blum, “The Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System: Beliefs, Politics, and ForeignIdeas andInstitutions: Policy Developmentalism andin Brazil Argentina Outcomes,” Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations exercises. thinking undervalues the emotional ideologiesappeal of in viewing them rationalistas realist the that arguing centuries, two past the of ‘isms’ familiar the of analysis in his account 161 160 Conflict Resolution 2 (Spring 1994):185-214; Zbigniew Brezinski, “Communist ideology internationaland affairs,” International Organization analysiscomprehensive for specificforeign actions. policy providea more to factors material the with them re-integrating or role causal independent assigningmeasured ineither ideas/ideologies/identities againstthem. This results an be factors to material from separated the first are ideational explanations ‘ideas matter’, that systemic factors and interests but by certain ideational factors as well. Hence, in order to show by material only constrained not are makers decision the that and (anomalies) choices policy foreign unexpected many understand to helpful sufficiently not are policy foreign to realist approaches that premise on the rely all making. Nevertheless, role indecision a play ideas/identities/ideologies extent what to and how over a consensus not is there policy, 163 162 Franz Schurmann, Wæver, “Identity, communities and foreign policy,” 22. Chen, 1. Cassels, 246. the American people — substantially affects U.S. foreign policy. …the set ofvalues, cognitions, ideas, and ideals — namely the ideology held by majoritya of Franz Schurmann’s foreign to approach astheideational be can called which researchagenda, Within this 162 Jie Chens’s below-quoted remark also represents a similar attempt to isolate to asimilarattempt represents remark also below-quoted Jie Chens’s 4,3 (September 1960): 266-91. The Logic of World Power 55, 3(Summer 2001): 553-88; Daniell Philpott, 37, 4 (December1993): 373-94; Thomas Risse Kappen, “Ideas do not float The Logic ofWorldPower The (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); KathrynSikkink, (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 188. 58 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1991); is illustrative of locating ideology 160 Revolutions in Sovereignty:How 161 Cassels provides asimilar provides Cassels 163 International Organization The Journal of 48, CEU eTD Collection 166 165 Press, 1987). 164 the ideology affects instance, for Haas, Mark For implementation. for apolicy’s condition is for notanecessary bearguedthat this foreign it aspect necessary policy,can component letto exist, alone have anyrole in foreign making of the policy. ideology isceases it argued, characteristic, without this in that of some works the so important below). Indeed, the need forideology beto consensual and responsive tosocial needs is taken the elite level (the beliefs foreignthe policies by conducted elite state the andinfluences thepatterns of policy making at and actions ofthis lineof ideology thought, affects patterns the of at the attitude level mass publicof through the rulers may also andwhich foreign be aretransmitted issues by perceivedpolicy to an audience. shaped by the valueshowever, the fromcausality runs in both directions, taking ideology also as a medium through making. In some works, foreign the decision policy affect the ‘objective conditions’ regards policies. flexible or coercive eitherleading cooperative, fluctuations, to policy foreign ofanideology strength produces influence objectivethe conditions ideology, and threat thestrength an of change inthe of perception people’s while that, he states Hence, behavior. policy foreign the and system) international in the power of distribution states, of capability (material conditions objective between the variable rather anintervening but ideology as aconstant nottake Chen does Yet, inevitable. is policy foreign in role its thus isinternalized; society the which into traditions in is cultural the rooted states, asChen Ideology, sharedenterprise. here asasocially 167 Competitive Conceptualization Praeger, 1960), 158, 159; and Michael Hunt, On similar arguments, see Cassels, 8 ; and Walter Carlsnæs, Walter 8 ;and Cassels, see arguments, similar On Chen, 11. Chen, 2-4. For asimilar view, see Gabriel A. Almond, Brezinski, 275. While these accounts take the emotional and consensual aspect of ideology as a ideology Thus,heremedium appears asa which through audienceperceptions of an as ideology it is realistas awindow-dressing,In contrast to the taken view whichtakes (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 2. 165 Ideology andU.S. Foreign Policy 59 The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of 167 (New Haven: Yale University Yale Haven: (New 166 According to 164 CEU eTD Collection hence defining the range of politically legitimate positions. ideas shape the foreign policy making by placing limits on the kinds of options available to decision makers and 171 170 169 Press, 2005), 2. increase actors’ clarity their providingabout thereby goals, for achievingforeign guidelines when they are embeddedin institutions,political andwhen roadmapsthe they provide context. in is a given rangeof permissible the what policy behavior by stipulating clear causal or moral motivations for an action and providing interpret means the and ends of their actions, andhow this in influencesturn foreign policy. makers decision way the ideas change how out point rather authors the in question, ideas the of acceptability social the on or action the of irrationality the on focusing by behavior policy 168 ends.” their achieve to rationally behave beings human when even policy, for matter “Ideas argue: they Hence assumption. of ideas in determining theforeign behaviorpolicy not while challenging rationality the in view, this on therein. involved Based interests arenopolitical there exclude that not possibility does the maker by bemay ideology thefact decision of the objectives the a given believed respect, that In this means calculations. and noends are there mean that necessarily not does function calculation in environmentto the which foreign operate. leaders policy ideological confines this approach as asharedenterprise, sees ideology view the that goals. their for realizing means andperform interests international and domestic their to posed threats and objectives their perceive ingeneral) society which theyoperate. foreign by policy shaping the policy understanding actors’ security of the in environment For asimilardiscussion without an emphasis on institutionalization, see Blum, 373-94, where he argues that Goldstein, and Keohane, 5 Ibid., 4. Mark L. Haas, According to this approach, ideas, when they are institutionalized, guide the foreign the institutionalized, guide are ideas,they when approach, this According to This also suggests that the presence of an ideational system in which the state elites state the in which system ideational an of presence the that suggests also This Ideas andForeignPolicy, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 168 In this sense, ideology is a filter through which leaders (rather than the 170 Thus, instead of showing the effect of ideas on a foreign Keohane and Goldstein seek to show the significance 60 171 Hence, ideas affect the foreign ideas policy the Hence, affect (London: Cornell University 169 Hence, from diverging CEU eTD Collection how parties,how eachhaving been acertainorganized around idea identity with or compete each and Conservativism) and Internationalism, Nationalism, Islamism, Kemalism, Westernism, foreign policy makersfilteredby various identitiesdecision are andideas in Turkey (e.g. Turkish foreign hasbeen policy by identity guided howthe interestsconsiderations, of the 2.2.2. Ideationalist approaches to Turkish foreignpolicy subsumed by realistthe studies. goal is show to causalthe roleideas, of ideologies or identities in foreign policy is which few, domotivate the leaderspush for a to certain agendain foreign main policy. the Hence, arather by upheld or all by shared are they be identities, or ideologies ideas, that and realists, by asconceptualized nota purely is foreign realm show thatstrategic policy to very attempt areabsentfrom calculations making. makes an what Then, decision ideational isapproach the interest-based that presuppose necessarily not policy does inforeign role have acausal policy issue is a highly amongsalient one the public. decision foreign in making; when is coalition the composed highly of groups,and polarized when foreign the effective are that positions ministerial major holding coalition, the in party ininfluential making ideais decision majororganized when party the acertain around the ideas aremore she argues that in partgovernments, coalitional thattake political the parties of ideas the Examining making. decision policy foreign in effective more be can idea certain a underwhich byidentifying theconditions this discussion to Özkeçeci-Taner contributes wouldinclined bemore topursue clearlythe guidelinesset of institutionalizedan idea. makers when decision suchcircumstances is it under as goalsan of action, realizable the over 173 172 objectives. policy Ibid., 270. 3-10. Keohane, and Goldstein Drawing on ideationalist studiesapproach discussed above,examinehow some Drawing the on In this regard, the consideration that institutionalized ideas, ideologies or identities can 172 In words,ideasother influence behavior conditions under of uncertainty 61 173 CEU eTD Collection 179 178 Inputs,” 171; Robins, 138-39. 177 Inputs,” 171; Robins, 138-39. 176 Westernization,” and West the Rethinking Turkey: in Identity of International Affairs Karakaya Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East: frontiers of the new geographic imagination,” Citizenship Identity in Turkey,” Kaygusuz, “The Politics of Citizenship by Drawing Borders: Foreign Policy and the Construction Contextthe of EU the of Accession NationalProcess’ Turkish on Foreign Policy”;and Ahmet Society the and Europeanizationof Greek-Turkish Cooperation”; O 175 Example”. Özkeçeci-Taner, “The Impact of Institutionalized Ideas in CoalitionForeign Policy Making: Turkey as an and comprehensive evaluation of national interest”. national of evaluation comprehensive and detached more a than “rather elites Turkish the of system value the of out born was orientation interests. national maximized Turkey’s objectively becausenot joinof organizations, these variousTurkey policies to Western/European in saw itinterest who theTurkish the elites of world-view Westernist of was hencearesultthe 174 the with driven are that actions of a series as is understood in turn Western-orientation Western-orientation, forvariable Turkey’s as are independent considerations taken an accordingly. interests national makingby shaping the world-view of Turkishthe foreign policy whointerpreted elites Republic. result of the Westernist identity that was institutionalized identities. these form change and and democratization) in the earlierher interactionsTurkey’s foreign policy (via domestic and transformation Europeanization years of the Turkish Turkishforeignthe identity policy politicaland particular identities in Turkey, and how of thetransformation of a result policy herforeign are conducts wayTurkey changes inthe certain how alsoshow some works inthis context, transformation domestic and interactions making. toinfluenceother decision Ibid., 139. Robins, 138-39. Bozda Bozda See for instance, Diez, “Turkey, the European Union and Security Complexes Revisited”; Rumelili, “Civil Rumelili, Revisited”; Complexes Security and Union European the “Turkey, Diez, instance, Seefor Bozda From an ideationalist perspective, Turkey’s Western/European-orientation appearsa Western/European-orientation Turkey’s perspective, ideationalistFrom an ÷OÕR÷ ÷OÕR÷ ÷OÕR÷ 176 Westernism,is it argued,has influenced the foreign decisionTurkish policy lu, 6; Ayd lu, 6; Ayd lu, Turkish Foreign Policy andTurkish Identity 61, 4(December2007): 471-88; Õn, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy:Historical Framework and Traditional Õn, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy:Historical Framework and Traditional Middle Eastern Studies 177 Turkey’s decision to take part in NATO, OECD and the EU 174 In order to point out the role of Turkey’s foreign policy 62 40, 6 (November2004): 26-50; Aras and Rabia ø hsan Da ; Aras, ; Turkish Studies 179 178 175 ÷Õ Hence, while identity Hence,ideological identity and while In other words, Turkey’s Western- Turkey’s words, other In , “Transformation of Islamic Political ÷uzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratisation in Turkey and Greaterthe Middle East 6,1 (March 2005): 21-37. øçduygu Özlem and Australian Journal ; CEU eTD Collection 182 (Istanbul: Boyut,2000), 162. process as the normalization of Turkey’s Westernization. See Da See Westernization. of Turkey’s normalization the as process Relations,” Society the and Europeanizationof Greek-Turkish Cooperation”; Ahmet Evin, “The Future of Greek-Turkish 181 2003), 1. and International Dynamics 180 Republic the behavioral —show shiftrepresents a that change in norm contentthe of Turkish Cyprusissue, andbacking Plan instead for Annan the the of creation a United Cyprus resignation of the Turkish government from considering confederation as a solution inmembership candidacy status 1999. for the be began asocial Turkey granted after andto a foreign was reality policy Europeanization and especially focus To relations on the view, with this EU. Turkey’s Westernization Turkey’s norma certain behavior a certain corresponds of identity.to which havethisview that Studies farmanifests as a country of policy foreign the inso and alongsocialization, after process of foreign haveidentity canbe on policy view arguedto impact astable only considerations that is basedon the This these organizations. with interactions asaresultof constructed Turkey’s was but organizations Western/European of a number to application Turkey’s drive not ‘Western’. to ‘Eastern’ being from transition inTurkey: society the and elite policy foreign the for orientation as material anidentity by alsosymbolize these factors to berecourse purely understood memberbe membership herto of EU,cannot athe andsuch the especially inNATO quest as Western-orientation, her of context the in undertook Turkey moves policy foreign the that is itargued Accordingly, organizations. Western mainlythe of be West, the apart to objective pursue her security cooperation. pursue her security through and more theCyprus) gave Republic of wayto cooperative and policies; beganTurkey to Greece (especially herwith countries with neighboring relations previously conflict-ridden Rumelili, “Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation,” 45. Cooperation,” of Greek-Turkish Europeanization the and Society “Civil Rumelili, See, for instance, Diez, “Turkey, the European Union and Security Complexes Revisited”; Rumelili, “Civil Rumelili, Revisited”; Complexes Security and Union European the “Turkey, Diez, instance, for See, Barry Barry Rubin, “Introduction”, in To another ideationalist view, on the other hand, Western and European identity did identity European and Western hand, other the on view, ideationalist another To Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 180 , ed., Ali Çarko Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration ÷lu and Barry Rubin(London, Portland, Oregon:and Frank Cass, 181 182 As of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey’s The changes that took place took Thechangesthat — the in context this ,” 5, 3(September2005): 395-404. 63 ÷Õ , ønsan Haklar Õ , Küresel Siyaset ve Türkiye ø hsan Da ÷Õ calls this CEU eTD Collection 2008). Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 16, (accessed July 5, 185 and Euro-Turkish Relations,” 74. Policy”,108; Melakopides, “Implications of Accession the of Cyprus to Europeanthe UnionforGreek-Turkish 184 183 context. Turkish the in reality social internalized fully a been yet not has identity’ adeviation it revealconstitute ‘European from the pursued towardsCyprus,seem or that to certain actions Similarly, behaviour. ‘European’ assumed the to conforming each of actions set entails a that do conform not above-mentionedthe to norms. Hence, according tothis view,European-orientation representsocial reality and drives the later foreign policy actionsthis after a period of routinized actions that internalized properly a becomes identity, identity’ ‘European integration, of process the undergoing are that countries the suchof practices policy foreign the guide initially may incentives as economic the traditional involves from replacedmutual one by benefits received cooperation. that the policiesof security exclusively as the protection of sovereignTurkey national borders from military threat is an definition the integration whereby represents evolution this view,European According to whoareconcerned. of those identifications individual from the andseparated process and identity’ ‘Europe’ whichunderstanding of ‘European are confined EUintegration the to a ‘European’ style dealing of issue with the and/or Turkey’s European-orientation. with seen concordant — arenot the conflict in of resolution the roleEU of the the concerning as RoC, well the reservations her recognize as strong to leader of TRNCandherrefusal the Turkish military in Northern for Cyprus; Turkey’s the support confederation thesis of the the presencethe of regardto missiles with in andthecriticisms installation Cyprus, of S-300 EU,the RoC to the of the accession the against —Turkey’s in reactions context Turkey this ‘Europeanization’ Turkishof foreign many policiespolicy, other by previously pursued foreign policy. Pernille Rieker, “Security, Integration andIdentity Change”, Working Paper 611, Dec 2000, Norwegian O Diez, “Turkey, the EuropeanUnion andSecurity ComplexesRevisited,” 170-72. ÷ uzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratisation in the Context of the EU Accession Process’ on Turkish Foreign Turkish on Process’ Accession EU of the Context the in of ‘Democratisation Impact “The uzlu, Indeed, such a view on ‘Europeanization’ or ‘European-orientation’ rests on a certain restson ‘European-orientation’ or Indeed, suchaview‘Europeanization’ on 183 Hence, while these foreign policy moves are shown as proofs for the 64 185 Thus, even if even Thus, 184 CEU eTD Collection scholars, Kemalism cannot be linked to being a member of the EU or other Western/European other or EU the of member a being to linked be cannot Kemalism scholars, defines Kemalism as inherently anti-Western. Asdiscussedin for previous the manychapter, membership EU. in the for Turkey’sideological factor, future let aloneasignificanta necessary condition, Kemalism.As discussed before, this even led some scholars totake the Kemalist principles as becould seen guidedby chapter, first Western/European-orientation then as Turkey’s in making the country an ally of the West/ Europe. further steps andtook foreign filtered policy down objectives identity their elites Turkish the 190 189 civilization.” European meant it and civilization, one only there existed “for elite Kemalist the that 188 187 Bozda with ‘Westernization’. of identification ‘modernization’ elite’s Kemalist the to adjunct a natural as taken is policy foreign her in orientation 186 with modernization and integration West/Europe. the Kemalist elites many forwho decided foreign moves policy pushedthat Turkey towards the was it since and Westernist inherently is Kemalism as policy foreign inher orientation Western/European- in Turkey’s wasdecisive some works, of these to ideology, according Kemalist policy. foreign Turkish directing in Kemalism of role the to refer that analyses ideationalist in the be observed can This policy. foreign on impact its in showing significant See, for instance Giritli and Baykal’s discussions on Kemalism and the EU. the and Kemalism on discussions Baykal’s and Giritli instance for See, Ibid., 6. Bozda Ibidem. See also Diez, “Turkey, the EuropeanUnion andSecurity Complexes Revisited,” 175. Ayd ÷OÕR÷lu, 5; Robins, 138. Õ n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” 171; Inputs,” Traditional and Framework Historical Policy: Foreign of Turkish “Determinants n, Indeed, ifIndeed, one subscribes totheintegrationistKemalism viewto asdiscussed in the This shows This shows way aspecificideology the that of a identity,ideas set or is definedis ÷OÕR÷ lu, 5. lu, 188 Hence, he argues that it was from this self-ascribed European Hence, itheand European self-ascribed was from argues Kemalist that this 190 On the other hand, such an argument would not be viable if one if viable be not would argument an such hand, other the On 65 189 186 187 In this respect, Turkey’s Western- Turkey’s respect, Inthis Similarly, Bozda ÷OÕR÷lu suggests CEU eTD Collection policy in question. foreign the against very itthe leadsresistance to others, to (Western-orientation), action policy foreign a certain for variable main asthe appears ideology Kemalist the some for while Thus, Kemalism. of definitions latter as competing utilizes studies the in ideationalist contested the largely is Kemalism of role the analyses, realist in the role significant any ascribed not is suggest dependence interests. notKemalism on Western the does be variable, ideological as basedbe upon this consideredto cannot Western-orientation tothe West institutionsattributed and 1950s,Turkey’s Western/European the during the ideology have of Westernism the be to Kemalist can the argued animpacton superiority the skinned nationalism” which is reactionary towards perceivedthe against insults the integrity capacityand of the that Turkey is an object of a continuing conspiracy by outsiders to be territoriallyKemalism, it coexisteddismembered) to central withwere other and potentially theaspiration “thin- European and contradictory features, Western-orientation while mainly that argues the Sevresinstance, for Syndrome Robins, (the suspicionpolicy. 194 105. actions with of EU.Ayd the that ideology cannot notbe factor forshown as Turkey’s a causal harmonization herforeign policy of Kemalist definition, their to according ideology, an as Kemalism conceptualize it. for support givingan than unconditional rather EU the towards skeptical andbeing affairs ininternational approach as pursuingacautious identity Kemalism/Kemalist as many one among ideas/identities other in Turkey and defineit some take context, andideasinthe Turkish identities competing through practices they draw on a different definition not take Kemalism as ideological variablean for Turkey’s Western/European-orientation as of Kemalism. In order to explain Turkish foreign policy 193 192 191 membership in institutionsthese workscontrary goal.to this institutions Kemalismas means fighting for the full-independence of Turkey and since It should be noted here that there are also ‘middle way approaches’ to the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign Turkish in of Kemalism role the to approaches’ way ‘middle also are there that here be noted should It Ayd 35. Jerusalem,” and Policy Foreign “Turkish Aras, 261; Özkeçeci-Taner, instance, for See, See, for instance, Aybars and Özden’s discussions on Kemalism and the EU. Õ n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” Cold the during Conjunctures and Patterns Changing Policy: Foreign of Turkish “Determinants n, Indeed, some studies that follow the ideational approach follow to Turkish Indeed, some studies that foreign theideational approach policy do 194 Õ n provides a similar line a n provides Hearguesthatwhilesimilar of argument. 66 192 Although donot these works 191 193 Hence, while Kemalism while Hence, CEU eTD Collection 198 Treaty that was imposed Sevres on of the theterms Ottoman unacceptable Empire ofthe in 1920.reminiscent are which On West this the from view,demands ofother see series to Soysal,lead 119, 148. could issue Cyprus the regarding pressures Western the to submission Turkey’s that argued is it where analyses 197 .Õ 196 morality,ititisfrom Turkey withdraw be argued, from to expected cannot Cyprus hertroops and saving the fundamental andrights of liberties Turkish the Cypriots. based is Turkey’s uponbringingperspective, position firstandforemost freedom island the to rights concerns that ledimage of Turkey as the Southwestern bastion of the Western alliance toduring the Cold War. the intervention and the policy pursued thereafter. From this island butalso the Turkish identity. in Turkish the villages only not that attacked coup followers Greek-led the the of against by was driven goal the saving theTurkishnessof of Cyprus; andhence itwas areaction AccordingTurkey’s national strategic some, to interests. Turkey’s 1974 Cyprusintervention of than their evaluation rather policy elite foreign of Turkish the concerns ideational several issue alsodue to onthe Cypriots were position theCyprus Turkish persistent sidingwith on 195 bypart, damaging strategicthe goalof EU membership (2003, 141). of these two opposite features of Kemalism hasworked toproduce an‘unintended consequence’ on Turkey’s country 141).(2003, This leads the author toclaim that rather than aclash of opposite ideologies, the coexistence independently. act and that Turkey was courageously able tostep out of the role that was imposed on her by the West countries Western the show to as itsought makers, policy the of interests than strategic rather nationalism on based was intervention Cyprus Turkey’s intact. identity Turkish the securing the structure of the international system. Instead, it wasimplemented due tothe concerns over by constrained it wasexclusively nor of Turkey, concerns security national themere involved the foreign practices, policy Turkish br Soysal, 10, 48, 33; Cem, Itmust be noted here that the Sevres Syndrome of Kemalism mentioned by Robins is also present in the Cem, Cem, Õ s’la Bozmak To another ideationalist approach to Cyprus, it was not nationalism but rather human rather but nationalism not was it Cyprus, to approach ideationalist another To According to this view that takes ideas and ideologies as the main causes for the maincauses ideas asthe andideologies view takes this that According to Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya (Ankara: Bilgi Yay 196 Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya In this sense, Cyprus intervention shattered In Cyprusintervention one-dimensional the sense, shattered this , 14; , 14; Õ nevi, 1995),nevi, 9-10. ù ù ahinler, ahinler, 195 In this sense, the decision for the operation neither operation the for decision the sense, this In raison d'être Türkiye’nin 1974 K Türkiye’nin 1974 K , 184; 67 ù ahinler, of of 1974operationthe and Turkey’s Õ Õ br br Türkiye’nin 1974 K Õ Õ s Siyaseti, 76; Mümtaz Soysal, s Siyaseti, 53. Õ br 198 Õ s Siyaseti Guided by this , 76. AklÕQÕ 197 CEU eTD Collection (1998, 49). generation should make sure Cyprus does not pass on the hands of an enemy as itis crucial forTurkey’s security motive and cause forTurkey’s Cyprus intervention. ForSabahattin 204 Ayd 203 202 12. 201 Yay Olu that directs the foreign policy decision. policy foreign the directs that and implementedattribute action, butanideational a an of justification roadmap retrospective a as not seen hence is policy foreign of honorability and legitimacy the and independence, of country.independence the and preserve existence the means to factor of Turkish foreign policy and implemented not only as a goal in itself but also as a 200 199 commitments.” international Londonthe Agreements.and Zurich restoring andlaw order inwith herrights inaccordance Cyprus from guarantor emergedthat of involve not undertaken butTurkey security theselfish with interests of sole the purpose is Thirdly,Kemalism 1974intervention the in it stated, chapter. discussed theprevious did as every has nation full that a oppressed to independence right principle the of pursuit Turkey’s of result a but vengeance, of act an nor annexation, an nor intervention. the of rightfulness in the believes she as long as Cypriots Turkish the of freedoms and rights give isjustbecause joined theRoC Turkey because EU.This the upon cannot protecting the Ayd concerns. other over legality by strict valued abiding that framework ideational a certain it legality the demonstrate is Turkey’s alsoaction, of that by action the suggested guidedwas Apartfrom these ideationalcauses, following Atatürk’s decrees regarding Cyprus is also taken as another Ferenc Váli, Ferenc Ayd Ayd Cem, Ibid., 285 ú Õ n, “DeterminantsÕn, of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” 181. umu ve Askeri Uygulama,” in nlar Õ n’s note isn’s note revealing wherehecites Atatürk: “in Turkey itis honorable comply to with Õ n, “DeterminantsÕn, of TurkishForeign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” 181; Soysal, n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” 181. Inputs,” Traditional and Framework Historical Policy: Foreign of Turkish “Determinants n, Õ Putting ahighemphasis on freedom,human rights, right peace,the to full- Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya , 1994), 136. 199 Bridge Across the Bosphorus Secondly, it is suggested, the intervention was neither a territorial conquest, a territorial neither was intervention the is suggested, it Secondly, 202 , 179;, Türk D This, according to Váli as well, has evolved into an important an into evolved has well, as Váli to according This, ø hsan Gürkan,“1974 K Õú 201 Politikas (Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), 71; cited in While aspect of this interventionthe is usually used to 204 It is also possible to observe how each of these ÕQÕ 68 n Analizi Õ br , ed. Faruk Sönmezo Õ øsmail, Atatürk once pointed out that the next s BarÕú Harekat 200 , anidea to generally attributed 203 Õ ’nda Siyasal ÷ lu (Istanbul: Der ø radenin CEU eTD Collection 205 Kemalism does not the viewthat to if subscribes rejected one the EUmaybe suggest foreign policy towards Turkish a policy thatincludeWhileKemalismis Kemalismguides the aredefined. theargument that supposedto leads to a loss ofapproach national sovereignty, depends a broader on2.3. From the rational/ideational dichotomy to their discursivehow construction the boundaries foreign policy orientation. of a specific unrepresentative seem may decision policy foreign certain a though even making, policy foreign in of role central Kemalism, the playing as beseen can ideas sense, this In it. of implementation very is the but Kemalism, as wellBasedRoC). onthis view, Turkey’s Cyprus present a deviationpolicy not does from as the of those administration the in power political equal an have to them assisting and enslavement of the ideas from Turkish Cypriots the nations’(saving oppressed and‘protecting state), the guarantor (relying on Zurich London actthe gave Agreementsthat and as to Turkey a rightthe (making andkeepingisland), the ‘reliance peaceinthe on international the agreements’ in ‘peaceathome world’ the peace for attaining full-independence), international agreements tofull-independenceof on relying independence’ Cypriots and right Turkish the (the issue:‘full- the Turkey’s andher 1974 intervention theprincipleCyprus policy of on previous chapter,definition state.” the of itidentity main the as seemsfull-independence the embracing and nations, excludes to encompass theforeignKemalist mainly,“peace athome, policy, peacein world,the oppressed the protecting other the all of characteristics three the involves Cem, to the according policy, aspectsforeign Turkish ideationaltraditional of the traditional aspects reasonsof Turkishthe making foreign policy is in revealing sense.The this Kemalist given the on remark Kemalism. Cem’s to are attributed that elements the basedon causesis foreignstated with respect policy to as discussed in the Cem, As the previous section attempted to show, the explanatory power of the ideational of the the explanatory power toshow, As theprevious section attempted Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya , 11. 69 205 While this While CEU eTD Collection 208 207 206 of the country in this context, sovereignty and independence the secure to decision rational Turkey’s emphasizes approach realist the While intervention. Cyprus the for causes as power guarantor a as intervene and independently act to right Turkey’s take analyses ideationalist and rationalist the Both policy. modern civilization’ and following Kemalist in directives reaching it). the of level the (‘reaching goal idealistic an reach to means a as but interest a national as not civilization. modern the of symbol European joinand to European the consideredcivilization Atatürk which superior and asthe as be recognized Turkey to because theywanted economic development importance to a great gave elite Kemalist the them, of one to According analyses. ideationalist some of conclusions welfare. national income andhence national the interest of Turkey to join the Western institutions including the EEC/EU as it contributes to According to one of the asanidea. states ideational approach with what the approach from rationalist the interest arguments based on is an merge interestingan what called the‘causes’. of produces provide as This theregards rationalist approach, it is in the economicbased on avoiding confrontation with the West. it found can irrational be of nationalinterests and againstTurkey the if are real interests the found rational aredefinedif national interests along of security strategic the interests Turkey, with besimilar While realistcan be approach. Cypruspolicy stated regardtothe Turkey’s can to consider Kemalism as key the variable in Western/European-orientation.Turkey’s Yet, the one lead can Westernism) and Internationalism includes also (which Kemalism of definition normative framework under whichthese actions acquire ideationalist meaning.From an point Atasoy, 259; Ibidem. Ayd Õ n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” 181. Inputs,” Traditional and Framework Historical Policy: Foreign of Turkish “Determinants n, Similar can be stated as regards the explanations given towards Turkey’s Cyprus Turkey’s towards given explanations the regards as stated be can Similar isit see Indeed, in to both approaches convergehow they possible definitions the ù ahinler, Türkiye’nin 1974 K 208 ideationalist explanations, on the other hand, emphasize the emphasize hand, other the on explanations, ideationalist 207 Here we find aconsideration of economic development Õ br Õ s Siyaseti , 53. 70 206 Interestingly, this is not against the CEU eTD Collection Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya 209 path.Atatürk’s tofollowingsecure principlesattributed and both thefull-independence of Turkey, to commitments international the by abide to principle the by guided was decision the view, of pre-discursive meaning to them, but also contributes totheiralsocontributes meaning tothem, but pre-discursive construction. and a pre-political notonly attribute ideologies does or interests ideas, of a cleardefinition providing byit. sense, this In andisconstructed both that constitutes foreign policy discourse be from mobilized separated by cannot independently ideology discourse them,the the of is exposedbackground cansustain contradictory foreign policies and how wayKemalismthe is defined to same the how analyze cannot we framework, certain this on Based policy. foreign in causes changes ideasit as facttakes that the dueto here examined question the to approach a suitable present not does still it objectives, policy foreign the direct they how examines and policy foreign in time. central ideas/ideologies into While ideational policy. foreign approach takes ideas/ideologies As the politicalexaminingisit assign discussed this question.because, This not does as above, any to role in venue auseful theoretical not seem offer does realism country, of a given orientation actors policy foreign the from a deviation as or with compatible seen is policy foreign particular do not have ideology ‘fact’. identifiable than an objectively issue, rather isacontested isideological’ ‘what and interest’ thenational constitutes ‘What interests’. orientation was byKemalismguided in itthat maximized Turkey’ssecurity and economic Western- Turkey’s and that ‘the interests’ and economic security maximized Turkey’s in the 1950swas Western-orientation between that‘Turkey’s asit difference rational arguing point ofview foreign policy is notguided byideologies but rationality, is there little from a realist Inthis while sense, in latter. the character anideational is attributed approach Ayd n, “DeterminantsÕn, of TurkishForeign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” 181; Cem, As our focus is how ideology focusAs ideology isour in theforeign how policy (Kemalism) structures away a that 209 Here again, we see that what appears as an interest to the rationalist to the interest asan appears what see that we Hereagain, , 14; ù ahinler, Türkiye’nin 1974 K 71 Õ br Õ s Siyaseti , 76;Soysal,9-10. CEU eTD Collection 214 213 212 of Minnesota Press, 1999). Security Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox of Minnesota Press, 1997); Wæver,“Identity, Communities, and ForeignPolicy”; Hansen, 210 represented in their foreign policy articulations. are these how but a policy in conducting interests ‘real’ their or believe genuinely makers decision foreign policy the what in interested revealing not are They approaches. ideationalist foreignpoststructuralistin to approaches contrast to policy stand stark realistthe and be adopted. on cannot policy impact theirdocuments epistemology causal that constructs of the foreign policy discourse.reproduced. As they do not exist in a pre-discursive and areproduced interests andmaterial identities, ideas, the foreign of policy that formulation realm, an material interests in or identities certain to their recourse makershave while decision viewthat the on rested therefore representations of a thecertain meanings that structure them. foreign policy, it is also through their 2.3.1. Poststructuralist approaches toforeign policy context. in this venue ideology in foreign foreign policy. asuitableto policy approaches Poststructuralist provide of role the analyzing in epistemology a discursive follows that and dichotomy ideationalism of Kemalism), and isstructures by constituted (the“self-constituting politics” foreign discourse the policy then we should undertake an approach that rejects the rationalism- Hansen and Wæver, and Hansen 211 politics Wæver, 26. Ibid., 27. Hansen, 1. Gearoid Ó Tuathail and SimonDalby, “Introduction,” in See for instance, Michael Shapiro, Michael instance, Seefor , ed. Tuathail andDalby Routledge,(London: 1998), 1. ; Iver B. Neumann, Poststructuralism takesalldiscursivesystems astemporal fragilefocusesand on and how it examine Kemalismrather additional not toprovide ischain but If ouraim to an 212 This suggests identities,that ideas, andinterests areontologically inseparable European Integration and NationalIdentity Uses of Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War 211 Poststructuralist research agenda in foreign is researchagendain Poststructuralist foreign policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Campbell, 72 214 Re-thinking geo-politics: Towards a critical geo- ; William E. Connolly, (Minneapolis: University Minneapolis: University Identity/Difference: Security as Practice as Security 213 In this sense, this In Writing 210 ; CEU eTD Collection Uluslararas 220 219 218 217 Routledge, 1996); Connolly, Michael Dillon, 216 Bilgin Y and 215 of juxtapositions, where one elementisits valued over opposite. reference towhatitdefinedis through andthemeaning not(Other) is a series through given national, institutional, and regional Self. the identity of the construct and a situation meaning to ascribe threat of representations how poststructuralist point of poststructuralist identity view of point that shouldconstitution bebased necessarily on identity against which the policy of the country can be based upon,it does not follow from the ‘communist’ East. the Western identity over ‘anti-communist’ Western-orientation Warduring the Cold appearsasachain thatvalued of discourses the and‘modern’. ‘democratic’ ‘under-developed’ and ‘non-Western’ helped constructing Western identity Turkey’s as ‘non-democratic’, as ‘traditional’, states bloc of Eastern the representation elite’s Turkish Coldwith the isWarduring regard toTurkey’s Western-orientation It that period. suggested ‘pro-freedom’. and ‘right’, ‘civilized’, as identity American stable secure a served to and‘sick’, ‘oppressive’ as redscare”,denotingthe enemy ‘barbarian’, the Americanness. ascribingthrough it a devalued identity and thereby attributing aprivileged value to (Other) enemy the externalizing by (Self) Americanness reconstituted U.S. the in danger of discourses the how shows Campbell Here sense. in this illustrative is policy foreign U.S. the Özlem Demirta Bilgin Y and Ibid., 177. SeeCampbell, Derrida, Jacques see, view Onthis Hansen, 6; on this view see especially, Campbell, Led by this aim,most of the poststructuralist discussions in IR focus on the question of Although this binary view is established on the premise that there is not an intrinsic an isnot there that premise the on is established view binary this Although Õ Hukuk vePolitika Õ lmaz, 40. Õ Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought lmaz, 44. 217 Writing Security ú Bagdonas, “Türkiye’nin ‘vazgeçilmez’ iki davas Referring to the Cold War, Campbell suggests that during this “hysteriaWar, the ReferringCold suggeststhatduring thisof to Campbell Identity/Difference 3, 11 (November2007): 21-22. 219 . According this to binary identity,construction Turkey’s of Writing and Difference . 215 According to this view, identity (Self) is always is (Self) identity view, this to According Politics Without Principle 73 (London: Routledge and Kagan Paul, 1978); Õ: K Õbr 220 Õs ve ‘Bat 216 ; Campbell, Campbell’s discussion of discussion Campbell’s 218 Õ’/ ‘Avrupa’ yayönelim,” Similar is argued also argued is Similar Writing Security (London: ; CEU eTD Collection 225 224 Policy inaConstructed World 223 European University, 2003),34. Central thesis, (MA 11 attack” September of the aftermath the in ‘evil’ the and ‘noble’ of the ‘drama’ American 222 221 negative terms duringthe policy inaction, linkof the between policies and identity as important elementspropagated ofAmerican identity. ideas thatare favorand multi-ethnicity, democracy who Bosniansasthose represented discourse policy foreign American the crisis Bosnian the during that shows Messari revealing during crisis foreign example. another the policy Bosnian provides discourse American the of analysis Nizar Messari’s is inneedliberation’. also onethat of but ‘the other. Iraqi are hand,one oppressed need the who‘liberation’in and‘freedom’people onthe and of the on ‘atrocities’ committing as followers andhis ‘dictator’ the Hussein, Saddam of regime the andsociety: state its between as bifurcated Iraq constructed discourse This administration. This canbedanger.on of in Bush post-September11discourse the the observed based exclusively nordiscourses are foreign policy the constructs, they their only neither are antagonisms. reference. As Hansen shows in shows AsHansen reference. single andstable foreign between policy link a certain and identity orientation aspecific of variations in the way Western and Turkish identity were cast in relation to one another. foreign in the ‘West’ policy and discourse relation to issue. wereanumber the There Cyprus Turkish of the constructs only the werenot being present, despite constellations, antagonistic identity. Western ascribedis tothe also that value a is which (multiculturalism) coexist can civilizations different how showing through also by Turkey’sidentity that not only constructed Western but a communistwas East, denoting Demirta Messari, 244. See Nizar Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Islam in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Hansen, 28; Özlem Demirta Wæver, 24. 222 If foreign policy discourse constructs variational identities, one cannot establish a Here the American Self was not only juxtaposed against a purely a purely against Other antagonistic juxtaposed only not was American Self Herethe ú Bagdonas,“Türkiye’nin ‘vazgeçilmez’ iki davas 221 While contrasting identities are an important part of of important partof danger, discourses identities arean While contrasting , ed. Vendulka Kubalkova (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 227-45. ú , “Considering the positive other in a discourse of danger: The re-played , while Balkan identity , while in asPractice Balkan identity Security was constructed 74 Õ ”, 32-38. 225 As the following chapters will show, 224 By the same token, it can be argued Foreign 223 CEU eTD Collection 229 228 227 226 countries. of Nordic the identity construction the have structured to Europe in and nation relation of state constellations various how examine writings. ideationalist and rationalist of claims truth the countering meaning in constructed foreign policy as well discourses a theoretical in approach of study structures beto analysisthe both asamethodological tool Discourse taken can follow shouldnotdoes that one a poststructuralist from position a ‘non-method’. apply analyses and deconstructivist analyses of analysisthe discipline2.3.2. Methodological considerations inpoststructuralism andtheuse of discourse to setting a new research an invaluable methodology foragenda, poststructuralism. it analysis ofmeaning makesdiscourse for structures This quest debate. the meanings structure inevitable. Oneshouldfocus on then also competingthe toinvestigate discourses which ifSecond, homogenous isnever politics a arena, identity-policy links variational are puzzlingnot observe identity to inthewayaspecific apolicya change isor articulated. if foreign andpolicy identities areneither fixed unchangeable nor ‘givens’,pre-discursive itis farmorewere during varied, open-ended. conflictcomplex, the and representations hence a particular ‘Europe’. aparticular hence and policy a European isof construction basedon a specific nation-state of constellation dominantdiscourse uponwhich dominantthe policy is based, they analyze howaspecific formation of statements and focusing on the official statements as representatives of the Ibid, 33. Hansen and Wæver, eds., Hansen, xix. Hansen, 31. Led by this ingoal, case to theory abstract preferred have authors poststructuralist of most the While European Integration and National Identity. 229 European IntegrationIdentity andNational 75 228 Taking discourses as a system for the , Wæver and others and Wæver , 226 Indeed, 227 CEU eTD Collection construction in foreign policy. Hence, the task ahead is to integrate our previous discussion on methodology and theory allows for a suitable venue to examinea as both the role analysis of ideology discourse that section this of contention the hence is It identity. on focus identity. Thisnotwithstanding, a poststructuralist approach does notneed tohave an exclusive foreign policy and between relation examined co-constitutive or the debates theoretical 2.3.3. A poststructuralist approach toideology and foreign policy is and whether andhow in articulations. there a process, these change duringthis identitiesconstructed are which debate, policy foreign the structure discourses basic different how show canbe to analyzed Foreign shouldpolicy discourse be selected. texts analysisneed doesnot tobe free of methodologicalany consideration limitswhichor as to representations. alternative marginalized ithow and itunderstandback history how was constituted in constitution presentconcept to the the of constructions of identity. different ethical) (spatial, and articulate that temporal, a of debate points within contestation main pointto the that discourses” “basic the identifying with start analysisshould discourse instance, Campbell, instance, for See, identities. reproduce danger of discourses how examined that analyses the in used methodology main 232 231 230 foreign policy. of an canbeasource unstable representations oppositional by articulated representations how also but discourse the dominant within parameters basic discourse withinnotas situated shesuggests field, widermain discursive only examining a the biased towardsan analysis dominantthe of discourse. Understanding the foreign policy political forces reinforce or compete with each other as contesting Ibid.,53. This genealogical approach is mainly basedFoucaultian on ‘history of the present’ and has been the Ibid., 52. Hansen, 7. Poststructuralist analysesinthe havePoststructuralist IR discipline either engaged inpurely meta- Hansen makes a further step to present a more comprehensive framework that isnot framework that a more topresentcomprehensive step Hansen makesafurther Writing Security 231 Once the basic discourses are identified, the aim must be to trace be must to aim identified, the are basic discourses the Once . 76 232 This suggests thatapoststructuralist Thissuggests 230 According to this view, According this to CEU eTD Collection a repertoire of various values and objectives that are linked to certain asactors goals linkedpolicy thatare to various objectives valuesand a repertoire of aconsistenttowards direction producesor afixed that andunitary issubject position. It rather foreignthe along policy ideological debate lines. ideology, their notonly articulations ideology the reconstitute butalsoin question structure ideological construction is also to elicit consent. As the foreign policy makers refer to an of an function sinceprimary the structures of form these one identities, and interests specific identity Asmaterialor interests. in ideologies, discussed just chapter, previous the as from a a deviation foreign constitutes policy whether acertain identifying than rather debate policy foreign the structure that narratives the and policy of criteria legitimating basic the on into the continuity and discontinuity of a certain foreign policy orientation requires focusing andfrom exempt interest identity the based articulations employ. foreign makers policy not are asideologies interests identities and of discursive construction consideringthe also allows foreign the discourse through policy construction ideology the examining suggest that and between interests identities andideologiesin ideas.I one created the to Instead, addition any politicalin is omnipresent or debates policy foreign of the center the is at construction ideology that discussionsuggest not through discourse. Such does foreignan policiesargument andare(re)constructed of in legitimization arealso andas ideologies the employed interests means, the only as one, such a claimcompatible with acertain identity may be one of theforeign policy templates, itis not, by any as policy certain a wouldrepresenting While articulations. policy plausible and legitimate making construct a further policy. in research foreign agenda poststructuralist dichotomy ideology thiswith abovediscussed approach the and situate contribution the within between As argued in firstthe chapter, ideology is a not unified system leadsthat foreign policy it be above, aninquiry that can viewdiscussed argued Based onthepoststructuralist At core the of foreign elicitthe is policy debates strugglethe to consent through 77 CEU eTD Collection represented in and by official the this discourse composition reproduced others, be can are points nodal which of identification the After constructed. is ideology acertain variations task is toexamine how these discourses compete with each other and among which discursive The third policy). the linktheideology to divergeinthey way (that the differential discourses among it splitting by discourse policy foreign the analyze to needs then One orientation). order to examine whether (in policy a specific to in relation it made is statements cast the parallels as orientation policy an foreign the extension of or a deviation from the foreign policy the structuring role of ideology in foreign policy orientation. dependent upon each other seems to be an analytically useful framework in order to examine and both parallel to as be Taking analyzedseparately. makingneed not foreign policy so-called directives of an ideology to a certain policy. Therefore, ideology constitution and linkthe that statements of as system a discourse policy foreign the taking requires orientation is of political arena differences. constituted in various of in between versions sofaras ideology the question competition inescapable the an involves constitution ideological sense, this In actors. other of discourses policy foreign by and provided alternative the those ideological nodal templates of previous the points in of the constrained areboth terms actors their policies, system.articulating In discursive another actor. Hence, while ideology is ‘what actors make of it’, it is not a free-floating be challenged (and delegitimized) by another foreign policy-ideology articulation made by its of terms in a newnodal pointto templateconstitutes ofanideology ‘fit’ constructed with previously the policy foreign a of articulation Each for. speak they position political the from policies their legitimize to order in it with associated elements main the capture to struggle Hence, the first task is to identify a certain time period where arguments with regard to foreign policy ideology and between therelationship to approach A poststructuralist 78 CEU eTD Collection and the West/Europe periods. different three through and West/Europe the Cyprus towards policy foreign Turkish and Kemalism between constructed links variational will above,analyze following chapters presented the Basedon framework the discourse. studies is not to examine for case following the as purposes of our aim the relation beaside conclusion could only the extent to which this Yet, discourse. official tothe alsorelate discussions academic how by showing extended the academicbe can study the of reach analytical The debates policy. foreign Turkish to Kemalism of elements circulate in the officiallinkedin the government part that take and Turkish the political parties establishment the howfocus the statements deliveredby on official military the one, analyzing the discourse or in the wider discursive field marginalized. howsome are and evolve variations policy-ideology as Hansen foreign suggests. how analyze can one way, this In period. time another of analysis the to Thecompared present dissertation will This framework can be applied to examine the role of ideology in official examine rolethe of ideology canbe the to framework applied This 79 CEU eTD Collection Cyprus of and islandintothe Greek in Turkish zones latethe 1950s official the colonial policy supporting inCyprus from shifted British the rule Turkey’s Cyprus While issuefor wasnoCyprus policy. Turkey there until early the 1950s associate member to EECinthe involves1963. This eraalso major for turning points i.e.War, (1948),Council (1949),and Turkey of OECD NATOEurope (1952), became an Cold the wakeof institutions the since various Western Having injoined return. reconstituted policies wereTurkey’s Western/European-orientation Cyprus issueinhow theseand the 1960-1979, legitimized and linkedIntroduction to each other, and how the role of Kemalism was question. economic whichblocked aidandloans all sanctions, wasa until on Cyprus progress the there resulted in the open defiance toher Western allies, a Turkey undertook military inintervention Cyprus which For the Turkish side, the best solution was the continuation of the British governance in the island; however, if however, island; the in governance the British of the continuation the was solution best the side, Turkish the For 604). In 1958, however, both Greece and Turkey declared that they gave upon 602). 2002, (Oran Turkey” 235 owner, real its to over it hand be to would solution 234 (DP) stated:“There is noCyprus issue”(Oran 2002, 598). mentioned. On 20 June 1950, Fuad Köprülü, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Democratic Party Our youthengages in a vain excitement.” (Oran 2002,598). In the 1950 election campaign, Cyprus issue was not is no such an issue called as ‘Cyprus question’…English government will not leave the island to another state. was clarified by the TurkishMinister of ForeignAffairs Necmettin Sadak wanted on 23 of JanuaryCypriots percent 96 that 1950 as follows: “There 233 237 independent state and Turkey became aguarantor powerfor then the established status-quo on island. the 236 that they would supportthe independence of island. the (Oran 2002, 607-614). After1955, the slogan of “Either Cyprus or Death” was replaced by “Either DivisionDeath” or (Oran 2002, After EOKA began its activities in 1955, Turkish position was still centered on maintaining the Whileboth AKEL communist(the party of Cyprus) and the Greek Orthodox Church (which made referendum Feroz Ahmad, an became Cyprus when Agreements Zurich and London the with 1960 in came point turning The status-quo DISCOURSE ON THE 236 This chapter analyzes how Kemalism structured the foreign policy debate on debate policy foreign the structured Kemalism how analyzes chapter This 237 , and to Turkish, and to Cypriots’ of right inself-determination RoC.In the 1974, with an For the For Turkish foreignachallenge how makers,this policy constituted to asto would change, in the words of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, “the most legitimate C de-facto The Making of Modern Turkey HAPTER separation of Cyprus. This led to the U.S. arms embargo and European I:T III: W ) began making Enosis) began EST HE CLASH OF /E UROPE AND THE (London and New York: Routledge,1993), 176. 80 K Enosis EMALISMS claims in 1950, the Turkishposition on Cyprus C YPRUS ISSUE T ? HE FOREIGN POLICY 235 Enosis , to the independence of and division theses, and theses, division and (1960-1979) 234 to the division the to status-quo . 233 , CEU eTD Collection Science Association, 1988), 59-112. Turkish Republic,” in Middle Eastern Studies see especially, Ergun Özbudun, “The Turkish Party System: Institutions, Polarization, and Fragmentation,” 238 in betweenfactions coalitional represented the 1965 andgovernments 1980. political onthe Kemalism focusing of intheconstructions examine diversity to the turn thus will section Thesecond on discourse. this built also leaders civilian of the articulations the the politics of Kemalism was not confined to the statements of the military establishment as the main actors of the Kemalist discoursethat While maysuggest discourse. this drewonthis coalitional duringthe period governments was the military establishment, it will be seen that orientation, and which identities and rationalities in wereconstructed making thislink. Western- the and policy Cyprus the between link stable a draw to employed were ideology Kemalist the of elements which examine and events, key these to in responding discourse study within the political caseto variations the Turkey’s Western-orientation agood provides duringdiscourse nature period this aswell thedisputed as of Cyprusquestionthe and coalitional governments This in of followed the represented which increased parliament. views aperiod the range of consisting of a wide range militarythe incoup electoral 1960, the system proportionalchangedwas into representation of political factions. intoconsiderationtakes Turkish that politics washighly polarized in period. this The richness of the world? Western the from andOtherness herdifference or identity Western Turkey’s reconstitute West? itwas itor the a stanceagainst Did Western-orientation an of Turkey’s extension legitimize the mission in Cyprus and Turkey’s rolein theWestern Alliance: was the operation For further For informationon thefragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics in the 1960s and the 1970s, The first section will focus on the way the military legitimized its rule and how the It is problematic to assume a unitary response to these key events especially if one Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish Political 17 (April 1981): 228-40; and ølter Turan, “Stages of Political Development in the 81 238 Following CEU eTD Collection unity. The Article 35 of the Armed Forces Statues extended the responsibility of extendedtheresponsibility Armed the unity. Statues Article Forces Armed 35of the The country the against any communist orIslamist and claims for power toestablish thenational ideologies, as ameansand safeguard Kemalism therebyseparatist deviant reconstituted to was as communism and Islamism the defining In principles. Kemalist the of realization ‘true’ to bring an end to the regressive asameans military proclaimed interventions by were the later of the military coup 1960 and and undemocratic ‘elevating status of the Turkishsociety the level the to of civilization’.contemporary The policies that drove the involvedperiod countryhome’, at ‘restoring order ‘restoring anddefending democracy’, and from the subsequentmain coalitional in governments. The of elements politicalthe discourse this of by the articulations and reproduced the oftheestablishment military hegemonic attempts until quasi-military underregime governments 1973. supra-party 1971, there was yet another military intervention to force Demirel to resign which led to a Gümü government took governmentover for took the1965elections. Thesewerewonby led JP, the byfirst Rag until head coalitions a temporary three unstable to Head of duty RPPwasgiven the the the majority of the votes in the general elections of 1961. In due course, In duecourse, in majority 1961. of general the the votes the elections of and inheritor the guardianof itselfpresented Kemalism as sincecould 1920s, the obtain which (RPP), Party Republican People’s the nor DP dissolved of the successor virtual a (JP), Party Justice new the Neither governments. coalitional unstable eraof an followed This ministers executed. were his two ministerand prime the and disbanded, party was political restructuringin Turkey. The Democratic Party was (DP) governmentdissolved, the 3.1.1. Peaceathome, generals intheparliament: the officers’ takeonKemalism 3.1. Theofficial discourse (1960-1979) ú pala and later by Süleyman Demirel, who remained as the prime minister until 1971. In The political The betweenpolitical discourse largely1960 and 1973wastherefore by dominated the The 1960s began with military an unexpected coup which an brought extensive 82 ø smet ø nönü, the Õ p CEU eTD Collection 243 242 the Air Forces and the Chief of memorandum Primethedelivered tothe Chiefsof by Demirel Minister Land,the the and Navy, General Staff stated that enough. The three-point yet‘mature’ not was democracy theview that implicated Kemalism1971 which was the only way to claim legitimacy itsfor rule after the 1965 elections: BasÕ principles.” impossible move away to from Atatürk’s principles; Turkey can be via advanced only these itisit became certain that coup “With May 1960 the of establishment: discourse military the the1960coup stated after governmentcoalitional following:the associated Kemalism with democracy and national unity. The program of the second 241 Matbaas National Unity Committee (NUC) that was established after the coup said: 240 defend Turkish territory Republicthe and of Turkey as designated by Constitution.”the (Birand 1987, 2). 239 function. internal include such an to Forces Ibid., 92. Ibid., 54. Cited in Nuran Da Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Birlik Komitesi, and safeguard to is Forces Armed the of duty “[t]he that states Statues Forces Armed 35ofthe Article The mevi,1988), 32-33. Õ The following remark also shows how the subsequent governments reproduced the reproduced governments subsequent the how shows also remark following The Nevertheless, the Demirel government could not survive the military memorandum of memorandum military the survive not could government Demirel the Nevertheless, Atatürk’s revolutions, protect to whichduty a form as it the see basisWe of will. our democratic national the order and the represents Turkish which state. and Revolution spirit the and script ofour with constitution, which isbased Atatürk’s principlesupon and the 27 May (1960) compliance in is program government our that ascertain to is goal primary Our unity ofactivity kind any and creed; or religion language, race, . . and endanger the democratic regime. result ofthis view,we will not permit any agitations that could harm the constitutional rules government willdefend countrythe from the extreme leftand right currents .As a logical Atatürk’s nationalism and secularstate as described in the constitution. Hence, our The in regime Turkey is ademocracy buildsthat uponAtatürk’s revolutions. Itis based on which governments coalition following the by made also were statements Similar whole nation Turkish the and Turkey consider to is Movement Unity National ofthe aim The , 1960),Italics 1-11. added. The national of unity the Turkish nationis onnational rested independence regardlessof 242 shall be strenuously opposed. strenuously be shall , and to establish an In a similar vein, the JP government led by Demirel used the same elements to elements same the used Demirel by led government JP the vein, similar a In ÷OÕ and Belin Aktürk, eds., impartial T.C.M.B.K. Direktifi ve Temel Görü 240 Hükümetler ve Programlar and virtuous administration 241 239 83 By the same token, the booklet prepared by the by prepared booklet the token, same the By that tendsto divide and harm this Õ II1960-1980 based onAtatürk’s reforms . ú leri (Ankara: Maarif (Ankara: TBMM (Ankara: 243 as a CEU eTD Collection the West through being recognized as equals’. Concomitantly, the program second of program the the being equals’.Concomitantly, as Westthe through recognized statuswithin ‘reaching peace in the West’ tothe of level and ‘gaininga respected the world’ home, at ‘peace of principle the of fulfillment the conditioned also but principles Atatürk’s 3.1.2. ‘Peace in the world, Turkey in the West’ home’. at and‘peace ‘democracy’, ‘national unity’, in establishingKemalism rolethe of reconstituted period during this discourse official the that clear becomes itKemalism, to reference by sphereideologies from public the andextricate Islamist communist the to and attempts the government said, “It is our duty to make the democratic order function efficiently.” Government,” Melen’s as theMovement “Kemalist Declaring newgovernment more. the 247 246 245 244 order.” sheria a establishing after [was] that right extreme the establishand communism to aspire[d] leftthat extreme todivideboth [sought] country, the that “against anyattempts country andsafeguard the andprinciples” reforms Atatürk’s of “realization the complete to aims were their primary was military indeclared that It officials andthe 1971. chief by NUC intheearly 1960s the made points nodal the Melen reconstituted Ferit and leadershipthe Nihat Erim, Naim Talu of Islamism rise above the contemporary civilization and to purge the threats such as communism and Ibid., 234. Ibid., 217. Cited inDa Cited in Birand, 13-14. The foreign policy articulations of the period did not only declare adherence to Looking justifications atthe given for political the establishedorder 1960s the after 244 . After the resignation of the prime minister, the supra-party governments under ÷OÕ and Aktürk, 201. 246 In the following government program, this was stated once wasstated program, this government following Inthe Atatürk’s principles will continue to shape our foreign policy. foreign our shape to continue will principles Atatürk’s 84 —NihatErim, 1971 247 245 CEU eTD Collection 250 2. 030/01/50/299/3, no: Ref. Meclisi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Ar 249 248 stated: revolutions asfor a Turkey’s trigger NATO membership, program the of Gürsel’s government principle. world’ in the home, peace at ‘peace the of extension direct of and membership NUC,the Turkey’s CENTO, the Councilas saw inNATO, a Europe of sovereignty. and independenceat home, interests, peaceinTurkey’s national as as world’ the well defending of principle ‘peace Atatürk’s asithelped fulfilling was legitimate, Thus, Western-orientation West. the with relations Turkey’s of context the in ‘equality’ and ‘sovereignty’ principles, a legitimateconstruct anchorfor this orientation by emphasizing Turkey’s Atatürk’spursuitof made sureto also made theperiod during West.The articulations values the ideas with and depended on the development of democracy at home and the adherence to the same set of move: made Erim also a similar discursive theWestern having acommunity.” within place respectful and organization the asamember of efforts constructive our nations, through integrating Western whichthe civilization ofdevelopingand Europe, servesthe purpose Council of the to contributions our of short fall not “We will stated, in 1962 government coalitional Cited inDa Nihat Erim, “Nihat Erim’in D Ibid., 25. humanity and civilization. Itisone of the main pillars of our foreign policy principles to Charter, UN with the aim an to defend the with principle of individual freedom and the principlesreal of the accordance in countries, Western the by founded institution an is NATO Following 1960coup, the theGürsel government, whichwas by appointed orders the in theWest reputation and Western-orientation Turkey’s From this perspective, them.international Our respect depends on this. a deed, itcannot be expected from Western democracies consider to any state oneto of be not is law of implemented completely at home rule adherenceand human to the rightsthe notmaterializedoes into as As long other. each to attached intrinsically are politics domestic and Thus, what applies everywhere else to worldin the well:applies to as Turkey Foreign policy Turkey embraces the Western civilization . Her strategy may change but this willnot. ÷OÕ and Aktürk, 5. Õú MeselelerKonusundaki Genel Görü ú ivleri Genel Müdürlü 85 249 ÷ ü, Cumhuriyet Ar 248 ú me S Thefollowing remarksof Nihat Õ ras Õ ú nda Konu ivi, Istanbul, January 9, 1963, 250 Considering Atatürk’s ú mas Õ ,” Millet CEU eTD Collection to strengthen her relations with the Western community. Western the with relations her strengthen to efforts great Turkey’s of extension agreementasan the governmentprogram, which defined logical result of our relations with the Western Europe.” and natural as a agreement . Wesee the for. good Europe to is “Turkey attached stated, Europe!” Milliyet wasmetEEC with enthusiasm. great page of September 13,1963,thefront On daily the in peace world’. the ‘peace athome, of principle the with as compatible organizations of considering mission the through these also but values, Western the of internalization Turkey’s and revolutions Atatürk’s between inparticipation theWestern organizations legitimizedwas notonly through drawinglink a playedroleCouncil important an Europe inachievingthisof goal. andinmembership the NATO,CENTO, that Turkey’s and sovereignty, independence and Turkey’sbest thethat pursuit protected national interests, principlethis of national 256 255 Milliyet agreements. international the of andbeingrespectful means, peaceful through conflicts the cooperation, resolving seeking international security and peace, common freedom, equity,justice, of principles the depended on that order aworld as establishing 254 253 252 251 government headed by Cited in Cited Market], Common the entered have [We Girdik” Pazar’a “Ortak “Türkiye’nin Avrupa’n Ibid., 25, 46. Ibid., 5, 24,122-123, 234. Ibidem. A similar statement was also made by the following coalitional governments until 1965. , 13 September1963. In this context, the Ankara Agreement which made Turkey an associate member of memberthe associate Turkey of made an which AnkaraAgreement the context, In this These were reiterated in the following coalitional governments. In the first coalition first the In governments. coalitional following in the reiterated were These sovereignty. and equality and developed even relations closer ties asaresult ofstrong Atatürk’shave revolutions we according to whom the principleswith of allies and friends these with relations our strengthen 254 cherished the event as follows: “It is acknowledged that Turkey as follows:cherishedisTurkey is the event “It apartof acknowledged that Türkiye-AET This was further reverberated in the words of the Prime Minister Minister Prime the of words the in reverberated further was This ø li Õ n bir cüz’ü oldu ú ø kileri nönü, the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ was defined (Ankara:Avrupa Toplulu 251 ÷u tesciledildi” [It is acknowledged Turkey that is apart of Europe], 86 ÷ u Yay Õ nlar Cumhuriyet Õ , 1976), 222. 256 255 On the same occasion, the This was restated in the , 13 September1963. 253 252 In sense,Turkey’sthis It was further noted ø nönü, who nönü, CEU eTD Collection the Cyprus issue was not mentioned. On 20 June 1950, Fuad Köprülü, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs from Affairs of Foreign Minister Democraticthe Party (DP) also stated: Turkish “There is Cyprusno issue.”(Oran Köprülü, 598). 2002,Fuad 1950, June 20 On mentioned. not was issue Cyprus the another state.Our youth engages in avain excitement.” (Oran 2002, 598). In the1950 election campaign, too, 1950: “There is suchno anissue called as ‘Cyprus question’…English government will not leave the island to 260 259 258 Common Market” ( the European Commission,of General the Emile Noel, Secretariat by the who in1971 said,delivered “Turkeyspeech another is realizing includes source same the The well. ideal as of officials EU Atatürk by entering in the 257 longTurkey colonialas astheBritish inCyprus. continued rule 3.1.3. TheCyprus issue: abrief overview of the discourse interests of Turkey. national the with complementary as them representing by principles Atatürk’s of pursuit the legitimized further also but goal ideational an to welfare economic and interests national mainfor the articulations onthelinkingThis not EEC. only of defense helped the template Turkey’s national economy and its mixed structure. thethat Additional includeof Protocol 1971 would not provisions thatwould undermine with Atatürk’s principles. is compatible that in away interests national Turkey’s defend and development economic Turkey’s intheWestern role alliance duringthe Coldestablish as Warand to a means as a both part of wereconsidered EEC with the relations Turkey’s memorandum, military Atatürk’s reforms: Minister of Affairs,Foreign Feridun linked Cemal Erkin this policy pro-Westernist to Consider the following remarks of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Necmettin Sadak on 23 January 23 on Sadak Necmettin Affairs of Foreign Minister Turkish of the remarks following the Consider Ibid., 218, 228. Cited inDa Cited in ibid., 230-31. It is worth noting here that this template was further reverberated in the words of the In this sense, the objectives attributed to the pursuit of Atatürk’s principles servedas tothepursuit of attributed In this objectives sense, the In theprogram Erim the too,whichof government, was establishedfollowing 1971 the as of promises era an opens] [agreement this Europe, of a part as Turkey In acknowledging As stated by As stated in governmentofficialsthe early 1950s,therewasthe no issuefor Cyprus on dependent joining as in the civilization welfare represented and by Europe.future Turkey’s considered also Atatürk present that reforms evidence clear Westernization Atatürk’s . . . . welfare and peace towards progressing regards ÷OÕ and Aktürk, 217, 175. Türkiye-AET 258 ø li Thisinvolved negotiations conducting special with EECso the ú kileri 1976, 243). 87 259 257 260 Nevertheless, the Nevertheless, CEU eTD Collection 265 Mediterranean 264 263 Sohbetleri, ve Yaz whether to use the guarantor rights to intervene. to rights guarantor the use to whether main for theTurkish challenges makers:restoredecision howto previousthe situation and of the citizens of Cyprus as well as the peace and security of the region.” establishedorder with 1960agreementsthe as “thesolution for best welfare the andhappiness 262 Tauris, 1993), 241-42. of Atatürk’s asaconstituent wasalsostated sovereignty’, which to aprinciple nations’ right newthe in developments involvedCyprus also theprinciple of ‘supporting the oppressed This was in line with the Kemalistforeign principles as stated in the program. Articulations on her accordance foreign with ofrespecting policy theinternational principle agreements. governmentinterveneafter in be coupof the Turkeywouldthat 1960stated readyto the maintaining Kingdom),station allowing herto numbera small in of troops island for the responsible agreements special rights also Turkey granted (along with the United Greece and guarantor power-sharing a for island, Constitution the turning constituted in The point respect. this of hands Greece.” in 1956:“Itis obviously asecurity cause for ustoensure thatCyprusnot pass does on to the 261 position, latter From the interests. national and sovereignty, incommunity leavingGreeks’ defend Cyprus Cyprusand ‘not security,to to Turkey’s of interests and Turkish rights the the ‘causes’: protecting between shiftedtwo position intosituation both a humanitarian and forissue anational Turkey. security heightening Greeksliving of conflictinthe between Turksandthe the the islandturned Cited inDa Stephens Robert see details, For Cited inDa Cited in Sabahat Erdemir, ed., For the nature and the reasons for this conflict, see Erik J. Zürcher, J. Erik see conflict, this for the reasons and nature the For The collapse of bi-communalthe governmenton island in the introduced 1963 two The London and Zurich agreements, which created an The London independent agreements,whichcreated and Cyprus Zurich anda ÷OÕ ÷OÕ (London:Pall Mall, 1966), 168-94. and Aktürk, 68. and Õ lar status-quo 262 Õ Aktürk, 47, 5, 26-27. (Istanbul: Ekicigil Matbaas . The official position was modified accordingly, considering the Muhalefette , Cyprus, a Place of Arms: Power Politicsand Ethnic Conflict inthe Eastern øsmet Õ , 1959),, 12. ønönü (1956-1959): 88 264 The program of the third coalitional Turkey: A Modern History Konuú ø smet malar ø nönü stated the following nönüthe stated Õ , Demeçleri, Mesajlari, 263 (London: IB 261 Turkey’s 265 CEU eTD Collection 271 270 269 268 267 Turkish Cypriots. security interests and the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in case of a new attack against the shift. It was stated that Turkey Turkey undertake would that was stated shift. It Cypriots. colonization the Turkey Turkish and tolerate not oppression of that wouldTurkey underlining In a government namedthe Cyprusissuesimilar vein,the national “greatest cause”of asthe oppressed nations’ and‘helping level civilization’.reaching contemporary the the of them shouldinclude the independence of‘supportingprinciples the andthesovereigntyof the Kemalism of principles the by directed was that policy foreign a that added was it hand, be sought with the other guarantorposition. Ontheonehand, Demirel’sfurtherhighlighted government that negotiations should states and within the context of the UN. Cyprus. in intervention impending the in be used not could equipment NATO the that stated 266 ø crisis.letter possible Minister Prime the following Johnson’s 1964, the so-called responses In Turkey’s of list the from removed was intervention military Cypriots, Turkish the liberate given governmentto the by Erim Nihat in 1963underlined this link: in home, Thewarning of peace world’. ‘peace at the principle particularly principles, the nönületter receiveda from blunt Presidentthe of Lyndon Unitedthe States Johnson which Ibid., 212. Ibid., 125. Ibid., 121. Cited inDa SeeHale, Nihat Erim, “Nihat Erim’in D With the military memorandum of 1971, the official discourse involved yet another yet involved discourse official the 1971, of memorandum military the With Although this pushed the government towards a more pro-active stance in Cyprus to in Cyprus stance amore pro-active towards government pushedthe Although this sovereign. honorof not debt Turkey tolet to 120,000Turks be ofunderservitude the another extension of the Turkish nation of thirty millions. Thematter should be put like this. Itis an The Turkishwith community 120,000isapartand apopulationsizeof furthermore an 267 270 In due course, amiddle underlined discourse Induecourse, ground newthe government’s Turkish Foreign Policy ÷OÕ and Aktürk, 125-26, 174, 195. 266 271 The next supra-party furtherprograms underlined Turkey that beshould Õú MeselelerKonusundaki Genel Görü , 149. 89 any measures to defend measures to national Turkey’s ú me S Õ ras Õ nda Konuú mas 268 Õ On the other ,” 2-3. 269 CEU eTD Collection spreading the values of the ‘contemporary civilization.’ ‘contemporary the of values the spreading and in world’ the home, peace ‘peaceat of principles fulfilling the complementary to Western organizations inNATO andother membership and Turkey’s Western alliance Turkey’s Western-orientation.All programs from government 1974 until 1979 sawthe an to alternative suggest to position official island ledthe of the partition for the intervention second Turkey’s followed that embargo American the nor intervention, the neither orientation nor againstit. While intervened Turkey inCyprusin the despite West 1974, Cyprus, Cyprus the policy was neither declaredasan of extension Western-Turkey’s of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’. Similarly, despite the shifts in the policy discourse on agreements’. independence and sovereignty the of island’the and ‘relying ontheinternational ‘safeguarding the legitimized principles of tothe by operation the recourse government civilian established newly the template, discursive available then the on building and Cyprus 275 274 did not equip Turkey with the right to unilaterally intervene, see Melakopides,73-101. 19 February 1959 (London: H.Stationery Office,1964).For acounter-argument that the Treaty of Guarantee see Guarantee, of Treaty the of take action with to the soleright the aim reserves of Powers re-establishing guaranteeing three of the the each state of impossible prove may affairs action establishedor concerted common by the present Treaty”. For the text 273 272 in Turkey. 1970s of early contextthe discursive programs.government in following the reproduced which was principle inthe world’ of athome, ‘peace peace the context the in affairs’ in domestic ‘non-interference and ‘equity’ of principles the use to began athome, world’ Melen’s government inthe of reconstruction principle. ‘peace peace the national security. counter animminentprepared to againstattack the living Turks on andTurkey’s island the Cited inDa Ibid., 317. as far so “…In Guarantee: of Treaty the of provision following the on relied Government Turkish The Ibid., 229, 263. In regard,Turkey’sthis unilateral intervention in1974 was not surprising, given the ÷OÕ 274 and Aktürk, 249, 339,375. In this sense, the operation was represented in accordance with principle in the with accordance represented was operation Inthis the sense, 272 This defensive approach to the Cyprus issue paralleled aconcomitant issue paralleled Cyprus the to approach Thisdefensive Conference on Cyprus: Documents Signed and Initialed at Lanchester House on 90 273 Following the Greece-instigated coupin Following Greece-instigated the 275 While different elements of the of elements different While CEU eTD Collection Bas economic developmentalof Atatürk’s reforms.” model the party called as the ‘left of center’ was in complete ø 276 of remark The vision. Atatürk’s fulfill to was aim primary its that by declaring stand its legitimizeincorporated the ideology its intoKemalism in RPPof sought to 1931,the program andhaving by Atatürk, Asestablished party 1930s. the of the ‘sixarrows’ termsthe of People’s Party (RPP) Republican the the view of left’: the to‘democratic center’ of ‘left from the Kemalism 3.2.1.1. 3.2. Deconstructing theofficial discourse not. abreak or from constituted their position, andwhether Cyprus, represented, discourses these rationality and identity of type what them), by written books the and parties the of head the by speeches delivered in public programs, election party (as stated party discourses programs, in the integrated were above Kemalism discussed of earlier the how constructions whether and justified to byrecourse pursuitthe principles. of Atatürk’s being by other each to linked indirectly were policies both policy, Cyprus in the moves the and Western-orientation the for given legitimizations in the employed were template Kemalist nönü, the Head of the RPP (1938-1972) is nönü, guardian Head determined RPPis the “The the illustrative: RPP(1938-1972) the of C.H.P. XVII.Kurultay Õ m ve Ciltevi, 1964), 6; cited in Kili, 189. Determined to pursue the genuine version of Kemalism, the RPP stated the that version Kemalism, RPPstated pursue thegenuineDeterminedof the to The coup in 1960 provided the RPP with the opportunity inThe coup in redefine RPPwith the Kemalism opportunity to the 1960 provided componentsits intotoexamine in isbreak The order thento thisahead unity task Õ (16 Ekim 1964) Genel Ba 276 Those who are against the left of center are against the Kemalist principles. ú kan 91 øsmet ønönü’nün Aç Õú Konuú mas —Bülent Ecevit,1966 Õ (Ankara: Ankara ø smet CEU eTD Collection 282 ve Ciltevi,1964), 8; cited in Kili, 190. 281 280 Left of Center because we Ataturkists”are (Kili 1969, 194). the in “We are of Humanity”, path the Center, of “Left follows: as read members party by the carried placards 279 1977), 401. 278 Bir Aú 277 path,” andAtatürk’s arrows, six program, RPP’s name for the appropriate as“themost of center’ ‘left the representing populism. and revolutionism, statism, of principles Kemalist the with compliance center’ was juxtaposed against this view on nationalism: nationaland our endangers unity.” nation the divides that movement any rejects which and exalts, and unites which nationalism Ataturkist “Thesubscribes to follows: nationalism as RPP viewon its RPPthe declared nationalism. its toKemalist congress, perspectives seventeenth In alternative delegitimized RPP the way in the prominent was This Kemalism. of principles six the of essence added to the six arrows. It is what shows the essence of the six arrows.” principle another not is center of left “The Kemalism: described best what but to, addition replaced any deviation from the six arrows of Kemalism. establishment, the RPP suggested that the nationalthe RPPsuggested establishment, unity the throughthe beestablished only that could military the of template discursive the on Building others. by challenged be to Kemalism Kemalism Kemalism butalso reconstituted asthe ‘leftof addingcenter’, anewnodal to point Itcould be added thathere in the fourth extraordinary congress RPP, of the which met insome 1968, of the Cited in Hikmet Bila, Cumhuriyet C.H.P.: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Onyedinci Kurultay Bildirisi: Ulus Ulus k ve Nefret Öyküsü , 7 July 1966; cited Mirkelamoin , 21 October1966; cited in Necip Mirkelamo In this respect, the party did not only delegitimize the rightist constructions of constructions rightist the delegitimize only not did party the respect, this In nationalism. Kemalist with clash of these all However, nationalist. themselves call also investment themselves as nationalist,declare imperialists call racists themselvescountry asnationalist, In our those. . who it supporton foreign revisions any make to need not do we (and) Our party program is in line with the Western democracies in its left of center perspective, ‘true’ reflect the not would Kemalism of interpretation ‘rightist’ sense,a In this ø nönü as the head of the party in 1972, declared that this perspective was not an not was this declared perspective in that nönü theheadof party the 1972, as , 14 October 1965. October , 14 282 CHP 1919-1999 (Ankara: Büke Yay 278 the party further assured that this perspective did not implicate not did this perspective that assured further party the ÷lu,402. (Istanbul: 281 Õ nlar A year later, what was not considered as the ‘left of ‘left asthe considered not later, whatwas Ayear Õ , 2000), 89-91. ù ÷lu, efik Matbaas 92 Ecevit Ecevit’i Anlat Ecevit’i Ecevit 279 In this vein, Bülent Ecevit, who later vein,Ecevit, who Inthis Bülent øleri Türkiye Ülkümüz Õ , 1999), 212; OrhanKolo Õ yor (Istanbul: Kervan Yay Kervan (Istanbul: 280 (Ankara: Ankara Nas ÷lu, Ecevit ile CHP: Õ nlar 277 In Õ, Õ m CEU eTD Collection 287 286 285 284 communism as the most serious threatfor Turkey (Mirkelamo 283 Kemalism.” from notadeviation Yettothe“certainly RPP,thismove was awayfrom ‘center’. suggesting a the left’, of motto into‘democratic party the changed thereby was leadershipin the 1972, the Marxism. from imported a terminology reforms, ‘base’ the initiating government. The basic elections the before slogan involved changingtheorder through elections, after which the RPP could not win the majority, nor could it obtain any seats in the said, “The real threat facing Turkey does not come from communism but fascism.” reliedand on hitherto had discourse official which the of threat source the reconstituted Ecevit ideologies be neededto that sweptestablish away in to order national the Inthisvein,unity. positioned. was Kemalism where was which from ‘center’, the views’ ‘separatist the of extrication Yet, with a twist, communism was not considered as one of those ‘deviant’ economic changes through ‘participatory democracy’. ‘participatory through economic changes socio- initiation of involved the that reforms with base the complemented not they were were necessary under the conditions of the 1920s and 1930s, they failed tobe fully realized as induce changes in the administrative, political,legal and institutions of state.the to in implemented order they words, were in other reforms; weresuperstructural civilization’, ‘raise revolutions, hadthecontemporary Turkey which inherentobjectiveabove to the of the RPP. speecheshegavein congress the twentieth the stated, requirednew changes within the limits ofits principles; andin sense,this itwas still Ecevit Kemalism, Kemalism. from adeviation mean not did perspective this from revolutions Ibid., 63. Bülent Ecevit, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Bila, 238. Ulus , 6 April 1966;cited in Mirkelamo This leftist butyet‘centrist’ approach Kemalismto waspushed before further 1969 the In Atatürk veDevrimcilik Atatürk Atatürk ve Devrimcilik 285 This view was further elaborated in the book written by written This inthebook elaborated viewwasfurther basedon Ecevit, CHP Tüzük veYönetmelikleri CHP Tüzük (Istanbul: TekinYay [Atatürk and revolutionism], Ecevit argued that Atatürk’s argued that and Ecevit revolutionism], [Atatürk ÷lu, 383. Itisworth noting thathere 93 (Ankara: ÇobanMatbaas lu 1977,÷lu 378). Õ nevi, 1970), 62. 287 IndefiningAtatürk’s regard, this in1956, Ecevit identified 284 Õ , 1976), 7. After Ecevit took over took After Ecevit 286 While they 283 CEU eTD Collection civilization’ couldbecivilization’ realized only way.through level contemporary the of ‘reaching the of goal revolutions. The Atatürk’s essence true the of elements ofKemalism. To this view, ‘participatory democracy’ and thebase reforms reflected revolutions and additional the nodal thatprovidedpoints anew fordefinition previous the sense, previously the upheldview ondemocracy was delegitimized by toAtatürk’s recourse whichorder” would develop the country by means of democracy.participatory for a“just RPPcivilization”, the promised forcontemporary democracy, the mainguide and 293 Matbaas 292 291 290 289 288 principles democracy. andstrengthening Kemalist the realizing of means by civilization contemporary of level the to country the and elevate primary of RPPwastostrengthen mission the the order republican stated that the valid bevalidforever. the capacity and had to beyond the pointreached byAtatürk’s revolutions.” “the real obstructionIn this sense, the real threat did not come Atatürk’s inhistory.makeprinciples Atatürk’s era whichwould according onegetstuck to andfrom the ideasoppression that were considered undemocratic; [came] from those who [could not] move one step Ibid., 4. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Ibid., 59. Ibid., 20. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 62 Õ This view was further defined in party’s the election program of 1973, where itwas will find ourselves in the darkness, insipidness, and hopelessness ofthe age before Atatürk. will never come back to the enlightenment, creativity and the dynamism of Atatürk’s era. We we hadif even a leader democracy, on up giving by time justthat of creativity as and strong dynamism same the attain . . . . If we turn our heads anaway aim from theto lightenliven of freeJust like we do notneed thought,to give up on democracy in name thethe of [Atatürk’s] revolutions with wedynamism of Atatürk’s era, it is a vain dream to expect that we could , 1973),3. AkGünlere: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1973 Seçim Bildirgesi 292 Declaring itself as “the founder of itself of newstate, as “thefounder the Declaring 94 288 The problem, for Ecevit was to evaluate 290 In this vein,further Ecevit argued: (Ankara: Ajans-Türk 293 In this In 291 289 CEU eTD Collection 297 296 295 condition toattain domestic peace and security” (CumhuriyetHalk Partisi 1965, 217). basic principle in its domestic and foreign policy; itconsiders the contribution to the world peace to be the only 294 in world’ the home, peace at of‘peace principle democracy of as role a guardian andTurkey’s policy foreign Flexible 3.2.1.2. and 1930s: more diversified realistic and of geographical Turkey’s asitrealities had been in the 1920s foreign era.Tothispolicy pursued during the earlyrepublican foreignbe view, had policy to decreasing the level pursuit of foreign the policy asimplementedprinciples of duringAtatürk’s era. In sense,this dependencethe to linked was concept’ policy foreign ‘new onthe twist, a With the construction. new U.S.brand and NATO implicatedAtatürk’s a clear principlesreturn to the and reforms, the RPP did not present this foreign policy initiativestated: as a wasdangerous. U.S. the NATO and on overdependence Turkey’s ‘sovereignty’.status’ within the Western community by holding on to theprinciples of ‘equality’ and Yet, the was RPP’sin line with discoursethe official her own national her henceshould ensuring develop strategy. and security discourse diverged in that it emphasizedstay in the security alliances which she was member a of, she should not seefrom this sufficientfor the goalthis of getting inflexiblethisforeign the principle1970s: thatwhile should This suggested policy.Turkey template a ‘respected in pointing out that Ibid.,18. Cited in Cited Ibidem. Italics added. the as world the in peace home at peace RPPaccepts “The RPPstated: ofthe program election 1965 The While in 1964 the RPP stated While in1964theRPPstated itsthat foreign policy wasguidedby principle the ofmember a the Communityalso is ofTurkey Europe,that but fact our startingthe exclude point not is the does Balkan area,certainly the This Middle East and country. Eastern the and Mediterranean Eastern, Middle Balkan, a primarily is Turkey geographically, and Historically of in terms it defining by policy developmental economic its legitimized it as Just that is, the United States, for her military equipment. of because her dependence theyearsthroughout asamemberposition of almostNATO exclusively on one source, disadvantageous very a into fallen has Turkey that obvious become has It Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit Speeches, May-June 1978 95 294 , a new foreign policy concept was added to 297 (Ankara: Toruno (Ankara: 296 ÷ lu Ofset, 1978), 2. 1978), Ofset, lu In this vein, Ecevit 295 Indeed, this view CEU eTD Collection 301 values otherdeveloping tothe ThismoveTurkey’s countries. identity reconstructed a as spread herin democratic to Westorder the decrease herdependence on needed Turkey to democracy’ as by defined Ecevitinand the election programs of RPP.Tothisthe view, ‘participatory of principle the with in accordance West the within role peculiar a claiming and Western-orientation placing manypursue had the arange within policies Turkey of to other Consider the following also by statement Ecevit: sense: in this illuminating is statement following The beyond. democracy valuesof mainly, spreadingthe of the ‘allies’, with core relations the the 300 299 298 theworld.” towards we have that responsibility of Ecevit “In clarify: spite of everything, wedonotleave want to NATObecause wethink remarks following the as non-alliance of policy the with complemented not was it identities, Ibid., 159. Ibid Ibid. Ibid., 20. Italics added. . , 4. . , 3. Hence, the RPP’s emphasis on flexibility within the Western alliance involved both involved alliance Western the within flexibility on emphasis RPP’s the Hence, While this While Western identity this Turkey’splaced a range within foreign of other policy freedom. alliancecriteria of her success in democracy, because after all, our alliance is not merely a militarydeserves evaluated to be accordingtoother well,criteria as particularly according to the . . . Turkey mightmake . defenseto collective through the bravery ofour people, butIthink Turkey It isOur friendsin the have West usuallyevaluated Turkey according to the contribution that an alliance aiming countries. developing other to many example encouraging an set may and example, encouraging an at sets Turkey development, strengtheningBy making asuccess War. of democracy, making by it World survive during ofthe stage economic Second the since continuously survived has democracy which in world the live under themost adverse conditions. Turkey happens to be the only developing country in and the to make democratic to world. her In capacity asadeveloping country ithas been able to make democracy contribution greater a view, our in and another, spreadinghas Turkey NATO. of frontier guard armed the as treated and regarded being with more any satisfied be cannot Turkey democracy and do right now. Balkan countries, beforeforming opening up to verythe rest closewhenof theRepublicstarted the world, and tieshistorical and these to thiswithemphasis isgeographical greater whatrealities. .This give the attitude in a way indicateswe should we areMiddle Therefore trying to Mediterranean. EasternEastern countries as much as possible, and with the 301 298 , that of peacefully establishing Turkey in her own region by region own her in Turkey establishing of peacefully that , 300 96 299 In this vein, a new element was placed at placed was element new a vein, Inthis a returnto policy first adopted CEU eTD Collection 303 302 following by remark Ecevit: the Consider conditions. any under West the with relations economic the maintaining or NATO of flank Southeastern the being merely than more much was differently, it put where her identity. Turkey inherent demonstrate could Western Western identity, Turkey’s to mainthe view, constituted building area indemocracy According to this honor’ this context. ‘national and independence’ ‘national movement), and decision of (freedom sovereignty’ ‘national of significance the underlined it in that West the with integration Turkey’s to a defensiveapproach the RPPupheld Western-orientation. Rather, hitherto-pursued from the with Westernthe shouldEurope not constitute a burden for Turkey: democratic role withinCommunity. the In vein,this EcevitTurkey’sthat stated integration the EEC. By the same token, the RPP emphasizedTurkey’s freedom of decision and Turkey’s ‘respected’ memberof this community. and carry willing to her domestic beyondprinciples as herborders a ‘responsible’ and stand byWest to while‘choosing’ the ascapable alone standing of was thereby represented in both Turkey domestic andinternational terms. state ‘free’ ‘democratic’, and ‘sovereign’ Cited in Cited Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, This perspective was also prominent in the RPP’s articulations on the relations with relations the on articulations in theRPP’s prominent also was This perspective attachment to democracy. as a whole.minor factors in Turkey’s relationshipwith democraticthe countriesof Europe and the West Atin andNATO our associate membership of the European Economic Community are only the basisWe have a kind of special relationship with democratic countries ofEurope.membership Our of our relationship with these countries is the Turkish people’s suggest abreak not NATO, this did regarding in statements As wasarticulated the relations. its maintain to Turkey for difficult sacrificing from itsnational honor and independence.That is why itmight be gradually more for the EEC . . . . TurkeyBut it is dangerous for themight EEC to be aburden for Turkey as much as Turkey’sbe beingdrawn a burden integration in intoWestern Europe whilemaintaining her freedom of decision and movement . . a position thatIn orderimprove to ourlinks with West,the Turkey should take herwithin place it the needs to pay this burden by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit Speeches May-June 1978 Ak Günlere, 223. 303 97 302 , 41. CEU eTD Collection would “realize ‘peace at home, and peace in the world’ not through pressure, punishment or throughpressure,punishment not world’ inand peacethehome, would ‘peaceat “realize party the that RPP stated the of program election The operation. the to prior world’ principle was also concomitant with the definitions provided as regards the ‘peace at home, peace in the home’ as a goal of Atatürk’s reforms and a part of Turkey’s role in the Western alliance. It 304 parliament: viewin hisat the same the speech highlighted Following the interventionresolution in authorizedthat Turkey’s in1974,Ecevit Cyprus also Cypriots asindispensable.”to free havethe right Turkey considers democracy, which Turkish “Thebelieves the that stated, RPP in need’. Inasimilarvein, one Ecevit ‘rescue the hence to‘democratize’ and was driven by and purpose that sole a ‘liberator’ the a‘hero’ Turkey reconstituted as discourse this bytheGreekdictatorship, and‘oppressed’ sovereignty’ remark: made the Operation,” followingof Ecevit whichwascalledas“ThePeace intervention, the In theaftermath country other. the on ‘pro-freedom’ and ‘pacific’ ‘democratic’, ‘responsible’, Cypriots’ to freedom rights and democracy on onethe hand, Turkey’s and policy as a territorial borders. TheRPPlegitimized intervention by Cyprus the emphasizing Turkish emphasis on special Turkey’s inbuildingrole democracy and extendingbeyond it her 306 305 Ibid. Milliyet Milliyet This was not only in line with the way the RPP represented ‘building democracy at Nobody can touch on the rights of Turks in Cyprus now. We cannot consider leaving Cyprus . Cyprus leaving consider cannot We now. in Cyprus Turks of rights the on touch can Nobody The RPP’s foreign policy articulations on the Cyprus issue also involved the same the involved also issue Cyprus the on articulations policy foreign RPP’s The democracy over dictatorship;it will be the triumph of freedom over oppression. in Cyprus will not be a victory for the nationTurkish alone, butwill also be the victory of Your resolution is asmuch a triumph for democracy as for Turkey. The victory to be achieved foreign the ‘under danger’, ‘in were Cypriots Turkish the that underlining In sovereignty. foreign and danger of oppression, kind any from inCyprus people of the Turkish emancipation the ensure to duty national indispensable an it considers RPP . The . , 23July 1974. , 21July 1975. 98 306 304 305 CEU eTD Collection 309 Speeches ( Turkey” ally her against arming been has Greece “Obviously replied, Ecevit Following this whenremark, asked by journalista whether insaying ‘other corners’ implicatedhe Cyprus, ( accordingly” structure defense and concept defense but we are face to faceUnion, Soviet the threat from fromthreat other,direct moreimminent under more no real weare threatsinstance, from for years; other inrecent corners, considerably and we have to reali[z]e our 308 307 freedom,lovefear,through andrespect.” but by following by remark the Ecevit: emphasis the of on principle indomestic‘non-interference asillustrated foreign and affairs’ fordevelopwas Turkey This aflexiblecrucial involved to security approach an framework. it that Cypruscaseshowed the exclusivelyUnion. Soviet In this sense, the focused on threat maneuver withinNATOwasseen importancehigh of urgency and as NATO’s conception of Turkey. against arming Greece was that assumption the to it was CyprusTurkey’s issue security.consideredthis alsoasamatter of and Related own Kemalism. of elements the on rested was policy Cyprus Turkey’s and West the with integration Turkey’s to relation domain identity uponwhich Western Turkey’s was based: ‘strengthening participatory the Western alliance.foreign policy as argued above,the RPPpushed aself-standing for for position Turkey within Kemalist and nationalism Kemalist of This constructions its in ‘equality’ and ‘sovereignty’ of not only elements the on Building interests. national Turkey’s defined with) in contradiction not (if of ignorant the role as wererepresented ‘West’ the policies of the Rather, West. the with integration Turkey’s Turkey ‘chose’ to take but also the Cited in Cited changed have Turkey facing threats the of urgencies “The ofEcevit: remarks following the Consider Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, In line with the official discourse, the RPP oscillated between two approaches to the to approaches two between oscillated RPP the discourse, official the with line In Hence, from Hence, the approach this too, Cyprus not castin intervention was opposition to so. So the elimination of outside interferences is essential for a solution of problems between ofproblems Turkey and Greece and for solution the a resolution of the for Cyprus issue. essential is interferences outside of elimination the So so. whenever were left alone they to settle their owndifferencesthey showedgreat todo ability were involved in the differencesTurco-Greek and the Turks Greeksended upin conflict. But under the ofshadow others. History witnessbears tothat because whenever other countries Turkey and Greece cannot solve their problems andthe Cyprus dispute cannot be resolved May-June 1978, 27). Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit Speeches, May-June 1978 Ak Günlere, 213. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit Speeches 99 307 This thatalso thelanguage shows used in , 23-24. 308 As a result, having room for 309 Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit May-June 1978 , 27). CEU eTD Collection 313 312 Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Yay 311 35. nationalism’,level‘reaching the of contemporary the bymeanscivilization liberalism’, of and involved the following principles: ‘sovereignty belongs to the nation’, ‘liberalism’, ‘Turkish principles. Atatürk’s “the real Ataturkist party” itself as itpresented left’, ‘democratic asthe as well center’ of ‘leftthe against being hence a minority ingovernment conservativein1979. Representing the right parliament,the and coalitional known as‘thegovernments Nationalistbetween Front’ 1975 and 1977andformed place inthe took later party until 1971. The government the leading 1965elections, the coalitionala formed first government Demirel, Süleyman by headed party, The flexibility. and sovereignty with with the RPP after the 1961 elections; then obtained the majority in 310 was it nor forgotten, itvulnerable. vision Atatürk’s fulfill to democracy Western Party’: ‘Justice Demirel’s 3.2.2.1. determined and sincere in fulfilling her mission. showed how but Turkey West, suggest analternativethe toTurkey’snot integration didwas democracy homeit andspreadingat RPP’sCypruspolicy beyond’. From perspective, this the Ibidem. Demirel, Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited Cited in Ümit Cizre-Sakall The JP’s discourse was preoccupied with Westernism as much as that of RPPwas much of the that as as Westernism with waspreoccupied The JP’sdiscourse For the For fromJP, Kemalism not becould interpreted of any view. point The inspiration source of our attitude and behaviors is Ataturkism and Atatürk’s Revolutions, Atatürk’s and Ataturkism is behaviors and attitude our of source inspiration The Büyük Türkiye the goal of which was to establish a social order that is free, Western, and civilized. and Western, is free, that order social a establish to was which of goal the 311 Süleyman Demirel, A.P.Genel Ba , 2nd ed., (Istanbul: Dergah Yay ÕR÷ 310 Õ lu, nlar inbeing nationalist civilizationist, by populist and asprescribed AP-Ordu Õ , 1966), 30. 313 ø liú Rather, it was embraced by the whole nation and kileri: Bir 100 Õ nlar ø kilemin Anatomisi (Istanbul: ú kanÕ Õ , 1977), 318. ve Ba ú bakan: Seçim Konuú —Süleyman Demirel, 1965 ù efik Matbaas malar 312 Neither was Õ II (Ankara: Õ , 1993), CEU eTD Collection ve Söyledikleri ve 320 319 318 317 316 315 314 national will’. for the ‘respect civilizationism. Westernist from Atatürk’s be detached goal not could JP,the civilizational Turkey’s liberal establish society.and revolutions Western wasto civilized, Atatürk’s of a in As center the goal Western-orientation. itsdeclared of the 1965election program, Turkey’s at principles Kemalist and will national the placed it rather, West; the emulating suggest not home’, at ‘peace of thegoal realizing and thereby investment foreign encouraging state, nation the over entrepreneurship,on private principlethe liberal upholding of democracy, the empowering model. a as civilization Western the taking perspective Kemalism forinseparable theJP,to beingwas, from also communism against and to Kemalism to JP’sthe ‘center’, the outof accusations andpushingthem responsetothe Demirel noted: built upon nodal the of points 1960’sKemalism.the before Shortly 1964elections the wellhow theparty show Kemalistbeing genuinely not theJPof thataccused arguments the Yet with a twist, the JP employed the same tools used against itself. Demirel’s responses to as entitled book Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited Demirel, Adalet Partisi, Ibid., 19-21. Demirel, Ibid., 75; Adalet Partisi, Ibidem. Just as the RPP represented its approaches other Kemalist the Just astheRPPrepresented stance bydelegitimizing circles. RPP’s the from especially suspicion serious met stand Kemalist party’s The and mistrust towards the majority of the Turkish people. Turkish the of majority the towards mistrust and principles. Iwould like to state that Iam rather astonished offendedand with theirdisrespect It has been ofaccused establishment. beingobstructionist, being against [Atatürk’s] its reforms andAtatürk’s since accusations unfounded many to exposed been has Party Justice The 316 Büyük Türkiye Büyük Türkiye and ‘reaching the level of civilization’. Western the level of and the ‘reaching (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Ne Adalet Partisi 1965 Seçim Beyannamesi 319 Büyük Türkiye Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Ba , 75. , 242. Adalet Partisi: Program ve Tüzük 314 [The great Turkey], establishing a welfare state that was based that state awelfare establishing Turkey], great [The This nationalist, civilizationist, developmentalist and liberal and developmentalist civilizationist, nationalist, This 315 101 ú Thisinvolved, in asdefinedby Demirel his riyat (Ankara: Do (Ankara: Do Õ , 1967), 38-39. ú 320 kan ve Ba ÷Xú ÷Xú Matbaas Matbaas 317 ú bakan Yard Nevertheless, the JP did Õ , 1964), 4. Õ , 1974), 3-4. Õ mc ÕVÕ 318 , YazdÕ Thus, for klar Õ CEU eTD Collection 328 327 326 325 324 Söyledikleri ve 323 (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Ne principles. later, in establishingwith 1977, after coalitional the government NSPandthe NAP the under real guardian of ‘national the the hence, main unity’, much of Kemalism.principles Indeed, nationalist” prescribedprinciples,” byAtatürk’s speeches Demirel declared the party’s perspective as civilizationist, nationalist and populist as again once represented aswas Kemalism will. national the and the sovereignty national the of defense ‘melting pot’ which dissolved any differences. Furthermore, in his election ‘democracy’, inbe this regardwould madeby only whothose were against ‘nationalthe unity’, ‘national unity’. In a similar vein, Demirel made the following remark: 322 321 will. national the with clash not could it as Kemalism with contradict wholeheartedly embraced and Atatürk’s reforms not line theparty’s principles, possibly could involved the same move.discursive ForDemirel, representing the view of majority,the who Demirel, Demirel, Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited Ibidem. Demirel, Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited Ibid., 87. An Ataturkist cannot disregard the Republic, national sovereignty or Turkish nationalism. The nationalism. Turkish or sovereignty national Republic, the disregard cannot Ataturkist An With With link, JPwas this asthe the ‘center’ backtothe thereby pushed andrepresented In this sense, both Kemalism andAtatürk’s personality were directlylinked to the and thoughts that endanger the republican order and national sovereignty are inevitably against inevitably Atatürk. are sovereignty national and order republican the endanger that thoughts and Kemalist . . It is impossible to detach Atatürk from the nation . . [Therefore] all behaviors the nation . . . [and] requirespursuit of Atatürk’s path can only be realized with respecting these principles.Ataturkism means loving the nation and her rights. A separatist view cannot be left and communism, it does the most unfair thing to declare itself asAtatürk’s party. nine arrows. Itopposesnationalism; it is neither republican, nor populist. While it protects the The moved has RPP away from Atatutkistthe principles.have They many outbroken of the Milliyetçiler Birle Büyük Türkiye Büyük Türkiye 324 327 , 69. In this vein, Demirel stated: Demirel vein, this In 322 which situated the communist discourse against Kemalist nationalism and the and nationalism Kemalist against discourse communist the situated which 325 who sought anarchy” sought who Süleyman Demirel, A.P.Genel Ba Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Ba Süleyman , 96. , 318. ú iniz (Ankara: Güne Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Ba ú riyat 326 Õ , 1969), 34-35. 323 and stated that “everybody “everybody are communists thatbut andstated ú Matbaas , and who deviated from Atatürk’s pathand Atatürk’s from , and deviated who 102 Õ ú , 1976), 200. kanÕ ve Ba ú ú kan ve Ba kanÕ ú bakan: Seçim Konuú ve Ba ú ú bakan Yard 321 bakan: Muhtelif Konu Hence, accusation any malar Õ mc ÕVÕ Õ , Yazd II 328 , 25. ú Õ malar klar Õ CEU eTD Collection 331 Söyledikleri ve 330 329 ideas.communist In this sense, an discourseanti-communist wouldnot only defend the internalize condition any under not would whole, a as revolutions Atatürk’s embraced already ideology. society, the communist having Turkish the Turkey,to Third, inopposition was who mentality.freedom, andWestern sought toestablish Atatürk, Second, in theseideas rights, human thought, scientific the against seen was communism First, assumptions. several in illustrative this regard: andof words Atatürk social the legitimacy revolutions.Atatürk Thefollowing remarksof are itslinkinvolvedstandbetween anti-communist with ‘center’ alsothe the making adirect move placeitself within The JP’s to alternative discourses. to the in JPemployed relation the early wasmissing1960s, from this construction. inestablishment 1960s,the whichhad Islamism, been ideology asa defined inseparatist the outside.” withlinks theirthe with replace order through communism thecurrent constitution, seekto integritythe of nation the and the countryby abusing the widefreedom rights given by the that areassembled ideological currents remark: totoppleregime the “Some andbreak down was furthergiven emphasis and includedin program governmentthe with followingthe unity’ ‘national the for anti-communism confront to need the Front’, ‘Nationalist the of motto Ibid., 88. Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited Cited inDa It wasnot only individual of the elements Kemalismstructured that discoursethe of As the above-quoted statements show, the JP’s anti-communist discourse involved discourse anti-communist JP’s the show, statements above-quoted As the nation. our for good do any not will rights human and will, national mentality, that thought believe We systems and movements that are Ataturkism. not in with harmony with the accord scientific not thought,does Western that system thought any support not do We soil. Turkish the on blossom to system throttling directive (smash communism wherever you find makeit) it impossible for this freedom The watchfulness of the Turkish nation, the patriotism of the state institutions andAtatürk’s 329 While this reproduced the defensive approach by employed military thethe defensive approach reproduced While this ÷OÕ , 171. and Aktürk, 383. Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Ba 103 330 ú kan ve Ba ú bakan Yard Õ mc 331 ÕVÕ , Yazd Õ klar Õ CEU eTD Collection 335 objectives of the Kemalist foreign policy: foreign Kemalist the of objectives 334 starting point for human is Kemalism”rights (Adalet Partisi 1969,106). 333 332 Atatürk in conducting its foreign policy. of deeds and theprinciples of guidance the take would government the that stated accordingly interests? and/or national Western policy: foreign A pro-Western 3.2.2.2. civilization. Western the towards this “Turkish vein, stated, is nation Demirel very eager and move determined to on road the In alliance. Western the Kemalism bebest could within realizedposition byaself-standing ‘real’ which the to according andWest the with culture democratic same the sharing to Westernism which confined theRPP, of from that JP’s the discourse appeal separated andbase. populist On hand, other the Kemalism seeing inherent ashaving an Westernist Council Europe, EEC of and NATO,by building projection this strictly on an anti-communist civilization, legitimate path to follow: the West. national unity, but alsoinevitably reflect the national will. Then there remained only one and Cited inDa Adalet Partisi, Ibidem. It is worth noting here that Demirel also attached human rights values to Kemalism, saying that “the Ibid., 87. In 1965program the which coalitional the of by government, itwas led JP,the was principle of equity in our relations with our neighbors. Although world conditions have conditions world Although neighbors. our with relations our in equity of principle struggle of all world nations in reaching highestthe level of civilization, and to respect the independence sovereignty ofworldand nations all and distinguished acquire ina the status international peace and security through collective security precautions, tosupportthe nations’ other interests, with to trust Turkey’s own securityin accordance force first while at the interests same strengthening national high Turkey’s maintain and safeguard to . . . [To] consider that one’s domestic peace can be insured only by a worldwide stable peace, In arguing that the goal of Atatürk’s revolutions was to reach revolutionslevel Western wasto the of Atatürk’s goal the In arguing that of the Western civilization. thought, enlightenment, and increasing the prosperity level. Ourculture is not in conflict with mean not does This deserting one’s own traditions and culture civilization. but replacing the dogmatic Western beliefs withof positivist level the reach to is reforms Atatürk’s of goal The 333 ÷OÕ theJPjoined thediscourse of pro-Western the 1960susedinrelation the to and Aktürk, 121. Süleyman Demirel, AdaletPartisiGenel Ba 332 334 335 This followed a comprehensive definition of the 104 ú kanÕ ve Ba ú bakan: Muhtelif Konu ú malar , 58. CEU eTD Collection 341 Söyledikleri ve 340 339 these main reasons” (Da reasons” main these maximum security only within a collective system. Our membership in NATO and CENTO alliances is based onorganizations: “Considering her geographical and strategic position, Turkey is 338 Adalet Partisi, Adalet butitalso national was notonly line in theKemalistWesternization interests Turkey’s with sense, this in and West; the of level economic the reach to was EEC the of member a become towards NATO and the EEC. development, and of security lieddiplomacy,through obtaining core atthe Turkey’s policy economic pacificism, mainly, policy, foreign Turkish the of goals main the Demirel, interests and reputation could bemaintained only foreigna pro-Western through policy. Turkey’s that and civilization contemporary the of level highest the marked civilization Western that the highlighted he his speeches, of one Demirel. In of press interviews subtitle of foreign economic relations instead of foreign policy. the under categorized andeven EEC the on specifically made in thearticulations prioritized for collectivesecurity need of threat and the communism ofTurkey interests the security underlined onNATO policy articulations foreign The concerns. aboveallother interests national the placed which policy realist this traditional of aspart andorganizations countries European Western with the conducted saw therelations Westthe with highestthe level civilization. Theof governmentprograms preparedby JP the 337 336 involve the staunch Westernism in propagated as election the programs, discourse in relation to the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, neither did it Demirel, Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited Ibid., 127. In the first Demirel government the following remark was stated in relation to the Westernist security Westernist the to relation in stated was remark following the government Demirel first the In See for instance Adalet Partisi, Adalet instance Seefor Ibid., 121-22. This realist approach to foreign policy was also stated in the and foreign thepublic speeches wasalso stated This policy to approach realist While this definition drew upon the elements already circulating in the official in the circulating already elements the upon drew definition this While for suitable still Turkey’s interests. are principles [Atatürk’s] that believe we then, since considerably changed Büyük Türkiye Adalet Partisi1965 Seçim Beyannamesi , 70. ÷OÕ Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Ba and Aktürk, 122-23). Aktürk, and , 322. 336 Adalet Partisi 1973 Seçim Beyannamesi 341 From this perspective, the reason for why Turkey chose to 105 (Ankara:Do ÷Xú 338 ú , while the economic interests were interests economic the while , kan ve Ba Matbaas (Ankara: Do 339 obliged Õ ú , 1964), 4,31. bakan Yard to accomplish its 337 ÷Xú nor did it associate Matbaas Õ mc ÕVÕ vis-à-vis , YazdÕ Õ , 1973), 73; 340 klar For the Õ CEU eTD Collection 346 345 344 343 342 withassociating EEC the model by order the Atatürk: prescribed in makes link asimilar statement following The policy. following apro-Western to ascribed primary principles of Atatürk are rationalism and Western civilizationism.” “The attribution: a similar of illustrative is remark following The other. the above elements making suchalink, Demirel also reordered elementsthe attributedKemalism, to raising these in as sides the two Indeed, of samecoin. were taken the ‘rationalism’ and civilizationism’ ‘Western- howthe note exemplifies further above-quoted The perspective. realist from a membernations/Western community’ of a respectedworld and ‘beingcivilization’ the level contemporary the of ‘reaching the of elements the reproduced EEC on the articulations civilizationism. Western and reforms member of the EEC was as follows: a become to wanted Turkey why of question interview an to answer Demirel’s Similarly, realist. as Kemalism and policy foreign pro-Western the both reconstituting helped Kemalism Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited Ibid., 253. Ibid., 75. Milliyet Milliyet that will take the nations to welfare and happiness. which gives priority and great value to individualthe and private entrepreneurism,is the one it. Turkey made her forthe choice order.EEC’s economic Turkey believes that thisorder, withouthesitation is because sharesshe the idealsame andunderstanding ofdemocracy with success of the democratic order. The reasonsocial for why Turkey takes part on thejustice sideGreat Atatürk’s directionof to followed be Turkishby the theRepublic inpolitical,economic and EEC terms is the pathway towards the West . . . . For Turkey, JPdidYet the not interests also only ‘ideals’but those ‘idealized’ the rationalize the EEC is a real Besides the emphasis put on the national interests, national the on put emphasis the Besides strongest members . . . Both parties have an interest in this. [However]development we to thatTurkey’sdo objective is reaching the level of the West,of raising her levelof economic thenot Western wantcountries . . to. [and] bebuilding a weaka competitive member industry . . . . of the EEC; we want to be one of its , 17May 1967. , 24 July 1976; cited in Süleyman Demirel, A.P.Genel Ba Türkiye-AET Türkiye-AET 342 ø li úkileri In this respect, ‘rationalizing’ the elements of 106 (Ankara: Avrupa Toplulu ú kanÕ 346 ve Ba 344 ú here we also see how the party’s the how see we also here bakan: Seçim Konuú 343 ÷u Yay Õ 345 nlar malar Õ , 1976),, 250-51. Õ II , 36. CEU eTD Collection 347 civilizationism Atatürk, of not a primary it of onlyas of objective and defined Westernist democracy basic pillar the the individualismon as hand, other the placed TheJP’sstaunchanti-communism, shared culture. West and refrainedidentifying the from entrepreneurship asaconstituentprivate of this thecountriesmade inthe similar to Turkey emphasized aswhat democracy’ ‘participatory the mainly civilization’, contemporary of level the ‘reaching the and ‘economic development’ differences with the liberal identity to Turkey. one employed foreign also but Westernist as beinginherently policy ascribed aWestern, and democratic by the RPP,In this sense,which, the JP’s legitimizationarguing of forthe EEC a policystrict not only rearticulatedstatism the forKemalist bigger threat for Turkey than the Soviet Union, Demirel stated: a as Greece identified Ecevit After in Kemalism. ‘inherent’ civilizationism the and principle, world’ inthe athome, peace ‘peace the will, national the also contradicted but communism indirectly support only not NATO did towards approach areserved sense, In principle. this in world’ the home, peace at ‘peace the with in compliance policy a pro-NATO and defined linkedas communism. totaking Soviet further JP the The Union astance‘choice’ against this economicas well development to approaches thestatist whichdelegitimized entrepreneurship of the Turkish nation countries. European Western to be on the side of the Western democracy and the private Demirel, It should also be noted here that the Westernism of the party involved significant Westernism hereparty the the of that noted should be also It It has been expressed that some hopes emerged in Turkey with regard to taking Soviet Union’s Soviet taking to regard with Turkey in emerged hopes some that expressed been has It it the‘will’ was by that legitimized arguing wasalso Western-orientation Indeed, the member countries. I hope these efforts do not take the form of the Trojan horse. From the perspectiveFrom of Atatürk’s principle horse. of ‘peace at home, peaceTrojan in ofthe world’,the we believe form ourthe take not do efforts these hope I countries. member conducting rapprochements withindividual countries and shaking the builttrust on the Union. Soviet the There and world free the between conflicts well-rooted are there Today policy? aresupport. [The Western countries] istherefore asking: Is Turkey changing sides inher foreign strategies to topple NATO from inside, by taking a stance against NATO, Büyük Türkiye , 75. 347 but also situated it at core of italso butat core of situated relationsthe pursuedwith the 107 CEU eTD Collection 350 349 Söyledikleri ve 348 above all other considerations. Yet, itis hard to situate this discourse as an example of an anti- is tone stricter present: a however, statement, In following the states. lawfrom other international to samerespect the expected who actor aresponsible here as resolution bewithin sought international contextof the Turkey agreements. was hence defined the rights and interests of both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, suggesting that the conflict governmentprogram of agood1965, constitute starting point: the in stated Demirel, of remarks following The issue. the on articulations party’s in the used examine elements the to have answer question, we this to Inorder approach? Westernist its following: didasregards how policy the JP integrate the within Cyprusissue the propagated Theis West. here the canbe question values hencethe ascribed ‘positive’ to asked that how taking supportof the Sovietthe Union with was associated taking astanceall againstthe for world’, principles. ‘peace’,the andincompliance withAtatürk’s This shows also remark Ibid.,125.Italics added. Cited inDa Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited Here we see Cyprus being represented as the ‘greatest national and placed asthe‘greatest cause’ beingHere weseeCyprus represented our is which question, Cyprus the resolve to order In valued that discourse official the of dimension first the of illustrative is remark This hoped we intentions good our of all With Cyprus. of Republic the with links intimate have We of ‘free the asbeing apart considered NATO was with Here weseehowsiding ignorant to the colonization of Turkish Cypriots. of Turkish colonization the to ignorant . . . [However] unilateralinvolved because she sincerely values regional security and the prevention of future conflicts . peace isour of not objective government.. Turkey has . preferred always peaceful negotiations between theparties possible unchanging an is community Turkish the of . interests . and . . rights the It ensures is unimaginable that Turkey could be she has towards it. earlier, Turkey expectsignored from . the. . otherandHowever,citizens. the its London and Zurich whichof haveagreements, to asawhole,be taken ourwere ofall parties welfare and warningspeace the ensured we signed to that the agreements the that agreement to the Cyprusthe same Governmentfaith and respect were as disregarded . . . . As I stated interests above everything. foreign policy should a nationalisticpursue andhonorable path by holding thenational ÷OÕ , 75 and Aktürk, 68. Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Ba 349 348 108 350 ú greatest national cause kan ve Ba ú bakan Yard Õ mc , in a way that ÕVÕ , Yazd Õ kla Õ i CEU eTD Collection 352 remark thereby situated the situated remark within Western-orientedCyprus policy policy thereby and general the itdrew alink Inthat threat. inCyprus events the above-quoted between communism, and the the Soviet ascontaining alsoas a‘Western the of cause’, butwhich was objective represented 351 island, amember of the JP made the following remark in the parliament on behalf of the JP: communistin AKEL Cyprusforparty directed massacres the against theTurksliving on the the Blaming region. inthe communism of spread the to lead might island in the developments from acleardeviation representing it. was pursued. Inthisit sense, reconstitutes valuesthe attachedWesternism to than rather but allianceestablishesWest alink being andof between the the way policy apart Cyprus the drawnot adirectlink between the Cyprus policy and Turkey’s withinrole the Western does this articulation Indeed, identity. same the of asanextension articulated linked inbeing policies were both regard In this Western democracy. the of also but asacharacteristic policy relation to the Cyprus policy are employed not only as a constituent of the nationalist foreign parliament from the JP is to the point: colonizationfollowingthe community. Turkish of the amember of remark the The Westbut the against as areaction policy defineCyprus the not party did stanceasthe Western Ibid., 26. Cited in Adalet Partisi, Adalet in Cited With this articulation the Cyprus issue was not merely presented as a ‘national cause’ as merely a ‘national not presented issuewas Cyprus the articulation With this AKEL, which is themostestablished party in the island having more than members,80,000 how the in on articulations the link,however,constructed was A more direct in will’ used ‘national and of sovereignty’ ‘national elements Here weseehow the What isthe government’s response to [the violation of London and Zurich Agreements and the Turkey, Greece, Britain, and the NATO community should not disregard this development. this disregard not should community NATO the and Britain, Greece, Turkey, intends island toturn into the of the the Cuba Mediterranean Soviet of Union. and a base the spend ofitseffortsall to wipe Turks out ofthe island. The communistinstitution ofAKEL democracies. all Western elementin indispensable an principles of which we agree upon, can governmenthave must share itsopinion with the itsopposition so that theforeignnational policy, themain characteristic insubsequent bloody eventsitsin Cyprus] andwhat are their precautions?real We believe that the sense. This is Adalet Partisi (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Ne 109 351 ú riyat Õ , 1963), 49. 352 CEU eTD Collection Söyledikleri 353 ‘eliminating thespread of communism’,‘defending nationalthe will and national honorable,approach’, nationalistic andpeaceful ‘pursuingindependence ofotheran nations’, involved theelements of ‘defending Turkey’s national interests’, ‘supporting the elements Kemalist tothe foreignattributed The JP’s articulations policy. on issue Cyprus the how both the Cyprus issue in same Thiswere reconciledthe alsoon being ustosee allows approach grounded template. and the Western-orientation were represented by rationalistpolicyrecourse attributed to the Western-orientation. to the infurther wouldremark realist the interests be reconciled reproduces and end,this the the that highlighting in sense, this In relations. the maintaining in sides both the of interests Cyprus issue,Demirel’s answer was following:the the to in relation ‘West’ the trust to interests national inTurkey’s was it whether to as question a to Responding Western-orientation. the with reconciled was policy Cyprus how examining argued that one has to look at how the Westernistorientation. positionWestern- her of extension an also but policy, is‘nationalistic’ and integrated‘humanitarian’ ‘responsible’, with a of example an only not was itissue Cyprus the on rather stand firm Turkey’s sense, this In ideology. than communist of the elimination to the civilization’ level of contemporary the the ‘reaching and ‘establishinglinked peaceathome’ that principlesof the official the reproduced discourse constituted the communist identity as the negative Other of the Western Self. This also See Adalet Partisi, SeeAdalet If we move down to the elements used in relation to both policies, we see how both Here Demirel links Western-orientation the to the issueby Cyprus the articulating Relationships arenot constructed easily, onehas tomaintain them.As the for possibility as to be can it cause, national ‘greatest’ the as taken was Cyprus as hand, other the On they are built on interests, not emotions. that it canwhether theCyprus can issue resolved be peacefulthrough we means, maintainstill thehope be. Today friendships are always built on interests. Friendships are strong when , 150-51. Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Ba 353 110 ú kan ve Ba ú bakan Yard Õ mc ÕVÕ , Yazd Õ klar Õ ve CEU eTD Collection (accessed January 27, 2008). Italics mine. 355 unit.” to realize our goals we havenationalism view, guidelines. wasshown as providing the true Türke Onthis to return to line.” a democratic along was “aiming at constructing anindustrial and pluralist society by helping Turkey advance Cyprusthe policy. Turkey’s foreign in and relation policy to orientation provides NAP the basicapproachof the Cyprus], whichis a compilation hisof statements and speeches since 1966, and which 354 written by and edited Türke Türke 1977-1978. later between and Nationalistthe Front 1975-1977 major government withinof coalition as the another discourse stood 1969, by NAPsince the ú Türke synthesis Turkish-Islamic Party(NAP): the Action Nationalist the of discourse The 3.2.3.1. incompatible with Western-orientation.Turkey’s as represented not was too, perspective from this Cyprusissue, the argue that to hence fair policiesit attributed tofollowing onthe elements weregrounded Atatürk’s path,would be both on theJP’sarticulations that fact the Given civilization’. level contemporary of the the for ‘supporting the independenceand countriesof sovereignty andhelpingother them reach except elements same the involved also Western-orientation the of representations party’s The sovereignty’, and ‘respecting the of principle fairness and reciprocity in international affairs’. “Ba Alparslan Türke Alparslan 355 ú ú bu (during the period the presentchapter focuses on),weshall mainly focus on book the first Nation in andlater within, represented Party Republican1965-1969, Peasant the The main objective in of asstated NAP, the well book the as in the party programs, Apart from the perspectives discussed above, the nationalist perspective of Alparslan of perspective nationalist the above, discussed from perspectives the Apart The fundamental The fundamental principles party,the of called as counter ‘nine lightsthe doctrine’ to ÷ ’un Özlü’un Sözleri,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, ú , 'Õú Politikam 354 For attaining this objective, not a foreign Forattainingnot a thisobjective, ideology but Turkish Õz ve K ú in1979, Õ br Õs (Istanbul: Orkun Yay 'Õú our self our Politikam 111 and combine our efforts asefforts anindivisable andcombine our Õz ve Õ nevi, 1979),nevi, 446. .Õ As by both parties headed were br Õs [Our foreign policy [Our and ú noted, “In noted, order CEU eTD Collection 358 357 356 matters. economic of it as thefree RPP,andpresented public sector the of in nation whole participation the upon which all the other principles were built. Consider the following remark of Türke thebasis democracy as anddepicting communism wascountering focus spectrum, basic the developmentalism andand industrialism populism, and technologism.Along this wide socialism (defined asbeing scientism, moralism, idealism, nationalism, follows: as were RPP the of arrows’ ‘six the the national national the fate. and regime, democratic the country, of unity the against threat serious a inflicting thereby clashing with Kemalistthe nationalism and ‘participatory it democracy’ propagated, and henceemploying bydiscourse, which the communist of wascontinuously NAP the accused democracy Indeed,thisand the pluralism. formed major with of point RPP, departure the incompatible discourse and revolutionistwith communist the representing anti-revolutionism, and anti-communism on stress a corollary paralleled it democracy’, ‘participatory RPP’s the stated the following: metaphor obstacles the torefera revolutionary for to bringing in about change Turkey, Türke Ecevit’s ‘lockeddoors’ the Asaresponse of inrevolutionto context. use the Turkish Ibid., 446. Ibidem. Türke According to the NAP, democracy is a must and the starting point. But it is not sufficient. Just In sense,this the NAPproposed formationthe inspired a national of sector, by the against any kind of monopolism. This is because it is based on the idea of pluralist society. pluralist of idea the on based is it because is This monopolism. of kind any against application of industrial democracy and mixed economy.is That whyour economic viewis likeoligarchy. an democracy Today political is strengthened being in Westthe the through fascism or democratized communism to be hold theeconomicas they hands powerintheir just social bases mustas the democracy political is basedon alsothe ofseparationprinciple of economic itspowers, and be based on a balance of power. It is not possible for systems such as why he mentions thenames of totalitarian dictators . . Ecevitwants toenter the room, the down to the possibility of a revolution which could open new doors for Turkey, it is curious Ecevit has also referred to ‘Atatürk’s revolutionism’ at times, but whenever the topic comes ú , 449. 358 357 In this vein,Türke Thus, while this perspectivepluralist inthe wasdepicted same line as for the society), peasantism, liberalism and individualism, and liberalism peasantism, society), the ú reacted against Ecevit’s remarks on possibilitythe of a 112 ú : 356 ú CEU eTD Collection 362 361 360 359 discourse of the JP. What principles of secularism, revolutionism, prioritized statism, and not which were also inthe is also missing for the in except inhome, world’, the ‘peace peace at of principle the pursuing with associated the picture is the linking of these elements to integrationist, pluralist and humanitarian in essence. The following remark is also to the point: drew the boundaries oflegitimacy,for view, this the NAP,wasnotin any way exclusivist but involved excludingthecommunist from discourse publicthe around sphere, which NAP the prosperity, and the national unity against any type of separatism and totalitarianism: presentationfollowing illustrates how this remarkalso involved delegitimization a corresponding of the NAPdelegitimizing communism and depicting the RPPas strengthening this ideology further. The as the sole defender of the national will, democracy, freedom, Ibid., 448. Ibid., 451-52. Ibid., 446. Ibid., 435. Here we see all the elements attributed to the principles of Kemalism, and the elements humanitarianism. as of it aspect international the and nationalism Turkish as ideal this terms for both Turkishthe society and allothernations. Wecall thedomesticdimension of realizeis to goal the oft-mentioned Our legalequality in internationalhumanitarianism. is relations in point also social and economicstarting our But society. pluralist and industrialized make Turkey among take part world ofthe nations democratic,as afree,modern, civilized, national integrity andindependenceAt core ofTurkish the . nationalism objectiveis the to not give up on thisideal.A departure from this meansideal adeparture from democracy, national interests, in short, the Turkish Constitution. We call this Turkish nationalism and will Turks should form a unity democratic around free regime,the integrity ofnation the and democracy,freedom,and development prosperity to defensiveapproach While this the Soviet Union. strengthen would the This totalitarian humanity. - communist the and threat . and nation drag Turkey Turkish to the the edge of against a civil war to be treachery useda is by division and and prosperousUpholdingfree, . Turkey . those base policies their that politicalfate on separation developed, a and world a such both establishing for indispensable is which and nationalisticdemocratic, policiesWe . will not giveupour peaceful democratic and cooperation policy realist, forming on depends world humanistic and just, free, a Realizing Türke how Here wesee the state. doors of which were broken by Che Gueveras, Maos, by Castros, simply using ofthe powers 359 361 ú sought to delegitimize the revolutionism of RPPby the of revolutionism the delegitimize to sought 113 360 362 CEU eTD Collection d'Etudes sur laMéditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien 13 (January-June 1992):141. rather then ‘Atatürk’s nationalism’,hand, by forward ‘nineputting lights’instead of ‘six andarrows’, ‘Turkish Nationalism’ it did not represent views. unity establishing the separatist nation the against the and democracy of itself as the real‘raising Kemalist Turkey party andto thein that period both in its developmentalist discourse, legitimized through principlethe level of of the contemporary civilization,current orderwith communism linkstheirthrough with outside.”the as well as in its emphasisreplace the to in order country and the nation the of integrity the break regime,the down on ‘nationalism’holdingthrough fight“topple couldagainst theviews on to one thatsought to couldthat integrity,harm national the Constitution, the the and Republic.” Nationalism”, and“fighting againstcommunism, anarchy, illegal actions, and any attempts 367 366 365 364 363 civilization’. contemporary the Turkey ‘raising member and nations’, honorable world andthe of respected omission, program the elementsof the mainly,appropriated samethe template, ‘being a relation histo ideals principles butor his rolein establishing the Republic. inyetAtatürk, not to note abrief made only of second principles’, that ‘Atatürk’s reforms’ or this coalitional makingomitted government ‘Kemalism’, anydirectreference to ‘Atatürk’s of program first the While part. took NAP the which in Coalition Front Nationalist so-called military duringestablishment period. the following Atatürk’s principles which was undertaken by the RPP and the JP as well as the See Cizre-Sakall Ibid., 383. Ibidem. Ibid., 321. Cited in Da In this sense, the NAP can be argued to have built on the Kemalist template available template Kemalist the on built have to argued be can NAP the sense, this In The absence of such a reference was also apparent in the government programs of the of programs government in the apparent also was reference a such of absence The ÷OÕ and Aktürk, 383. ÕR÷ lu, “The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey,” Cahiers 364 This required, as stated infollowing This “Turkish the program, asstated required, 114 366 363 365 above Yet, despite Yet, this Therefore, only 367 On the other the On the level of level the CEU eTD Collection (accessed January 27, 2008). 371 370 369 368 unimaginableintellectuals to come up with have a embracedgreater evilit as anthan ideal that to befor under our nation.”the trusteeship of the West. Itcommunism” is NATO as a symbol of theWest but democracy, its slogan of “either democracy or democracy and disrupting the national integrity. NAP ignorance any of would factthis enslave Turkey totalitarianism byharmingto madecommunismindispensable it remain [forin Turkey] to theNATO alliance.” of threat imminent the and Union Soviet the from threat potential “the NAP, the For communism. for countering asanalliance of NATO their representation was coalitions Front Nationalist during the partners of coalition the ground common of the communism. Indeed, fightagainst threat the to by inorganizations Western the propagated JPbutparticipation the anti-Westernism towards policy: foreign A multi-directional 3.2.3.2. Party. Salvation National remained reactionary such to articulations, which an attitude was also takenupby the remaining in the alliance was not depicted in contradiction anti-Western with party’s in the depicted contradiction wasnot in alliance remaining the view, evilideology Türke this On acceptance– communism. of another the to contributed hence and culture and morals national destroyed it as evils all of root the with the West and Europe. For the NAP, modernization in Western lines was considered to be upuntilKemalist propagated discourse then modernizationwhich associated and civilization principle ‘reaching of In it the level contemporary civilization’. the sense,from diverged this “Ba Ibid., 429. Ibidem. Türke ú bu The foreign policy discourse of the NAP did not involve an unhesitant Westernism as Westernism unhesitant an involve not did NAP the of discourse policy foreign The By the same token, the NAP did not attribute a Westernist connotation to Atatürk’s ú , 450. ÷ ’un Özlü’un Sözleri”, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 370 did notconstruct a Western but anti-community identity. 115 369 However, as the NAP did not consider not did NAP the as However, ú 371 noted: “Turkish noted: In this sense, 368 For the For CEU eTD Collection 378 377 376 375 374 (accessed January 27, 2008). 373 372 Muslim countries.” from West,“theTurkey andstrengthening her over-dependence on relations the with the ‘Creator’.” the becauseof ‘created’ the “valuing as described synthesis, Islamic againstrooted communism,in ideology juxtaposed werenotTurkish-the Western butthe communism.According this to perspective,humanism, democracy,freedom, and which were counter to means sole the as synthesis Turkish-Islamic the to complementary but perspective, sovereignty sovereignty forbut Turkey also adeviation from goal the ‘reaching of assimilationthe bring about Turkishthe andof culture independence the loss of and interests, national integrity, and economic development, but also her cultural values. political unification, such adevelopment since wouldnot only be national againstTurkey’s cooperation EECbuttheevolutionwith the integration asocial, of this towards cultural and Turkey’s Cyprus policy. cooperation instrumental inwas counteringfor the Sovietcommunism and support increasing countries, Western the with cooperation Turkey’s of importance survival. (the soul) asboth TurkishnessIslam holding body) to and (the sense,on on survivaldepended Turkey’s the rejection of one of them would pose an existential threat to Turkey’s Ibid., 248-89. Türke Ibid., 407, 339. Cited inDa “Ba Türke Tercüman ú bu As this remarksuggests, integration Turkey’s with would West/Europe the not only country. cultures goal of butthe reaching beyondof foreign thelevelof contemporary civilizationthe strong as a imitator an or colony a be to chosen not has nation Turkish culture. Western the and European Turkey between terms cultural and social in common in nothing absolutely is nationsThere . . . . We believe that Turkey should refrain from being a refugee in the By Türke this token, ú ú , 189. , 450. ÷ 373 ’un Özlü’un Sözleri”, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, , 6 February 1976; cited in In foreign policy terms, this meant going back to the ‘roots’, hence the ‘roots’, backde-orienting to Inforeigngoing meant this policy terms, ÷OÕ and Aktürk, 407. 378 374 While thegovernment programs inwhich NAPthe place took stated the 376 ú declared NAPwas notagainsteconomic the Turkey’s that Türkiye-AET ø 116 li ú kileri , 248. 375 beyond for the NAP, this the level of the of level the 372 377 In this In CEU eTD Collection 381 380 naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean region, “occupy all Aegean islands and Cyprus, and the requirements of this policy. As the document War against of Turks Greekimperialism.” the stated, GreeceCyprus andthe subsequentrepresentation of action this as an extension “Independencethe of sought to become a strongTürke 379 Union.” Soviet the or U.S. the over handed be not could issue Cyprus the of resolution the as policy, policy national defenseofTurkey’s interestsrequiredmoreand the developing elastic a ‘reachingreal level the civilizational Turkey was not goal of but West’ the of guardian of the Turkish national interests, values, integrity and ideals. Hence, in this view, the West also by situating it against the ‘national will’,and how it thereby represented itself as the with We NAP integration the how Turkey’s the alsosee delegitimized attributes. civilizational principle thehitherto-defended-cooperation and West dissociated from with its the this itsof own construction NAP the presented see how Herewe civilization’. contemporary and the most radical presented Türke perspective For regardingCyprus. 1966 representing theposition of NAP,laterRPNP, andthe criticized Ecevit’s Cypruspolicy NAP. later by Cyprus, attention from policy which the RPNPandthe received special towards from ThisTurkey’s onanypower. wasseencrucialespecially overdependence with regard to being Self from isolated the towards world. the without according tothe Turkish-Islamic synthesis, this left only one option for Turkey: tobe oriented Ibid., 191-92. Ibid., 186. Türke 379 ú , what this meant in effect was the annexation of the whole island, unification with In his memorandum In hisDemirel in letter to 1966,Türke This suggested that foreign policy should be multi-directional and aim at disengaging ú 380 Alparslan Türke Alparslan , 183. While this was to some extent in line with the RPP’s ‘flexible foreign policy’, for policy’, foreign ‘flexible RPP’s the with in line extent some to was this While ú , both in his memorandum letters to the Prime Minister Demirel in Demirel Minister Prime the to letters memorandum his in both , 117 381 ú expanded on for expanded and reasonsthe on ú , amulti-directional beyond it; and CEU eTD Collection 386 minority. Greek remarkable a 385 384 383 382 policy. Turkey’s delegitimize to level diplomatic the at community international the persuade and intervention, Turkey’s for room any allow to not island in the Turks tothe status minority a give in Cyprus, reinforcements her increase Eastern Anatolia.” and South the Dardanelles the control remark isremark of illustrative this move:discursive Atatürk’sfollowingnational interestsby but TurkishCyprus tothe also deeds. The recourse also dueto historicalthe fact‘Cyprus that alwaysTurks’: belonged to beperspective, definitely hadTurkey, handedsecurity to to but notonly over due to reasons, this from Cyprus, above. discussed elements multi-directional and Islamist, nationalistic, Mediterranean Seas and full sovereignty over the rest,” and Aegean in the islands the of some over control permanent a “have to objective Ibid., 276-77. Ibid., 192-93. Imros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) are the Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea that have Ibidem. Ibid., 183. Ibid., 182. h. g. f. e. d. c. b. a. Indeed, the NAP did Turkey. to not onlynever has Cyprus belonged to Greek sovereignty . Hence,Cyprus. fairest. solution would the hand be over to Cyprus over seek rights historical has Turkey Finally, toTurkey. for territory legitimize. In addition, the fact that130,000 Turks live on island makesthe theisland an important Turkey’swhoever hastheisland acquires theopportunity to Ankara andbombard Erzurum and go back occupationthat takesoff from Greece cannot return to Greece after bombarding Ankaraor Erzurum. But surroundingsof the . . . whole. This hasbelongs to Anatoliaalso . . The one whoimplications has it has the control over the Southern Anatolia and its forCyprus Turkey’sis a very important territory forstrategic Turkey. First of all, given its geologic security. structure, it A military plane As this action illustrates, plan Cyprusthe for policy Türke Action. Special Cyprus proposed the for jihadists train disposal, Turkey’s to NATO from divisions three withdraw Bulgaria, with treaty non-interference a sign Greece, with relations trade the cut Turkey, from citizens Greek evacuate [Tenedos], and [Imros] government, Turkify of this power executive the realizing by organization jihad voluntary a found Britain, or Switzerland either in government Cyprus Turkish temporary a establish 386 118 383 Accordingly, Turkey, who also had the 384 385 had to: 382 Subsequently, Greece would ú comprised the CEU eTD Collection dragging Turkey towards cultural following cultural dragging division. only towards through Turkey and assimilation Hence, Turkey’s independentstand, strengthening the separatist viewsin Turkey and furthermore in threat Turkey,overlooked clearly requirementsthe of nationalTurkey’s interests, damaging inNAP, line, JP, followingtheRPP,in the strengthening and apro-Western thecommunist the to According perspectives. by other advocated policies the through benot realized could ‘raising Turkey of principle the and modernism, democracy, statism, populism, unity, national nationalism, articulations of the RPP and the JP. Although the NAP also relied on the concepts of realism, inand tothe foreignmulti-directionalism, starkcontrast policy stood NAP’sdiscourse the criticized Ecevit’s Cyprus policy: 389 388 387 remained as only the realistic andfair solution.Consider following the remarks of Türke integrity and independence of island,the declaredprogram in federation that government foras themost the suitable the the option changenot even whenthe during NAP wasin Although no corollary power. change wasmade goal and representing Atatürk’s foreign policy as realist and nationalistic. This position did Cited in Türke Cited inDa Ibid., 245. Thus, given its synthesis of anti-Westernism, anti-communism, Turkism, Islamism, Turkism, anti-communism, anti-Westernism, of synthesis its given Thus, start . . . . For Turkey’s security and survival, Cyprus, as a whole, should belong to Turkey. half of islandthe or in two three days, or have should occupied thewhole island the very from Ecevit haveshould deployed more reinforcementsin theisland,moved and occupythem to the the Greek and quo establishedthe Turkish communityisland, the in byinsure the security of order in the Turks the island,maintain the thesecurity of Turkey the and disrupted the restore to Lausanne was operation of the in aim the that thestated Ecevit islandTreaty, . . and. . Inestablish order to peacerealize by protectingthese objectives the rights of both In this sense, the NAP attempted to legitimize its policy by presenting it as arealistic its bypresenting it policy tolegitimize NAPattempted sense,the In this existence. its protect policy. national Thisrealistic a through objectives his is realized and had, the Turkey opportunities casethe for Cyprus.stating this?After . the First World War,Atatürk evaluated the conditions ofthe time and No otherEverything hasshows that Turkey have altogether. aright to Cyprus Why dowehesitate on solution will satisfy Turkey, or ensure its security, or ÷OÕ and Aktürk, 290. ú , 306-309. beyond the level of contemporary civilization’, for the NAP, these ideals 387 388 for Türke 119 ú , the annexation of the whole Cyprus status- ú that 389 CEU eTD Collection directed by directed Quran Western in elements its discourse by declaring the principles of party the as informed and Ataturkist revolutionism. Thisnotwithstanding, the NSPalsorelied onIslamist andanti- and the state the of characteristics secular the with inconflict was found that discourse of disbandedin bytheorders its Constitutionalthe Court extreme 1971 dueto Islamist NSP emergedcoalitional with government RPPin the andlater with 1974-1975, JPandthe NAP.The the as the emphasistheir starkest in the NSP’sThe party,discourse. virtualfounded in formed1972, a successor of the National Order Party (NOP), which was (NSP) Party Salvation theNational of thediscourse salvation’: ‘national towards path The 3.2.4.1. survival and fulfilling Atatürk’s foreign policy vision. Turkey could achieve. Inthis sense,itwas apartial only move securing towards Turkey’s Turkey’s Cyprusfrom intervention, was viewpoint, this a only instance‘limited’ of what Türke andthespeechesof inview statements of the of Hence, civilization. alsobut requirements deedsthe Atatürk’s with inaccordance only not her Self’andbecome whatshe taking oncewas astancethrough againstThis West. the was more fulfilling than capable of the requirements civilization.of Then, Turkey should‘return to was not West the butthe inherentTurkish-Muslim identity. wasbecausethe This Turkswere 390 of ‘reaching ideal the accomplish to beable Turkey would policy multi-directional a and lights’ ‘nine the Necmettin Erbakan, Necmettin We are against the exploitation of Atatürk . . . . We are on the right path. We are on the true path. The demonization of the West and the celebration of Turkey’s Islamic roots found Turkey’s Islamicroots of West celebration the the and The of demonization above 390 the level of the contemporary civilization’, the inspiration source of which Milli Görüú , and stating that “the Westernist thoughts will turn us, who are in the (Istanbul: Dergah Yay 120 Õ nlar Õ , 1975), 85 ú , it would not be incorrect to state state that beit to incorrect not would, —Necmettin 1973Erbakan, CEU eTD Collection Erbakan’s response to a question that whether the party respected Atatürk’s revolutions a question is Atatürk’s whether totheparty respected Erbakan’s response that it despite fact the did discourse, that itself openly not presentof ‘the guardian Kemalism’. from theNSPrefrained establishmentduringpursuing an period. the Yet, anti-Kemalist interestsnational the on emphasis and campaign anti-communist its Indeed, discourse. official the were the only common denominator with the other parties and the military West,” both “rejecting the spiritual values and national interest.” national and values spiritual the “rejecting both West,” capitalism of theimperialistErbakan,“supported coalitional with to according JP,which, the governments the West,” and partin the to take prevent NSP the was Western’ not did that ‘whatever of demonization the RPP, which this ‘evil’Western the camp. Nevertheless, byNSPwithin wassituated the official discourse, was “orientedthe non-Western towards Muslim world. Eventhe communism, socialism associated with ‘anti-Westernism’of the in the for Turkey Turkey in these terms: “ national identity as inherently andhow itreligious redefined modelcivilizational the for 393 392 391 in Erbakan for view Islamist an was view’ ‘national the sense, this In identity. ethnic the to complementary identity was only for thereligious which NAP, from the of that theNSP’sdiscourse separated Erbakan. by written later book of the title alsothe which view’, was ‘national the on salvation Turkey’s depended Islam.” of reality own our learn to inability of a state into world, Muslim Ibid., 29. Ibid., 63-89.Italics added. Ibid., 63. Turkey, view anational hence and us and the and Given its emphasis on Islamism and anti-Westernism, the NSP radically diverged from The NSP regarded the West as the greatest threat inflicting a number of social ills social on of number a inflicting threat West greatest as the the The NSPregarded The ‘national view’ of the NSP, in elevating the religious identity above the national, the above identity religious the in elevating NSP, the of view’ ‘national The Milli Görü Westerners ú As is to be Islamized”. [The national view], illustrates how this discourse constructed the constructed discourse how this illustrates view], national [The Muslims , we from possess the biggest thoughtsystem ever . . The best an Islamic perspective. The following remarks of remarks following The perspective. anIslamic 392 121 393 391 Forthe NSP, CEU eTD Collection EEC would not only result in Turkey’s colonization, but incolonialism its wasrooted identity, Judeo-Christian-Greek integrationalso Turkey’s with the the loss of her Islamic identity. 259) (1975, 246); “Common Market is a Zionist game” (1975,247); “CommonMarket will assimilate us.” (1975, 398 397 396 395 394 Turkey thewithin Christian Europe.” assimilateenthusiasm aboutTurkey’s future membershipwas “athe to only plan Muslim sovereignty with by making samestate Turkey Europe. the Turkey’s colonization, thebankruptcy of nationalthe industry, lead would in to NSP,integration West the the with For period. same establishment the by political other the andthemilitary one propagated the than Western-orientation parties directed Turkey: againstproject unity the neo-colonialist of of the Self. The NSP’s representation of the EEC followed the same logic, in describing it as a real of source civilization, loss of the economic andpolitical independence andthe destruction ignorance of the meant the theWest with integration NSP, For the civilization. contemporary notconsider the Western-orientation as an objective that could bring Turkey to the level of the 3.2.4.2. The ‘national view’ and orientation towards the Muslim world “we are the real guardians of the regime and the Republic; nobody else.” illustrative in this respect. His answer was affirmative butyet circuitous: “Of course,” he said, Ibid., 241. Similar associations were made throughout the book: “Common Market is a Catholic Union” Ibid., 254. Ibid., 262. Ibid., 236. Ibid., 340. Here we see a radically different representation of the Western identity the and identity Western of the representation Here weseearadically different Given its declaration of the Islamic civilization as the most superior to all, the NSP did civilizations. countrieshave thiscolonialist outlook because they belong to the Judeo-Christian Greek and Turkey as well are as welcomed in this is project to thenewmethodspractice of neo-colonialism. nations Western The African many why to as reason The ages. for colonialist been have The Common Marketis anew colonialist project of the Western European countrieswhich 395 398 In this sense, as the EEC (Common Market)’s neo- Market)’s (Common EEC as the sense, this In 122 397 396 For Erbakan, the EEC’s and the loss of national of loss the and 394 CEU eTD Collection the Common Market in vain.” ErbakanEurope, “Yet, westrugglealso noted, tosell locust beansour andparsley leaves to 402 401 400 399 following statement is exemplary of this view: Erbakan’s West. the crusade mentality’of in ‘deep-rooted the grounded as was considered by token, same the conflict, Cyprus ontheCyprussince the question, in discourse the party’s her industrial development. make lead couldtheir Arab Turkey move disposal,countries the afastto and in remarkable integrationher rationalizes and West the with withintegration Turkey’s the de-rationalizes second The republic. Muslim world. For Erbakan,and threat representsthe Western values incompatible with mainprinciplesof the the with the crucialas acultural West the declares The first world. Muslim the towards andWest orientation strategic raw materialsworld. at Muslim the namely, ties, cultural and historical shehad countries with the marketcommon a establish hadto Turkey interests, national and sovereignty, independence, integrity, national Turkishness accordingthis to view: The below-quoted remark also shows how this spiritual loss would also lead to a loss of Ibid., 266. Ibid., 266. Ibid., 265. Ibid., 260. 400 This Community,which is composed of Christians andwhich putforward its inherent crusade The history shows usthatwhenever Turksdeparted from their national and spiritual identities, These two aspects of taking a stance against the Common Market were also employed theNSP,inFor tokeepaway order from such atragedy and defend hernational unity, be compatible with the history, culture, or faith ofnoble our nation. Undertaking such an assimilating uswithin Christians,determined in a manner until Day ofthe Judgment, cannot by identity and linking the history Muslim as Turkey a province great itself.to Supporting such amovement thataims at Turkey’s eradicate to aims question, Cyprus the with mentality money. into existence national and values declaring our lands,factories, andmines forsale but also converting our national and spiritual Fins,Khazars, and Hungarians. Therefore,joining the Common notdoesonly Marketmean they lost their Turkishness. The most obvious precedentof this is the current situation of Here we see a double discursive move to legitimize the disengagement from the legitimize disengagement the move to discursive Hereweseeadouble 401 402 Further delegitimizing the goal of integrating with the Western 123 399 CEU eTD Collection has participated in the inter-European institutions with asincereand arealist inalways inter-European has participated the “Sincespecial in governmentprogram,stated, emphasis the herestablishmentTurkey which policy, common the was ground defined in followingthe way: law”“adhering and andbeingobedientAtatürk’s to principles.” of rule the with governed state, theTurkish of characteristic secular and democratic, national, common denominator both of parties wasdescribed as“believing in wholeheartedly the In the first findNSP didnot inany representation place.program the governmentof it coalitions the took coalition government program, when it shared the power with the RPP, the as the Turkish Armed Forces. as the Turkish Armed 407 406 405 404 403 of as “the victory intervention Cyprus lineTurkey’s jihad’.view,Erbakan with defined asa‘national In represented this Turkey defend to identity her and existence, astheonly wasproposed foragainst EEC the of Market option an establishment Islamist and issue: the Cyprus ‘defendthe landsMuslim againstthe justCrusaders’. Hence, asthe along religious lines, but also ascribed a religious objective to Turkey’s policy on the EEC Ibid., 248. Cited inDa Ibid., 234. Ibid., 265. Ibid., 247. With these articulations that challenged the official view, the Islamist discourse of of the discourse Islamist view, the official the challenged that articulations With these In Turkey’snot only NSP’s sense,the this discourse constructed identity national Apart from this remark,principle. of this elements basic the Association Partnership with the EEC was also given a integrity, equity and non-interference in the internal policies of other states, and enhancing and cooperation within states, this framework.other Indeed,of policies internal the in non-interference and equity integrity, from ‘peace word’in the is respecting the main principles ofindependence, sovereignty, in the world’ is the basic principle which will preserveits value forever.What we understand inspired by the principlesofAtatürk. great For us,Atatürk’s proverb of ‘peace home,at peace As ithas beenwith all governmentsof the Republic, our foreign policy will continue to be as a whole, is strongly against such an attitude. attempt can only be done by whothose do not know the power of the national will. Ournation, ÷OÕ and Aktürk, 269. 405 our nation,” won by the efforts of the “jihadistbrothers” as well 407 404 124 Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus was similarly pact a sund servanda pact a 403 406 With regard to the foreign and the rule of law are the CEU eTD Collection 411 nation was in complete unity and solidarity.” trips to various cities in AnatoliaErbakan in followingthe way:“Right after the Cyprus victory, what weobserved from our from Izmir in the west to Hakkari by ithaving Turkey’s reconstituted ‘national path’; wasput and This unity’. these qualities, in the east was that our Nation.” Turkish the of “strength the in Cyprus ‘theintervention, crusadementality confronting of West’ forthe was a ‘real’ proof NSP’sthe nationalism and Islamism find could a‘real life value’. NSP, Forthe Turkey’s emphasis. negative direct any freedfrom hence in document, the were noted that mentalities’ ‘other of content spiritual values.” conflict with pursuitthe of honorable an andfree life” and destructive of“all material and sphere. Similarly, it did not build on the ‘democracy’ element that was peculiar to the official the to peculiar was that element ‘democracy’ the on build not did it Similarly, sphere. public the from Communism and Islamism away sweeping on emphasis official the involve and fascism, communism, that was spiritualism NSP’s the integrated that statement only The RPP. Ecevit’s include not did which Coalitions, Front National in the JP the of discourse capitalist confrontation NSPhadthe against Common the Market andall institutions. European other from absolutist the wasfar thisreflecting ‘reservation’ NSP’s protectionism. Yet, industrial whichdevelopment was inline with flexible RPP’s the position thesis and the national the prevent not would integration the that insure to necessary was it that stating 410 409 408 attitude.” Ibid., 370. Cited in Erbakan, Cited inDa Ibid., 249. other mentalities In this sense, Turkey’s 1974 Cyprus interventionIn theonly sense,Turkey’s 1974Cyprusconstituted this domain where Similarly, the NSP’s Islamism could not filter through the Westernist and pro- 408 This pro-European attitude was however counterbalanced with a cautious note with a cautious counterbalanced however attitude was This pro-European ÷OÕ and Aktürk, 338. Italics added. 409 Milli Görü Thus, Westernism Thus, and capitalism wereconfined within the obscure that were dependent on materialism had to be countered as they as “in they bewere countered hadto materialism on were dependent that ú , 375. 410 It was definitely against the West, hence on the ‘true 411 125 Yet, this construction of national unity did not CEU eTD Collection Kemalism, mainly, ‘reaching mainly, Kemalism, On the other hand, the parties level. governmental at the findrepresentation not they that did extent tothe marginalized wentwere beyond the military’s template(exceptfor the discourse of andthe NSP), anti-Westernist, added communist, andnew Islamist discourses points to the genuine Kemalism theirs represented argued that aseach party Kemalisms competing challenged by Whileforeign their counterparts. competing constructed policy discourses legitimized as complementary with the elements associated with Kemalism, each being intodiscourse its constituents allowednotice us to thatdiverging political views were it. official Openingthe composing discourses andtheparty governmental (official) discourse unity anddissolved a‘melting pot’ that any differences within country. the national of symbol the as Kemalism constituted discourse official the sense, this In elements. dominantKemalist discourse as followingthe programs government mainlybuilton samethe separatist views through Kemalism.We found that this template was reconstituted as the asthe itconsidered what and delegitimize policies its legitimize to itemployed elements the establishment, military the of discourse the examined first have We path. Atatürk’s following were grounded on elementsattributed to the issueCyprus Western/European-orientation and Conclusion ‘purification’. wasadeviationWest, Turkey’s andhence from amove ‘wrong path’ the towards Turkey’s intervention,Cyprus as represented a stance against thecrusade mentality of the sense, this herSelf. In secure to elements Western imperialist the sweepaway rather should theNSP, For roots the of civilizationthe were within hence, Turkishthe culture; Turkey ‘raisinglinked level discourse that the democracy to Turkey to Western civilization’. the of Despite this overtly stated allegiance, the official discourse involved a rift between between a involved the rift discourse allegiance, official the stated this overtly Despite As our discussionAs our foreignshowed, the policy articulations in1960-1979towards the beyond the level of the contemporary civilization’, and ‘building 126 CEU eTD Collection notapparent, at a time when the government was not formed by coalitions. The analysis of the Western-orientation issuepolicy articulations the Cyprus the diversity was the and when on foreign the structured how the elementsdiscussedexamine above is to ahead1970s. Thetask and fragmentation politics duringthe 1960s and extreme the Turkish the polarization of Cyprus policy and Turkey’s Western-orientation. output. We saw that it from Western-orientation Turkey’s and that Kemalism wasforeign a singleproduces policy rather a specific a ‘deviation’ constitutes Cyprusintervention further views that the problematizing picture, interpretation of KemalismHence deconstructing the unity of the foreign policy discoursethat revealed a more complex reconciledeach toother. asopposed policies both situate may beusedto template same exactly the the that may betrue, opposite the that suggested discourses NAP’s NSP’s and analysis of the the hand, other the On Western-orientation. the against situated be it could nor orientation Western- Turkey’s of extension adirect as seen be intervention Cyprus the could neither that showed issue Cyprus the and Western-orientation the linkbetween a direct of absence rationalist elements and ideational the to attached each policies, associated both between link indirect an constructed with the that elementstemplate discursive a triangular revealed ofThis pursuing objectives. policy foreign rationalist a Kemalist foreign policy.relation The to these policies and that Kemalism was associated with bothin ideational employed were and explanations ideationalist and rationalist both that showed orientation of Kemalism and legitimized their articulations on Cyprusthe issueand Western-the policies. their legitimize to claiming while template same the on built discourses marginalized even however, the made its political leaders of elements, wasindeedthe what1970s participatory It can be argued that such It canbe is argued that a diversifiedsurprising picture not given the Focusing eachof definedhow governmental on the elements the constituent discourse democracy at home and spreading it beyond’. The Kemalism of ithome 1960sand beyond’. of TheKemalism andspreading at the democracy 127 CEU eTD Collection government towards these events. these towards government the elements how of analysis is an follows what In organization. in the membership full for applied Turkey of KemalismCyprus intoissue anindirect turned condition for Turkey’s membership and inthe EEC when structured a military andfollowedcoup bya single party Thisgovernment. wasalso the time when the the responsespolitical discourse during the 1980s serves thisgoalbyfocusing on a period which began with of the military establishment and the 128 CEU eTD Collection Protocol Cyprus refusedthe issue. tosign Greece andFinancial insisted on blocking Fourth the whichwaslinkedto wasalsothe ‘Greecefactor’ there barriers, andpolitical economic these independence bythe TRNC inbeing1983 andTurkey’s and the first the onlycountry to Cyprus issueinto an indirect condition for Turkey’smembership in EEC. the rejectedCommission’s report membership Turkey’s that for in application 1987. in wasannounced the human in democracy,which and development, Turkey rights economic being normalized,far from they civilianwere rule, the to backuponTurkey’stransition relations wererestored as there was still block Fourth the Financial European the Protocol.Commission (EC)tosigning dissatisfaction democraticon regime in Turkey,the the relations with the EEC came to afreeze uponpart the decision of of the EC with the level of domestic Turkey. for foreign and policy consequences both had which years three for lasted that rule military the beginning country, whole the of Introduction also Çelik, 20, 1989,SEC (89) 2290 final/2, (accessed January 14, 2008).See Communities, European ofthe SeeCommission EEC. the to membership onTurkey’s impact a negative had Cyprus 416 Prospects Turkey. to released been have would Units Currency 414 European million 600 signed, been Protocol this Had (accessed1, March 2007). 413 181-84. see Ahmad, democracy, restore to 412 (accessed January 14, 2008). See also Çelik, Community, Brussels, December20, 1989, SEC (89) 2290 final/2, settlement of the Cyprus dispute. See Bölükba See dispute. Cyprus of the settlement 415 Indeed, theCommission’s Opinion published in 1989 asserted thatthe unresolved conflict with Greece over Communities, European of the Commission See Forfurther informationon the undemocratic policies undertaken during this period despite the oft-stated ideal In addition, Greek lobbies also insisted that Turkey’s membership could be considered only afterthe Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession What complicated the matters even more was the unilateral declaration of declaration was theunilateral more even matters the complicated What In 1980, the senior officials of the Turkish Armed Forces assumed the administration the assumed Forces Armed Turkish the of officials senior the 1980, In , ed. Clement H. Dodd (Wistow, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1992), 47. 415 Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy until werewithdrawn until troops from Turkish the Cyprus, asituation the turned that C Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community HAPTER V K IV: EMALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy úÕ Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the , “The Turco-Greek Dispute”, in Dispute”, Turco-Greek “The , , 109. 129 412 Following the collapse of the of collapse the Following Turkish Foreign Policy: New , 105. , Brussels, December , Brussels, 1980 416 , 413 S 414 While the Besides CEU eTD Collection Fakültesi Yay 417 action illegalas butalso demanded of the fromwithdrawal Turkish troops island.the notonly declared Turkey’s Council UNSecurity the 541 of recognize it. The Resolution that interpreted the main pillars of Kemalism differently. While a more defensive approach to approach While amore defensive the mainKemalism interpreted that pillars of differently. and 2)this divergence wasgroundedin provided elements the by individual the discourses issue, the West and the Cyprus towards approaches narrative diverse involved show, 1)this will following analysis asthe However, in theworld’. home peace of ‘peace at principle that legitimized the positionÖzal Turgut and President the Evren during this period. towardsand party programs the Westof andfocus civilian wewill era(1983-1989) government tothe the on government. Later turn the Motherland and the Party of military-supervised the program andthe declarations, military Kenan Evren, Head of state Cyprusand the public issue speechesby (1980-1983) focusing on publicthe speeches of Chiefthe of Military the and the Staff byof therecourse era Primemilitary in the discourse the examine first will we Ministeraim, this In in approaches. differences to the with cherished Cyprus integrated the albeit that Western-orientation, policy within Turkey’s Kemalism of it is interpretation that contention explore the aspecific to elements constituent its into Kemalism of their representation authority, deconstruct and state the representing linkingemployed focus policies? of Thischapterwill in units these on discourse the the were Kemalism of elements which least, the not but last And narrative? consistent one in and discourse Was issue? Western-orientation there Cyprus indeedthe the relation to only policy foreign Turkish the structure Kemalism did how scene, political the from purged membership in the EEC. sense, prolongation the in resolution of the a seriousTurkey’s conflictthe barrier posed to Faruk Sönmezo Between the specified dates, the government programs contained a single narrative governmentprograms contained asingle dates,the Between specified the ideaswere ‘radical’ a timethe when At chapter: present the of question(s) Hence the ÕQÕ , 1991), 115-130. ÷lu, Taraflar Õ n Tutum ve Tezleri Aç ÕVÕ 130 ndan K Õ br Õ s Sorunu (1945-1986) (Istanbul: ø .Ü. 417 øktisat In this CEU eTD Collection 418 state. of head the became Evren Kenan General while coup, the parliament. The new cabinet was led by Bülent Ulusu, an admiral, who had retired just beforeprofessors, and officers, retired excludingall place politicians whotook in previous the ofbureaucrats, composed a cabinet to authority executive the delegated intervention, military coup. Shortly after duringpolitical discourse the the 1960s, 1970s.a ‘restoration’ with this Similar to came the coup, the National Security Council (NSC), set up after the 4.1.1. Kemalism froma‘battle-zone’ a‘buffer-zone’ to 4.1. Themilitary era (1980-1983) chain. discursive this of blocks building main the identify will discussion following The foreign policy’. and‘active cooperation’ andeconomic development Kemalismmainly, during thisperiod, ‘peaceathome,peace intheworldsustainable through into introduced were points nodal new that be seen will it addition, In others. over Kemalism of rationalistic attributes the Cyprusby issueelevating to the wasmadepossible approach Kemalism paralleled seeingTurkey’s Cyprus policy as a ‘national cause’, amore conciliatory reconstituted by program reconstituted the of government. Ulusu’s the of and by establishmentearly military attempts the hegemonic 1980s wasdominated the beingthe of discourse becomenarrative challenged. Hencethepolitical dominantwithout the would declaredwhat it that secured new administration the from or press, the parliament Ahmad, 183. The 1980s began with a singlenarrative Kemalist which ended the polarization of the enmity against Atatürk by deviating from Kemalist principles. who, unfortunates for the of those sake of their attempts interests, aimed disastrous the at disintegrating impeded again theonce country has and Forces even Armed creating Turkish 131 418 With no opposition in the in opposition no With —Kenan Evren, 1980 CEU eTD Collection 12 Eylül 1981) 424 (accessed March 2, 2007). Council, 420 423 422 421 Council, 1982), 221. following: conditions? questionthe Respondingto of Atatürk’s guidance do the principles. with of all-necessary the restructuring political governmentreconstituted this template, stating that the primary duty of the governmentwas to Kemalism. from would betaken only thatthe guidance administration announced 12 Eylül 1981 order.” democratic the functioning of authority restore nationaland unity and togetherness, avert apossible civil war and fratricide, reestablish the existence of the [s]tate, and eliminate all factors that prevent the normal 419 administration of the country. the over took and Republic protect andsafeguardthe to tothem granted power invoked the Forces Armedthe he where declaredthat radioand television, over Kenan broadcast Evren, Kemalism. civil strife in 1970s the due which was to promotion the “warped”of ideologies of instead Cited in Cited Ibid., 17. The English version of the document can be found in General Secretariat of the National Security Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Ibid., 296. Cited in General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 221-22, 296. Cited in Cited sense, there is no need redefine to Atatürk’s principles. the private sector cannot accomplish. Similarly,his nationalism was notdogmatic. In this Atatürk’s view of statism was not strict but a soft statism. That is why the state should do what and statism are still applicable today. were They howeverdistorted before September 12. [Atatürk’s] six principlesof republicanism,nationalism, populism, revolutionism, secularism Why tobe was Kemalismconsidered so crucial for coping with present the The military narrative started on September 12, 1980, with the statement of of with General 1980, on September statement 12, the started narrative The military 12 September inTurkey: Before and After Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Ba Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Ba 420 (Ankara: Ba , 241. Hence, the aim of the operation was to “preserve the integrity of the country, ú bakanlÕ Ulusu Hükümeti Program k BasÕ 419 This was, asunderlinedinEvren’s because of speech, the mevi,1981), 17. ú ú kan kan Õ Õ Orgeneral Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980- Orgeneral Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980- 421 (Ankara: General Secretariat of the National Security National of the Secretariat General (Ankara: Similarly, in towards striving these aims, the Financial Times 132 Õ , Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 424 in 1981, Kenan Evren said the said Evren Kenan in 1981, 422 423 Ulusu’s CEU eTD Collection 427 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981) 426 178. see Ahmad, economy, Turkish onthe reforms of these effects immediate 425 would it contradictory however interpretation, new any that mean not did this Yet, ideology. this of renewal a continual meant which revolutionism, of principle the from came Evren, consensual ideology as opposed to the ‘foreign’ ideologies. This inherent flexibility, for line: in this is also statement following The principles. Atatürk’s of essence real from the acleardeviation represented establishment, for the which, interpretation fromKemalism of diverged and delegitimized the Kemalism(s) of 1970s, the military’s the how showed also statement Evren’s circumstances, changing the to suitability emphasizing non-dogmaticof the Kemalismcharacter and hence its applicability and principlesthe independence’, ‘national of ‘national ‘modernism’.sovereignty’ and also but principles’, ‘six the involve merely not did Kemalism of restoration the conferences, in press speechesand his public As ignoredreiterated Evren nevertheless. was not innot wereprinciples need still of An and were emphasis applicable. redefinition additional present definition to whatlink move to the rather than This discursive static. character hadideology adynamic that was assumedmoderate a as Kemalism tointroduce to beserved also dogmatic the not was nationalism ‘original’Atatürk’s that Kemalism underlinedstatism perhaps the was only arguestatismway to thatreasonable wasstill applicable. Stating that these late 1970sandeconomic of crisis following the IMFausterity package, Ibid., 120-21. See, for example, for See, Thestructural adjustment program with IMF the was signed before the coup,on January 24, 1980.On the Here too, we see how Kemalism was presented as an inherently innovativewe see and Kemalism presented asaninherently Here too, how was Kemalism at all, or consciously distorting and exploiting it for sheer interests. the sensitive balance among his principles. Such an eitherattempt means not comprehending characteristic [of Kemalism] does not allow it to be pulled to the extreme rightor left, due to development that ispositive suitableand for the social structure. On the other hand, this development, such as communism, fascism,[N]azism,he and it set free to any new constrained withinnarrow and frame.a strict In contrast to regimesthe thatreject change and Atatürk, by including the principle of revolutionism,has protected his philosophy from being after the out measures carried theeconomic liberalization of background Againstthe Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Ba , 118-120. ú kan 133 Õ Orgeneral Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 425 a softer version of 427 426 Besides CEU eTD Collection civilization as prescribed byKemalism. as prescribed civilization future.the This in uniting society requiredonce again reaching the the the aim of level of Kemalism. Basedonthisview, democracy could be its for in suspended secure functioning considereddemocracy also avaluebeas interpretations defended toof totalitarian against aspects of Kemalism, any other interpretation, for the military, remained ‘obstructionist.’ impartial power and represented the ‘genuine’ Kemalism. the ‘genuine’ andrepresented impartial power only was the military the factthat tothe due civilization’ level contemporary of the to the could that ‘unite’ ‘raise Turkey power militaryand only asthe This the paralleled presenting Turkishthe society,could nor they level the Turkey raise to contemporary the of civilization. unite they could Neither Kemalism. of objectives main the against principally as Kemalism of rightist interpretationmodes ofthought’, anyleftist or military the considered establishment and 1970s. the discursive by moves undertaken werealso that military the establishmentduring the 1960s and interventioncoup the military involved1971. Thiscircularof three reproduction also 1960’s legitimize the were usedto that elements the reconstituted of 1980s the establishment 429 428 contemporary civilization’ and statuswithin havinga respected it. the of level the ‘reaching was objective long-term the while inside’, ‘enemy the with objectives of Atatürk’s revolutions. The short-term objective of the revolutions was struggling long-term the and short the involved mainly speech, same in the stated as balance, This interpretation. their of limits the secured Evren, for principles, the among balance sensitive be could of The be revolutionism. viatheprinciple affirmed arrows’, with ‘foundational the Ibid., 25. Ibid., 119-121. Second, similar to Second, similar 1960’smilitary the the1980’s to military establishment, authorities First, in underlining that the military regime was principally against the ‘extreme the against principally was regime military the that in underlining First, 134 429 Hence, without these linear these without Hence, 428 In this sense, the military CEU eTD Collection (accessed March 2, 2007). 433 432 431 amendment on the following clauses: following the on amendment bases of the the forth Constitution set which Preamble The as irrevocable. 2 inArticle Republic of the characteristics main declared the taken which were precautions thisobstruct path, constitutional was also tied battle-zone. pre-coup getthe of out panacea to to Article 2, guidancethereby for ‘reaching thelevel of the contemporary civilization’, Kemalism would serve as a removingcountry. anythe to threats against struggle’ possibility‘national the in umbrella ideological legitimate only the of in sense: this illustrative Meclisi, guided by Atatürk principles, Atatürk nationalism, national consciousness and ideals. See Türkiye Büyük Milletbefore the military coup to the fact that the young generation was left with ‘foreign’ ideologies instead of being 430 principles.”as the“degeneration Atatürk’s of wasrepresented instigated coup the that main for conditions main the the reason coup, to the obstructionism. than Indeed, rather economicprioritizing the political and conditions leading totalitarianism, itany from deviation accused wasdirectly fostering of fratricide, division, and See Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Ibid., 230. ix. Council, Security National of the Secretariat in General Cited Ibid., 389. This was restated in theprogram of Ulusu the government which linked chaoticthe situation Ulusu Hükümeti Program accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility the of principle the interests, national Turkish to contrary activity an to accorded indivisible unity of the Turkish state, embodies . . [t]he recognition that no protection shall Constitution, whichbe affirms eternalexistence the of Turkishthe nation motherlandand and the founder of the of Republic Turkey,Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this In line with conceptthe of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the as Kemalism considered administration military 1980’s the indicates, statement this As September1980 operation 12, throughout the country. It was those great deviations from path this necessitatedthat theimplementation of the modern, civilized, healthy, consistent,are humane and stable notstate administration the country. If Atatürk’saccepted principlesto function arenot followed faithfully and conscientiously, . . and. . if these basic principleswere strayed from, fratricidal movements and separatist began to emerge in as theTurkish Atatürk Republic. principles ofare The the cornerstone ofthis structure. When these basicThe Ataturkist pillars pattern of thought, and the proper pride in being ofa Turk, lies at thethe heart of the Turkish Republic, it will be impossible for a Third, because Kemalism united the society and secessionism, anarchy, against because Kemalismunited society the Third, 432 Inthis sense, by people the uniting Atatürk’s nationalism, around and giving Õ , (accessed March 2, 2007). Ulusu Hükümeti Program 135 430 433 The following remark of Kenan Evren is Evren Kenan of remark following The To prevent any future sinister attempts to Õ , 431 CEU eTD Collection Information, (accessed Februaryand 2007). ofPress 23, General Directorate Minister, Prime the of of Office Turkey,” Republic ofthe Constitution 434 line Kemalism thatwould‘peace conform atto maximhome,andin Atatürk’s of peacethe principle the world’ in at home, peace the ‘peace of elements the Reconstituting 4.1.2.1. policy being one. Below are mainthe building blocks of foreignthis policy template. foreign matters’, ‘domesticinterfere inTurkey’s theWestnoted should that it further not was the Western-orientation was taken as unquestionable and as an extension of Atatürk’s reforms,Whereas other. the on Turkey’ of sovereignty national the threatened that ally untrustworthy the presentationthem within the principle of ‘peace at home, peacein the world’. Added to these elements was integrating by sphere policy offoreign the on elements these of the projection the involved mainly West as a ‘symbol of civilization’4.1.2. Kemalism andforeign policyduring military the era on world’. the the one hand,democracy, ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’,and and ‘peace at home, peace in as ‘an nationalthe interests, national independence, sovereignty and integrity,modernism, represented the inherent goals of the foundational ‘six arrows’. These were, mainly, defending they as attention special given were reforms Atatürk’s of objectives the and Kemalism coalitions ‘side-principles’of establishment in1960sandand the subsequent 1970s.The military earlier the by employed elements the of a restatement rather but Kemalism; Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, “Preamble,” under “The under “Preamble,” Information, and of Press General Directorate Minister, Prime the of Office In its conduct of In its administrationforeign pursue a conduct of newmilitary policy, the to promised The pursuitforeign in principles Kemalist establishment’s the policy conducting of of reinterpretation a radical present not did establishment military the Hence, are united in . . . the desire for and belief in ‘[p]eace at home, peaceor in the values world’. the moral nationalism, and principles, historical reformsTurkish and modernism territory, and of Atatürk state its with . . Turkey of existence of the 136 and that all Turkish citizens Turkish all that and 434 CEU eTD Collection communal talks.” communal inter- of process the communities through and two the of theleaders between reached resolution issuebeof Cyprusthe had found to of “within theframework agreements the in linewith principlethe of‘looking for apeaceful forsolution international the disputes’, possible.” way in every peace regional and world the to “contribute and and aggression which couldbe directedagainst Turkey, her territorial national integrity,”and “stand threat againstany would to Turkey continue independenceTurkish of Republic, the ‘equality of rights’ as embodied in the UN Charter. andthe in affairs’, domestic ‘non-interference for integrity’, territorial ‘respect ‘sovereignty’, 440 439 438 437 436 435 interest. ahumanitarian with means legal and peaceful forbuta humanitarian Turkey, legal resolve issuewhich and asoughtto Turkey through side.from other the alsoexpected was initiative similar anda attempts community hadmade that TurkishCypriot the constructive declared that principles From East. lineforeign policy, of resolution this issuedepended Cyprus onthe the of the of ‘reciprocity’, takingties in sidesin whileavoiding with neighboring countries the conflicts the Middle the her strengthen to continue and EEC, in the membership full for ‘equity’strive in NATO, membership and traditional of course foreignthe sofar.policy pursued ‘respect for past agreements’.period.and present the era Atatürk’s continuity implemented between policy during oft-stated the Itreconstituted the was repetitively world’. Ibid., 300. Ibid., 364. Ibid., 362-63. Ibidem. Ibid., 299. 298. Council, Security National of the Secretariat in General Cited 435 In this sense, the new administration did not suggest any change in the line of lineof the suggest anychange inthe not did newadministration the sense, In this As clarified later, this line meant adhering to the principles of ‘independence’, of principles the to line meantadhering this later, As clarified 440 From From this theCyprusperspective, issue not a nationalwas security issue 137 436 Hence, just as it was immediately just Hence, asit after was immediately 439 Furthermore, for the establishment, 438 Turkey would adhere to her to Turkey would adhere 437 This articulation CEU eTD Collection 445 444 443 442 441 activities. their ignored simply or in Turkey, objectives,” and ideological accomplish in“diving to historical countries order Turkey anddisintegrating at aimed their line despite of Turkey’sthought, most ‘sincere’ toestablish efforts peaceful some relations, constructs the Turkish identity as pacifist and respectful internationalto law.According tothis West theimperialist of policy’ and swallow dismember, the ‘divide, Kemalism against through Domestic unity 4.1.2.2. on being strong and unified as a state and andon being society,strong unifiedasastate national sovereignty and Atatürk’s principles and reforms, and principles Atatürk’s and sovereignty national struggle, the national for consciousness in developing world’, home, peace the ‘peace at Evren: of Kenan statement following Consider the a foreign into problem. turned that policy threats Kemalism’sin role integrating the sphere anddomestic ideological countering the foreign reconstituted discourse this as‘foreign’, Kemalism than other ideologies the considered insteadforeign of ideologies ‘hostileof powers’. In itthat viewed ‘outside’the as hostile and Cited in General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 302. Council, Security National of the Secretariat in General Cited Ibid., 398. Ibid., 402. Ibidem. Ibid., 393. In representing the ‘outside’ in statementnegative terms, theof above-quoted Evren Turkey. in ofterrorism spread sincere behaviors from some countries, but it has also been proven that they even assisted thefriendly relationswith all countries. However, not only that she could not receive the same home, peace in the world, has accepted it as the main pillar of her foreign policy to continueTurkey, being faithful to Atatürk’s principles of freedom, secularism, democracy, and peace at ideology! of the sort: The ‘Kemalism’, the ideology of our Great Leader Atatürk. Indoctrinate this with ‘isms’. Weknow ideologies, them well. very If adoctrine with certain an ‘ism’ is necessary, there with is already one you indoctrinate to like would nowadays people Many Friends! 445 441 while others either hosted hosted eitherterrorist organizations whileothers that operated 442 138 Thefor solution, establishment, the depended 443 “remaining loyal to the principle of principle the to loyal “remaining 444 and finally,pursuing Kemalism, —Kenan Evren, 1981 CEU eTD Collection dragged into domestic conflicts and civil war. In his book, Evren refers to Spicer’s comments as ‘revealing’. as comments Spicer’s to refers Evren book, In his war. civil and conflicts domestic into dragged opinion that12September was the most distressing day somefor inthe West who hoped thatTurkey would be Committee. In his speech, whichwas published in the daily 78. Here Evren quotes James Spicer, who was then the Head of Turkey-United Kingdom Joint Parliamentary 450 12 Eylül 1981) employedinvolved also dismemberingfrom the pactsshe Turkey was apartof. Turkey. in regime fascistic theocratic and acommunist, establishing and terrorism,spreading 449 448 447 446 some todismember Turkey from her goal integratingof with West. the of plans the and Turkey to threats unconventional confront to shield ideological an and policy foreign realistic and apeaceful implementing for as abase both wasreconstructed Kemalism wholeheartedly neither which West in the ‘some’ of plans sinister the against blow a major threw supported democracy. flank of and NATO weaken theSouthern to NATO, ‘some’that in aswell the West, the hoped for acivil as Union Soviet inwar in Turkey order nor believed Drawing imageit on Independence War(1919-1923) the was of ‘imperial the West’, stated in democracy. anti-Westernism. recourse to some without Western countries to used inrelation was also In this regard, the role of unconventional aimedpolicies that “divide, to dismember and swallow” the also but territory, Turkey’s to threats security traditional the only not confront to shield Turkey’s foreign inAccordingpolicy general. tothis lineof Kemalismthought, served asa See Evren, Cited in Cited Ibid., 303. Ibid., 321. Ibidem. For the military establishment, the new ideological warfare the enemies of Turkey the is politics this thatAnd our enemies attempt to implement. country. ofthe occupation the for need no be would there then own its with ideology, accordance in is that shape a into transformed is country the of administration countriesnowadays are forced to collapse from within bymeansof If wars. civil the of type Dear friends, the world is changing so rapidly that the styles of war also change . . . . The The call for national unity through Kemalism was also reverberated in approaches to 447 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Ba In this vein, Evren stated: 12 Eylül’den Önce Ne Demi , 392. ú ú lerdi, Ne Dediler, Ne Diyorlar kan Õ Orgeneral Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980- 139 Hürriyet 448 on 9 October1984, Spicerexpresses his 450 Based onthis view, 1980’scoup (Istanbul: Ad Yay Õ nc 446 ÕOÕ 449 k, 1997), 276- Turkey Turkey by This frame This CEU eTD Collection 453 452 12 Eylül 1981) 451 more explicitly: this approach reforms. Atatürk’s of as aresult but embraced identity, imposedTurkey’s inherent as Westernist democracy Turkish not by was West, the model European while her againon democracyof emphasis the for development, remained exploitation. againsteconomic but capital theWestern he not werecited whereheclaimed was statements legacy of principlesAtatürk’s of democracy andmodernization. Atatürk’s In context, this West the natural by imposed of own project, butwasaresultdevelopmental Turkey’s the well as in cultural and political terms. This showed that Turkey’s Western-orientation was not to this approach, Turkey’s place in the global community is the West, both in economic as statement of Evren: following the Consider project. unchangeable and an of Republic base butthe the objective, a pragmatic andtemporary wasnot Europe, West, andespecially of the becoming apart establishment, the For West. the with integration and cooperation further of favor in also was ‘West’ the regarding general position Turkey, administration’s disintegrate the some to the Western-orientation and Kemalism, non-submission, 4.1.2.3. See ibid., 263, 30. See ibid Cited in Cited it suits Turkey and the Turkish nation best. Atatürk had said that the best system that would fit Turkey will herrealize transition democracy to not because the West wants it so, butbecause West. According of beingapart the Kemalism with association of Here weseeadirect Turkey. with begins border economic and political areas. One should not ignore the fact that theWestern democracies’ Turkey ascribesregard, greatIn this importance Republic. to heryoung socialour of and culturalbase relations permanent with the been Europehas as wellmatter as those This in West. main objectives the of One Europe. with relations her to importance grave a given always of has Turkey the Turkish Nation, which embraced Atatürk’s principles, is to be a part of the plansof the to West’ in relation ‘imperialist the of image the of invocation its Despite ., Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Ba 235. , 267. 452 Similarly, it was repetitively underlined that Turkey adopted Western- the Turkey adopted that underlined repetitively itwas Similarly, 451 ú kan Õ Orgeneral Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980- 140 453 The following statement by Evren illustrates Evren by statement following The CEU eTD Collection 456 455 454 in if even interfered issue. interference, In thisit the countries’ sense,any‘foreign’ ‘European linkedit it to indirectly asthe from was held Western-orientation, separate Turkey’s Turkey’s factthe was Cypruspolicy Turkey’s that links.In this sense, despite disruptalliance could also init,lead ‘unintendedthat interfere consequences’ asanyintervention to could Turkey. Consider thefollowing of remarks Evren: in situation war acivil or spur secessionism could that interferences international domestic or no were asthere long best’ her as and ‘suited ally as this Western afaithful and democratic, terms of the motto: ‘peace at home, peace in the world’. Hence, Turkey would continue to be was integrated into theKemalistforeign in whichhad policy been traditionally understood Westernism way, as this In ‘domestic’. represented was Western-orientation originthe the of economic, and militarypolitical, Turkey’s alliance establishment, the For subservient. was that witha Westernism to theopposed West did not mean ‘selling Turkey to thedefensive emphasis on independentTurkey’s stance and hernon-submissive identity as West’, as statement: following the made Evren vein, this In policy. foreign Kemalist allying with Westthe did notmeanloosing Turkey’s full-independence, orbeing the against Ibid., 241. Ibid., 64. Ibid., 300. According tothis theWest line of thought, hadtotrustTurkey’s Cyprus policy not and consequences. unintended to led operation Cyprus the of aftermath the in embargo American obstruct every stepwe thispursue, will not producegood results. You have how seen the Our transition to democracy will be much faster if our European friends support us. But if they Thus, pro-integrationist the of discourse military the involvedestablishmentalso a to security our is why that NATO; we entered NATO. linked we why is That alliance. that to oneself selling mean not does alliance independent; however,he established the Balkan and Pact, the later Sadabat Pact. Toget inan Full-independence does notmean non-alliance . [Atatürk] made his country fully Turkey’sline. membership NATOwasalso in sense, represented Inthis a similarto him, we will do our best for his wishes to come true. Turkeydemocracy. was Becausewe hisare childrenand we have taken over duty from the 456 455 141 454 CEU eTD Collection military era and also had been one of the designers of the economic stabilization program of 24 January 1980 January of24 program launched by Demirel government before stabilization the coup (Ahmad 1993, 183). economic of the designers ofthe one been had also and era military 457 involved in foreign policy. actively were both contrary, the on but office; presidency the assumed they when figure president, andbetweenlater as 1993.Neither into ableak a president and them of turned 1989 role firstas aprime minister between 1983 and1989 during which Kenan Evren was the RPP. democratic thesocial as justice social the respected and even NSP asthe traditionalist NAP, asthe nationalist JP, as the liberal and was hence conservative power. It to thatcame previous parties been bythe had propagated that merged the principles dissolved by the coup; yet, following the unification campaign of the military establishment, it was party that other of any it acontinuation was not in that sense the The MPwasnew, which inÖzal’s Motherlanda (MP), party era. post-military the Party was established newly 4.2. Thecivilian diplomacy and the Özal-Evren era(1983-1989) stance. anti-Westernist taking an without identity anon-submissive of construction the helped other, the on ‘sovereignty’ and Westernism and democracy on the one hand and Kemalism, ‘non-interference’, ‘reciprocity’, inalso Thelink expressedbetweenissue. Kemalism, approaching drawn Cyprusthe was policy foreign Kemalist the elementof asan represented was Turkey which of character non-submissive the wasdomestic. regard, this In theprocess,of which facilitate source would foreign butbecause support forwas needed democratization, because theWest otherhand,the by if Turkey,supported would West, the faster, be notdemocratized much further. much On by Turkey result anopposite distancing form,a desired produce would to was with anintention by bringing strengthen undertaken her alliancelinks to actions Turkey’s Ahmad, 192. Indeed, there was also a personal continuity, as Özal was the deputy prime minister during the The 1983 elections marked the beginning of the civilian rule and the success of The markedthebeginningTurgut andthesuccessof of 1983 elections rule civilian the 142 457 Özal played a leading a played Özal CEU eTD Collection 459 (accessed March 2, 2007). 458 had been preoccupationthe of military the butrather,establishment; ‘national will’. Thisnot which threats ideological focus on not did MP the Similarly, all times. be securedat to needed a condition it as butthat in didsee democracy future merely a goal bethat to the not attained need toendsimilar suspensions. for a in employed arguing elements these MPalso the and democracy, integrity, sovereignty of principles tothe by recourse indemocracy intermissions legitimized establishment principles. from Atatürk’s no was divergence there that proof main the as it presented and era civilian the to transition the legitimize to nation’ country. the of indivisibility the and nation Turkish the of independence and integrity the of respectful it was nationalism Atatürk’s and that faithful to nationalism thatthe party’s was underlined program government’s new The policies. its legitimize to principles Atatürk’s to recourse nation’ 4.2.1. The Motherland Party’s moves to claim‘sovereignty legitimacy: belongstothe time. examineforeign employedin to turn during discourse the Evren’s same policy the template we will later clearer, Özal rationalism of economic the and Evren of defensive approach the between divide the make to aim an In Kemalism. of elements the to recourse by Özal of that mainly and MP the of discourse the in articulated were policy’ ‘Cyprus the and orientation’ ‘Western- policy’, ‘active how of discussion the by followed be will This Kemalism. to legitimized in the party and government programs of the MP and which nodal points were tied Ibid. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Yet, thatmilitary ofin Yet, MP’s establishmentthe view from diverged democracy the on it however, Kemalist as openly did have The party; itself declare a MP didnot In what follows is the examination of how the transition to the civilian era was 458 It referred to Atatürk’s maxim of ‘sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the I. Özal Hükümeti Program 143 Õ , Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 459 In this way,just as the military CEU eTD Collection interests over the relative power and security of of Turkey security and power relative overthe interests economic the itelevated in that establishment military the of articulations the from diverged MP’sdiscourse the new; however, wasnot of Turkey interests national the defend should national interests in conductingforeignIndeed, foreign policy. the argument policy that rationalist andactive foreign policy 4.2.2. Putting the ‘national interests’ onthe front: Kemalism as a pursuit of a realist, itlinking will tothe of nationthe govern, to rather beingthan supervised. realization of the principle of sovereignty but also reconstituted the element of sovereignty by highlight only undemocraticestablishserved to that means to delayed democracy the based arguments are not necessarily exempt from an ideological ideological from discourse. an exempt arenotnecessarily arguments based interest- andhow arerationalized ideologies how is of exemplary discourse mainly Özal’s reconstituting the Kemalistforeign policy as realist and rationalist. In this sense, the MP’s and thereby discourse, Kemalist the into policy this of translation a corollary involved conciliatory to conciliatory approach Cyprusthe issue could also belegitimized via samethe elements. amore how reveals anddefined ordered were elements way these the makers. However, by employed policy MP’s aswasusedthe template previous the the sameKemalist discourse below, As in beseen turn. will toKemalism characteristics attributing these change, thereby Atatürk’s policies. In itvacillated sense,this between representing continuity and initiating intointroduced Turkishforeign the policy by recourse tothe Kemalist principles and foreign policy needed to be abandoned. Yet, the MP also sought to legitimize the ‘novelty’ it The MP’s emphasis on nationalism and national sovereignty paralleled an emphasis on After coming topower, the MP stated that the 144 status-quo vis-à-vis approaches toTurkish other countries. This CEU eTD Collection (accessed March 2, 2007). 463 (accessed March 2, 2007). center, her Western-orientation and relations with the countries in the Middle East did not did East in Middle the countries the with relations and her Western-orientation center, with the Muslim world. For the MP, so long as andEurope, full seeking in membership status EEC. the Turkey’s national interestsmain focus of Turkey while strengthening heralliance links with U.S.andthe the Western were put at thewere in power before, the MP underlined that the balance of interests and equity should be the sameto the Similarelements. previous tothe governmentsandmilitary that the establishment reciprocal basis. reciprocal servanda of and principles shewasapartof, respectthe member organizations the of contribute regionalto the and andsecurity worldby peace astheremaining trustworthy Atatürk. in approach’ world of the home, peace at following ‘peace of motto underthe president, the was Özal when Özal from 462 (accessed March 2, 2007). 461 (accessed March 2, 2007). 460 <Õ countries. other the with relations and peaceful interest the traditional Kemalist foreign policy, which it described as theworld’ in athome,peace ‘peace advancing foreign policy: the traditional Pursuing 4.2.2.1. the pursuit of the national Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Ibid., and Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, ld ÕUÕ m Akbulut (1989-1991) andm AkbulutYÕ Mesut These elements were also present in the MP’s articulations on Turkey’s cooperation As the above-quoted remark notes, in its foreign policy too, the MP claimed tofollow nation. our for forward it advance and policy, foreign Ataturkist traditional our Our government is determined to pursue Turkey’s rights and high interests with adherence to , territorial integrity, independence and non-interference in domestic affairs on a affairs indomestic on andnon-interference independence integrity, , territorial 462 Inits propagation for Turkey’s Western-orientation, too, the MP referred I. Akbulut Hükümeti Program I. Özal Hükümeti Program I. Özal Hükümeti Program 461 I. Y According this Turkey approach, to continue to would Õ lmaz Hükümeti Program 145 lmaz (1991), who took (1991), wholmaz took Primeover the Ministry Õ Õ , , —The Program of the Motherland Party, 1983 Party, Motherland ofthe Program —The Õ, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 460 463 This propagatedby policy later was Õ , Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, pacta sund CEU eTD Collection March 2, 2007). Büyük Millet Meclisi, Hükümeti Program Meclisi, Millet Büyük SeeTürkiye world’. the in peace home, at of‘peace maxim Atatürk’s and and later by Mesut Y by Mesut later and 468 ve Tezleri Aç the ‘Preliminary Draft’ which was a precondition for signing the agreement. See Sönmezo See agreement. the signing for precondition a was which Draft’ ‘Preliminary the from be removed would troops the island. foreign the This that was signed by condition the the Presidentincluded ofwhich the TRNC,1986, whileMarch of 29 the Cyprus Draft GovernmentAgreement refused to approve on (accessed March 2, 2007). Here it is referred to the Framework 467 466 465 464 on the basis of equity and reciprocity. community”Turkish Cypriot byfollowing hertraditional policy seekingof solutions peaceful Hence, Turkey would “continue guaranteeto and protect the life and the property safety of the itproof that was from Turkish not the side thatescaped of problem.the settlementthe was a UN the of supervision the under solution seek afederal to TRNC of the acceptance the in federal state. form of reachingthe a unified asettlement to obstacle didtheirstatus years; however, forindependent existence twenty in their not any way an pose against andattacks violation of the rights their declare dueto independence were obliged to on self-determination the of rights Turkishthe For Cypriots. MP,theTurkishthe Cypriots effective. Islam world, and thatthe and West the thesebetween bridge a as serve efforts to order in countries Eastern should Middle the with be met with reciprocal actions on bothworld’ principle. sides to be the Middle East was seen complementary to the realization of the ‘peace at home, peace in the and West the both with ties close maintaining contrary, the On exclusive. mutually be to need Ibid. In thefollowing government programs of MP, the when the party was represented by Y Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. This approach was alsopursued the towards Cyprus issue an with additional emphasis 465 ÕVÕ ndan K Õ , (accessed2, March 2007); and Türkiye 464 Õ lmaz, the same emphasis remained with a special reference to the Framework Agreement Framework the to reference a special with remained emphasis same the lmaz, Õ I. Y br In vein,thisTurkey neededit that was underlined develop herrelations to Õ Õ s Sorunu lmaz Hükümeti Program II. Özal Hükümeti Program , 116-19. 468 Õ , (accessed 146 Õ , Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 466 Turkey’s support for Turkey’s support ÷ lu, Taraflar Õ ld I. Akbulut I. ÕUÕ m Akbulut Õ n Tutum 467 CEU eTD Collection 472 of prevention the for EEC the warsfuture in into continent.the (Gözen 2000, evolved 125). that Community Steel and Coal European the create to initiative 471 470 (accessed March 2, 2007). 469 the settlementpolitical inthe of conflicts to cooperation couldcontribute in Middle East the East. Middle the to in relation articulated inEurope, conflicts future of for prevention the cooperation of economic seeking of conflicts. settlement for way the the would pave liberalization is economic and victory’ words, that other cooperation ‘economic the achievedthrough countries alike. andEastern Western with the relations andimproving economic the liberalizingfinancial and the encouraging investment market, trade the foreign exports, and which required economy asound on security and peace depended national this perspective, in 1923, a similarvein military’s with the emphasis on the foreignpurging ideologies. From for ‘peace condition home’, imagery conveying the at of of ‘National 1919- the Struggle’ in governmentthe program is illustrative in this respect: remark following The round. way other the than rather security for condition be a to forward astep moving achangeeconomics Kemalist of chain, order inthe the reconstituted principles, in ofAtatürk’s of MP’srepresentation establishing astableeconomy.The this goal terms protecting from forthe MP, country the was this threats, outside the only through possible indoctrination of Kemalism as a necessary condition for restoring order and peace and thereby the world’ in peace athome, for ‘peace a condition as development economic sustainable active: Playing 4.2.2.2. Gözen, 126. In aninterview with U Ibid. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, This functionalist approach to security, which was influenced by the European project by influenced European the security, was which to approach This functionalist main asthe development economic sustainable of presentation the Here wesee victory.’ economic an with crowned is it unless continuous or bepermanent can victory ‘No rapidly. and [In way] this easily the conditionsmore that instigate conflict are removed resolved naturally. be AsAtatürk can once said, problems social stably, develops that economy In an While the military establishment saw the removal of foreign ideologies and the ur Dündar÷ur on 22 January 1991, Özal stated his admiration for theEuropean countries’ I. Özal Hükümeti Program 472 For Özal, the creation of economic and financial and economic of creation the Özal, For 147 Õ , 471 wasalso 470 In 469 CEU eTD Collection 478 (accessed March 2,2007)). 477 Ba for cooperation between the Western and the Islam world and to build a common Judeo- build acommon to and world Islam andthe Western the between for cooperation view,be Accordingmember thissettlement of had Turkey Cyprus anEEC the to to dispute. them:and role between bridge play a West the and East the both for indispensable be to Turkey for way only the as seen was policy security concerns. to belimited not should relations the that and world’; ‘Western aWesterncountry,also in hadtomake amore activewith her cooperation engagement the it. Turkey, Thethat stated party vocation,butseen program being 1983 of complementary to economic cooperation. ‘Planthe serve wasAction’ of declaredto as for for establishing mutual a framework avision themeetings and wereheldinIstanbul, organization, the Presidency the of Turkey assumed 476 was elevated to the Presidency level in1981. 475 474 126. 473 Commercial Cooperation of the Organization the of Islamic Conference (OIC). infrastructure, build necessary the able to or willing involved was none countries of the because be partly realized not could countries for MiddleEastern market the establishing acommon before they [took] steps that could upset the interests of each other.” region. Oncesuch was established,“these countriesan be obligedorder tothink would twice Mehmet Barlas, ed., Barlas, Mehmet Anavatan Partisi, “Anavatan Partisi 1983,” BELGEnet, under “Partiler ve Programlar “Partiler under BELGEnet, 1983,” Partisi “Anavatan Partisi, Anavatan Cited in Cited representation 1975, in (OIC) Conference Islamic the for Organization the to member a became Turkey While See Gözen, 126-30. “An Inevitable War,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS-WEU, February 20, 1991; cited in Gözen, ú bakanl This was also underlined with regard to Turkey’s full membership full This Turkey’s application alsoand underlined the regard to with was policy that is based on anger, complexes, and obsessions. which have ascertained,been andwhich does notmake maneuvers.sudden Itshould not be a through only implementing a swift and possible active is policy, which This does not change East. directions,the the objectivesand of West the for both indispensable be to has Turkey Western not supplementarytoTurkey’s vision was hand,On ‘Eastern’ other this the Õ k BasÕ Ba ú bakan Özal’ 474 mevi, 1989),4-6. several initiatives were made to play an active role in the Economic and rolein theEconomic play an made to active were initiatives several Turgut Özal’ 476 Õ n Yurtd ÕúÕ Õ n An Temaslar Õ larÕ (Istanbul: Sabah Kitaplar Õ ndaki Konu 148 ú malarÕ , 13.12.1988-31.10.1989 478 Õ , 1994), 126. 473 While the project of Õ ,” Madde 35, Madde ,” (Ankara: 475 477 In1984, Active CEU eTD Collection Olgular, Belgeler,Yorumlar (1980-2001) budget cuts, and 30% increase in the customs tax. See Oran, tax. customs inthe increase 30% and cuts, budget policy, economic combined age, the retirement in increase transfer, money free for be made would arrangements aimed at harmonizing economythe Northernof the Cyprus with thatof Turkey.According to this protocol, 483 following remark by Özal: the cause’.Consider ‘national as the saw Cyprus approach that non-conciliatory traditional Özal,to the by aswiftas opposed action For dispute. Turkey Cyprusissuerequired plan the Cyprus of the settlement the towards approach active and more conciliatory paralleled a also East the and West the with cooperation economic developing to inrelation propagated policy policies the challenging issue: tothe Cyprus approach Anactive andconciliatory 4.2.2.3. zone. afree areainto the economic toturn Cyprus Northern the encourage investment foreign to the necessity and stressed to economy increased tension; and numberthe of in troops Cyprus be itdecreased by1500for was a burden to Turkish the in economic same that and developmentcooperation, priority giving Özal token, suggested to including conflicts, issue.settlementforpermanent theTurco-Greek Cyprus the this would not only resolve the present conflict between the two civilizations, but also create a instead of being alien to it. Europe,” “complementary [S]elf of words,the in “alter-ego”, other the Turkey represented inreligious centrism was to admitEurope Turkey as afull inmember EECbecause the Europe inTurkey 482 481 480 479 security. and global peace to the contribute thereby and perspective humanistic admission of Turkey as a member would provide the EEC with a more secular, global and civilization. Christian-Islamic/Greco-Roman Following the same approach, Economic CooperationProtocol was signed with the TRNC in 1986 which Cited in Cited Ibidem. Özal, 304. Özal, Placing the economic interests above the security concerns, the active and rationalist and active concerns, the abovethesecurity interests Placing economic the Turkey in Europe, Europe in Turkey Ba ú bakan Özal’ , Özal expanded on this ideal, arguing that the best way to end the ethno- Õ n Yurtd 480 Turkey,for Özal, was both European and Muslim; and hence the ÕúÕ Temaslar (Istanbul: (Nicosia: K. Rustem andBrother, 1991), 317-18, 285, 331. Õ ndaki Konu øleti 479 149 ú im, 2004),pp:107-108. Inhis titled book as ú Türk D malarÕ Õú , 30-32. Politikas 483 Õ : Kurtulu Turkey andEurope, ú Sava úÕ status-quo ndan Bugüne 481 482 For Özal, For By the By CEU eTD Collection status-quo against wasconflicts not foreign Atatürk’s the duringpolicy era, butagainstthe pursued policy towards the Hatay theHatay province: policy towards CyprusAtatürk’s and the activetowards policy between be inhowÖzal drew aparallel seen This can butits very application. foreign policy a deviation from it Kemalist Özal,the was not remark, this is put more explicitly: Hatay joined Turkey as a province. as Turkey joined Hatay 1939, in conducted referendum the With 1938. in independence declared later and ofSyria province a became Hatay 1938, in of independence declaration Syria’s After Hatay. annex to intervention amilitary undertake not particularly Atatürk, stated that it should belong to Turkey as the majority of its inhabitantsFrench mandate werein Syria in 1920and Turks, gained autonomy they in 1923. Althoughdid theRepublican administration, and 486 485 484 This suggestedfrom aclear move the necessity, and instating the need for amore rational and problem-solving in approach Cyprus. as ina burden Turkish the considering for troops instead of national the a security economy Ibid., 127. It should be noted thathere Hatay (previously, Alexandretta) province was included within the Ibid., 180-81. Cited in Barlas, 131. In this aconciliatory, having sense, anti- line. They think status-quoism is politics. active policy. But our foreign policy has been dominated by the the by dominated been has policy foreign our But policy. active conditions. When conditions are convenient, important problems can be solved meansby of an of achievingprecedent a is the maximumHatay benefitwith minimuma policy]. cost by means foreign of calculating active the the international [to example an is policy Hatay Atatürk’s While this initiative posedachallenge tothe traditional Cyprus, forpolicy towards which calculate and policies can benefit world usthe most. changing the to ourselves turn to have We affairs. foreign the of gauged overallthe foreign policy. Nowit is the time remove to it from numberthe one priority unfortunate that has issue the attentionCyprus our captured forthelast years fifteen and Turkish needs policy foreign to be achievingeconomicbased towards development. Itis Here we see how Özal redefines ‘the national interest’ in relation to the Cyprus issue in Cyprus the to relation interest’ ‘the Özal national Here weseehow redefines states. Turkish and Greek separate two in bases have and troops federation is the best solution. In wayneitherthis nor Turkey Greece willneed keep to their states or two communitiesisnot acourageous act.You decide have with to regard Doyouto Cyprus. want two separate coexistingIt is a mistake to perpetuate a crisisunder in the name a of loose‘national cause’. federation? To escape from a solution . . . . In my opinion, a loose approach had approach been Atatürk: implemented byreferencethat to 485 status-quo 486 150 approach pursued so far. In the following status-quo and activetowards approach 484 ø nönü line instead of Atatürk’s of instead line nönü CEU eTD Collection rationalistic approach to conflicts and national economy. Because the EEC membership EEC economy.the Because andnational conflicts to approach rationalistic ideals.certain to byrecourse foreign policies articulated the rationalist ideals European whichgavebirth treaties the Communities.” the to instituting andEuropean Community, Özal declared Turkey’s “commitment to European unity, as thewell as the realistmembershipin 1987. In submittedhis official letter Council to the Ministers of of the discourse for areactionary full made buton contrary, application the approach, asurprising propagate of Özal was identity European inherent and Turkey’s notcivilization’ the modern the of level through ‘reaching vocation theWestern/European exempt Legitimizing 4.2.2.4. from possible. link this made that ingeneral legitimizingKemalism of andthat element this interpretation of itwas the specific initiative, new this legitimize the served to interests national the of defending element While the time. the of conditions the and interests between national the foreign involvedas it arational calculation policy Kemalist this realism and reformism. Thisin turn reconstructed ‘active policy’ as the real application of in lacking Kemalist nor conditions, present the given realistic nor interests, national Turkey’s with compliance in neither was policy official the on concessions no giving on quo discourse pro- the of insistence the that highlighted thereby Özal Hatay, towards policy Atatürk’s 487 Cited in Özal, xiii. Özal, in Cited In linking the proposed foreign policy approach to the Cyprus issue to the realism issue therealism of to Cyprus foreign tothe policy approach In linkingtheproposed always struggled to change the can be seen as the last Ottoman Sultan. On the other hand, Atatürk has been a reformist who As discussed inAs the the MP’sWesternistdiscussed previouspolicy sections, suggested a At a time when the relations with the EEC were virtually frozen, Özal did not glorifies Atatürk. But the bureaucracy is in the line of conservative. only He perpetuates the Montreaux,sides with and England France against Germany and Italy. But Atatürk takes when Hatay the conditions are convenient, regime changes the Straits in We have twolines inour foreign policy; one Atatürk’sis line, the otheris status-quo. status-quo . . . . Everybody talks about Kemalism, 151 ø nönü, not that of Atatürk’s. ø smet smet Pasha’s line. 487 ø In this sense, In nönü’s line is ø smet status- ø nönü CEU eTD Collection 492 491 (accessed March 2, 2007). following: and peoplesthe of who Turkishthe belong to he people Europe the stated among them,” (accessed on March 2, 2007). See also Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Millet Büyük Türkiye See also 2007). 2, March on (accessed 490 489 therefore the ‘national will’. In goal affirmation Atatürk’s of alsobut identity, confirmation the of and Turkey’s European 488 westwards.” face their set Atatürk before “even Europeans, be to Turks the of part the on ‘choice’ the other hand, for reformsÖzal, had as their aim the inculcation the of the Western Europeanvalues into the Turkish society. all primary Atatürk’s of Atatürk’s factthat because the of This goal. natural was consequence vocation of Turkey was not merely a ‘duty’, but a maxim:Atatürk’s accomplish to in order befollowed to target the seen as wasnaturally EEC the West, the Westerncivilization. wasthe regard in follow this to needed one thecivilization andthat civilization’, level of contemporary the terms. noted Inan interview in Turkey’sÖzal that wasto‘reach objective primary 1991, the outlook, MPthe applicationalso defined for Turkey’s membership EECinideational in the encouraging further foreign investmentin Turkey. sofarby economicitto the market policy of economy,”woulda pursued contribute successful foroperation the necessary laws, practices and rules, of “theacceptance involved Ibid., x. Özal, 275. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, in Cited Andrew Mango, Andrew In this way, Turkey’s application for a full-membership status was asa for afull-membershipIn presented application status way, Turkey’s this conditions. toTurkey’s due previously goal of reaching the level of modernthe civilization and which could not be attempted It fell upon us to apply for full membership inthe EEC, which was set as a target byAtatürk’s Barlas 492 In this sense, Turkey’s membership in the EEC did not only represent the not only inrepresent the EECdid membership In Turkey’s sense, this , 262. Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role II. Özal Hükümeti Program Turkey in Europe, Europe inTurkey in Europe,Europe Turkey 489 As the contemporary civilization was represented by 490 152 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 90. Õ , 488 However, apart from economic from this apart However, I. Akbulut Hükümeti Program , which Özal dedicated “to Õ , 491 On CEU eTD Collection towards Cyprus towards being with involved EEC.While the amemberof move also a this discursive Cyprus againstTurkey’s Western/European vocation inand reconciling proposed policythe policy and Turkey’s Western/European-orientation in juxtaposing the previous approaches to In Europe. vein,this said: Özal issue,Cyprus themore would this Turkey rift away from her primary goal of integrating with this themore framework, Turkeyinsisted onthe non-negotiability her interests towards of the vocation. from her European be draggedaway notto also but conflict of the forissuenotonly resolution the the Cyprus towards problem-solvingapproach and develop a instead hitherto andtheunnecessaryobstinacy conspiracy pursued theories 496 495 494 493 West, from the be away rifted to not War Persian Gulf policy in the region. Forcommon for conducting a itas apartner butregarded force as viewa divisive ‘Europe’ not Özal, just as Turkey had to Cyprus, This to which policy acorollary regard alsoparalleled did purpose. with legitimated side with the Western coalition constituted Europe Turkey’s vocation European afundamental a domestically as and in the and valueswith cultural common roots andsharing level the modern civilization’ of the Ibidem. Ibid., 99. Cited in Barlas, 116. Ibid., 339-40. The rationalism of Özal’s discourse thereby drew a stable link between between astable link Cyprus the thereby drew discourse The rationalism of Özal’s they geton with you asyou keep objecting everything? that [you] donot deserve joining the EEC; because, they seek consensus in the EEC. How can to want not give do any concessions, you thisif will be taken asarude reaction by otherthe side. They will obstinacy, think sheer a with it,’ with agree don’t I this, want not do ‘I u say If Here we see how Özal’s association of Turkey’s pro-European policy Here wesee ‘reaching with policy howÖzal’s pro-European of association Turkey’s history. her been has throughout always she as area of this part a is Turkey depend. values these and life of way this defend can she that believes Turkey them better with the help of whichEurope, representsfor Europe hergeographical the with area onwhich ideals these share we Since rights. and human liberty on based life of way democratic a establish to centuries two than more struggled Europe.her Thatis fundamental Atverygoodthe costofpurpose. sacrifices has Turkey Turkey believes that in joining the European Community, she identifies her future with that of 493 153 494 496 Turkey give needed Turkey uponthe to 495 In other words, according to CEU eTD Collection (accessed March 2, 2007) 498 (accessed March 2, 2007). 497 fundamentalism, Islamic and fascism, communism, of ideologies deviant the from Turkey’s biggest problem the as current accountdeficit, a AtestablishÖzal declared time need when theunity. and thedomestic to conditions present Evren’s duringhis continuedtostress discourse presidency extraordinariness the the of home’ ‘peaceat achieving for condition Kemalism asa 4.2.3.1. Kemalism. to approaches rationalist can also help understanding the mainparallels rifts the and between defensive and economic of discourse Evren his tothediscourse of during presidency MPduringthe period same the represented asthemainmilitary juxtaposingera). In problem the addition, during the were conditions theanarchical (as was restored system democratic the changes after involved underline is thishow section approach necessary also to his a separate while approach, in continuity certain pinpoint could one consideration, into speeches these of style and content provinces in the country as well as in domestic and international press conferences. Taking the speeches regarding Turkey’s in role herforeign affairs inhis variousvisits to traditional the MP was in power. After assuming the Presidency Evren’s4.2.3. Kenan of reconstitution foreignKemalism and policy office he continued to deliverwith both the West and the East to make Turkey an indispensable partner for both.public develop relations the in the needto it sofar stressed as became apartof official discourse the policy Active level. governmental the at representation official find not did it as marginalized refusal to call the Cyprus cause as the ‘national cause’ of Turkey, this initiative was rather Ay Ay Õ Õ n Tarihi n Tarihi While the discourse of the MP focused on the necessity for economic development, Kenanfigure Evren dominant also another when was of foreign the policy discourse , 18 October1985, , 13 March 1985, 154 497 for Evren, it was the threat coming 498 which, to CEU eTD Collection 1996, v-viii). speech, freedom of market and democracy as what represented the Kemalist vision (Atatürk Ara (Atatürk vision Kemalist the represented what as democracy and of market freedom speech, 503 1987) 502 501 (accessed March 2,2007). 500 (accessed March 2, 2007). the world’ in peace athome, and‘peace policy, foreign Multidirectional 4.2.3.2. upon a unity Kemalism.around domesticAccording approach, latter the dependent tothe Turkey. peacewasseen primarily outlook, achieve which couchedcondition to Kemalism peace, domestic within neoliberal a more Turkey. because, Evren,Kemalism for its still for vitality preserved the integrity and thesurvival of needed to be watchful for any future attempts to makebe Kemalismbeforgotten. attempts watchful forfuture neededto to any still one principles, Atatürk’s of embracement the with country the throughout established finally was peace that affirmed himself Evren when even hand, other the On 1987. until law whole the was declared lifted only that 1980coupwastotally country with the throughout martial normality but back the to swiftly military not restored of era was the extraordinariness 499 conditions. Evren, were the tools of those that attempted to push Turkey back to the pre-coup In his talk in the Second International Symposium on Atatürk, Özal identified the elements of freedom of Cited in Cited Ibid. Ay Ay (Ankara: TBMM BasÕ Õ Õ n Tarihi n Tarihi order to contribute to the regional and world peace and security. and peace world and regional the to contribute to order great ascribed has importance to maintaining principles, peaceful relations with Atatürk’s other with countries, and made in accordance every effort in establishment, her since Turkey, a as development economic sustainable the on emphasis Özal’s to in contrast Hence, principles, then we can never achieve permanent stability. wayof Kemalism.If we cannot ourselves save from extremesthe embrace or Atatürk’s The games played on Turkey take place in the right and the left. The only way to save us is the 501 503 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba Consider the following remarks of Evren: Kemalism, for Evren, served as a panacea to fight against the grave threats facing grave fightthe threats to against for servedasapanacea Kemalism,Evren, 499 , 10 November1985, , 27 May 1984, To confirm Evren’s call to be vigilant against these divisive forces, the mevi,1987), 60. ú kan Õ Kenan Evren’inSöylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas 155 502 —Kenan Evren, 1987 Õ m 1986-9 Kas úWÕ 500 rma Merkezi rma That was That Õ m CEU eTD Collection 506 1987) 505 2, 2007). January 1986, (accessed March other. Turkey has not diminished her relations with the West as some are trying to claim.” See claim.” to trying are some as West the with relations her diminished not has Turkey other. her relations with the West on the one hand, and with the Arab and Muslim countries in the Middle East on the 504 region. in the for model countries the served asarole forWestasshe the importance strategic herincreased From only the being Turkey’s in this secular andperspective, Muslim region country the Turkey’s Westernidentity, by itfromcarrying dimension the of security to culturalthe one. reconstructed discourse this orientation, a newIslamic instance of an than rather West, isillustrative: statement following Evren’s community. contrary, this policy was seen complementary to Turkey’s role as membera of theWestern Islam world was not a reaction to the recentduringfor theearly Evren, Turkey’srapprochement1980s, with Middleandthe East the cooling off of relations with the EEC. discourse. later in Evren’s special emphasis gaineda andIslamiccountries MiddleEastern the with relations this peaceful aimdeveloping in and here. in regional ispeace the period which concern Establishing of latter approach the principlethe to recourse by ofsecurity global and ‘peace regional the to contributing as policy foreign atTurkish home, peace in the world’, although there was a slight change in the off foroff an search had ideological Turkey’s in claimsroots. that the thealliance East interference in domestic affairs’ constituted the bottom line of the policy, as if it were to shake Ibid., 397. Cited in Cited On his visits to Tunisia, Egypt and Qatar, Evren noted the following: “Turkey is making efforts to improve to efforts making is “Turkey following: the noted Evren Qatar, and Egypt Tunisia, to visits his On , 100. In seeing the for vital relations strengthening cultural Turkey’s in importance the has Turkey sense, theIn this opportunity East. to Middle lead the a bridge in role betweenespecially the East andregion, the in the West. countries the historical with ties common has Turkey hand, other the On well. as security than other areas including exclusive security dimension . Turkeycomprehensive has a withcooperation the West In terms ofits nature, Turkey’s belonging to Westernthe community does nothave an foreignWhile could beseen in Westernist this a shiftas policy propagated Evren’s above,As stated duringhis Evren presidency too, described the objective of the Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba 506 Yet, the traditional focus on the respect to the ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘non- and integrity’ ‘territorial the to respect the on focus traditional the Yet, ú kan Õ Kenan Evren’inSöylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas 156 505 Õ m 1986-9 Kas Ay Õ n Tarihi 504 On the On , 23 Õ m CEU eTD Collection 511 1987) 510 (accessed2, March 2007). 509 (accessed March 2, 2007). andin tranquility the islandthanks tothis role. peace been had there that and agreements, international the by Turkey to entrusted rights the in of their the toprotectframework security ofthe Cypriots, state partnershipTurkish rights troops, Evren arrivednoted, andremainedin islandinthe response tothe usurpation of the Turkey’s into Turkish The becamemeetings turn didnot as afavor. problem UN political the injustice and pursued ajustcausefor an federal solution state eventual wouldthat be rooted infor problem, in Evren,wasnot island, presenttroops Turkey’s the TheCyprus Western Europe. the well as as OICcountries his the to visits at discourse focus of in Cyprusissue the ‘juststance’ another Evren’s Turkey’s became relation to TRNC, recognize the onlycountry to the visiblestill remained asTurkey countries were region. the in problems the for solution peaceful a for vital were inthat aconsensusonmatters important with was Islamiccountries the reaching particularly 508 507 Arabthe andbe removed. Islamic countries” could stability in the Middle beEast could ifonly restored “lackof the unity and solidarity among peaceand the that noted also he peace, domestic the to hisapproach with vein In asimilar problems.countriesof understanding aconsensual and intheregion present the achieving this forum wouldto resolving contribute differences the between Turkey and Arab the integrity and don’t interfere in our domestic affairs.” countries regardless of their regime, as long as they recognize our independence and territorial Responding to one of such claims, Evren noted, “We maintain our relations with other Ibidem. Cited in Cited Ibid., 129. Ay Ay , 413. Õ Õ n Tarihi n Tarihi Being one of such problems where the differences between Turkey other and the Turkey between differences the such where problems Being of one Representing the Turkish state at various meetings of the OIC, Evren underlined how underlined Evren OIC, the of meetings various at state Turkish the Representing Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba , 24 February 1984, , 19 January 1984, ú kan Õ Kenan Evren’inSöylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas 157 511 509 507 In sense,this in she that responded to In this sense, Turkey’s Inthissense,Turkey’s rapprochement Õ 510 m 1986-9 Kas anissuethat Õ m 508 CEU eTD Collection Cyprus and resolve her differences with the Islamic countries and the West in order to in West order the and countries with Islamic the her differences Cyprus andresolve in insist‘just’ cause herTurkey had to on break respectivechain, the and perspective, to of consensusfor onthe thisreasons conflictconstituted viciousthe circle.From this lack that the forin ‘peaceathome, underlined Evren’sdiscourse condition peace world’, the In contrast to the MP’s discourse that saw economic development and cooperation as a 516 515 514 513 512 integrity’, ‘ from ‘territorial traditional the ‘equity’, of of roleprinciples standpoint the intheconflicts discourse, it resumed its traditional emphasis in articulating Turkey’s peace-building/keeping developing her relations thereby Islamic the with countries, foreign Özal’s paralleling policy recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by the other countries.” Hence, this “vicious circle” could only be overcome by“equal both treatment to sides and the solution permanent claimthe Turkey the inher in sincere for will island. that the was document by the Greek side on the other, was a proof of this tendency as well as a support for of the theof side rejection DraftMarch 1986byhand,and Turkish one the 26 on the island. a Christian into Cyprus turn to Hellenism of GreekCypriots,the which in fact was rooted the that they never gave upon idealtheir of Turkey’s logicobsessive outby aspointed Özal, butbecause of non-conciliatory the attitude only legitimate government’ and of wholethe Cyprus. ‘the ofbeing as by virtue unjustly recognized situation they received politically advantageous and economically the share to intend not would Cypriots Greek the “that was Evren, for a peacekeeper. but Turkey nothing on equal negotiated was conditions, Ibidem. Ibid., 92. Ibid., 397-98. Ibidem. Ibidem. Therefore, while Evren’s later discourse also ascribed an active role to Turkey in Turkey to role active an ascribed also discourse later while Evren’s Therefore, due to was not noted theperpetuationthat By conflict the Evren same token, of the pacta sundservanda ’, ‘non-interference in the domestic affairs’, and ‘reciprocity’. and affairs’, domestic in the ‘non-interference ’, 158 514 ForEvren, the approval of the Preliminary 513 512 The real problem, 516 515 CEU eTD Collection 518 1988) 517 Evren West, ascribed a and prioritized even indispensableTurkey’san value Western- to the with values common sharing for indicator an as organizations Western in the involvement Turkey’s discourseWesternist that represented MP’sthe to inparticipation Similar the OIC. Turkey’s to inrelation stated overtly was not that aspect an country, Western truly Turkey’s inherent identity Western and followingproject Atatürk’s of turning Turkey into a policy continueddiscourse tolinkin involvement Turkey’s Westernthe organizations to goals ofAtatürk’s pursuit the community and Western inthe presence Turkey’s 4.2.3.3. follows: as basis on this Federalto the Republicof Germany, Evren theTurkish President policy the defined foreign consideredit ifbased upon was principlesof‘reciprocity’the and‘equity’. Inan visit official state. peace in the world’ maximhome main ‘peaceat of the component the wasseen as invarious occasions, This, asstated of Atatürk, which was declaredWestern identity. andher intentions her peaceful confirm thereby peace,and tothe contribute as the basis of the new Turkish Ibid., 396. Cited in Cited (Ankara: TBMM BasÕ 517 As the above-quoted statement illustrates, after the military era too, Evren’s foreign era too, themilitary after illustrates, statement above-quoted As the reforms. Atatürk’s the with dimension indispensable an gained which country our in Turkey’smembership in the EEC will be the consequencenatural of the Westernization period principle, sheexpects other countries to act accordingly. policy our of involves respect to contractual principle commitments.basic Just as Another Turkey is attentive to abide by negotiated. this be cannot territory even of Turkey’s span hand Similarly, a others. of ofterritory span hand a even for desire no has Turkey foreign for interventions. indifference mean not do intentions peaceful these doubt, no With basis. equity has Turkey fully supported perspective, the resolution of conflictsthis through negotiationsFrom anddialogue isbuiltthat on the elsewhere. and region her in interests mutual and stability Turkey sincerely wants tocontribute to building cooperative relations that serve the peace, Hence, from Hence, from giving this on be causes’couldconcession such ‘just perspective, only Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba mevi,1988), 264. ú kan Õ Kenan Evren’inSöylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas 159 518 —Kenan Evren, 1988 Õ m 1987-9 Kas Õ m CEU eTD Collection ( NATO” besides organizations European in apart of taking goal her ataccomplishing aims part…Turkey a we are of which and values, common we share which with community, Western the with relations 523 1988) 522 521 1987) 520 519 community Western in the being to directly it tying by orientation member of the Western institutions was also prominentin Evren’s articulations on the EEC. more clearly: this puts of remarkEvren following will.The national the reflect legitimately organizationsnot would build only upon pathof the butAtatürk, also inevitably and values as indispensable lifean style. In this Turkey’sinvolvementsense, in Western the Western and democratic the internalized awhole, as revolutions Atatürk’s embraced already perspective, became crucial due to the reforms of Atatürk. Second, the Turkish society, having this to according Westernization, First, discourse. MP’s of the components integral the regard: in this illustrative are Evren of remarks following The policy. foreign Kemalist Atatürk’s Westernist reforms, thereby interpretationreconstructing aWesternist of the Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba Accordingly Evren stated: “Turkey’s NATO membership represents an important dimension of the present ofthe dimension animportant represents membership NATO “Turkey’s stated: Evren Accordingly Cited in Cited Ibid., 102. Cited in Cited Ibid., 396. , 396. , 91. This approach This approach linkedthat Turkey’s place in Western the community beingto a World War on the basis of democratic ideals and respect for human rights and principles. and became memberthe founding of the Western organizations established after theSecond the Western Europe,nation butbecause our wanted With it. thisaim, haswith Turkey sided misunderstanding here: hasnotTurkey democracy chosen ofbecause hergood relations with the by GreatRepublic Atatürkour of . . . and the comprehensive establishment the with Westernist turn reforms taken irrevocable thereafter. an taken has Let me correctof Turkey a part the The steps taken by the Turkish society for Westernization has along past. This basic choice on henceWesternistEvren’s discourse involved several constituted also assumptions that important element that strengthens our ties with the West. democratic parliamentary system by our nation as an indispensable life hasstyle been the most values weshare with the West since establishmentthe of our republic. embracement The of Turkey’s close with relationsWesternU.S.A. the and the Europe are in rooted common the Turkish Republic. been the prioritized aspect in foreignTurkish policy since GreatAtatürk, the founderof the Turkey. Because, whatever perspective It cannotone beexpected that the takes,countriesof the Common Marketwill close Turkeytheir borders to is a part of Europe. Westernism has Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba 520 ú kan Õ Kenan Evren’in Söylev veDemeçleri (9 Kas ú ú kan kan Õ Õ Kenan Evren’inSöylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas Kenan Evren’inSöylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas 160 521 Õ m 1987-9 Kas 519 and building on Õ Õ m 1987-9 Kas m 1986-9 Kas Õ m 1988 , 415). 522 Õ Õ m m 523 CEU eTD Collection 526 Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas application, Evren said: “We cannot think of a Europe without Turkey” ( Turkey” without Europe ofa think cannot “We said: Evren application, 525 524 secularism. and ofdemocracy principles nationalpreserving byuniting the society survival and thearound the European Kemalist national existence. wasIn this also sense, legitimized holdingspecial emphasis wasgiven on Turkey’s and democraticsecular identity, while EECgoal the on to the European by recourse vocationdefining Kemalismin terms of confirm Westernistthis goal. To Westernness,Turkey’s alsoby basis Westernist tohad aprimarily on policy foreign thethe Kemalist the reconstituted also goal but policy, elements of of democracy,establishedby Evren Atatürk, not only a constructed domestic base for Turkish the foreign national unity, and even Evren is of illustrative this approach: ininvolvement EC,butthe on Turkey’s existingalready identity. Thefollowing remark of whole the Westernizing thereby sites, society. butitinvolved themodernist goal integratingof Western the cultural values into the suburban membershipbe reducedtoeconomics According Turkey’s EECnot could tothis perspective, Turkey. without impossible seen also was which of existence the EEC, the of member a being on Ibid., 28 Asked by a journalist what would Turkey’s route be if the EC gave a negative response to Turkey’s Ibid., 396. In considering the European-orientation as an extension of Turkey’s Western identity Western Turkey’s of extension an as European-orientation the considering In Austria, Yugoslavia, Norway, and Finland are not in the EEC but continue their existence.in Europealready as ourselves We see EEC. the in included being upon anddepend not does country ofa believeexistence The existence. her maintain still will Turkey membership. full our accept that many Indeedof Turkey belongs to the European. Let continent . us assume the that EEC does not our allies also accept us as European . . . . For example, 525 On otherthe hand, Europeanness exclusivelywas not conditioned toTurkey’s Õ m 1987-9 Kas 161 524 This was process considered tobe dependent Õ m 1988 , 405). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba ú kan 526 Õ CEU eTD Collection expression in statement: expression following the fordevelopment an eventual membership inthe EEC than fact importantthe found that its for Turkey’s the problems impliedlessaconcern references previousthe to enlargements of In this sense, blocked being Turkey’s application, country. Western primary goal a fully of and democratic forEEC Turkey’s about enthusiastic being not in Evren, West, the as suspicion, with West the the EC’sdiscourse that saw the Western-orientation as of domestic origin. Hence, thiscritical approach viewed Westernizing Rather, reforms Atatürk. itof involved theseconddimension of Westernistthe reports thison Turkey’s would delegitimizeenemy than a partner. Yet, this discourse didparallel not level an anti-Western-orientation either, as of having todismember anagenda from her Turkey European morevocation took Westthe as democracyan the Western-oriented servingmutual the interests.security This because consideringwas the‘Western allies’ as and for Western-orientation the cherished that discourse policy foreign the within comfortably foreignforces, with an emphasispolicy on the country’s sovereignty and unity. This, however, did not fit seencontinued as an to beextension preoccupied with theof divisionthe and the dismemberment plans of the outside Damocles’ of ‘sword the under policy foreign Westernist vocation: and her European sovereignty upon Turkey’s infringing ‘West’ The 4.2.3.4. objectivesproblematic incorporate others,to butis onlywhile incorporating Turkey. must There be other behind digestthis. Spain and Portugal yet. If youalso join, thiswill be backbreaking.’ It is somehow not We haveat the beenexcuses tryingrooted they in this fact put. . . . [The to forward:West] doesbe its West thinksbest ofa us inas if we orderweremember the Turkey not of ‘We100 yearsto welcome ago, be sure of tookthis. Their us in treatment the is EEC.for Greece,Look years, this was but problematic. there always We could isnot even As the statement quoted above illustrates, the President Evren’s later discourse to divide Turkey, and kickstruggle herin a outfrom where still she belongs. are They finished. notyet are Turkey strain to attempted have who Those 162 —Kenan Evren, 1984 CEU eTD Collection 529 1988) all issue” ( the is This Muslims. we are and anything before Christians are they Because this. behind discrimination religious Europe, but when it comes to the EEC, Turkey should not be included. This is unacceptable. There is certainly a 528 1987) 527 inrights Turkey. dissatisfaction on the involved areaof the Another membership.contention immediate Turkey’s conducive to part of Western Europe with the level of era. Atatürk’s since the democratization and outrightthe rejection of Europeanness,which hadbeen seen Turkey’s the as primary goal human a partof European the organizations: If was notwelcomeTurkey in EEC,thisthe connoted being to howtheEuropeanness waslinkeddirectly illustrates further statement years. Evren’s image back traced non-European) ascribedtoTurkey 100 oriental (and therefore which in the wasrooted above,discrimination ‘implied’ this quoted in underlined statement the welcome notand to clandestine TurkeyintheEuropean efforts project. the for Turkey’s membership, to Evren’s pointed statementinsincerity the on partof the Westthe infringement on Turkey’s sovereignty, for lacked itmatters also Turkey’s on that infringement the involved sovereignty, anydirect an imply only could in Turkey rights human and democracy of level the with concern EC’s had done so without interference Atatürk’s and followingreforms, had chosen and Westernization Turkey already democracy by any otherand belonged domain humanrights tothe ‘domesticFrom of perspective, politics’. latter the state but by her ownfor democracy Evren, inclusion a country, of tothe wasa prerequisite institutions democratic will. In this sense, the Çelik, By the same token, Evren declared the following: “Turkey can be a member of NATO, OECD, Council of Cited in Cited , 272). , 291. However, the digestion capacity of the EEC was not the only issue which was not In voicing with the dissatisfaction EC’sprocrastination the negotiations the openingof it! always an obstacle . . . . We are either a European country, or not. We should make them say Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba 527 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba 529 While from the EC’s perspective, the establishment of efficient of establishment the perspective, EC’s the from While ú kan ú kan Õ Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas , 105. Õ Kenan Evren’inSöylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas 163 Õ 528 m 1987-9 Kas Õ m 1986-9 Kas For Evren, as Õ m Õ m CEU eTD Collection 533 532 531 Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kas said: “They are attempting to found a communist party have would in Turkey” Evren, ( for Turkey, communist structuring. parties when political the time waspresent suitable. Turkey’s Viewing for this comment as interferenceappropriate yet not was indomestic this whom affairs, for he 530 bearing democraticconsolidation. Turkey’s on they in interfering domestic affairs? they are our European vocation by demanding that weremove military our forces from how Cyprus...See speech he delivered,said thefollowing: Evren unjustly in todistance employing order from Turkey hermembership goal. Atanother public respect: trigger the eminent threat of ‘being kicked out from belonged’ any of attrigger where out ‘being eminentthreat In the time. Turkey kicked issue which could rejection Cyprus the the asthough EEC, of Europeanness denoted Turkey’s the beingasamemberof rejected situation of precarious meaning tothe atragic attributed the Westernist project. than In emphasis articulatingmore found countries other by thenon-interference and Cyprusreciprocity, issuesovereignty, as the sword of Damocles, Evren also ofequity, maximin principles the athome,extension of peaceinthe which world’ ‘peace the as an taken rather was Cyprus The issue reforms. ofAtatürk’s chain last the accomplishing neitherit did itas extension Westernistrepresent an wasbased policy the of that upon by itinviewdefining theseterms, it theCyprus not did against policy as a policy West, the Ibid Ibid., 269. Ibid., 292. The criticisms as to why Turkey did not have communist parties was also met by a similar reaction by Evren, . , 273. The Cyprus issue,from this perspective, was one of the ‘domestic issues’ the EEC was of democracy? Their aim is not to incorporate us [in the EEC]. rights, wewill not be considered as ademocratic country. See what they link to the condition problemswith Greece to Internationalthe of Court we Justice, andif do not recognizeKurds’ Look what theyinvented now: we If do not sit atthe Armenia,table with we if can’t bringour As the above-quoted statementsAs the above-quoted although indicate, Evren’s otheredtheWest discourse European country, it is apart of the EEC. They should know this. head likeThey notshould swing Armenian issue,the the Kurdish issue,or whatever issue ourabove the sword of Damocles…Turkey is European, and is in Europe. Because it is a Õ m 1986-9 Kas Õ 532 m 1987) 164 And headded: “ 530 They makeare trying to us from disincline our The following remarks are illustrative in this illustrative are remarks following The , 270). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurba 531 533 ú kan Õ Kenan CEU eTD Collection civilization’ and realizing ‘peace at home, peace in and ‘peacehome, peace at world’.civilization’ the realizing legitimized West,the through ‘reaching principlesthe of level the of contemporary the with integration further to goal complementary a as contrary, the on but Western-orientation the from asadeviation presented wasnot of OIC the context the within countries Muslim the with cooperation an active pursuing Similarly, principle. world’ inthe home, peace at ‘peace the with coined were consensually they state, asafederal side Greek with the integration and theindependence of Islamic the futureworld, recognizing TRNCfor her and the playing Western role the states, abridge between with Islamic strengthening relations the the based. While new foreign policy initiatives werealsomade in this such period, as be upon which the main foreign was the policy continued to peace in world’ template the athome, Turkey. for ‘Peace policy suggested competing orientations that Kemalistnarratives consensual than of that 1960’s the and 1970’sin it sensethe didnotinvolve that poles-apart Conclusion be‘threatening’ this unjust removed. but suggestonly give the not seatof that European Dionysius up organizations, Turkey would upon swordthe but herinternalization Atatürk’sof reforms and membershipin many other Turkey’s dependentcontinued.Europeanness Europeannessnot Inthissense,asTurkey’s was AndEEC. more would beincluded within listthe of conditions asthe discrimination against imposed term, adefensive Evren took in approach suggestingCyprus, burden this that was rather long in theintegration plea the of Turkey economicandfor against Turkish the development but this sense, Evren’s discourse can be argued to have taken a Westernist line not despite As the discussion above showed, the 1980’s foreign policy discourse was more Hence, as opposed to the MP’s approach that saw Turkey’s Cyprus policy aburden as saw Turkey’s policy Cyprus that MP’s tothe approach Hence, asopposed upon Turkey by upon virtueTurkey ofbeing linked aconditionas for Turkey’smembership in the it. 165 for the West, CEU eTD Collection and the and a non-conciliatory latter, the community. To Western the amemberof from being of her goal away Turkey letalone driving further, issue the complicated as what West of the interferences the Cyprusissue represented to the and status a‘national cause’ The former attached ofconflicts. for resolution the and theWest theEast both with cooperation economic of developing theimportance emphasized Özal’s discourse West, the defensive approach focusedof Evren on non-submissivethe identity inof Turkey relation to Whileintact. the development economic role the keeping elevated of that rationalism economic an propagating other the and threats, security grave the emphasizing and Kemalism of elements the approach to diverse undertaking a defensive one narratives, of composed two were made to diversify the Turkish foreign policy. initiatives new when a time during even Western-orientation Turkey’s legitimize to employed was latter the affairs, inherdomestic non-interference West’s the against reactions Turkey’s legitimize to used was template first the While civilizationism. Western meant civilizationism and the Soviet of in international countries ideologies’domestic‘foreign andsome supporters and West the the (both powers foreign of plans Union) dismembering the against a tool as both constructed was Kemalism and policy. foreign Turkish in play would Kemalism role the defining helped as a proof Kemalism to thecountry) also domestic(uniting the 1983. We attributed seen role that have that Turkeyboth the legitimizations was in elementsalreadyconsensually wereprominentKemalism of propagated the 1980s.These during given for the coup as well Westernas the transition to the civilianas Kemalist era after These constructions of Kemalism were reverberated in issue. tothe Cyprus ofKemalism approaches were reverberated These constructions However, our analysis showed that the apparent consensus in the 1980s was in fact By the same token, ‘restoring democracy’ and ‘national sovereignty’ were the other status-quo approach to Cyprus was against the essence of the Kemalist foreign policy foreign Kemalist the essence of the Cyprus against to was approach 166 CEU eTD Collection different constructions of how Cyprus policy and Western-orientation were linked to each linked Western-orientation to were Cyprushow and of constructions different policy Nevertheless, situation this leada unified to not did foreign butinvolvedpolicy, rather Kemalism. to recourse by policies two the between link a direct making in a role played for Cyprusthe indirect EEC membership into issueturned Turkey’sfuture an condition membership.Turkey’s EEC future Indeed, fact the achange that inTurkey’s policy regarding secure Cyprusto was necessary toward a moreapproach conciliatory that inhighlighting made alsoEuropean andvocation damagedherallianceÖzal’s links. move asimilar discourse failure tosupport Turkey regard totheCypruswith issue drewTurkey away from her part of deviate Westor the from it. Evren’s made discourse thislinkin that thearguing West’s these policies in showing how Cyprus policy could help Turkey realize the goal of becoming a in speeches. byWestasstated the the rejection therewasaperceived whether Cyprus, or was issuessuch as ‘sensitive’ ECpresseddemands oncertain regardless the whether propagated of Western-orientation the legitimation, domestic already an Having role. ‘indispensable’ it an attribute reforms which of consequence Atatürk’s to served the directembracing as a wasconsidered EEC with the integration andespecially Turkey’s Western-orientation the Second, in principle. home,‘peace world’ the peace at the of asa example depicted tangible these moves.discursive Turkey’s Both Cypruspolicy and the Western-orientation were level of contemporary the civilization’. The policymakers in 1980s the employed both of or‘reachingthe inhome, ‘peace theworld’ at peace tothe principleelements attributed of the of in terms both legitimizing by policies these between link indirect an drawing involved Cyprusthe policy Western-orientation. Turkey’s within Asthe last chaptershowed, this EEC. in the membership eventual her to obstacle an and economy national because itdisrupted ‘nationalthe in interest’ longthe term via being a burden for Turkey’s The discussion revealed that an additional discursive move draws a direct linkan move that drawsadirect additional The discussion between revealed discursive integrated Kemalism that of interpretation itwas aspecific that showed This analysis 167 CEU eTD Collection candidacy candidacy in 1999provide animportant contextanalyze to how the defensive and the from round in of next the EU enlargement 1997, and the of acknowledgement Turkey’s EU affiliations of partiesthe involved in decision the making Indeed, process. Turkey’s exclusion political the of in regardless lines, these foreign policy discourse the toanalyze therefore and integrationist positions theirpolitical keeping while identity intact.The task ahead is their of political stands,actors Turkish the discourseofficial between oscillated defensive the in divergence the wehave seenthatdespite Yet, problematic. identity rather rationality, and output, policy foreign certain a produces Kemalism that contention the made this how and partin government the parties thattook and the establishment military of perspective the by an alternative construction by the President Evren. delegitimized was and level governmental the at represented officially not was initiative This discourse. official in the ‘reciprocity’ and affairs’ in domestic ‘non-interference of principles the of dominance the to thanks discourse theofficial of a component into materialize not did be givebe an onherTurkey should preparedto member Cyprusto policy concessions EEC Cyprusbe removed cause from numberonepriority foreignthe of Turkish policy and that and pursuingtheintegrationist path Similarly,drawn byAtatürk. Özal’ssuggestion the that Western-orientation the between linkmade the to thanks West the a cardagainst as be played hera supplementary Western-orientation, neitherpolicy itto thethat did Cyprus suggest bid Evren’s the ‘national recourseto toTurkey’scause’ in notpropose relation Cypruspolicy did defined Kemalism as well as the ‘West’ and the Cyprus cause. in approaches waythey the linkedthem these separately as theydiverged constructions, Whileother. the Cyprus issue was reconciled with WesternTurkey’s inorientation both Up to here we have discussed how competing Kemalisms were constructed from the Kemalisms wereconstructed here competing how wehave discussed Up to The template both approaches depended upon also limited their policy articulations. 168 CEU eTD Collection reconstituted by reconstituted them in turn. Kemalismit and was approaches how the foreign discourse structured to policy integrationist 169 CEU eTD Collection comprehensive reform comprehensive withfrom legal rangingharmonizingreform structure plan of that the EU, the involved that and aswift restructuring than immediate organizations European an EU membership. thatresolution issue the benot linkedofficial of Turkey’s Cyprus the should declarations to hermembershipnotwithstanding the futurein one of to EU, the barriers the constituted Turkey’s asposition issue the vocation’ towards linked Turkey’s ‘European to exceptionally in from toTurkey’s Cyprus issuethe detached wereconcomitantly role NATO and references on articulations The application. legitimize the madeto arguments interest-based the besides leaving the EECand EU(asof the 1991) as‘the’ symbol civilizationalistthe of project defending the Westernist the valuesversus spread of communism gradually diminished, NATO and to value attached ideological the EEC, tothe formembership full application with the EEC. Alliance,Western hermembership whichlimited to was inNATO and the pursued relations Nevertheless, Cyprus, officialTurkey’sboth linkedpolicies policy towards to wereconsensually roleinthe togetherwere alsoused propagatean to foreignanti-Western suggestpolicy a deviation and from the withelements similar While policies. these linking in variations the and issue the Cyprus the towards end of the path followingAtatürk’s structured policy pro-Western the wellas as policy the pursued Cold War andEastern bloc. We have seen how the elementsafter attached to Kemalism,Atatürk’s reforms, and Turkey’s Western versus the alliance in the roleof Turkey’s apart and project civilizational Turkey’s of extension an as both actors political the by taken was Western-orientation Turkey’s Introduction As ‘EUlessvocation’ Turkey’s along into turned term beingobjectiveof of apart the The in of analysis foreign andthe policy showed that discourse 1960-1979 1980-1989 C HAPTER ANALYSIS OFTHE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE :K V: EMALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY 170 (1997-2007): AN CEU eTD Collection ed. Mehmet U 534 acknowledged. status European countries butalso what was she doing the during Cold Wartohave herEuropean Eastern and Central the only not than more do to needed Turkey as country the of integrity unity to the and a of Turkey and as threat in domestic affairs forcethe EU asanintervening Atatürk’s civilizational goal during theCold Warera, after 1990s itthe began toidentify the chain of asthelast intheEEC membership the had regarded While discourse defensive the be necessary the to apartmany of undertake todelegitimize EUbut the it.reforms elements the defensiveupheld that positionthose left conflict the of resolution the with regarding conditions any nowithout member ‘element’ at their disposal asafull admit RoC the to EUwaswilling the factthat to the Moreover, democracy. Western legitimize to Turkey’stransition their made just had that countries EU European goalEastern and Central the of orthat and of RoC the acknowledgedcandidacy status Turkey’s surprise, the Summitwhich,1997, to of affairs’.Added this to was rejection the also Turkey’sof LuxembourgEU candidacy atthe in domestic ‘non-interference and ‘reciprocity’ ‘sovereignty’, of principles the adhering level of the contemporarysomething that could be easily into the fitoft-propagated discourse thatlinked ‘reaching the civilization’ and ‘realizingaffairs’. peaceforeign and in domestic at ‘non-interference home,and ‘reciprocity’, peace‘indivisibility’, The‘sovereignty’, in thepooling world’ to of elements therole of the elevated that discourse in defensive morethe apparent was of sovereigntyresolving the Cyprusissue, the previous enthusiasm toitattached began todiminish which both in neighborlyestablishinggovernance good to with relations countriesand surrounding the domestic developing and functional acompetitive establishingeconomy,democratic andpluralistic and foreign policy terms was not represented the ‘contemporary civilization’. In this regard, rather thandelegitimizing rather this regard, In civilization’. ‘contemporary the represented E. Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öni ÷ur andNergis Canefe (London andNew York: Routledge, 2005), 182. 534 This led to the questioning of the extent to which the present EU which present the the to extentof questioning the Thisledto ú , “Helsinki, Copenhagen and beyond,” in 171 Turkeyand European Integration , CEU eTD Collection Ziya Öni Ziya 536 535 organizationsmounted their support for the EUmembership. andforeign beganaffairs’, tobemore dominantas liberalthe tanksthink and civil grass-roots in domestic ‘non-interference and integrity’, and unity ‘national ‘sovereignty’, to approach which in introduced were 1960s the and 1970s,though under shadow the of defensivethe elements the pluralism, and democratization, liberalism, multiculturalism, 1999, of Summit integration with the TRNC to counter the accession prospects of the RoC to the EU. of Denkta thesis confederation supporting the for resolution the of Cyprusthe issue. Thenew official position on Cyprus hence involved newfor the new offensive, Turkey with policy especially policy and orientations a regard to undertaken, general the radical turned discourse moreand even defensive and at times were EUreforms sensitive of the and some EUwasprepared into the for accession Program necessary EU-related reforms,of cultural andrights extension itthe and to penalty minoritywas death the of during abolishment the as such groups.reforms sensitive the theresisting era of this outlook, nationalistic coalitiona heavily represented NAP the and DLP the coalition, the of parties when the National Y andMesut Bahçeli Devlet Ecevit, Bülent by,respectively, headed MP, the and NAP, (DLP), Party Left Democratic of the government coalitional and the some of the main figures of the judiciary, the bureaucracy and higherof echelons brass, president, the intelligentsia,by top military the some of the political parties such as the RPP, civilization’. of ‘contemporary the address ascribedhitherto the delegitimized approach defensive civilizational the goal, Atatürk’s For the increasing pressures from the civil society for Turkey’s EU membership in late 1990s, see especially see 1990s, inlate membership EU Turkey’s for society civil the from pressures increasing the For Ibid., 183. ú With the EC’s acknowledgement of Turkey’s candidacy status in the EU’s Helsinki mainly represented thisdefensive approach was 2000s andDuring the early the 1990s , “Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era,” in Era,” post-Helsinki the in Relations , “Turkey-EU 535 While the MPappearedtobe more supportive of the 172 ú , the President of of TRNC,andfurther , thethe President Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Õ lmaz. The two dominant The two lmaz. 536 Another important Another CEU eTD Collection Union,” 4, 1(Spring 2003): 9-34; Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Turkey’s political reforms and impactthe of Europeanthe International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era,’ 538 537 Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2003), 9-35. Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics reforms EU necessary the pushed for only not negotiations, accession Turkey’s receive for to adate in its commitment tothe EU-related reforms, despite its pro-Islamic roots. could obtain in seats JDP parliament,the the as emerged only the was party that that vigorous directly in membership project the EU. the to replaced bya liberalconservative view whichlinked modernization and thecivilizational Court. However, the Islamist of Constitutional by theorders the disbandingwere established the VP of the after (JDP) that view’s traditionalthe Virtue linking Party of civilization Constitutionalnew Court, parties were founded by members previous the mainly of WP,(VP),the and to theIslam Felicity beganthe dissolution of the toWP government be and thenParty the disbanding of the WP by the (FP)orders of of aftermath In the the in remarkable change. this also was of secularization) February 28 process and the Justice and Development EU. the with integration further to it conditioning other the and context, specific Turkey’s Party on asdependent basic democratization the viewing one discourses, two expand, constituting began to wasblurred before the1990s, which and one, integrationist defensivethe approach between the and human democracy rupture secularism, inthe rights, liberal perspective military the coup apro-EUof began standin1980, to take late 1990sandfor amore argued pro-Islamist NSPand its successors. As the Welfare Party (WP), which replaced the NSP after in in of developmentthis change the the and regardhasbeen discourse the Euro-skeptic once although this did not preventitfrom althoughnot With also employing did this the defensive regard to discourse. On the domestic reforms that took place in the last decade, see, especially, Ziya Öni Ziya especially, see, decade, last the in place took that reforms domestic Onthe Ibid., 183. South European Politics & Society After the 2002 elections during which none of coalition inthe previous none of parties the Afterwhich during 2002elections the Indeed, memorandum military the February 1997 (whichof started so-calledthe 538 , but also employed a more integrationist discourse in the area of foreign policy, of in foreign area the discourse integrationist amoreemployed , butalso 10, 1 (April 2005):16-30. 173 , ed.Ali Çarko ÷lu and Barry Rubin (London, ú , “Domestic Politics, , “Domestic 537 The JDP, willing Turkish Studies CEU eTD Collection process. in making involved thevocation decision regardlessparties the of politicalthe stand of inpresent Turkishthe foreign policy regardingdiscourse the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s EU analytical viewgood notionstool ofKemalismto howcompeting of were elements the a distinction the provides by other, the propagated elements the to had recourse each approach of representatives the as blurred times at was divide this While discourse. integrationist the Luxembourg and Summitsdiscuss Helsinki and to then themainturn elementsemployed by the of events key above-mentioned the to responded establishment military the and makers policy the how discourse, defensive the by employed elements the review first will we aim, and theCyprus vocation European in makersthis Turkey’s policy. In of relation to policy the foreign articulations the pathstructured policy Atatürk’s toaccomplishing attached objectives period wasKemalist hegemony’ and the ‘dissolution of ideology’, Kemalistthe the duringdiscourse this notthe to ‘challenges of era is an exempt context policy Turkish War post-Cold the that argument the from will iscontrary to beseen era. It during that ‘post-Kemalist’ whatcalledasthe thereconstituted elementsdebate, andof last the but notdivide,how Turkey’s European-orientation and Cyprus havebeen withinpolicy situated this theKemalist least, how the role ideology.of Kemalism in TurkishCyprus Republic. foreign Rather, policy a United of for creation AnnanPlan the andbackedthe for Cyprus; approach confederalist was the mainconstructive infor pressing steps asolution inCyprus; resigned from supporting the more and active take beganto government from Turkish the 2002, 1990s. Beginning the Cyprus issue as well, the JDP displayed a departure from the defensive approach of the The aim of this chapter is to examine how the elements of Kemalism structured examineisKemalism this of elements The to howthe structured aim chapter this of 174 CEU eTD Collection policy articulations that drew on that approach. articulations this policy foreign in the employed were Kemalism of elements main the how is follows What rights. forhistorical legal some,be given and, ‘respected’, neededTurkey’s to was a that policy regarding Turkey’s in role issue.From Cyprus the perspective,this Turkey’s Cyprus policy interventionthe rejected thereby discourse this policy, of foreign of theimplementation the and EUformulation to what was seen as the not seeing the sovereignty from butalso only perspective capacity a territorial asthe for the ‘domestic affairs’ In EUconditionalities. the reservation towards outright an represented approach defensive of Turkey and its claims Turkey from becoming afundamentalist country like Iran. would bestprevent foreign that regardedasthe security-belt was policy Western-oriented for others, necessary, was orientation policy a newforeign that argued have some basis, this on While nation-state. the of sovereignty the to threat a also but institution, insincere not only anuntrustworthy and it others,was For (security,and reasons. religious) political, was as a European organization, which Turkey had a Turkey was asorganization, which aEuropean EU the some, For from perspective. this were propagated that elements secure the defend and political sphere. the of conceptualization national-security-state-based a conveys which them of interpretation rather adefensive but Kemalism, of elements to these recourse the is not however, approach, this to characteristic gives the defensive What views’. extremist the by democracy removing interference in the domestic and foreign affairs’, ‘full-independence’,‘non- andintegrity’, ‘defending and unity ‘national ‘sovereignty’, on emphasis is the approach defensive the 5.1. Thedefensive approach Notwithstanding variations be policythe in the EU,the asto to the pursued to relation In 1997-2007, there were different articulations on what kind of foreign kindwouldIn articulations weredifferent of what 1997-2007, there policy on As the first chapter introduced and the third and fourth chapters revealed, at the core of 175 right to join but discriminated for other join discriminated but to CEU eTD Collection 541 540 imperialism inand it that equated Customsthe Union with Sevresthe Treaty against which employed‘full-independence’, elements integrity’ ‘national the of against unity and countries instead. with Turkey that Market suggested Muslim Turkey,the should establish a Common Erbakan 539 apart.” this also tear we will SevresTreaty, the apart War tearing by theIndependence began “We will not recognizeHead this of thepaper new WPrag defined when we the come Customs to power Union in as eleventhe enslavementit. days. Just of Turkeyas we by thethe Islamist EU: WP against the West, and theby variations employed approach, one has defensive the foreign producedtwo of policy.This other by the secularista Western-oriented to andsecularism linked parties Westernist political some and establishment military reactions to other. the it, on counter to Westernism and secularism hand, and one the on of Islamism threat the 1995, during which WPreceivedthe more votes than inbroughtexpected, politicalthe agenda and 1990s. early Nevertheless,municipal elections1994 and the of general the elections of with military the coup of 1980, wasnot at core the of politicalthe during debates 1980s the hadbeen dissolved to replace the NSPthat in home’. 1983 was established TheWP,which at ‘peace and unity’ ‘national integrity’, ‘national the ensure to in order sphere political the from beview’ purged to asthe only‘extremist dissolution emerged Islamism of Sovietthe Union, Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Westernism’ 5.1.1. ‘National struggle Customs againstthe vs. Union’ ‘national struggle against Erbakan, Süleyman Kocaba Yeni Yüzy Yeni 539 540 Perpetuating the NSP’s emphasis on Islamism and anti-Westernism, Erbakan, the Erbakan, anti-Westernism, and Islamism on emphasis NSP’s the Perpetuating As the ‘threat of communism’ dropped from the political repertoire with the While the WP employed a pro-Islamist and anti-Westernist discourse in the start, the in start, the discourse anti-Westernist and a pro-Islamist employed WP Whilethe Defining the EU as a “Christian Club”, that sought Definingdivide that the Club”, EUasa“Christian to anddisintegrate Türkiye’nin Temel Meseleleri Õ l , 14December1995; cited Kocabain ú 541 , Refahyol Hükümetinin Sonunun Perde ArkasÕ In this regard, the WP drew on the defensive approach inthe wayit approach WPdrewon defensive Inthe the this regard, , ed. Hasan H. Ceylan ú , 51., 176 (Ankara: Rehber, 1993), 200. (østanbul: Vatan Yay Õ nlar Õ , 1997), 42-45. CEU eTD Collection 545 544 543 542 the cooperation of the TPP with the WP and the emergence of Erbakan as the prime minister. Muslim countries 5.1.2. Secularism asaforeign policyprinciple: counteringfurther integration withthe “Do not sell secularism.” ambitions. O, Mesut Y personal sheer their for country the endanger who those against regime the of guarantors Y warned Çiller government, coalitional WelfareParty.” the with coalition Welfare the with Partybe accomplished cannot This door. this enter to have we start, is a and Union “Customs the most unfortunate following: with the Customs the objections Agreeement stated Union EU,Çiller the to would takeby Atatürk. blockopened thepath to itattempted andas Islamist, place. That is 1960s andwhy they 1970s,stated that notenterintowould acoalition itwith WPas the was I will not makeParty a (TPP), which (presentedpresented as the symbol of ‘darkness’). itself In this vein, countries Islamist of the orbitthe towards civilization) of the ‘core’ asthe (represented Tansuas Çiller,the the Headsuccessor of the True Path of nationalthe unity and integrity of by Turkey from diverting her Western-orientation the the DP of 1950s andalso but Republic the of tothe secularism only athreat not would pose Islamism perspective, the JP of the integrity’. ‘national of Westernismbuilt From whichagain this unity on and element same the 1920s. the Turkish Independence War was cast, conveying the image of the ‘National Struggle’ in the Yeni Yeni Sabah Milliyet Sabah ù Despite Çiller’s resistance to side with the WP, the ‘most unfortunate’ took place with and secularism emphasis the on was approach endof On defensive other the the , 20 February 1996; cited in Kocaba , 15 December1995; cited Kocabain afak , 5 December 1995; cited in Kocaba , 28 February 1996; cited Kocabain Õ lmaz, donotbury the country to the darkness for the sake of a seat.” 545 543 ú After Erbakan began to approach Y Mesut approach beganto After Erbakan , 49 ú ú , 46., , 46. ú , 49., Õ lmaz with the following remarks: “We are the “We are remarks: following with the lmaz 177 542 Referring to Erbakan’s to Referring Õ lmaz for a lmaz for 544 CEU eTD Collection (Sava (Sava country” our in of Allah 1997, power 19-20). and Another authority MP the from the party recognize not and also order delivered Quran a the speech from away that faces the enemy their of the party was Kemalists that anMP from the WP publicly stated the following in 1994: “We will definitely call those to account who turn 550 Aleyküm Komutan compare Turkey to Afghanistan compare to and Turkey were the gurantors that they secularismof andAtatürk’s members of WP. the members of counter by someto overtlythe proclaimed delivered anti-Kemalist pro-Sheria speeches and Iran, likeletbe not Turkey would and secularism ‘real’ the of that they guardians the stated were On from todismemberherWestern-oriented course. attempted onehandthe Turkey Erbakan it whether and Kemalist and secularist was coalition WP-TPP the and WP, the which in discourse was Turkey mainly centered thereby on questioning/defending the extent to the Afghanistan example. This is not a time to stop or wait.” 549 548 547 of the General Staff Staff of General the like the onethattookplacein Afghanistan Taliban movement. with In the vein,this Chief the WPinvolved the initiating adevelopment whether was visit, dangerLibya another discourse 546 way of conducting affairs.” fromdistant ContinuingIran. the relations as ifnothing hadhappened is notan appropriate Edward Burns, the then by as stated U.S., by the wasunwelcome which Trip’, his ‘Eastern of aspart and Indonesia U.S. Secretary of ForeignMuslim countries in the East. In Affairs:this aim, Erbakan visited Iran, Pakistan, “We Singapore, Malaysiahavecoalition period, the new government embarked on its planwarned toseek further integration with the Turkey to initiatives While nowithdraw madebefrom Customs Agreementthe duringwere to Union this In the report submitted to the Constitutional Court by the public prosecutor Vural Sava Vural prosecutor public the by Court Constitutional the to submitted report the In Refah Partisi ve Gerçekler Sabah Sabah Zaman, 10 August 1996; cited in Kocaba 548 ú 1997,21-22). and that “Atatürk would be a member of the WP were he alive today,” In the early 1990s prior to the Luxembourg Summit of in political 1997,the Luxembourg Summit tothe EU the of In 1990sprior early the , 14 October1996; cited Kocabain , 2 October1996; cited inKocaba Õ m (Ankara: Kim Yay ø smail Hakk smail 550 On the other hand, Çiller further reassured that it was ‘insane’ to , RP, Yay 546 While similar reactions were also given in relationErbakan’s to Õ nlar Õ Õ Karaday nlar ú Õ , 71. , 40-41; cited Fehmiin Çalmuk, ú ú Õ , 61. , , 77., , 2000), 103. Õ stated, “We have to draw important lessonsfrom important draw have “We to stated, 178 547 Bir Bir ErbakanHikayesi: Selamün ú , it was documented was it , 549 which served ú CEU eTD Collection 556 2000, 134). of the colors the Kurdistanflag addedare photograph, on the leftthis corner In of the party logo…This is a shamefulposter. Party situation forour state” (ÇalmukWelfare of a photograph a have now “We argued: Ecevit 555 minister after thenightmare,the asan followingprime 1999elections, the awakening the became who Ecevit, by cherished was event The government. coalitional WP-TPP the Erbakan to sign the recommendations which in due course led to his resignation and the fall of Minister Prime the obliging and Republic, the to threat serious most the as fundamentalism stem measures of Islamismin perceivedgrowth to designed Turkey, the Islamic declaring the was inappropriate. See negative comment on this visit was made by the Foreign Affairs Speaker of the U.S, Nicholas Burns that the visit 554 553 principles.” FacingAtatürk. wemustvigilant look for the guidanceand such be Atatürk’s a threat, of only us by to inherited Turkish ofthe Republic secularand characteristics the on democratic give not up “Wewill follows: army ofas the major concerns the underlined of SeaForces the bein knownparty came to ‘February the triggered,28 process’ what as, General Turkey. The PKK’s colors in one of the party logos, 552 551 countries, secularism and the Republican order’, the WP’s ‘suspicious’ visits to a number of Islamic place ‘making‘Westernism’, ‘defending gain Turkey arespected thewithin world’, distancing from Turkey West:the without East the with rapprochement sought they that argued Erbakan West, the from path. Before the WP took part in the coalition government in 1994, the Head of the Democratic Left Party Bülent Erbakan’s visit to Kaddafi in Libya created a big tensionwhen it was combined with avisit to Ibidem.Iran. After a Cumhuriyet Zaman, 10 August 1996; cited in Kocaba Sabah 551 Despite this struggle to claim Despite this elements to legitimacy by struggle tothe of recourse oft-propagated make Turkey great once again. We will take a respected place in the world in this way. West and some countriesin the Muslim countrieswhich the West rejects. We are struggling to Our initiative is not against the West. We can serve as a bridge between those who reject the adeviation signal not did countries Muslim the made to visits the that reassure also To , 2 October1996; cited inKocaba 554 556 allowing the female bureaucrats to wear headscarves in the office, using the office,wearin using the headscarves to female bureaucrats allowing the , 1 October1996; cited in Çalmuk, 218. Soonafter, onFebruary NSCannounced28, 1997,the its adoption 18 the of Hürriyet , 7 August 1996, cited in Çalmuk,220. 552 ú , 71. ú , 61. , 555 and thespeeches delivered bysome members of the 179 553 CEU eTD Collection 559 (accessed January 13, 2007). 2001), contemporary placeamongnations’ ‘taking arespected world and ‘obtaining the contemporary civilization’, secularism a would inevitably divergenceconstitute from of ‘reaching goal the the level of the revolutions. from this Atatürk’s Basedon approach, anydeviation of this conceptualization linkedalso of defense principleof objectivesthe and the to the of secularism democracy but be future’, attainedinthe democracyas‘agoal to only not democracy future reconstituted for the integrity and asasecurity-belt and unity national symbol as of core Kemalism,of the initiatingit togiving memorandums. amilitary coup placed military In that atthe secularism establishmentin 1960s,the 1970sand 1980sin legitimizing the moves rangedthat from ‘democracy’the was upheldmainly by equality. This military that the reconstituted secularwas not benot would able upholdof to tenets freedom democracy basic the — and that since astate state, fordemocratic agenuinely be asecurity-belt to of secularism principle Constitutional he argued Court following: the Recommendations: AScorecard,” Recommendations: 28 February the “Implementing Günay, see Niyazi WP, ofthe resignation the to led then which document 558 2008). konu 557 and dividing the national unity. forge of for anIslamic-basedattemptingstate having orders Constitutionalthe Court to value”. follow Atatürk’s enlightenmentpath, which was as“followingdefined scienceas highestthe to inevitable andattempt an order, republican democratic the and secular strengtheningthe of Sava See Sava See Ecevit,“Bülent Ecevit’in28 Kas ú ma,” Demokratik Sol Parti, (accessed February 11, ú 557 , 14-15. As seen in the above-quoted remark, the 1990s defensive discourse elevated elevated remark,the 1990sdefensive discourse the As seenin above-quoted the may result indeviating from orbitthe of Atatürk’s revolutions. [Atatürk’s] revolutions. To put itdifferently, any compensation to given be from secularism Atatürk’s revolutions is the ofprinciple secularism which forms the foundation stone of is possible only in secular societieswhere there is noreligious enforcement...At the centerof becauseof twobasic democracy freedom tenets equality.are realizationand The ofthese two secular are that those are democracies Real secularism. on depends primarily Democracy Soon after Erbakan’s resignation, the political activities of bannedby of WPwere political the activities the after Soon resignation, Erbakan’s ú , 32. For the detailed description of the recommendations and the measures taken following the NSC the following taken measures the and recommendations of the description detailed the For 32. , Washington Institute for NearEastPolicy (WINEP), Õ m 1999 günü Ankara’da DSP’nin 14. Y 558 In the accusation report Sava 180 Õ ldönümü kutlama töreninde yapt 559 Research Notes ú presented to the 10 (May Õ÷Õ CEU eTD Collection December2004. 562 2008). Adalet ve Kalk Development Party.” See Erdo January 13, 2008). Erdo 2008). 13, January ve Kalk Adalet Dedi,” Pearson Görü 561 1999, Konuú being secular, democratic and governed by the rule of law mainly, ( state, Turkish ofthe characteristics domestic of the “expression the viewas this described he century, Turkey. to threats the to in reference Redefining principlethe ofprinciple ‘peace at home, peace in tothis theworld’ asthe ‘globalview’threats Turkey the had to on take in the 21 focus not did he Yet, of Turkey. vision policy foreign the defined which state ofthe characteristics basic ofthe one as ofsecularism principle the considered more radical. We used to talk in favor of an Islamic state.” Abdullah Gül made this break clear with his statement: “We have changed. We used to be membership. EU of goal the and secularism to commitment underlying an with party conservative rightist as acenter- but view’ ‘national of the asasuccessor itself present not JDPdid the however, Ironically, ever. morebe than defended neededto secularism of why principle the as to main the constituted discourse reason of JDPandthe its from security-centered the divergence pro-Islamic RPP,the the roots in For theparliament. only RPPrepresentedthe opposition the RPP,withthe 2002elections,the during which JDPthe obtained the majority whilevotes, of fore againin discourse of the tothe Headof Deniz Baykal,definition came the secularism of security-centered This country. the of development and peace the to threats the with principle 560 policy. foreign the Turkish for served of principle also as indirect condition main the pursuing secularism an goalsof sense,the In this foreign policy. Turkish basis the asof the was presented secular state and ademocratic establishing were Western, that werethose states secular as the orientation Western- also the but secularism from not only asadeviation wasrepresented states non-secular the with WP’srapproachment While the level’. societal the at peace and freedom “ Consider Erdo Consider Indeed, ø slam Devletinden laik devlet anlay devlet laik Devletinden slam Hence, the defensive discourse focused on associating the threats to the secularism the to threats the associating on focused discourse defensive the Hence, øsmail Cem, Minister the of ForeignAffairs in coalitionalthe period between1997-2002 also malar, Demeçler, Aç ú mesi, Erdo Õ 561 nma Partisi, May 4, 2003, availabl from (accessed January 13, ÷ The Deputy Head of the JDP and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs an’s following statement: “We are not a religion-centered party.” See Erdo party.” a religion-centered not “Weare statement: following an’s Õ nma Partisi, November 7, 2002, available from (accessed from available 2002, 7, November Partisi, nma ÷ an also said, “We are not a continuation of any party, we are the Justice and Justice the we are party, ofany a continuation not “Weare said, also an ÷an:‘ ÷ øste an, “Hiç bir Partinindevam 560 Õ klamalar ÷imiz K ÕúÕ na” [From the Islamic state to the concept of secular state], of secular concept the to state Islamic the [From na” Õ 1999, 3). br Õ s konusunun adil, bar 181 'ÕúLúleri Bakan Õ de ÷ iliz. Biz AK Parti’yiz. Bu Böyle Bilinmeli,” ÕúoÕ 562 ve kal Õø smail Cem: Haziran 1997-Nisan ÕFÕ birçözüme kavu ÷ an, “Erdo an, ú turulmas Milliyet ÷ an- ÕGÕ , 24 r.’ st CEU eTD Collection (accessed January 2008).13, 566 (accessed February 2008).11, 565 2008). CumhuriyetHalk Partisi, December13, 2005, available from (accessed January 13, 564 (accessed January 2008).13, republican order, ifplace republicanis isnotto mineson this society, it?” peaceof the order, what presidentthe ismade in if this way]…, isnot this separatism,if isnotthis to damage the indivisibility of the state. In this vein, Baykal made the following remark: “[If the definitionthe of and integrity the also but secularism of principle the only not against was ‘religious a as president’, Gül, candidate, presidential proposed its of representation JDP’s the RPP, for the Moreover, thestate. of integrity and unity againstthe threats for the regard nohad which perspective, a pluralist from nationalism and secularism of principles the redefine to identities?” rest, then youignore the indivisibility theof Turkish nation. Is Turkey a confederation of sub- itincluding alongsidethe under Turkish of the citizenship, Turkish pot ethnicities the under emphasis sharing supra-identity the on of “If citizenship, Baykalargued,youTurkish putall Erdo to Referring incite separatism’. views that extremist of the ‘purging element the reconstituted separatism.nationalism instigated This to discourse of JDPwith the regard 563 only outlined. perspectivefrom the Atatürk was only logical that the ‘real’ Kemalist party was the RPP, as Kemalism could be defined the JDP was andiscourse of JDP,for theRPP,couldbethe hypocrisy. secularist From only perspective, this obstructionist Atatürk’s revolutions party andthe pursue that not areligion-centered did policy, the under the cover of a secularist. Baykal, “Baykal’ Baykal, “18 Nisan 2007 Tarihli Grup Konu Baykal, “72 Millet Bir Bizde. Kimse Kimseden Daha Üstün, Kimse Kimseden Daha A Deniz Baykal, “Baykal’ Therefore, given the continuation of the potential threats for Turkey, itwas impossible Turkey, for threats of potential given the continuation the Therefore, Despite the reassurances given by the JDP that it was the guardian of the secular order, 564 Õ n Grup Konuú Õ n Grup Konu mas Õ ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, July 22, 2003, available from ú mas Õ ú ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, April 25, 2006, available from mas Õ 566 ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, April 18, 2007, available from 182 563 Similarly, the pluralist the Similarly, úD÷Õ da De 565 ÷ il,” Hence, it Hence, ÷ an’s CEU eTD Collection (accessed January 2008).13, 569 (accessed January 2008).13, 568 567 change”. religion and conscience; and theindispensable for precondition scientism,innovation and of for freedom the security the tolerance; and understanding reciprocal institutionalize peace; internal peace; the essence of a modern and civilized state order and life style; the only way to integrity and national of stone Republic, democracy, the foundation as “the saw secularism state. secular atruly within only flourish they could state, the of main characteristics the law were freeing it from the narrow borders itfrom borders freeing To confirm of narrow military the the establishment. Baykal’s principles, Kemalist of defense the to element pluralistic a added thereby RPP the integrity, andits and unity state of the characteristics secular and democratic againstthe threats following remarks of Deniz Baykal are illustrative in this sense: ‘participatory thedemocracy’integration within approach.of the defensive of element The the also but state the of integrity and unity national the against hence and secularism, elementto it. This involved not only presentation the of JDP’s approachas themain to threat of by 1990s,albeit discourse plurality, RPPcontainedthe adding the secularist the anew perpetuating thesecurity-driven in instead identifyingdiscourse threats of emphasizing Baykal, “Baykal’ Ibid. See also Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Ibid. 567 For the RPP, while the principles of human rights, democracy, and the supremacy of In that it called the people to rally around the Kemalist principles to confront the confront to principles Kemalist the around rally to people the called it that In Republic live, to show their stance against this development. constitutionalorderof and whowantTurkey, make to the democratic Atatürk secular, protected by the people against the state . . . Unfortunately. . . We thereforetoday we have come to a pointcall where thosesecularism and who the republichave have to respectbe and integrity to and thisthe will persist . To disregard existencethe of these threats is a shame . disregard . . . will . which This and continue existed to exist . . None has of [the governments] always is untilnow have overtlywhich engaged in such a the identity, first republican democratic secular threat.our against The second involvesWe have a threat twoagainst seriousthe national unity threats against Turkey, dear friends. The first is the potential threat Declaring that they were determined to “defend secularism from any threat”, the party threat”, from “defendsecularism any to determined they Declaring that were 568 In redefining secularism in terms of enlightenment and contemporariness and contemporariness and enlightenment of terms in secularism redefining In Õ n Grup Konu ú mas Õ ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, May 30, 2006, available from CHP Parti Program 183 Õ , Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, available from 569 CEU eTD Collection 574 “Türkiye’de Seçimler”, (accessed January 14, 2008). 573 (accessed February 2008).11, 572 571 (accessed February 2008).11, 570 alone.” and country, world athird is introverted, a that Turkey or leader, a regional theEUand member of a world, tothe is open that aTurkey either anddogmatism; non-contemporariness, intolerance, for“…either beliefs, respect and theAtatürk’s enlightenmentof revolutions, democracy, or andAtatürk leftunguarded. by hadbeeninherited Model’ which ‘Turkey genuineguardian itself asthe of represented Turkey into the cultural sovereignty of Arabic-Middle-Eastern-Wahhabism.”the Erdo of Erdo Turkey he that hadwas two, said: “They therethat was into thoughtdivided only Turkey the showed meetings the that media Western madein the comments the to refferring Moreover, nation.” but by institutionsby not state, only of the and the the Republicthe guarded are secularism that shown has “this stated, Baykal democracy, and will national the of example an as meetings these celebrating In values. Republican the and principles Kemalist the demonstrations wereheld cities inother well,as each giving the same message of defending Turkists, Weare Ataturkists’, ‘O,Atatürk, we arefollowingyour path!’ Similar holdingflags upTurkish andposters, with Atatürk’s slogans:the ‘WeareTurks,We are witnessed amassive demonstration, where thousands mausoleum,walked toAtatürk’s it,Ankara on14April against and public2007, the threat reactions the representation of and become a regional leader. Moreover, in that it associated contemporariness, itthe associated in that leader.Moreover, a regional becomeand breakby free peoplefrom couldthe Turkey World image Third andherMiddlethe Eastern Ibid. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Baykal, “02 May Ibid. Baykal, “18 Nisan 2007 Tarihli Grup Konu ÷an’s only path directed one direction for Baykal, which “draggingwas defined as Despite the JDP’s recourse to secularism and allegiance to the EUmembership, the to allegiance secularism and to recourse JDP’s the Despite ÷ an, they have found out that there is also the Turkey of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.” Õ s 2007Tarihli Grup Konu 574 In this sense, only with a genuinely upheld secularism that is In that agenuinely this with guarded sense, only secularism upheld Güzel Günler Görece 573 This, for This, a inevitably party, choicethe between: suggested ú ú mas mas ÷iz: CHP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi Õ Õ ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, April 18, 2007, available from ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, May 2, 2007, available from 184 , BELGEnet, under , BELGEnet, 572 The RPP 571 570 CEU eTD Collection (accessed February 2008).11, Seçilmez. Olsa Olsa AKP’ye birGrup Ba 577 576 (accessed February 2008).11, Sunulan Merkez Yönetim Kurulu Raporu, 575 level home,the world’ principlein andtheof ‘reachingthe to the ‘peace at of the peace Erbakan made toMuslim In countries. this principleregard, the ofsecularism,by being linked and communitarianism, affiliations religious was basedon that foreign policy acertain represented RPP, for the move, era. policy pursued sinceAtatürk’s a clear deviation, forHamas leaders in theAnkara and their failure to clarifyRPP, to them the significance the of with secularismfrommeeting was government’s JDP the theconsiderations, other all beyond orbitinterests national of the main principles allegiance toAtatürk’s principle of home,‘peace at peacein world’the involved regarding the of the Turkish foreign by theforeign religiousremoving affiliations from of mainconcerns the policy. true Since Wahhabism. her closer to the ‘civilized’ countries by freeing her from the orbit of Arabic-Middle Eastern- imageand Turkey aswhat could of get ‘uncivilized’ shed the alsorepresented secularism was integrity unity andbeing national nation-state, to the and of tied and the security the besides beingadomestic characteristic In this regard, thecontemporary within civilization. status a respected ingaining aim the of ‘face’ Turkey’s inredrawing aspecial role attributed and the European-oriented secularism between inmade 1990s the link further reconstituted RPP the member EU, the of a and leader regional a becoming with revolutions Atatürk’s following and enlightenment, foreign policy. In this sense, the principle of secularism was terrorist institution. a as EU, inthe those and theU.S. mainly countries, thecivilized by all been regarded had Onur Öymen, “Genel Ba “Genel Öymen, Onur Ibid. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi This was, forThis inseparablewas, RPP,the from foreignpursuing agenuine secularist policy 577 This paralleled the reactions given to the WP following the visits Merkez Yönetim Kurulu, Yönetim Merkez ú 576 kan Yard kan andfurthermorefailed todistance Turkey from institution an which Õ mc Ankara, March25, 2006, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, available from ú ÕVÕ kanvekili’,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, April 25, 2007, available from 575 Öymen, ‘AKP ‘AKP Öymen, With a complete disregard for this policy, the JDP’s Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Parti Meclisi Toplant 185 ø çindeki Pazarl çindeki Õ klarla Türkiye’ye Cumhurba Türkiye’ye klarla ÕVÕna ú kan Õ CEU eTD Collection November1997/TURKEYSETTINGSAILTOTHE21STCENTURY.pdf.>(accessed June 18,2008). Perceptions herto become right amember,in aradical by resulting suspending response government the excluded Turkey from the the Luxembourg1997, which of Summit War. In respect, this Cold EECduringthe the list of formal candidates, undeniable of right Turkey from emanated that agreements made past the Turkey between and was considered as an overt rejection of following remarks: 578 discourse of achieve this goal as longit as did underminenot hersovereignty. Turkey’sdowhat membership.Thissuggested Turkey that wasnecessary was ready to to for pastagreements’ in‘respect of‘reciprocity’, ‘equity’, to relation pursue theprinciples and expectedto EUwas integration. the Hence, forfuture her the right andgave ‘Europeanness’ this view, Association the Agreementsigned in 1963 alreadyacknowledged Turkey’s Tofundamental change‘order’. thatwould previouslyreforms established shaking require the of aprocess than War, rather Cold the during becamemember a Turkey institutions Western and Cyprus as Turkey’s rights’ 5.1.3. The elements of ‘reciprocity’, ‘equity’, and ‘respect for past-agreements’: the ‘EU with rapprochements MiddleEast’. the ‘inappropriate the inas was identified a wasemployed what countering as template civilization’ contemporary Cited in Cited As underlined in the above-quoted remark, membershipinAs underlinedwas regardedasan theEU above-quoted the world. of the regions other accession to the EUmembership, while projecting herpolitical and economic dynamism to the turning obsession, itinto an Turkey willcontinue to doall workthe isnecessary for that Turkey is not doomed to waitourOn forpart, agreements. an international from ambiguous weemanating Turkey for right shalla is EU the in timemembership Full exert or outcome every to realizeeffort this to goal.gain Withoutthat right as soon as possible . . . . Nevertheless, Shortly before the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, these elements were apparent in the apparent were elements these 1997, of Summit Luxembourg the before Shortly the oneof EUwasregardedas the approach,the defensive From of perspective the 'ÕúLú 2, 3 (September-November1997), (accessed February 19, 2008). on the EU’s decision, but was rested on Turkey’s ‘own’ civilizational project. The reportdependent not was asher‘Europeanness’ alsoEU candidate, an to become her right to reference legitimized Turkey’s membershipfurther level contemporary and EU the the civilization’ of would addamomentum goal. to this sense,this the link In between‘reaching provided the was not a membership as a reflection Atatürk’sof civilizational goal,it was also highlighted that the EU Turkey’s saw it that and policy foreign European-oriented traditional the from deviation remarks: 579 the same vein, the report presented to the EU Ministers by membership whileTurkey hadjoin a to right as honorablean memberof institution.the Turkey’saddingnewconditions to which thesincerity kept EU, the andof equitability to test the Head of the NAP, Devlet Bahçeli stated that the Helsinki Summit would be an opportunity articulatingfor membership. Turkey’s Helsinkiright to the Prior summiton November 1999, time highlighting elements the of ‘reciprocity’, ‘equity’for and‘respect past in agreements’ same the at while policy, hercontinue pro-European to Turkey’s part on will restated the that presentmembership its the newthe to decided towards officialview government, government in broughtApril DLP,1999 elections the MPtogether and which a coalitional NAP, in afterwith the change the government diplomaticthethe EU.Shortly with dialogue Cited in Cited Devlet Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, Devlet Hence, whileit government did considerthe was publiclynot any declared that . Turkey rejects. any kind. . EU of linkage the between her candidacywith to the EU and the Cyprus issue. relations her of framework the outside issue Cyprus the put has expects end an this discriminationto forthcomingin the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Turkey . candidate status was denied to Turkey byassertiveness,modernism EU’sand democracy. Turkey-EU relations entered Enlargementa turbulent phase when summit, December 1997.civilization’ contemporary the Turkeyof ‘sharing ideal . Atatürk’s . . of . In reflection casea as Turkey’s governments Turkish EU of all vocation is not realized, there will relationswith EU be the and on EUmembership.Turkey’s We noconsider thiscommon approach setback to our . Our present governmenthas maintained the same determination for further developmentof 'ÕúLú sine-qua-non leri Bakan Õø for democratization and modernization, but rather astimulus, which rather for but modernization, democratization and smail Cem ú kan z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. ÕPÕ , 163. 187 ø smail Cem,involved the following ú mas Õ ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Milliyetçi ,” 580 579 In CEU eTD Collection National Program and the Regular Reports,” Regular the and Program National of the Helsinki Summit: An Analysis of Copenhagen Political Criteria in Light of the AccessionPartnership, 584 Çarko “Turkey’s Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euro-Skepticism?” in Ali 583 582 Partisi, June 6, 1999, available from (accessed February 19, 2008). 581 EU. the make to would Turkey commitments the on a compromise months after the summit, the governmentfinally announced that the coalition partners reached represented afundamental inturning point relations.Turkey-EU Keeping its four promise, membershipfulfillment of criteria the objectively. de-linked andthatevaluated Turkey’s thatone candidacy Cyprusissuefrom the Turkey’s be thatwouldequity In would the only comply regard,the this with principleof approach the stated: Agreements. Zurich and London the from emanated right this that given was pursue again Turkey’s to right “honorable”the policy implemented in Cyprus, relation to ‘equity’ was being pursuedin linking Cyprus Turkey’s policy to EUmembership,the asit of principle the for disregard a similar how and candidacy EU to right Turkey’s towards as approach a discriminatory interpreted was Luxembourg Summit howthe underlined membership Prime seemedtumultuous, the Ecevit Minister membershipdefined the as EU an law. rule of the and democracy human rights, areasof the laws and amendmentstoninety-four existinglaws, bringingnew with adjustments regard to of Accessionthe of andPartnership medium-termshort goals announced new eighty-nine For a detailed analysis on the National Program, see Sanem Baykal, “Turkey-EU Relations in the Aftermath inthe Relations “Turkey-EU Baykal, Sanem see Program, National the on analysis a detailed For On the difficulties implementing the reforms and the parties’ focus on the national interest, see Gamze Avc Gamze see interest, the national on focus parties’ the and reforms the implementing difficulties Onthe Cited in øsmail, 383. Devlet Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, Devlet ÷lu and Barry 149-170.Rubin, In this context, thedecision inIn thiscontext, summit EU’sHelsinki December1999 taken at the our both political and military enjoy guarantees to emanating from international agreements continue on Cyprus. shall people Cypriot Turkish The General. Secretary Nations the continuation of the talks between the two communities under the aegis of United the full for membership, in total disregard ofAdministration the international agreements on Cyprus, isovershadowing Cypriot Greek the with negotiations opening on insistence EU’s The ú kan z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. ÕPÕ Ankara Review of European Studies 188 584 Even though the path to 2,3 (Fall 2002): 15-63. 583 ú mas The National Program Õ ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Milliyetçi ,” 581 In this vein, Cem 582 Õ , CEU eTD Collection forother options’], 588 Security and Defense Policy, July 17, 2001);cited Suvarierol,in 62. and the State of Negotiations F.Poos, SeeJack report. Parliament’s 587 Turkish Studies 586 (accessed January 14, 2008). was not Turkey’swas not Cyprus internationalit law; with wasatodds that position rather,was the 585 members. oralliances in in which both Greece and international organizations are not Turkey RoC’sparticipation the to couldbeused inrelation powers veto the that 8, whichunderlined Article is and state excluded” the anyother partial with “theof integral Cyprus or union that illegal as it would violate both the Article 185 of the Constitution of the RoC which stipulated Turkey’s goal beingof amember of Union.the the TRNC as well as thebefore forisland resolution the not only would issue,this the support of delegitimize Turkey’s presence of the whole the of if became a member EUrepresenting the RoC because the problem serious Turkish forces in settlement. of a political members, regardless wave firstEU of the place within the island, but alsoinRomanovisit theRoC Prodi’s 2001,whenCyprus herOctober to hestated that would take jeopardize term goals of Turkey’s EU Accession Partnership, in candidacy status integration 1997, the resolution the of issueinto short- Cyprus the of the and the President of the EU Commission, itsinof for membershipin EC’s application RoC the of EU 1990, the the acknowledgement following inseparable from issues each other inevitably anumber became —the of events membership infuture candidacy, the Cypruspolicy and acknowledging thetwo Turkey’s options just because of some obstacles and challenges on the way. look for other Turkey not must Turkey that stated indispensableof undeniableand right and Ibid, 58. Indeed, this was bothexpressed inEU Commission spokesman’s words and highlighted in the European Cited in Semin Suvarierol, “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road Membership to in the EuropeanUnion,” “Ecevit’ten AB aç From Turkey’s official point of view, the accession of the RoC to the EU would be While theHelsinki of Summit1999 did not underlinelink any direct between Turkey’s 588 Based on approach this as underlined byall leadersparty during theperiod, it 4,1 (Spring 2003): 62. Milliyet Õklamas , March8, 2002, (European Parliament, Committee onForeign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Õ : ‘Ba ú ka seçenekler aramay Report Report on Cyprus; Application for Membership to the European Union 189 587 Õz’” [Ecevit’s statement on the EU: ‘We will not look 585 586 This was a This was CEU eTD Collection 31, 2003, available from (accessed February 2008).13, 593 (accessed February 13, 2008). 592 (accessed February 13, 2008). 591 November29, 1999, available from (accessed February 19, 2008). 590 (accessed February 13, 2008). to the EU cause would be impossible. EUcausewouldto the be of membership,EU Erdo response to the criticisms directed at the party that it was selling the Cyprus causefor the sake Cyprus and that both were her rights emanating from previous international agreements. international previous from emanating rights her were both that and Cyprus as such sensitivities national her on up giving without reforms EU necessary the implement to principle of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘equity’ on several occasions. He reassured that Turkey was able on on onethe hand while excludingTurkey other,the on this would shadetheir sincerity.” other candidate countries . . If the EU decides to embrace the former Warsaw Pact countries stated, “Turkey has do.done whatsheneeded Turkey to is situation in a better than 10 the On principles issue,‘equity’ of ‘reciprocity’. and this theMinister of Justice, Cemil Çiçek of the accession forgive start toTurkey the the JDPsawthefailure of the adate EU to previous government, talks in 2002 as a litmus test for its sincerity and compliance with the 589 integrationist The Prime approach. Minister Erdo vocation policyand Cyprus by members mainly party the underlined the parametersof the from diverge articulations madeonTurkey’s although defensiveapproach, the the European membershippromising theRoC on to other the hand, in in one ‘equity’ and onthe Cyprus giveupthe herrights pushing Turkey on to this view, the EU failed EU. in the Turkey beforemember admitting RoCasa accept the EU’s policy to to comply with the principles of ‘respect for past agreements’ and Cemil Çiçek, “Avrupa, Türkiyeyi D Türkiyeyi “Avrupa, Çiçek, Cemil Erdo Erdo Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, Erdo ÷an, “TBMM Grup Konuú ÷ ÷ After coming to power with the 2002 elections, the JDP’s discourse did not completely an, “TBMM Grup Konuú an, “TBMM Grup Konuú ú kan ÕPÕ z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli'nin Devlet z Dr. ÷an thatCypruswas Cyprus cause’,stated ‘national the and selling masÕ mas mas Õ Õ Õú ,” Adalet ve Kalk ,” Adalet ve Kalk ,” Adalet ve Kalk lamak lamak 592 ø çin Bahane Aramamal Bahane çin In the same line with the discourse employed by the by employed discourse the with line same the In 190 590 Õ Õ nma Partisi, February 2, 2003, available from Õ nma Partisi, June 5, 2002, available from nma Partisi, May 1, 2002, available from ÷ an underlined the EU’s failure to pursue an failure the the EU’s underlined to Õ ,” Adalet ve Kalk Adalet ,” ú mas Õ ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Hareket Milliyetçi ,” Õ nma Partisi, October Partisi, nma 589 Hence, to 593 591 In CEU eTD Collection from (accessed January 13, 2008). 599 Program anexample of a policy that is active, non-reactionary and respectable. See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, (accessed January 2008).13, Indeed, Turkey’s Cyprus intervention in1974 was set as 598 from (accessed January 13, 2008). 597 Kalk 596 (accessed February 13, 2008). kabul ediyorum demek de bana göre yanl göre debana demek ediyorum kabul 595 Kalk 594 of EUpolicy. orbitthe Turkey’s perspective, being committed to beingcommitted idealperspective, full the with membership of co-exist could a respected making it clear to the dishonorable,EU that both the EU and issue. Cyprus were Turkey’s Cyprus of the settlement before any RoC to the her ports open to herself obliged already rights. deadlock for the Turkey-EU relations, because bysigning theAdditional Turkey Protocol, inrights both aspects. However, RPP, for the this wasonly beginningof the future the Additionalthe have recognize Turkey notthat Protocol did confirmed to theRoC Turkey’s to traffic members from all including theRoC.For of JDP, Union,the the added clause the to comply with the Additional Protocol according to which she had to open her ports and airports intertwined as the continuation of the EU accession talks depended on whether Turkey would ‘causes’ from more link EUvocation,becameyetTurkey’s two the theCyprus even policy the EU in the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Turkey’s fulfillment of the political criteria for the EU membership; Baykal, “Lozan’a, Ege’ye, K Ege’ye, “Lozan’a, Baykal, Baykal, “Baykal’ Baykal, “Lozan’a, Ege’ye, K Ege’ye, “Lozan’a, Baykal, Abdullah Gül, “AB, K Erdo Erdo Õ Õ nma Partisi, February 13, 2004, available from (accessed February 13, 2008). nma Partisi, November6, 2002, available from (accessed February 13, 2008). 597 an, “AK÷an, Parti Genel Ba ÷an, “Ba Õ Similarly, the JDP government reiterated that they did not see the Cyprus issue within issue Cyprus the see not did they that reiterated government JDP the Similarly, , available from , (accessed January 13, 2008). TotheRPP, thepolicy by pursued governmentwas not the only alsobutsubmissive 598 ú bakan Erdo and thatTurkey should nothave signedtheAdditional before Protocol Õ n Grup Konuú Õ br Õ s'ta Bir Taraf Olamaz. Müzakerelerin an: ÷an: Annan Plan Õ Õ ú br br kan Õ Õ mas s’a Dokundurtmay s’a s’a Dokundurtmay s’a Õ Recep Tayyip Erdo Õ ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, February 17, 2004, available from 594 ÕúWÕ They stated itbein They anyway linkedit stated could not that to r,” Adalet veKalk Adalet r,” Õ külliyenKuzey K 596 Õ Õ 191 z,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, June 28, 2005, available 2005, 28, June Partisi, Halk Cumhuriyet z,” z,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, June 28, 2005, available 2005, 28, June Partisi, Halk Cumhuriyet z,” Nevertheless, despite all official efforts to de- ÷an AB Bürokratlar Õ nma Partisi, December 18, 2003, available from available 2003, 18, December Partisi, nma Õ br ø çine Girmesi Kabul Edilemez,” Adalet ve Õ s’a yaramaz demek yanl Õ ndan Brifing AldÕ 595 and rejected the roleof the and rejected ÕúWÕ r, külliyenbunu ,” Adalet ve 599 CHP Parti From this CEU eTD Collection ve KalkÕ 606 from (accessed May 24, 2007). 605 (accessed February 2008).11, 604 December7, 2006, (accessed June 20, 2008). additional preconditions to fulfill the treaty obligations.See “Turkey ‘willup open to Cyprus’,” 603 (accessed December1, 2007). 602 601 (accessed January 2008).13, accusation: Cyprus policy was apartof Turkey’s EU policy inwithand realist contrast Baykal’s 600 from EU-orientation.” evendeviation is not our “there a slight interests, national Turkey’s with concomitant and principles foundational Turkey’s interest. and vision national one’s to on holding by only arena international inthe status state policyAtatürk, state pursued since this markedthe bankruptcy of government’sthe Cyprus policy from and adeviation realistthe RoC. the from action reciprocal some by followed was it that condition with analternativesuggestinginstead, offer totheRoCon of two Turkey’s opening ports the Instead of yielding tothe EU’s pressure to prevent apossible ‘crash’, the government came up Protocol the suspension could bring Turkey’s EUmembershipnegotiations. about of of Additional comply the with terms failingthe to as process, accession Turkey’s endangered Cyprus,this Northern to the embargo trade lifted the unlesstheEU for trade Cyprus to ports similar vein, Baykal stated: Erdo Erdo Despite having beenseen as a significant step, this swift move was not found satisfactory since it put forward TraynorWatt, and “Turkey clashes with EU overCyprus,” Ibid. Baykal, “Baykal’ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Parti Meclisi Toplant ÷ ÷ nma Partisi,nma November 5, 2006, available from (accessed 2007). May 24, dares to turn the Northern Cyprus, every inch of which is covered by the Turkish nation’s Turkish the by covered is which of inch every Cyprus, Northern the turn to dares Who fairly. and dares to belittle Turkey’s Cyprus cause! Who dares tolookdown upon the honestly Turkish Who state! openly, Turkey with relations its conducts EU the that hopes Turkey When the Prime Minister Erdo When the Prime want We EU. the democracy against and Europe,being or we want our rightsdemocracy, to against be respected,being as andview we our want it take all. should Nobody civilization? Can anyone question our engagementwith democracy? Nobody can doubt it. Can anyone questiondesire our tobe within the civilization,withinWestern contemporarythe an, “Aç an, an, “Türkiye zor bir ülke de Õ k ve net söylüyorum, kim ne derse desin, AB yönelimimizde en ufak bir sapma yoktur,” Adalet yoktur,” sapma bir ufak en AByönelimimizde desin, derse kim ne söylüyorum, ve net k Õ n Grup Konuú mas ÷ il, dürüst bir ülke,” Adalet ve Kalk Õ ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, July 1, 2003, available from 604 Erdo ÷ an declared in 2006 that Turkey would not open her open not would thatTurkey an in2006 declared ÕVÕ na Sunulan Merkez Yönetim Kurulu Raporu ÷an, defining areflection Turkey’s as EU goal of 192 The Guardian Õ nma Partisi, June 20, 2006, available 606 , June , 16, 2006, Healsothe underlined that 603 While for Baykal, for While 601 BBC NEWS , available from available , 605 stated: 600 , In a 602 CEU eTD Collection November1997/TURKEYSETTINGSAILTOTHE21STCENTURY.pdf.>(accessed June 18,2008). November1997), (accessed January 13, 2008). ù 607 “humiliating.” was way it.on dependent was her character civilized forneed nor theacknowledgmentof neither didapproach, EU the herEuropeanness, Turkey civilization’, freeing the civilizational goal from Turkey’s relations with the EU. Based on this contemporary of level ‘reaching the the of of principle the interpretation defensive yetanother one forother.The the articulations on foreign involved Turkish 1997-2007also policy during Turkey’s topursueboth right EUandthe Cypruspoliciesbeing without imposed tochoose counterbalanced by on principlesthe defensivenotes the ‘equity’ andof ‘reciprocity’ and EU policy and the maxim of 5.1.4. ‘The EU is not the only address thecontemporaryof civilization’ ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ were European did not mean that she had to choose between an Asian identity and a European one. a European and identity Asian an between choose to had she that mean not did European following speechof Foreignthe Minister Cem delivered in 1997 isilluminating in sense:this shouldhave perspective amuch rather broader limitingthan aEuropean herself to reach. The arta arta Ba Ibid., pp. 1-2. See also Cem, “Turkey: Setting Sail to the 21st Century,” in Cited Erdo ÷ ÷lanmadan Onaylan From this approach, Turkey’s EU vocation was notan “obsession”; and tosee itin this links between made Turkey’s integrationist the section, in As previous the discussed realist diplomacy, rather than a tool for aconflictual policy. blood,into anissueof politicalhaggling! Our government the sees issue Cyprus as amatterof In other words, the fact that Turkey was both Muslim and secular, both Asian and Asian both secular, and Muslim both was Turkey that fact the words, other In Asian andEuropean. This isouruniqueness, richness, and ourstrength. Asian an and aEuropean identity. characteristic Turkey of possesses the beingboth between andtheprivilege choose to obligation or need a have also not does Turkey culture’. European human genderrights, and equality, ofwhich all constitute basis ofthe the ‘contemporary phenomenon, isTurkey acountry values sharesthat the of democracy, pluralism,secularism, have to its obligation an or aproblem have not does It years. 700 for European Europeannessalready is Turkey verified by foreign countries . . . . If being European is a cultural an, “Do an, 'ÕúLú leri Bakan ÷ rudan Ticaret Tüzü Ticaret rudan Õø Õ 608 p Uygulanmal smail Cem, Given her multiple identities and peculiar characteristics, Turkey multiple peculiarcharacteristics, Givenand her identities ÷ ü, K ü, 61. Õ ÕGÕ br Õ r,” Adaletr,” ve Kalk s Türk Taraf s Türk 193 ÕQÕ n Beklentileri Esas Al Esas Beklentileri n Õ nma Partisi, December16, 2006, available from 607 Perceptions Õ nmak Suretiyle Ve Hiçbir Ve Suretiyle nmak 2, 3 (September- 2,3 609 CEU eTD Collection 614 613 less democratic than it would have been otherwise. ( otherwise. been have would it than democratic less 612 611 610 project. civilization way to fulfill Atatürk’s vision to viewing the EU question as only illustrative: remarks of Cem are following The advantage. her to ‘richness’ this employ could and all them embodied She Atatürk.” view’ as “the exact application of the principle of ‘peace at home peace in the world’ as set by ‘global the defined and principles Kemalist the to policy this linked also Cem multiplicity. in identity Turkey’s its asthereby conceptualized reconstructed ‘global the outlook’, in the EEC. contribute West,butalso full membership encumbered tothe only herto Turkey’s prevented presenting herself as the ‘staunch ally of the West’ as in the Cold War. This representation not in than rather fullness, its heridentities had rediscover ForCem,approach. Turkey to defining Turkey’s fundamental as hergoal innerSelf. how Turkey her how thiscould enrich Western with the world diversity depended on and newpolicy Turkey’s ‘Easternness’, demonstrate the end other propagated of to pendulum the in home, world’dictum at accordingly. peace the ‘peace and ‘civilizationism’ Kemalist Ibid., 247. Ibid., 441. Ibid., 109. Cem also stated that Turkey’s Cold War politics of being a gendarme Ibid.,of 105. the West turned Turkey in Cited With this articulation, Cem suggested a change from considering the EU as the only pursuit of being a global state. preferenceswill have new preferences instead. It is about supplementingwe and complementing the have such‘substitution policy’; in otherwords, itdoes notmean that we have put asideour EUgoalas and the EU withMiddle ThisEast. approach doesmeannot —asit has been usually misunderstood as —a our otherwith. will She look for neweconomic and openingscultural in the Balkans, Caucasus and characteristics.the Turkey will naturally assign special importance to her relations with the societies she lived Our foreign policy is in In this regard, rather than insisting on an exclusive Western identity, or moving to the to moving or identity, Western exclusive an on insisting than rather regard, this In 613 'ÕúLú Hence, in seeing Kemalism as its base, the ‘global outlook’ also reconstituted the also reconstituted outlook’ its ‘global base,the as Kemalism in seeing Hence, 612 leri Bakan In putting the EU into this larger context, this foreign policy vision, policy foreign this context, larger this into EU the putting In 611 In this sense, this view was not fully exempt from an integrationist Õø smail Cem, 64. 610 'ÕúLú 194 leri Bakan 614 Õø Asked ininterviewan this whether smail Cem 1999, 358-76). part of largerAtatürk’s of CEU eTD Collection 619 618 617 (accessed January 14, 2008). 616 615 EU,which,the in the candidacy granting Turkey, itselfto reconstituted also as a “multi- correctionthe of “existing injustice” the owner of Republican the enlightenment,”revolution and Atatürk’s underlined thisCem, approach.declared the DLP For who as“the representative andthe which The Helsinki candidacy, Turkey’s Summitacknowledged responses tothe 1999, of sincerity in upholding its civilizational ideals itsdependent on was ability embraceto Turkey. EU’s that out pointed rather It identity. European the against identity Turkish juxtapose late discourse skeptic of 1990s. the Hence, the terminology of the 1970s Islamist discourse became a referential pointin the Euro- “Berlin Wall”, Y Mesut acknowledge in failed to was Luxembourg theaftermath 1997, which present Summit of especially of the Turkey’s EU Thismulticulturalism how Turkey by in andplurality,abided approach them contrast. candidacy. suchidealsit embracemany instanceshowtheEUfailedas the to propagated, that showed Shortly after were there this approach, According to identity. and European civilization of representative the summit, from goal freedthe EU ‘reaching thebeing levelof of civilization’ only the contemporary the the then Prime Minister remarks: pointed to, Atatürk goal Westernization the contradicted Cited in Cited Cited in Cited Ibid. “Avrupa Ibidem. In contrast to the 1970’s Islamist discourse, however, this discursive move not did discursive this however, 1970’sIslamistdiscourse, In contrast to the In this sense, the thought. had we as civilization references contemporary of level has Turkey reached this level thatin many On aspects. the otherhand,opinion, many my countriesIn havenot reached the civilization. dissociated contemporary of level the was to pointed Atatürk What the EU orientation from being the sole Õ Turkey in the 21st Century TRT-1, Politikan lmaz, declared that the decision taken at the Luxembourg Summit built a new a built Summit Luxembourg the at taken decision the that lmaz, declared úDúNÕ n” [Europe is perplexed], 616 and defined the EU’s underlying characteristic as a “Christian Club.” “Christian a as characteristic underlying EU’s the defined and Õ n Nabz Õ : 4 Ocak 1998-29 Mart 1998 (Mersin:Rüstem, 2000), 161. Milliyet 619 , December 16,1997, available from and a“historic decision”Turkey for as wellfor 195 (Ankara: Bas 615 ø smailfollowing Cemgavethe Õ m Yay 618 Helsinki decision meant decision Helsinki Õ n Müdürlün ÷ü, 1998), 178. 617 CEU eTD Collection from (accessed January 13, 2008). 626 625 “Türkiye’de Seçimler”, (accessed January 14, 2008). 624 623 “Türkiye’de Seçimler”, (accessed January 14, 2008). 622 621 620 unjust. Criteria were Copenhagen comply the with failure to Turkey’s on criticisms EU’s the that declared repetitively ofthe previous government, JDP officials the discourse 2007. Inthesamelinewith not. or amember, shewasacandidate, whether develop, to continue would sharedand already Turkey values that were the they EU;rather, to the particular values werenot view, Copenhagen this the To moreperspective. global involved a ideals’ EU from ‘European Criteriathe anewmeaning Copenhagen andgavethe which entity.” multi-ethnic and multi-religious cultural, ‘reach to the level of the contemporary civilization’, he further stated, “Our goal iscrystal “Ourgoal stated, he further civilization’, contemporary the of level the ‘reach to Christian a Union or coalition valuesof as itpropagated. accession talks with Turkey was the final test that would show whether the EU was a should follow a flexible foreign policy. foreign flexible a follow should Turkey that also suggested JDP 1990s,the ofCem in the 1980s, and the‘global outlook’ with ‘flexiblethe foreign policy’ RPPduringthe of the 1970s, ‘active policy’ the the of change our destination and route.” destination change our means indexed to a specified date . . . . No decision that is taken by the EU will lead us to Confirming this, Erdo Turkey anEUstatebutwas as extensionthe of Turkey’s own civilizational project. depend of EU’sacceptance on the not did European-orientation the From this perspective, policy. EU her for asset an as but to substitution a as not policy, foreign her in alternatives Erdo Ibid. Adalet ve Kalk Ibid. Adalet ve Kalk Ibid., 157. Ibid., 166. ÷ This was reverberated in the discourse of the JDP following the years from 2002 until an, “5. “5. an, ø sti Õ Õ nma Partisi, nma Partisi, ú are veDe are ÷an said, “The goalsof nation concerningthe future our are byno ÷ Her Her erlendirme Toplant erlendirme ú ú ey Türkiye ey Türkiye 626 622 Dissociating the EU goal from Dissociating from to Turkey’s the EUgoal objective They further stated that the decision to open the 624 ø ø çin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi çin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi According to this perspective, Turkey needed more needed Turkey to this perspective, According ÕVÕ ,” Adalet veKalk ,” Adalet 196 620 The same approach also dissociated the 621 Õ nma Partisi, October 2, 2005, available 2005, 2, October Partisi, nma 623 Furthermore, in a similar vein , BELGEnet, under , BELGEnet, , BELGEnet, under , BELGEnet, 625 CEU eTD Collection Partisi, November5, 2000, available from (accessed January 14, 2008). 630 when timecame forfinal arrangements” (Avc difficulties some Wehad consideration. those views into their stated have taking by They issues many on changes program. We made views. National of the implementation and preparation the to pertaining concerns some 629 reforms on the most sensitive issues in theshort-term” (Öni implement to unwillingness the and criteria Copenhagen the meet to need the between a balance strike to Turkey illuminating: “The National Program (NPAA) represented an attempt on the part of the political authorities in 628 2005, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). 627 NAP. remarkableof elementEuro-skepticism in the government, forgroundwork main the reforms for Turkey’s entrance inthe was EU, there also a her power. Turkey’s national sovereignty and aspart of a clandestine plan divide to Turkey and weaken to threat a as issues these taking in affairs’ in domestic ‘non-interference and sovereignty’ ‘national of‘full-independence’, elements tothe issuesthese on hadrecourse also for Cyprus’support membershipin tothe theEUprior resolution of issue.Articulations the in Copenhagen EU’s tothe candidacy status 1997andits criteria, Turkey’s rejection of to a number of issues, rangingfrom the reforms Turkey had toundertake in order to fulfill the home, peace in the world’ in domesticaffairs’:submission ‘No tothe EU’, and abolder at to‘peace approach 5.1.5. Theelements of ‘full-independence’,‘national sovereignty’ and‘non-interference instead, and move on our path.” Criteria’ ‘Ankara Criteria us,wewill Copenhagen call the nottake EUdoes casethe clear. In reserved and reactionary position taken during the 1970s. the reservedtaken during position and reactionary the than 1990srather the after approach amore “cool-headed” itadopted that acknowledged priority priority beof and hadto government placedthe economicnew opening development on Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, The following remarks of Mesut Y Indeed, it was during this coalitional period when the NPAA was prepared. Ziya Öni Erdo 629 ÷an, “Türkiye’nin Üyeli While the coalitional government of the DLP, the MP, and the NAP prepared the prepared NAP the and MP, the DLP, the of government coalitional the While As discussed above, official ininvolved the discourse a 1997-2007 defensive approach The NAP of the 1990s was certainly not the NAP of the 1970s, as the party ú kan ÕPÕ z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin MHP 6. Büyük Kurultay Konu Kurultay Büyük 6. MHP Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. ÷i AB’nin Stratejik Gücünü Artt Õ 627 lmaz, the Head of the MP, are illuminating in this sense: “the [NAP] had Õ 2003, 169). 197 ú , 2003, 13). ÕUÕ r,” Adalet ve Kalk 628 630 represented especially by the by especially represented According to the NAP, the Õ nma Partisi, September 3, ú mas ú ’ statement is Õ ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Milliyetçi ,” CEU eTD Collection Partisi, November29, 2001, available from (accessed January 2007).14, 636 11,June 2002, available from (accessed January 14, 2007). 635 634 March 21,2000, available from (accessed January 14, 2007). 633 632 Partisi, October26, 2001, available from (accessed January 14, 2008). a member of the EU Turkey. ignores the EU’sinsincerity ‘objective’ towards was welcome for it calling were stated, “Supporting EU’sstanceor reports objective, the Bahçeli progress the NAP, the path insincere.” towardsand indeterminate, membership‘inconsistent, was Cyprus and separatism’ ‘Kurdish the on position was not a the Turkish the nation and people.” from exemptdiscourse. integrationist the 631 even objective of Turkish outlook in its foreign foreign policy asindiscourse 1970s. The the identificationparty’s of mainthe policy as ‘raising Turkey to the level of the EU countries and Eurasia. in leader be aregional to in andenergy order oftrade areas in the for cooperation centers introverted Thirdintroverted World country. aMiddlefrom her democratic the towards regime,an world into turning Eastern Turkey and leader andfrom becoming byinviting country, chaos aregional the dragging within division one explanation: The PKK as well as those that supported wasonly Bahçeli, bolder thisthere the goal. For towards totake actions when attempted Turkey PKK aimed to prevent Turkey Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, Ibid. Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, Ibid. Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, beyond Yet, the NAP underlined that the EU policies were against “the national interests of interests national “the against were policies EU the that NAPunderlined the Yet, 631 From why it intensified its From actionswas curious asto PKK this the perspective, 635 them’ Responding to the Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Y Mesut Minister Prime Deputy the to Responding ú ú ú ú kan kan kan kan 633 further clarified how the foreign policy vision of the party was not was party the of vision policy foreign the how clarified further ÕPÕ ÕPÕ ÕPÕ ÕPÕ z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM’de Yapt TBMM’de Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM’de Yapt TBMM’de Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. 632 634 In this sense, the party did not have a strictly anti-Western For the Head of the NAP, Devlet Bahçeli, the EU’s 198 636 Hence,whilebe Turkey’s to right Õ÷Õ Õ÷Õ Grup Konu Grup Grup Konu Grup ú ú mas mas Õ lmaz’ statement that the EU the that lmaz’ statement Õ Õ ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Hareket Milliyetçi ,” ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Hareket Milliyetçi ,” ú ú mas mas Õ Õ ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Milliyetçi ,” ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Milliyetçi ,” CEU eTD Collection December14, 2002, available from (accessed January 14, 2008). 642 January 31, 2002, available from (accessed January 14, 2008). 641 Hareket Partisi, November30, 1999, available from (accessed January 14, 2007). of Öcalan. See Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel See Bahçeli, Öcalan. of execution the for and punishment capital ofthe abolishment the against openly was NAP The Öcalan. Abdullah 640 639 December6, 2002, available from (accessed January 14, 2007). 638 11,June 2002, available from (accessed January 14, 2007). 637 ontheCyprusconcessions issue. sovereignty humanin to references its just asitrights, demanded thatTurkey gave defend and interests to right hernational andTurkey’s of terrorism threat disregarding the reforms, Turkey’s policies against the PKK, and the Cyprus issue.history, andpotential. For Bahçeli,magnitude, Turkey’s with thein accordance was EU accession was the unless heaven the to journey and wrong, they found it right and realist to give concessions on these causes. on these give concessions to and realist found itright they and wrong, utopian Bahçeli, one’s justcausesas holdingsame on they to while considered category. To could these issues. beno negotiation on there Bahçeli, For straightforward. very was position NAP’s the penalty, death abolishing and speech freedom of minority rights, laws on extending new concerningthe context, media, Bahçeli stated that this would certainly lead to separatism. lead to thisthat would stated media, certainly Bahçeli stated, “What isstated, “What is indispensable for respectterritorial integrity, toour Turkey national the ‘reciprocity’. of principle the of exercise any before sovereignty on Turkish For Cypriots. Bahçeli, was this unacceptable, asthese acts would pool Turkey’s varioussubmission future other to total mean would unconditionally reforms these undertaking vein, same the In state. Turkish saw the EU accession reforms as a direct threat against the sovereignty and integrity of the Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, See Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel SeeBahçeli, It should be noted here that this situation mainly involved the executionof the former leader Ibid.of the PKK, Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, The reservations of the party towards the EU were mainly in relation to the EU the to mainly inrelation EUwere the towards party the of The reservations ú ú ú kan kan kan 637 ú ÕPÕ ÕPÕ ÕPÕ kan z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli’nin Dr. Devlet z ÕPÕ ú kan ÕPÕ 638 z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin TBMM Grup Konu Grup TBMM Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. fait accompli fait The NAP situated also Turkishthe ‘Europhiles’ in the 640 As regards the use of Kurdish in education and 199 , such as recognizing the RoC andgiving, such up as recognizingtheRoC ú ú ú mas mas mas ú Õ Õ Õ mas ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Hareket Milliyetçi ,” ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Hareket Milliyetçi ,” ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Hareket Milliyetçi ,” 642 641 By this token, Bahçeli token, this By Õ In this sense, the NAP ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Hareket Milliyetçi ,” ú mas Õ ,” Milliyetçi ,” 639 In this CEU eTD Collection 383). needed tojoin Turkey under theconditions of they tyranny case pressure,and in but the choice wassurvival; intheir her ( forhands TRNC ofthe independence the wanted indeed Turkey that stated also Turkey and foreign policy levels ( levels policy foreign and military economic, the at integration partial on a working Turkey, and TRNC the between Council Association 647 646 (accessed January 14, 2008). Aç countries took place on the date the EU began negotiations with Cyprus, as a symbolic asa Cyprus, with negotiations EUbegan the placedate the on took countries between the TRNC and measures accession the accelerated Turkey. Turkish the of government nextround enlargement, the The first meeting for negotiationsfrom listof the candidates with excludedTurkey the accession Cyprus and of the Association the start EUwould the 1997declared that when Summitof Luxembourg context that the Council between tworepresented theissue asamatter of Turkey’s ownnational was security problem.within It this with the island’s Greek Cypriot government. Cypriot Greek island’s the with would go ahead with plans integrateto Northern Cyprus should the EUlaunch accession talks against againstany it TRNC be asan the attack would that Turkey,and perceived attack a preventive bombing would take place.a preventive would bombing take response thatthis bystated vigorous which military,would mean Turkish the When announced deploy RoC itsthe decision missilesto a in1997,this S-300 the produced EUdisregarded developments was in Cyprus aclearproof the ‘sensitivities’.these that solution!” NAP stated, “Cyprus on prominent party’sthe main regarding outlook issue. the Theofficial Cyprus website of the is not an impediment but a national cause. Submission cannot be a 645 2008). 644 643 suffice proveto their friendliness towards Turkey.” would this sensitivities, national our If EU respected structure. the andstate unitary culture, Similar declarations followedbefore the Luxembourg Summit, finally leading to the establishment of Ibidem. the Bahçeli, “Genel Ba “Genel Bahçeli, See the official web-site of the Nationalist Action Party at (accessed February Ibid. 19, Õklamas From this perspective, the EU’s support for the Greek side as regards the side asregards Greek for the support EU’s the From this perspective, Õ ,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, June 7, 2002, 644 ú kan ø smail 1998, 364). Shortly after this declaration, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Affairs of Foreign Minister the declaration, this after Shortly 364). 1998, smail ÕPÕ z Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin Liderler Zirvesi’nin Ard Zirvesi’nin Liderler Bahçeli’nin Devlet z Dr. 646 The Turkish governmentfurther announced that 200 647 643 Inthis officialthe regard, discourse This non-submissive approach was Thisnon-submissive approach also Õ ndan Yapt ndan Õ÷Õ Bas casus belli, Õ n øsmail 1998, and 645 CEU eTD Collection 652 ( ignored the rule of law and disregarded the 1960 Agreements, and its animosity towards the Turkish Cypriots” 651 November1997/TURKEYSETTINGSAILTOTHE21STCENTURY.pdf> (accessed 18, June 2008). Perceptions 650 649 (Istanbul: Ça University forCenterCyprus Studies Publications, 1999), 28-34; Erol Manisal 648 decision. summit’s tothe response 1970s, in constituting anidentity for Turkey waspursuantthat international of law, Cyprus policy of the government was reminiscent of the policy pursued by the RPP during the however, asstated by itCem, did not involve playingtheCyprusbid against theEU: issue concerning wasreactionary; Cyprus the discourse the security-driven remarks show, ‘unjust’againstthe and‘illegal’ policies pursued regarding the island’s future. in necessary failed an neededTurkey measures this totake case theEU to take regard, action security. In indirectly Turkey’s was culminatingthreaten in also butwould that region, the in developments: discourse centered these relation to 'ÕúLú Ibid., 60. Consider the following statement of Cem: “EU should realize how it was unfair and unjust towards us, how it Cited in Cited Cited in øsmail, 383. See, leri Bakan øsmail, 362-363. See also Korkmaz Haktan Hence, nothaving been seen as a stance against the EU but as a ‘responsible deed’, the this respect. community in Northern and Cyprus theirconfidence on future.the Weare trying tohelp in solution. The solution of the corresponding problem isa much very dependent for on the power and welfare looking of the and Turkish dimensions different in rooted as it seeing is matter problems between currentthe situationof Cyprus and the EU.our Therefore, approach to the We haveno not tendency and try to Cyprus againstuse evaluation inour the EU ofthe In this EU’sLuxembourgsense, the not only decision tothewould tension contribute no can Turkey . . longer. . remain passive in frontTurkey of these for developments.also but Cyprus Northern the for only not a problem into issue security the turned has Greece by signed doctrine military the . and . . Cyprus in weapons sophisticated deploy to decided Cyprus ofSouthern Administration Greek the that fact The enforcements. war deploys administration Greek the before We Mediterranean. ask Eastern the in the dangerous very EU be may to that reevaluateculmination a of step first the the steps it willof the whole Cyprus is not only a violation of international law and denial of reality but also take with utmostThe EU’s consideration of Administration theGreek of Southern the representative as Cyprus attention before it is too late, and 'ÕúLú 2, 3 (September-November1997), (accessed January 14, 2008). 656 Brussels,March 21, 2002, (accessed January 14, 2008). 655 of a political settlement in the island. in the settlement a political of the Union regardless RoCwouldthe be amember of Prodi stated that Commission Romano problem. be moreto active tosolveinitiative inthe Cyprusissueandtakeabolder the inorder 654 theCyprus question. an on agreement to prior Cypriots Greek the of accession incaseof the drastic measures be totake might obliged Turkey offensive for measures’. ‘defensiveFollowingturn statement, Cem Prodi’s that declared Cyprusissue tothe GreekCypriotside, while giving guarantee <Õ in of HeadofMesutwas reverberated the words the MPandtheDeputy the Minister, Prime in principle: home, world’ peace the ‘peace at mainly,beAtatürk’s foreign policy, tobasedconsidered traditional on Turkey’s wasalso this countries, policy relationsthe with other to approach having apeaceful our pressour should exert their efforts into changing this” ( situation as‘Turkey’ expansionist has policies and Cypriot Turks are supporting the occupation’.We think that 653 humanitarian. and responsible, “Türkiye’dentarihi rest: ‘Ya biz, ya Rumlar!’”[A historic gamble from Turkey: Either usor theGreeks!] Cited in Suvarierol, 62. Y Mesut Y Cited in Cited On the need to change the perception of the EU, Cem stated the following: “Everybody has been seeing the seeing been has “Everybody following: the stated Cem EU, of the perception the change to need Onthe lmaz, who stated that the EU was placing the whole pressure on Turkey the regarding Turkey on whole EUwasplacing the pressure the stated that lmaz, who Õ lmaz, “Mesut Y , November3, 2001, (accessed January 14, This bolder connotation added to the principle of ‘peace at home, peace inhome, ‘peace theThis bolderworld’ principle peace addedtothe at connotation of itself . . . [It is] a positive bold step that is oriented to build the future. peace in the world’continue is not a productto pursue to ofgivethese a any passiveconcession goals on that policy. with. . . power We the will within create to is ourselvesa notcontribution tobut stepresist important the Equally policies backan of any from important. state,activeespecially our theconfederation national a policies of Greece towards interests. andone policies tonotand the thatand willgeneral can go peacebeyondwe naturally understand Cyprus. In this context, we consider the . claims on Mediterranean, the future of Cyprus, say . we When . . ‘Peace Mediterranean. of the part Eastern both in at crossroads home, energy crucial most the we see seas; in lie both ofTurkey interests existential wesee the First, 656 'ÕúLú Õ lmaz, “Ba Yet, one of the ‘boldest’ voices came from the DLP, when the President of the EU leri Bakan Õ lmaz’ ú bakan Yard Õø Õ n De smail Cem ÷ erlendirmeleri,” Avrupa Birli Õmc 653 ÕVÕ Y , 658. In placing Turkey’s national interests at the center and center atthe interests national Turkey’s Inplacing Õlmaz Brüksel’de Konu 657 This was when the defensive discourse took an took defensive Thiswaswhen the discourse 202 'ÕúLú leri Bakan ÷ i Genel Sekreterli 658 ú tu,” Avrupa Birli The Prime Minister and the Headof andthe Minister ThePrime Õø smail Cem 655 and that Turkey andTurkey needed that thus ÷ 1999,72). i, Brussels, June 14, 2002, ÷ 654 i Genel Sekreterli ÷ i, CEU eTD Collection as it would only pave the way for Turkey’s loss of sovereignty and independence, in other following words of the Chief of the General Staff are illustrative: The independence. and integrity territorial Turkey’s threatened directly that formations pooled national Turkey’s sovereignty,also but because its links of with terrorist the forward because reformsthe itthat put force EUwasadivisive notonly the perspective, new search [for allies] that would include Iran and Federation.” new allies] the Russian Iran include would search [for that would do better by notcompromising either with the EU or with the U.S., but by beginning “a slightest assistance from the EU,” after 40 years of door. years of EU’s 40 on knocking after from EU,” the assistance slightest same context. At a conferenceregarding the Cyprus issue, and conditionsthe Turkey had tofulfill tobe amemberin the on foreign policy, K 2002): 142. Hasan Kösebalan, “Turkey’s EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures,” 663 January 14, 2008). (accessed Membership,” Union 662 European UnionMembership,” 660 interests, national Turkey’s on negatively looking of EU EBSCO 661 (accessed January 2008).14, 659 K Tuncer NSC,General Turkey’s of General Secretary from the circles, government the of came out statements controversial most the an alternative, settlement. Cyprus TRNCif a DLPEcevit Turkey theEUadmitted the before added that the annex could “Ordudan Son Dakika Golü,” [Last Minute Goal from the Military] European Seeking Stop To Turkey For Call With Controversy Causes General “Turkish Gorvett, in Quoted Quoted in Jon Gorvett, “Turkish General Causes Controversy With Call For Turkey To Stop Seeking “Ageneral speaks his mind,” Cyprus Mail host (accessed June 24, 2008). For the retired General Suat retiredthe General For [PKK] movement’s survival by offering overt and covert assistance to it. of Turkey’s context entry the in place take rights, inhuman and thedemocracy European so-called of platform the Union . . . . SomeThe developments EU members that have encourage been thethe PKK,main which factors has been tryingbehind to gainthe a place for itself in While this reactionary attitude did not lead to putting aside the EU goal lead forputting EUgoal didinsearch not asidethe to While attitude this reactionary 659 , 6 , November2001; cited Suvarierol,in 62. Eurasia Insight Economist ø 362, 8264 (16 March2002): 53-54, lhan, too, the path towards the EU could not be accepted not the EUcould thetowards path lhan, too, , June 22, 2008, 22, , June 203 ÕOÕ nç stated that “Turkey hasn’t seen the Milliyet 661 ÕOÕ nç, who put the EU’spolicy put the nç, who K Middle East Policy 9, 2 (June ÕOÕ , 8 December 2000; cited in cited 2000; , 8December Business Source Complete nç suggested that Turkey that suggested nç 663 660 Accusing the 662 From this , CEU eTD Collection available from (accessed February 13, 2008). 667 (accessed February 13, 2008). 666 9, 2003, available from (accessed February 19, 2008). 665 permanently resolved. unacceptable, Erdo 664 issue, security issuea national as Cyprus the in2004.Identifying memberbecame EU aof the made by some politicians in EUcountriesthe and, Cyprus the issue. statements the EUreforms, the to in relation usedmainly were These honor’. ‘national and concessions on Cyprus’ together with of‘national elements the sovereignty’, ‘independence,’ RPP, continued employ to defensivethe elementof ‘non-submission EU’andto the ‘no- the and JDP the mainly parliament, new the in parties two the However, parliament. new the during which none of partiesthe place took that in the previous coalition could in obtain a seat regard to‘Turkey’s sensitivities’ suchas cause theCyprus wasabatedwith 2002elections,the ‘civilizationism’: it words, would Turkey preventprinciplesfrom ‘full-independence’realizing Atatürk’s of and Abdullah Gül, “K Erdo Erdo Suat an pointed out that any further imposition by the EU with Cyprus÷an anyfurther with imposition was outthat by regard to EU pointed the 665 ÷ ÷an, “Ba ø The non-submissive attitude towards the EU was especially apparent after theRoC after apparent EUwasespecially the towards attitude The non-submissive pushedbolderalso stance a that with for andEuro-skepticapproach This anti-EU Ataturkist thought.with incongruous is Europe with Integration mission. our as Europeanization Atatürk longed forwas not this.Atatürk showed [us] civilization rather than ofindependent EU’s [entity] and oursacrifice ownsovereignty . . The independence that joins the EU, the independence of [our] country will lose its present meaning; we will be part tell me, candidly, don’t you at least suspect there is something wrong with this? . . If Turkeyin fact demonstrated against our candidacy in Europe,HADEP, [and Abdullah Öcalan]. Please the of Fener [Greek] Orthodox ChurchBartholemeos, the Greek Patriarch thePKKsupportersCypriot[s], who the Greece, candidacy: EU Turkey’s by delighted were who those] at [Look lhan, and underlining that Turkey had andunderliningTurkey do, the donewhatsheneeded that Head of to JDP, the an, “TBMM Grup Konu Grup “TBMM an, Avrupa Birli÷ 666 ú bakan Erdo 664 and that Turkey would not recognize the RoC unless the Cyprus issue was Õ br Õ s'ta Çözüm Olmadan TanÕ 667 i’ne Neden HayÕr? an KKTC÷an Cumhurba On the other hand, for the Head of the RPP, Baykal, it was certain ú mas Õ ,” Adalet ve Kalk ,” Adalet (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000); cited Kösebalan,in 140. ma Olmaz,” Adalet ve Kalk ú kan 204 Õ Denkta Õ nma Partisi, December 1, 2004, available from available 2004, 1, December Partisi, nma ú ile Görü ú tü,” Adalet ve Kalk Õ nma Partisi, December1, 2004, Õ nma Partisi,nma May CEU eTD Collection 673 from (accessed January 13, 2008). 672 (accessed January 2008).13, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). 13, January (accessed 671 from available 670 (accessed January 14, 2008). interests. Turkish with fully coincide the Annan Plan, which EUdidthe keep its promise not of removing tradeembargo the totheNorthern Cypruswas after voted when ‘yes’ apparent especially was This commitments. past its byof observant not the and insincere was Turkish Cypriots although this did not even 669 (accessed February 19, 2008). be elevatedtoacondition of EU membership: precondition beto amember 2004,Turkey’s after position on Armenianthe issue would also 1923. of Treaty Lausanne the on bases she that perspective rights minority the and Sea, Aegean inthe interests policy, Cyprus her mainly, causes’, ‘national her on concessions any give respected status in the international arena. Based on this, Baykal stated that Turkey should not security. and Baykal national foreignsaid, the Turkey bebasedsurvival policy Turkey’s couldof only on 668 EU”, the country. and nation a as integrity indivisible and policy protected Turkey’sthat national interest and maintainedthat hernational independence the EU would come up with another condition as Turkey fulfilled the previous ones. road the that towards EUmembershipthe adead-endfull was of and additional conditions; Ibid. Baykal, “Lozan’a, Ege’ye, K Ege’ye, “Lozan’a, Baykal, Baykal, “Baykal’ Baykal, “D Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Baykal, “Grup Konu 672 In this regard, similar to the NAP’s position in the late 1990s, for Baykal, too, the EU the fortoo, Baykal, 1990s, late in the NAP’sposition the to similar In thisregard, must .Armenian genocidewill be resolved, thenwill come the Pontus genocide, then the They could not turn [the Armenian issue] into a preconditionmembership] [for made it but a In thisfor Baykal, context, pursue Turkey hadto an honorable, and respected active 671 Õú asubmissive policy Turkey would preventfrom gaining anhonorable and 670 Politika Bizim En Temel Dayanak Noktam As the EU was interested in keeping Turkey as the “permanent candidate for “permanent candidate as inkeepingthe Turkey wasinterested Asthe EU Õ n Grup Konuú ú masÕ Güzel Günler Görece ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, October17, 2006, available from Õ br Õ mas s’a Dokundurtmay s’a Õ ,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, October 4, 2005, available from 673 Thus, just as the recognition of the RoC turned into a ÷iz: CHP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi Õ 205 z,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, June 28, 2005, available 2005, 28, June Partisi, Halk Cumhuriyet z,” Õzd Õ 669 r,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, February 21, 2006, Being grounded on principles, on these Beinggrounded , 668 CEU eTD Collection from (accessed February 19, 2008). 676 675 674 and as model ‘serving main used the civilization’ a nations’ asthe emerged other to templates contemporary level of the of the ‘reaching While elements the values. of asacoalition rather Other against protecther whichTurkey needed to own national interests and sovereignty, but From this perspective, the EU was not regarded as a rival, an untrustworthy ally or a negative the Europeanidealsintegrating and spreadingitelsewhere by serving as a peculiar role model. in rather emphasized theroleof Turkey perspective but security state from issuea national of Kemalism. Those who had elements involved version the of issue EUand the regarding ade-securitized also Cyprus the recourse to this approach did not view the EU or the Cyprus5.2. The integrationist approach Turkey, and we are Turks, we will make our own decision.” interfere in our domesticcriticizing the Turkish Parliament’s of procrastination amending the Article 301:“Nobody can affairs, the functioning of our parliament or its schedule. We are the statements that insulted Turkishness, Baykal stated: supported theabolishment that Article of of the 1982Constitution,the 301 whichoutlawed As by to‘national regardsthose thepro-reform arguments sovereignty’. delegitimize recourse Erdo Ibid. Ibid. ÷an, “Ba Apart from Apart approach the foreign defensive the policy discussed articulations above, Similarly, Erdo people. You took it off thewall but submitted it to Europe! take the ‘sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation’ off the wall and give it to the to human rights, freedom of ordemocratization?speech, You (thegovernment) promised to 301 defend?defends It Turkishness. does you, Why thisdisturb friends? Howis this relevant Everybody if iscallingfor301,as allwere in the chorus.same Why301? the What doesthe Again, similar to the NAP’s critical articulations on the EU reforms, Baykal soughtnot is This to right,complex. thisguilt is impossiblepermanent a to into accept. her putting and her insulting incessantly by Turkey Assyrian genocide; waiting they .[The in willall itsare line . EU] pursue the with relation ú bakan Erdo ÷ ÷an’dan AB’ye Mesaj,”Adalet ve Kalk an warned the EU not to intervene in Turkey’s domestic affairs by 674 206 Õ nma Partisi, September 17,2004, available 676 675 CEU eTD Collection 678 Radyo Televizyon Kurumu: D regime…We pursuedhave ourstruggle against this threatwith utmost determination.” Quoted inrepublican and democratic secular, the against posed Party Welfare the threat the and danger the observed 677 amore secularismdefensive definition suggested Erbakan’s pluralist approach.Rather, andof leaders period,during did nor the secularism itbeenuphold the ashad definedby the was neither againstsecularism hadbeen by as suggested Sava by Sava Vural caseinitiated defense the against partners.” coalitional two the between ground compromising common characteristics of Turkishthe Republicprinciples andAtatürk’s togetherform[ed] the secular and “democratic thatthe stated (TPP-WP) government coalitional the of program principle. secularism on the articulations threat-based the from it diverged way the parties. of conservative the leaders by onlyapproach the propagated was not integrationist approach,the followed the defensive just only military not JDP in asbeestablishment asit will 2002. Yet, that the seen, was by ‘captured’ the WP; andlater TPP andwas the the parties, conservative the of discourse the especially in reconstructing the element of participatory democracy. This was first apparentin sovereignty of conception andpluralist human-centered a on drew approach integrationist followed the who views, those separatist the against state of values the the with conserving approach defensive preoccupation the of tothe In contrast approach. by them defensive the involved from connotation these ‘sovereignty’ security-based added to freeing the elements pluralistnational and security-free conceptionof Kemalism 5.2.1. Restoringsovereignty’ ‘national and ‘participatory democracy’: towards a of Kemalism which defensivethe approach ‘fixed’ tothreat-based articulations. in this regard, the integrationist approach also provided a revised version of the other elements Sava The remarks of the Head of the RPP, Deniz Baykal, are illuminating in this sense: “We, as the RPP have long ú , 114. In the late 1990s, the WP’s discourse emerged as a representative of in this approach of arepresentative emerged WP’s In thelate1990s, the as discourse and integrity’ ‘national of elements the on take approach’s integrationist The Õú Politikan Õ n Nabz Õ , 55. 207 ú to disband the party theWP disband how revealed party the to ú aswell by party as other 678 Yet, Erbakan’s TRT Türkiye 677 The CEU eTD Collection Kalk (accessed January 14, 2008). See also Adalet ve 684 December25, 2002, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). 683 682 681 680 Placing the human approach. human-centered a and taking state the role the of decreasing as anenrichment, rights and andcultures ethnicities religions, different understandingmeant pluralist democracy this perspective, democracy at the center of the definition given as democracy was possible only if the threat element was removed from was removedfrom discourse. element the if threat only possible democracy the was itin pluralismrepresented liberal as values democracy. for and theparty,that conditions For government coalitional previous DLP-NAP-MP of approach from the diverged defensive the democracy. for precondition the were tolerance and diversity because society,” of the segments certain ideasdisturbset of “offend,established or sharedby butalsothosethat could shock all, require democracy.expense of view, Basedon this apre- current not democracy did the goal future at it a viewingas than rather all beat times, tomet a condition freedoms to of the state. In this way, the WP’s discourse elevated democracy and basic rights and religion, could definitionsthe warned against limit of remove secularism or that freedom the of 679 European Rightswhich AgreementHuman to had beena Turkey party since 1987. to the and aswell contradictory undemocratic decision the as accusations groundless, it Republic, the make would to the posed threat based anunproven down a party on had.law of beforethey faith the irrespective receivedequal treatment all citizens that guarantee religion affairs freedom and the of butalso the state and of separation religion involve only the not did For Erbakan, secularism of liberal understanding democracy. Adalet ve Kalk Erdo Ibid., 41. Ibidem. Ibid., 102. Erbakan, Õ nma Partisi, ÷ This approach became especially prominent in the discourse of the JDP, which also an, “Türkiye’de “Türkiye’de an, 681 Refah Partisi Savunmas and focused on human rights rather than the protection of national security values security national of protection the than rather rights human on focused and 682 AK Parti Tüzü Õ nma Partisi, ú u anda maalesef tam sa tam maalesef anda u Her ÷ ü, accessible from (accessed January 14, 2008). ú ey Türkiye Õ (Istanbul: Fast Yay ø çin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi ÷OÕ kl Õ 208 bir demokrasi ya demokrasi bir Õ nc ÕOÕ k, 1997), 90. ú am Õ yoruz,” Adalet ve Kalk Adalet yoruz,” , 680 679 Õ nma Partisi, nma Erbakan 683 Closing From 684 CEU eTD Collection 2005, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). 689 (accessed January 14, 2008). 688 (accessed January 13, 2008). 687 (accessed June 16, 2008). birle vatanda that binds us all is citizenship of Turkish Republic.” See Erdo See Republic.” ofTurkish citizenship is all us binds that 686 from (accessed January 13, 2008). ilave ediyorum ve ‘millet devletin efendisidir’ diyorum,” Adalet ve Kalk JDP, wouldnot endanger only social the alsopeace but political pluralism. so, fordo the to Failing for modernization. necessary new developments to as animpediment party. to nationalism.a pluralistapproach JDPsuggested citizenship,Turkish the ethnicities supra-identity of underthe placed different it that In Turkey’. from am ‘I term the within synthesized was which nationalism, Kemalist is the master of the state.” Nation tothis formulation: element me another masters Let nation. add of the arethe farmers 685 Christian. protection of religious rights and freedoms of individuals, be they were Muslims, Jewish, or faiths andthe between brotherhood different of establishment the on depended secularism of implementation genuine To this view,the of Turkishculture. the ingredient as anecessary but society from the be removed as a to threat not religion seeing the involved also approach democracy rather than seeing secularism as a precondition for it, the JDP’s integrationist Erdo state, tothe role minimal ascribed a that perspective from a liberal sovereignty thenational Defining approach. the‘human-centered’ called as by reconstructing theregards ‘national previoussovereignty’, the party also reformulated a different nodal point toKemalism one. This was apparent in Erdo Erdo Adalet ve Kalk Erdo Consider thefollowing remarks of Erdo Erdo ú erek el ele verece el ele erek 688 úOÕ÷Õ ÷an, “Ba ÷an, “Izmir,” Adalet ve Kalk ÷an, “Ba The integrationist vision of the party in itself vision of wayitThe integrationistthe party showed also the approached To the JDP, conservatism meant respecting cultural traditions without viewing them 687 bizim ortak paydam This aspect was also emphasized within the ‘conservative’ identity of the of identity ‘conservative’ the within emphasized also was aspect This ú ú bakan Erdo bakan Erdo Õ nma Partisi, ÷ iz,” Adalet veKalk Adalet iz,” an Sun-Valley÷an Konferans ÷an Eski 685 Her Õzd ú Õ ey Türkiye r. r. Bizler Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatanda Õ nma Partisi,April 3, 2002, available from ú ehir’de: Atatürk ‘köylü efendisidir’ milletin dedi. Benbuna bir kelime ÷an: “Turkish,Kurdish, Circassian,Laz, what you,have identitythe 686 Õ nma Partisi, December 10, 2005, accessible from accessible 2005, 10, December Partisi, nma Second, similar to the WP that gave a primary role to ø çin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi 209 Õ ’nda Konu ÷ an, “Ba an, ú tu,” Adalet ve Kalk ú bakan Erdo bakan ÷ Õ nma Partisi, March 4, 2004, available an said, “Atatürk oncesaidthat “Atatürk an said, úÕ olarak o üst ortak paydada ÷ an’s definition of what was ÷ an: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Türkiye an: Õ nma Partisi, July 6, , 689 CEU eTD Collection (accessed January 13, 2008). 693 692 691 (accessed January 14, 2008). secularism, republicanism, and democracy, defined as the core of the civilization project of project civilization of the core asthe defined and democracy, republicanism, secularism, mainly, since its establishment, had propagated thebased ideasthe party which was on “a 2002elections withnew changing TheRPPenteredthe motto: beginning”, conditions. the of principles alsorevised party butthe accordingthe hitherto-employed perspective the to democratic a social JDPfrom by employed the hegemonize elements seek the only to not Islamists before, were those whowere reserved towards or against the EU. Erdo for decades, of Republic governments the by hadall been EU as pursued that goal the the defining and Copenhagencriteria, the of for implementation the ideasas‘crucial’ these 690 arena. international inthe reputation a higher also but legitimacy with it provide for because only not thestate would they These important wereequally withering of state. the for way the pave mean not did speech of freedom the for barriers legal the removing human live so that the states lives’. national interests’. In this vein, the JDP’s 2002 election program stated: high the on concessions giving of ‘unacceptability the and sovereignty’ ‘national emphasized that of the coalitional from discourse government previous diverged threat-based the Erdo Ibid. Ibid. Adalet ve Kalk ÷ an declared that the only ‘obstructionists’, a term had define to been the that aterm used only an the ‘obstructionists’, declared that ÷an, “Tekirda It is possible to find a similar emphasis in the RPP’s discourse as well. The RPP did This ‘human-centered’ approach was also evident in the party’s motto: ‘make the ‘make motto: party’s in the evident also was approach ‘human-centered’ This higher value to law that protects the individual and emphasizes public participation. tradition,view that replaces these concepts, which aspire withto maintain the bureaucratic and statist and a national democratic,interest, regional hinder culture realization the of Copenhagen criteria.party national Our subscribes to the security, national sovereignty, national to regard with population civil andmodernization process . our The of ideological attitudesof the anti-EU segments consequence of the pluralistnatural a as EU the to membership full Turkey’s sees party Our understanding that ascribes a higher value a These elements were also present in the JDP’s articulations on the EU, which again Õ nma Partisi, ÷ 2. Ola ÷an Kongresi,” Adalet ve Kalk Her ú ey Türkiye 691 ø çin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi In this sense, giving priority to privatization and 210 Õ nma Partisi,April 29, 2006, available from 693 , 692 Presenting 690 CEU eTD Collection 698 697 696 2008). 695 (accessed January 14, 2008). 694 civilization’: contemporary contemporary age’ elementthe which reconstructed of ‘reachinglevel the of the interpretation institutions of theparty state, the also provided anewinterpretation Kemalism.of new This wasmain the of preservation alsothe for crucial freedoms and rights basic and presented institutions society as a than focusingrather basic only on rights the andindividuals. freedoms of way to ‘raise 1970’s the definition andimportance aparticular ascribed civil to the institutions society Turkey beyond the level of within neo-liberal order. the the new was pursued with interestpreventmonopolizationan to and the rights safeguard of labor the this sense,supporting privatization reforms notdeviatedid from Kemalistlong statism so asit in character. in democratic it social and was statistessence for the RPP, sector, public the not during 1970s,the itthis suggestexpanding statismpropagated from the as diverged did redistribution, social justice and the elimination of regional economic differences. came be state mainfor policy the seen and to the asalegitimate beas considered agent change. continuous as suggested by outlook sixth the principle: revolutionism, as interpreted reformism and Atatürk. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, once expressionthe of a rebellion against imperialism, theestablished order,inequality, gained a democratic leftist leadership the of Atatürk, established with the basis of themodern Turkey, started and Republic the processof democracy, the and social realized which struggle, democratic national and history our in roots its character with the 1960sThe Republican People’s Party is the representative of abig . innovative movement,. which has. . The RPP was In its definition achange‘participatory too, from party democracy’, of the suggested 694 Inits party program, six the principles Kemalism of revised were from newthis 695 From this ‘new social democratic perspective’, privatization began to privatization perspective’, democratic From social ‘new this CHP Parti Program Güzel Günler Görece Õ , available from (accessed January 14, ÷iz: CHP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi 211 , 698 Inseeing civil the 696 While 697 In CEU eTD Collection 2008). Adalet ve Kalk 703 available from (accessed January 13, 2008). 702 ve Kalk 701 (accessed January 14, 2008). 700 2008). outside of the EU.”left being of means by region in the be alone to choose never can We West. the preferred 699 beingcontemporariness, and an‘abandoned’ dogmatism country on world other, the third membership,revolutions democracy, and Atatürk’s onehand, on the andthe non- is “unquestionable.” that anda choice as acivilization project, MinisterForeign theMinister and Affairs of Abdullah vocation Gül theEU defined of Turkey Westernized.” being than other alternative any have In line discourse with the of RPP,thePrimethe Erdo Minister andalone.” a country, third world is introverted, aTurkey or that leader, EU andaregional contemporariness, and dogmatism; eithernon- a Turkey intolerance, that or is open to revolutions, the world, Atatürk’s of a member enlightenment the of and the democracy, beliefs, for respect [E]ither . “. remark: following in his exemplified as membership EU the to meaning similar a ascribed also Baykal leader RPP The goal. civilizational the link membership not only initiatebutalsodrewadirect the and between EU the EU reforms civilization’ 5.2.2. TheEUreforms as a primary means to‘reachthelevel of thecontemporary Abdullah Gül, “Türkiye içinAB birMedeniyet Projesidir. Tart Murat Mercan, “Bat Erdo Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Õ ÷ nma nma Partisi, May 29, 2003, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). As discussed in the previous sections, the DLP-MP-NAP coalitional did the DLP-MP-NAPcoalitional governmentin previousAs sections, the discussed age. contemporary the supersede and new Turkey making of [Islamic]obstructionism, concessions. and Intoday’s reality, theRPPisownerofideal the an, “Türk Silahl “Türk an, Õ nma Partisi, May 25, 2003, available from (accessed January 13, ÕOÕ 701 Õ la Kuvvetleri Türkiye’de modernle Türkiye’de Kuvvetleri The Deputy Head of the JDP, Murat Mercan also stated, “We do not “We do Mercan alsostated, Murat JDP, the Head of TheDeputy ú maktan baú Güzel Günler Görece CHP Parti Program ka alternatifimiz yok,” Adalet ve Kalk Õ , available from (accessed January 14, ÷iz: CHP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi 212 ú me ve demokratikle me 702 ÕúÕ In the same vein, the Deputy Prime lmas Õ Mümkün olmayan bir Tercihtir,” 699 ÷ Õ nma Partisi, May 22, 2003, an “Turkey said,has always ú me sürecinin milad sürecinin me , 703 In placing the EU ÕGÕ r,” Adalet r,” 700 CEU eTD Collection 708 ve Kalk 707 (accessed January 13, 2008). 706 2002, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). ; and Erdo 705 (accessed January 13, 2008). law, human rights, secularism, and freedom of thatEurope values andconscience, speech freedom of secularism,human law, and rights, of supremacy the pluralism, democracy, embraced “participatory wasthatTurkey legitimate reforms. from identity as a becameTurkey since theAtatürk’s of result inseparable that European the “Turkish public had chosen the EU as the representative of the contemporary civilization”where shebelonged’. from ‘dismember Turkey means asato serving than rather project complete hercivilization to foropportunity Turkey agreat represented freedom, EUreforms the of areas the in extending she benations, memberbe of arespected norcould worldthe civilized. she joinview,solving this could Turkey replaced defensive neither could approach EU,nor the bevalueimportant defended to democratic forsovereignty. Unless a pluralist, and problem- most as the affairs’ indomestic of‘non-interference principle the because theyconsidered theEUaccession reforms reserved towards governmentswere on view,thethis previous determined to accelerate the EU accession reforms in order to attain attain objective. this to in order reforms accession EU the accelerate to determined mostbe the would newgovernment the that alsodeclared but civilization” contemporary importantas in “mostprojectthe torealize order goal Atatürk’s of reaching the level the of 704 with power coming Erdo 2002elections, to the civilizational the goal as prescribed byAtatürk. these thereby articulations underlined the indispensability EUmembershipforthe of reaching Ibid. Erdo Erdo Erdo Erdo Õ ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ nma nma Partisi, May 29, 2003, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). For the JDP, attributing a civilizational goal to the EU reforms was legitimate as the These articulations were also reverberated in relation to the EU reforms. Shortly after Shortly EUreforms. the to in relation reverberated also were These articulations an, “Türk Silahl “Türk an, an, “TBMM Grup Konu ú an, “TBMM Grup Konuú an, “Erdo an, 708 According to this view, what made Turkey European and Turkey’s EU vocation EU madeand Turkey’s European Turkey view,what this According to ÷ an’ Õ n KKTC Ziyareti,” Adalet ve Kalk Adalet Ziyareti,” KKTC n Õ 706 Kuvvetleri Türkiye’de modernle Türkiye’de Kuvvetleri mas mas an, “TBMM÷an, Grup Konu Õ Õ ,” Adalet ve Kalk ,” Adalet ve Kalk 213 Õ Õ ÷ nma Partisi, June 19, 2002, available from nma Partisi, June 19, 2002, available from an did membership only not goal the describe Õ ú nma Partisi, November 16, 2002, available from available 2002, 16, November Partisi, nma me ve demokratikle me ú mas Õ ,” Adalet ve Kalk ú me sürecinin milad sürecinin me Õ nma Partisi, May 1, 705 In this regard, Inthis ÕGÕ 704 r,” Adalet r,” Based 707 CEU eTD Collection 712 (accessed January 13, 2008). 711 (accessed January 13, 2008). values andvalues asameans reforms it toattain it, aremarkablealso link represented between the each on other: civilization’. Thefollowing of remarks Erdo ‘reach level itthe as ameansto wasseen of promised contemporary the prosperity economic the also but represented it values the only Not objective. civilizational Turkey’s fit reforms only asthe means Turkey for achieve hercivilizational to goal: EU the of implementation successful JDPsawthe how the clarified further following remarks accession reforms, Erdo accession EU were skeptical the those that towards vein,warning imported be toTurkey.this In to as‘alien values’ byviewing byAtatürk EUreforms the complete initiated the reforms fail to ‘domestic Thoughtof anchor’. this way,block Turkey would herowndevelopmental path and these lines, the EU reforms would serve to complete this civilizational project, which had a 710 709 today.” represent Ibid. Italics added. Erdo Erdo Ibid. ÷ ÷an, “Ba While this remark considered the economic development as a final goal Whileand consideredasafinal goal development theeconomic sawthe this remark Turkey. for crucial is of objective the words, other in membership, EU . The . rooted, asdifferences are taken as richness and as transparency and accountability are present . Our economic developmentwill be triggered as the culture of discussion and compromise is In this sense, the EU was seen as an economic,sense, there is no other ‘model’ that can cultural,serve as a solution. ‘model’ can that raise economicthe political,and and administrative standards of Turkey. In this political isa EU The . . . . realistic be us Let . . . . EU the without this achieve modelwe could that argue could that best equity, to be a part of the developed world,expression ofand freedom of thought, tohave afree marketto on based the liveof competitionrule and humanly in peace and tranquility.law, One tonecessary for has emergefunctioning asacountry Turkey that democracy and aruleof to the securethe EU is necessary.thedevelopment and civilization in developinga globalizing and world, Turkey’s membership in basic We Webelieve are thatrightsdefinitely the EU reforms and arefor an freedomsTurkey’simportant catalyst entry andand inas such theremove EU. In orderall notthe to bebarriers on the margins restricting of the the an, “TBMM Grup Konuú ú bakan Erdo 709 In sense,this reforms whileAtatürk’s inestablished the identity Turkish an Carrefour÷an Aç ÷ an stated, “Nobody should dare to block our path to the EU.” pathtothe block “Nobody our dareto an should stated, 712 mas Õ ,” Adalet ve Kalk ÕOÕúÕ nda,” Adalet ve Kalk ÷an illustrate how the were seen two as dependent 214 Õ nma Partisi, June 5, 2002, available from Õ nma Partisi,nma June 7, 2003, available from reaching the level ofthe EU criteria 711 710 His CEU eTD Collection (accessed January 13, 2008). 714 January 13, 2008). dönmü 713 issue. Cyprus inthe say more a have Turkey could conditionalities EU the implementing hernational sensitivities such as Cyprus by insisting onher previous position; only rather, by involved in the EU accession process. To Erdo problem as it was seen impossible to arrive at a permanent solution in the island without being issue. For the JDP, the EU ‘sovereignty’ and affairs’ domestic inthe ‘non-interference accession‘independence’, 5.2.3. Projecting the EU vision on the Cyprus issue: revising the concepts of reforms would EU. on the articulations from defensive the viewhence diverged this final objective also the as integation the help articulating In member. a becoming to way her on Turkey Turkeyconfronting threats the out pointing than solve rather Turkey of status developmental and civilizational the the Cyprus a problem-solvingTheseupgrade ‘need’ hitherto-stated to the remarksalsosugest approach to legitimizations. for makingboth atemplate as served path Atatürk’s following with associated identity-basedboth interest-based whilevocation elements to arguments, hadrecourse the and ideational goal butas a continuation of historicalTurkey’s path: Erdo Kemalismnodal to from point remarkof view. integrationist an Thebelow-quoted point of new itadded a thereby civilization’, of‘reaching contemporary of level previousthe template criteria tothe EU byrecourse the Legitimizing and EU criteria goal. civilizational the Erdo Erdo ÷ ú an membership how as wasnotonly shows also EU the and an economic taken tür,” Adalet ve Kalk ÷ ÷an, “Ba The above-discussed approach was also prominent in the articulations on the Cyprus the on articulations in the prominent also was approach above-discussed The EU Turkey’s legitimize to sought that articulations the show, remarks As these countries. The EU is the best way to reach this ideal. among Turkey. democratic, ideal a Turkey free takespart the that and advanced is Our of interest the is in membership EU prosperous. and just liberal, democratic, be to dream Membership in the EU is a natural extension of Turkey’s historical path . . . . [It] is Turkey’s an, “TBMM Grup Konuú ú bakan Erdo Õ nma Partisi, July 27, 2004, available from (accessed an: Türkiye÷an: gelece mas Õ ,” Adalet ve Kalk i için son÷i için derece önemlibirkav 215 ÷ Õ nma Partisi, June 5, 2002, available from an, Turkey did nothave a luxury to hang on to 713 ú aktan aln ÕQÕ n ak Õ yla 714 CEU eTD Collection 717 ve KalkÕ 716 October17, 2003, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). 715 if membership. Turkey Second, herEUagenda tothe thisextended Turkish Cypriots, would Cyprusthe issue, the issue aproblem-solving approach towards would Turkey’s alsotrigger same ‘EU’ vision.While Turkey’s accession to the EU was the best way to have a more say in within integrated the Cypruspolicy were ‘causes’ membership the and of separated EU the membership.her EU regardto for Turkey with existingobstacle issue an ever- makealso Cyprus the but conflict, the of settlement the and exacerbate Cypriots causes’. ‘national her of in both lose would Turkey then membership, Turkey’s for precondition Cyprusjust becausesome inthe EUsaw a change inTurkey’s Cyprus position asa insisted ongivingnoconcessions on national the interests security of Turkey regarding undertake the EU reforms. viewing conflictfrom of theresolution andrefrain to issueasaprecondition Cyprus the For Erdo This suggested Turkey that an should take active rolestate in asaguarantor resolving the concerns. foreign policy underother vocation the European never should relegate and concerns, security problem-solvingapproach with regard totheCyprus issue ofinsisting instead on national the achievementthe her of on view, civilizational thisgoal. one shouldmore Based pursuea obsessive insistence issueon Cyprus the Turkey’s wouldonly European obstruct vocation and by advocated approach This paralleledinthe1980swhenhe the the Özal hadsuggested that Ibid. Erdo Erdo ÷an, “AK Parti Kurucular Kurulu Genel Ba ÷an, “Ba nma Partisi,nma February 1, 2003, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). The JDP called this policy as “the policy of solution and the win-win approach.” 716 As Erdo ú bakan Erdo ÷an stated, thislead would not only isolation tofurther Turkish the of an: ÷an: K Õ brÕ s Konusunda Çözüm Siyaseti ÷ an, if Turkey failed to implement the EU reforms and ú kan RecepTayyip Erdo 216 øzleyece ÷an Ba iz,” Adalet ÷iz,” ve Kalk 717 In this regard,thehitherto Inthis ú kanl Õ÷Õ nda Topland Õ nma nma Partisi, Õ ,” Adalet 715 CEU eTD Collection 722 (accessed January 13, 2008). 721 (accessed January 14, 2008). Cyprus would become a member as a united country. The full text of the AnnanNovember Plan can 11, be 2002 availableand the fromdeadline was set for February 7, 2003. In case the final proposal was accepted, then720 Partisi, January 5, 2003, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). de do not want to use the language of the status-quo.” SeeErdo status-quo.” ofthe language use the to want not do 719 (accessed January 13, 2008). not used as a shield elements ‘full-independence’,inof ‘non-interference domestic affairs’ and ‘sovereignty’ were against the EU reforms or imminent security threats but rather as a the island”, the on but contrary,the future “safeguarding of Cypriotthe the Turks.” thismean perspective, didnot “giving uponthesovereignty of rights citizens Turkish the on give her decisions herself. We cannot intervene.” herself.We givecannot herdecisions Cyprus, ‘no’ Turkey forvoted thewould GreekCypriots in intervene referendum aunified after the whether a question to as to Responding matters. TRNC’s domestic inthe non-interference and TRNC Turkey’s of the rights thesovereign refer to to principles these JDPemployed the interfere inTurkey’s policy in andTurkey’s Cyprus respect sovereignty and independence, not EUshouldWhileunderlined the approach from that defensive approach. a defensive the which were employedlinked inthe Turkey’s thatarticulations EUvocation Cyprus policy and ‘sovereignty’, and affairs’ domestic in the ‘non-interference ‘full-independence’, of principles for the conception anational-security-free Thisparalleled cause’. a‘national policy as Cyprus not only the butalso EUconditionalities Turkey’s JDP’s de-securitized discourse policy the Cyprusissue. the hitherto-pursued of resolution towards challenged the vision.”part ofourEU 718 further serve to attain both goals. In this vein, Erdo ÷ Ibid. Erdo on Problem Cyprus ofthe Settlement a Comprehensive on Agreement for Basis the presented Annan Kofi Erdo Öni iliz ama bu saattensonra 40 y ú ÷an, “Bavulumuzu Toplamak Yok,”Adalet ve Kalk , “Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era”, 30. Consider following the remarks of Erdo ÷ In legitimizing the new Cyprus policy in these terms, the JDP government clearly government JDP the terms, these in policy Cyprus new the legitimizing In an, “AB vizyonumuzun içinde K içinde vizyonumuzun “AB an, 720 Erdo ÷an said, “Cyprus isanindependent As state. an independentstate, she will 718 Õll Õk politika ile de bir yere var Õ br Õ s Türkleri de var,” November 15, 2003, available from available 2003, 15, November var,” de s Türkleri 217 Õ ÷ 721 nma Partisi,nma December14, 2002, available from an, Similarly, “to demand a solution”, from Õ ÷ lamayaca “K an stated, “Turkish Cypriots are also a Õ brÕ s’ta asla ver-kurtul politikas ÷ÕQÕ söylüyoruz,” Adalet ve Kalk 722 Õ Hence, the Hence, ndan yanandan an: “We÷an: 719 Õ The nma CEU eTD Collection available from (accessed February 13, 2008). 724 2004, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). “Ba rights. These type of approaches do not bring a solution but only exacerbate the existing problem.” See Erdo 2008). Accordingly,Erdo Adalet ve Kalk Northern part of the island, see Erdo standards and values. standards and democracy building inCyprus and sidesassure that both in Cyprus could reach EUnorms, the and peace the to contribute conflict, the of settlement the help only not would Turkey perspective, integrationist From this Greek Cypriots. with the EUtogether the to accession their of context the within Cypriots Turkish the of freedoms and rights the towards focus the 723 principles and ‘civilization’ beyondTurkey 5.2.4. Theelements ofKemalism asa‘model’ othercountries: to projecting theKemalist EU. the Cyprus. would RoC the be opened for its EU’sremoval the inreturn on embargoof Northern the for the support integration both Greeks andof in Turks EU,andpromisedthe ports thatthe to Turkish livingandisland. the GreekCypriots onthe In vein,this full governmentgave the the both to vision EU its extend to willingness government’s the for indicator an sense this in principles’. her ‘foundational in with others accordance of rights the Turkey respected that confirmation of the contemporary civilization’, she would also project this unique civilizational model to model civilizational unique this project also would she civilization’, contemporary the of ‘reach level the an aim with to values herdomestic within values contemporary the integrated as Turkey that madesuggested link this that nations’. articulations The other the as amodel to elementof Kemalism in integrationistthe foreign policy of articulations period:the ‘serving Gül, “D OnErdo ú bakan Erdo ‘ forThe government’s the support Annan Plan, whichenvisioned aunited Cyprus,was 723 Reaching the level Reaching linked another civilization’ the level was also to contemporary the of ÕúLú ÷ This was in line with the government’s attempt to de-securitize This to in theissue government’sattempt the was line with shift and an’s speeches on the necessity to remove the embargo applied to both Greeks and Turks on the on Turks and Greeks both to applied embargo the remove to necessity the on speeches an’s leri Bakan Õ nma Partisi, May 9, 2003, available from (accessed January 13, ÷an Lübnan Ba Õ Gül, K an stated:÷an “I do not find a view supportsthat embargos ascongruent with human 724 She would also secure her civilizational goal to become a member of become a to goal her civilizational secure also Shewould ú bakan Õ br Õ s Eylem Plan ÷ an, “Ba Õ Hariri Ortak Bas ú bakan Erdo ÕQÕ Aç 218 Õ klad Õ n Toplant ÷ an KKTC Cumhurba Õ ,” Adalet ve Kalk ÕVÕ ,” Adalet ve Kalk Õ nma Partisi, January 24, 2006, ú kan Õ Denkta Õ nma Partisi, May 12, ú ile Görü ú tü,” ÷an, CEU eTD Collection November1997/TURKEYSETTINGSAILTOTHE21STCENTURY.pdf.>(accessed June 18,2008). Perceptions ‘obsessive’ emulation that would flatten the richness of Turkey’s unique synthesis, a ‘global flatten unique ofTurkey’s synthesis,‘obsessive’ emulation richness thatthe a would up looked Instead of inengagingsheto. an East; be others onewhom rather the would quoted remark of Cem a‘global underlines, wouldTurkey’ emulate neitherWest the northe also as a ‘civilizational model’ that affirmed Turkey’s already ‘civilized’ status. As the above- but in athome, principle world’ peace of ‘peace the the application only seen asthe‘genuine’ not was borders her beyond far synthesis this reflect to ability her and values contemporary template was represented as a model to be ‘exported’ to the other regions of the world: new this how shows remark following Cem’s ‘tolerance’. and rights’ human for ‘respect 725 should conduct peace in in the world’ principle legitimizing ‘global as the foreignthe outlook’ policy Turkey in the 21 outlook’ of Turkey. WhileForeign Cem drew on the traditional Affairs 1990s 2000s,theMinister of late and early In early had thistemplate. the employed 1990s components Cem of the ‘peacealso at home,referredin peace world’. home, the ‘peace at of principle of the to the samean extension of the civilizational objective templateattributed to Kemalism but also atangible example Western inworlds. In this sense, ‘serving as amodel to the other countries’his was not only seen as references and the theMuslim namely, cultures’, ‘irreconcilable so-called bridgethe serve between asa to to reach and the to aspired level she to the status raisetheir to in order both countries other the ‘global Cited in Cited In regard,Turkey’sincorporationthis her ‘foundationalof with principles’ the Atatürk. by pointed direction the a in be can others that for model Turkey, a . . . . values contemporary all with identity of sense and humanism, that becomes oneof the major centres of attraction with its historical record, cultural richness, world’...that competes with the best in the ofscience,realms technology and economy... and fulfils the requisites ofour great leaderAtatürk’s dictum; ‘Peace at home, peace in the secularism, respect for human rights and its traditional characteristic - tolerance...that truly characteristics the with century of a ‘[g]lobal 21st the to State’ Turkey . . carry that to acts be as a should role model withgeneration its democracy, today’s of goal The Indeed, Ecevit’s RPPin Indeed, Ecevit’s in MP1980s,and 1970s,Özal’s the the WPin Erbakan’s the 'ÕúLú 2, 3 (September-November1997), (accessed from available CEU eTD Collection 2003, available from (accessed January 14, 2008). values uponwhich EUwasfounded:the civilizations.” different of compromise a union invites is that clash itof civilizations; anaddressof and harmonization meeting, the is neither a Christian Union nor a regional unity. EUis a sum of political ideas. The EU is not 733 732 and spreading these values further. In of ideasthe both Turkey thisand the EUshared and emphasized Turkey’s role instrengthening vein, the Prime Minister Erdo in terms EU the redefined viewrather this Club, aChristian EU as viewedthe that discourse defensive the to contrast In homogeneity. cultural than rather diversity within unity represent membership quest on the other served as a great opportunity for the EU given thatit sought to of EUcountries.the Tothis ‘unique’ view,Turkey’s role onthe one hand,andher EU rest from the of EUbymeans ofherthe ‘difference’ liberal characteristic pluralist and secular, tothe contribute could howTurkey on focused JDP the religions, different of coexistence peaceful the suggested that secularism of definition its with line same the In Kemalism. in integrated thisnewcapture element also would elections 2002 establishedthe with liberalism and the EU reforms, it was of no surprise that the JDP governmentin isrespect: this illustrative following statement that Turkey’swas integration with the EU as a direct application of Turkey’s ‘own model’. The Erdo Ibid. ÷an, “Ba and economically, Turkey has been and will continue to be part of Europe and share the same the share and of Europe part be to continue will and been has Turkey economically, and secularism, democracy, tolerance, rule of by law and her European vocation.Historically,shaped is geographically, politically history Turkish religions. and cultures traditions, The identityEuropean isquest of the aproduct to forge harmony differentamong identities, As a party that emerged as a staunch supporter for multi-culturalism,for pluralism, supporter as astaunch As emergedthat a party harmony bridge between the two civilizations more effectively. criteria, EU the will fulfilling by gain civilization of contemporary reputation level the reach will which Turkey, characteristic, this With world. both the and region the in in stability and the peace the to Westcontribute will and the Model’ ‘Turkey ofthe East characteristic exemplary the and success the and this that For we believe reason, peace. fulfill and harmony in together live to World her Western the and Islam missionthe for guideline to be a culturalThe ‘Turkey Model’, the ofbases which were established andby Kemal Atatürk, provides a ú bakan Erdo an ve÷an Barroso’nun ortak bas 733 Hence, Turkey’s difference would strengthen the strengthen would difference Turkey’s Hence, 222 Õ n toplant ÕVÕ ,” Adalet ve Kalk 732 Õ nma Partisi, July 2, ÷ an stated, “The EU CEU eTD Collection Partisi, December30, 2006, available from (accessed January 2008).13, 738 2004, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). 737 (accessed January 14, 2008). 736 from (accessed January 13, 2008). 735 Kalk 734 model on the Northern Cyprus and the accession of Cyprus to the EU as a unified state. In this solution her the of perspective, issueon the of depended civilizational Turkey’s projection coexistence.” of “apeaceful Turkey as symbol demolished differences. In by replaced and towards vein,Erdo this tolerance elsewhere, she could also show that theIslam culture.” previousfrom the EU, she conceptionsalso has a for usanymore.” an is not lotOther to offer. Turkey is a model of pursuitandmodel.herher Confirming this,Erdo civilizational project that conciliatesof Otherness democracyTurkey’s to linked thatwere principles in same the of terms defined was show, Europeanness and remarks As identity link between the identity. European the above-quoted and the Turkish could bethe world’ in terms of newthe term of ‘harmony of civilizations’ alsohelped building a stable in home, peace at and‘peace civilization’, contemporary the level of the ‘reaching countries’, countries. time changing viewof the oneandthe a halfbillion Muslim European the towards of the EU countries towards the one and ahalf billion Muslimsin the world, while at the same theperspective in change was Muslim inevitably criteria majority would a country the where Erdo Erdo Adalet ve Kalk Erdo Mercan, “Mercan: Modernizm ve kültürel kimlik aras kimlik vekültürel Modernizm “Mercan: Mercan, Õ nma Partisi, September 25,2003, available from (accessed January 13, 2008). ÷ ÷an, “Ba ÷ This was template also employed inthearticulations on Cyprusthe issue.From this model the other ‘serving to theIn of reconstitution asa sense, principles the this of havoc. wreaking is terrorism where growing, are cultures and religions between identity and modernism. should This be taken as amodel in world where the divisions values and principles. has Turkey pioneeringmodel been ofconciliationa between cultural an, “Ba an, “AB bizim için art 737 As Turkey outhercarried ‘unique’ model civilizational at homeit and projected ú ú bakan Recep Tayyip Erdo bakan Erdo Õ 736 nma Partisi, To this view, Turkey’s entry in the EU and her ability to fulfill the EU the fulfill to ability her and EU inthe entry Turkey’s view, this To an Chicago’daki÷an Türkler’le biraraya geldi,”Adalet ve Kalk Õ Her k birÖteki de ú ey Türkiye 735 Similarly,he “While is argued, Turkey gaining something ÷ an’Õ ÷ ildir,” Adalet ve Kalk ø çin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi n Kurban Bayram 223 738 Õ ndaki uyum modeli için Türkiye örnek ülke,” Adalet ve Adalet ülke,” örnek Türkiye için modeli uyum ndaki Õ ve Yeni Y Õ nma Partisi, December28, 2005, available Õ l mesaj Õ ,” Adalet ve Kalk ÷ Õ , nma Partisi, June 12, an “Thestated, EU 734 ÷ an defined Õ nma CEU eTD Collection (accessed January 13, 2008). 741 (accessed January 13, 2008). 740 January 13, 2008). olarak gelsin,” Adalet ve Kalk 739 are Cyprus approach JDP’s the towards RPP by the accusations the to in response speaker same principles and as boththis link.Choosing one overthe other was not necessary were informedsince both by the served to reach the sameincompatibilityno between vocation European Turkey’s Cyprusand the of causebyvirtue goal. The remarks of the from was there this Hence, approach, ‘foundational heragenda andthepursuitof principles’. government associated was not with asubmissive the policy EUbutTurkey’stowards owncivilizational Cyprus viewtowards ade-securitized having From vocation. perspective, Turkey’s EU this and in and confirmed supported dimension themodel civilizational advocated relation to problems] will vanish.” That is what we are doing remarks of Erdo in Turkey. If also “provethe the world that democracy sameand Islam culture could coexist.” is done in that the integrationCyprus of the Muslim Turkish Cypriots within the accession plan of Cyprus would as well, thenEU could into Cyprus anisland turn “peaceful coexistence.” of all [the Copenhagenthe throughoutisland thewhole reforms and becomingthereby amemberofthe implementing by only view, this to According island. the on living communities both haunted on rulethe law,human of democracy, andsecularismrights in resolving the conflict that EUreforms the of importance the out pointed rather approach to Turkey, this threat security defensivethe RoC’s viewthatemphasized howthe in membership a EUwouldthe pose to contrast island. In partof the theNorthern on embargo economic EU’s the removal of the and Cyprus Northern the of development economic the on placed was emphasis special vein, Erdo Erdo Erdo ÷an, “Ba ÷an, “Erdo ÷an, “Ba In this sense, the revision of the Cyprus policy to involve a humanitarian, economic ú ú bakan Erdo bakan Erdo ÷an’ ÷an are alsoillustrative: “End ethnic to religious and regional nationalism! Õ n KKTCn Ziyareti” Adalet ve Kalk 741 an ABD’de,”÷an Adalet ve Kalk an: Temennimiz÷an: odur kiK Õ nma Partisi, April 20, 2004, available from (accessed 224 Õ br Õ nma Partisi, November16, 2002, available from Õ Õ nma Partisi, December18, 2006, available from s birbar Õú adas Õ haline Birle 739 Similarly, it was suggested itwas Similarly, ú ik K 740 Õ br The following The Õ s Cumhuriyeti CEU eTD Collection (accessed December1, 2007). 742 economic in representing of Kemalism, of elements the out narrative a de-securitized concerns. policy foreign other over elevated were honor’ ‘national and interests security Turkey’s issue. Cyprus the and EU the towards both policy non-submissive a emphasize to employed world’ principle and the principle of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ were in the home, peace at ‘peace the to attributed elements the world; Islamic the with integration delegitimize Turkey’s policy to principle usedasaforeign secularism was Muslim countries; Customs counter struggle’ Union to was employed both integration andwith the Turkey’s narrative out of the elements Kemalism. theelements of andordered way the they represented of Kemalism. diverged discourses in these that two European vocation Cyprus causevacillatedbetween and From this in party factions period, the duringon Turkey’s represented discourses governmentthe the perspective,political many different whiletherewere showthat discourses helpedus integrationist the term of ‘national both policies. Structuringwhat theanalysiswas according identified to thedefensiveas and Kemalism; rather, these elements provided the main repertoire for the terms used in relation to vocationTurkey’s exemptEuropean and Cypruscausewerenot from elementsof the Conclusion government did not face a dilemma of choosing between Cyprus and the EU. forthe theEUgoal for the selling was unacceptable; ‘Cyprus government present cause’ blaming that stated the JDP defensiveremark,the this Asaresponse to tothepoint. therefore Adalet ve Kalk The articulations that drew on the integrationist discourse, on the other hand,presented on other the discourse, integrationist onthe drew that The articulations asecurity-centered constructed discourse defensive the on drew that The articulations discussionAs our foreignshowed, the articulations policy between 1997 and2007 on Õ nma Partisi, “Bakanlar Kurulu Toplant 225 ÕVÕ ,” December11, 2006, available from 742 CEU eTD Collection integrationist one as Turkey moved closer to the EU goal discourse EUgoal and the as defensive moved asTurkey to closer one integrationist wasreplaced defensive by an and discourse Islamist The discourses. defensive integrationist the between dynamics the and context international in the changes the of result a as marginalized remained initiatives some discourse, official the of part became and principles’ in home,at world’. peace the peace through harmony civilizations of ‘the and Eurasian power’, becoming astrong through civilization contemporary the level of the ‘reaching EUcriteria’, the level of the ‘reaching elements ofKemalism butalso addednew formations previously tothe chainconstructed — previous the on drew only not discourse contemporary The chain. Kemalist the of extension Kemalist principles’ or ‘the end of the ideology’‘raising both Turkey and Northern Cyprus to the level of the EU criteria’. in reforms: EU the to Turkish directly goal civilizational Turkey’s linking in element politics. this of formation Rather, it a newsuggests constituted approach integrationist the was ‘humiliating’, civilization contemporary an civilization’ pointed outWhile adefensive version of principlethe of‘reaching the levelof contemporary the that the consideration globalthe values with her ‘foundational principles’ ofand project them beyond her borders. the EU goal as the only incorporate which could to Turkey extent the issue on way depended Cyprus the resolutionof the to reach the in From unique and integration perspective, with thethis Muslim Turkey’s roleEU the world. showed Turkey’s that of Turkey ‘foundational the principles’ butpresented asoneof world the other countries’. Secularism was notused to counter Turkey’s integration with the Muslim amodel as in to ‘serving world’, and the home, peace ‘peaceat civilization’, contemporary the level of the ‘reaching of principles the realize means to asa of harmony civilizations the and coexistence, peaceful multiculturalism, pluralism, democracy, participatory prosperity, Second, while new policies were legitimized by recourse to the ‘foundational the to by recourse legitimized were newpolicies while Second, not ‘dissolution of contemporary represent does the the the In thisperiod regard, 226 CEU eTD Collection EU as it delayed the implementation of EUreforms. of the implementation EU asit delayed the the to accession Turkey’s derailed policy Cyprus asecurity-centered approach, integrationist not have any didlatter the as vocation European Turkey’s seen against Cypruswas to approach securitized value if In this ade- from position, attempted todelegitimize other. a defensive the sense, viewof the Turkey’s when eachdiscourse words, in other stake; at security were policies these on competing articulations was when against other each juxtaposed they were each discourse, within reconciled policies were endangered.these while Hence, policies. these on articulations defensive and integrationist the between By theconstructions same token, hand,the competing other ‘foundational given On part of the principles’. Turkey’s fromof Kemalism, the as seen in being They were reconciled other. the over be chosen to paths asseparate vocation the way European permit Turkey’s integration Cypruscauseand the viewing not European did the these policiesof the elements of Kemalism,were as wellhandled as their translation also in EU. tothe accession of Turkey’s context the terms of suggestedthe values attributed within ontheseelements by emphasis a defensive were counterbalanced vocation European to a clash domestic and‘full-independence’, affairs’ integrationist the articulations onTurkey’s in of ‘non-interference principles with the clashed EUreforms asthe Similarly, vocation. from herpermanently European to Turkey drift thatsought attempts delegitimized any partin took government the partiesthat the political country and as became acandidate as Turkey discourse political margins of the the to pushed werealso European orientation Turkey’s to an alternative suggested that officials military of some articulations the Similarly, with delegitimized rapprochement Muslim the countries. that Turkey’s defensive overtures the counter to parties Islamist the once of disposal the at template legitimate only the emerge and as discourse made secularism-centered pro-EU This the Islamism. delegitimized Third, the legitimization of vocation inThird, legitimization CypruscauseandTurkey’s the the terms of European 227 CEU eTD Collection articulations on Turkey’s European orientation orientation Cyprusand on European Turkey’s articulations policy. policy foreign the structured that Kemalisms’ of ‘clash the but Kemalism identifiable it foreign Inthiswas not an policy sense, different counterpoise objectives. objectively toboth template reconcile and served asacontested policy unanimousand foreign reaction interpretedtheir the stand elements in politics. and policies legitimize their to intheir struggle both discourses to hadrecourse as theparties Whileof Kemalism, this suggests thatit partiesalso wereshows not consistentthat Kemalism in the way they has not produced a Indeed, the borders between the defensive and integrationist approaches were blurred approaches were integrationist between the defensiveand borders Indeed, the 228 CEU eTD Collection the relationship between identity and foreign policy. The main ambition of study present the main ambition of identity andbetween foreign The policy. relationshipthe foreign the in the focuses poststructuralistresearch policy agenda foreign policy on sphere, poststructuralist works on ideology do not examine the self-constitutive aspect of ideology in of objects i.e.ideology foreign analysis, and policy, separately. While arestudied the medium of their mutual constitution. Within the poststructuralist literature, however, both asdiscourse the ideologysphere whichboth within andand foreign policy is thus constructed of ideology foreign making. and Following policy apoststructuralist approach,this study took lie core atthe interests, identities and ‘truths’, of multiple constructions that than and causal, rather is co-constitutive and constructed isdiscursively ideology and policy foreign between ideology role to in foreign show shaping has sought thatthe study to policy, this relationship discourse. the of aspect and self-constitutive the may change over time, how ‘ideological’ itis to provide a fixed definition for an ideology, anumbermeaning question ignore how issues,the of and ideology of e.g. other a particular ‘ideology matters’, these studies overlook the role of alternative definitions for the ideology in material in is world. Whileinterest-based this mostly to show an attemptundertaken that shape spacethatthe can ideational interest-free in an and assuming of question ideology the acausal ideology foreign definition by attribute to policy an operationalizable providing role hand, the studiesIn most of these works, the role of ideology captures minimal space,that if any at all. On the other reservewhy a moreof a number to answer an substantial revealing towards tilted been has policy foreign Turkish of analyses role for a particular ideologyThe goals of thestudy in a given questions posed with regard to Turkey’s particular foreign policy ‘actions’ or ‘choices’.Turkey’s ‘actions’ or foreign policy particular regardto posedwith questions In an attempt to reveal the problems with attributing a non-discursive and directive and anon-discursive attributing with reveal problems the In an to attempt As itis with most of the studies that fall within the domain of IR, the main focus of the C ONCLUSION 229 CEU eTD Collection policies should rather focus on the basic legitimating criterion for these policies rather than rather policies these for criterion legitimating basic the on focus rather should policies other. with each irreconcilable were apparently policies that for the criterion legitimating puzzlein thiscontextwashow a ideology,single namely,Kemalism, could a beused as while theCyprus application intervention of of 1974 wasasuccessful main principle.this The ‘full-independence’, of principle Kemalist the with conflicted vocation EU and orientation Western- Turkey’s that arguing coin, the of side other the from ‘irreconcilability’ the issue. hand, approached abandon some Cyprus the thetraditional stancetowards other the On being to e.g. willing ‘compromising’ morepolicies, requiredapproach oriented/European fundamental objective of foreign Turkish According policy.following to view,this an-EU- corresponded to a European identityfit Turkey’sargue that in policy Cyprus neither framework nor of the Turkey’s EU accession, or the sort of rationality to ledsome with authors to this regard policy offensive overtures occasionally-manifested that placed the EU goal as the andWar).period) theTurkey’s and andafter thedefensive EEC/EU(during Cold having been independentundertaken as an policy from Westernthe bloc (during the Cold War out pointed thethat Cyprus policy from Turkey’s Western/European-orientationdiverged in irreconcilabledefined incompatible Thearguments thatpolicies as foreign policies. these ontheWestern/European-orientationpolicy allegedly discourse and policy the Cyprus – two Resolving thepuzzle approaches. ideationalist the extent, Turkish foreign policy tothe foreign ideology 3) contribute co-constitutiveand between policy, and relationship studies which2) IRliterature,the fill gapin the poststructuralist research the agenda in by IR examining the are dominated mostly ideology within of conceptualization the poststructuralist situate 1) three-fold: was therefore by the realist and, to a certain This study argued that understanding compatibility and incompatibility of incompatibility particular of and compatibility understanding This study argued that foreign in Turkish Kemalism of role the on focused dissertation the aims, these With 230 CEU eTD Collection interference in domestic affairs’, a defensive interpretation of the elements of Kemalism of theelements of interpretation adefensive affairs’, indomestic interference ‘non- and ‘full-independence’ sovereignty’, ‘national interests, Turkey’s on emphasis centered its security- Given principles. Kemalist the of interpretation a specific depended on rather in EEC/EU. the as membership an or toTurkey’s obstacle orientation European policies ineither Cyprus representing Turkey’s an traditional policy of as extension Turkey’s these between link a direct offered discourse political the membership, EEC/EU Turkey’s for condition indirect an into turned Cyprus Northern the from withdrawal army’s Turkish as the policies.hand, other On the separate vocation were rather European the and policy Cyprus the suggested that 1980s) the (before most of party discourses the seen that have We foreign policy. Kemalist of objectives the to attached being policies, each both between link indirect an constructed that template discursive a triangular revealed Kemalism of making thislink. in constituted was identity and rationality of type certain a how and principles, Kemalist examine moves which discursive madein were linking these policies the pursuitof to the opposite to or compatible with each other. Thus, the main task of the dissertation was to aspecific goal Turkish policiespolicy areinherently these directs and that towards foreign corollary meaning it.to Hence, this study argued that itis problematic claimto that Kemalism a ascribed articulation policy foreign each as Kemalism of change continuous the and construction the to contributed also shown, was as process, This Kemalism. of objectives the of formulations competing the of means by counterpoised and reconciled been have policies Kemalism tofollowingAtatürk’s (the objectives/principles attributed path), andthatboth of elements different embeddedwith were policies these on articulations that showed taking the task of taking of attributing an task the Our discussion showed that viewing these policies as incompatible or compatibleviewing asincompatibleOur discussion or showedthat these policies elements the to recourse by legitimized were policies these of each how on Focusing a priori identity and rationality to them. The case analyses case The them. to rationality and identity 231 CEU eTD Collection The findings us let findingsturn to the analysis. of our on policies. these structured policy theforeign discourse that constructions these between clash the rather was It policy. Cyprus and orientation Western/European onTurkey’s articulations the for template fixedserve anda single asa Kemalism not that did were competing constructions of Kemalism in the Turkish foreign policy discourse showed goal Thefactlevel there that Atatürk’s civilization’. ‘reaching the of of contemporary the fulfill Atatürk’s annexingera andaccomplish therealism could Turkey of altogether Cyprus and viewthe from herself only West/EEC/EU that the issue.Theseby propagated de-orienting orientation by Kemalismrecourse to pushed andthat for abolder in approach Cyprusthe Turkey’s European to legitimized alternatives that in political represented the discourse views other also were thatthere we haveseen hand, On theother discourse. alternative byan delegitimizein thelinkmade to attempt eachother against an juxtaposed they were drawn by In Atatürk. words,other while thesepolicies were reconciled within each discourse, adeviation Cyprus from constituted that both Turkey’s policy European vocation andthe path elements of of out the narrative constructed ade-securitized Kemalism.that those To of principles Kemalism, vocation,however, and that 2) a submissive policy with regard to the EU was also a deviation from theit from European a clear Turkey’s deviation 1) asubmissive Cypruspolicy was suggested that was the non-compromising and the security-centered 1. Atatürk’s path to Western/European-orientation and membershipand intheNATO and Western/European-orientation path Atatürk’s to and the majority of partiesthe since the 1960s until 2000s the directly linked following The military of discourse the establishment(in 1960s, the 1970sandthe 1980s), the foreign with Kemalisma single policy orientation. hasnotbeenassociated that showed discourse policy foreign Turkish in the Kemalism of role the of analysis present The Having reiterated maingoalsthe and of theinitial thus study the theanswerpuzzle, to 232 CEU eTD Collection 2. constitution did not necessarily involve constitution of a negative Other versus a pure a versus Other negative a of constitution involve necessarily not did constitution EU maximized national Turkey’s interests. Similarly, study our confirmed thatidentity the joining hand, other the on others, To vocation. European her from herself orient to these policies. Tosome, nationalof the interestsde- Turkey required Turkey to found2000s). We also and have that different competing rationalities were attributed (asarguedthislate in 1990s by global approach and the early Cem’s outlook the a only was EU-orientation her that and location geographical her of reflective is foreignmore policy that global a had pursue to Turkey some arguedthat hand, majority (asarticulated leaders). thethe bytheother West/Europe On political of andhad tobepursued despite and insincerethe duplicitous approach of the wasTurkey’s West/Europe integration the with that Somesuggested discourse. in official the were present Western/European-orientation Turkey’s to relation from isolation West. complete the a or policy Westernist a staunch either ends: two the between merely discourse policy previousstructure foreign theelementsofKemalismRelated tothe point, not the did pursuit Atatürk’s of path. the to recourse via legitimized also were 2000s) early in the establishment military (the West the with non-alignment and 1970s), inthe Party Action Nationalist (the Motherlandin the Party 1980sandthe annexation JDP inthe2000s), Cyprus of foreign RPPinthepolicy 1970s),active(the Cyprusthe policy issuetowards (the establishmentin theparties in 1960sand and flexible the government the1970s), military (the Cyprus in intervention The principles. Kemalist the to corollary as seen was that direction policy only the not was Western/European-orientation the that found have we Yet, one. being EEC/EU the institutions, Western other More variations of be policy the to pursuedin 233 part right of CEU eTD Collection 4. 3. top military officials. The government programs not only built on the Kemalist the on built only not programs government The officials. military top Kemalism was not limitedthat found have we to components, its into the discourse discourse official the deconstructing By of a minor group of state elite, mainly the Kemalism by hegemonizing the ‘nodal employedpoint’ by them. of the changing conditions, but also sought to delegitimize alternative constructions of discourses did not only build on previousthe Kemalist by template in itrevising terms reforms: ‘reaching the level of the the level of ‘reaching reforms: EU the of were critical that arguments the delegitimize to in order Party) Development pointwas addedtothis inthe2000s(especially by template Justicethe and construction: ‘reaching new via a Party) Left Democratic the Party, Action Nationalist the (e.g. some parties level of the contemporarypresenthow the analysis showed 1960’s and 1970’s the of‘reachingassociation the civilization’ with a pro-Western ideology of Kemalism,butalso competing articulations made in samethe period. The the to policy revisions chronological involve only not did was Kemalism of challenged constitution the Thus, by rationalities. and identities Kemalist competing hence Kemalisms, multiple constituted also process this Kemalism, of components the of means by policies competing legitimized makers policy foreign as the identity. Hence, itsfrom once-cherished Westdiverged the how articulate to template attributing a civilizedby Westernness Westernist hence Turkey’s civilization’ constructing with a policy, identity to the West. thecontemporary of ‘reaching thelevel principleof the associated Some articulations. On the policy otherforeign these through reconstituted were hand, identities Variational Self. others used the same beyond the level of the West’. We have seen that a new nodal that We seen have West’. level of the the EU criteria 234 ’. This showed thattheindividual’. This showed party CEU eTD Collection 5. and ameltingwhich pot any dissolved withindifferences country.the within the ‘center’ notbut only themselves socialrepositioned and pro-Islamist democratic to conservative also reconstructed of discourse partiestheir outof ‘center’, the nationalist rangingfrom opponents and Kemalism as the symbolpush andhence seekingto whatKemalismthe saw asseparatist views they to of nationalnon- Attributing stance. Kemalist their reconstituted unity that move discursive a Kemalism, delegitimize by theirfrom opponents the that other arguing deviated parties of path the leadersparty declare principles the but adherence to of Atatürk they to also sought Not only theprogramsdid government aswell individualas the statementsmade by military than establishment. the rather leadership, withinintegrated the Kemalistchain, the articulations through of civilianthe civilization through sustainable development’ and ‘the harmony of civilizations’ were model contemporary aslevel the the ‘serving Muslimnations’,of the ‘reaching a to level ‘reaching the of ‘establishing Copenhagencriteria’, democracy’, the participatory principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the within the the integrated elements international ‘being respectful agreements’, the of world’). On the other hand, the elementsindependence, interests’, and national ‘resolving disputesthrough peaceful means’ and of community being‘defending through recognizedasequals’, sovereignty,the withinWestern status the ‘gainingarespected level contemporary the civilization’, of adopted principlesthe employedby military (‘raising the establishment Turkey to the programs Kemalistchain.butalso expandedthe government contentof the The template employed by military the inestablishment 1960s,the 1970s the and the 1980s 235 CEU eTD Collection 7. 6. different bases and, in this regard, it constituted competing legitimacies as well. despite serving as and the ‘foreign’ but that this rupture is discursively constructed. It also suggested that ‘domestic’ the between a border clear is not there that assumption poststructuralist the confirmed only not This leaders. policy the of articulations policy foreign competing the in Kemalism of constructions different of means by differently constructed was ‘border’ fixed; the rather, was not ‘outside’ and the ‘inside’ border the separating the andbetween the the ‘outside’, ‘domestic’ and As the analysis ‘foreign’. showed, our affairs’), politics the Kemalism of involved drawing the borders between the ‘inside’ domestic the in ‘non-interference (e.g. principles Kemalist the to recourse by Turkey particular foreign policies (e.g. the Cyprus issue) were seen as the ‘domestic affairs’ of dimension and thereby pushed ‘outside’ of politicalthe legitimacy, since and Thus, since what was seen as a deviation from imposed thanbeing rather ‘domestic that policies’ were from policies ‘outside’.the Kemalismand causes’ ‘national as was represented were attributedpolicies these way, this In Kemalism. a ‘foreign’ of elements the to recourse by Western-orientation the and issue Cyprus the regarding policies their legitimized makers policy the way in the revealed was policy foreign strikingthe instances of Kemalism’s in as role serving a base legitimacyof for Turkish of the political leaders that due ideas itsreach, articulations but to the within attributed divergent unique inaccommodating competing meanings as not, Kemalism hasbeen inNevertheless, study,was becausediscussed this this to its components. discourse. political Turkish Onein the ideas divergent of of denominator common the and legitimacy of symbol a as Kemalism constructed discourse official the sense, this In base of legitimacy, the role of Kemalism was constructed on constructed was Kemalism of role the legitimacy, of a base 236 CEU eTD Collection 8. 9. ascribed wide-ranging principles and objectives tofollowing pathAtatürk’s and discourse official the Kemalism, of role the on discussions academic the to Similar terms of the in one official the and discourse academic the between parallels significant are there that showed further discourse policy foreign Turkish inthe Kemalism of analysis The discourses discourses defined the official the and academic way the between similarities remarkable found also have We ideology. of an alsobeseenasacomponent could interests certain as based arguments pursuing the discourse. Following on sees both as dependent andthat ideational material the and the divide between the a certain idearejects main one of poststructuralism that of Thisassumptions discourse. the supports is not necessarily official the and policy foreign in Turkish Kemalism of role the on discussions exempt from the academic the both in in world’) the ‘peaceathome, peace (e.g. of ‘ideals’ certain interest- pursuit tothe by waslegitimized recourse national ‘defendingsovereignty’) (e.g. the contradictory to the nationalbeen seen has not in world’) the home, peace at ‘peace civilization’, contemporary the interests, of level the ‘reaching (e.g. ideas while certain following discourses: official and theacademic pursuit of certain ‘realist’ ‘ideational’the in tobe blurred ‘realist’ principles the and both the rather proved principles oppressed nations’, ‘peace at home, peace in the world’). However, the divide between all the to asamodel ‘serving civilization’, level of contemporary the the ‘reaching ‘integrity’, ‘full-independence’,‘ideational’ ‘rationalism’) ‘reciprocity’, to (e.g. ones ‘sovereignty’, interests’, national ‘defending (e.g. principles ‘realist’ of aset from ranged – Kemalism of elements the – path Atatürk’s following to attributed principles content of the Kemalist ideology. In both constructions, the concepts and concepts the constructions, both In ideology. Kemalist the of role of the Kemalist ideology in Turkish foreign policy. 237 CEU eTD Collection 10. National the Salvation (e.g. parties non-Kemalist allegedly the of discourse the in even not Party,discourse, the Welfare official the in circulation any found not have ideology Kemalist Party).the of characteristics The anti-Westernistnon-democratic so-called the Yet, Kemalism. of elements the to recourse discourse was notinlegitimized is by were more,establishment early the these 2000s). What arguments Salvation Party in the by in (as from disengagement National the the official propagated discourse West the 1970s, the Welfare KemalismParty asnon-democratic. Indeed, there were suggestions for Turkey’s in early the 1990s,saw ever power to came that theparties nor military establishment neither the and the military West, the with integration Turkey’s to obstacle aserious ofKemalismposes nature’ non-democratic ‘the that arguments the to contrary addition, In debates. official the in only havespace ina marginal captured they defensiveacademic discussions, discourse imperialism’ and ‘full-independence’ have beenone of majorthe components of the against ‘fighting of While theelements debates. academic tothe correspond However, ouranalysisshowed thatthe official discoursenotcompletely did imperialism’). the against ‘fighting and ‘reciprocity’ affairs’, in ‘non-interference domestic ‘sovereignty’, principles of to the reforms (by recourse further the to andreluctance civilization’) contemporary the level of the ‘reaching principle (by tothe of intensification of both reforms recourse the the suggested in the official approaches) 1(thein werealso ‘integrationist’ ‘defensive’and Chapter the represented discourse.country.competing The two totherole approaches ofKemalism identifiedwere that Articulations securing of the full-independence to community member of Western/international the anumberfrom formaking Kemalism,constructed roles Turkey ranging of a respected on Turkey’s integration with the EEC/EU 238 CEU eTD Collection not refer to following Atatürk’s path to legitimize establishing a Customs Union with the Muslim countries. 743 The only exception in this regard was the discourse of the National Salvation Party of the 1970s, which did 12. 11. reference to pursuing Atatürk’s pathhaspursuing meaningto the Atatürk’s a ‘historic’ ascribed also reference to the conditions of the past and the present. Hence, the legitimization of new policies by Independence the andconstruct alink War(National of Struggle) between 1919-1923 serving identity reconstitute imagery foundational the by bringingTurkey to theof of discourse: policy foreign Turkish inthe Kemalism of role another yet shown has This arecertaindeviations eventhough there from ‘foundational the revisions. principles’, pursuing Atatürk’s path still seem beto the main template in ensuring that there are no to elements attributed Nevertheless, the 1980-1983. era of military 1970s orduringthe identity’and the caseinthe 1960s ‘Kemalist/Ataturkist tothe aswasthe phrase or ‘Kemalism/Ataturkism’ tothe references of direct instances fewer are there Indeed, views. of ‘suture’ alternative gapsrevealed by the delegitimization continuingthe to this study drew on), then our analysis showed that the ‘surgeons’ ofKemalism are still conceptualization ideology (the a particular of establish their construction to leaders ifexisted. However, by hegemony mean we continuous the attempts by policy the never hegemonic, been interpretations ascompeting its of elementshave always understands hegemony as of absence the any competing views,thenKemalism has one If Turkish policy. ‘foreign’ for criteria main legitimating the serves asoneof still Kemalism that showed further analysis our discourses, alternative by challenged is asit policies role instructuring its dominantandlegitimate or characteristic Moreover, contrary to the argument that Kemalism has lostits hegemonic it. legitimized through anddelegitimized but toanti-Kemalism by legitimized recourse 743 239 CEU eTD Collection link ideology link ideology and foreign policy, and howparticular constructions have been marginalized that discourses thecompeting between main difference the structure to reach analytical further policy. competing ‘nodal in Discussing points’ of terms basicdiscourseshasthe given us a focusing onthe nodal helpedpoints us show the dynamic ideology constitution of andforeign Concluding remarks Studying the co-constitutive between foreignrelationship policy and ideology by representing both both representing policies asthe integrationist remarks onthe EUmembership wereadded adefensive dimension by the West/Europe, the with integration to goal civilizational the link to approach by integrationist has ‘moderated’ been the neo-imperial Other view Westasa the of second template, marginalizing the firstand the third While templates. the defensive the was towards tilted rather discourse theofficial above-mentionedthe constructions, between but oscillated followed astable havenot route vocation Western/European the resolve the Cyprus issue. As analysisour showed,while Turkey’s Cyprus policy and construction imagery,this of in path viewing Turkey’s EU as onlyviablethe to way built third policiesthe on both reconciled that articulations hand,On those other the resolutionthe oftheissueindirect turned into formembership an in condition EU. the construction of construction of imagerythis in insisting on ‘causes’pursuing both the two policies should be held separate from each other drew on the second withdrawing not infrom historicallythe claimedargued that rights Cyprus. Thosethat construction of this imagery in proposing to fight Cyprus and the EUvocation onthefirst mutually incompatible as depended towards policy traditional the represented that articulations Those ‘friends’. of help against suggested policies, representing them as a ‘National that isStruggle’, foughteither the imperialism of the ‘West’ or imperialism ‘West’ the of the rights 240 of of Turkey. despite the untrustworthy ‘allies’ or against the Western imperialism by the fact that factdespite the with the CEU eTD Collection against whichagainst Thisthey compete. means, while foreign policy by is structured components the previous providedthe political (nodal by agents)andthefixations other points) the agents They are rather wish. they dependent sphere policy-relevant any to onideology of the strings the templatespulling in free completely not that already exist (those that were legitimizeideology in constituted question In other theirto foreign words, stand. own policy agents are by it formulatehegemony.involves the adynamic Assuch, as actors practice, discursive sphere is never ahomogenous ideologyrealm, then isconstitution also astruggle for ifthey Third, is in propagate. politics, legitimacy about gaining essence, and thepolitical providebetween ideology astablelinkforeign legitimacyand gain policy policies forto the then ideology construct, is adiscursive policy, foreign isas just ideology, if dependentSecond, policies. their legitimate on and theformulate to makers policy articulations the by employed tool only the not is identity that shows this of the agents ofdivergent foreign from or policy isaffirmative policy foreign a foreignparticular a whether of who manifestations If policy. foreign for seekpolicy to orientation are embeddedideology and foreign policy involves taking ideologywith as one of the mainthe legitimating criterionelementsin making, policy foreign apoststructuralist of relationship conceptualization between the of an ideology, criteria legitimating basic the on focusing requires policy foreign to approach poststructuralist constructions. alternative the delegitimize to in attempts and reconstituted and howthey clear-cutare constituted arenot discourses different between rather as a methodological advantage of discourse analysis topoint out how the divisions This, however, was not takenshifted between than remainingcompetingrather discourses loyal their ‘nodal to own points’. as a weakness of the methodologypolitical employedactors soughtin asthe wasblurred discourses the basic the between The divide dominant. became while others study to capture but the nodal points of the alternative discourses and thereby Hence the main theoretical conclusions of the thesis can be outlined as follows. If If the follows. as be can outlined thesis of the conclusions theoretical main Hence the 241 CEU eTD Collection particular foreign policies; and that the ideologies, being discursive constructs as they are, are constructs beingideologies, discursive the that foreign and policies; particular in legitimizing ideologies objectify also articulations policy foreign that out pointing this study foreignto open a new by inpoststructuralist research studies, policy agenda of main ambition itwas the such.Hence, identity as of constitution onthe center need to not foreign does policy to approach apoststructuralist given, asobjectively identities presenting entity that directs an action but that the foreign policy articulations constitute subjects by inworks foreignthe policy focusedliterature on revealing thatidentity is notan objective as it whilewas pointed in out However, 2, poststructuralist the identity/interest/idea. Chapter from causal linkrefraining drawing astrict between a particular policy and aseparate interdependence is precisely this discourse, toitselfthrough circularity and which linksa particular discourse what poststructuralistlogic, acircular renders While this conceptualization). our aswell, given a discourse ideology works aim of (whichmakes and practices setofideas,action, courses beliefs an attitudes, ordered to reveal and their and as identitiesideologiesconstituted) are and interests, discursivethe that through practices reason for discourse both isdiscourse. Hencewe as amedium through took (itof constructed practice domestic, insideand outside, material and ideational,ideological and non-ideological were and foreign ideas, and interests between divisions taken-for-granted the how out pointed of particularalso helped revealingideologies certain points that provide a theoreticalstructuring thedividebetween made policies, foreign particular thearguments in study the angle to make insense of the rolethe past and contemporary by ‘fixed’ agents. other the are terms that the reformulate whoseek to agents foreign policy between the struggle the foreign policyof ideology, what an ideology is composed of anddebates. what it refers to also changes as a result of This study In this regard, while this dissertation focused on the role of a particular ideology in 242 CEU eTD Collection the European the Union membership,is Islamism how equated with pursuing ananti-Western to legitimize anapplication is to liberalism used how instance, for studies thatanalyze, those out how various ‘isms’ form the codes used in a foreign policy discourse has implications for constitutive relationship between Kemalism and Turkish foreign policy anddiscourse pointing co- regard,studyingthe of this claims within them. In contained according set the to policies the structure do ‘isms’ other many and neo-liberalism capitalism, socialism, Islamism, civilizationism, fundamentalism, humanitarianism, nationalism, secularism, liberalism, times, post-ideological called so the in even yet, capitalism; and communism clash havemay toideology. between We behind left hot the ‘historical’ characteristic conceptualization of ideology developed inthis itisstudy, attribute to problematic a similar given the a past, of assomething beconsidered may a certainleader to are attached that ideological discourses eventhough However, cults. once had which personality countries the in even policies domestic/foreign of principles legitimating major be the to seem security and liberalism, rights, human of democracy, principles the but cults personality once-reified the an formanytendency outdated foreign policycountries’ not today discourse since the ideas of be faced may being problems challenges and tothe solution aprescriptive presentingas them leader’sparticular Takingleader. national ideas the former as and precedent a binding was studied a following involved that ideological the path the fact that of here discourse the as just generalizable, not are Kemalism to attached points nodal particular the Similarly, foreignthe policies as of a domestic origin, than being rather from imposed ‘outside’). the beenlegitimize limited anditnot hasmilitary discourse the to of servedto establishment, the has Kemalism of politics the policy, foreign Turkish of criteria legitimating main the of one as identity. or policy, rationality of suggestive a particular intrinsically not are They direction. certain a in policy foreign the direct that entities objective not Indeed, some findings of study this were country-specific (e.g.Kemalism stillserves 243 CEU eTD Collection ‘ism’ on a particular policy and the inseparability of the so called ‘isms’ from the discourse. impactof an independent the showing the impossibility of for taken granted, thatare borders the of fluidity the out point thus and discourses, academic and official the by Kemalism as whatis taken linkreveal deconstruct discursively, this ishow was to dissertation established borders of an ideology study to its role in aparticularshaping policy, aim the this of Kemalism.fix works within tothe that of theideological the Nevertheless, reach contrary involvedinalso is practicea similar what in takenas considering path of a pursuitAtatürk’s chain of the ‘ism’ that is alsoinvolved gets ideological inan studied. practice inconstituting anadditional nodal tothe point Thought of thisin question ideas the aparticularand policy between a link establishes causal that articulation way, one can argue that thisideas aredefined asan‘ideology’, ‘world view’,‘principled ideas’ a‘movement’, each or dissertation of set specific a whether of ideology. Regardless of politics from the separate beheld cannot ideology onaparticular discussions academic this regard, In between them. ‘real’ relation the nodal than out rather pointing an point betweenadditional themconstructs established link causal pre-discursivesphere. Each a separate rather belonging than to political actors of the practices discursive on the is in resides dependent and rather Ideology reconstitution. its to contributes (adiscursive and chain) a certain template discursive on dependent is both ‘ism’anda iseach link policy that a particular than madebetween rather another, areinvolved not,and interests aparticular policy inpreferring or regardless of certain whether place. firstthe justify in policy theare usedto the ‘isms’inescapably that certainreconstitute butalso order show, such endeavored to donotonlyforeignarticulations the in structure a policy discourse ideologies and suggested the policy withappear consistent As each other. this study policy, humanitarianism how or is employed tojustify a unilateral interventionmakes that the This shows that regardless of This showsthatregardless maker apolicy believesof whether in ideology a particular 244 CEU eTD Collection methodology methodology employed inthis study developedand thearguments can providea starting point establishing the implications of the media and civil society studies on foreign policy. The whetherindeed they officially constructed. are more marginalbutinnodal also generalpublic or the dominantremain points discussions show whetherthe notonly constructed officially moreserve to does general discourse public indeed notlimited tothe chief state officials; and thought of this way, aninvestigation intothe in leaders forlegitimacy. establishing In their theforeign quest this regard, are makers policy be by captured official the hence additional provides governmentthe concepts to to repertoire borders separating additional Italsoconstructs publicthe from private. the nodal and points reconstructing thealready nodal circulatingpoints in blurring and discourse the thereby the by discussions official and public the between as amedium only not serves versa, tothemorevice of general sphereextending boundaries official the the and public discourse in institutions. Thisarea, civil andother bybusinesssociety associations, conferences given influential researchers, editorials, press bynewsextent, writings of reports, think-tank a considerable to constructed, butalso officials chief military or by heads of governments show foreign howthe isnot limitedpolicy particulardiscourse only tothe speeches delivered focusparticular on officialthe providesdiscourse, a promising andfruitful research field to government.think-tanks, This area,civil by society represented discourses alternative and other investigated discourse wasthemedia not which institutions waswas Oneareathat over time. hegemonized and marginalized are constructions particular how andleft the parties in thethat doand foreignthe discourse policy arethrough nodal constructed revealing howparticular points grey-zonenot manage to take part puzzles andfor thenecessityan in-depth case-oriented conduct answer the analysisto for by in thethe present study due to its This shows that there is a need for further theoretical and methodological research methodological and theoretical further foris need a there that shows This This study focused in onasinglecountry’s to discourse foreign both order policy 245 CEU eTD Collection incompatible policies. incompatible allegedly rationalizing and legitimizing as as well order, a certain in discourses policy the structuring for as a buttemplate policies variable particular as anof independent –not matters stateelite.ideology Finally,narrow in norisitdomainof something theexclusive of a past, isneither Ideology assumed. is generally it than complex more far is constitution ideology of some this revealed study: by of‘dynamics’ analytical and the ‘sphere’ the reach points to the involved therein,a furtherin analysis this and direction furthercontribute can provide Whilepromising. on alsoeach andthe of this depends specialcontextthe case puzzles foreignthe widening policy thisdiscourse, is angle further only not butalsopossible ideology state its andthecontested of ‘inclusiveness’ in role the and a particular structuring narrower angle of military and governmental discourse to the wider party discourses to show free Although attempted to ideology study thefrom this constitution and the role of the general and competinghow construct doesthis discourse, identities? public rationalities and public? How does the of general more the in itcirculate discourse constitutionthe andhow does discourse foreign the policy of a particular between ideology society doesa and civil the structure official How particular discourses? ideology/ or dynamics Whatare the by society? civil the reproduced discourse foreign policy ideological an ‘ism’ evolve in the questions researchagendabefollows: future Hence, the is for the can placedas How an more etc. associations, and business reports news institutions, society civil byinfluential given declarations the leaders to andthespeeches of party andparty programs from government the if is among circulate data points reach the extended more general the of discourse public nodal official the by ‘ism’ particular a of role(s) drawn self-evidently the how explore to 246 CEU eTD Collection ______. Süleyman Demirel,______. A.P. Genel Ba ______. Süleyman Demirel,______. PartisiAdalet Genel Ba ______. ______. Adalet Partisi [Justice Party]. [Justice Partisi Adalet ______. ______. Adalet ve Kalk Abadan-Unat, Nermin. “Laiklik ve “Laiklik Nermin. Abadan-Unat, II]. II]. Ankara:Merkez Partisi Genel Yay Adalet [Süleyman Demirel, the Chairman of the JP and the Prime Minister: election speeches Ne Merkez Genel Partisi Ankara: andspeeches]. writings Adalet Prime Minister: ve Söyledikleri 1969. Prime Minister: various speeches]. Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Ne Merkez Genel Partisi Ankara: Adalet speeches]. various Prime Minister: Konu Party]. Ankara:Do statute]. statute]. Ankara:Do 2008). (accessedJanuary 14, “Türkiye’de Under in [elections Seçimler” Turkey], Turkey: the 2002 election program of the Justice and Development Party]. BELGEnet. from from 2007). (accessed December1, [The cabinet meeting].[The cabinet veAdalet Kalk 2008). Kalk Destekleme Vakf the future], edited by Ça÷ future], the and republicanism]. second In Her Süleyman Adalet Partisi 1973 Seçim Adalet Partisi 1973Beyannamesi AK Parti Tüzü÷ü. 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Adaletve Kalk Available from (accessed February 12, 2008). Adalet ve Kalk and EU from clearly,explicitly our isorientation’]. deviation evena slightest not there yönelimimizde en ufak bir sapma yoktur’” [Prime Minister Erdo (accessed January (accessed January 2008). 13, 2006.DevelopmentParty],December16, Available from regulation must take into consideration the expectations of the Turkish Cypriots and should not have Cypriots any Turkish preconditions]. the of Adalet veexpectations Kalk the consideration into take must regulation Suretiyle Ve Hiçbir (accessed January 13, 2008). Kalk Õ Õ nma Partisi Party], and Partisi nma [Justice Development April 29,2006. Availablefrom nma Partisi Partisi nma and[Justice Party],December Development2006. 18, Availablefrom ÷ ú ú ú ÷rudan Ticaret Tüzü ø bakan bakan Erdo bakan bakan Erdo bakan Erdo bakan sti iz” [Turkish citizenshipis common denominator. our As Turkish citizens, we ú are ve De are ÷ 2. Ola 2. Õ Õ nma Partisi [Justice and Development Party], December 28, 2005. nma Partisi [Justice and Development Party], November 5, 2006. ÷an: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatanda ÷an: ‘Aç ÷an Erdo ABD’de” [Prime Minister ÷ ù an Kongresi” [Second ordinary in Kongresi” ordinary [Second an congress Tekirda ÷ Õ arta Ba arta erlendirme erlendirme Toplant k bir Öteki k bir Öteki de Õ Õ nma Partisi Partisi nma andDevelopment[Justice Party],June 20,2006. nma Partisi [Justice and DevelopmentParty], October 2, ÷ ü, K ÷ü, Õ il, bir dürüst [Turkey ülke” isa difficult not butan honest k venetsöylüyorum, kimne dersedesin, AB ÷lanmadan Onaylan Õ br Õ ÷ s Türk Taraf úÕ ildir” [The EUisan not Other for usanymore]. olarak o üst ortak paydadaüst birle ortak o olarak 258 ÕVÕ ” [The fifth consultation ” [The fifth andconsultation evaluation ÕQÕ Õ p Uygulanmal p n Beklentileri Beklentileri Esas n Al Õ nma Partisi [Justice and úOÕ÷Õ ÷an in theU.S.A.]. Adaletve bizim paydam ortak ÕGÕ ÷ an: ‘Let me state r” [Direct trade ú erek el erek el ele ÷ Õ ]. veAdalet nmak Õ nma Partisinma Õ zd Õ r. CEU eTD Collection ______. “Ba ______.“Ba ______. “Ba______. ______. “Ba ______. “Ba ______.“TBMMKonu Grup ______.“Türkiye’nin Üyeli ______. “Ba 13, 2008). Party], April 2004. 20, Available from (accessed January as the United Cyprus Republic]. Adalet ve Kalk .Õ (accessed February 2008). (accessed February 14, andParty],May Development2004. 1, Availablefrom: Prime Minister Erdo Prime Minister (accessed January (accessed January 2008). 13, DevelopmentParty],June 12,2004. Availablefrom Erdo 27, 2004. Available from (accessed January 2008). 13, turn for her future]. Adalet ve Kalk ak 2004. Available from (accessed February 2008). 19, EU]. Adalet ve Kalk from from 2008). (accessed13, February ve Kalk (accessed January (accessed January 2008). 13, DevelopmentParty],March 2005. 9, Availablefrom: EU]. vethe of Kalk Adalet power strategic the enhance (accessed January (accessed January 2008). 13, DevelopmentParty],July 6, 2005. Available from Erdo Õ br yla dönmü Õ ÷ ÷ s Cumhuriyeti s Cumhuriyeti gelsin” olarak [WeCyprus hopethat into turns anisland of peace ú an meets the Turks in Chicago]. Adaletve Kalk an talks at the Sun-Valley Conference]. Adaletve Kalk ú ú ú ú bakan Erdo ú bakan bakan Erdo bakan bakan Erdo bakan bakan Erdo bakan bakan Erdo Õ bakan Erdo nma Partisi [Justice and DevelopmentParty], December 1, 2004. Available ú tür” [Prime Erdo Minister tür” ÷an'Õ ÷ ÷an: Türkiye gelece ÷an’dan AB’ye Mesaj”[PrimeErdo Minister ÷an Sun-Valley Konferans ÷ an Chicago’daki Türkler’le biraraya geldi”an Minister [Prime Chicago’daki Türkler’le Õ ÷ an: Temennimiz ki odur K nma Partisi [Justice and DevelopmentParty], September 17, ÷ an’s nation]. ve tothe Kalk Adalet address i AB’nin Stratejik Gücünü Artt n Sesleni Ulusa ú mas Õ ” [Speech at the National attheNational ” [Speech Assembly of Turkey]. Adalet Õ nma Partisi [Justice and DevelopmentParty], July 259 ú ÷ Konu i için son derece önemlibir kav ÷ an: Turkey has takenacrucial successfully Õ ú ’nda Konu’nda mas Õ br Õ nma Partisi [Justice and Development Õ s bir bars bir ÕQÕ ÕUÕ n Tam [ThefullMetni” text of Õ nma Partisi [Justice and [Justice Partisi nma Õ r” [Turkey’smembership will nma Partisi [Justice and [Justice Partisi nma ú tu” [The tu” Prime Minister Õú adas Õ nma Partisi [Justice and ÷an’s message the to Õ nma Partisi [Justice nma Partisi Õ haline Birle ú aktan aktan aln ú ik ÕQÕ n CEU eTD Collection ______.“Ba ______.“Türk Silahl ______. “Ba______. ______.“Ba ______. “Ba ______.“AB icinde vizyonumuzun K ______.“Ba ______. “Ba conference of the Prime Minister Erdo from from (accessed January 13, 2008). Adalet ve Kalk democratization process in process Turkey].democratization veAdalet Kalk (accessed January (accessed January 2008). 13, DevelopmentParty],May 29, 2003. Availablefrom milad 2003. Available from (accessed January 2008). 13, of Carrefour]. Adaletve Kalk (accessed January (accessed January 2008). 14, DevelopmentParty],July 2003. 02, Available from Prime Minister Erdo veKalk MinisterErdo from from (accessed January 13, 2008). 2008). 2003. November 15, Available from (accessed 13, January of our EU vision]. Adalet ve Kalk ve Kalk Adalet reservations]. Northernthe Cyprus; however, Ithinkisit equally accept wrong itto without any It is wrong to totally reject the Annan Plan by saying that itdoes not do any good for 18, 2003. Available from (accessed February 2008). 13, yanl göre bana de demek ediyorum kabul bunu külliyen (accessed January 13, 2008). March 4,2004. Party], and[Justice Available Development from add to this and say ‘the nation is the master of the state’]. Adalet ve Kalk Minister Erdo Prime [The diyorum” efendisidir’ devletin ve‘millet ediyorum ilave kelime bir buna ÕGÕ ú ú ú ú ú ú bakan Erdo bakan Erdo bakan Erdo bakan Erdo bakan bakan bakan Erdo bakan bakan Erdo Õ r” [Turkish Armed representthebeginning Forces modernization of the and nma Partisinma [JusticeParty], andDevelopmentOctober 17,2003. Available ÷an: We pursueapolicy will of with regardtoCyprus].solution Adalet ÷ Õ Kuvvetleri Kuvvetleri modernleTürkiye’de Õ an in Eski nma Partisi [Justice and DevelopmentParty], May 12, 2004. Available ÷an Lübnan Ba ÷an ve Barroso’nun basortak ÷an: Annan Plan ÷an Carrefour Aç ÷an: K ÷an Eski ÷ an and Barroso]. Adalet ve Kalk ú Õ ehir: Atatürk said ‘farmers are the masters of the nation’. I br ú Õ ehir’de: ‘köylü ehir’de: Atatürk milletin efendisidir’ dedi. Ben s Konusunda Çözüm Siyaseti Õ Õ nma Partisi [Justice and Development Party], December Party], Development and [Justice Partisi nma nma Partisinma and [JusticeParty], June Development 07, Õ br ú Õ Õ nma Partisi [Justice and DevelopmentParty], bakan s Türkleri var.”de [Turkish are Cypriots also apart Õ külliyen Kuzey K ÕOÕúÕ 260 ÷ an and the Prime Minister of Lebanon Hariri]. nda” [PrimeErdo Ministernda” Õ Hariri Basin Hariri Ortak Toplant Õ ú n toplant me ve demokratikle Õ nma Partisi [Justice and nma Partisi [Justice Õ Õ br nma Partisi [Justice and ÕúWÕ Õ ÕVÕ s’a yaramaz demek yanl r” [Prime Minister Erdo Minister [Prime r” ø ” [Jointpress conference of zleyece ÷an at opening the ÷ ÕVÕ iz” [Prime ú me sürecinin ” [Jointpress Õ nma Partisi ÕúWÕ ÷ an: r, CEU eTD Collection ______.“Erdo “Bavulumuzu______. Toplamak Yok” [Wepack upourbags]. not will veAdalet Kalk ______.“Türkiye’de ______.“K ______. “AK ______. Kurucular Kurulu Genel Parti Ba ______.“TBMMKonu Grup ______. “Hiç bir Partinin devam Õ ______. “Ba (accessed January 13, 2008). Partisi Party], andDevelopmentNovember[Justice 16,2002. Availablefrom (accessed January 13, 2008). Partisi Party], andDevelopmentDecember[Justice 14,2002. Availablefrom (accessed January 13, 2008). Kalk [Unfortunately,not live wedo healthy a indemocracy Turkey now]. Adaletve (accessed January 13, 2008). Partisi [Justice and DevelopmentParty], January 5, 2003. Available from cannot achieve withcannot for policy 40years].the anything pursued veKalkAdalet give-it-away and get-rid-of-itpolicy butwe are regarding Cyprus saying one that politika ile debiryere var 2008). February 2003. 1, Availablefrom (accessed 13, January Recep Tayyip Erdo Topland (accessed February 2008). 13, Partisi Party], andDevelopment[Justice February 2, 2003. Availablefrom 2003. Available from (accessed January 2008). 13, made clear]. Adalet ve Kalk a continuation of any party. We are the Justice and Development Party. This must be (accessed February 2008). (accessed February 19, DevelopmentParty],May 2003. 9, Available from Erdo Õ Õ ÷ nma Partisi Partisi nma and[Justice Party],December Development2002. 25, Availablefrom br an meets the TRNC PresidentDenkta ú bakan bakan Erdo Õ Õ s’ta asla s’ta ver-kurtul politikas ” [The founding committee of the JDP meets under the chairmanship of ÷an’ Õ n KKTC Ziyareti.” [Erdo ú u anda maalesef tam sa ÷an KKTC Cumhurba ÷ an]. ve Kalk Adalet ú mas Õ lamayaca de Õ Õ ” [Speech at the National atthe ” [Speech Assembly]. Adaletve Kalk nma Partisi [Justice and DevelopmentParty], May 4, ÷ iliz. Biz AK Parti’yiz. Bu Böyle Bilinmeli” [We are not ÷ÕQÕ Õ ndan yanandan de 261 ÷an’svisit to the TRNC]. Adaletve Kalk söylüyoruz” [We söylüyoruz” have never subscribed to the Õ ÷OÕ nma Partisi [Justice and Development Party], andDevelopment [Justice Partisi nma ú ú kan kan Recep Tayyip Erdo kan kl ú ]. 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