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Erdoğan the Builder in Northern Cyprus. Turkish President Recep

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Erdoğan the Builder in Northern Cyprus. Turkish President Recep NO. 47 AUGUST 2021 Introduction Erdoğan the Builder in Northern Cyprus Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Visit to the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” Cements a Shift in Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and Reinforces Ankara’s Isolation Günter Seufert Ahead of his trip to Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus on July 20, 2021, the Turkish President announced that he would be bringing “good news” to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Speculation ran rampant that Erdoğan would use the 47th anniversary of the Turkish invasion to announce that Azerbaijan, Pakistan, or Kyrgyzstan would establish diplomatic relations with the TRNC, which is currently recognized only by Turkey. But Erdoğan merely unveiled the construction of a pomp- ous presidential palace that would befit a future, independent “Turkish Cypriot State”. The Turkish president is still reluctant to back up his words of international recognition of the TRNC with deeds. But the visit shows that Ankara is working to- ward the final division of the island, and Erdoğan’s actions made it clear once again that he alone calls the shots in northern Cyprus. Since the election of former “Prime Minis- Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist ter” and national-conservative Ersin Tatar Movement Party (MHP), Turkish troops in as “President of the Republic” of the TRNC Cyprus are an essential contribution to the on October 18, 2020, Turkey has turned its security of Anatolia and an indispensable back on reunifying the island under a bi- element of Turkey’s far-reaching strategy in communal, bi-zonal federation. Guided by the region. Turkey’s president, Tatar has declared that only international recognition of the TRNC and a two-state solution can lead to a peace- Marginalization of the ful settlement in Cyprus. Tatar boasts of the Turkish Cypriots support that he receives from Erdoğan and says that he is proud to be Turkey’s man in From Ankara’s perspective, Turkish northern Cyprus. Cypriots cannot hold the reins when the In Ankara, the government and parts of interests of Turkey are at stake. Still, the secular opposition have once again Ankara always postulates that the Cypriot adopted the stance that for Turkey, Cyprus Turks are sovereign and that Turkey only is first and foremost a matter of security. defends their rights and interests. The TRNC For Erdoğan’s unofficial coalition partner has been economically dependent on Tur- key since its foundation in 1983, and the not least, the Turkish administration would Turkish military has always determined the open Cyprus’s former tourist hub, the sub- security policy of the TRNC. Nonetheless, urb of Varosha (Maraş in Turkish) near Ankara has so far shied away from en- Famagusta, to investors. The region is forcing strategies and decisions that openly Greek-owned and has been off-limits since confront the Turkish Cypriots. This changed the Turkish invasion in 1974. Two United in the run-up to the 2020 TRNC presidential Nations (UN) resolutions call for the return election, in which Ersin Tatar, Ankara’s pre- of the area to its original owners. ferred candidate, came out on top. Like a victorious commander, Erdoğan Mustafa Akıncı, Tatar’s federation- traveled to Cyprus with two airplanes and a oriented predecessor, said that never before large entourage. He was accompanied by had a northern Cypriot election seen such MHP Chairman Bahçeli, eight ministers, the concerted action by Turkey’s intelligence chief of the general staff and commanders service, military, diplomats and politicians. of all branches of the armed forces. West- Furthermore, never before had there been ern politicians who called on Ankara to such pressure and threats, and never before adhere to the internationally agreed upon had financial resources been used to such framework for resolving the Cyprus conflict an extent. Akıncı ran for reelection despite and to heed UN resolutions received a harsh the serious threats this posed to him and response. President of the European Com- his family. Unbeknownst to him, his co- mission Ursula von der Leyen reiterated the workers were summoned to Ankara and EU’s position, namely that it would never the Turkish embassy in Nicosia, and he saw recognize a two-state solution. Erdoğan himself denigrated as an agent of the rebuked her, saying, “have you ever heard United States and the Republic of Cyprus. Erdoğan let anyone dictate his speech?” In a The Turkish secret service also exerted similar tone, he also dismissed a bi-partisan pressure on other right-wing candidates warning issued by US senators and a call for running against Tatar. One of them, Sertaç moderated action made by the EU’s foreign Denktaş, son of the founding president affairs envoy Josep Borrell. of the TRNC, openly stated this on Septem- ber 4, 2020. When Erdoğan addressed the parliament Ankara’s Salami Tactics of the TRNC, the left-liberal opposition re- fused to participate. Tatar, in response, Against this backdrop, the “good news” that accused the opposition parties of treason, Erdoğan finally announced before the par- showing that Turkey’s authoritarian politi- liament of the TRNC was quite modest. He cal climate is now spreading to northern neither declared a new state nor the intro- Cyprus as well. duction of a presidential system. Instead, he announced the construction of a presiden- tial palace, a national recreational park and A Boastful Announcement new premises for the parliament. In Tur- key, the secular and nationalist opposition Like a father to his children, Erdoğan an- always rejected any concession on the nounced to the Turkish public that he Cyprus issue, and when Erdoğan made this had “good news” before his trip to Cyprus, statement, they did not conceal their dis- and the press raised expectations to a fever appointment. The opposition press is call- pitch. There was talk not only of diplomatic ing for concrete steps that would facilitate recognition of the TRNC but also of a major friendly states’ recognition of the TRNC. infrastructure program. A “Turkish Cypriot Also, from the perspective of the opposition State” with a new constitution governed by parties, the current dispute over natural gas a presidential system based on the model reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean has of Turkey would replace the TRNC. Last but SWP Comment 47 August 2021 2 once again highlighted the strategic impor- with Greece and Turkey, stated that Tur- tance of Cyprus for Turkey. key’s actions violated UN resolutions. The government press in Turkey strikes France, Israel, Cairo and Moscow expressed a different tone. It presents the construc- similar views. tion projects as a sign of Erdoğan’s political In a statement issued by its president determination and as “symbols for the on July 23, the UN Security Council con- coming declaration of the Turkish state in demned “the July 20, 2021 announcement Cyprus”. It asserts, as in domestic policy, by the Turkish President and the leader of Erdoğan is pursuing incremental steps in the Turkish Cypriots on the opening of a foreign policy as well. He is patiently portion of the restricted area of Varosha.” placing the pieces, and the question is not The Council calls for a reversal on the whether but when he will found the new matter and underlines its commitment to state. a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation in Indeed, Turkey has been applying this Cyprus. tactic in Varosha, the aforementioned former tourist hub of Famagusta in the Turkish-occupied north of the island. Turkish Path Dependency and the Already in July 2019, as prime minister of Significance of European Policy the TRNC, Ersin Tatar said that his govern- ment was preparing to open the closed As the saying goes in Turkey: Cyprus is the area. Under the Turkish Cypriot administra- field in which Turkish foreign policy has tion, the Cypriot Greek owners of the prop- achieved its most success to date. Despite erties located there would be allowed to international condemnation, Ankara has resume economic use of the premises or to managed to maintain its occupation of the apply for compensation. A little over one island’s north for nearly five decades with- year later, in October 2020, on the occasion out significant consequences. During the of Erdoğan’s visit to the island, Tatar Cold War, the relatively strong presence of opened the gates of the restricted area and communist movements in Greece and invited the Turkish Cypriot population to amongst Greek Cypriot populations, the inspect it. British military bases on the island, and The next step took place during Erdoğan’s Turkey’s central role in NATO were all rea- visit in July 2021. In an area that comprises sons why Ankara faced little international 3.5 percent of the overall fenced territory, pressure with regard to its policy in Cyprus. Greek property owners were invited to In 1975, Ankara founded the so-called invest in the reuse of the buildings under “Turkish Federal State in Cyprus” (Kıbrıs the Turkish Cypriot administration or to Türk Federe Devleti) and replaced it with apply for compensation. the TRNC in 1983. In this way, Turkey has cautiously but successively advanced the statehood of Turkish Cypriots. However, International Response contrary to the rhetoric cultivated in Tur- key, Ankara has never seriously attempted In Washington, US Secretary of State Antony to persuade friendly states to recognize the Blinken said, “the United States views TRNC. Ankara has always followed the Turkish Cypriot actions in Varosha, with credo of Rauf Denktaş, the founding presi- the support of Turkey, as provocative, un- dent of the TRNC, according to which acceptable, and incompatible with their Turkey’s solution to the Cyprus problem past commitments to engage constructively should be to facilitate the persistence of the in settlement talks.” Calling for an early state of limbo between international law meeting of the UN Security Council on the and the factual situation.
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