systematically brands activists as either puppets of puppets either as activists brands systematically regime Syrian the done, have region the in leaders the of images disseminates regime the activists, by disseminated casualties and protests of images the to contrast In the popularandpacificdimensions oftheprotests. belying vision a create to machine propaganda the of use full making is government the hand, other the against protesters and the action of the . On various on fronts since then. On the one hand is the repression out played has strategy regime’s The that havesownterroramongthepopulation. the of actions the and cities other and this in operations military-type of onset the , of siege the with exponentially rose arrests and injuries deaths, of trickle daily The ing thetoneofdemands. elevat- and participants of number in territory,rising the throughout proliferate to protests caused only protests first the to reaction defensive regime’s The protesters. by Dignity” of “Day the called sonably the spark to be lit. It was 15 March 2011, not unrea- Daraa who had painted graffiti against the regime for from adolescents of number a of arrest the against protests several repress to regime the for events enough specific them, was it of apparently , In revolt. of fire the all sparked in but causes, tent la- many had have world Arab the in revolutions The The OriginsoftheRevolt Barcelona European InstituteoftheMediterranean(IEMed), Editor-in-Chief, Arab World andMediterraneanRegionDepartment Head Lurdes Vidal Revolution andanUncertainFuture Syria, Vertigo intheFace ofaRadicalised Mediterranean Politics |MiddleEast or pro-regime rallies. As other As rallies. pro-regime or masira afkar/ideas , the pro-regime brigades pro-regime the Shabiha, anisation that has prevented unified collective action. action. collective unified prevented has that anisation regime hasmanipulated itthroughapolicy ofsectari- the as insofar factor key a is Diversity power. for gle but in political contention and, ultimately, in the strug- confessions between enmity in sought be not should conflict the of roots the although conflict, the of ing Syrian diversity has served to foster a culturalist read- on thewholetheyarenolongerso“minority”. gether can add up to 40% of the population, so that to- minorities the all it, at looks one how on pending De- conflict). the to due Iraq to returning are who more, or million 1 (some refugees Iraqi and (2.3%) refugees Palestinian are there addition, In (10%). Christians and (1-3%) Ismaili (1-3%), Druze 20%), Shiites, Alawi (12%, although (70-75%), some indicate their number as Muslims Sunni are Syria in er Circas- sians and Turkmen. Insofar Armenians, as religions, living togeth- Assyrians, as such minorities significant a is Kurdish community (15%) and other, less numerous there but (80%), majority the are Arabs diverse. enormously is population Syrian The and theregionalcontext. power military and economic political, its of nature teristics due to the country’s social composition, the charac- unique displays revolution Syria’s it, ceding pre- revolts Arab the of path the follows it Although The SpecificitiesoftheSyrianContext among internationalpublicopinion. mistrust and confusion of deal great a generating up ended has opposition the and apparatus state the both Over from information of manipulation torpedoed. the time, is clandestinely entering those of work the and banned are journalists that sidering The spread of information is particularly critical, con- regime. theocratic a up set and peace the disturb hostile international actors or terrorists attempting to

179 Med.2012 Panorama 180 Med.2012 Panorama crescent” and maintains its confrontation with with confrontation its maintains crescent”and “Shiite the called been ostentatiously has what of cornerstone the constitutes Syria Iran, to ally major A militia. Lebanese the through fluence in- and intervention of relationship complex a tained to that of Lebanon, a country with which it has main- bility. The fragility of neighbouring Iraq can be added a region of enormous vulnerability and political insta- From a geostrategic point of view, Syria is located in and itsloyalists. regime the of – survival i.e. “stability”– the the of name in population the against a repression conduct of to policy it allowed has and desertions from ence in the military has saved the regime for months pres- Alawi major the and clan family the of gemony and (republic) huriyya the first hereditary republic or republic hereditary first the cational institutions, associations, etc.), making Syria edu- unions, (labour State the and society of ments Assad ele- all over dominion its spread the clan Alawi family’s Syria in network, society civil nascent a and movement worker independent less or more a was there where Egypt, Tunisiaand to contrast In prevented unifiedcollectiveaction sectarianisation thathas it throughapolicy of as theregimehasmanipulated Diversity isakey factorinsofar ised natureoftheSyrianrevolution. decentral- rural, strong the explains argument nomic eco- This years. few past the of droughts the from suffering and progress from excluded and environment growth economic where rural a to contrast clear in concentrated, is wellbeing is this since tent, po metropolises from massive expressions of discon- Alep- and the protected had networks ic the summer of Until 2012, this framework of them. political-econom- brought has power in government the with relations their that privileges economic the from benefited have who cities, large in class middle commercial and entrepreneurial Sunni the of sectors certain of support the without possible be not would However, the organic cohesion of this circle of power made and them accomplicesandhostagestotheirsurvival. communities minority these of sectors specific co-opted has regime the extent, Tocertain a (kingdom). The he- The (kingdom). mamlaka - from - yumlaka yum-

armed forces, who have progressively organised to to organised progressively have who forces, armed the from deserters the of protection the without sion repres - the withstand to able been have not would revolt the Perhaps radicalisation. to contributed ly pressive tactic employed by the regime has decisive- re- the Nonetheless, preferences. ideological crete con - or strategy initial conscious a in rooted not is it that demonstrate dissent expressing for mechanism main the as demonstrations of use the and demands its of nature the composition, social Its movement. non-violent pacific, a originally was revolt Syrian The From PacificRevolttoCivil(?)War revolution hasreachedthepointofnoreturn. Syrian any the 2011, March before imagine to dared have would than more much is process reform this although and, credibility enjoyed elections the in ning the distribution of power. None of the new parties run- amendments on impact The no had and cosmetic merely were adopted violence. generalised of climate Both the referendum and the elections took place in a society, makingwayforamulti-partysystem. and politics Syrian on party Ba’ath the of monopoly dency to two, seven-year terms in office and ends the presi- the limits parties, political new of creation the for May. The revised constitution eases restrictions on announced were elections February parliamentary in and 2012 held was referendum constitutional a elections, local after that such process, reform a take In his third public speech, Assad committed to under- has torndownthewallsoffear. it feels that population a of eyes the in credibility no have change for prospects the Nonetheless, norate. Gover- Al-Hasakah the in Kurds 100,000 of sation nationali- the and conservative to cessions con- came 2011 March 30 on speech President’s the After empty. words those making relentlessly, continues repression of path the although arrive, to for its capacity for reform, promises did not take long To retain a certain legitimacy and international credit The Regime’sPromises,DevoidofCredibility the Arabcauseandanti-imperialiststruggle. Israel has allowed Syria to call itself the champion of against enmity the decades, few past the over radic spo- highly been have countries both between flicts con- direct Although militia. Lebanese the through n Aep, n mngd o nlc a lw tothe a blow inflict to managed and Aleppo, and Damascus strongholds, loyal most its at check in In July 2012, the rebels’ guerrilla tactics put the army between twofactionsofthe population. war a not and regime the against people the of gle tion, as they consider that it continues to be a strug - qualifica- this accept to refuse analysts certain and activists the Nonetheless, confrontations. the of and scope civilians of massacres the to due others, regime itself and the International Red Cross, among the Nations, United the by war civil a declared cially offi- was confrontation the 2012, of summer the In regime continuestodenyanyresponsibility. the but them perpetrating of militias pro-regime the sacres is still pending investigation. Activists accuse and July in Treimseh. The responsibility for said mas- Qubair in June Huleh, Al in May in – children many them among – civilians of massacres the with lence vio- of levels to untenable displaying is Syria leading war. civil inexorably be to seem violence, tarian for responsibility the which is uncertain and which follow patterns of sec- massacres, the Moreover, against theropes points ofrevolt show aregime border positionsandthemultiple Aleppo, thecaptureofseveral The battlesforDamascusand control. its from escaped had that territory recover to units elite its deployed regime the 2012, early in where was symbolised by the Bab Amro bombing in Homs, violence of degree the in point turning definitive The rection peaceful. insur- the keep to wishing sectors certain with ing distanc- a even and biases ideological more playing dis- began also and tactics guerrilla adopt to began the clandestine inflow of arms, the armed opposition by Supplied forces. security and Shabiha the fight to began and areas rebel and demonstrations tect armed opposition groups started to organise to pro- the time, that At rocketed. regime the by pression re- when 2011, of summer the in possibly but tion, It is difficult to date the start of the revolt’s militarisa- nel fromtheciviliansphereandexternalmilitias. person- by joined been also has which organisation non-coordinated a (FSA), Army Syrian Free the form The (SNC), established in in established (SNC), Council National Syrian The Council, theother politicaloppositionorganisation. National Syrian the with rivalry declared a and ences clined towards dialogue, it has insurmountable differ- in- more and intervention foreign to Opposed ists. activ - independent and parties Kurdish youth movements, parties, political including coalition a is cus, Damas- in based and 2011 mid-September in ated cre- (NCC), Committee Coordination National The a certainorganisationalstructure. is there directed, not and spontaneous are protests that assert activists the although and tendencies, citizen of variety wide a of representatives include are the spinal column of the revolution. These groups They Committees. Coordination Local as meet and groups) 400 (some information spread that tivists ac- young of comprised groups coordination siqiya, The foundation of the opposition consists of the tan- and withinasinglegrouppositionshaveveered. lines dividing clear no however, are, There regime. dialogue or making a pact with certain sectors of the towards predisposition a or intervention foreign of acceptance the struggle, armed to recourse as ters munity.mat- fundamental such in lie differences The com- international the among reticence enormous sent a minority but whose presence has given rise to thatrepre- groups Salafist armed finally, and lims; Mus- conservative of group disperse a joined); have sectors other which and revolution the of engines Local Coordination Committees that have served as the (including movements youth intellectuals; dent dissi- communists); and Nasserists (socialists, tion Comment Blog: supporters of the traditional opposi- the on groups five into it classified Dahi Omar discredit haveresultedinafragmentedopposition. and exile silence, forced mistrust, mutual to opposition the subjecting of measures, repressive of years Fifty A DividedPoliticalOpposition million andahalfdisplacedpeople. some and refugees 150,000 over are there UN, the the Syrian Human Rights to Observatory, and according to according lives, 19,000 of toll human a en tak had July,revolt late of By months seventeen the a regimeagainsttheropes. show revolt of points multiple the and positions der bor- several of capture the Aleppo, and Damascus for battles The others. among Defence, of Minister heart of the military leadership in an attack killing the Syria -

181 Med.2012 Panorama 182 Med.2012 Panorama membership in the Arab League in November 2011 November in League Arab the in membership of suspension the or missions diplomatic Syrian of matic gestures – removal of ambassadors, expulsion Diplo- population. civilian the on impact an having up end also they although regime, the on glehold have served to put pressure and an economic stran- and US, the and EU the from come primarily Sanctions have diplomacy. and sanctions between ed alternat- has Community International the by Action Wars ortheColdWar. the situation has even been compared to the Balkan as such and used, terms been have “Iraqisation” or “Lebanisation” there, happening been has what explain To region. the in countries other to spread possible its and war sectarian of risk the and (Iran) Shiites and Arabia) (Saudi Sunnis between rivalry the Syria: in echoes found have conflicts ternational in- and regional recent most the year, past the Over the RiskofaProxyWar An InoperativeInternationalCommunityand among theSyrianopposition. has acted as a factor of dissent rather than cohesion support international intentions, expressed Despite Turkey andtheGulfStates. this proxy war by accepting the backing of the West, to itself accommodated clearly has latter the SNC, the with allied not activists certain of words the In Kurdish militiaandIslamistgroupsofallsorts. factions, Lebanese mention to not Syria, of future the for struggle the in involved deeply are and Iran post- Assad Syria. Turkey, a Qatar, Saudi Arabia, USA, , of alignment international the determine ally eventu- could and conflict the of results the influence can opposition support Foreign affinities. international are groups between discrepancy of cause Another greements anddesertionshavebeenconstant. disa- and capacity, and base considerably power its have undermined rivalries and In-fighting vention. inter- international for calling and FSA the with nation tually created a military command in supposed coordi- the non-violent nature of the revolution, the SNC even- Although when it was established, it was committed to the Council), Assyrian Bloc the and independent activists. left eventually whom of (many Bloc Kurdish the Bloc, National the Committees, Coordination Local the Brotherhood, Muslim the group, Declaration cus Damas- the of members includes It group. opposition internationally-recognised most the is 2011, October some with arms, others with funding and yet others yet and funding with others arms, with some army, rebel the aiding are they that admitted have countries various helplessness, of situation this with Faced clear. not was be to was future Assad’s what although government, transition a of formation the on agreed powers world where meeting a hosted Geneva July, late In initiative. Annan’s de-legitimise and violence greater towards trend the confirm cres massa- the continues, repression military The day. passing every with patent more and more becoming is failure observers, 300 of deployment the Despite strategy ofrepression. its pursue to time regime the lent however, has, It withdrawal. military for eager seem not does regime though it was born amid scepticism, al- since the Syrian initiative, the supports The community protest. international to right the and journalists; for ment move- free aid; of sending the prisoners; of lease re- “aspirations”; people’s the meet to process cal politi- a ceasefire; plan: six-point his presented thus He conflict. the to solution political a not and lence vio- of ceasing a achieving on focused first Annan diate intheconflict. me- to Kofi envoy of League Arab and UN as Annan legitimate opposition and approved the appointment the as SNC the of recognition the accentuated they effective, very not but Symbolic participate. not did Russia as such allies Syrian which in Paris, and bul Istan- Tunis,then Syria”in of “Friends so-called the of meetings the through arrived step following The to RussiaandChina’svetoes. gotiated resolution that was finally not approved due ne- toned-down, a pass to attempted which UNSC, the of hands the to went then plan action League’s Arab The “farce.” a it considering left, members its of some as crumble to began mission the 2012, ary Janu- In December. of month the during repression of ceasing the monitor to was that mission observer an established agreement The opposition. the with dialogue into enter and access journalists allow ers, gime for it to end repression, release political prison- re- Syrian the with agreement an reached Arab League the failure, this of face the In . and sia Rus- by vetoed resolution, condemnatory a at tempt at- first its made (UNSC) Council Security Nations inAugust United the that November until of condemnation not was it but 2011, statement first issued League their Arab the and Nations United The quiring aresponse. re- indignation international of sense a to reaction – have been slow measures of pressure, generally in offensive that has put the regime against the ropes the against regime the put has that offensive rebel a with coincided Ramadan of beginning The an Uncertain,FearfulFuture The RegimeBeginstoFissureintheFace of gime orafuturegovernment. re- current the with whether Syria, with relationship en their alliances and ensure themselves a beneficial other, attempted to maintain an- their positions, or strength- way one in have, actors international and al drastic bring could regime change to the regional balance of power. All region- Assad the of fall the and interests, their for vying are actors different the which in field playing a certainly is crisis Syrian The the and Kurdish questionfromimplicatingTurkey. Iraq new a becoming from Syria to prevent attempts time, same the at and opposition the the rebels, responds to the refugee crisis, organises supports government, the pressures it as dilemma complex a in Turkey put has Syria in crisis the cy, democra- Islamic of model a tion”as presented and “Arabso-called revolu- the of victor great the Being policy and has had to deal with the Syrian quagmire. Turkey has been obliged to give up its zero problems more vulnerableinahostileregionalsetting. point. Losing Syria would only make Iran weaker and war drums were the beating between Israel and Iran that at some even or re-emerged, has issue clear nu- Iranian the months, few preceding the over that matter small no is it Indeed, Israel. with frontation the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and deepened its con- Iran has reached Hezbollah through Syria, influenced enclave ofTartus –it’sfootholdintheMediterranean. port naval its or contracts, arms and business of form the in whether region, the in positions its lose to ing will- not is Russia Moreover, Libya. in intervention the of results the with satisfied are China nor Russia ther national interference in a country’s internal affairs, nei- inter- of detractors Ferocious allies. steadfast of help the without pressure international or revolt of months In any case, Assad could not have withstood so many implications ofinterventionareunforeseeable. to willing have a new Iraq, aware that seems Syria is not Libya and the actor international No plausible. appeared Libya in one the like intervention military regime’s sense of immunity, for at no time has foreign The repressive tactic has been closely linked with the to sendarmstheregime. continues Russia while tools, communications with tion ofademocratic futureforallSyrians. of foreign intervention that free would distort the act construc - to able be – region the in experience political the considering complex extremely is with able to garner the necessary support and – a factor integrity and be simply must value person This opposition. the among great of personalities other and activists politicians, are there – exist may possibly He Mandela.” “Syrian a for need the tioned men- recently has Friedman L. Thomas column, his Inpopulation. Syrian entire the of rights the tecting pro- order new a build to and wills the confrontation together bring civil avoid to reached be can consensus social a whether and all, for and once for role positive a playing of capable are powers international and regional whether front, a form political to unite to able be will date, to disparate so opposition, the whether see shall We control. no with acting are that militias armed the control and revenge, for thirst the and fragmentation torial terri- vacuum, institutional an avoid to is issue The privileges. which it can retain power and protect its clientelist come if it loses the willtrust of regime the loyal the forces through of end the – flank military the on out played being is future The leave. does Assad if even continuity, involving solution a accept to rive too late: the opposition does not seem willing the transition, consensual ar- could landing” “soft “Yemen-style”or solution a to agree to aged man- powers international although stage, this At worse. which firepower, much grow can for crisis humanitarian the that means potential full its deployed yet not has fall, it and powerful will is army Assad’s regime since the when predict to impossible is It felt. be to beginning are that factors are bels re- the by points control border of seizure forces the and security the and loyalists among sertions De- crumble. to beginning is regime the so, Even unlikely tooccur. however, is, that intervention an heard, being again are intervention international of favour in opinions into large-scale regional conflict, especially now that escalation of danger the increases weapons these of presence The aggression. external any against weapons biological and chemical of arsenal his use to hesitate not will he that assuring and rebels the by taken territories and neighbourhoods to bombard planes fighter military deploying by responded has Assad heartland. economic and political its at

183 Med.2012 Panorama