Mediterranean Politics | Middle East Syria, Vertigo in the Face of a Radicalised Revolution and an Uncertain Future Lurdes Vidal hostile international actors or terrorists attempting to Head disturb the peace and set up a theocratic regime. Arab World and Mediterranean Region Department The spread of information is particularly critical, con- Panorama Editor-in-Chief, afkar/ideas sidering that journalists are banned and the work of European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), those entering clandestinely is torpedoed. Over Barcelona time, the manipulation of information from both the state apparatus and the opposition has ended up generating a great deal of confusion and mistrust 2012 among international public opinion. Med. the origins of the revolt The revolutions in the Arab world have had many la- the Specificities of the Syrian Context tent causes, but in all of them, specific events sparked the fire of revolt. In Syria, apparently it was Although it follows the path of the Arab revolts pre- enough for the regime to repress several protests ceding it, Syria’s revolution displays unique charac- 179 against the arrest of a number of adolescents from teristics due to the country’s social composition, the Daraa who had painted graffiti against the regime for nature of its political, economic and military power the spark to be lit. It was 15 March 2011, not unrea- and the regional context. sonably called the “Day of Dignity” by protesters. The Syrian population is enormously diverse. Arabs The regime’s defensive reaction to the first protests are the majority (80%), but there is a significant only caused protests to proliferate throughout the Kurdish community (15%) and other, less numerous territory, rising in number of participants and elevat- minorities such as Assyrians, Armenians, Circas- ing the tone of demands. sians and Turkmen. Insofar as religions, living togeth- The daily trickle of deaths, injuries and arrests rose er in Syria are Sunni Muslims (70-75%), Shiites, exponentially with the siege of Daraa, the onset of Alawi (12%, although some indicate their number as military-type operations in this and other cities and 20%), Druze (1-3%), Ismaili (1-3%) and Christians the actions of the Shabiha, the pro-regime brigades (10%). In addition, there are Palestinian refugees that have sown terror among the population. (2.3%) and Iraqi refugees (some 1 million or more, The regime’s strategy has played out on various who are returning to Iraq due to the conflict). De- fronts since then. On the one hand is the repression pending on how one looks at it, all the minorities to- against protesters and the action of the Shabiha. On gether can add up to 40% of the population, so that the other hand, the government is making full use of on the whole they are no longer so “minority”. the propaganda machine to create a vision belying Syrian diversity has served to foster a culturalist read- the popular and pacific dimensions of the protests. ing of the conflict, although the roots of the conflict In contrast to the images of protests and casualties should not be sought in enmity between confessions disseminated by activists, the regime disseminates but in political contention and, ultimately, in the strug- images of the masira or pro-regime rallies. As other gle for power. Diversity is a key factor insofar as the leaders in the region have done, the Syrian regime regime has manipulated it through a policy of sectari- systematically brands activists as either puppets of anisation that has prevented unified collective action. To a certain extent, the regime has co-opted specific through the Lebanese militia. Although direct con- sectors of these minority communities and made flicts between both countries have been highly spo- them accomplices and hostages to their survival. radic over the past few decades, the enmity against However, the organic cohesion of this circle of power Israel has allowed Syria to call itself the champion of would not be possible without the support of certain the Arab cause and the anti-imperialist struggle. sectors of the Sunni entrepreneurial and commercial middle class in large cities, who have benefited from the economic privileges that their relations with the the regime’s Promises, devoid of Credibility government in power has brought them. Until the summer of 2012, this framework of political-econom- To retain a certain legitimacy and international credit ic networks had protected the Damascus and Alep- for its capacity for reform, promises did not take long po metropolises from massive expressions of discon- to arrive, although the path of repression continues tent, since this is where economic growth and relentlessly, making those words empty. After the wellbeing is concentrated, in clear contrast to a rural President’s speech on 30 March 2011 came con- Panorama environment excluded from progress and suffering cessions to conservative Islamism and the nationali- from the droughts of the past few years. This eco- sation of 100,000 Kurds in the Al-Hasakah Gover- nomic argument explains the strong rural, decentral- norate. Nonetheless, the prospects for change have ised nature of the Syrian revolution. no credibility in the eyes of a population that feels it has torn down the walls of fear. 2012 In his third public speech, Assad committed to under- Diversity is a key factor insofar take a reform process, such that after local elections, Med. as the regime has manipulated a constitutional referendum was held in February it through a policy of 2012 and parliamentary elections were announced for May. The revised constitution eases restrictions on sectarianisation that has the creation of new political parties, limits the presi- prevented unified collective action dency to two, seven-year terms in office and ends the 180 monopoly of the Ba’ath party on Syrian politics and society, making way for a multi-party system. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, where there was a Both the referendum and the elections took place in a more or less independent worker movement and a climate of generalised violence. The amendments nascent civil society network, in Syria the Assad adopted were merely cosmetic and had no impact on family’s Alawi clan spread its dominion over all ele- the distribution of power. None of the new parties run- ments of society and the State (labour unions, edu- ning in the elections enjoyed credibility and, although cational institutions, associations, etc.), making Syria this reform process is much more than any Syrian the first hereditary republic or yumlaka - from yum- would have dared to imagine before March 2011, the huriyya (republic) and mamlaka (kingdom). The he- revolution has reached the point of no return. gemony of the family clan and the major Alawi pres- ence in the military has saved the regime for months from desertions and has allowed it to conduct a From Pacific revolt to Civil(?) War policy of repression against the population in the name of the “stability” – i.e. survival – of the regime The Syrian revolt was originally a pacific, non-violent and its loyalists. movement. Its social composition, the nature of its From a geostrategic point of view, Syria is located in demands and the use of demonstrations as the main a region of enormous vulnerability and political insta- mechanism for expressing dissent demonstrate that bility. The fragility of neighbouring Iraq can be added it is not rooted in a conscious initial strategy or con- to that of Lebanon, a country with which it has main- crete ideological preferences. Nonetheless, the re- tained a complex relationship of intervention and in- pressive tactic employed by the regime has decisive- fluence through the Lebanese Hezbollah militia. A ly contributed to radicalisation. Perhaps the revolt major ally to Iran, Syria constitutes the cornerstone would not have been able to withstand the repres- of what has ostentatiously been called the “Shiite sion without the protection of the deserters from the crescent” and maintains its confrontation with Israel armed forces, who have progressively organised to form the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a non-coordinated heart of the military leadership in an attack killing the organisation which has also been joined by person- Minister of Defence, among others. The battles for nel from the civilian sphere and external militias. Damascus and Aleppo, the capture of several bor- It is difficult to date the start of the revolt’s militarisa- der positions and the multiple points of revolt show tion, but possibly in the summer of 2011, when re- a regime against the ropes. pression by the regime rocketed. At that time, the By late July, the seventeen months of revolt had tak- armed opposition groups started to organise to pro- en a human toll of 19,000 lives, according to the tect demonstrations and rebel areas and began to Syrian Human Rights Observatory, and according to fight the Shabiha and security forces. Supplied by the UN, there are over 150,000 refugees and some the clandestine inflow of arms, the armed opposition million and a half displaced people. began to adopt guerrilla tactics and also began dis- playing more ideological biases and even a distanc- ing with certain sectors wishing to keep the insur- a divided Political opposition rection peaceful. The definitive turning point in the degree of violence Fifty years of repressive measures, of subjecting the Panorama was symbolised by the Bab Amro bombing in Homs, opposition to mutual mistrust, forced silence, exile and where in early 2012, the regime deployed its elite discredit have resulted in a fragmented opposition. units to recover territory that had escaped from its Omar Dahi classified it into five groups on the Syria control. Comment Blog: supporters of the traditional opposi- tion (socialists, Nasserists and communists); dissi- 2012 dent intellectuals; youth movements (including the Med.