Worthy of Better Memory: the Royal Navy and the Defence of the Eastern Empire 1935 - 1942
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Worthy of better Memory: The Royal Navy and the defence of the Eastern Empire 1935 - 1942 Volume 1 of 2 Andrew Jonathan Corrie Boyd Student Number: 1102571 Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities in the University of Buckingham February 2015 Abstract Andrew Jonathan Corrie Boyd Worthy of better Memory: The Royal Navy and the defence of the Eastern Empire 1935 - 1942 This thesis proposes major revisions to the history of the naval defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire during the critical period 1935 – 42 as the Royal Navy (RN) sought to manage the increasing risks posed by three potential Axis enemies across divergent theatres. It challenges the prevailing historical interpretation which explains the successive defeats suffered by the RN at the start of the war with Japan as the inevitable consequence of resource weakness and imperial overstretch already evident in a deeply flawed pre-war strategy “Main Fleet to Singapore”. The dominant narrative argues that: Britain never had the naval resources to protect a two hemisphere Empire let alone cope with a triple threat from Germany, Italy and Japan; it certainly could not pose any effective counterweight to Japan once it was fighting for its life in Europe; and it compounded resource weakness by consistently underestimating the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and failing to recognise the potential of modern airpower at sea. Britain’s strategy for defending its Eastern Empire through naval power therefore rested on convenient self-deception regarding Japanese intent and the balance of relative capability whereas in reality the RN was decisively outmatched. Furthermore, most historians suggest that, while Britain’s initial war with Japan ended in ignominy, this had little impact on the overall global struggle against the Axis because Britain’s role in the East was essentially irrelevant to the Allied cause whatever the losses to its own imperial standing. This thesis contends that the dominant narrative is neither satisfactory nor sufficient and reflects important gaps in the historical record. But it also argues that the historiography of the last 50 years has defined the RN role in protecting the Eastern Empire in very narrow terms, focusing almost exclusively on the defence of the Far East territories and the prospects of deploying a fleet to Singapore. In reality, the Eastern Empire encompassed a much wider area and it faced existential threats on its western boundary as well as in the east. Ensuring the security of this wider area had profound implications not just for Britain’s own war-making potential but for the overall Allied cause too. The thesis therefore offers an interpretation which, for the first time, investigates thoroughly the inter-dependencies between different theatres of war hitherto viewed principally in their own terms. By taking this wider perspective, it demonstrates that not only was there more coherence and continuity to RN policy and strategy towards the Eastern Empire in this period than historians have traditionally accepted but that it also reflected greater realism about what truly mattered and where naval resources should best be concentrated at any given time. In doing so, it shows how and why prevailing accounts are defective. The thesis proposes five main arguments across the period 1935 – 1942. First, it shows that the RN of 1939 was stronger, more capable, more innovative, and more ambitious in its strategic goals than the mainstream accounts of its inter-war history have generally i accepted. It is simply not the case that meeting the demands of a multi-theatre war over the next three years as the output of the rearmament programme became available was out of reach as many have argued. It then demonstrates that British strategy to ensure adequate security through naval power for the core territories of the Eastern Empire in the face of the Triple Threat was more flexible and realistic, and better directed at what would prove to be the critical points in the first half of the war, than the prevailing historical narrative recognises. Thirdly, by looking at all relevant theatres simultaneously, it argues that Britain’s investment in the Middle East, and the RN commitment to the Eastern Mediterranean, from 1940 – 42, were essential both to protect the Eastern Empire and its resources and to enable it to generate maximum war potential. This commitment also vitally influenced the security of the Atlantic lifeline. It was not a diversion but an essential complement to meeting the threat from Japan. The thesis then re-examines the disasters suffered by the RN in the first phase of the war with Japan. It argues that promises of US naval support in the Atlantic and exaggerated expectations of the deterrent power the US could exercise against Japan allowed Britain’s war leadership to believe it could maintain a forward defence strategy in the Middle and Far East theatres simultaneously. This goal was never realistic with the resources Britain was able and willing to deploy overseas; yet it was the Admiralty, rather than the Prime Minister, who showed a reckless disregard for the resulting risks in the immediate run-up to war. In reality, the exercise of naval power to secure what mattered in the Eastern Empire did not ultimately depend on holding Singapore. The final line of argument is that it is simply not possible to reach a secure judgement on the eastern theatre without a proper understanding of how it interacted with the other war theatres and how this then influenced the decision-makers of the day. The thesis shows how the entry of Japan into the war confirmed that the Indian Ocean was an inescapable defence commitment, critical not just for Britain but also the wider Allied cause, ranking indeed second only to the Atlantic lifeline in importance. Despite the defeats suffered in the first months of the Far East war, the thesis demonstrates how the RN could still generate sufficient power by mid-1942 to defend this theatre against any naval force Japan was likely to deploy. The 1935 start date for the thesis marks the point when the threats posed by a resurgent Germany, an increasingly hostile Japan, and unpredictable Italy, moved from theoretical to real. The end of 1942 is an appropriate finishing point because, as the thesis explains, it marks the end of any credible threat from the Axis to the core Eastern Empire through either the Indian Ocean or the Middle East. ii Dedication To all those in the Royal Navy who planned and fought to defend the British Eastern Empire in this period and are worthy of better memory iii Acknowledgements I thank the staff and trustees of the following institutions for allowing me access to documents deposited in their archives: The National Archives, Kew The British Library Churchill College Archives, Cambridge The Imperial War Museum The National Maritime Museum, Greenwich The University of California Irvine Libraries I also thank my supervisor, Professor Gwythian Prins, and my Director of Studies, Professor John Adamson, for all their support and guidance in preparing this thesis. iv Abbreviations ABC-1 American British Staff Conference No 1 ACNS Assistant Chief of Naval Staff ADB American Dutch British AMWIS Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Survey ASV Air to Surface Vessel Search Radar CAS Chief of Air Staff CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CinC Commander in Chief CNO Chief of Naval Operations in the US Navy COS Chiefs of Staff DRC Defence Requirements Committee DCNS Deputy Chief of Naval Staff D of P Director of Plans DMI Director of Military Intelligence DNI Director of Naval Intelligence EF RN Eastern Fleet FAA Fleet Air Arm FEA Far East Appreciation FECB Far East Combined Bureau Force G RN Task Force comprising battleship HMS Prince of Wales and escorts Force H RN Task Force established mid-1940 to guard Western Mediterranean Force Z RN Task Force renamed from Force G on 8 December comprising the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, battle-cruiser HMS Repulse and escorts FSL First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff GC&CS Government Code & Cypher School IJN Imperial Japanese Navy IJNAF Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force IJAAF Imperial Japanese Army Air Force JIC Joint Intelligence Committee v JPC Joint Planning Committee JPS Joint Planning Staff JN25 Japanese Navy Cypher KGV King George V class battleships NEI Netherlands East Indies NID Naval Intelligence Division OIC Operational Intelligence Centre PM Prime Minister R-class Royal Sovereign class battleships RAF Royal Air Force RN Royal Navy SIS Secret Intelligence Service USN US Navy VCNS Vice Chief of Naval Staff WIR Weekly Intelligence Report Additional Abbreviations used in References ADM Admiralty AIR Air Ministry AT Admiralty Telegram CAB Cabinet Office CCA Churchill College Archives, Cambridge FO Foreign Office IWM Imperial War Museum JM Japanese Monograph NMM National Maritime Museum, Greenwich PREM Premier TNA The National Archives UCI University of California Irvine Libraries WO War Office vi Table of Contents Volume 1 Title Page Abstract i Dedication iii Acknowledgements iv Abbreviations v Table of Contents vii List of Tables and Maps ix Declaration of Originality x Word Count xi Introduction 1 Chapter One The Royal Navy 1935 – 39: Rearming for a two hemisphere war 13 Chapter Two The naval defence of the Eastern Empire 1935 – 40: Managing 72 competing risks vii Chapter Three Britain’s Eastern strategy after the fall of France and its impact on 127 naval planning Chapter Four The US relationship, ABC-1, and the resurrection of a Royal Navy 187 Eastern Fleet Volume 2 Chapter Five Royal Navy readiness for a war with Japan in mid-1941: 244 Intelligence and capability Chapter Six Summer and autumn 1941: Reinforcement and deterrence 298 Chapter Seven The deployment of Force Z and its consequences: An inevitable 346 disaster? Chapter Eight Defending the Indian Ocean in 1942 392 Conclusions 446 Annex 1 The historiography of the naval defence of the Eastern Empire 458 1919 – 1942 Annex II Warships completed by principal naval powers 1930 - 1942 466 Bibliography 473 viii List of Tables and Maps Tables 1.