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Uva-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Paradise in Peril. Western colonial power and Japanese expansion in Sout-East Asia, 1905-1941 Bussemaker, H.Th. Publication date 2001 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Bussemaker, H. T. (2001). Paradise in Peril. Western colonial power and Japanese expansion in Sout-East Asia, 1905-1941. in eigen beheer. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:28 Sep 2021 127 7 Chapterr 2. GREATT BRITAIN 2.1.. Introduction. Thiss chapter deals with Great Britain, the only nineteenth century superpower deserving thatt description, and even Great Britain was in decline after its greatest triumph : victory overr Germany in 1918. Not only the contemporary history of Great Britain In the Far East, butt also Dutch-British relations in that region are covered here until the attack on Pearl Harbor. Thee First World War left Great Britain utterly exhausted. The result was not only that Britainn disarmed quickly after the war, but the loss of knowledge, experience and productionn facilities needed to rearm quickly whenever that need might arise was also an unforeseenn consequence. Warships in particular take 5 to 6 years of construction before theyy can be brought into service. In foreign policy however, Britain acted as if it was still rulingg the waves. This was especially the case in the Far East, where there was no longer sufficientt British military or naval power available to challenge an increasingly aggressive Japan.. In the end, Japan called the British bluff, with disastrous results for Britain and her closee allies. Thiss chapter is an important one because the security of the Netherlands East Indies was directlyy dependent on a strong and well-armed Singapore base supporting an Eastern Fleet.. When Singapore capitulated on 15 February 1942, the loss of the East Indies was onlyy a matter of time. It is therefore of importance for Dutch readers to have an understan- dingg of why the British decided to have a Singapore naval base in the first place and how thiss decision was implemented in the years between the wars. Because generally a superpower'ss naval strategy is directly related to foreign policy, then British foreign policy inn the interwar years must be dealt with as well. Britishh Interwar defence policies are covered next, dictated by political expediency as highlightedd by the Ten-year Rule, and defined within the framework of the 1922 naval disarmamentt conferences at Washington and the one in 1930 in London. It resulted in the irretrievablee loss of British naval superiority. The role the much maligned Treasury under Churchilll and later under Neville Chamberlain played in that process is discussed. British navall strategy in the interwar-years was dominated by the concept of the "Main Fleet to Singapore",, which in its turn was dependent on the availability of a fleet base at Singapore. Thee origins of the Singapore strategy are discussed, as well as the repeated political interventionss during the construction of that base, caused by its symbolic function for the securityy of the British Pacific Dominions of Australia and New Zealand and the "Jewel in thee Crown": British India. At the important Imperial Conference in 1937, those dominions couldd still be kept pacified by reaffirming the Singapore strategy. As is discussed however, inn time British promises in time became shallower due to the deteriorating situation in Europe.. Secret talks with the U.S. Navy failed to fill the security gap as the Americans did nott fall for the bait of an empty base. The refusal of successive British Naval Chiefs of 128 8 Stafff to send even a single squadron of capital ships to Singapore made the British positionn in the Far East in the end untenable, and even Churchill's decision to send a "deterrentt squadron" of 2 capital ships intended to tame the Japanese, could no longer changee the situation. Inn a separate sub-chapter the development of the Singapore base is discussed right from itss inception. It was marred by the ongoing debate on air power versus battleships in the Britishh defence establishment in the twenties. This resulted in delays which were not fatal forr the base itself, but struck defemce a fatal blow. In the late thirties, the defence of Singaporee became dependent on that of the whole of the Malayan peninsula, including specificallyy the good landing beaches on Siamese territory, close to the Malayan frontier. However,, Churchill refused to invest scarce resources in the defence of Malaya, believing thatt Singapore could hold its own as a "fortress", which it really couldn't at all. Thee second part of this chapter is devoted to British-Dutch relations in the Far East. Thee integrity of the Netherlands East Indies has always been paramount in the discussions onn the security of the Singapore base. If those islands which were under Dutch rule were too be occupied by the Japanese, then they could invest Singapore at leisure. The security off these islands was therefore of paramount British interest. The British Government, however,, remained deeply divided about the question of whether to extend a security guaranteee to the Dutch almost up to Pearl Harbor. Moreover, at that time, contrary to commonn sense and opinion, the Dutch administration in the East Indies was not at all convincedd that a close alliance with the British was in its best interest It remained officially neutrall and aloof therefore, even after May 1940 and the alliance with Britain in Europe. It putt the Dutch Government in exile in London in a quandary, as its official policy was to obtainn a British guarantee for the East Indies. In time, however, these internal differences weree resolved, and although the Dutch Governor-General maintained a dignified political aloofnesss with respect to the allies-to-be almost up to Pearl Harbor, his naval and military commanderss became deeply involved in attaining a common understanding with their allies.. During an important series of Staff Conferences, called the Singapore Conferences whichh will be gone into in depth, this understanding was translated into common military goalss and cooperation. Interestinglyy enough, especially for British readers, even before the war in Europe had started,, informal contacts between the two Dutch services and their British and Indian counterpartss had been made. Although much original source material has been lost, enoughh has remained to elucidate a most interesting development which took place more orr less illegally, without the official consent of even the Dutch political decision-makers but whichh laid the foundation stone for close military and naval cooperation later on. The final partt of this chapter contains much original source material taken from Dutch archives, whichh may be of use for English-language historical researchers. 2.2.. British Foreign Policy. Britishh foreign policy between the two World Wars was strongly influenced by the past, particularlyy by the nineteenth century. The basic principles of British foreign policy however aree even older, going back to the Hundred Years' War with France. Great Britain exercised aa stronger influence on European history than would have been thought possible conside- ringg its of its small population and its geographical size. Its force multiplier was its geograp- hicall position: an island astride the richest countries of Europe on the other side of tine 129 9 Channell and the North Sea. As long as its fleet ruled the waves, Great Britain was safe behindd both the "moat" of Channel formed and the expanse of the North Sea against from anyy interference by any continental Power whatsoever.573 When the Royal Navy lost its commandd of the sea temporarily, as happened during the War of American Independence, thee results were disastrous. Until Singapore happened, the lost battle of Yorktown was Britain'ss greatest military disaster.574 AA constant factor in British foreign policy was the "balance of power": the balancing of continentall Powers in such a way, that no single one could become too powerful to challengee the British.575 The Dutch owe their existence as an independent nation to Britishh interventions on their behalf, such as against the Spanish King Philip II during the Dutchh War of Independence in the 16th century and against the French in the 18th and earlyy 19th century. The Kingdom of the Netherlands anno 1813 was a British design to providee a counterweight to French aspirations. Britishh influence during the Belgian secession remained strong,576 and at that time they weree not on the same side as The Netherlands. Britain "ruled the waves" during the whole off the nineteenth century but the rise of a united Germany in Europe at the end of that centuryy coupled with the emergence of the United States and Japan as world powers at thee beginning of the 20th century, changed the balance of power to the disadvantage of England.
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