Japanese Conquest of Malaya & , 1941-42 -

By Gerald F Pillay1

Introduction

Those with an historical or military bent will find this document a comprehensive reprise of the subject, perhaps even overladen with detail. Its value is that the information is not elsewhere found in one place. For the adept I have left in fascinating detail about the re-occupation of Malaya and Singapore, ie Operation Zipper and Operation Tideface, etc. The casual reader may skip much of the document, and only go by the headings. The brave will find that the following annexes provide much for additional digestion:

Annex A Air Defence Deployment - 8 Dec 41

Annex B Battle Order - 8 Dec 41

Annex C Map of Japanese Invasion of Malaya 1941-42

Annex D Map of , 1942.

“” was the term used to describe the defence sector of Malaya and Singapore under a single Commanding Officer. I keep to it for convenience. I have retained the original names of peoples, places and events for historical authenticity.

This document is put together from information on the Internet. All sources are given, and are hereby acknowledged.

Imperial Defence Strategy2

In the 1920s, the British Imperial geopolitical thinking evolved along the following lines. The most probable enemy in the East was . The main targets to be defended were Australia, New Zealand and . Of the last, Singapore would be the prize target. The launch base would be Japan. An air offensive was out of reach. The threat was essentially naval. And finally, distance provided insulation of about 180 days to the actual arrival of any invasion forces. The last fundamental underlying British defence strategy was that any attack on Singapore would be by sea from the south. The jungles of Malaya formed an impenetrable barrier.

In these circumstances, Britain decided that the defence would be naval. The decision was taken to build a huge Naval Base at Singapore to act as the forward bulwark of the Far East Fleet. In the event of an attack, there would be sufficient “relief time” to send reinforcement

About Gerald F Pillay, see https://geraldpillay.wordpress.com/2011/09/03/about-gerald-francis- pillay/ 2 For a and full and authoritative recount, see http://www.britain-at- war.org.uk/WW2/Malaya_and_Singapore/html/singapore_defences.htm

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 2 naval battle units as needed, which meanwhile could be deployed elsewhere. The building of the Naval Base began in 1923. It was completed in Sep 1939.

The Naval Base was to be protected by battleship scale (up to 15”) gunnery emplacements ringed around the island, with the Tengah Airfield to provide aerial defence as necessary. Work on the latter started in 1937 and was completed in 1939. By that date, there were in all four airfields, at Changi, Seletar, and as well, making Singapore Britain’s mightiest air base, as well as naval base, in the East.

British Dilemma

By 1939, it became clear to the British that the Japanese intended to take Malaya, which supplied 38% of the world’s rubber and 58% of its tin. Aircraft could now fly much longer ranges than a decade previously. Incredibly it further seemed that the Japanese did, indeed, also intend to take Singapore, the “Gibraltar of the East”.

The following captures the British dilemma:

“The consequence of the first year of the war (World War II) completely altered the outlook. Principal among these were the Japanese advance into Southern and Hainan, the situation in Indo-China resulting from the French collapse, the increased range of aircraft, above all, the necessity for retaining in European waters a fleet of sufficient strength to match both the German and Italian Fleets, so making it impossible for us to send to the Far East an adequate naval force should the need arise.

In August 1940, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) reviewed the position. Their main conclusions were:

a. Until Germany and Italy were defeated, or drastically reduced in naval strength, we were faced with the problem of defending our Far Eastern interests without an adequate fleet. b. It was no longer sufficient to concentrate upon the defence of Singapore island; it was now necessary to hold the whole of Malaya. This involved an increase in the existing army and air force. c. In the absence of a fleet, our policy should be to rely primarily on air power. The necessary forces could not be provided for some time; until then substantial additional land forces were needed.” http://www.britain-at-war.org.uk/WW2/Malaya_and_Singapore/html/singapore_defences.htm

Change in Defence Strategy

The chess board was now altered dramatically. What the British Chiefs of Staff recommended and what was finally achieved in build up by 8 December 1941 is summarized in the table3 below.

26. Adapted from “Singapore Defences” by Lt Gen Sir Henry Pownall, at http://www.britain-at- war.org.uk/WW2/Malaya_and_Singapore/html/singapore_defences.htm

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 3

Army Actual Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Aug 1940 accepted by recommended by recommended by Achieved 4 5 COS when COS until GOC until RAF 7 Dec RAF reached RAF reached reached 1941 approved l approved approved strength strength strength Regular 9 26 36 48 32 Battalions

Air Force Actual Strength Strength Strength Strength Aug 1940 approved by recommended by Achieved 6 COS C-in-C s 7 Dec 1941 Aircraft 84 282 582 158

In a nutshell, the defence position was woeful. Only one-third of the approved aircraft were provided, and not even the minimum scale of infantry battalions as recommended by the COS in the event of a shortfall of aircraft was deployed.

In the following sections, we look briefly at what the British did do in the way of build up, for better appreciation of the war into which we were plunged.

Air Defence Build Up

First, it became immediately necessary also to defend the Malayan coastline as well as the Naval Base. The British proceeded to build a total of 22 airfields on both sides of Malaya concentrated towards the north where out of reach of the Singapore airfields, with Butterworth completed in 1939. This was to provide air cover and support to the naval forces repulsing any coastal landings, secondly, to counter carrier-borne enemy aircraft supporting their own invasion troops; and thirdly to support the land defence forces in dealing with any actual enemy landings on the shoreline .

The aircraft situation was very grim indeed. Every British airplane and squadron was committed to the defence of the homeland, which at that point was coping with the Battle of Britain, the outcome of which was not yet known.

There were 161 front line aircraft based in Malaya and Singapore on 8 December 1941. These comprised 66 Brewster Buffaloes7, 24 Bristol Blenheims, 24 Vickers Vildebeests, and 24 Lockheed Hudson. In addition, there were 3 Catalina flying boats belonging to the Royal Netherlands Air Force

These aircraft were assigned to 13 squadrons8 deployed as shown in Annex A9. Of these 8 were RAF, 4 were RAAF and 1 an RNZAF squadron. One squadron of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air Force (ML-KNIL) was deployed to Singapore, contributing to the Allied cause before being recalled to Java before the fall.

4 GOS = Chiefs of Staff 5 GOC = General Officer Commanding, Malaya 6 C-in-C = Singapore Conference of Commanders-in-Chief, Oct 1940 7 The US carrier-based fighter version was the F2A, the exported fighter version was the 339. 8 The desired scale of provision would have been around 36 squadrons, and the minimum 16. 9 There are some variations in the numbers given in different websites. These figures are taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaya_Command

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 4

The most modern fighter was the Brewster Buffalo, a plane which the US Navy was already replacing. Considered below par for service in the UK, the majority of the 170 procured by the RAF Purchasing Commission from the United States was diverted for use in the Far East, where it was believed they would as first line fighters be superior to any Japanese aircraft encountered. The preceding proved to be a fatal error of judgment

The fighter squadrons equipped with Brewster Buffalo were beset with numerous problems, including: poorly-built and ill-equipped planes; inadequate supplies of spare parts; inadequate support staff, lack of a coherent command structure; inter-service antagonism, and pilots lacking training and experience

The resulting situation may be gleaned from the following assessment:

When war did erupt, the Japanese Army Air Force - with its highly maneuverable Ki-27 and Ki-43 fighters - and the Japanese Navy Air Force equipped with the mighty A6M Zero, proved vastly superior in just about all aspects, and many of the Japanese fighter pilots were veterans of the war against China. By contrast, the majority of the young British, New Zealand, and Australian pilots who flew the Buffalo on operations in Malaya and at Singapore were little more than trainees, and many flew into battle with only the basic training of their trade.

Of the Buffaloes on 8 December 1941, most of them were shot down, destroyed on the ground and destroyed in accidents. Only 10 survived to reach India or the Dutch East Indies.

The remaining offensive aircraft, the Bristol Blenheim, Lockheed Hudson light bombers and Vickers Vildebeest torpedo bombers, were also obsolete. Most were quickly destroyed by Japanese aircraft and played an insignificant part in the campaign.

Two more fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons arrived in Singapore on 8 Dec 41, but I did not pick up what planes they brought with them.

Finally, much needed reinforcements in the form of an additional eight squadrons with a total of 99 Hurricanes Mark II and Mark IIA fighters arrived in the course of Jan 42, but too late and too inadequate to re-capture the air over Malaya or Singapore. .

Naval Defence Build Up

To the relief of everyone, the Navel Base, started in 1923, was finally completed in 1938-1939 The current generation will have little idea what this was, except that it was converted into the Sembawang Shipyard after the war. Here is a flavour of its greatness, which cheered our hearts and gave us hope even in Malacca:

“The British had begun building a naval base at Singapore in 1923, partly in response to Japan's increasing naval power. A costly and unpopular project, construction of the base proceeded slowly until the early 1930s when Japan began moving into Manchuria and northern China. A major component of the base was completed in March 1938, when the King George VI Graving Dock was opened; more than 300 meters in length, it was the largest dry dock in the world at the time. The base, completed in 1941 and defended by artillery, searchlights, and the newly built nearby Tengah Airfield, caused Singapore to be ballyhooed in the press as the "Gibraltar of the East." The floating dock, 275 meters long, was the third largest in the world and could hold 60,000 workers. The base also contained dry docks, giant cranes, machine shops; and underground storage for water, fuel, and ammunition. A self-contained town on the base was built to house 12,000 Asian workers, with cinemas, hospitals, churches, and seventeen soccer fields.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 5

Above-ground tanks held enough fuel for the entire British navy for six months. The only thing the giant naval fortress lacked was ships.”

. http://countrystudies.us/singapore/8.htm

It is recorded that there were sizeable reinforcements of naval personnel some time in 1940 and or 1941. During this period, an assortment of naval warships had also begun assembling at the Naval Base.

Finally, Singapore and the world were re-assured that the fortress would indeed be impregnable and safe by the arrival at Singapore on 2 Dec 1941 of Britain’s most modern battleship the Prince of Wales and the refurbished First World War battle cruiser Repulse, accompanied by four destroyers. They were to be joined by the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable, which however ran aground in the Caribbean. This squadron joined a naval fleet already on station comprising 4 British light cruisers and 3 destroyers, with another heavy cruiser and 2 more destroyers, plus a Dutch light cruiser and 4 US destroyers already steaming in and expected within 3 days. While not a full tactical battle group, these collectively represented a considerable defence capability. Australia alone supplied 8 warships. Unfortunately the various ships were in different states of readiness. And there was no naval plan, as far as I can tell.

To defend the naval base, heavy 15-inch naval guns were stationed at Johore battery, Changi, and at Buona Vista to deal with battleships. Medium BL 9.2 inch guns were provided for dealing with smaller attackers. Batteries of smaller calibre anti-aircraft guns and guns for dealing with raids were located at Fort Siloso, Fort Canning and Labrador. Four of the five 15- inch guns were given an all-round (360°) traverse and subterranean magazines. At the planning stage, aviation was not neglected. The plans called for an air force of 18 flying boats, 18 reconnaissance fighters, 18 torpedo bombers and 18 single-seat fighters to protect them.

Land Defence Build Up

When Britain declared war against Germany, on 3 Sep 1939, she was desperately short of troops. The regular British Army stood at a mere 227,00010 men, inclusive of British troops in India and Burma (we may take it that this included British Malaya). Britain had precisely 9 divisions ready for war11. On the other hand, the Germans at that point in time had 78 divisions. The British government introduced conscription and by May 1940, the British Army strength was brought up to a 50 divisions. After the Dunkirk evacuations, the British Army stood at 1,650,000 men. But all of these were required and deployed in Europe and Africa. Despite all efforts, the British were strapped for manpower, and desperately short of troops to protect its empire. By the invasion date, the British only provided 18.6% of the ground forces in Malaya Command.

The largest component of the British Empire was India. On the one hand, India was Britain’s largest peace-keeping headache and external defence commitment. On the other hand, Indian represented Britain’s large pool of manpower. The British Indian Army was the largest full-time volunteer (i. e non- conscripted) army in the world. It was commanded mainly by British officers, with recruitment on a provincial or regional basis. At the brigade level, the Indian Army sometimes included a British battalion. While enrolled to provide internal security and home-land defence, India’s entry into World War II is succinctly described in the following:

“The political situation in India underwent a fundamental transformation at the time of Britain's entry into World War II. Without consulting Indian political leaders, Britain declared India to be at war with Germany on 3 September 3, 1939. The legislature passed the Defence of India Bill without opposition, as the representatives of the Indian National Congress boycotted the session. Between 1939 and mid-1945, the British Indian Army expanded from about 175,000 to more than 2 million troops -- entirely through voluntary enlistment..”

10 Another source gives it as 295,000.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 6

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/army-history.htm,

The British Indian Army provided the principal component, namely 56.2%, of the defence forces facing the Japanese in Malaya and Singapore.

Australia's defence thinking was also founded on the so-called ''. Australia entered World War II on 3 September 1939, and on 15 September 1939 announced the formation of the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF), the first having been formed during . It grew to five divisions. In both wars, the AIFs were wholly voluntary forces. At the outbreak of the Japanese war the Australian forces formed 18,6% of the defences forces in Malaya Command.

Canada and New Zealand supported the British in both World Wars, but not with ground forces in Malaya.

12 Actual Build Up

On 3 Sep 39, leaving aside the navy and air force, there were no more than 20,000 troops under Malaya Command. These may be briefly summarized as follows:

(a) Malaya Command, There were effectively five battalions, four British battalions plus the 1st Battalion, the Malay Regiment. With the early arrival of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, there were four additional battalions, making 9 battalions in all.

(b) Singapore Fortress. Singapore being a naval base and fortress - and the C Echelon (workshops and depots) of the British forces in the East - the defence provisions included 20 regular artillery regiments of all calibers of gunnery, and a comparable number of engineer units of all descriptions. There was no regular infantry formation.

The above reflected the peace-time status quo. The volunteer SSVF and FMSVF units, including the MVC, made up 8 battalions or just under half of the total of 17 infantry battalions of the Command.

In the following two years, the British were to take concrete steps to defend the country. Sadly, most of the troops were newly recruited and poorly prepared for battle, not to say jungle war- fare. The build up was as follows: . (a) From Oct 40 to May 41, two Indian Inf Divisions, with a total of six infantry brigades, arrived and were formed into the III Indian Corps. . (b) From Feb to Aug 41, the 8th Australian Infantry Division of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2 A*IF) arrived with two brigades.

(c) No more British battalions arrived, but the 2nd Battalion, the Malay Regiment was formed.

12 Convenient army figures (infantry) to have in mind (full strength): 1 battalion = 1,200 men 1 brigade = 3 battalions + HQ + support = 4,500 1 division = 3 brigades + HQ +support = 20,000 1 corps = 3 divisions +++ = 70,000 1 army = 2 or more corps +++ = above 100,000

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 7

Altogether there were now 32 regular battalions, of which 18 or 56.2% were Indian, six or 18.6% British13, six or 18,6% Australian, and 2 or 6.6% Malayan (regular), There were no tanks. Due to the rapid expansion of the British Indian Army, many of the formations in the Indian divisions were ill-trained and lacked large enough cadres of experienced troops. The same was broadly true of the Australian forces.

Order of Battle - 8 December 1941

No more units arrived before the Japanese invasion of Malaya on 8 Dec 41. With some re- shuffling of brigades and battalions among the Indian units, the Order of Battle on that fateful date was:

1. The General Officer Commanding, Malaya Command, was Lt Gen A. E. Percival, appointed in May 1941, headquartered at Singapore.

2. The 3rd Indian Corps (comprising the 9th and 11th Indian Infantry Divisions, its Line of Communications Brigade14, Fortress and support units) was responsible for the defence of the whole northern half of Malaya. It was headquartered at .

(a) Of the above, the 9th Indian Infantry Division was responsible for the defence of the eastern corridor, Also headquartered in Kuala Lumpur, it had its brigades deployed as follows:

th • 8 Indian Infantry Brigade, at Kota Bahru nd • 22 Indian Infantry Brigade, at Kuantan

(b) Of the above, the 11th Indian Infantry Division was responsible for the defence of the western corridor. It was headquartered in Sungei Patani, and had its brigades deployed as follows:

th • 6 Indian Infantry Brigade, at Jitra th • 15 Indian Infantry Brigade (Reserve), at Jitra th • 28 (Gurkha) Indian Infantry Brigade, at Ipoh • The Penang Fortress had 7 mixed battalions, at Penang

(d) The 3rd Corps Command Reserve, comprising the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, was held at Port Dickson

3. The of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force, (AIF) was responsible for the defence of the southern half of Malaya. Headquartered at Kluang, its brigades were deployed as follows:

nd • 22 Australian Brigade, at Mersing-Endau th • 27 Australian Brigade, at Kluang

4. Fortress Singapore Division comprised the following

st • 1 Malaya Brigade comprising, 2 Battalions of regulars of the Malay Regiment • 2nd Malaya Brigade, comprising 3 British Battalions

13 Two of the British battalions served in the 6th and 15th Indian Infantry Brigades, respectively, according to the practice of having mixed units. All the brigade and battalion commanding officers were also British. Likewise, most of the formation support units were British.

14 The 4 Battalions of the FMS VF were grouped as part of the Corps’s Line of Command troops. The 4 Battalions of the SSVF were redeployed to Singapore as the SSVF (3rd) Brigade.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 8

• SSVF Brigade, comprising 4 Battalions of mobilised Volunteers, including the MVC • The Royal Engineers Brigade, and • The Artillery Brigade, both of mixed British, Singapore and Hong Kong units.

When Japanese forces invaded Malaya, the ground strength of Malaya Command was 88,600,

Percival was expecting further reinforcements, namely the 44 and 45 Indian Infantry Brigades and the British 18 Infantry Division, which were on the way. These would have added another 16-18 battalions or at least 25,000 men. But alas, the Japanese sense of timing had been exquisite, and they were too late when they finally arrived on staggered dates during Jan 42.

Command

There was one fatal weakness. The British navy, airforce and land forces were under different commands, each extending over the Far East theatre of war. Operating over the same territory were the Allies. At that point in time, there was no Allied “supreme commander” (like Eisenhower) for the whole Far East or more to our purpose no one commander of the British forces defending Malaya-Singapore. It is quite incredible that it was only on 17 Jan 1942 that a Supreme Commander, South West Pacific was created. (Wavell). Naturally it got disbanded some 29 days later when Singapore fell.

The Japanese

The Japanese invasion force on 8 Dec 41 comprised 70,000 men of the 25th Army of the Imperial Japanese Army under the command of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. He assumed the command only on 27 Nov 41. It seems incredible that he got the whole scheme organised in a fortnight – unless he had had it ready in his pocket on arrival. It is possible the Japanese staff officers had got it all put together before he came. Still we must give him full credit for the power of his leadership.

Yamashita was given the overall responsibility for the invasion. In reality, the Japanese strength was less than that, as the 5th Division left behind a whole regiment15 in Shanghai, China as late as 26 Dec 1941, while the 18th Division left two headquarters regiments in Canton, China. Meanwhile, the Imperial Guard Division, elite academically, had no combat experience

On the other hand, Yamashita had soldiers with experience in China. He could count on III Air Group, which had 459 aircraft and the Japanese Navy’s Southern Command, which comprised a battle cruiser, ten destroyers and five submarines. He also had 500 tanks. .

The Japanese planned and delivered their attack with exquisite calculation. First they brought their launch bases to Hainan reducing their invasion time to four days exposure at sea, Secondly, they understood air power. They positioned their air bases along the Indo China coast. From here, their fighters were ready to protect the invasion route and give air cover to the landings, while their bombers were poised to strike the airfields in northern Malaya – and even as far as Singapore. Upon the launch of their assault, they went simultaneously for the air defenses. They knocked out most of them within hours and established mastery of the air. Thirdly, they blind-sided the British, doing exactly what the latter thought was not possible, that is attack from the north via the jungle. By landing in Southern , they were able to attack the entry points into west Malaya without even sailing round Singapore and the Straits of Malacca. Lastly, their trump card was speed: they hit the enemy repeatedly while they were reeling, and did not allow time for re-grouping or reinforcements.

15 The Japanese regiment comprised about 2,500 men

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 9

When it came to the actual ground fighting, it was again another ball game than the defenders expected. They had the winning formula. The operating strategy in most cases on the ground was simple enough: attack the front, pin the defenders down, outflank the line, encircle them, and cut off communications, and force them to retreat. It was the Japanese’s ability to do this repeatedly that won them the war. Firstly, they commandeered and used bicycles extensively (their “bicycle infantry”) to move swiftly both through the kampongs and terrain’s heavy mantle of primary and secondary jungle, enabling them to slip pass and out-flank the defenders. Secondly, they used collapsible boats to land their troops almost anywhere on the shores, invariably of course behind the enemy. Thirdly, they used light mobile tanks. Besides being suitable for movement in the jungle, these tanks were light enough to be floated and towed inland, where they could run havoc. Fourthly, the assault forces had effective artillery backing. And lastly, they took no prisoners. With control of the air – which meant also control of the sea - there was no problem landing successive waves of reinforcements and supplies, It should be added that the Japanese were more battle seasoned. In their assaults, they relied on the weight of numbers and were prepared to take a higher level of casualties. The defenders had no package of counter-strokes against this adversarial combination of the Japanese.

My good friend and an astute observer of life, Mr. Choo Eng Khoon, in his laconic way, made this trenchant remark, “The Japanese out-generalled the British”.

THE WAR

Opening Gambits.

Percival’s objective was to hold up the Japanese for as long as was possible to allow for the further reinforcements to arrive. Yamashita’s plan was precisely the opposite; to advance swiftly to Singapore before they did.

Correctly anticipating the invasion from the north, Malaya Command allocated the responsibility to the 3rd Indian Corps to defend the northern half of Malaya and repulse the invasion. The 8th Australian Division was allocated responsibility for the southern half of Malaya, covering Malacca and Johore. There were two fighting divisions in the north facing the Thai border and one in the south.

Both sides recognised that control of the west coast corridor would be the balancing point of the campaign. It was the spinal cord and jugular vein of the country. It was accordingly heavily defended. The defence deployments described in Annex B reflect this.

For the same reason, the Japanese made it their primary tactical objective and their route of choice to Singapore. The war became a series of retreating battles as the Japanese pushed the defenders back to successive defensive lines and advanced down this corridor, until they reached Singapore.

Opening Rounds

The war began on 4 Dec 1941 when the Japanese launched the main body of their invasion troops from Hainan in a huge convoy ringed by their naval armada. Another convoy left from Saigon. Both converged in the Gulf of Siam on 7 Dec 41. The invasion fleet was sighted by an RAF Hudson on 7 Dec 41.

The invasion then separated again into three landing groups. Shortly after midnight on 8 Dec 41, about 90 minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbour, 5300 Japanese soldiers, supported by artillery troops, engineers and signallers, landed at Kota Bahru. This signalled the beginning of Japan's invasion of Malaya. Despite heavy resistance and 15% losses, they

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 10 established a beachhead by 1900. On 8 Dec 41, the Japanese simultaneously attacked Kota Bahru airfield. Basically they shot down or destroyed most of the British aircraft.16 .

The other forces landed at Singora where after a brief battle against Thai defenses, they also established a foothold, and immediately began operating from its airfield. They also successfully landed at Patani. From these points they began to move south towards the Thai- Malayan border to launch their invasion of western Malaya.

If the British navy had been out there in the area and their air force in the air, and engaged them at sea, we might have had a different tale to tell, although the outcome would probably not be different. But alas, see further on.

That same morning Imperial Japanese Navy bombers attacked Singapore, the first ever air raid aimed at the colony. It became evident Japanese aircraft bombers operating in Saigon were now in range of Singapore.

By 11 Dec 41, the Japanese had captured all airfields and destroyed almost every Allied aircraft in northern Malaya. The Japanese had thereby achieved air superiority over the invasion front-tine, and secured their reinforcement and supply lines by sea.

Percival then ordered that until reinforcements arrived all aircraft would only be used in the defence of Singapore and for the protection of supply convoys moving north into Malaya.

Penang was also bombed by the Japanese on 8 Dec 41 and daily thereafter. The island (with its population) was abandoned by the British on 17 Dec 41. The evacuation of Europeans alienated them from the local population.

Naval Debacle

On receipt of intelligence in Singapore on 6 Dec 41 of the invasion convoys, Sir Tom Phillips, the newly promoted Admiral of the British Far East Fleet, decided to intercept the invaders. He counted on surprise. He declined air-cover (saying the airforce would not be able to protect his ships) and deliberately did not communicate his movements (saying this would break radio silence.)

Force Z, consisting of the Prince of Wales, the Repulse and four destroyers, sailed from Singapore at 1710 on 8 Dec 41, effectively after the fall of Kota Bahru. On 9 Dec 41 Force Z passed the Anambas Islands to the east, and was spotted by Japanese submarine I-65 at 1400, which shadowed the British ships for five hours without Phillips being aware of it.

I-65's report of the British battle group reached the Japanese 22nd Air Flotilla headquarters two hours later – around 1600 hours. At that time, their aircraft were loading bombs for an attack on Singapore, but they immediately switched to torpedoes. The bombers were ready by 1800 hours.

About 1730, the Force Z was spotted by three Japanese seaplanes, which had been catapulted off the Japanese cruisers escorting the transports. These aircraft continued shadowing. At 2055 on 9 Dec 41, Philips cancelled the operation, saying that they had lost the element of surprise, and ordered they return to Singapore.

At 0050 next morning, 10 Dec 41, Phillips received a report of Japanese landings at Kuantan. Force Z turned and headed in that general direction, without signalling his intention (which would have revealed his position). At 0718, the Prince Of Wales catapulted off a reconnaissance aircraft which flew to Kuantan, saw nothing, reported back so to the Prince of

16 One report has it that the RAF lost some 66 of their 110 aircraft by the evening of 8 Dec 41.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 11

Wales, and flew to Singapore. At 1015, more Japanese aircraft spotted the ships, after Force Z failed to find any Japanese invasion forces and was heading back south.

At 1113, the fleet was attacked by three waves of Japanese planes, the first being 17 Nell bombers from Mihoro Air Corps, armed with 500 kg (1,100 lb) bombs, as well as eight Nells with two 250 kg (550 lb) bombs.

Around 1140, the first of 16 Nell torpedo bombers (two squadrons from Genzan Air Group) arrived and attacked, sending four torpedoes into Prince of Wales.[31] The first wave of attackers delivered one catastrophic torpedo hit on her outer port propeller shaft. Turning at maximum revolutions, the shaft twisted, breached several compartments ruptured the sea water protection. Herewith the final moment of the ship:

This single torpedo hit had three crippling effects. First, it caused a 11.5 degree list to port, meaning starboard 5.25-inch anti-aircraft turrets were unable to depress low enough to engage the attackers. Furthermore, power to Prince of Wales' aft[ 5.25 inch dual-purpose turrets was cut, leaving her unable to counter further attacks. Power loss to her pumps meant an inability to pump flood water faster than it was entering the breached hull. Second, it denied her much of her auxiliary electrical power, vital for internal communications, ventilation, steering gear, and pumps, and for training and elevation of the gun mounts. The crews also had difficulty bringing the heavy 2-pounder mountings into manual operation. Third, the extensive internal flooding and shaft damage left the ship under power of only the starboard engines and able to make only 15 knots at best, and with her electric steering unresponsive the ship was virtually unmanageable..

The order to abandon ship was then given and Prince of Wales rolled over to port, righted herself, settled by the head, her stern rising in the air, and sank at 1318. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinking_of_Prince_of_Wales_and_Repulse

Two attacks aimed at the Repulse by high altitude bombers and a squadron of torpedo bombers passed without damage. The third and final attack by 26 Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' torpedo bombers from the Kanoya Air Group, and a detachment from the 21st Air Flotilla based near Saigon, struck from several directions. She was hit heavily and suddenly, and the captain ordered the crew overboard; The Repulse listed heavily to port over a period of about six minutes and finally rolled over, righted herself, settled by the head, her stern rising in the air, and sank at 1233.

The air cover assigned to Force Z, 10 Buffaloes of No. 453 Squadron RAAF from Sembawang arrived over the battlefield at 1318, just as the Prince of Wales sank.

Within the first three days of the war, the Japanese had established full control of Malayan waters as well as of the air. It only remained for their army to go capture Malaya and Singapore.

In retrospect there are several questions in my own mind. Firstly, it took Phillips three days from first intelligence of the invasion to set sail. Force Z (Force G originally) had arrived eight days earlier. These facts bespeak an incredible lack of readiness and or complacency. Secondly, when he got underway on 1710 on 8 Dec 41, he must have known that the Japanese had already landed in Singora, Patani and Kota Bahru, and taken over the airfield at the latter; or again British communications to the fleet headquarters were appalling. In fact, Singapore island and his two capital ships had been raided that very morning and they had taken part in the anti-aircraft defence. It must have been clear that he had missed any clandestine objective of interception. The role left to his magnificent new battleship was to catch the returning (empty) convoys and guard against follow on waves of transport. There was no need for (further) secrecy as the Japanese were already present in the area and in the air. The joke was that a Japanese submarine tailed him for five hours undetected. Thirdly, I cannot understand what he intended to do at Kuantan on receipt of news of a Japanese

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 12 landing; the Japanese would have long disappeared into the jungle. And fourthly, what was his purpose in returning to Singapore; he was already within its air-cover and the job left to be done was where he was, patrolling the Malayan coast against further convoys, It seems to me Force Z had completely lost its purpose.

Battle for Malaya

The battle for Malaya may be summarised as follows, and followed on the Map at Annex C.

Date Location Action

Western Corridor

8 Dec 41 Singora Japanese landed and took Singora and Patani. Patani After heavy resistance and losses they defeated the 8th Kota Bahru Indian Inf Bde, took Kota Bahru, and neutralised and captured RAF airfield.

In all cases, the troops set off immediately to attack the Malayan western corridor via the gateways of Jitra and Kroh.

10 -12 Dec 41 Jitra & Kroh Jitra was the critical northern gateway to the west coast. This primary front was defended in strength by 11 Indian Division, comprising 6 Indian Inf Bde and 15 Indian Inf Bde, with 28 Indian Inf Bde in reserve. But their front-line defences were incomplete. Defenders sent three columns forward to delay the Japanese. Only Krohcol was successful. The Japanese broke through and attacked the main Jitra positions on 11 Dec 41. After 15 hours of heavy fighting, they defeated the 15 Indian Inf Bde with its battalions in full retreat, and captured Jitra. The remaining forces of the Division were ordered to retreat to Gurun. Two of the battalions were British. The others were Indian.

Alor Star and other northern airbases including Butterworth, guarded by Jitra, were lost following this defeat.

8-17 Dec 41 Penang Intensively bombed by the Japanese daily from 8 Dec 41, with heavy civilian casualties, the British abandoned Penang on 17 Dec 41

The 12 Indian Bde, stepping in for the badly mauled 11 Indian Division, carried out a very successful fighting withdrawal to Kampar, delaying their advance and, inflicting heavy casualties on the Japanese spearhead units.

30 Dec 41 – 2 Kampar Next, the British established a defensive line from the coast Jan 42 through Telok Anson to Kampar, using the advantageous natural terrain at the last. It was defended by a re- organised and reduced 11 Indian Inf Division made up of the 15/6 Indian Inf Bde re-formed with the survivors of Jitra and the 28 Gurkha Inf Bde.

The Japanese attacked Kampar on 30 Dec 41 through 1 Jan 42, without success, and withdrew. It was the first

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 13

serious defeat suffered by the Japanese in their Malayan campaign.

In the end, on 2 Jan 41, the Japanese made landings on the coast south of the line, successfully captured Telok Anson, out flanked the Kampar defenses, and forced the latter to retreat to the next defensive line at Slim River.

6-8 Jan 42 Slim River Slim River was established as the second defensive holding line. What they were defending was the Trolak road which led to the road and railway bridges over the River. The task was again that of the 11 Indian Division, who had deployed the reduced 12 Indian Inf Bde and 28 Gurkhas Bde after Kampar.

On 6 Jan 42, the Japanese produced a daring brilliancy, of attacking by night straight down the road using tanks. They split two successive brigade defence positions, and went through to capture the bridges.

The 11 Indian Division was finished. The surviving brigade forces were ordered to retreat to Johore.

11 Jan 42 Kuala Lumpur After Slim River, it was decided that the next line of defence would be in Johore, namely along the Muar- Segamat - Endau line. The remaining defence forces of he 3rd Corps were ordered to withdraw, leaving KL undefended.

Japanese captured this city unopposed. The 3rd Indian Corps had meanwhile been ordered to evacuate to south Johore to form the last line of defence before Singapore. They carried out demolitions all along the way as they went south.

The III Indian Corps completed passing through the Australian-held Muar-Segamat-Endau defence line by 14 Jan 42 , after which it was closed. The Japanese attacked the line that same day. It was that close.

12-13 Jan 42 Malacca In retreating to Johore, the British also left Malacca undefended. Apparently neither side thought it worth fighting over. The Japanese mainly passed through Tampin and simply occupied Malaca.

There was one incident. The Malacca bridge was bombed and put out of use for the duration of the war. I saw the dive bomber that did it, as it flew past my bathroom window as I was having a bath. This would have been about 12 Jan 41. I waved at the pilot and he waved back.

It must have been about the next day, 13 Jan 41, that the last MVC HQ convoy evacuated to Singapore, and the Pillays with them. We too just made it through before the Johore defence line was closed.

Malacca fell on 15 Jan 42

14 Jan 42 Segamat The Muar-Segamat-Endau defence line was along the main east-west transverse trunk road from coast to coast,

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 14

with major north-south crossings at Segamat and Muar

The Segamat and Muar sectors were assigned to the Australian 8 Division headquartered at Kluang, which deployed the 27 Australian Inf Bde in the Gemas-Segamat sector and a re-organised 11 Indian Inf Bde at Muar.

.The Australians laid their defences up the road from Segamat to Gemas. The Gemenchah Bridge on the main trunk road before Gemas was a highly strategic target. One Australian battalion from the 27 Austrian Bde ambushed the Japanese advance down the road on 14 Jan 42 and held them up for two days inflicting 700 Japanese casualties for a loss of 87 of their own.

They had to withdraw eventually against a superior attack, and the bridge as well as Gemas fell.

14-23 Jan 42 Muar The main body of the 27 Australian Bde, along the trunk road to Segamat,, were backed by the 8 Indian Inf Bde,

and to their left the 22 Indian Inf Bde guarding the roads from Malacca to Segamat.

The Muar sector, which included its winding river and the coastal north-south trunk road, was allocated to the 9 Indian Inf Division, repositioned after the defeats on the eastern corridor. The 45 Indian Inf Bde, newly formed units, young and untrained for battle, and who had just arrived in early Jan 42, was also deployed to Muar. So also was the British 18 Inf Division. But the last had not arrived. When their 53 Inf Bde did arrive on 15 Jan 42, they were immediately deployed to fight, with disastrous consequences. Their other two brigades, also young recruits, arrived in Feb 42, just in time to fight for a few days and then surrender to the Japanese, in Singapore.

The battle for Muar began on 15 Jan 42, and the town was captured by 16 Jan 42. An attempt on 17 Jab 42 to re- capture Muar failed, likewise an attempt on 20 Jan 42 to recapture the Parit Sulong bridge in Japanese hands, a vital link to Yong Peng further south and, the point of assembly for the surviving and retreating troops. The final action at this line took place on 23 Jan 42, on the road just before Yong Peng which had been blocked. However the Japanese broke through with superior forces, again using tanks.

In the space of a few days the British had lost an entire Indian brigade and the best part of two of Australian battalions as well as one brigadier, three Indian Army battalion commanders and an Australian battalion commander.

During the night of 25 Jan 42, the Australian Division was forced to withdraw its brigades from both sectors, leaving the Japanese in control of the west-east main road across the country.

20-31 Jan 42 Johore It was decided that the regrouped and re-organised 3rd Indian Corps, less the 9 Indian Division, with the 22 Australian Inf Bde under its command, should be responsible for holding the defence of southern Johore,

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 15

along the final defence line Endau-Kluang-Batu-Pahat.

On the east of this line was the 22nd Australian Brigade, which was already in that area. In the centre, defending the railway and the main trunk road, were the remainder of the Australian 8 Division and the 9th Indian Division. On the west coast was the reconstituted 11th Indian Division,

Again, as at Muar, the. western sector proved the critical one. Japanese troops had earlier landed near Batu Pahat on 16 Jan 42, and before long were driving between the western and central sectors, threatening to cut off the 11th Indian Division. On the night of 25 Jan 42, the troops on the central sector had to withdraw, thereby leaving the Japanese in control of a main road from east to west across the country.

With landings at Endau taking place, it was impractical to hold southern Johore. On 27 Jan 42, Malaya Command received permission from the Allied Command to order a full retreat across the Johore Strait to the island of Singapore. About 0800 on 31 Jan the last troops crossed the causeway, which was immediately demolished.

Important Footnote:

The two regular battalions of the Malay Regiment had likewise been evacuated to Singapore. Together with British battalions, they formed the 1 and 2 Malaya Bdes

The 3 and 4 Battalions of the SSVF had earlier been mobilised and evacuated to Singapore from Penang and Malacca, respectively. These together with the two battalions of the Singapore SSVF formed the Straits Settlements Volunteer Forces (SSVF) Bde. This brigade took part in the defence of Singapore.

I have a note which says that it was decided to disband the FMSVF units advising them to return to their families.

.

Date Location Action

Eastern Corridor

8 Dec 41 Kota Bahru The Eastern corridor was defended by the 9 Indian Inf Division, with its 8 Indian Inf Bde positioned at Kota Bahru and the 22 Indian Bde at Kuantan

The Japanese landed on the night of 7 Dec 41. After heavy resistance and losses, they defeated the 8th Indian Inf Bde and took Kota Bahru and the RAF airfield..

The Japanese split into two groups, one moving west to join the other groups from Patani and Songkla to attack the western corridor, and the other half moving down the east

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 16

coast toward Kuantan.

On 10 Dec 41, the Japanese made further landings near the two airfields at Gong Kedah and Machang, south of Kota Bharu, which had to be abandoned.

On 12 Dec 41, Kelantan was evacuated by the remaining forces. This operation was completed by the 22 Dec 41. 30 Dec 42 Kuantan The 22 Indian Inf Bde had been assigned to protect Kuantan and its airport under the Battle Order of 8 Dec. We are told that the Prince of Wales received a message on the morning of 10 Dec 42 that Kuantan was under attack. But a reconnaissance flyover revealed nothing.

On the 30 Dec 41, the Japanese began their attack on Kuantan, There was fierce fighting around the town and the aerodrome, and early on the morning of 3 Jan 42 orders were issued for a withdrawal towards the west. That completed the removal of the 9 Indian Division from the eastern corridor.

We know that some time in mid-January the 9 Indian Division were re-deployed to southern Johore.

20 Jan 42 Endau The Japanese landed at Endau from fresh convoys from Indo-China on 20 Jan 42. After a vigorous defence by the 22 Australian Inf Bde, supported by the Royal Navy and RAF from Singapore, they took the eastern sector of the final line of defence.

The convoys brought with them men and equipment to restore and operationalise the Kluang airfield, which the the Japanese expected to capture shortly. So much for forward planning. Using the Endau-Segamat- Batu Pahat road, their forces from east and west would soon converge in Bahru

The Battle for Singapore

Battle Dispositions

Evacuation of all defence forces was completed by the morning of 31 Jan 42, and the causeway was blown. Some reinforcements had just arrived: a number of Hurricane fighters flown off an aircraft-carrier, a light tank squadron from India, and the main body of the British 18th Division

At that point Percival had on the island the following:

• One much battered 3rd Indian Corps, of two divisions • One tired and depleted Australian 8 Division;

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 17

• the equivalent of two divisions of the original Singapore Fortress with their massed artillery, engineer and other support units, and including the three local brigades of the Malay Regiment and the SSVF; • the newly arrived 18 British Inf Division, one brigade of which had already fought in Muar; and • the 44 & 45 Indian Inf Bdes both of which had already fought and been depleted in Muar.

One report gives the total men under arms to be over 100,000, excluding the navy and the air force. I would say about half were artillery, engineer and other support troops.

Percival spread his infantry across a 70 mile line – fronting the entire northern coast of the island. This proved a mistake. He had overestimated the strength of the Japanese. His tactic spread his men out for too thinly to defend a concentrated attack at any one point.

The defenses were divided into four main areas. The Northern Area was defended by the 3rd Indian Corps which now comprised the re-constituted 9 & 11 Indian Divisions. Percival believed that the Japanese would land on the north-east coast, and deployed the near full- strength British 18 Division, which had just arrived, to defend the Eastern Area. The Western Area was defended by the re-constituted the Australian 8 Division whose 22 Inf Bde was placed to the left towards Jurong and the 27 Inf Bde to their right towards Kranji, together with the 44 Indian Inf Bde, The Southern Area, which included the city of Singapore, was defended by the original Fortress Troops, mostly in fixed defenses, including the 1 and 2 Malaya Inf Bdes, and the SSVF Bde.

These deployments may be seen in the Map of Singapore at Annex D.

On the evening of 10 February, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, cabled Wavell, saying:

“I think you ought to realise the way we view the situation in Singapore. It was reported to Cabinet by the C.I.G.S. [Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Alan Brooke] that Percival has over 100,000 [sic] men, of whom 33,000 are British and 17,000 Australian. It is doubtful whether the Japanese have as many in the whole Malay Peninsula. In these circumstances the defenders must greatly outnumber Japanese forces who have crossed the straits, and in a well- contested battle they should destroy them. There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population. The battle must be fought to the bitter end at all costs. Wavell subsequently told Percival that the ground forces were to fight on to the end, and that there should not be a general surrender in Singapore.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Singapore

On the other hand, the following quote from General Yamashita is revealing

“My attack on Singapore was a bluff – a bluff that worked. I had 30,000 men and was outnumbered more than three to one. I knew that if I had to fight for long for Singapore, I would be beaten. That is why the surrender had to be at once. I was very frightened all the time that the British would discover our numerical weakness and lack of supplies and force me into disastrous street fighting.”

– Tomoyuki Yamashita Shores 1992, p. 383.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 18

Air Defences

The first air attack on Singapore was on 8 Dec 41, at the beginning of the Malayan offensive. The next recorded attack was on the night of 29 Dec 41. Thereafter it was nightly, then by 12 Jan 42 daily, then night and day, and then continuously.

By 16 Jan 42, all air force units in Malaya had been driven back to Singapore. To lessen the congestion in Singapore, the bomber squadrons were transferred to Palembang in Sumatra, From there, the obsolescent bombers made long flights to continue to attack Japanese-held airfields in Malaya and maintained daily reconnaissances across the South China Sea and to protect incoming convoys with British reinforcements. The antediluvian fighters left behind had to deal with the Japanese bombers and fighters from increasingly battered airfields, and finally only from the Kallang civilian aerodrome.

On 3 Jan 42, some 51 Hurricane Mk II fighters had arrived in Singapore (in crates), with 24 pilots, the nuclei of five squadrons. However, they became operational only on 20 Jan 42. On that day they destroyed three enemy planes - for the loss of three Hurricanes. However, like the Buffalos before them, the Hurricanes began to suffer severe losses in intense dogfights

During 27 January–30 Jan 42, another four squadrons with another 48 Hurricanes (Mk IIA) arrived on the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable (which should have arrived with the Prince of Wales on 2 Dec 42!) - making it 99 Hurricanes in all. But they had to fly to and operate from airfields in Palembang. The staggered arrival of the Hurricanes—along with inadequate early warning systems—meant that Japanese air raids were able to destroy a large proportion of the Hurricanes on the ground in Sumatra and Singapore.

To capture the air war that went on above in the skies on the day of the invasion of Singapore, 8 Feb 42, I cannot but include this piece

“On the morning of 8 February, a number of aerial dogfights took place over Sarimbun Beach and other western areas. In the first encounter, the last ten Hurricanes were scrambled from Kallang Airfield to intercept a Japanese formation of about 84 planes, flying from Johor to provide air cover for their invasion force. In two sorties, the Hurricanes shot down six Japanese planes for the loss of one of their own; they flew back to Kallang halfway through the battle, hurriedly re-fuelled, then returned to it. Air battles went on for the rest of the day, and by nightfall it was clear that with the few machines Percival had left, Kallang could no longer be used as a base. With his assent the remaining eight flyable Hurricanes were withdrawn to Palembang, Sumatra, and Kallang became merely an advanced landing ground.[17] No allied aircraft were seen again over Singapore, and the Japanese had achieved complete air supremacy.[18]”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Singapore

(Note: On 15 Feb 42 the Japanese established themselves near Palembang and on 16 Feb 42 evening all air force units withdrew to Java.)

The Japanese Attack

During the first week of Feb 42 there was artillery activity on both sides, and there were Japanese air attacks, mostly on the docks and the civil aerodrome. Blowing up the causeway delayed the Japanese attack by one week.

8 Feb 42

At 2030 on 8 Feb 42, two divisions of the Japanese 25th Army—led by Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita—landed on the north-western coast of Singapore, in the Sarimbun area. This sector was

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 19 defended by the Australian 22 Inf Bde. The weight of the attack was not at first realised; The defenders were not reinforced. After two days’ resistance, they had to withdraw towards the centre of the island.

9 Feb 42

On the night of 9 Feb 42, the Japanese opened a second front, with a third division landing massively at Sungei Kranji. This sector was defended by the Australian 27 Inf Bde. Although the reserves were thrown in, by 0800 the Japanese were breaking through, attacking the aerodromes in the Western Area, and advancing towards Bukit Timah and Singapore city.

On 9 Feb 42, the Japanese opened a third front landing to the far southwest towards Jurong, defended by 44 Indian Inf Bde. The Allied units were forced to retreat further east.

At this point, the Australian 8 Divisional commander decided to form a secondary defensive line, known as the "Jurong-Kranji Line, to consolidate his retreating troops.

10 Feb 42

In the early hours of 10 Feb 42, the Japanese launched a follow up landing at Sungei Kranji, to the right of their earlier front and nearer the causeway, also defended by the Australian 27 Inf Bde. Here the Japanese suffered severe casualties from burning oil which had been discharged from the Woodlands oil depot into the water and ignited by gunfire. They however they achieved a tenuous beachhead. They also captured Woodlands, and began repairing the causeway, without encountering any Allied attacks.

With the west and north coastal defences breached and outflanked, Percival drew a Defence Line from Jurong through Kranji to Kallang aerodrome, covering the MacRitchie and Peirce reservoirs and the Bukit Timah supply depot area The defence forces were to consolidate and make a stand against the Japanese along this line. The 15 Indian Inf Bde was re-positioned near Bukit Timah Road to support the others already committed in the area and to guard the island's vital food and petrol supplies.

11 Feb 42

On 11 Feb 42 the Japanese advanced on all fronts against this Defense Line. Despite efforts to save them, the food and petrol dumps near Bukit Timah were lost. This meant that little petrol and only fourteen days' military food supplies remained to the defenders - although the civilian food situation was less critical. The Japanese captured most of the Allied ammunition and fuel and gained control of the main water supplies

By establishing complete command of the Kranji estuary, the Japanese had now opened the way for their armoured units to land unopposed.. Tanks were floated and towed across. The Japanese were now able to advance south rapidly and outflank just about everybody. The Japanese outflanked the 22nd Brigade on the Jurong Line, as well as bypassed the 11th Indian Division at the naval base on the other side of the causeway.

One report while not very clear left me the impression that at this point the total Japanese force numbered some 70,000 infantry, supported by 150 tanks, 168 guns - and more than 500 aircraft

12 Fe 42

On 12th, Percival finally decided to withdraw and re-position the British 18 Division from the Eastern Area to within the eastern half of the Defence Line, along the so called “Serangoon Line” from Kallang to Paya Lebar.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 20

There was heavy fighting along the whole western half of the Defence Line on 12 Feb. The defence forces held the line generally well on this date. The Australian 22 Inf Bde held an advanced position south of Bukit Timah until evening, when after forty-eight hours of stubborn resistance, it was withdrawn.

At this point, Percival issued a secret order defining a tight perimeter around the city as a fall back line if pushed back. Fatally, the Australian divisional command misunderstood this as a order to retreat. As a result, the 44 Indian Inf Bde, the 12 Indian Inf Bde and the 22 Australian Inf Bde abandoned the Defence Line, leaving the Japanese to walk through on the west.

13 Feb 42

The Allied lines stabilised around a small area in the south-east of the island and fought off determined Japanese assaults.

On 13 Feb 42, the main Japanese attack was made along a ridge to the west of Singapore City. Other units—including the 1 Malaya Infantry Brigade—had joined in. A Malayan platoon of C Company —led by 2nd Lieutenant Adnan bin Saidi—held the Japanese for two days at the Battle of Pasir Panjang.

In the afternoon at a staff conference all the senior commanders were agreed that, owing to the exhaustion of the troops, a counter-attack could have no chance of succeeding. A start was made that evening with the evacuation of numbers of surplus staff officers, nurses, technicians and others whose knowledge would be of value to the Allies. Many of the small ships that took off evacuees on that day were sunk, and those on board were either drowned or taken prisoner.

14 Feb

At 0830 on 14 Feb 42, the Japanese again launched a heavy attack at Pasir Panjang. on the front held by the 1 Malay Brigade. The defenders beat off this and a number of other attacks. The fighting included bitter hand-to-hand combat, and losses from both sides were heavy. At 1600 another attack supported by tanks eventually succeeded in penetrating the defence. Owing to the failure of units on both its flanks to hold their ground, the 1 Malay Brigade withdrew at 1430.

It was at this point that C Company of the Malay Regiment received instructions to move to a new defence position, Bukit Chandu. It was a key defence position for two important reasons. It was situated on high ground overlooking the island to the north; and secondly, if the Japanese gained control of the ridge, it gave them direct passage to the Alexandra area. The British army had its main ammunition and supply depots, military hospital and other key installations located in Alexandra.

The Japanese pressed their attack on Bukit Chandu in the afternoon, They launched an all-out banzai charge in great numbers. The attack overwhelmed the Malay Regiment, and the defence line shattered. Greatly outnumbered and short of ammunition and supplies, the regiment continued to resist. Both sides engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat using bayonets. Adnan bin Saidi was seriously wounded but refused to retreat or surrender and instead encouraged his men to fight to the end.

Soon after, Pasir Panjang was under Japanese control, and Adnan bin Saidi, wounded and unable to fight, was captured. Instead of taking him prisoner, the Japanese continuously kicked, punched and beat him before tying him to a cherry tree and stabbing him to death with their bayonets.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 21

At about 1300 on 14 Feb 42, the Japanese soldiers advanced towards the Alexandra Barracks Hospital.[21] After the Japanese troops entered the hospital, they killed the a number of the patients, including those undergoing surgery at the time, along with doctors and members of nursing staff, this incident becoming known as the Alexandra Hospital Massacre.

Early on the 14th the water situation became critical; the mains were broken and repairs could not keep pace. It was estimated that at most the supply would last for forty-eight hours - possibly only for twenty-four.

A counter-attack was judged by all to be impossible; so at a meeting in the afternoon, terms of surrender were agreed with the Japanese commander, Lieutenant-General Yamashita,

15 Feb 42

The Surrender was signed at 1915 at the Ford Motor Factor and hostilities ceased at 2030. This was the end of the fighting – after seventy days of struggle without respite

On 15 Feb 42, Percival surrendered some 80,000 soldiers. This was the largest surrender of personnel under British leadership in history. Many of the troops saw little or no action. Of these, some 55,000 were Indian personnel, and 13.400 Australians, with the majority of the balance of 14,600 being British.

VOLUNTEERS IN BATTLE

I did not find a comprehensive account of the Volunteers in the defence of Malaya and or Singapore. The information found put together provides the following picture.

• The Compulsory Service (Volunteer Forces) Ordinance was implemented in Jul 40 in both the SS and the FMS. It applied only to male British subjects and British Protected Persons between the ages of 18 and 41. In practice only Europeans were called up. About half of the latter were mobilised for training in Mar 41, but the programme was not extended following protests of disruption from the estates and businesses. Non- European volunteers were only mobilised subsequently somewhere before the Battle Order of 8 Dec 41. Besides their regular part-time training, they received no preparation for the war as far as I can see.

• Analysis of the Malayan Campaign reveals that the Penang volunteers must have been evacuated to Singapore before 17 Dec and the MVC before 13 Jan. The FMSVF units who were responsible for Line of Communications Bde duties for the 3rd Corps progressively withdrew to Johore, where in the final week the local soldiers were disbanded while the European members and other locals who elected to stay on were evacuated to Singapore and joined up with the SSVF Bde. The overall FMSVF strength was given as 7.395

st • The official strength of the SSVF was 4.199, of whom 1,250 were from Singapore’s 1 and 2nd Battalions, 916 from Penang’s 3rd Battalion and 675 from Malacca’s 4th Battalion. A, B, and C Coy of the 1st Battalion were made up of English, Scottish and Eurasian solders respectively. The other battalions were mixed. I have no figures for Penang’s 3rd Battalion, but in the case of the MVC, A Coy was European, B Coy was Chinese and the others mixed. The numbers would have swelled with arrival of the FMSVF personnel, possibly by up to a thousand, mainly European. This would bring the enlarged SSVF to over 5,000, with the proportion of Europeans and Eurasians near half overall.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 22

• The Volunteer battalions were committed to battle. My best conclusion is that they were mainly deployed in the Bukit Timah area. One British source reports that 96 Volunteers died during the campaign. But this figure is low. There is a memorial plaque in Red Square between Christ Church and the Clock Tower in Malacca which records a Roll of Honour of 100 soldiers from the MVC alone who died. This percentage (14.8%) reflects a heavy engagement level and casualty rate In its related website, there is a listing of 89 of the names with details. Of these 22 were European, 10 were Eurasian, 40 Chinese,13 Malay and 4 Indians.17 Another British report gives the number of campaign awards to all Volunteers of all races as 10018.

• On surrender, the European and a good proportion the Eurasian Volunteers were interned as prisoners of war (POWs). Another British report gives the number of the latter who died as 395. The other locals were disbanded in due course and returned to their hometowns. There are reports that many Chinese volunteers were massacred as part of the Japanese anti-Chinese pogrom.

Finally, the following extract from an Internet the source of which I cannot immediately identify throws light on the situation after surrender.

“At the surrender of Singapore there were more than 18,000 Volunteers in the armed forces, most of whom were imprisoned as military personnel, although some were imprisoned as civilians along with many non-native women and children who had not been able to escape from Singapore. “ http:// www.

A complementary source records this:

“With considerable local knowledge the Volunteers were of enormous help to the thousands of captured British Forces, especially those who had only been in the Far East for a matter of weeks before capture.”

http://www.cofepow.org.uk/pages/armedforces_r_malayan_volunteers.htm

The above suggest that a large number of European civilians, whether they took up arms or not, got counted as Volunteers towards the end. Once rounded up as POWs, it mattered little. From the context, the estimate appears to have been made inside prison after surrender.

AFTERMATH

At the time of the Singapore surrender, it is estimated that there were some 120,000 Japanese troops on land in Singapore and in southern Malaya. Japanese losses are variously reported, as high as 25,000 to 35,000.

Altogether in the whole Malaya campaign, the British and Commonwealth losses were 9,000 killed and wounded with 130,00019 captured.

Singapore was renamed to Syonanto (昭南島 Shōnantō), which means "Southern Island gained in the age of Shōwa"; .frequently mistranslated as "Light of the South",

The Australian commanding officer, Lt Gen , caused a controversy when he transferred his division to a brigadier, commandeered a small boat, escaped, and eventually

17 http://www.roll-of-honour.com/Overseas/malaccaww2.html. Ethnic classification is by me, based on on the name 18 http://www.malayanvolunteersgroup.org.uk/node/58,

19 I take this figure as inclusive of the Singapore surrender.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 23 made his way back to Australia. (A court of inquiry later found that he was not justified in doing so.) Percival served imprisonment in Manchuria and was flown back to Singapore for the Japanese surrender in 1945.

The British, Volunteer and Australian prisoners of war were imprisoned in Changi Prison, and some 9,000 were sent to the Burma “Death Railways” and many others perished in prison. Only 6,000 survived.

Of the Indian prisoners, the Japanese persuaded some 30,000 to join the Indian National Army, which under Subba Chandra Bose was allied to Japan and dedicated to fighting the British for India’s freedom. The others were imprisoned. I have no figures how many survived.

Within two or three weeks, the Japanese got the causeway re-opened, and more to the purposes of our narrative, the railway working. The Japanese could not wait to move the refugee population back to Malaya to grow their own food and feed themselves.

RE-OCCUPATION

.For us, the War only ended on Re-Occupation. The Japanese eventually surrendered on 15 Aug 45, after the atom bombs were dropped. But a lot was going on before and immediately after that, leading to Re-occupation. It is appropriate to mention briefly a few external events during the inter-regnum which touched our lives and therefore have a bearing on our story. Our readers having so to speak gone through the war in these pages, we owe it to them to capture the facts relating to the Re-occupation to complete the story.

Operation Zipper

Not surprisingly, the Allied (SEAC) were drawing up plans to re- take Malaya, codenamed Operation Zipper. With over 100,000 Allied infantry, the plan was to capture Port Swettenham and Port Dickson, and would involve an airstrike of more than 500 aircraft of the Royal Air Force. The assault was scheduled for 9 Sep 45, but was forestalled following the .

The immediate objective became to take the Japanese surrender and re-occupy both Malaya and Singapore. A reduced Operation Zipper was implemented ahead of schedule, and Operation Tiderace was put together for Singapore by re-configuration of the original plan.

The Allied fleet departed from Rangoon on 27 Aug 45, sailing for Penang. The full complement consisted of about 90 ships. It included two battleships, HMS Nelson and the French battleship Richelieu. The heavy cruiser HMS Sussex served as the flagship. HMAS Hawkesbury was the sole Australian warship. There were a total of seven escort carriers: HMS Ameer, HMS Attacker, HMS Emperor, HMS Empress, HMS Hunter, HMS Khedive and HMS Stalker (I can’t refrain from the comment: where were you when we needed you most!)

The Allied fleet arrived in Malaya on 28 August, and a small detachment was sent on to Penang as Operation Zipper. It consisted of the battleship HMS Nelson, escort carriers HMS Attacker & HMS Hunter, and a light cruiser HMS Ceylon, with two destroyers and two Infantry Landing Ships They arrived in Penang on 28 Aug 45 The HMS Nelson was the flagship of this fleet, and the articles of surrender were signed aboard it on 2 Sep 45. With the Japanese surrender, the Allied troops landed, while the fleet rejoined the main force and sailed as Operation Tiderace for Singapore.

The 23rd and 25th Indian Inf Divisions were the first formations to land in Malaya on 9 Sep 45, occupying the capital, Kuala Lumpur, and then accepting the surrender of the Japanese Army there. It is now historic that the first re-occupation landings were at Pantai Morib, along the west coast just south of Kuala Lumpur, between Port Swettenham now Klang) and Port Dickson. There is a stone memorial on the shore commentating the occasion inscribed with

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 24 these words, see http://www.ww2museums.com/article/11371/Memorial-Operation- Zipper.htmhttp://www.ww2museums.com/article/11371/Memorial-Operation-Zipper.htm

Text on the memorial: 46 Indian Beach Group landed here 9th September 1945 And handles across the beaches 42651 personnel20 3968 vehicles 11224 tons of stores

Operation Tideface

Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander of Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), ordered that the Allied troops set sail from Trincomalee and Rangoon on 31 August for Singapore, thereby launching Operation Tideface.

The fleet from Penang arrived in Singapore on 4 Sep 45, meeting no opposition. General Itagaki, accompanied by Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome and his aides, were brought aboard HMS Sussex in Keppel Harbour to discuss the surrender. By 1800, the Japanese had surrendered their forces on the island. An estimated 77,000 Japanese troops from Singapore were captured, plus another 26,000 from Malaya.

“Unable to cope with the humiliation of defeat, when General Itagaki told his officers of their surrender to the British, up to three hundred of them committed suicide using grenades, in their rooms at Singapore’s famous Raffles Hotel (which had been used as a base by the Japanese during the occupation).” http://scheong.wordpress.com/category/general-history/20th-century/wwii-1939-1945/

The formal surrender was signed on 12 Sep 45 at Singapore City Hall. Lord Louis came to Singapore to receive the formal surrender of the Japanese forces In the region from General Itagaki Seishiro 21on behalf of Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of the Japanese Southern Army Group who had suffered a stroke earlier in the year.

On 15 Aug 45, a British Military Administration (BMA) was established by Proclamation covering Malaya and Singapore. This continued until the Malayan Union was formed in 1 Apr 46, at which point Singapore reverted to being a Crown colony. The Federation of Malaya replaced the Malaya Union on 1 Feb 48.

B-29

The B-29 Superfortress was the legendary air war machine of World War II., It was a high altitude long distance heavy bomber. Sub-sonic, awesomely armed - literally a flying fortress, and with a bomb payload of 20,000 lbs, it had a combat range of 3,250 miles (bringing targets of 1.500 miles within bombing range).

20 Almost the size of four divisions.

21 On 17 Jul 42,, General Yamashita was posted by Tojo to command the Japanese First Army in Manchuria. Yamashita was rescued from exile and assumed the command of the Japanese Fourteenth Area Army on 10 Oct 44 to defend the Philippines. He would lose eventually. After the surrender, he was tried for Japanese war crimes in the Philippines (but not in Singapore or Malaya), and was hanged in Los Banos, Manila on 23 Feb 46.

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 25

“Perhaps the most famous B-29 is the Enola Gay, which dropped the atomic bomb "Little Boy" on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Bockscar, another B-29, dropped "Fat Man" on Nagasaki three days later. These two actions, along with the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9 August 1945, brought about the Japanese surrender, and the official end of World War II.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_B-29_Superfortress#Specifications_.28B- 29.29

The original Allied plan from about 1944 was to bomb Japan from China with logistical support from India. Apart from the marginal distance of operation, the problems of freighting supplies over the Himalayas proved forbidding. So, the B-29s were withdrawn from China by the end of Jan 45, and transferred to the Marianas, which was captured for the purpose. But, throughout this prior period, B-29 raids were also launched from China and India against many other targets throughout Southeast Asia, including Singapore. The last B-29 combat mission from India was flown on 29 Mar 45. This airplane merits inclusion in this story, because one B-29 was shot down and crashed in the jungle between Malacca and Johore, not quite 30 miles from where we lived. The news spread like wildfire, although he Japanese kept strict control of the area. It was the first we came to know of the war outside since Singapore, and gave us a quiet thrill that we might be rescued soon.

]

MPAJA

The British had prepared for the possibility of Japanese occupation by training small Malayan guerrilla groups. Once war became a reality, the guerrillas organized the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). They consisted primarily of Chinese Communists, with smaller numbers of Kuomintang (Nationalist) Chinese and some Malays. The British supplied them with officers and arms. They rose from about 3,000 in 1942 to 7,000 men and women in 1945. Because of the Chinese majority in the army, the Malayan Communist Party was able to infiltrate and indoctrinate the guerrillas and to stress that postwar Malaya would become Communist through their efforts. The MPAJA avoided large-scale action against the Japanese, but after the war its Communist-indoctrinated members emerged as heroes. This army attempted a brief, unsuccessful seizure of political power before the British military returned. The MPAJA officially disbanded when most of its members turned in their arms to the returning British forces. Its leadership, organization, and many of its arms remained underground, however, until the uprising of the Malayan Communist Party in 1948. As might be imagined, they made an immediate appearance in Malacca upon announcement of the Japanese surrender.

MVC After the War

After the re-occupations, MVC in its original identity never re-formed. The volunteer movement in due course became part of Malaysia’s Territorial Army. The Singapore Volunteer movement however continued after the war.

But, after the war, the British recognised the services of the Volunteers. Mr. B. S. Naiker, an eminent Chetty Malacca community leader22, was an MVC volunteer from 1938 to 1949. Promoted to the rank of Sergeant his Army No was 80051 and he was award the 1939-1946 Star, the Pacific Star, the Efficient Service Medal and the Defence Medal.

My Dad was a member of the Straits Settlements Clerical Service. He was posted to the MVC as Chief Clerk some time in the mid 1930s, He was a civilian member of staff, technically not a Volunteer. On mobiisation of the latter, he was given the rank of Regimental Quartermaster

22 See his blog at http://chetti-malacca.blogspot.com/

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 26

Sergeant (RQMS), to enable him to continue his functions His final duty was to bring the MVC administrative HQ to Singapore on the very last day of evacuation. After doing so successfully, his function was complete and he was disbanded before the fall of Singapore together with other non-combatants.

* * * *

Original Edition 2011. No change for the 2nd Edition23) 19 Jul 2013 (Released in toto on this blog-site as a standalone document, with only minor editorial touches.)

22 See https://chettymalacca.wordpress.com 23 The Original was Chapter Four of the Story of Odiang (My Dad), see https://geraldpillay.wordpress.com/2013/08/25/the-story-of-odiang-2nd-edition-2013/

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 27

Annex A

MALAYA COMMAND AIR DEFENCE DEPLOYMENT - 8 DEC 41

Based on Singapore Island

• No. 36 Squadron RAF - 6x Vickers Vildebeest • No. 100 Squadron RAF - 12x Vickers Vildebeest • No. 205 Squadron RAF - 3x PBY Catalina

• RAF Tengah; • No. 34 Squadron RAF - 16x Bristol Blenheim IV

• RAF Sembawang; [4] • No. 453 Squadron RAAF - 16x Brewster Buffalo

• RAF Kallang; • No. 243 Squadron RAF - 14x Brewster Buffalo • No. 488 Squadron RNZAF - 16x Brewster Buffalo

Based in Northern Malaya

• Sungei Patani; [5] • No. 21 Squadron RAAF - 12x Brewster Buffalo [6] • No. 27 Squadron RAF - 12x Bristol Blenheim I

• RAF Kota Bharu; [7] • No. 1 Squadron RAAF - 12x Lockheed Hudson • Detachment from No. 243 Squadron RAF - 2x Brewster Buffalo •

• RAF Gong Kedah; • Detachment from No. 36 Squadron RAF - 6x Vickers Videbeest

• RAF Kuantan; [8] • No. 8 Squadron RAAF - 12x Lockheed Hudsons • No. 60 Squadron RAF - 8x Bristol Blenheims

• RAF Alor Star (Butterworth?); • No. 62 Squadron RAF - 11x Bristol Blenheims,

* * *

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 28

Annex B

MALAYA COMMAND BATTLE ORDER - 8 DEC 41 Indian III Corps (Northen Malaya)

Commanding Officer Indian III Corps - Lt Gen Lewis Heath

• Indian 9th Infantry Division

Maj-Gen Arthur Edward Barstow ( †, 28 January 1942 at Layang-Layang near Bota) HQ : Kuala Lumpur

• 8th Indian Infantry Brigade

Brig Berthold Wells Key HQ : Kota Bahru

• 2nd Battalion, 10th Baluch Regiment • 3rd Battalion, 17th • 1st Battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles • 2nd Battalion, 12th • 1st Mountain Battery, Indian Artillery

• 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade

Brig G.W.A.Painter HQ : Kuantan

• 5th Battalion, 11th Sikh Regiment • 2nd Battalion, 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles • 5th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery

th • 11 Division Command Troops

• 88th (2nd West Lancashire) Field Regiment RA • 42nd Field Park Company (Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners)

• Indian 11th Infantry Division

Maj-Gen David Murray-Lyon HQ : Sungai Petani

• 6th Indian Infantry Brigade

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 29

Brig William Oswald Lay HQ : Jitra

• 2nd Battalion, East Surrey Regiment • 1st Battalion, 8th Punjab Regiment • 2nd Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment • 22nd Mountain Artillery Regiment, Royal Artillery

• 15th Indian Infantry Brigade (III Corps Reserve)

Brig Kenneth Alfred Garrett HQ : Jitra

• 1st Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment • 2nd Battalion, 9th • 1st Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment

• 28th (Gurkha) Infantry Brigade

Brig W. St J. Carpendale / Lt Col W.R. Selby HQ : Ipoh

• 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles • 2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles • 2nd Battalion, 9th Gurkha Rifles

• 11th Division Command Troops

• 3rd Cavalry (IA) • 100th Light Tank Squadron • 137th (2nd West Lancashire) Field Regiment RA • 155th (Lanarkshire Yeomanry) Field Regiment RA • 80th Anti-Tank Regiment RA • 85th Anti-Tank Regiment RA • 1st Independent Company • 23rd Field Company (Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners) • 43rd Field Park Company RE

• Krohcol

• 3rd Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment • 5th Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment • 2/3 Australian Motor Company

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 30

• Line of Communications Brigade

• 1st Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces (Perak) • 2nd Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces (Selangor) • 3rd Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces (NS) • 4th Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces (Pahang) – • 1st (Light) Field Regiment, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces • Armoured Car Squadron, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces - • Signals Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces

• Fortress Penang

HQ : Penang

• 5th Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment (assigned to Krohcol) • 11th Coastal Regiment, Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery • 3rd Battalion, Straits Settlements Volunteer Force (Penang) • 2nd Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Indian Artillery

• Fortress Support Units

• 3rd Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment (assigned to Krohcol) • 5th Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment (assigned to Krohcol) • 1st Battalion Mysore Infantry (Indian States Forces) • 1st Battalion Bahawalpur Infantry (Indian States Forces) • 1st Battalion, Hyderabad Regiment (Indian States Forces) • 11th Indian Division Signal Regiment • Australia Imperial Force (Southern Malaya)

Commanding Officer Australia Imperial Force - Maj Gen Gordon Bennett

HQ : Kluang

• Australian 8th Division

Maj Gen Gordon Bennett HQ : Kluang

• Australian 22nd Brigade

Brig Harold Burfield Taylor HQ : Mersing - Endau

• 2/18th Australian Infantry Battalion

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 31

• 2/19th Australian Infantry Battalion • 2/20th Australian Infantry Battalion

• Australian

Brig Duncan Struan Maxwell HQ : Kluang

• 2/26th Australian Infantry Battalion • 2/29th Australian Infantry Battalion • 2/30th Australian Infantry Battalion • 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion

• 2/4th Anti-Tank Regiment

Fortress Singapore

Commanding Officer - Maj Gen F. Keith Simmons HQ : Singapore

• 1st Malaya Brigade

Brig G. C. R. Williams

• 2nd Battalion Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire) • 1st Battalion Malay Regiment • 2nd Battalion Malay Regiment

• 2nd Malaya Brigade

Brig F. H. Fraser

• 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment • 2nd Battalion Gordon Highlanders • 2nd Battalion 17th Dogra Regiment

• Straits Settlements Volunteer Force Brigade

Col R G Grimwood

• 1st Battalion, Straits Settlements Volunteer Force (SVC) • 2nd Battalion, Straits Settlements Volunteer Force (SVC) • 4th Battalion, Straits Settlements Volunteer Force (MVC) - Lt.Col Charles Alexander Scott • Singapore Armoured Car Company, Straits Settlements Volunteer Force

• Royal Engineers Brigade

Brig I. Simson

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 32

• 30th Fortress Company, Royal Engineers • 34th Fortress Company, Royal Engineers • 35th Fortress Company, Royal Engineers • 41st Fortress Company, Royal Engineers

• Artillery Brigade

Brig Alec Warren Greenlaw Wildey

• 1st (Heavy) Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Indian Artillery • 1st Anti-Aircraft Battery, Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery • 2nd Anti-Aircraft Battery, Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery • 3rd (Light) Anti-Aircraft Battery, Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery • 3rd (Heavy) Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery • 35th (Light) Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery • 7th Coastal Regiment, Royal Artillery • 9th Coastal Regiment, Royal Artillery • 16th Defence Regiment, Royal Artillery

Malaya Command Reserve

• \- Brig.A.C.M.Paris / Lt.Col.I.M.Stewart

HQ : Port Dickson

• 5th Battalion, 2nd Punjab Regiment • 4th Battalion, 19th Hyderabad Regiment • 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders

• 4th Battalion 9th Jat Regiment • 13th Indian Auxiliary Pioneer Battalion

* * *

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 33

ANNEX C

The War in Malaya 1941-42

Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 34

Annex D THE WAR IN SINGAPORE 1942

* * * *