Japanese Conquest of Malaya & Singapore, 1941-42

Japanese Conquest of Malaya & Singapore, 1941-42 - By Gerald F Pillay1 Introduction Those with an historical or military bent will find this document a comprehensive reprise of the subject, perhaps even overladen with detail. Its value is that the information is not elsewhere found in one place. For the adept I have left in fascinating detail about the re-occupation of Malaya and Singapore, ie Operation Zipper and Operation Tideface, etc. The casual reader may skip much of the document, and only go by the headings. The brave will find that the following annexes provide much for additional digestion: Annex A Air Defence Deployment - 8 Dec 41 Annex B Battle Order - 8 Dec 41 Annex C Map of Japanese Invasion of Malaya 1941-42 Annex D Map of Battle of Singapore, 1942. “Malaya Command” was the term used to describe the defence sector of Malaya and Singapore under a single Commanding Officer. I keep to it for convenience. I have retained the original names of peoples, places and events for historical authenticity. This document is put together from information on the Internet. All sources are given, and are hereby acknowledged. Imperial Defence Strategy2 In the 1920s, the British Imperial geopolitical thinking evolved along the following lines. The most probable enemy in the East was Japan. The main targets to be defended were Australia, New Zealand and British Malaya. Of the last, Singapore would be the prize target. The launch base would be Japan. An air offensive was out of reach. The threat was essentially naval. And finally, distance provided insulation of about 180 days to the actual arrival of any invasion forces. The last fundamental underlying British defence strategy was that any attack on Singapore would be by sea from the south. The jungles of Malaya formed an impenetrable barrier. In these circumstances, Britain decided that the defence would be naval. The decision was taken to build a huge Naval Base at Singapore to act as the forward bulwark of the Far East Fleet. In the event of an attack, there would be sufficient “relief time” to send reinforcement About Gerald F Pillay, see https://geraldpillay.wordpress.com/2011/09/03/about-gerald-francis- pillay/ 2 For a and full and authoritative recount, see http://www.britain-at- war.org.uk/WW2/Malaya_and_Singapore/html/singapore_defences.htm Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 2 naval battle units as needed, which meanwhile could be deployed elsewhere. The building of the Naval Base began in 1923. It was completed in Sep 1939. The Naval Base was to be protected by battleship scale (up to 15”) gunnery emplacements ringed around the island, with the Tengah Airfield to provide aerial defence as necessary. Work on the latter started in 1937 and was completed in 1939. By that date, there were in all four airfields, at Changi, Seletar, and Sembawang as well, making Singapore Britain’s mightiest air base, as well as naval base, in the East. British Dilemma By 1939, it became clear to the British that the Japanese intended to take Malaya, which supplied 38% of the world’s rubber and 58% of its tin. Aircraft could now fly much longer ranges than a decade previously. Incredibly it further seemed that the Japanese did, indeed, also intend to take Singapore, the “Gibraltar of the East”. The following captures the British dilemma: “The consequence of the first year of the war (World War II) completely altered the outlook. Principal among these were the Japanese advance into Southern China and Hainan, the situation in Indo-China resulting from the French collapse, the increased range of aircraft, above all, the necessity for retaining in European waters a fleet of sufficient strength to match both the German and Italian Fleets, so making it impossible for us to send to the Far East an adequate naval force should the need arise. In August 1940, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) reviewed the position. Their main conclusions were: a. Until Germany and Italy were defeated, or drastically reduced in naval strength, we were faced with the problem of defending our Far Eastern interests without an adequate fleet. b. It was no longer sufficient to concentrate upon the defence of Singapore island; it was now necessary to hold the whole of Malaya. This involved an increase in the existing army and air force. c. In the absence of a fleet, our policy should be to rely primarily on air power. The necessary forces could not be provided for some time; until then substantial additional land forces were needed.” http://www.britain-at-war.org.uk/WW2/Malaya_and_Singapore/html/singapore_defences.htm Change in Defence Strategy The chess board was now altered dramatically. What the British Chiefs of Staff recommended and what was finally achieved in build up by 8 December 1941 is summarized in the table3 below. 26. Adapted from “Singapore Defences” by Lt Gen Sir Henry Pownall, at http://www.britain-at- war.org.uk/WW2/Malaya_and_Singapore/html/singapore_defences.htm Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 3 Army Actual Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Aug 1940 accepted by recommended by recommended by Achieved 4 5 COS when COS until GOC until RAF 7 Dec RAF reached RAF reached reached 1941 approved l approved approved strength strength strength Regular 9 26 36 48 32 Battalions Air Force Actual Strength Strength Strength Strength Aug 1940 approved by recommended by Achieved 6 COS C-in-C s 7 Dec 1941 Aircraft 84 282 582 158 In a nutshell, the defence position was woeful. Only one-third of the approved aircraft were provided, and not even the minimum scale of infantry battalions as recommended by the COS in the event of a shortfall of aircraft was deployed. In the following sections, we look briefly at what the British did do in the way of build up, for better appreciation of the war into which we were plunged. Air Defence Build Up First, it became immediately necessary also to defend the Malayan coastline as well as the Naval Base. The British proceeded to build a total of 22 airfields on both sides of Malaya concentrated towards the north where out of reach of the Singapore airfields, with Butterworth completed in 1939. This was to provide air cover and support to the naval forces repulsing any coastal landings, secondly, to counter carrier-borne enemy aircraft supporting their own invasion troops; and thirdly to support the land defence forces in dealing with any actual enemy landings on the shoreline . The aircraft situation was very grim indeed. Every British airplane and squadron was committed to the defence of the homeland, which at that point was coping with the Battle of Britain, the outcome of which was not yet known. There were 161 front line aircraft based in Malaya and Singapore on 8 December 1941. These comprised 66 Brewster Buffaloes7, 24 Bristol Blenheims, 24 Vickers Vildebeests, and 24 Lockheed Hudson. In addition, there were 3 Catalina flying boats belonging to the Royal Netherlands Air Force These aircraft were assigned to 13 squadrons8 deployed as shown in Annex A9. Of these 8 were RAF, 4 were RAAF and 1 an RNZAF squadron. One squadron of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air Force (ML-KNIL) was deployed to Singapore, contributing to the Allied cause before being recalled to Java before the fall. 4 GOS = Chiefs of Staff 5 GOC = General Officer Commanding, Malaya 6 C-in-C = Singapore Conference of Commanders-in-Chief, Oct 1940 7 The US carrier-based fighter version was the F2A, the exported fighter version was the 339. 8 The desired scale of provision would have been around 36 squadrons, and the minimum 16. 9 There are some variations in the numbers given in different websites. These figures are taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaya_Command Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-42 4 The most modern fighter was the Brewster Buffalo, a plane which the US Navy was already replacing. Considered below par for service in the UK, the majority of the 170 procured by the RAF Purchasing Commission from the United States was diverted for use in the Far East, where it was believed they would as first line fighters be superior to any Japanese aircraft encountered. The preceding proved to be a fatal error of judgment The fighter squadrons equipped with Brewster Buffalo were beset with numerous problems, including: poorly-built and ill-equipped planes; inadequate supplies of spare parts; inadequate support staff, lack of a coherent command structure; inter-service antagonism, and pilots lacking training and experience The resulting situation may be gleaned from the following assessment: When war did erupt, the Japanese Army Air Force - with its highly maneuverable Ki-27 and Ki-43 fighters - and the Japanese Navy Air Force equipped with the mighty A6M Zero, proved vastly superior in just about all aspects, and many of the Japanese fighter pilots were veterans of the war against China. By contrast, the majority of the young British, New Zealand, and Australian pilots who flew the Buffalo on operations in Malaya and at Singapore were little more than trainees, and many flew into battle with only the basic training of their trade. Of the Buffaloes on 8 December 1941, most of them were shot down, destroyed on the ground and destroyed in accidents. Only 10 survived to reach India or the Dutch East Indies. The remaining offensive aircraft, the Bristol Blenheim, Lockheed Hudson light bombers and Vickers Vildebeest torpedo bombers, were also obsolete. Most were quickly destroyed by Japanese aircraft and played an insignificant part in the campaign.

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