CHAPTER 1 1 AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE : THE AMBUSH AT GEMA S ENERAL Percival had decided before the debacle at Slim River G that the most he could hope to do pending the arrival of further reinforcements at Singapore was to hold Johore. This would involve giving up three rich and well-developed areas—the State of Selangor (includin g Kuala Lumpur, capital of the Federated Malay States), the State of Negr i Sembilan, and the colony of Malacca—but he thought that Kuala Lumpu r could be held until at least the middle of January . He intended that the III Indian Corps should withdraw slowly to a line in Johore stretching from Batu Anam, north-west of Segamat, on the trunk road and railway , to Muar on the west coast, south of Malacca . It should then be respon- sible for the defence of western Johore, leaving the Australians in thei r role as defenders of eastern Johore. General Bennett, however, believing that he might soon be called upo n for assistance on the western front, had instituted on 19th December a series of reconnaissances along the line from Gemas to Muar . By 1st January a plan had formed in his mind to obtain the release of his 22nd Brigade from the Mersing-Jemaluang area and to use it to hold the enem y near Gemas while counter-attacks were made by his 27th Brigade on the Japanese flank and rear in the vicinity of Tampin, on the main road near the border of Malacca and Negri Sembilan . Although he realised tha t further coastal landings were possible, he thought of these in terms of small parties, and considered that the enemy would prefer to press forwar d as he was doing by the trunk road rather than attempt a major movement by coastal roads, despite the fact that the coastal route Malacca-Muar- Batu Pahat offered a short cut to Ayer Hitam, far to his rear . It was therefore on the possibilities of action along the trunk road that hi s mind was fixed. It is not in the nature of retreat to inspire confidence ; and certainly what had happened to the 11th Division between Jitra and Kuala Lumpur, with its series of failures, heavy losses, and progressive demoralisation, had not done so . While General Yamashita basked in the sunshine o f success, Generals Percival and Heath might have reflected, as Hitler wa s to do a year later, that "it is a thousand times easier to storm forwar d with an army and gain victories, than to bring an army back in an orderl y condition after a reverse or a defeat" .1 (Later, perhaps, they might console themselves with the thought that, because of the priority given to the wa r against Germany, retreat in Malaya was in some part the price of the Allied Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 12 Dec 1942 . 1-6Jan1942 BENNETT AND PERCIVAL 199 successes which evoked that strangely chastened remark from the strutting Fuehrer.) To Bennett, concerned with the part which the A .I.F. was now to play in the dangerously deteriorating situation, it seemed that the withdrawal s in Malaya had been the outcome of faulty leadership . On 4th January he proposed to Percival that upon withdrawal of the III Indian Corps int o Johore, all forces in that State should come under Bennett's command ; alternatively, that the A.I .F. be responsible for the west of the State, and the Corps for the east . Percival rejected both proposals, on the grounds that fusion of the Corps and the A .I.F. must lead to command and administrative difficulties, and replacement of the 22nd Australian Brigad e on the east coast by troops unfamiliar with the area would weaken the defences of that area . He said that the only practical solution seemed to be to make the A .I.F. responsible, after the withdrawal, for the east o f the State and the Corps for the west ; and at a conference next day he issued orders embodying this principle, with the proviso that there mus t be no withdrawal without his permission south of the line Endau 2-Batu Anam-Muar . Bennett reported to Australia on 6th January that Heath's men were tired and in most units lacking determination; that "unless great changes in outlook take place withdrawal will continue, exposing my left flank an d ultimately creating impossible position for A .I.F." He continued that he had therefore urged that his fresh and fit 22nd Brigade should b e replaced in its existing position by an Indian brigade, and placed in th e forefront of the fight in western Johore ; that the retiring units shoul d occupy a supporting position, and the former "purely defensive attitude " should be replaced by "strong counter-attack methods" . General Sturdee, who had received Bennett's report, replied that while he felt it would b e most unwise to attempt from Australia to influence dispositions in Johore , it was difficult to believe that when the enemy reached northern Johor e he would not attempt concurrently landings in eastern Johore . These, h e said, seemed likely to be pressed with even more determination, an d would be actually closer to Singapore . In global perspective, the misfortunes being suffered at the time b y the defenders of Malaya were far more than counter-balanced by the significance of a document signed by the representatives of 26 nations on New Year's Day, 1942, as the outcome of the meetings between M r Churchill and President Roosevelt in August and December 1941 . It was a document which gave birth to the United Nations, pledged to the prin- ciples embodied in the Atlantic Charter created at the August meeting , with the addition of religious freedom, and to united action against th e Axis Powers. This great marriage of aims and action, precipitated by 2 Later amended to Mersing. 200 AUSTRALIANS INTO BATTLE 1 Ja n Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour, was to have a tremendous effect not only upon the course of the war, but also upon world affairs thereafter. 3 Okn Marianas Philippin e a Islands Caroline ; islan d 1. 1 a More Na y New Ireland \ Bougainvill e . aSulomon [ Tin,on ABDA AREA Darwin Hebrid Townsvill e ledoni a AUSTRALIA Brisbane . Perth 4 Sydney ./ 7Adelaide ' F Melbe r r t asmania obart It was of course in keeping with the more immediate purposes of th e document that the setting up of a united command against Japan should proceed. The main architect of the A.B.D.A. Command organisation was s The text of the document was : A Joint Declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala , Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia. The Governments signatory hereto , Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Join t Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, dated August 14, 1941, known as th e Atlantic Charter, Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty , independence, and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, DECLARE : (1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, agains t those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war . (2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto, and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies. The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be , rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism. Dec-Jan DIRECTIVE TO WAVELL 201 the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Marshall . The principal problem had been how to reconcile the varying national interest s of those countries concerned—Britain, the United States, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia—in such a command, and to allow of employ- ment of their forces in such ways as would be acceptable to them . As, however, the United States was anxious to build up American forces i n Australia for recovery of its power in East Asia, there existed a ready basi s of agreement between these two countries . Britain ' s interests were involve d primarily in the retention of Singapore and of control of the Indian Ocean , as well of course as in the defence of Australia ; while the Dutch sough t to safeguard their East Indian possessions . Because of the importance she attached to maintaining resistance by China, and the fact that th e only practical supply line to that country was by the Burma Road, the United States sought the inclusion of Burma in the command .4 The British representatives demurred on the ground that Burma had so recently bee n transferred from the Far Eastern to Indian Command, and was dependen t upon India for administration, reinforcements, and supplies . Finally it was agreed that it should be included in the A .B.D.A . area for operational purposes, though it would continue to be administered from India .