New Interpretations in Naval History Craig C

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Historical Monographs Special Collections

1-1-2012 HM 20: New Interpretations in Naval History Craig C. Felker

Marcus O. Jones

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Recommended Citation Felker, Craig C. and Jones, Marcus O., "HM 20: New Interpretations in Naval History" (2012). Historical Monographs. 20. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/historical-monographs/20

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Historical Monographs by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS New Interpretations in Naval History Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy 10–11 September 2009 New inNaval Interpretations History Edited by Craig C. Felker andMarcus O. Jones

Edited by Craig C. Felker and Marcus O. Jones

NNWC_HM20_A-WTypeRPic.inddWC_HM20_A-WTypeRPic.indd 1 22/15/2012/15/2012 33:23:40:23:40 PMPM COVER The Four Days’ Battle of 1666, by Richard Endsor. Reproduced by courtesy of Mr. Endsor and of Frank L. Fox, author of A Distant Storm: The Four Days’ Battle of 1666 (Rotherﬁ eld, U.K.: Press of Sail, 1996). The inset (and title-page background image) is a detail of a group photo of the midshipmen of the U.S. Naval Academy’s class of 1865 taken in front of the Atlantic House hotel, which the Academy leased when it moved to Newport, Rhode Island, during the Civil War. The class of 1865 was the only one trained entirely in Newport. Three of its members later returned to Newport as presidents of the Naval War College (Caspar Goodrich, Charles Stockton, and French Chadwick) and one as a faculty member (Bowman H. McCalla). Naval War College Museum (original in U.S. Naval Academy Museum).

NNWC_HM20_A-WTypeRPic.inddWC_HM20_A-WTypeRPic.indd 2 22/15/2012/15/2012 11:42:25:42:25 PMPM New Inter pre ta tions in Na val His tory

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:08 AM U.S. GOV ERN MENT OFFI C IAL EDITION NOTICE

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This is the Of fi cial U.S. Gov ern ment edi tion of this pub li ca tion and is herein identi fied to cer tify its au thentic ity. ISBN 978-1-884733-91-8 is for this U.S. Gov ern ment Print ing Office Of fi cial Edi tion only. The Su per in ten dent of Doc u ments of the U.S. Govern ment Printing Offic e requests that any reprin ted edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the authen tic work with a new ISBN.

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The logo of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC), Newport, Rhode Is land, au then ti cates New In ter pre ta tions in Na val His - tory: Se lected Pa pers from the Six teenth Naval His tory Sym po - sium Held at the United States Na val Acad emy 10–11 Sep tem ber 2009, edited by Craig C. Felker and Marcus O. Jones, as an offi cial publi ca tion of the Col lege. It is prohib ited to use NWC’s logo on any republication of this book without the ex press, written permis sion of the Edi tor, Naval War College Press, or the ed i tor’s designee.

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ISBN: 978-1-884733-91-8

HM20_Felker&Jones-2 Friday, February 17, 2012 8:52:15 AM NAVAL WAR COLLEGE HISTORICAL MONOGRAPH SERIES NO. 20

The histor i cal monogra phs in this series are book-length stud ies of the history of na val war fare, ed ited his tor i cal doc u ments, con fer ence pro ceed ings, and bib li og ra- phies that are based wholly or in part on source ma te ri als in the His tor i cal Col lec - tion of the Na val War College. The ed i tors of the Na val War College Press express their special grati tude to all the mem bers of the Naval War College Founda tion, whose gener ous finan cial support for researc h projects, confer ences, and printing has made possi ble the pub lica - tion of this histor i cal mono graph.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:08 AM {BLANK UNLESS NEEDED FOR DEDICATION}

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:08 AM New In ter pre ta tions in Na val His tory: Selected Pa pers from the Six teenth Na val His tory Sym po sium Held at the United States Na val Acad emy 10–11 Sep tem ber 2009

Ed ited by Craig C. Felker and Marcus O. Jones

N ES AV T A A L T W S A NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS D R

E C

I O

N L

E NEW PORT, RHODE IS LAND T

R I VI IBU OR A S CT MARI VI 2012

HM20_Felker&Jones-5 Friday, February 17, 2012 8:56:24 AM The con tents of this vol ume rep re sent the views of the au thors. Their opin ions are not nec es sar ily en dorsed by the Na val War Col lege or by any other agency, or ga ni za tion, or com mand of the U.S. gov ern ment.

Printed in the United States of America

His tor i cal Mono graph Se ries

The Li brary of Con gress Cataloging-in-Pub li ca tion Data

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS Code 32 United States Na val Acad emy His tory Sym po sium (16th : 2009) Naval War College New in terpre ta tion s in naval his tory : selected papers from the six teenth Naval 686 Cush ing Road His tory Sym posium held at the United States Naval Acad emy, 10-11 Sep tember New port, R.I. 02841-1207 2009 / ed ited by Craig C. Felker and Marcus O. Jones. — 1st ed. p. cm. In cludes bib lio graph i cal ref er ences and in dex. ISBN 978-1-884733-91-8 (pbk.) 1. Naval art and science— His tory—Congres ses. 2. Naval his tory—Congres ses. I. Felker, Craig C., 1959- II. Jones, Marcus O. III. Title. IV. Title: Se lected pa pers from the sixteenth Naval His tory Sympo sium held at the United States Naval Acad emy, 10-11 Sep tem ber 2009. V27. U55 2009b 359.009—dc23 2012000736

HM20_Felker&Jones-6 Friday, February 17, 2012 8:57:37 AM TABLE OF CONTENTS vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Fore word, by John B. Hattendorf ...... ix Pref ace ...... xi Program of Events of the 2009 Na val His tory Sym posium ...... xvii I. Co lo nial Amer i can Re sis tance to Brit ish Na val Im press ment in the Rev o lu tion ary Era ...... 1 Chris to pher P. Magra II. Medium Powers and Ironclad Con struc tion: The Spanish Case, 1861–1868...... 11 by Carlos Alfaro Zaforteza III. Wa ter Wings: The Early Years of Navy and Ma rine Corps Avia tion...... 23 Laurence Mitch ell Burke II IV. Riverine Oper a tions of the Dan ube Flotilla in the Austro-German Ro ma nian Cam paign of 1916 ...... 35 Michael B. Barrett V. “There’s Noth ing a Ma rine Can’t Do”: Pub lic ity and the Ma rine Corps, 1911–1917 ...... 49 Heather Pace Mar shall VI. Arms and the Man: Some Ap proaches to the Study of British Naval Commu ni ties Afloat, 1900–1950 ...... 61 Bruce Tay lor VII. Ostfriesland, the Gen eral Board of the Navy, and the Washing ton Na val Treaty: A Relook at a Historic Sinking ...... 73 John T. Kuehn VIII. “This Tempo rary Strategical With drawal”: The East ern Fleet’s War time Af ri can So journ...... 87 An drew Stew art

HM20_Felker&Jones-7 Friday,February 17, 2012 8:58:50 AM viii NEW IN TER PRE TA TIONS IN NA VAL HIS TORY

IX. Escort Oilers : The Untold Story of the Battle of the Atlan tic ...... 99 Ken neth P. Hansen X. See Fido Run: A Tale of the First Anti-U-boat Acous tic Torpedo ...... 115 Kathleen Broome Wil liams XI. Hiding in Plain Sight: The U.S. Navy and Dis persed Oper a tions under EMCON, 1956–1972...... 127 Rob ert G. Angevine XII. Tur bu lence and Ter ror ism: The Story of Head quar ters Sup port Ac tiv ity Sai gon, 1964–1966 ...... 143 John Darrell Sherwood About the Au thors ...... 161 Titles in the Se ries ...... 165

HM20_Felker&Jones-8 Friday,February 17, 2012 8:59:13 AM FOREWORD

The U.S. Naval Academy’s Naval History Sympo sium, held regu larly in Annapolis, Maryland, since 1971, con tin ues to be one of the most im por tant events for the schol arly ex change of ideas on na val his tory. It serves this purpose not only in the United States for Ameri can naval his tory but in the world at large for global naval his tory. It is certainly the larg est regu lar meet ing of na val his to ri ans. The Na val Academy, with its his toric grounds, large and active his tory de part ment, fine mu - seum, rich histor i cal collec tions, and numer ous naval memo ri als, is an ideal place to bring together such a large group of highly informed experts, includ ing naval pro fes sion als and ci vil ian ac a dem ics, to ex change re search in for ma tion and ideas on a scholarly level. A dozen published vol umes of se lected pa pers have cap tured the es sence and growth of the Naval Academy’s sympo sium over the decades. Like this vol ume, most have carried the now well estab lished title of New Inter pre ta tions in Naval His - tory. Typ i cally, each vol ume in the se ries has been a selec tion from the many pa pers presented at each sympo sium and has ranged widely across all peri ods of naval history and the his to ries of many navies. Not lim ited to any par ticu lar theme, other than pre sent ing new in ter pre ta tions of what ever sub jects re search ers are work ing on, each sym po sium and its result ing vol ume pres ent very use ful samplings of current think ing, new themes, and new ap proaches in na val his tory. Col lectively, the se ries has been a great stim u lus to ad vanc ing and en courag ing naval his tory and contin ues to chart the state of na val his tory as a field of re search and in quiry. This par ticu lar volume, from the Sixteenth Sym po sium, adds further to the fine tra di tion es tab lished by its pre de cessors. The full range of the more than sev enty pa - pers pre sented at the sym po sium can be seen in the pro gram of events, while the volume itself presents twelve excel lent papers selected by the edi tors—pa pers ranging from the mid-eighteenth century to the late twen tieth cen tury, with topics that vary from aspects of Ameri can, British, and Spanish na val his tory to stra te gic, techno log i cal, and so cial his tory.

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In publish ing this vol ume, the Na val War College, as a gradu ate-level edu ca - tional and research insti tu tion, and the Na val Academy, at the un dergrad u ate level, join together with the mutual inter est of helping to promote a better under stand ing of navies and na val history.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF, D.PHIL. Er nest J. King Pro fes sor of Mar itime His tory Chair man, Mar i time His tory De part ment

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:10 AM PREF ACE

In The In flu ence of Sea Power upon His tory, Alfred Thayer Mahan criti cized his to rians who had overlooked the “profound deter min ing influ ence of mari time strength” on the events that shaped the history of Western Europe in the seven - teenth and eighteenth centu ries. Compe ti tion for control of overseas trade, the naval captain argued, had been a histor i cal cata lyst for a “clash of in terests,” “angry feelings,” and war. We may debate the rele vance of Mahan’s theo ries over the ensu - ing 120 years. But his belief in the link between history and man’s use of the sea seems no less im portant to the contem po rary world of global ized econo mies, trans- na tional threats, and techno-centric na vies than it was in Mahan’s day. Four decades ago the History Depart ment of the U.S. Naval Academy sponsored its first naval his tory sympo sium. Over the years the sympo sium gained a repu ta - tion as the hallmark confer ence dedi cated to naval and mari time history, drawing scholars from around the world. In 2001, the at tacks on the World Trade Cen ter and Pen tagon preempted the Fourteenth Sympo sium and left the future of the con- ference in doubt. Four years later the History Depart ment sought ap proval from Academy leader ship to re sume the confer ence on its bien nial schedule. With the Acad emy’s en thu si as tic sup port, the Fif teenth Na val His tory Sym po sium was held in Sep tem ber 2007. The Six teenth Sym po sium was held on 10–11 Septem ber 2009. Despite the global re ces sion, over two hun dred par tic i pants from sev en teen coun tries gath ered in Annapolis to share in sights on an in credi bly di verse range of top ics. Over the two days, eighty-four his to ri ans pre sented their scholar ship, de bated ques tions, and re - newed old acquain tances in an atmo sphere that was as dynamic as it was colle gial. To those who could not at tend the sym po sium, the enclosed essays offer but a brief glimpse of the di versity and energy of the naval and mari time his tory commu - nity. The slate of schol ars in cludes some of the lead ers of the field but also young au - thors who are the future of this com munity. Like the prior editions, this book is in ter na tional in scope. Also, in keep ing with the 2007 pro ceed ings, the es says were

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not tied to a central theme. Conse quentl y, they stand out for their su perb schol arship. But just as im portantly, they repre sent the qual ity of the sym po sium and the vi tality of na val and mari time his tory stud ies. The only failure of this book is that it could not include all the excep tional essays. Fortu nately, many of those have been nomi nated to Dr. Gary Weir of The In ter na tional Jour nal of Mar i time His tory and Dr. Richard Gimblett of The North ern Mar i ner. Each of these gentle men has our ap - preci a tion for their as sistance to the sympo sium and commit ment to the scholarly com mu nity. This book and many of the sympo sium functions were funded through the gen- eros ity of the McMullen Sea Power Fund, managed by the Naval Academy Founda - tion. The McMullen Fund permit ted us to keep regis tra tion fees to a min i mum and still main tain the qual ity ex pected of an in ter na tional con ference. This sup port also allowed the sympo sium to off set travel expenses for many gradu ate stu dents and for eign schol ars, as well as to of fer research grants for fu ture con ference pre sen ta - tions. The sympo sium commit tee and the Academy’s History Depart ment are deeply grateful to the McMullen family and to the Naval Academy Foun dation for their sup port of the con ference. Prepar ing for and exe cut ing a naval history sympo sium can be best describ ed in the U.S. Navy’s lex i con as an “all-hands evo lution.” The con ference would not have been possi ble without the unqual i fied support of the Naval Academy’s leader ship. The Su per in ten dent of the Na val Acad emy, Vice Adm. Jeffrey Fowler, ap proved the contin u a tion of the sym po sium and the use of Na val Acad emy fa cili ties and ser - vices. His in tro ductory re marks at the plenary session con veyed the insti tu tion’s un wa ver ing sup port for na val and mar i time his tory. Dr. Wil liam Miller, ac a demic dean and pro vost, strongly endorsed our request for the 2009 sympo sium and was in stru men tal in se cur ing sup port from the Na val Acad emy Foun da tion. Al though newly ar rived as the direc tor of the Divi sion of Human i ties and Social Sciences, Col. John Kennedy, USMC, kept the faith that a group of aca dem ics could coor di nate and ex ecute the con ference with out step ping on too many toes. The fi nal link in the leader ship chain, though by no means the least impor tant, was the chair of the His- tory De partment. Dr. Da vid Peeler brought the sym posium back to life and provided superb guidance to the 2009 sympo sium commit tee. Dr. Richard Abels, who re lieved Pro fes sor Peeler as chair in 2008, ral lied de part men tal sup port for the myr - iad ad min is tra tive and lo gis ti cal re quire ments es sen tial to the sym po sium’s success. While the Na val Acad emy re flects many at trib utes of ci vil ian un der grad u ate univer si ties, the added respon si bil ity of our faculty members to develop midship - men into Navy and Marine Corps of ficers places incom pa ra ble demands on their time. Yet the pro fessors and mili tary faculty of the History Depart ment, many of whom are not naval his to rians, gave their valuable time and wholehearted sup port

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:10 AM PREFACE xiii

to the sym po sium. They served on the reg is tra tion desks, set up class rooms, par tic i - pated in the var i ous so cial func tions, and at tended many of the sem i nars. Their ef - forts, mostly be hind the scenes, are tes ta ments to their pro fes sion al ism and ded i cation to his tory. They are col leagues in the fin est sense of the word. Co or di nat ing ma jor as pects of the sym po sium was the re spon si bil ity of the Sym po sium Ex ec u tive Com mit tee. As so ci ate Pro fes sor Marcus Jones proved a superb deputy. He kept the planning process focused and ensured that the sympo - sium was exe cuted flawlessly. When the pub lica tion pro cess and my impend ing deploy ment to Afghan i stan appeared to put this book in ex tremis, he will ingly carried the process to comple tion. Lt. John Cauthen over saw the regis tra tion of over two hundred par tici pants and still found the time to present an excel lent paper that is being consid ered for publi ca tion. Asso ci ate Profes sor Lori Bogle identi fi ed the lead ing pub lish ers in na val and mar i time his tory and co or di nated their par tic i pa- tion in the confer ence. Their dis plays not only of fered the lat est schol arship to con - ference partic i pants but also served to en hance the sym po sium’s pro fessional rep u ta tion. Sym po sium par tic i pants were some of the first pa trons to en joy the newly reno vated Naval Academy Museum, during the Thursday evening recep tion, courtesy of its direc tor, Dr. Scott Harmon. Lt. Col. Brian Ross devel oped and im- plemented a trans porta tion plan that moved partic i pants with an effi cienc y that could be achieved only by a combat-ex pe rienced Marine, while Maj. Mark Deets led col leagues in the tiring but es sen tial task of trans form ing classrooms into sem i - nar rooms and then back again for Mon day classes. Fi nally, Mrs. Con nie Grigor, whose “day job” is taking care of the depart ment’s admin is tra tive require ments, was called into service to process ex tremely impor tant stipend packages for our visit ing schol ars. Her pa tience with the sym po sium di rec tor’s ad min is tra tive clum si- ness is much appreciated. Special recog ni tion also goes out to depart ments within the Naval Academy that provided services that made this confer ence a first-class af fair. The Special Events Depart ment over sees hun dreds of events a year and yet took a genu ine in ter est in the sympo sium. The Super in ten dent’s proto col office proved extremely helpful when for a brief time the sym po sium was on the ra dar screens of some very se nior offi cers . Mr. Greg Zingler over sees the day-to-day oper a tions of Alumni and Mahan Halls. His dep uty, Jim McManamay, has the unique tal ent of solv ing dicey logis ti cal problems quickly and pain lessly. With out the use of those ex qui site fa cili - ties, the sym po sium sim ply could not have been pulled off. Di ane Greene’s artis tic talents produced eye-catching posters and pro grams for two suc cessive sympo sia. Finally, a special thank-you goes to the Na val Academy secu rity of fice. One can only imagine the problems asso ci ated with moving two hundred people off the Yard in the mid dle of a formal pa rade, but the Defense Depart ment po lice and U.S. Navy

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secu rity force person nel went beyond the call to en sure that our guests got on buses and on their way with little incon ve nienc e. Our sin cere ap pre ci a tion also goes out to or ga ni za tions out side the Na val Acad- emy that have proved themselves deeply invested in the suc cess of the sympo sium. Adm. Bruce DeMars of the Na val Histor i cal Founda tion (NHF) graciously accepted our invi ta tion to speak at the sympo sium luncheon and offered engag ing in- sights on chal lenges facing the pres erva tion side of na val his tory. Dr. Andrew Gordon, who held the Class of 1957 Chair in Ameri can Naval His tory, offered an im pas sioned speech at the sym po sium banquet on the fate of the cruiser USS Olym- pia. Dave Winkler, Direc tor of Program s and De velop ment for the NHF, adver tised the sympo siu m through the founda tio n’s newsl etter, Pull To gether. The ro bust par - tici pa tion of faculty from the Naval War Colleg e lent much prestige to the confer - ence. Simi larly, the Naval History and Heri tage Command is recog nized for its sustained and much ap preci ated presence at the sympo sium. Rear Adm. Jay DeLoach was an active par tic i pant in panel ses sions, chaired a panel on Abra ham Lincoln and his ad mi rals, and en ter tained our for eign guests at the Wash ington Navy Yard. The his to rians on his staff of fered pan els on some of the most en gaging and lively top ics of the con ference. Partic u lar recog ni tion goes to Dr. Sarandis Papadopoulos, whose en thu si asm for the sym po sium and pro fes sional net work ing skills are unpar al leled. He reached out to the most distin guished scholars in the field to serve as chairs, com men ta tors, and mod era tors on many of the pan els. Randy is truly one of the leaders in the naval and mari time his tory commu nity, and he was instru men tal in the Sixteenth Sympo sium’s success. The publi ca tion pro cess can be daunting, even with essays of such superb cali - ber. Add the va garies of the Navy’s contract ing sys tem, and it becomes an al most in- surmount able task. But the Na val War Col lege Press ar rived in the nick of time, and the en thu si as tic re sponse of its man aging ed i tor, Pel ham Boyer, to this manu script is greatly ap preci ated. One can say that this book il lustrates the poten tial of a Navy Uni ver sity sys tem. Finally, special recog ni tion goes out to all who attended and par tici pated in the Sixteenth Na val History Sym po sium. They can all feel justi fi ably proud of their con tri bution to the suc cess of this con ference and its fu ture as the flagship event for na val and mar i time his tory. The scholar ship was di verse, sub stan tive, and in sight - ful. The so cial events provided op portu ni ties to share ideas in an infor mal setting. Our atten dance was global, the food was ex ceptional, and the buses ran on time— for the most part. In 2011 the Na val History Sym po sium en ters its fifth de cade of service to the scholarly commu nity of naval and mari time histo ri ans. Under the direc tion of Pro- fes sor Marcus Jones and his dep uty, Cdr. John Freymann, we can all look forward

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to com ing to gether in the fu ture in Annapolis to ex change ideas, debate great questions, and fur ther the study of na val and mar i time his tory. Mahan, I think, would be pleased.

CRAIG C. FELKER, Cap tain, U.S. Navy Di rec tor, Six teenth Na val His tory Sym po sium

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:10 AM HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:10 AM PROGRAM OF EVENTS OF THE 2009 NAVAL HISTORY SYMPO SIUM

Thurs day, 10 Sep tem ber

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF U.S. NAVY AIR POWER Hill Goodspeed, U.S. Na val Avi a tion Mu seum, “Ad vance ments in Navy Air craft De sign, 1922–1945” Tim Jackson, U.S. Naval War Col lege, “The Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940: The Im - pact on Amer i can Pre pared ness for World War II” Douglas V. Smith, U.S. Na val War Col lege, “Adm. Jo seph Mason ‘Bull’ Reeves (USNA Class of 1884), the Fa ther of Navy Car rier Avia tion” Robert “Barney” Rubel, U.S. Na val War Col lege, “The Transi tion to Swept-Wing Jets” Kevin Delamer, U.S. Naval War Col lege, “History of Navy Heli cop ter Avia tion” Chair: Thomas Cut ler, U.S. Na val In sti tute Moder a tor: Stanley D. M. Carpen ter, U.S. Naval War College

ROUNDTABLE ON U.S. NAVY DOCUMENTARY EDITIONS Michael Crawford, Naval History and Heri tage Com mand Rear Adm. Joseph Callo, USNR (Ret.), New York, New York George C. Daughan, Portland, Maine James L. Nelson, Harpswell, Maine Chair: Rear Adm Jay DeLoach, USN (Ret.), Naval His tory and Heri tage Command

CHANGES AND CONTINUITY IN THE U.S. MARINE CORPS IN THE 20TH CENTURY Heather Pace Mar shall, Duke Univer sity, “‘There’s Noth ing a Marine Can’t Do’: Publi ciz ing the Marine Corps from Above and Below” Colin M. Colbourn, Uni ver sity of South ern Missis sippi, “Pride and Progres siv ism: John A. Lejeune and the New U.S. Marine Corps, 1914–1929”

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David J. Ulbrich, Ohio Univer sity, “Tran si tions in the Second World War: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of a Modern Marine Corps” Earl J. Catagnus, Temple Univer si ty, “Intel lec tu al Warrio r: General Alfred Gray’s Transformational Commandancy, 1987–1991” Chair: Gregory J. W. Urwin, Tem ple Uni ver sity Mod er a tor: Charles D. Melson, U.S. Ma rine Corps His tory Di vi sion

LUNCHEON—BO COPPEDGE ROOM, ALUMNI HALL Speaker: Adm. Bruce DeMars, USN (Ret.), Chair man, Na val His tor ical Foun da tion

THE RISE AND FALL OF NAVAL REPUTATIONS Roger Dingman, Uni ver sity of South ern Cal i for nia, “Com mo dore Mat thew C. Perry: Devil or Dove?” Barry Gough, Wilfred Laurier Uni ver sity, “Ad mi ral Sir Da vid Beatty’s Ghost: His - to rians and the Hero of Jutland” Asada Sadao, Doshisha Univer sity, “Admi ral Kato Tomosaburo: Angel of Peace Re stored” Chair: Ron ald Spector, USNA Class of 1957 Chair in Na val Heri tage, U.S. Naval Acad emy Moder a tors: Jon T. Sumida, Univer sity of Maryland, and Ronald Spector

THE SEARCH FOR CAPTAIN JOHN PAUL JONES’S BONHOMME RICHARD Robert S. Neyland, Na val History and Heri tage Com mand, and Pe ter Reaveley, In- de pend ent Scholar, “The Na val En gage ment be tween Bonhomme Richar d and HMS Sera pis: Battle Won and Ship Lost” Peter Guth, U.S. Naval Academy, “Track the Sinking Ship: GIS and Ocean Model - ing in the Search for the Bonhomme Richar d” George Schwarz, Na val History and Heri tage Command; Melissa Ryan, Ocean Tech nol ogy Founda tion; and Alexis Catsambis, Na val History and Her i tage Com mand, “Search ing for Bonhomme Richar d” Chair: Jo seph Kirschbaum, U.S. Gov ern ment Ac count abil ity Of fice

PUSHING THE ENVELOPE ON THE HIGH SEAS: U.S. NAVAL TECHNO - LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II Claude Berube, U.S. Naval Academy, “Ameri can Thunder Child: Barron, Ellet, Ammen and U.S. Ram Ships in the 19th Cen tury” K. C. Epstein, The Ohio State Uni ver sity, “Early Ameri can Devel op ment of the White head Tor pedo: Tech nol ogy, In dus try, and Tac tics” Laurence Mitchell Burke II, Carne gie Mellon Uni versity, “Wa ter Wings: The Early Years of Navy and Marine Corps Avia tion”

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:10 AM PROGRAM OF EVENTS xix

Jona than Reed Winkler, Wright State Univer sity, “The Navy and Strate gic Com- muni ca tions in the Era of World War Two” Chair: Hal M. Fried man, Henry Ford Com mu nity Col lege Mod er a tor: Sarandis Papadopoulos, Na val His tory and Her i tage Com mand

TOPICS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN NAVAL HISTORY Michael Barrett, The Cit a del, “The Danube Flotilla in the 1916 Ro ma nian Campaign” Marcus O. Jones, U.S. Na val Acad emy, “The Type XXI and Inno va tion in the Ger- man Navy dur ing the Second World War” Chair: Col. Thomas Julian, USAF (Ret.)

SAILING SHIPS AND NAVAL CONSTRUCTION IN SPAIN AND LATIN AMERICA Feliciano Gámez Duarte, Universidad de Cádiz, “Beyond Kolkhis: The Busy Life of the Spanish Frigate Veloz Pasajera, 1807–1830” Carla Rahn Philips, Uni ver sity of Min ne sota, “The ory and Prac tice in Span ish Ship Con struction in Early Mod ern Times” Francisco Fernandez-Gonza lez, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, “Spanish Ship build ing Reg u la tions (Ordenanzas) in the 17th Century” Ivan Valdez-Bubnov, Universidad de México, “Anto nio de Gaztaneta and the Se ville-Cadiz Po lit i cal Con flict (1700–1725)” Chair: Law rence Clay ton, Uni ver sity of Al a bama Mod er a tor: Jorge Ortiz-Sotelo, Shifrin Chair in Mil itar y His tory, U.S. Na val Acad emy

ROUNDTABLE ON ORAL HISTORY Jan Herman, U.S. Navy Med i cal Depart ment Evelyn Cherpak, U.S. Naval War Col lege Rep re sen ta tive of Navy Com bat Doc u men ta tion De tach ment 206 Robert Taglianetti, U.S. Marine Corps History Divi sion, Oral History Branch Chair: Re gina Akers, Na val Histor y and Her itag e Com mand

RESISTANCE BY THE COMMON SAILOR Chris to pher P. Magra, Cal i for nia State Uni ver sity at Northridge, “Co lo nial Amer i- can Re sis tance to Brit ish Na val Im press ment in the Rev o lu tion ary Era” Keith Mer cer, Saint Mary’s Univer sity, Hal i fax, Nova Sco tia, “Press Gangs and Naval-Ci vil ian Discord in Atlan tic Canada, 1775–1815” Thomas Malcomson, George Brown College, “Resis tance and Pun ish ment in the Brit ish Navy on the North Amer i can and West In dies Sta tion, 1812–1815”

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Chair: John Hattendorf, U.S. Naval War College Moder a tor: Rich Gimblett, Staff Histo rian for the Ca na dian Navy

THE U.S. NAVY IN VIETNAM: ON THE COAST AND ON THE SHORE Edward J. Marolda, for mer Chief Histo rian, Naval His tory and Heri tage Com- mand, “The Sand Sail ors of Viet nam” Mark Moyar, U.S. Ma rine Corps Uni ver sity, “Mar i time In fil tra tion dur ing the Viet nam War” John Sherwood, Naval His tory and Heri tage Command, “Turbu lenc e and Ter rorism: The Story of Headquar ters Support Activ ity Sai gon, 1964–1966” Chair: John Prados, Na tional Se cu rity Ar chive Mod er a tor: Jay Veith, In de pend ent Scholar

Fri day, 11 Sep tem ber

SCIENCE AND THE WAR AT SEA, ASW TECHNOLOGY David Zimmerman, The Univer sity of Vic to ria, “The Chilowsky and Langevin Pat - ent Dis pute and the Ori gins of As dic” Gary Weir, Na tional Geospatial-Intel li gence Agency, “Allyn Col lins Vine and the Birth of Un der sea War fare, 1940–1946” Kathleen Broome Wil liams, Cogswell Polytechnical Col lege, “See Fido Run: The Tale of an Anti-U-boat Acoustic Torpedo” Chair: Mi chael Whitby, Di rec tor ate of His tory and Her itag e, De part ment of Na tional De fence, Can ada Mod er a tor: Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, Na val His tor i cal Branch, Na val Staff, U.K. Min is try of De fence

STEAM SHIPS AND NAVAL CONSTRUCTION IN SPAIN AND LATIN AMERICA Carlos Alfaro Zaforteza, King’s College London, “The Ironclad, the Spanish Naval Dockyards and the Chal lenge of New Technol ogy, 1861–1868” Carlos Tromben, Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Armada de Chile, “Replica of the Chilean Steam Corvette Esmeralda c. 1870” Jorge Ortiz-Sotelo, Shifrin Chair in Mil i tary His tory, U.S. Na val Acad emy, “The Pe - ru vian Cor vette Union (1865–1881)” Larrie D. Ferreiro, De fense Ac qui si tion Uni ver sity, “Ship build ers to the World: Evolu tion and Revo lution in Spanish and Chilean Shipbuild ing from the Cold War to the 21st Century” Chair: Francisco Fernandez-Gonza lez, Universidad Politecnica de Madrid Mod er a tor: John Harbron, Ca na dian In sti tute of Stra te gic Stud ies

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:10 AM PROGRAM OF EVENTS xxi

PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE U.S. NAVY Craig L. Symonds, U.S. Naval Academy, “Lincoln and Combined Oper a tions” Rob ert J. Schneller, Jr., Naval His tory and Her i tage Com mand, “Lin coln: ‘I Must See Dahl[gren]’” Andrew C. A. Jampoler, In de pend ent Scholar, “The U.S. Navy and John Harri son Surratt, Jr., ‘The Last Lin coln Con spir a tor’” Chair: Rear Adm. Jay DeLoach, USN (Ret.), Naval His tory and Heri tage Command Mode ra tor: Willi am Dudley, former Direc tor of Naval History

TOPICS IN GLOBAL MARITIME HISTORY Sabrina Guerra, Universidad San Francisco de Quito, “Guayaquil, ‘Lady of the Pa- cific’: Its Mari time Trade and the Impact of the Inde pend ence Process” Manohar Banger, Maharashtra Mari time Board, “Ancient Shipbuild ing in India: A His tor i cal Re view” Erin Greenwald, The His toric New Orleans Col lection, “On the French At lantic Circuit: Company Ships, Cargoes, and Crews between Lorient and Loui si ana, 1720–1731” Chair: Capt. Chris to pher Page, RN, Royal Navy Naval His tor ical Branch

JFK, VIETNAM, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY Chris to pher K. Ives, Inde pend ent Scholar, “Between Doctrine and Ethos: The U.S. Marine Corps and Army, Coun terin surgency, and the Vietnam War” Leo J. Daugherty, U.S. Army Acces sions Com mand, “Partners in Counter in surgency: Lieuten ant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, and Presi dent John F. Ken- nedy, 1961–1966” Rhonda L. Smith-Daugherty, Al ice Lloyd Col lege, “An Al li ance with Prog ress: Ken - nedy, Diem, and a Dis tant Jun gle” Chair: Nicho las Evan Sarantakes, U.S. Naval War College Mod er a tor: An drew J. Birtle, The Cen ter for Mil itar y His tory

“DOES ANYONE KNOW WHERE WE ARE? DOES ANYBODY CARE?” THE BRITISH EASTERN FLEET AND ITS BASES IN WORLD WAR II Ashley Jackson, King’s Col lege London, “Cey lon, the In dian Ocean, and the Sec ond World War” Au gus tine Meaher, Uni ver sity of Mel bourne, “‘The In abil ity of Ef fec tive Ac tion with out Singa pore’: The Ups and Downs of the Singa pore Na val Base” Andrew Stewart, King’s College London, “East Africa, the British Com mon wealth and the Sec ond World War” Chair: Adam Kane, U.S. Naval Insti tute

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NAVAL EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER Keith Neilson, Royal Mili tary Col lege of Canada, “Mental Maps, Insti tu tional Val- ues and the Effects of Bolshevism on British Percep tions of Rus sia as a Na val Power, 1917” Greg Ken nedy, King’s Col lege Lon don, “An glo-Jap a nese Na val Re la tions and Technol ogy Transfer in the 1930s” Harry Dickinson, King’s College London, “Not Much Wisdom, Not Much War: Sir Astley Coo per Key and the Royal Na val Col lege Greenwich 1873–1876” Chair: Eu gene Rasor, Em ery and Henry Col lege

THE UNITED STATES NAVY ON THE PERIPHERY Claire Phelan, Univer sity of Mary Hardin-Baylor, “‘The Incon ve nience, Extrav a - gance, and Perplex i ties of New Orleans!’ U.S. Naval Offi cers on the Periph ery” C. Herbert Gilliland, U.S. Naval Academy, “The U.S. Afri can Squadron: Exhor ta - tions to Op er a tional Suc cess” Diana L. Ahmad, Missouri Univer sity of Science and Technol ogy, “Two Captains, Two Regimes: Benjamin Franklin Tilley and Richard Phillips Leary: America’s Pa cific Is land Com mand ers, 1899–1901” Den nis J. Ringle, Henry Ford Com mu nity Col lege, “Black-Hull Sailor with Com - mo dore Perry in Ja pan” Chair: Su zanne Geiss ler Bowles, Wil liam Pat er son Uni ver sity

ISSUES OF NAVAL TRANSFORMATION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL Jorit Wintjes, Univer sity of Würzburg, “The Biggest of All? The Battle of Ecnomus and Naval Command and Control in Ancient World” Bob Angevine, George Washing ton Uni ver sity, “Hid ing in Plain Sight: The U.S. Navy and Dis persed Oper a tions un der EMCON, 1956–1972” Ste ven Ippolito, Mon roe Col lege, and Benjamin Armstrong, USS Wasp, “The Trans for ma tion of Mon gol Mil i tary For ma tions in the 13th Cen tury” Thomas B. Grassey, U.S. Naval Academy, “Halsey’s Two Mistakes and Leyte Gulf” Chair: Alexandre Shel don-Duplaix, French Ser vice Historique

TOPICS IN ROYAL NAVY HISTORY John A. Cauthen, U.S. Naval Academy, “Spithead Mu tiny, 1797” John Beeler, Univer sity of Al a bama, “The Royal Navy, Ed u cation, and Of fi cer Com pe tence: Chal lenges of the Mid-nineteenth Cen tury” Cori Convertito-Farrar, Univer sity of Exeter, “Tattoo ing in the Victo rian Navy: An In ves ti ga tion into the Mo ti va tions” Bruce Taylor, Los An geles, Cali for nia, “Arms and the Man: Some Ap proaches to the Study of Na val Com muni ties Afloat” Chair: Chris to pher McKee, Grinnell Col lege

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:10 AM PROGRAM OF EVENTS xxiii

BUREAUCRACY AND THE U.S. NAVY Edward L. De Rosa, Rutgers Uni versity, “A Fleet Grows in Brooklyn: The New York Naval Shipyard and the Building of the U.S. Navy” Michael L. Weisel, Duke Univer sity, “Jo seph Whar ton: A Quaker Vulcan—The Po - lit i cal Econ omy of Big Steel and the U.S. Navy, 1885–1895” John T. Kuehn, U.S. Army Com mand and General Staff College, “The Ostfriesland, the Wash ington Na val Treaty, and the General Board of the Navy: A Relook at a His toric Sink ing” Dennis Conrad, Na val History and Heri tage Command, “Were They Really So Un- prepared? Josephus Daniels and the U.S. Navy’s Entry into World War I” Chair: Marcus O. Jones, U.S. Naval Acad emy

WORLD WAR II Donald Chisholm, U.S. Naval War Col lege, “Naval Support to Anti-Japa nese Gue- rilla Op er a tions in the Phil ip pines, 1942–1945” Kenneth P. Hansen, Cen ter for For eign Policy Stud ies, Dalhousie Uni ver sity, “Es - cort Oilers: The Un told Story of the Battle of the Atlan tic” Kathleen M. Ryan, Mi ami Uni ver sity, “Nice Girls, Camp Fol lowers, and the Con - struction of World War II Fem i nin ity” Nich o las Evan Sarantakes, U.S. Naval War Col lege, “The British Pa cific Fleet Visits Ja pan” Chair: Jeffrey G. Barlow, Na val Histor y and Her itag e Com mand

NAVAL HISTORY SYMPOSIUM BANQUET Remarks : Dr. Andrew Gordon, USNA Class of 1957 Chair in Naval Heri tage

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:10 AM HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:10 AM I Co lo nial Amer i can Re sis tance to Brit ish Na val Imp 1689–1815ressment in the Revo lu t ionary Era

CHRISTO PHER P. MAGRA

n the summer of 1768, be tween 6:00 and 7:00 PM on 10 June, Amer i can colo - nists in Boston, Mas sa chu setts, ri oted against Brit ish author ity. Three to four Ihundr ed sea far ers gath ered at Boston’s wa ter front as a Brit ish na val offi cer painted the king’s broad ar row on the main mast of John Han cock’s sloop Lib erty and be gan to unmoor the vessel in or der to tow it to ward the se curi ty of a nearby war ship. Cus toms of fi cials had ac cused Han cock of il le gally stow ing con tra band on Lib erty. The sea far ers gath ered near the wa ter’s edge and hurled in sults at the na val offi cer and at the sea men and custo ms offi cials assist ing him. The offi cer cut the moor ing cables. The cust oms agents jumped ship and at tempted to escape the scene. The mob of sail ors chased them through the streets of Boston. Crowds of col - onists joined the sail ors pursu ing the cus toms agents, and the mob swelled to an es - ti mated two thou sand. The cust oms agents someho w made good their es capes. The mob vented its frustr a tion by break ing the win dows of the agents’ homes. Then the mob dragged one of the war ship’s boats from the wa ter front to Boston’s Lib erty Tree. Bos tonians conduct ed a mock vice admi ralt y court and conde mned the navy’s propert y. The mob then car ried the boat to the Common and set it ablaze. Such ri - otous be hav ior posed enough of a threat to in duce Brit ish na val offi cers and cus- toms col lec tors to flee to a nearby for ti fied po sition, Castle Wil liam.1 Most his to ri ans see this riot sim ply as col o nists’ re sis tance to the sei zure of John Hancock’s sloop. The 1768 riot is also com monly in ter preted within the wider context of co lonial resent ment to ward the Brit ish gov ernment’s post–Seven Years’ War crackdown on co lonial smugglin g. In an effort to pay off its massive war debts, the British govern ment had decided to force colo nists to pay vari ous tariffs. Hancock’s Lib erty report edly carried Madeira wine and other goods on which the Boston merchant had not paid im post du ties. Thus, the sei zure of Lib erty can be seen as one battle in a larger British campaign to snuff out colo nial clandes tine commerce, in response to which colo nists rioted against what they perceived to be an infring e- ment on their free trade.2 What is often over looked is the fact that the British war - ship and the of fi cer respon si ble for seizing Hancock’s Lib erty had been conduct ing im press ment raids in the weeks lead ing up to the riot.3

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This negle ct is symptom atic of the lack of scholarly atten tion given to the mar i- time di mensions of the Ameri can Revo lution. The sea is commonly seen as a vast empty space in between lands, where history un folds.4 As a result, peo ples’ in ter action with the sea and the his tor i cal re per cus sions as so ci ated with this in ter ac tion are not taken se ri ously. Even among mar i time his to ri ans, only a hand ful of schol ars have ever exam ined the role that Brit ish naval impress ment played in the or igins of the Amer ican Revo lu tion and the birth of the United States of America. In general , there have been two schools of aca demic thought on the role British naval impress ment played in the or igins of the Ameri can Revo lution. There are his- to rians like Jesse Lemisch, Marcus Rediker, and Gary Nash, who pres ent a “bot tom up” in ter pre ta tion of na val im press ment as a chronic im po si tion on the rights of Ameri can workers. 5 For the most part, these his tori ans tend to focus on the plight of the Amer i can workingman. In contrast, such his to rians as N. A. M. Rodger and Denver Brunsman present a “top down” portrait of naval impress ment. 6 They ar - gue that impress ment was rare and that while it regre tta bly robbed workers of the ability to choose their careers themselves, it none the less afforded the lower sort a career path, dis cipline, food, and shelter. Histo rians in this lat ter camp align more with British naval admin is tra tors than with the pressed men, and they do not see im press ment as play ing an im por tant role in the rift be tween col o nies and mother country. To date, Lemisch has provided the only book-length inves ti ga tion of the connec tions between British naval impress ment and the ori gins of the Ameri can Revo lution, and his study focuses on New York City.7 For the most part, histo ri ans in ter ested in the connec tions be tween Brit ish na val im press ment and the break- down of Anglo-Amer i can rela tions have re stricted their stud ies to the War of 1812.8 My re search pro vides new ev i dence that re in forces the bot tom-up in ter pre tation of the connec tions that ex isted be tween Brit ish na val im press ment and co lo - nial re sis tance to Brit ish au thor ity. Co lo nial busi ness own ers and work ers clearly likened impress ment to tyranny and corrupt govern ment, and they viewed coerce d mili tary service as a form of slavery. My research also expands on Lemisch’s study of New York City. Impress ment raids occur red throughout the British North Ameri - can main land colo nies, and they gen erated fierce re sent ment and re sis tance among a cross section of col o nists. Wide spread co lo nial resent ment and re sis tance to Brit - ish na val im press ment con trib uted to col o nists’ will ing ness to re sist Brit ish au thority dur ing the late-eigh teenth-cen tury im pe rial crisis. Na val im pressment can be defined as a system of co ercion that puts peo ple into mil i tary ser vice on war ships for var i ous, nor mally ex ten sive, pe ri ods of time. First, the British monarch would autho rize use of the system. The Board of Admi ralty , a govern ing body of seven men (usually four admi rals and three mem bers of Parlia - ment) that ad minis tered the British navy, then printed and dis tributed press war - rants to com mis sioned of fi cers along with sets of or ders. Like ar rest war rants, press

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warrants were legal doc uments that empow ered naval offi cers to use force to take men to war ships; these war rants were good for only a spec i fied amount of time. Press warrants stip u lated that “Sea men, Sea far ing Men and Per sons whose oc cupa - tions and call ings are to work in Ves sels and Boats upon Rivers” were to be pressed.9 The Board of Admi ralty typi cally sent these war rants to the cap tains of warships, who in turn gave them to lieuten ants to ex ecute. 10 Lieu ten ants and loyal, phys i cally tough seamen then took tenders into ports or used tenders to board vessels at sea.11 The lieu ten ants and their loyal sea men were col lectively known as “press-gangs.” Pressed men were placed on the ten ders and taken back to the war ships. Vol un teers were given the king’s shil ling and al lowed shore leave and free dom of move ment about the ship. Those who refused to volun teer for mil itary service were kept in chains be low deck and were de nied shore leave. This was im press ment. There was a com plex set of rea sons for the de ploy ment of this co ercive sys tem. Most obvi ously, British author i ties autho rized naval impress ment to man the navy.12 The size and num ber of vessels involved with the British navy ex panded over the sec ond half of the eigh teenth cen tury, in creasing 26 per cent in terms of to tal dis - place ment.13 Because sea far ers typ i cally chose work on mer chant ves sels, for their higher wages, the Brit ish gov ern ment au tho rized press-gangs to force sub jects into mili tary service in order to meet the man power demands of a larger navy. There were other rea sons for na val im press ment, how ever. Impress ment func tioned as a form of so cial control; press war rants were is sued spe cifi cally to sup press ri ots in port cit ies, and ad mi rals, re ceiv ing writ ten re quests from mas ters, au tho rized press- gangs to seize trou blesome sail ors on mer chant ves sels.14 Impress ment was used to man short handed mer chant ves sels.15 It was used to man shorthanded army trans- port vessels. 16 This coer cive sys tem was used forc ibly to pro cure pi lots for navi ga - tional as sis tance.17 There is even ev i dence that ad mi rals op er at ing over seas au tho rized press-gangs out of per sonal an i mos ity.18 The navy also pressed men into ser vice for sundry short-term la bor in ship yards.19 It was for a vari ety of reasons, then, that the British navy pressed men around the Atlan tic World. British naval press-gangs oper ated in and around North Ameri can co lonial ports prior to the Rev o lution. There were reported in cidents of im pressment in coastal commu ni ties ranging from northern seaports like Falmouth, Maine, to Nor folk, Vir- ginia, in the south prior to April 1775, when the “shot heard around the world” rang out at Lexington, Mas sa chu setts.20 For ex ample, Captain Corner of HMS Romn ey had pressed men on at least three sep a rate occa sions prior to the riot in the sum mer of 1768.21 Despite the riot that fol lowed, Captain Corner and his crew contin ued to press men in Boston. Sev eral months af ter the mob ac tion, a press-gang boarded a Lon don ves sel enter ing Boston’s har bor and took six teen of its crew.22 The navy then had the pru dence to re lo cate Cap tain Cor ner to Phil a del phia; how ever, Cor ner pressed three sea men off a ves sel bound from New castle, England, to Phil a del phia in July 1769.23

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The Brit ish navy also pressed co lonial fish ermen di rectly off fishing vessels while they were work ing on the Atlan tic Ocean. Skipper Jona than Mil let and company of the schoo ner Hawke, out of Sa lem, Massa chu setts, were “a-Fish ing in the Straits of Belle Isle near Bradore [Labra dor]” in July 1766, when, accord ing to Millet’s de po si - tion, Captain Hamil ton, “the Master of his Majes ties’ [sic] Sloop Mer lin with a Num - ber of Armed Men in several Boats came on board my Schooner, and demanded my Business there.” The sur prised yet pugna cious Yankee skip per “told him I was on a cod fishing Voyage from New England.” The British naval offi cer treated Mil let “as an Enemy. . . . He damned me and gave a Blow with his Fist on my Face. I told him it was hard Usage . He again damned me & then ordered a Num ber of armed Men to seize me which they did. One of them at the same time shoving a Loaded Pis tol against my Breast.” Captain Hamil ton in formed the colo nial fishing crew they “were a Pack of Damned Rascals several times.” Ac cording to Millet , “He then seized my Vessel & Fish and put a Sentry on board.” The captain of HMS Mer lin “kept [i.e., pressed] one of my Men, viz. Fran cis Con, & threatened that if he ever Catched any New England Men Fishing there again that he would seize their Ves sels & Fish and keep all the Men, beside in flicting severe Cor po ral Punish ment on ev ery man he took.”24 This case of im press ment had lit tle to do with man ning.25 The British navy was enforc ing the ten ets of the 1763 peace treaty, which in cluded keep ing British fish ermen out of fish ing waters reserved for the French, and the Strait of Belle Isle was one of the re gions the treaty made strictly off-limits to British fisher men. 26 Indeed, when Mil let demanded to know why Hawke, its crew, and its catch were be ing seized, Captain Hamil ton informe d the skipper that he “had broke the Law.”27 The navy was also re spond ing to the com mer cial lobby of fish mer chants in Eng land, which had been pressur ing the Brit ish govern ment to keep colo nists out of the rich fishing wa ters around New found land. Fish mer chants in Eng land wanted these wa ters as their private preserve. 28 Despite the fact that manning was not the primary mo tiva - tion be hind this case of im press ment, it was still im press ment. Fish ermen were forc ibly ap pro pri ated for mil i tary ser vice in the navy. Such Brit ish na val im press ment gen er ated much re sent ment among North Ameri can colo nists. In fact, col o nists in this part of the Brit ish Em pire were par tic u - larly resent ful of naval impress ment, because it vio lated a law passed in 1708 that made it il legal for the Brit ish navy to press men in Ameri can ports.29 The law, known as the “Sixth of Anne,” was on the minds of leading Bosto nians when in 1768 a town meet ing re solved to send “in struc tions” to rep re sen ta tives in the Mas sa chu setts legis la ture, which in cluded such fu ture rev o lu tion ar ies and founding fa thers as Sam- uel Ad ams, John Han cock, and James Otis. The in structions re quired that nothing be left undone that may conduce to our re lief; and in partic ular we rec om mend it to your con sider ation and discre tion, in the first place, to endeavor that impresses of all kinds may if possi ble be prevented. There is an act of Parlia ment in being, which has never

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been repealed, for the encour agement of the trade to America; we mean, by the 6th Anne, chap. 37, sect. 9.30 For business own ers in Boston, “any im presses of any mar i ner, from any ves sel whatever, appears to be in direct vio la tion of an act of Parlia ment,” and therefore press-gangs posed a direct threat to colo nial le gal rights.31 That is why dur ing the 1768 riot Bosto nians held emergency town meetings and wrote protest let ters demand ing the dis missal of the of fending naval offi cers from the British navy. They then sent these let ters to their rep re sen ta tives in the Mas sa chu setts leg is la ture. They also sent letters to the gover nor of Massa chu setts and to their lobby ist in Parlia ment. 32 The town meet ings and protest let ters respond ing to im pressment were part of a larger Amer i can de mand that the Brit ish gov ern ment re spect col o nists’ con sti tu- tional rights.33 The Sixth of Anne in spired more than meet ings and let ters. It height - ened col o nists’ aware ness of their le gal rights, and it el e vated their will ingness to de fend those rights. At Charleston, South Carolina, in 1743, Capt. Charles Hardy observe d that the “Spirit of Prose cut ing on that Statute [6 Anne, c. 37] reigns here more than ever.”34 Hardy nervously noted that col o nists were taking naval offi cers to court for vi o lating this law. Two years later in Boston a mob verball y accosted naval of fi cers who had been press ing colo nial sea men. One of these offi cers, Capt. John Rouse of HMS Shir ley, later ac knowledged that he “dared not” set foot on shore in the co lo nial port city af ter this mobbing, “for fear of being pros e cuted on the [6 Anne, c. 37], or murdered by the mob for pressing.” 35 Colo nists resented the fact that the navy ig nored the Sixth of Anne. They per ceived it as a vio lation of their legal rights, and it made them es pe cially sen si tive to any ad di tional in fringements. North Amer ican colo nists fur ther perceived na val impress ment to be a threat to their polit i cal rights as British sub jects. By the eighteenth century, England was a con sti tu tion ally lim ited mon ar chy.36 A Bill of Rights lim ited the Crown’s pre rog a - tive powers. The liberty of British subjects was supposed to be sacro sanct, and col o - nists believed they were enti tled to the same rights and liber ties as people living in Great Britain. Indeed, Adm. Pe ter War ren, the na val of fi cer in charge of, among other things, impress ment in North Amer ica in 1745, warned the Admi ralty that Ameri can colo nists main tained “the high est no tions of the rights and lib erties of English men.” 37 Distance from the mother country perhaps made colo nists more sensi tive about these mat ters, but so did na val im press ment, which con stantly grated on co lo nial sen si bil i ties and rubbed raw co lo nial nerves. When colo nial mari time labor ers resisted a British press-gang that had boarded their vessel at sea in 1768, they killed a naval offi cer in defense of their liberty. James McGlocklin, the cook on board Pitt Packet, testi fied in the murder trial of the colo - nial sea men that his fel low crew mem bers had re sponded to the Brit ish na val of fi - cer’s com mand that he be allowed to come up on the deck of their ship that “they were Freemen born free, and would not go aboard a Man of War.”38 James Siley, a

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British marine who accom pa nied the lieuten ant onto the colo nial brig, and John Roney, the brig’s master, both testi fied they heard them “say they wanted nothing but their Liberty.” 39 Peter Bowen and Wil liam Pea cock, the British warship’s midshipmen, both testi fied that the Ameri cans “said they were resolved to die, sooner than be pressed on Board a Man of War.”40 Patrick Henry was not the only Ameri - can to main tain a “lib erty or death” ethos. More col o nists were will ing to square off against British author ity to defend their rights on the eve of the Revo lu tion. North Amer i can col o nists also re sented the vi o la tion of cus tom in her ent in certain cases of im press ment. Fish ermen, along with mas ters, mates, car pen ters, and cabin boys, were tra di tion ally ex empt from na val im press ment. In Lon don in 1739, for ex ample, it was reported that there was “no Certainty of any Protections being granted” by the Ad mi ralty Board against im pressment “except [for] Coast ers and fish ing Ves sels.”41 When ever the navy pressed fish ermen from fish ing ves sels, then, it was a vi o lation of what E. P. Thomp son has re ferred to as the “moral econ omy” of Eng lish work ing peo ples.42 Whereas in fringements on this moral econ omy stim u - lated the rise of class con sciousness and riots against a revo lution in England (that is, the In dus trial Rev o lu tion), they fu eled rev o lu tion ary en er gies in America. North Ameri can colo nists further re sented the fact that British naval impress - ment dis rupted trans at lan tic ship ping to and from the col o nies. Bos to nian busi - ness men be lieved press-gangs “ru ined” the “trade and busi ness of this and the other towns,” and this eco nomic ru in ation “raised such a spirit of re sent ment in the peo - ple.”43 Insuf fi cient crews de layed mer chant ves sels, which cut into profit mar gins, discour aged trade, and threatened unem ploy ment and higher prices. British colo - nists in Nova Scotia expressed sim ilar concerns in a peti tion they laid before their royal gover nor in 1775. The Nova Scotians believed “it our duty to lay be fore your Excel lency the Dis cour agement [that] the trading part of the People meet with in their Commerc e with Great Britain, the West India Is lands, and also the Coasting Trade, by hav ing their Sea men and other persons em ployed by them in that Busi - ness im pressed and put on Board Ships of War, which un less speed ily pre vented must ut terly ruin the small Trade of this prov ince.”44 While the Nova Scotians restricted their protests to legal channels , most likely due to the presence of a naval base in Hal i fax, other North Amer i can col o nists took to ex tra le gal and il le gal forms of protest against what they per ceived to be a direc t threat to their legal and economic rights and free doms. Na val im press ment fu eled mil i tant and force ful co lo nial re sis tance to Brit ish au - thority in colo nial America, resis tance that was part of the vi olenc e asso ci ated with the wider rev o lu tion ary move ment.45 In addi tion to the Pitt Packet murder case, the 1768 riot in Boston mentioned ear lier, and the more famous Knowles riot there in 1747 (in which sailors seized control over the port city for several weeks), col o nists in Nor folk, Vir ginia, forc ibly re sisted na val im press ment in 1767.46 The sloop Hor net

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came into Nor folk on 5 Septem ber, and Capt. Jere miah Morgan landed with “several of his of fi cers and about 30 seamen.” After im bibing “a little Dutch courage” at the lo - cal tav ern, Morgan and his press-gang, armed with “large clubs,” attempted to force Ameri can colo nists into mil i tary service. The town watch raised an alarm, how ever, and “at least 100” mem bers of the colo nial commu nity turned out to fight off Cap tain Morgan and his crew. The Brit ish press-gang retreated to Hor net, but not be fore town mem bers seized some of the Brit ish sail ors, ar rested them, and placed them in jail for the week end.47 This re sent ment and re sis tance cul mi nated in out right de mands for sep a ra tion from the Brit ish Em pire, as ev i denced in the Dec la ration of In de pend ence. Thomas Jeffer son, its prin cipal au thor, listed im press ment as one of the fore most rea sons colo nists consid ered the Brit ish govern ment to have abused its author ity, and in a corrupt fashion. Jeffer son wrote that King George III “has constrained our fel low Cit i zens.” These citi zens had been “taken Cap tive on the high Seas.” They were forced to serve in the Brit ish mil i tary, and they were made “to bear Arms against their Country, to be come the ex ecu tion ers of their friends and Brethren, or to fall them selves by their Hands.”48 Ameri cans were justi fied in their re bellion and the forma tion of an inde pend ent nation because of this abuse of power. In con clu sion, peoples’ in ter ac tion with the sea contrib uted to the late-eigh teenth- century impe rial crisis that brought about the birth of the United States of Amer ica. The British govern ment and its navy forced colo nial sub jects to perform mili tary service at sea. Colo nial mar itime labor ers were forcibly taken from their ships and from their port commu ni ties. Ameri c an colo nis ts resen ted and resiste d coerc ed mil i tary ser vice at sea, and this re sent ment and re sis tance di rectly in formed the Amer ican de cision to break with the British Empire. This setbac k for the British Empire and the rise of the United States can not be fully un der stood if we end his - tory at shorelines .

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NOTES 1 Dirk Hoerder, Crowd Ac tion in Rev o lu tion ary Mas - of the Ameri can Revo lu tion,” in Ameri can Revo lu - sa chu setts, 1765–1780 (New York: Aca demic, 1977), tion: Peo ple and Per spectives , ed. Andrew K. Frank pp. 164–84. and Peter C. Mancall (New York: ABC-CLIO, 2 Merrill Jensen, The Founding of a Nation: A History 2007), pp. 189–206; William Pencak, “Thomas of the Amer i can Rev o lu tion, 1763–1776 (New York: Hutch in son’s Fight against Na val Im press ment,” Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), p. 347; O. M. Dickerson, New Eng land His tor i cal and Ge ne a log i cal Reg is ter “John Han cock: No tori ous Smuggler or Near Vic- 132 (Janu ary 1978), pp. 25–36; Neil R. Stout, The tim of Brit ish Rev e nue Rack e teers?” Mis sis sippi Val - Royal Navy in America, 1760–1775: A Study of En - ley His tor i cal Re view 32, no. 4 (March 1946), pp. forcement of British Colo nial Policy in the Era of the 517–40; Wil liam M. Fowler, Jr., The Baron of Bea con Ameri can Revo lu tion (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In sti- Hill: A Biog ra phy of John Han cock (Boston: Houghton tute Press, 1973); Neil R. Stout, “Manning the Royal Mifflin, 1980), pp. 82–100; and John W. Tyler, Navy in North America, 1763–1775,” Ameri can Smug glers & Pa tri ots: Boston Mer chants and the Ad - Neptu ne 23 (April 1963), pp. 174–85; Roland G. vent of the Ameri can Revo lu tion (Boston: Northeast - Usher, Jr., “Royal Navy Im pressment during the ern Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 5, 13, 16, 114, 266. Ameri can Revo lu tion,” Mis sis sippi Val ley His tor i cal Re view 37, no. 4 (March 1951), pp. 673–88; Richard 3 Hoerder’s account is an ex ception to this gen eral Pares, “The Manning of the Navy in the West In- schol arly ne glect. Hoerder, Crowd Ac tion in Rev olu - dies, 1702–63,” in Trans ac tions of the Royal His tor i - tion ary Mas sa chu setts, 1765–1780. cal So ci ety, 4th series (n.p.: 1937), vol. 20, pp. 31–60; 4 For a thorough discus sion of this histor i cal inter pre - and Dora Mae Clark, “The Impres sment of Seamen tation in general and for argu ments against it, see in the Amer i can Col o nies,” in Es says in Co lo nial John R. Gillis, Is lands of the Mind (New York: History Pre sented to Charles McLean An drews by His Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Bernhard Klein and Studen ts (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, Gesa Mackenthun, eds., Sea Changes: Historicizing 1931), pp. 198–224. the Ocean (New York: Routledge, 2003); and Martin 8 See, for exam ple, Reginald Horsman, The Causes of W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, The Myth of Conti - the War of 1812 (Phila del phia: Univ. of Pennsyl va - nents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: Univ. nia Press, 1962). of Cal ifor nia Press, 1997). Also, see W. Jeffrey Bol- ster, “Putt ing the Ocean in At lan tic History: Mar i- 9 “Lords Com mission ers, Ad miralty, To All Cap- time Commu ni ties and Marine Ecology in the tains,” [London?], 7 Novem ber 1775, in Na val Doc- Northwest Atlan tic, 1500–1800,” Ameri can Histor i - uments of the Ameri can Revo lu tion , ed. William Bell cal Review 113, no. 1 (Febru ary 2008), pp. 19–47; Clark (Washing ton, D.C.: U.S. Govern ment Print- and Marcus Rediker, “To ward a Peo ple’s His tory of ing Office, 1964) [hereaf ter NDAR], vol. 3, p. 349. the Sea,” in Mar i time Em pires: Brit ish Im pe rial Mar - The actual press warrant read: “I do hereby depute i time Trade in the Nine teenth Cen tury, ed. Da vid ——be long ing to His Maj esty’s——un der my Killingray, Margarette Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby Command, to impress Seamen, Sea faring Men, & (Roch es ter, N.Y.: Boydell, in as so ci a tion with the Persons whose oc cupa tions & call ings are to work in Na tional Mari time Museum, 2004), pp. 195–206. Vessels & Boats upon Rivers accord ing to the tenor of this Warrant. In testi mony whereof I have here- 5 Jesse Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull: The Role of unto set my Hand & Seal this Day of——.” New York’s Sea men in Pre cip i tat ing the Rev o lu tion (New York: Garland, 1997); Marcus Rediker, Be- 10 “Last Night, about eight o’Clock, Vice Admi ral Pye tween the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (Cam bridge, came down and hoisted his Flag on Board the U.K.: Cam bridge Univ. Press, 1987); and Gary B. Barfleur. He or dered all the Ships in Com mis sion to Nash, The Urban Cruci ble: Social Change, Polit i cal take on Board six Months Provi sions, to complete Con sciousness, and the Or i gins of the Amer i can Rev o - their full Com plement of Men, and get ready for Sea lu tion (Cam bridge, Mass.: Har vard Univ. Press, with all pos si ble Ex pe di tion; in Con se quence of 1979). Also, see Peter Linebaugh and Marcus which Or ders, Lieuten ants from every Ship went Rediker, The Many-Headed Hy dra: Sailors, Slaves, imme diately to Lon don to open Houses of Rendez - Com mon ers, and the Hid den His tory of the Rev o lu - vous. . . . Press War rants are ex pected down [from tiona ry Atl anti c (Boston: Beacon, 2000). For a the Ad miralty Board] this Day.” Virginia Gazette , 24 bot tom-up ex am i na tion of Brit ish na val impress- June 1773. ments in ports in England, see Nicho las Rogers, 11 Ten ders were so ubiqui tously used in na val im press- Press Gang: Na val Im press ment and Its Opponents in ment raids that the ves sels came to be de fined in Geor gian Brit ain (Lon don: Con tin uum, 2007). terms of this im press ment. Wil liam Fal coner, for 6 Den ver Brunsman, “The Evil Ne cessity: British Na- ex am ple, de fined a ten der as a “small ves sel em - val Impress ment in the Eighteenth-Cen tury Atlan tic ployed in the King’s service, on vari ous occa sions; World” (PhD diss., Prince ton Univ., 2004); and N. as, to receive volun teers and im pressed men, and A. M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anat omy of con vey them to a dis tant place; to at tend on ships of the Geor gian Navy (London: Collins, 1986). war or squad rons; and to carry intel li gence or orders from one place to another, &c.” Wil liam Fal- 7 Book chapters and arti cles include Matthew Raffety, coner, Dictio nary of the Ma rine, 1780 ed. (London: “A Sea of Rebel lion: Mar itime Workers in the Age Printed to T. Cadell, in the Strand, 1780), p. 1345.

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12 “The King having been pleased by his Or der in complement], as they would then be able to spare Coun cil of the 16th of June 1775 to or der my Lords Men for ex tra Services and not have the same Rea - Comm[isione]rs of the Adm[iral]ty to is sue out son for Pressing out the Ves sels from Europe, and such Warrants as they should find requi site for other Parts coming with Supplies for the Navy and press ing so many Seamen, Sea faring Men & Persons Army, a Prac tice which may greatly af fect us in fu - whose oc cu pa tions & call ings are to work in Ves sels ture, un less your Lordship shall be pleased to di rect & Boats upon Rivers in His Majes ties Domin ions in that Protections be given to Vessels sailing from North America as should from time to time be nec- Britain, and Exemp tions to others who may bring es sary for Man ning His Maj[es]t[ie]s Ships & Ves - such Supplies.” Maj. Gen. Wil liam Howe to Lord sels em ployed in those parts.” Philip Stephens to Dartmouth, Boston, 27 No vem ber 1775, NDAR, Vice Adm. Sam uel Graves, Admi ralty Office, 24 vol. 2, p. 1155. June 1775, NDAR, vol. 1, p. 493. “The Ships with 17 “I have also their Lord ships’ com mands to send you me at Boston are begin ning to be sickly, they have herewith two Press Warrants empow er ing you to lately lost sev eral men by deaths, and as de ser tions impress Seamen in North America , and to signify happen, notwith stand ing the utmost care is taken to their further direc tion to you, in case the Pilots prevent it, I have ordered the Scarborough at abovementioned (‘to en gage, upon your arrival at Piscataqua, and the Lively at Marblehead, to raise those Provinces [“Caro li nas, Georgia, & East men for the Squad ron, and have directed Cap tain Florida”], as many Pi lots as you can who may be ac- [Thomas] Bishop of the Lively to press thirty Sea - quainted with any part of the Coasts thereof’) men, if that Number of Volun teers cannot be pro- should not be willing to engage in His Majesty ’s Ser - cured. Neces sity obliges me, con trary to my vice, to im press them by virtue of those Warrants, incli na tion, to use this method to man the King’s and to keep them on board the Sloop you command Ships, and as it shall be done with all possi ble mod - un til you receive di rections from Sir Peter Parker, or er ation, though at a place extremely vio lent in sup- the Com mander in Chief of His Majesty’s Ships in port ing and car ry ing into ex e cu tion the Res o lu tions North America, for their further disposal.” Philip and Di rec tions of the Con ti nen tal Con gress re spect- Stephens to Captain Rob ert Cooper, RN, of HM ing the Non-impor ta tion Agreement, I trust their Sloop Hawke, Spithead, Ad mi ralty Of fice, 21 No - Lord ships will not dis ap prove thereof.” Vice Adm. vem ber 1775, NDAR, vol. 3, p. 381. Samuel Graves to Philip Stephens, Secre tary of the Brit ish Ad mi ralty, Preston , Boston, 20 Feb ruary 18 “The Ad miral [Graves] issued press-warrants at 1775, NDAR, vol. 1, p. 98. Marblehead on account of the deten tion of some wax-can dles im ported for his own use, and which 13 Niklas Frykman, “Seamen on Late Eighteenth- were seized by the Commit tee of Inspec tion.” “A Century Euro pean Warships ,” In ter na tional Re view Private Letter from a Gen tleman at Boston, Dated of So cial History (April 2009), p. 1. Feb. 19, 1775,” Morn ing Chron i cle and Lon don Ad- 14 See Vir ginia Ga zette, 31 De cember 1772; and Vice vertis er, 8 April 1775, cited in NDAR, vol. 1, pp. 93– Adm. Graves to Gen. Thomas Gage, Boston, 11 June 94. 1775, NDAR, vol. 1, p. 656. 19 Admi ral Graves “sent four Press Gangs, under the 15 A merchant -ship cap tain, Thomas Caulson, was Command of Captain [John] Linzee [Lindsey] to breaking the Ameri c an Conti ne ntal Asso c ia t ion’s secure all the Shipwrights, Caulkers and Seamen ban on trade by at tempt ing to land certain manu - they could lay hold of, and three hundred men were factured goods at Falmouth, Maine, and the British thus im pressed, among whom were found many navy was helping him do it. The navy was even sailors who were taken for the Ships, and the Arti fi - press ing men to sup ply Caulson with a crew for the cers, af ter some days con fine ment, con sented to return trip to Bristol. “[Thomas] Caulson no sooner work and were released.” “Narra tive of Vice Adm. arrived, but the next day had the [HMS] Canso Sam uel Graves,” Preston , Boston, 18 June 1775, Man-of-War up to Town, and his old Bristol Sloop NDAR, vol. 1, p. 714. along side of his new Ship, tak ing out the goods. But 20 For impress ment at Nor folk, Virginia, see “News it seems he can not get any of our people to help from Nor folk, dated Septem ber 5, 1767,” Virginia him; and I do not think he will be able to get his Gaze tte, 1 Octo ber 1767. For Phil adel phia, Pennsyl - Ship loaded and rigged unless he gets the Man-of- va nia, see “News from Phil a del phia, dated July 10, War’s men to do it. And I hear that Capt. [Henry] 1769,” Vir ginia Ga zette, 27 July 1769. For impress - Mowat has been pressing men; some he re leases, ment in Boston, Mas sa chu setts, see “News from and some re tains; and it is sug gested by some, that Boston dated June 16, 1768,” Vir ginia Ga zette, 14 his de sign is to sup ply Cap tain Caulson with men July 1768; “News from Boston, dated Novem ber 17, from his own Ship.” NDAR, vol. 1, pp. 179–80; Pe- 1768,” Vir ginia Ga zette, 12 Janu ary 1769; and “Di- ter Force, Ameri can Archives (Washing ton, D.C.: M. ary of Lieuten ant John Barker,” en try dated Boston, St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1838) [here after 8 Febru ary 1775, NDAR, vol. 1, pp. 81–82. For AA], series 4, vol. 2, p. 318. Marblehead, Massa chu setts, see NDAR, vol. 1, pp. 16 “I beg leave to Re mark the great want of Seamen ex - 93–94, 98. For Portsmouth, New Hamp shire, see peri enced this Summer, for the navi gat ing of Trans- NDAR, vol. 1, pp. 69, 126, 224, 329, 362. For Fal - ports, for man ning armed Ves sels, and Boats on mouth, Maine, see NDAR, vol. 1, pp. 179–80; and partic u lar Services, and on many other occa sions, AA, S4, vol. 2, p. 318. which in duces me to urge the Neces sity of sending 21 “There were some oc currences respect ing the offi - out Seamen to complete the Transports to their cers of the Romn ey pre ced ing this af fair [i.e., the sei - proper Number. . . . It is also to be wished that the zure of Han cock’s sloop] which raised the re sent - Kings Ships had their War Estab lish ment [i.e., ment of the popu lace. On the Sunday eve ning

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be fore, a press gang went on board a ves sel just ar - after the 14th day of Febru ary 1707, upon pain that rived from Glasgow, and which came to anchor off any of ficer or of ficers so im press ing or tak ing away, the long wharf [in Boston]. . . . A few days af ter a or causing to be im pressed or taken away, any mari - young man, that had served an ap pren tice ship in ner or other person, contrary to the tenor and true this town, was im pressed out of an in ward bound mean ing of this act, shall for feit to the master, or ship. . . . The day fol low ing a man was taken out of owner or own ers of any such ship or ves sel, £20 for an East ern ves sel [pos sibly a cod fish ing ves sel; a ev ery man he or they shall so im press or take, to be banker] by an armed schoo ner, that was bound to recov ered with full costs of suit, in any court within Hal ifax [Nova Sco tia].” “News from Boston dated any part of her Majesty’s domin ions.” June 16, 1768.” 30 “News from Boston dated June 20, 1768,” Vir ginia 22 “News from Boston, dated No vem ber 17, 1768.” Gaze tte, 14 July 1768. 23 “News from Phila del phia, dated July 10, 1769.” 31 Ibid. 24 Jon athan Millet, deposition, 13 Septem ber 1766, 32 Ibid. Misc. Bound Manu scripts, 1766–1769, MHS. The 33 For more on these consti tu tional rights, see Bernard Strait of Belle Isle divides the north coast of New- Bailyn, The Ideo log i cal Or i gins of the Amer i can Rev o- foundland from the southern tip of Lab rador. Salem lu tion, 2nd ed. (Cam bridge, Mass.: Har vard Univ. fish merchant Jona than Orne owned Hawke. Press, 1992). 25 Naval impress me nt is commo nly asso ci ated with 34 Cited in Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of Con flict: manning concerns . See, for ex ample, Stout, “Man- Brit ish Armed Forces and Co lo nial Amer i cans, 1677– ning the Royal Navy in North America, 1763–1775”; 1763 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, and Pares, “The Manning of the Navy in the West 1989), pp. 148–49. In dies, 1702–63.” The follow ing paragraph lists additional con cerns that prompted im press ment over 35 Ibid., pp. 152–53. and above the fac tors dis cussed at the be gin ning of 36 J. C. D. Clark, Eng lish So ci ety 1660–1832, 2nd ed. the essay. The fact that manning was not the pri- (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000). mary reason for impress ment does not make it 37 Peter War ren to the Duke of Newcas tle, 18 June something other than impress ment. 1745, in The Royal Navy and North Amer ica: The 26 Ar ticle 5 of the 1763 Paris Peace Treaty stipu lated War ren Pa pers, 1736–1752, ed. Julian Gwyn (Lon- that “the subjects of France shall have the liberty of don: Navy Records So ciety, 1973), p. 126. fish ing and dry ing on a part of the coasts of the is - 38 L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds., Le gal Pa - land of New found land, such as is spec ified in the pers of John Ad ams (Cam bridge, Mass.: Harvard XIIIth Ar ticle of the Treaty of Utrecht [i.e., from Univ. Press, 1965), vol. 2, p. 320. Bonavista to Point Riche].” Clive Parry, ed., The Con sol i dated Treaty Se ries (New York: Oceana, 39 Ibid., pp. 309, 319. 1969), vol. 42, p. 325. For arti cle 13 of the 1713 40 Ibid., pp. 294, 300. Utrecht Peace Treaty, see ibid., vol. 27, p. 486. 41 “News from Lon don, dated July 11, 1739,” Vir ginia 27 When the British naval offi cer informed Millet that Gaze tte, 12 Octo ber 1739. Also, see Vice Adm. Sam- by in ter na tional law the co lo nial fish er men were op- uel Graves to Capt. Wil liam C. Burnaby, RN [cap- er at ing in il le gal wa ters, the mar i time la borer re - tain of HM Sloop Mer lin], 5 July 1775, NDAR, vol. plied, “If I had it was through Igno rance”; Millet, 1, p. 820. de po sition. Lines drawn in peace trea ties were not 42 E. P. Thomp son, Cus toms in Com mon (New York: easy to see on the ocean. For more on this point, see New Press, 1992), pp. 185–351. Joshua M. Smith, Bor der land Smug gling: Pa tri ots, Loyal ists, and Illicit Trade in the Northeast, 1783– 43 Ibid. 1820 (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2006). 44 NDAR, vol. 2, p. 877. 28 Christo pher P. Magra, The Fish er man’s Cause: At - 45 For more on this vio lence, see Wayne E. Lee, Crowds lan tic Com merce and Mar i time Di men sions of the and Soldiers in Rev olu tionary North Carolina: The Ameri can Revo lu tion (Cam bridge, U.K.: Cambridge Cul ture of Vi olence in Riot and War (Gainesville: Univ. Press, 2009), pp. 127–58. Univ. Press of Florida, 2001). 29 6 Anne, c. 37, Great Britain, Statutes at Large from 46 For more on the Knowles riot, see Wil liam Pencak the Tenth Year of King Wil liam the Third to the End and John Lax, “The Knowles Riot and the Cri sis of of the Reign of Queen Anne . . . , vol. 4 (London: the 1740s in Massa chu setts,” Perspec tiv es in Ameri - 1769), p. 336. The Sixth of Anne formally stated: can History 10 (1976), pp. 163–214. This is the de- “That no mar iner, or other person, who shall serve fini tive study of the riot. For a treatment more on board, or be re tained to serve on board, any pri- re cent but less detailed, see Den ver A. Brunsman, vateer, or trading ship or vessel that shall be em- “The Knowles Atlan tic Impress ment Riots of the ployed in any part of America, nor any mari ner, or 1740s,” Early Amer i can Stud ies 5, no. 2 (Fall 2007), other person, being on shore in any part thereof, pp. 324–66. shall be lia ble to be impressed or taken away by any 47 “News from Nor folk, dated Septem ber 5, 1767.” offi cer or offi cers of or belong ing to any of her Maj- esty’s ships of war, em pow ered by the Lord High 48 “The Charters of Freedom,” The Na tional Ar chives, Admi ral, or any other person whatso ever, un less www.arc hives.gov/exhib its/chart ers/decla ra tion such mari ner shall have before deserted from such .html. ship of war be long ing to her Maj esty, at any time

HM20_Felker&Jones-10 Friday, February 17, 2012 9:00:48 AM II Medium Powers and Ironcla d Construc tion The Spanish Case, 1861–1868

CARLOS ALFARO ZAFORTEZA

n April 1866, the newly commis sioned ar mored frig ate Tetuán struck a rock as it sailed out of Ferrol Dockyar d. As the damage ap peared not too seri ous, it Icontin ued its trip to Cadiz. Upon ar rival, howev er, it was decid ed that the ship should un dergo repairs to mend its false keel, to clean the heavy fouling, and to fix the effe cts of three years of gal vanic ac tion be tween the cop per sheathing and armor plate. But then a sec ond prob lem arose, as none of the avail able docks was large enough to ac commo date what was at the time the largest ship built in Spain. Ow ing to lack of funds, the new docks were not yet fin ished. The frig ate was forced to sail to Toulon, where it waited, since all the docks at the French port were oc cupied by French war ships. Finally , af ter hav ing its hull cleaned and re paired, the crew conducted proper tri als and took reli able speed mea surements. 1 But the dela ys had sig - nif i cant con se quences. Tetuán’s orig i nal mis sion was to join the squad ron in the Pacific. But by the time it was finally ready for sea, the at tack on the Callao forts had taken place and the Spanish fleet had sailed away. The 1860s wit nessed a surge in warship con struction across Europe and the Amer i cas. The in tro duc tion of ar mor, ri fled guns, and iron con struc tion rev o lu- tionized naval archi tec ture. Unde terred by the huge costs involved, both great and small pow ers launched build ing pro grams to acquire the new ships. Sev eral second - ary navies strove not only to replace their wooden ships but also to increas e their na val strength. These in cluded the fleets of It aly, Aus tria, and Spain, none of which had had a squadron of capi tal ships before. By the end of the decade, the Spanish navy comprised seven seago ing ironclads and a dozen wooden frigates. Except for three of the for mer, all were built at na val dock yards, for which the nec es sary in fra - structure and tech nology had to be ac quired. This pa per ad dresses the challenges involved in building the ironclads.2 To this end, the need for such ships and the po - liti cal deci sions to autho rize them will be briefly sketched. Then the techno log i cal, eco nomic, and in dus trial chal lenges will be ex plored. Through com par i sons with other coun tries, the gen eral conclu sion is drawn that the use of in dige nous na val construc tion made the cost of sea power much higher for aspir ing na val powers

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than for the great powers. Economic and techni cal dif ficul ties plagued the domes tic con struction of the Span ish ironclads. The Need for Ironclads By the end of the 1850s, Spain’s ma jor ex ter nal secu rity concerns were the Balearic Islands and Cuba. Anglo-Frenc h ri valry after the Cri mean War and the ques tion of Italian uni fi cation raised the pros pect of a gen eral Euro pean war. The Span ish feared that Britain or France might seize Minorca as a base to strangle the other’s im pe rial routes. Span ish con cerns, though, were not iso lated to the Med i ter ranean. Cuba was seen as an ob jective of U.S. ex pan sion ism as well. The at tempts of Presi - dents Frank lin Pierce and James Buchanan, al though fu tile in ret ro spect, only in - creased ten sions. The mat ter for the Span ish gov ernment was not whether but when the United States would strike. In deed, by 1860 the two coun tries were al - ready fight ing by proxy in the Mexi can Civil War. Both govern ment and pub lic opin ion saw a na val force as a neces sary ele ment to pre serve Span ish neu tral ity in Europe and de fend Cuba against the United States. This meant first-class ves sels capa ble of in ter cept ing an in va sion force or of es cort ing a re lief ex pe di tion. The most ad equate model for these du ties was the Gloire-type ar mored frigate. The key de cisions were made in 1860, 1862, and 1866. The first de cision was the com pletion of an ini tial sea go ing iron clad and sub se quent eval u a tion of its po ten- tial. The sec ond reflec ted the fears of an impend ing war with the United States. By 1866 the Span ish gov ern ment was sens ing an im mi nent threat. But it was also suf - fering the conse quences of delays in the com pletion of the ships, since all ironclads should by then have been com pleted. In May 1860, the Junta Directiva de la Ar- mada (navy exec u tive board) had included two armored frigates in the naval expan sion pro gram. This was consid ered suf fi cient as long as only Euro pean na vies built ironclads. The main force was to be made up of nine fifty-gun frigates, at an es - ti mated cost of sev enteen mil lion reales apiece;3 that compared with thirty-five million for an ar mored frig ate. A proven tech nol ogy, frig ates were con sid ered the op ti mum so lu tion.4 But, hedging their bets, the Spanish autho rize d the construc - tion of two ar mored ships at the Ferrol (Tetuán) shipyard, and another (Numancia, subse quently can celed) at a for eign ship yard. These views changed as soon as the Navy Min is try learned the de tails of the bat - tle of Hampton Roads and of the U.S. Navy’s moni tor-buil d ing program. The junta met on 13 April to make sense of events. Its members came to the conclu sion that the Amer icans were indeed a poten tial threat to the empire and that Cuba could be defended only with armored ships. Regard less of the Civil War’s outcome, they believed that at the war’s end the Ameri cans would resume their south ward expan - sion. Sud denly, wooden ships seemed ob so lete. Af ter con sid ering its op tions, the junta de ter mined to • Convert the fifty-gun frigates Zaragoza and Arapiles into armored ships.

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• Build an other ar mored frig ate (Príncipe Alfonso) at La Carraca dockyard, using the tim bers earmarked for the fifty-gun Navas de Tolosa and the eight-hun dred-horse power engines building in France for a can celed ship.5 • Award the contracts for the building of two armored frigates abroad (Vitoria and Sagunto), whose ten ders had been un der con sid eration for some time. • Order ar mor plates from the French firm Petin et Gaudet for the fol low ing ships: Zaragoza, Tetuán, the ship to be built at La Carraca (Príncipe Alfonso), and a “floating battery.” • Apply a set of 360-horsepower engines built at Ferrol to an “armored battery,” presum ably the “floating battery” mentioned above; this ship was sub se quently canceled. • Build a further twelve “armored batter ies” for harbor defense (also can celed).6 The first four points con sti tuted the founda tion of the sub sequent build ing effort. But most of these mea sures also depended to a great ex tent on in dige nous resources. Opti mis tic esti mates about the com pletion of the ships were widespread. The Span ish ships were sched uled to be completed by the end of 1864. This rad i cal change in the naval program was a widespread phenom e non, a product of the as - sess ment of the new tech nol ogy. In many ways the Span ish de cisions were rep re- senta tive of those of smaller naval powers trying to deter mine how to fit in with their more pow erful rivals. The Italians, for exam ple, canceled the construc tion of four ninety-gun wooden battle ships. Ad di tion ally, three wooden frigates were converted into ar mored ships, and several ironclads were or dered from abroad.7 Another event that affecte d ironclad construc tion was the war against Chile and Peru.8 Once war was declared by Chile in Septem ber 1865, and then by Peru in Jan- u ary 1866, the Brit ish gov ern ment em bar goed ar ma ments or dered by both belligerents. Never the less the Peru vian gov ernment man aged to get the ironclads Huascar and Independencia completed by delay ing its decla ra tion of war. The Span - ish Vitoria and Arapiles, as well as the Chilean corvettes Chacabuco and O’Hig gins, remained in Brit ain for the dura tion of hostil i ties. After the Span ish fleet sailed away from the Pa cific in May 1866, the govern ment was concerne d over the possi bil ity of an allied attack on Cuba or the Philip pine archi pelago. The de fense of Cuba was assured by the presence of Tetuán, but by May 1867 Numancia, flag ship of the South At lantic Squadron, badly needed docking to have its iron hull cleaned and painted. A third ironclad was urgentl y needed to re - place it.9 Zaragoza would still take a year, Príncipe Alfonso lon ger. Meanwhile, the Peru vi ans were shopping around for ironclads. To lay down new hulls was out of ques tion. Time, dock yard re sources, and fi nance pre cluded it. Af ter un success ful attempts to pur chase ironclads in Denmark and the United States, the only solu tion left was to convert some wooden frig ates into belt-and-battery armored cor vettes.

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This scheme was tested in Resolución, which was sched uled for a large re fit. Still, by 1868 the de facto ces sation of the hostil i ties, the ef fects of the 1866 fi nancial crisis, and the return of polit i cal strife led to a virtual standstill in the dockyards. The 1868 revo lution ef fectively ended the cy cle of the first ironclads. Príncipe Alfonso was completed only in 1877, af ter the coun try had gone through an other pe riod of po - lit i cal tur moil. For eign and co lo nial pol icy re quire ments were pow er ful enough to create the polit i cal will to fund a domes tic building capa bil ity. However, the Span- ish ex chequer proved un equal to the task. Cop ing with Technological Change To choose the right technol ogy in a pe riod of rapid techno log i cal devel op ment was a complex deci sion. The first step was the adoption of the ironclad as the capi tal ship, which was made only after the battle of Hampton Roads. Even the most ad - vanced navies opted for solu tions diffi cult to explain, such as the British mammoth ironclads derived from Warrior or the Ameri can concen tra tion on the moni tor type. Second ary powers could not afford such costly exper i ments. They could adopt only proven technol ogy, even at the risk of being conser va tive. The restored corps of Spanish naval construc tors played a vital role in this task. Many of its members had studied naval ar chitec ture at the Lorient school, then had placements in the Brest Dockyard, complet ing their training with spells in the naval mis sion to Brit ain. As a re sult, they had a good knowl edge of the prog ress in both countries, comple mented by occa sional vis its to the United States and other coun - tries. They were respon si ble for the de sign and construc tion of the ships stud ied in this pa per. Na val in tel ligence was also crucial; naval mis sions in Britain and France played essen tial roles in tracking new devel op ments. But it proved ex tremely diffi cult to keep up with the pace of tech no logi cal change in naval warfare. By 1866 the fully armored Gloire, with its twelve-centi me ter ar mor and six teen-cen ti me ter ri fled guns, had been su per seded by the belt-and-bat tery Océan, with twenty-centi me ter armor and twenty-four-centi me ter rifled guns. Yet the Span ish ironclads—Tetuán com mis sioned and Numancia in the Pacific— had conformed to the basic design of Gloire, with thin ar mor, vulner a ble to rifled guns. More over, their ar ma ment con sisted of twenty-cen ti me ter smooth bore guns, already ob so lete and in effec tive against ar mor, as was con firmed by the ex pe ri ence of the at tack on the Callao forts in May 1866 in Peru and the battle of Lissa on 20 July that same year in the Adriatic. Keeping up with these de velop ments required sub- stantial modi fi ca t ions in the design of Príncipe Alfonso, in clud ing • Re place ment of the orig i nal eight-hun dred-horse power en gines by a thou sand-horse power set • Building of a central battery and an upper-deck armored redoubt and increase of the thickness of the water line belt to sixteen centi meters

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• Re place ment of the orig i nal ar ma ment of thirty twenty-cen ti me ter smoothbore guns with thirteen heavier, more pow erful guns protected by the cen tral battery and redoubt • Rebuild ing of the unarmored ends of the battery deck in iron, to protect them from catching fire.10 The changes re flected the strug gle between gun and ar mor, and they in tro duced a higher propor tion of iron in the ships’ struc ture. They also reflected the dif ficulty of hav ing at least one state-of-the-art ship un der construc tion. Aus tria and Italy expe rienced the same problems. After the 1866 war both na tions sought to cut ex - penses. Con se quently, though the Aus trian navy re sumed iron clad construc tion in 1867, it did so at a more lei surely pace. Italian ships lin gered on the stocks for years, just like the Spanish Príncipe Alfonso, which was finally completed only in 1877. No Italian ironclads were laid down between 1865 and 1873. Economic Constraints Ferrol Dockyard built the thousand-hors epower en gine of Príncipe Alfonso, the larg est to date. The casting of the block was straightfor ward, but the forging of large parts was be set by prob lems. The crank shaft turned out to be de fective, be cause the forging hammer was not power ful enough. The solu tion was to order a new crankshaft from John Penn & Sons of London, which dou bled the esti mated cost.11 Nev- erthe less, im port ing a crankshaft was cheaper than or der ing a larger forg ing hammer and paying the high wages of British instruc tors. The pre dic a ment at the Ferrol yard reflected the prob lems of na val mod erniza - tion for a smaller na val power. Essen tially there were two ways of acquir ing ad - vanced naval arma ments. The easier was to order the ships abroad, which offered the attrac tion of moder ate cost and quick deliv ery. However, it also entailed the use of foreign currency and long-term depend ence on foreign suppli ers, as well as on their gov ern ments’ pol i cies. Al ter na tively, fa cil i ties, plant, and know-how could be acquired to pro duce the ships lo cally. This usually meant huge invest ments in time and money, which included refur bish ing the dockyards or building them anew, to pro cure a rela tively small number of ships, of uncer tain qual ity in the ini tial out put. For rea sons of pres tige and in dus trial de vel op ment, as pir ing sea pow ers at tempted the second method. But once in oper a tion, the shipyard had to be kept busy with new construc tion to re main eco nom i cally via ble. The size of the Ital ian, Aus trian, and Span ish fleets sim ply did not allow this. With the ex ception of Aus tria, nei ther could they thrive on civil ian or for eign contracts. At the top end of the econo mies of scale, Britain enjoyed the lowest cost of sea power. The “workshop of the world” could deliver high-technol ogy products at the most compet i tive prices. A strong exche quer and a par liament will ing to spend vir - tu ally any amount of money on the Royal Navy completed this al most ideal

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scenario. Unfor tu nately, few of these bene fits were available to small and medium powers. Spain, for exam ple, could not count on its under de vel oped mari time indus tries. Their contri bution to the na val ex pan sion of the 1860s was three small, wooden gunboats and six small-crew engines. True, the country en joyed three sub - stan tial na val dock yards, a legacy of its eigh teenth-cen tury navy. However, they needed ex ten sive, costly refur bish ment to cope with the much larger modern, steam-pro pelled ships. Russia also suffered a low degree of indus tri aliza tion, but it en joyed the fi nancial strength of a great power. Its 1863 ironclad program include d the construc tion of a brand-new dockyard in Saint Peters burg for the special pur pose of building iron- armored ships. The magni tude of the project was enough to attract British capi tal, plant, and tech ni cal ex per tise.12 Such an under tak ing, though, was not fea si ble for Spain. The in vest ment in plant and the over heads in creased unit costs unac cept - ably, while the weak finances of the Spanish gov ernment made work ing for it unat - trac tive to for eign tech ni cal ad vis ers. Fur ther more, four fac tors re stricted the funds avail able for iron clad con struc - tion within the Spanish naval budget: high unit cost, the need to adapt dockyard fa - cili ties, the build ing of other ship types, and cur rent na val ac tiv ity. The cost of a Gloire-type ship, for ex am ple, was roughly dou ble that of a large frigate. By the time the navy decided that smaller, cheaper, coastal-defense vessels were more appro pri - ate for certain du ties, cost over runs had consumed all the funds al located for iron - clad con struc tion. Simi larly, new dry docks had to be built to accom mo date the new ships. The British and French navies were faced with the same prob lem. But due to their large num bers of ships, their ships/docks ra tios were higher and thus rep resented smaller propor tions of their naval budgets. In Spain, the Navy Minis try scheduled the building of four docks in Ferrol, one in La Carraca, and two in Cartagena.13 This meant an in vest ment of around 120 mil lion re ales—equiv a lent to the cost of four armored frigates. The pro ject was only par tially com pleted and was much de layed by cost over runs and bud getary problems. Between 1858 and 1866 the three pen in su lar dock yards built nine wooden frig - ates, a type con sid ered es sential for over seas service. Yet their construc tion con - sumed a large pro portion of available funds. Despite Spain’s desire to keep pace with the great na val pow ers by build ing ironclads, the far-flung in ter ests of the Spanish state re quired a more balanced naval force. Exten sive oper a tions con - ducted in support of the govern ment’s active foreign policy during the 1860s im- pinged on the naval budget and dockyard resourc es. These oper a tions included the war with Morocco (1859–60), inter ven tions in Mexico (1861–62) and Santo Domingo (1861–65), an 1863 crisis with United States over Cu ban terri to rial waters, the es tablish ment of the Pa cific Station (1862), and the subse quent war with

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Chile and Peru (1865–68). The lo gisti cal and refit work in volved meant heavy, un - fore seen ex penses, which com peted with new construc tion in a dwin dling naval budget. Simul ta neous financ ing of a large building program and oper a tional demands could not be achieved through the ordi nary annual budget. At the time the Spanish trea sury benefited from the Disentailment Law of 1855. This piece of leg is lation was central to the economic pol icies of Spanish Liberal govern ments, as it put up for sale a large mass of common land. This source of extra income was directed primar - ily to public works and the armed forces. By an act of 1 April 1859, the navy received a supple men tary credit of 450 million reales for dockyard plant and facil i ties and ship construc tion. A supple men tary credit of 250 million was provided two years later.14 As previ ously mentioned, the program was sub sequently modi fied by, on one hand, the increas ed impor tance of the ironclad and, on the other, budget re - ductions and cost overruns. By 1864 the bud get defi cit caused by heavy spend ing—not only foreign inter - ventions but also railway sub sidies—as well as a rising pub lic debt placed a heavy burden on the trea sury. Simul ta neously, income began to dwin dle through a se vere downturn of an economy already weakened by the cot ton decline caused by the Ameri can Civil War. The ef fects of the 1866 fi nancial crisis, to gether with the fail ure of the 1866 and 1867 har vests, aggra vated the sit u a tion. As a re sult, the na val budget was sub jected to se vere cuts that preclude d payments to for eign contrac tors. In June 1867, John Brown and Company in Brit ain claimed over due pay ments to tal - ing £28,000 for the plates of Zaragoza and Príncipe Alfonso.15 Once Zaragoza was completed, work in the dockyards came to a standstill; for all practi cal pur poses, the building program ended with the 1868 rev o lution, in which Queen Isabella II was de posed. A Weak Industrial Base Because of the lack of in dus trial in frastruc ture, construc tion was de layed beyond 1864 and the pe riod of economic prosper ity. The main aspects of this lack of resources were pro cure ment dif fi cul ties and lack of pri vate in dus try, build ing ma te rials, and dockyard facil i ties. In this period the Spanish dockyards made the tran si tion from the tra di tional, cen tu ries-old sup ply sys tem of work ing with ba si - cally raw ma te ri als to a mix ture of raw ma te ri als, man u fac tured com po nents, and ma chin ery. The in tro duction of steam power and iron in na val con struction made pro curement of the new ma te rials more com plex. As an ex am ple, some times ar mor plate had to be trimmed to ac count for wrong templates or modi fi ca tions to the hull. This was a time-con sum ing job, since nei ther ad e quate means nor per son nel was available. 16 The navy had to spec ify de tails and cost es ti mates for the dif ferent compo nents, put them out to ten der, conclude contracts, make payments, and conduct quality control. The other problem was inte grating foreign compo nents into

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Spanish ships. To deal with the growing pro portion of foreign-pr o duced items, the navy main tained two stand ing naval mis sions abroad, one in Brit ain and one in France, in constant com mu ni cation with the minis try and the dock yards. The ef - forts of these, in which admin is tra tive person nel and naval construc tors worked in close col lab o ra tion, needed close co or di na tion. These man age ment skills were crit - ical factors in the procure ment process; they kept delays and cost over runs within reason able limits, but they took time to acquire. A further disad van tage was the lack of a domes tic private sector that could supple ment this build ing effort. The ideal case of Brit ain has been men tioned. Though smaller, less indus tri alized coun tries like Aus tria or It aly benefited from fledg ling pri vate sec tors. The Aus trian navy re lied on the mari time in dus tries around the active port of Trieste, where the steam packet com pany Österreichischer Lloyd was based. These com pa nies in cluded the Stabilimento Tecnico Triestino ship yard, which built the hulls of all the Aus trian navy’s ironclads; engi neer ing firms that built the en gines and boilers; and even an armor-plate man u facturer, in Zeltweg.17 This high de gree of nation aliza tion avoided pay ment in for eign currency, further invest ment in the Pola Dockyard, and strain on the limited capac i ties of the naval dockyards. The Ital ian navy too was assisted by the private sec tor, albeit to a lesser de gree. While the new estab lish ment at La Spezia was being built, it had to make do with the obso lete dockyards of Genoa and Naples. Italian ship engines were of do - mes tic man u facture, and the Orlando Ship yard, of Livorno, built one ship.18 Still, the Italian navy had to resort to foreign ship yards for more than half of its ironclads. By compar i son, Span ish indus tries did not help the navy to any consid er able extent. Only in 1867 did Portilla Hermanos y White, of Se ville, start the do mestic pro - duction of sheet and an gle iron, rivets, screws, and nuts. This under tak ing was in direct response to an ur gent appeal from the navy to com plete the as-yet unarmored sides of Príncipe Alfonso.19 As all the ma te ri als for the rail way con struc tion boom were imported, its contri bu tion to the devel op ment of the Spanish iron indus try was nil. Due to fi nan cial dif fi culties, the navy was able neither to pay foreign con- tractors nor to set up a new workshop in a dockyard. The main diffi culty in produc - ing iron com po nents lay in re cruit ing the nec es sary skilled la bor, vir tu ally non - ex is tent in Spain. This in ev i ta bly meant Brit ish work ers and in structors. The navy was unable to pay their high wages punctu ally. Tim ber supply was an other sig nif i cant prob lem. Most ironclads con tin ued to be built of wood. But in the nineteenth century the Spanish navy no longer ran its own tim ber-supply system, rely ing instead on pri vate con tractors. Just as the 1859 pro - gram was launched, this arrange ment came un der se vere strain, for three rea sons. First, the 1859–61 pro gram meant a signif i cantly heavier demand than pre vi ously. Also, the An glo-French na val race fol low ing the end of the Cri mean War led to a general shortage of large, seasoned tim ber in the Euro pean mar ket. Fi nally,

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substan tial con tracts concluded with sup pli ers in the United States failed to ma te ri- alize, because of the on set of the Amer i can Civil War and the subse quent blockade of the Southern ports. To get around the first prob lem, the Spanish ordered some of the projected ships from abroad, but this arrang ement was thwarted by tim ber short ages in for eign ship yards. Ad di tion ally, poor-qual ity tim ber was re spon si ble for the cancelation of con tracts for one ar mored and one fifty-gun frig ate with Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée of La Seyne, and of an other fifty-gun frigate in Brit ain. The builder of Arapiles asked for permis sion to reduce the scantling s of its floor tim bers, since he was unable to find sound tim ber of the re quired di men - sions.20 Con se quently, the navy had to re vise its plans. It con cluded new tim ber contract s for the construc tion of addi tional ships. The third fac tor delayed the launch ing of Tetuán. Since pine deck beams from the south ern United States were not forthcom ing, iron deck beams were ordered from Eng land.21 As a re sult of this dearth of large tim ber pieces in the in ter na tional mar ket, Zaragoza, sister ship to the Brit ish-built Arapiles, had more iron worked into its hull. This led to the future increase of iron com po nents in ship build ing, such as deck beams, frames, and knees (which supported the deck beams at the ends, where they joined the frames). Owing to the lack of suit able person nel, the fa cili ties for ironworking re mained very lim ited. The hard ware needed to cut, shape, and punch sheet iron was acquired in Britain and sent to Ferrol Dockyard but was then put aside for lack of skilled labor. In 1866, in the midst of the war against Chile and Peru, quick servic ing of the fleet was criti cal. Never the less , only through the col labo ra tion of Portilla and the trans at lan tic steam line An to nio López y Cía. of Bar celona, which sup plied two dozen engi neers and boilermakers between them, could Cadiz Dockyard com plete the fitting out of two wooden frigates. 22 Even the phys ical config u ra tion of the dockyards was inad e quate for the construction of large ships. Príncipe Alfonso was scheduled to be built in Cadiz.23 But in - firm slipways and the progres sive silting of the channels around the dockyard precluded the building of large ships. Moreover, once launched, the ironclad would not be able to enter any of the ex ist ing dry docks.24 There fore, it was de cided to have the ship built at Ferrol, which was spacious, had long and firm slipways, and deep draft. Moreover, it was expected that the dry dock ordered in Britain would be ready before the ship was completed. Cartagena also needed heavy invest ment in slipways and docks, but the dockyard there was built on firm ground, unlike Cadiz, and the har bor was deep enough. That is why the ironclads were built at Ferrol and Cartagena. {LINE-SPACE } Spain’s par tic u lar, changing circum stances and its eco nomic structure proved to be im ped i ments to build ing an iron clad squad ron. The win dow of op por tu nity comprised only the five years from 1859 to 1864. If the dockyard facil i ties had been

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:11 AM 20 NEW IN TER PRE TA TIONS IN NA VAL HIS TORY

more up-to-date and the Spanish mari time indus tries had been more devel oped, as in Austria or Italy, the pro ject could have been feasi ble. Thereaf ter, po lit i cal and budget ary sta bility dis ap peared. At the same time, an un ex pected war de manded the ur gent comple tion of the new ships. By 1868 the build ing activ ity had come to a stand still. Yet the re sults were accept able, if not wholly satis factory. The er rors made were much like those of the British and French. By 1870 the Spanish navy could field six seago ing ironclads; if their armor was already too thin, they were armed with ri fled guns. The cases of Aus tria and It aly are com pa rable. This leads to the wider ques tion of why second ary pow ers were willing to face the stag gering costs of do mes tic iron clad con struc tion. Na tion al ism was cer tainly im por tant. Like their larger coun ter parts, these powers had in de pend ent na tional poli cies. It was only rea son able for them to de velop a cer tain de gree of naval self-suffi ciency and the means to pursue it. This course of action of ten turned out to be much cost lier than orig i nally envis aged. Further more, it proved almost impos si ble to keep up with the latest devel op ments. Despite the disad van tages, however, the Spanish navy for the most part ade quately sup ported over seas po lit i cal ob jec tives.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:11 AM MEDIUM POWERS AND IRONCLAD CONSTRUCTION 21

NOTES 1 Ferrol Chief Construc tor to commander of Ferrol 15 “Proyecto de ley, presentado por el Sr. Ministro de Dockyard, 24 Novem ber 1865, Archivo General de Haci enda, relativo a los presupuestos gener ales del Marina Álvaro de Bazán, El Viso de Marqués, Estado para el año económico de 1866 a 1867,” Ciudad Real [hereaf ter AGMAB], Ferrol 3872; Chief Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Congreso, 10 Febru ary Con structor of naval mission to France to Navy 1866, apps. 1, 3, 53; John Brown and Co. to Bri ga - Minis ter, 8 June 1866, AGMAB, Buques 1176/712/ dier Acha (offi cer in charge of the naval mission to VII. Britain), 20 June 1867, AGMAB, Buques 1176/651/ 2 For an overview of the Spanish ironclad program II. see Carlos Alfaro Zaforteza, “Cambio tecnológico y 16 Captain General Ferrol Na val De partment to Navy política naval en la monarquía isabelina: los Minis ter, 30 August 1865, AGMAB, Buques 1176/ primeros blindados,” Revista de Historia Na val, no. 712/VI; Chief Con structor to Direc tor of Person nel, 73 (2001), pp. 75–103. 20 Jan u ary 1868, AGMAB, Buques 1176/806. 3 Approx i mate exchange rate: one pound sterling 17 L. Sondhaus, The Habs burg Em pire and the Sea: Aus - equals one hundred reales. trian Naval Policy , 1797–1866 (West La fayette, Ind.: 4 Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Congreso, 29 Janu ary Purdue Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 210–11; “Die 1861, p. 1342. Panzerplatten-Fabrikation in Oesterreich,” Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Berg- und 5 All horse power figures refer to nomi nal val ues Hüttenwesen, 20 Au gust 1866, pp. 268–70. rather than effec tive power. Nomi nal power was a measure of the phys ical size of the engine, which 18 Gabriele, La prima marina d’Italia, pp. 44–45, 155– was directly re lated to its effec tive power. 58; “La ma rine militaire de l’Italie en 1867,” La Re - vue Mari time et Coloniale (Decem ber 1867), pp. 6 Minutes of 13 April 1862 meeting, AGMAB, Buques 789–90. 1176/493. 19 Mem o ran dum on ma te ri als needed for the Príncipe 7 Mariano Gabriele, La prima marina d’Italia (1860– Alfonso, with com ments by Chief Bookkeeper dated 1866) (Roma: Ufficio Storico della Ma rina Militare, 23 May 1867 and by Chief Construc tor dated 31 1999), pp. 84, 88. May 1867; report on the in spec tion visit by naval of - 8 For a survey of the war from the Amer ican view- ficers and con struc tors to the pre mises of Portilla point see Wil liam C. Da vis, The Last Conquistadores: Hermanos y White, 14 May 1867; all AGMAB, The Span ish In ter ven tion in Peru and Chile, 1863– Buques 1176/651. 1866 (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1950). For the 20 That is, the dimen sions of the structural mem bers Spanish view see Agustín Ramón Rodríguez laid across the keel. Navy Min ister to pres ident of González, La Armada Española, la Campaña del the Junta Consultiva, 28 June 1861 and 25 Novem - Pacífico, 1862–1871, España frente a Chile y Perú ber 1861, AGMAB, Ingenieros 3420. (Madrid: Agualarga, 1999). 21 Navy Chief Construc tor, note on mem o ran dum 9 Navy Minis ter to Captain General of the Cartagena dated 29 Decem ber 1861; Captain General of Ferrol Depart ment, min utes, 28 May 1867, AGMAB, Depart ment to Navy Minis ter, telegrams, 14 August Buques 1176/806. 1862 and 5 Decem ber 1862; all AGMAB, Buques 10 Chief Construc tor to Direc tor of Marine Artil lery, 1176/712-I. 15 No vem ber 1866, AGMAB, Buques 1176/586. 22 Captain General of Cadiz Depart ment to Navy Min- 11 Mem o ran dum, 17 July 1870, AGMAB, Buques ister, 25 Janu ary 1866, dated 1, 2, and 3 Febru ary 1176/651. 1866, AGMAB, Maestranza 2647. 12 Jacob W. Kipp, “Das Russische Marineministerium 23 Navy Minis ter to Captain General of Cadiz Depart - und die Einführung der Panzerschiffe,” Ma rine ment, 9 Octo ber 1862, minutes, AGMAB, Buques Rundschau (April 1981), pp. 211–12. 1176/576. 13 Navy Minis ter to presi dent of the Junta Consultiva, 24 Chief Construc tor of La Carraca to Captain General 1 June 1861, AGMAB, Ingenieros 3420. of Cadiz Depart ment, 5 No vem ber 1862, AGMAB, 14 Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Senado, 10 March 1859, Buques 1176/443. app. 31, and Congreso, 18 May 1864, p. 2153.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:11 AM HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:11 AM III Wa ter Wings The Early Years of Navy and Ma rine Corps Avi ation

LAURENCE MITCH ELL BURKE II

he int roduc t ion of a novum—a new conc ept or new hard ware—is not, by it self, suffi cient to change how a mili tary orga ni zation wages war. The novum must be int e grated into the mili tar y in the form of doc trine gov ern- T 1 ing, train ing in, and suppor t for its use. In the case of the air plane, several fac tors influ e nced its inte gr ati on into the mili tar y. The limited perfor manc e and mechan i - cal unr eli abil ity of early air craft, mini mal funding, and the state of domes tic aircraft manu fac tur ing all constr ained the abilit y of the U.S. Navy and Mari ne Corps to de - velop avi a tion. But I will ad dress only one fac tor here: the dis turbed and contest ed (or, at best, un clear) lead ership in navy and Ma rine Corps avi a tion in the years prior to World War I. Leader ship plays an impor tant role in orga n iza tional inno va tion. A rece nt attempt to predict mili tary inno va tion was unable to do so reli ably but did identify factors that indi cate likeli hood for change. These provide a useful framework for exam in ing the in troduc tion of the air plane to both the navy and Marine Corps.2 One of these con di tions is the pres ence of “prod uct cham pi ons”—se nior of fi cers who ad vo cate changes.3 The ex is tence of a prod uct champion, will ing and able to fight for the inte gra tion of a novum into his (or her) or gani za tion, is an impor tant factor. This champion works to assem ble a network of support to bring about change that he (or she) be lieves is neces sary. 4 Un sta ble lead er ship of na val avi a tion up to World War I hin dered the emergenc e of product champi ons, contrib ut ing to its slow de vel op ment. The navy first con sid ered the air plane in 1898: war with Spain was loom ing, and this drove gov ernment in ter est in Sam uel Langley’s success ful unmanned fly ing ma chines.5 Despite a posi tive endorse ment by a joint army-navy board of Langley’s plans for a man-car rying machine, the navy’s Board on Construc tion de cided that the air plane had no place in the service. Never the less, naval observ ers partic i pated in the 1908 tri als of the Wright Mili tary Flyer. One of these prepared an enthu sias tic report for William Cowles, the chief of the Bureau of Equipment. 6 But once again, the navy took no ac tion.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:11 AM 24 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY

Still, there was plenty of in ter est in air planes among na val of fi cers. In 1909, Cowles asked to pur chase two air planes; the act ing secre tary re plied that air planes had not “progre ssed suffi cientl y to war rant their purchase at this time.”7 A year later, both Hutch I. Cone, chief of the Bureau of Steam Engi neer ing (BuEng), and Richard Watt, chief of the Bureau of Construc tion and Re pair (BuC&R), sepa rately re quested au thor ity to pur chase air planes.8 The new sec retary, George von Lengerke Meyer, passed Cone’s re quest to the navy’s General Board for comment. Its presi dent, Adm. George Dewey, recom - mended that “the value of aeroplanes for use in naval warfare should be inves ti - gated without delay.” 9 But the as sistant secre tary merely ordered BuEng and BuC&R to assign offi cers to coor di nate with Capt. Washing ton Irving Cham bers, who was han dling avi a tion mail for the secre tary. How ever, these of fi cers were only to work with Cham bers, not for him.10 Never the less , Chambers , though given little au thor ity, was to have a great in fluence on naval avi a tion and to be its first suc cessful prod uct champion. 11 With his am bigu ous man date, Cham bers orga nized the 14 No vem ber 1910 flight of Eugene Ely from the cruiser Bir ming ham.12 On 18 Janu ary 1911, Ely landed on the bat tle ship Penn syl va nia. These events are typ i cally cited as the ex per i men tal be gin- nings of the aircraft carrier . How ever, these flights were simply proof-of-concept exper i ments to show that air craft could oper ate with ships. A third flight, almost for gotten in na val avia tion histo ries, took place in Febru - ary 1911: Glenn Curtiss demon strated his new “hydroaeroplane” (a floatplane) by landing in the water next to Pennsyl va ni a and being hoisted aboard.13 After a recep - tion, Curtiss was hoisted out again and re turned to his base.14 Chambers felt that the hydroaeroplane would be most useful to the navy, needing no special modi fi ca tions to ships.15 In light of these exper i mental successes, Chambers pushed for funding for the navy to buy its own air planes.16 The next two months demon strated the unsta ble posi tion of avia tion within the navy. In mid-March, Secre tary Meyer, respond ing to Cham bers’s requests for clar i - fica tion of his terms of refer ence, ordered him to “keep informed,” advise, recom - mend, guide, and consult on avi ation mat ters but gave him no author ity. In an effort to give Chambers some support, Admi ral Dewey transferr ed him to the Gen - eral Board on 30 March. The success ful flights garnered money for na val avi a tion, but Congres s placed the twenty-five thousand dollars un der the Bureau of Navi ga - tion (BuNav). Thus Cham bers transferred again, on 14 April, to BuNav, where he was given a partic u larl y cold recep tion. 17 With the money, Cham bers purchased three airplanes, primar ily for training pilots and second arily for exper i ments to explore the airplane’s poten tial. 18 He knew that the airplane was not ready to be inte gra ted into naval oper a tions. But Cham- bers expected to have a nu cleus of trained pi lots by the time a plane had been

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:11 AM WATER WINGS 25

devel oped that could accom pany the fleet to sea. Thereaf ter, all training of avia tors would take place in the fleet, to ex pose more sail ors to avia tion than would be possi - ble if airplanes were based ashore or in special-pur pose ships.19 Train ing of the first na val avi a tors had started well be fore Con gress funded the planes. Tak ing ad van tage of of fers from Curtiss and the Wrights, Cham bers had as - signed the first naval avia tors. Lt. Theo dore G. “Spuds” Ellyson ar rived at Curtiss’s San Diego camp on 23 Decem ber 1910 and helped with the two flights to Penn syl va - nia. Lt. John Rodgers (who had seen the flights as a mem ber of Penn syl va nia’s crew) reported to Dayton, Ohio, for training on 17 March 1911.20 Lt. John Tow ers re - ported for training at the Curtiss plant in Hammondsport, New York, on 27 June. These men had great in fluence in this early pe riod of na val avi a tion, train ing subse - quent naval avia tors and estab lish ing the sylla bus for further training. 21 Once trained, these of fi cers converged on the navy’s first aero nau tical sta tion— Greenbury Point, in Annapolis, Mary land. Rodg ers and Tow ers, along with a small cadre of enlisted men, were at the “avia tion camp” by Septem ber 1911; Ellyson arrived on 3 Octo ber.22 There the avia tors began to famil iar ize them selves with the navy’s new planes, practice their fly ing, and plan exper i ments. They were joined in Novem ber by Ens. Victor Herbster.23 Cham bers as signed Herbster to train ing in the Wright air plane, high light ing two sources of ten sion al ready ex tant in this small com mu nity of na val avi a tors.24 The first source of ten sion was rooted in a pat ent bat tle be tween the Wrights and Curtiss. While the is sue played out in court, some of that an i mos ity fil tered down to the pilots the two firms trained.25 The sepa ra tion into Wright and Curtiss “camps” (which was quite literal at times) was rein forc ed by the fact that the two man ufac - tur ers used en tirely dif ferent de signs for their flight con trols.26 Herbster’s assign - ment to the Wright B-1 meant that Rodgers had to be his instruc tor. The second source of ten sion stemmed from ques tions of se nior ity. Rodgers was the se nior lieuten ant, but Ellyson had started avi a tion train ing first. That Rodgers had charge of training Herbster did nothing to clarify the rela tive author ity between Rodgers and Ellyson. Never of fi cially set tled, the mat ter caused ten sion within na - val avia tion while Rodgers and Ellyson were fly ing.27 That the two were also on oppo site sides of the Wright/Curtiss is sue exac er bated both prob lems and splint ered the na val avi a tion com mu nity. In addi tion to their intracamp problems, all of the avi ators were occa sion ally frus trated with the nonflying Cham bers. For instanc e, the flyers wanted to make their ex is tence known to the pub lic and dem on strate their use fulness to the rest of the navy through par tic i pa tion in pub lic aeronau tical meets and set ting new avi a - tion records . Chambers , on the other hand, was terri bly concer ned that fa tal crashes would harm the repu ta tion of na val avi a tion and did all he could to em pha size safety, in clud ing pre vent ing his avi a tors from of fi cially at tend ing avi a tion meets and

HM20_Felker&Jones-25 Friday, February 17, 2012 9:01:40 AM 26 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY

discour ag ing record seeking. Nor did the flyers un derstand how carefull y Chambers needed to tread to get what was wanted from the chiefs of the var i ous bureaus. 28 But the least tracta ble issues arose from the fact that Cham bers was not a flyer. Cham bers based his un derstand ing of avia tion on the ory, and he managed avia - tion accord ingly. The avia tors recog nized that avi ation the ory was still a long way from descri bing what happened in the real world and har bored a de gree of resent - ment that Cham bers could not (or would not) appre ci ate their problems. 29 For in - stance, Chambers wanted to develop a stan dard con trol for aircraf t, but when one flyer suggested try ing the now famil iar stick and rudder pedals in an air craft, Cham- bers resisted. He felt that steer ing with the feet would be awk ward for a sailor and was just a “Euro pean vogue” that would pass. He also ob jected to the stick, believ - ing that a wheel would be more nat u ral to a navy man.30 Fur ther more, Cham bers was order ing new planes without consid er ing the avia tors’ opinions. The flyers grew so frustrated that they wrote direc tly to the secre tary of the navy, rec ommend - ing that a fly ing offi cer be involved in select ing new aircraft designs. 31 There was a strong feel ing among the avi a tors that actual fly ing of fi cers should have the fi nal say in is sues con nected with flying—there were too many in tan gibles that nonflyers would never under stand. In the spring of 1912, more of fi cers reported for flight train ing. One was 1st Lt. Alfred Austel Cunningham, the first Marine Corps avia tor. Be fore report ing to Annapolis, Cunningham had been at the Ma rines’ Ad vance Base School in Phil a - delphia. Offi cers at the Advance Base School were still working on what that force would look like.32 Cunningham envi sioned the air plane as a substi tute for cavalry, and on 12 Febru ary 1912 he suggested that a small avia tion unit should be added to the Ad vance Base Force. The Ma jor General Comman dant of the Ma rine Corps, William Biddle, rec ognized that air planes could greatly bene fit ad vance-base defenses and recom mended that Ma rine offi cers should be trained to fly, “so that a suffi cient number of expert avi a tors . . . may be available” to conduct recon nais - sance for an ad vance base.33 Cham bers agreed and recom mended that the Ma rine Corps send offi cers to the avia tion camp for training. 34 Con sequently, Biddle or - dered Cunningham and 1st Lt. Bernard Smith to avi a tion train ing. Cunningham reported on 22 May 1912 and Smith on 18 Septem ber.35 Thus a new ten sion was in - troduced to avia tion, one that largely contin ues to this day: while the Marine avia - tors thought of themselves as do ing Corps-specific tasks, naval avia tion leader ship viewed the Marines as ad di tional resource s for navy mis sions.36 In the mean time, Rodgers had left avi a tion, re quest ing and receiv ing orders to sea duty in Au gust 1912.37 Among the rea sons for his do ing so was that the new navy secre tary, Josephus Daniels, placed great im por tance on time at sea for pro mo tions. At the time, many in the navy (in cluding the avia tors), saw avia tion as just an other as signment, not a ca reer.38 As well, the per ish able nature of fly ing skills was not yet

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rec ognized; it was thought that trained of ficer s could fly again at any time.39 Thus, Rodgers’s return to the fleet was seen as nei ther un usual nor a par tic u lar setback to naval avia tion. Ellyson was the second offi cer to leave naval avia tion volun tarily, follow ing a drift away from the “ac tion” of the avia tion camp to the pol itics and pa- perwork of Washing ton. In mid-March 1913, Ellyson, frustrated with Chambers’ s leader ship and also needing sea time, re quested orders to sea duty and left avia tion on 29 April.40 Ellyson and Rodgers ceased to be either product champi ons for the airplane or part of the network support ing other champi ons. Both rejoined naval avia tion after the Great War, but so much had changed by then that neither ever again wielded the influ ence they had in those first years.41 In contrast, John Tow ers remained with na val avi ation through out his ca reer, making him a partic u larly influ en tial prod uct champion. Unlike Rodgers and Ellyson, Cunningham’s de parture from ac tive partic i pa tion in na val avi a tion was not his own idea: his fiancée forced him to choose be tween fly - ing and marry ing her.42 After his de parture from flying in August 1913, how ever, Cunningham contin ued to be a product champion for avia tion within the Marine Corps. He was also a member of the Cham bers Board, which met in Oc to ber 1913 in order to set forth specific propos als for giving the navy an “ade quate aeronau ti cal ser vice.”43 Cunningham eventu ally overcame his wife’s objec tions, return ing to active flight status in 1915 and remain ing on avia tion duty through 1922.44 One more “depar ture” in 1913 had a signif i cant impact on naval avi ation. On 30 June, a special board forc ibly retired Cham bers. In the service vernac u lar of the time, he was “plucked,” os ten si bly for lack of sea time as a cap tain—the fate feared by Ellyson and Rodgers. Chambers had wanted to go back to sea but had de layed because the navy had not assigne d a relief as head of avia tion within BuNav. He also feared what could happen to naval avia tion without a senior offi cer in charge or, worse, with one who did not care about avia tion. 45 Chambers had believed that his impor tant role, manag ing naval avia tion, would pro tect him. However, the real reason behind his plucking was likely the manip u la tion of Adm. Bradley Fiske (Aide for Oper a tions since Janu ary 1913), who felt that Cham bers was retard ing naval avi a tion.46 As mentioned ear lier, Cham bers took a pragmatic ap proach to na val avi a tion’s de velop ment. The lim i ta tions of the machines were one reason. 47 Cham bers firmly believed that improve ments in pro pulsion took prece dence over tests of bombs and bombing equipment, which the planes could not yet carry anyway. 48 In any case, Cham bers felt that bomb ing was one of the less impor tant uses of naval avi ation. Navy planes would be much more useful in scouting and recon nais sance. 49 Fiske, on the other hand, had grand ideas for reform ing the navy, in cluding the use of naval avia tion. He envi sioned waves of navy bombers repuls ing land ing forces and torpedo planes sinking ships.50 Although Cham bers had log ical reasons

HM20_Felker&Jones-27 Friday, February 17, 2012 9:03:23 AM 28 NEW INTERPRETATIONS IN NAVAL HISTORY

for his pol icies, his prag matism seemed to Fiske more like outright oppo si tion to na val avi a tion.51 Ironi cally, though Fiske may have wanted Cham bers gone in order to put his own man in place, no one else was available. Cham bers remained on ac - tive duty as the head of na val avi a tion within the bu reau; in fact, Chambers would remain on active duty with avi a tion through 31 Octo ber 1919. But his signif i cance as a product champion began to wane with his plucking. 52 As a fur ther irony, Cham bers’s retire ment and rein state ment occurred at a time when the nascent or- gani za tion was begin ning to demon strat e its useful ness to the fleet. Through the end of 1912, na val and Marine avi a tors had ex peri mented with dif - fer ent en gines, wire less te leg ra phy, and sub ma rine spot ting.53 Early in 1913, the avi - ation camp packed up to join the fleet’s win ter maneu vers at Guantanamo, Cuba. While there, the seven of fi cers of the camp (in clud ing the two Ma rines) flew their five aircraf t as much as possi ble, spot ting sub marines, scouting for the fleet, and, perhaps most impor tantly, giving rides to fleet offi cers . This last practice not only gave naval offi cers a sense of what the air plane could do but gen erated more requests to become avia tors—one of them from Lt. Cdr. Henry Mustin. Already in- trigued by flying, he quali fied as an avia tor while in Cuba.54 Other pas sen gers include d two future com manders of naval avia tion (Cdr. Noble E. Irwin and Lt. Cdr. Thomas Tingey Craven) and a future Marine Corps Comman dant (Lt. Col. John Lejeune).55 The com mander of the At lantic Fleet, Rear Adm. Charles Badger, was so im pressed by the avi a tors’ per for mance that he planned to use planes in case of orders to in tervene that win ter in Mexico. 56 But the an tic i pated or ders never came, and in mid-March the avi a tion camp re turned to Annapolis.57 Cham bers’s loss of in flu ence, which had be gun with his pluck ing, con tin ued dur ing the win ter of 1913–14. Capt. Mark Bris tol re ported to Fiske in De cem ber for “special duties” with the Aide for Oper a tions. Fiske told him to take charge of avia - tion, but these or ders were prob lem atic since Cham bers was still in charge of avi a - tion in the Bureau of Navi ga tion. 58 In Janu ary, how ever, Fiske suc ceeded in trans ferring avi a tion (and Cham bers) to his sphere of responsibility and named Bristol the head of what would, on 1 July 1914, of fi cially be called the Of fice of Na - val Avi a tion.59 Though Fiske’s out spo ken ness eventu ally led to his re moval from naval avia tion, his rank made somewhat easier the coor di nation of the vari ous (and con ten tious) navy bu reaus.60 This new regime wasted no time, is suing a flurry of orders to im plement the rec - om men da tions of the Cham bers Board:61 Mustin be came ex ec u tive of fi cer and acting command ing offi cer of the old battle ship Mis sis sippi on 31 Decem ber 1913. Three days later, Daniels or dered the avia tion camp at Annapolis to move to Pensacola.62 Shortly there af ter, Bris tol ordered Mis sis sippi to Pensacola to become the station ship of the new Na val Aeronau tic Sta tion.63 Bristol ordered Tow ers to es - tablish the Navy Fly ing School ashore at Pensacola but confused the is sue of

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com mand by not ing that Mustin, as Se nior Of fi cer Present, would de cide ex actly where the school would be es tab lished.64 Mustin, a lieuten ant commander, clearly out ranked Towers, a lieuten ant, but Towers was clearly the senior avi ator, hav ing taught Mustin to fly. Despite the po ten tial, this am bigu ity never devel oped into a problem. More damag ing over the long term was the poor rela tion ship that eventu - ally devel oped between Mustin and Bristol. 65 While every one else was moving to Pensacola, Ber nard Smith and the newest Marine avia tor, 2nd Lt. Wil liam McIlvain, took two aircraft and ten enlisted Ma- rines to join the first Ad vance Base Maneu vers in Culebra, Puerto Rico.66 As with the avia tion camp the previ ous year, the “Marine Section of the Flying School” par - tic i pated in ma neu vers but also found time for fly ing Marine of fi cers over the prac - tice area.67 Through such ef forts the avia tors made favor able im pressions on the commander of the advance-b ase forces, Col. George Barnett (made Major General Com man dant of the Marine Corps on his re turn to the States), as well as—once again—Ad mi ral Badger.68 The Ma rine Sec tion re turned to Pensacola in plenty of time for na val avi a tion’s first real test, though its mem bers would be left out of it. The Mex i can Revo lution was heating up, and the U.S. Navy received orders to inter vene. On 21 April 1914, a landing force of navy and Ma rine per sonnel oc cupied the Mex ican port of Veracruz. Another squad ron pre pared to land forces at Tampico, if nec es sary. Na - val avia tion arrived a few days later—Towers, Smith, Ensign Godfrey de Cheva lier, four airplanes, and ten mechan ics sailed to Tampico on USS Birmin gham .69 Mean - while, Mustin and Mis sis sippi, with Lt. (j.g.) Patrick Bellin ger , three student avia - tors, and the remaining two planes, steamed to Veracruz. Bel lin ger did the bulk of the fly ing, in aircraft re con fig ured as land planes, mostly in sup port of the land ing forces. (At Tampico, Tow ers’s section had or ders to make no flights.)70 These flights were in the na ture of ad vance-base work, but the only Marine avia tors were in Tampico (Smith) and back at Pensacola (McIlvain). Nor were the planes placed under the control of the Marine forces ashore. An army brigade ar rived on 30 April to re lieve the landing par ties and attempted to take over the navy’s avi ation section. But the planes re mained under navy control, sup port- ing the Marines (who remained ashore) as well as the army until Mis sis sippi re - turned to Pensacola in June.71 The begin ning of the First World War later that summer had ma jor reper cus - sions on na val avi a tion. Tow ers im me di ately re quested to be sent as an ob server and soon re ceived or ders to Lon don as an as sis tant na val attaché.72 Tow ers would spend two years in Lon don, ben e fit ing from his friend ship with Lt. Cdr. Cyril Porte of the Royal Navy Air Ser vice. They had met in the sum mer of 1914, while plan ning a trans atlan tic flight with Curtiss.73 When the war broke out, Porte re turned to Eng- land, where he was able to give Tow ers entrée to British naval aviation.

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Mean while, fur ther tech ni cal de vel op ment of na val avi a tion ef fec tively halted. Mis sis sippi was sold to Greece. The avi a tors had no sooner shifted the planes and all avi a tion equip ment to the ar mored cruiser North Carolina (the new avia tion station ship) than they were ordered to Boston, where the crew off-loaded it all.74 On 7 August 1914, the ship sailed to Eu rope to pro vide re lief to Ameri cans stranded overseas, and the avia tion offi cers were needed to help man the ship. Mustin remained as ex ecu tive of fi cer, but Capt. Joseph Oman took com mand just be fore they sailed. McIlvain was the only flyer ordered off the ship, in order to oversee ship ment of the avi ation gear back to Pensacola.75 The avia tors remained on board and were effec tively away from avia tion un til their return to the United States at the end of 1914.76 (The ship would not re turn to Pensacola un til Sep tem ber 1915.)77 The loss was not just of per son nel; Pensacola was ef fectively op erat ing out of the sta tion ship. All ac counts (in cluding pay for the men left in Pensacola) and pa per work had to go through the ship.78 Until it re turned or other ar rangements were made, the de - vel op ment of na val avi a tion was ef fec tively par a lyzed.79 North Carolina’s en gagement in Eu rope was not all bad, how ever. Upon ar rival in France, Mustin, Bellin ger, and Smith went to Paris on an im promptu fact-find ing mis sion.80 They toured sev eral airplane facto ries and were also able to observe some of the lo cal French army avi a tion squad rons.81 Their presence in Europe also made it eas ier for Bris tol to have Smith and Herbster as signed as as sis tant na val attachés in Paris and Berlin, re spec tively.82 Over the next two years the infor ma tion that Tow ers, Smith, and Herbster gained on Euro pean avi ation would be of great help. By the end of Jan u ary 1915, all the avi a tors who had sailed with North Carolina (ex cept Smith and Herbster) had re turned to Pensacola.83 That March, Congre ss provided one million dollars for naval avia tion, which Bristol imme di ately used to order des perately needed new air planes.84 The same bill also created the of fice of Chief of Naval Oper a tions (CNO), which ab sorbed the role of the aides for coor di - nat ing the navy bureaus. 85 Secre tary Daniels appointed Wil liam S. Benson to the po si tion in May. Benson set about es tab lish ing his new of fice, and his order of 8 July placed the Office of Naval Avia tion under the CNO.86 As CNO, Benson had more au thor ity (though not much more) than Fiske to secure the coop era tion of the bu - reaus.87 However, Benson was at best neu tral about avi a tion. With out Fiske, Bristol’s influence with the bureaucracy weakened. July also brought ten new of fi cers to Pensacola for flight train ing, the largest class yet. The stu dents in cluded Marine first lieuten ants Francis T. Evans and Alfred Cunningham, who returned to avi ation and pre pared to requali fy under new reg ula - tions.88 With an in flux of new stu dents, new planes, and the return of North Carolina in the fall, naval avia tion could resume exper i ments in bombing, spot ting, improv ing cata pults, and deter min ing what quali ties were wanted in naval aircraft. 89 In March 1916, Bristol left Washing ton for command of North Carolina and “the Air Service in the field.” Though Bristol intended to ex ercise his influ ence from

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afar, re spon si bility fell to his as sis tant, Lt. (j.g.) Clar ence Bronson, who was at least an avi a tor.90 Bronson now re ported to Benson’s Aide for Mate rial, Capt. Josiah McKean, who did not want to deal with avia tion. 91 In April, McKean rec om mended reor ga ni za tion: Bristol would report to the fleet com mander in chief rather than directly to the CNO. Pensacola would no longer report through Bristol but instead to the CNO’s Mate rial Section. 92 Benson approved, and the changes were made by July.93 McKean also wanted a commander to relieve Bronson; a more senior offi cer could re lieve McKean of some of the avia tion work.94 What he got was John Towers, now a se nior lieu ten ant, re cently returned from Lon don. Bronson was still turn ing over the avia tion desk when he died in a bombing test on 8 Novem ber. 95 But Tow - ers’s personal knowledge of British aircraf t and doctrine, both further developed than the U.S. Navy’s, helped him get past this setback. Two crashes in 1916 convinced avia tors that the old pusher hydro planes— which was all the navy had for training—w ere danger ous. But Bristol contin ued to purchase pushers rather than the safer “trac tors.”96 Mustin suc cessfully fought Bris - tol on this point. The CNO grounded the pushers as unsafe and replac ed them with the first re ally mod ern navy air craft.97 Mustin’s stand against Bris tol con trib uted to his relief as comman dant of the Pensacola Air Station by Capt. Joseph Jayne in Jan- uary 1917. The month be fore, Bristol had departed naval avia tion for good when he left North Carolina and turned over com mand of the navy’s Air Service to Rear Adm. Albert Gleaves, commander of the De stroyer Force, Atlan tic Fleet.98 Once again, nonflyers held se nior avi a tion po si tions. This was the state of lead ership that would take naval aviation into the First World War. {LINE-SPACE} Naval avia tion made very slow progress in the prewar years. One reason was the constant turn over of people at the top combined with repeated changes in orga ni - zational structure. Marine avia tion’s leader ship was more stable than that of the navy. There was no formal or gani zation even there, but in a con sid erably smaller or ga ni za tion than the navy, a for mal or ga ni za tion was per haps un nec es sary. How- ever, the Marines de pended upon the navy for their airplanes and training. Con sequently, the un certain ties in na val avi a tion also slowed the de vel op ment of Ma rine Corps avi a tion. The 1920 cre ation of an of fi cial Avi a tion Sec tion in Ma rine Corps Head quar ters and of the navy’s Bu reau of Aero nau tics the fol lowing year fi nally spelled the end of the or gani zational un certain ties de scribed in this pa per. Na val avia tion contin ued to face problems with hardware, funding, and in finding the “proper” use of airplanes (all impor tant factors in naval avia tion’s devel op ment from the very begin ning), but it had finally found a fixed place in the orga ni za tional chart.

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NOTES 1 This has been the theme un derly ing I. B. Holley’s float, Curtiss had to taxi back to his base. This did work. Put another way, the adop tion of any new not, how ever, de tract from the achieve ment. Ellyson thing (be it tool or idea) requires its inte gra tion into to SecNav, 17 Febru ary 1911, Chambers Papers. the culture adopting it: Oriol Pi-Sunyer and 15 “The De vel opment of Naval Avia tion” (speech to Thomas De Gregori, “Cul tural Resis tance to Tech- the Aero nau ti cal So ci ety, un dated, but be tween 9 no log i cal Change,” Tech nol ogy and Cul ture 5, no. 2 March and 1 July 1911), Chambers Papers. (1964), p. 249. 16 Cham bers to SecNav, 23 No vem ber 1910, Chambers 2 Jeffery A. Isaacson, Christo pher Layne, and John Papers. Arquilla, Pre dict ing Mil i tary In no va tion (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999). 17 Cham bers to Gen eral Board, “Memo randum re ‘Aero nautics ,’” 8 Au gust 1913, GB-449; Chambers, 3 Ibid., p. 4. “Brief Summary of the First Steps in the Devel op- 4 See also Bruno Latour, Sci ence in Ac tion: How to Fol- ment of Naval Avia tion,” 24 May 1917, p. 8, Cham- low Scien tists and Engi nee rs through Soci ety (Cam - bers Papers; Stephen K. Stein, From Tor pe does to bridge, Mass.: Har vard Univ. Press, 1987). Avi a tion: Wash ing ton Irving Cham bers and Tech no- 5 As sis tant Sec re tary of the Navy The o dore Roo se velt logi cal In nova tion in the New Navy, 1876–1913 to John Davis Long, 25 March 1898, in The o dore (Tuscalousa: Univ. of Al abama Press, 2007), pp. Roo sevelt, ed. Louis Auchincloss, Let ters and Speeches 164–65. (New York: Library of Amer ica, 2004), p. 142. 18 The money could not be spent until the begin ning 6 Board of Ord nance and Forti fi ca tion, “Report of of the fis cal year, on July 1, but the day Chambers Joint Board,” 29 April 1898, General Cor respon - issued the requi si tion for the planes, 8 May, is con - dence, record group [hereaf ter RG] 165, file no. sidered the birthday of na val aviation. 3896, National Archives, College Park, Md., 7998; 19 BuNav [written by Chambers] to Rodgers, 28 No - Cdr. C. H. Davis, USN, to Secre tary Long, 30 April vem ber 1911, Chambers Pa pers; An nual Re port of 1898, and 1st endorse ment, General Cor respon - the Sec re tary of the Navy (Washing ton, D.C.: 1911), dence, Office of the Secre tary of the Navy [hereaf ter p. 59. SecNav GC], RG 80, National Archives Building, 20 Winthrop [Acting SecNav, letter prepared by Washing ton, D.C. [hereafter NAB]. Cham bers] to Glenn Curtiss, 13 Decem ber 1910, 7 Bureau of Equip ment [hereaf ter BuEquip] to 26983-72, SecNav GC; Winthrop [prepared by SecNav, 19 August 1909, 26983-20:1, SecNav GC. Cham bers] to the Wright Company, telegram, 13 8 Cone to SecNav, 7 Octo ber 1910, Washing ton March 1911, 26983-109, SecNav GC; Stein, From Irving Cham bers Pa pers, Manu script Di vi sion, Li- Tor pe does to Avi a tion, p. 163; U.S. Navy Dept., brary of Congress, Washing ton, D.C. [hereaf ter United States Naval Avi ation , 1910–1980 (Wash ing - Cham bers Papers]. ton, D.C.: U.S. Govern ment Printing Office, 1981), pp. 3–4; George Van Deurs, Anchors in the Sky: 9 Presi dent of the Gen eral Board to SecNav, 14 Octo - Spuds Ellyson, the First Na val Avi a tor (San Rafael, ber 1910, file 449 [hereaf ter GB-449], Sub ject Files Ca lif.: Presidi o, 1978), pp. 54–55. of the General Board, RG 80, NAB. (Further cita - tions of “GB-num ber” are to the appro pri ate files in 21 Ellyson, in fact, was also re spon sible for much of this collection.) Towers’s flight training. Clark G. Reynolds, Ad mi ral John H. Towers: The Strug gle for Na val Avi ation 10 Acting SecNav [Win throp] to Bureau of Construc - (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In stitute Press, 1991), pp. tion and Re pair [hereaf ter BuC&R] and Bu reau of 34–44. Steam Engi neer ing [hereaf ter BuEng], 13 Octo ber 1910; BuC&R [Watt] to SecNav, 21 Oc tober 1910; 22 Van Deurs, Anchors in the Sky, pp. 133–34. BuEng [Cone] to SecNav, 13 Oc tober 1910; all in 23 U.S. Navy Dept., United States Naval Avia tion, Chambers Papers. 1910–1980, p. 5. 11 Other offi cers, such as Dewey and Cowles, were also 24 Bureau of Navi ga tion [hereaf ter BuNav; prepared by product champi ons , believ ing that aircraf t could do Cham bers] to Rodgers, 28 Novem ber 1911, Cham- great things for the Navy, but they were consid er - bers Papers. ably less success ful. 25 This was es pecially true of these first avia tors. Van 12 Cham bers to SecNav, 23 No vem ber 1910, Chambers Deurs, Anchors in the Sky, p. 105; Reynolds, Ad mi ral Papers. John H. Towers, pp. 47–48. 13 Al most forgot ten, that is, proba bly because it does 26 For “camps,” Tow ers, partial manuscrip t for auto bi - not advance the carrier para digm. ogra phy [hereaf ter Towers, auto bi ograph i c al ms.], 14 Whether due to problems with the engine or an in- p. 23, Towers Papers. The reason for the sep ara tion ability to overcome the hy drody namic forces on the was prob a bly the Curtiss camp’s shar ing space with Glenn Curtiss’s own winter operations.

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27 Van Deurs, Anchors in the Sky, p. 105. acci dents after returning to aviation and before 28 Ibid., pp. 130–31, 148–49; Chambers, memo ran - either could rise to high rank. dum, “Con cern ing Par tic i pa tion of Gov ern ment 42 Cunningham to Cham bers, 3 Sep tember 1913, Avi a tors in Pub lic Meets and Cel e bra tions,” and Chambers Papers. handwrit ten note, “Policy —Safe & Sane—Conser - 43 F. D. Roose velt [Acting SecNav] to Chambers, 9 Oc - vative,” Chambers Papers. tober 1913, Chambers Papers. 29 Reynolds, Admi ral John H. Towers, p. 52. 44 Cunningham to Bristol, 3 Decem ber 1914, General 30 George Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet: A Narra tive Cor re spon dence of the Of fice of Na val Aero nau tics, of Na val Avi a tion’s Early De vel op ment, 1910–1916 1914–1917, RG 72, 1740-14, NAB [hereaf ter ONA]; (Annapolis, Md.: Naval In stitute Press, 1966), p. 94. John son, p. 8; Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet, p. 128. 31 Towers to SecNav, 17 Octo ber 1913, Chambers Marine Corps policy was to rotate avia tors back to Papers. reg u lar duty af ter five years, result ing in Cunning - ham’s sec ond and final de par ture from avia tion. He 32 The Ma rine Corps did not get formal re sponsi bil ity requested a re turn to avia tion in 1928 but was told for advance-bas e plan ning un til 1910, and the Ad- he was too old to fly. John son, Ma rine Corps vance Base School, respon si ble for working out such Aviation, p. 30. plans, was not es tab lished un til 1911. Cdr. R. H. Jack son, USN, comp., “His tory of Ad vanced Base,” 45 Cham bers, “Brief Sum mary of the First Steps in the 15 May 1913, GB-408 [Advance Base]. De vel op ment of Na val Aero nau tics.” 33 Cunningham to Of ficer in Charge, Ad vanced Base 46 Stein, pp. 184–88. School, 12 Febru ary 1912, Chambers Pa pers. 47 Chambers to SecNav, 28 June 1912, GB-449. 34 Cham bers to Aide for Person nel, mem o ran dum, 12 48 Many letters from Chambers to hopeful inven tors Febru ary 1912; SecNav to Major General Com man - em pha size his de sire to make air planes safe be fore dant, U.S. Marine Corps [hereaf ter MGC], 4 March dealing with aerial ordnance. For exam ple: Cham - 1912; both Chambers Papers. bers to BuNav, “Sub ject: John W. Currell Re his ae - 35 Cunningham’s arrival is cele brated as the birthday rial torpedo,” May [?] 1912, Chambers Papers. of Marine Corps avia tion. Edward C. Johnson, Ma- 49 Chambers, “Memo ran dum on Naval Avia tion,” at- rine Corps Avi ation: The Early Years, 1912–1940, ed. tached to Cham bers to SecNav, 28 June 1912, Graham A. Cosmas (Wash ing ton, D.C.: U.S. Gov- GB-449. ern ment Print ing Of fice, 1977), pp. 4–5; J. W. 50 Fiske to Presi dent, General Board, 7 April 1911, Kinkaid [in charge of the Ex per i ment Sta tion at GB-449; Bradley A. Fiske, From Mid ship man to Annapolis] to Chambers, 22 May 1912, Cham bers Rear-Ad mi ral (New York: Century, 1919), pp. 503– Papers. 506. 36 Cunningham held the for mer view, whereas Smith 51 Fiske, From Mid ship man to Rear-Ad mi ral, p. 538. was more in tune with the latter. John son, Ma rine Corps Avi a tion, p. 4 note, 11 note. 52 The ad di tional in for ma tion re gard ing Cham bers’s “pluck ing” in this and pre vi ous para graphs is taken 37 Van Deurs, Anchors in the Sky, p. 129, and Wings for from Stein, From Tor pe does to Avi a tion, pp. 181–98. the Fleet, 65–66; Towers, auto bi ograph i c al ms., p. 29, Towers Papers; Reynolds, Ad miral John H. Tow - 53 Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet, pp. 64–65; Senior ers, pp. 51–53. Avi a tion Of fi cer [Tow ers] to SecNav (Bu reau of Op er a tions), 18 De cem ber 1912, GB-418. 38 Cham bers, “Brief Mem o ran dum Con cern ing the Advance of Avi ation and Its Bearing on the Fore go - 54 At the time, solo ing marked the end of train ing; ing Rec om men da tions,” un dated but prob a bly early [Cham bers?], “The De vel op ment of Na val Avi a- 1913, Chambers Papers. tion” and “Na val Avi ation at Guantanamo Bay,” both un dated, Cham bers Papers; Reynolds, Admi ral 39 Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet, p. 95. John H. Towers, pp. 56–63; Van Deurs, Wings for the 40 Van Deurs, Anchors in the Sky, pp. 130–51. Fleet, pp. 79–82. Like Towers, Mustin initially saw 41 Ellyson’s influ ence on the early years of naval avia - pos si bil i ties for the air plane in ex tend ing na val gun - tion is clear from the volu minous corre spon dence fire. Like Cunningham, Mustin was an enthu si ast in the Cham bers Papers between him and Cham- before joining naval avia tion; John Fass Morton, bers from Ellyson’s as signment to avia tion in 1911 Mustin: A Naval Fam ily of the 20th Century (Annap - un til his return to sea service in 1913. These letters olis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003), pp. 65–81. cover a vari ety of top ics and show that Cham bers 55 “List of Of ficers Who Have Taken Flights . . . ,” unre lied on Ellyson’s opin ions and feedback to help dated but proba bly mid-to-late 1913, Cham bers Pa - guide the devel opment of na val avia tion (even when pers; Reynolds, Admi ral John H. Towers, p. 59. he over ruled Ellyson). Fewer letters survive in the 56 Towers to Ellyson, 20 Febru ary 1913, Towers Pa- Cham bers Pa pers from Rodgers, but those that do, pers. Tow ers was still as sisting Cham bers in as well as refer ences to Rodgers in others’ corre - Wash ing ton. spon dence, make clear that Rodgers played a sim ilar role. Though he may not have been as friendly with 57 Senior Avia tion Offi cer [Towers] to Offi cer in Cham bers as Ellyson, Rodgers was the only na val Charge of Avia tion, “Weekly Re port on Avia tion,” avia tor trained by the Wright Co. until 1914 and 15 March 1913, Towers Papers; Van Deurs, Wings thus was the expert on the Wright aircraft. In addi - for the Fleet, pp. 82–87, 93–94, 103–104. tion to the fact that both had long ab sences from 58 Fiske, From Midship man to Rear-Admi ral, pp. 538–39. na val avia tion, both Ellyson and Rodgers died in air

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59 [Bristol?], memo ran dum for the Aide for Oper a - 76 Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet, pp. 115–17; Morton, tions, “De vel op ment of Aero nau tics,” un dated but Mustin, pp. 96–101. proba bly Decem ber 1913, ONA, 1-14-½, seems to 77 Mor ton, Mustin, p. 103. be Bris tol’s rec om men da tions for ac tions to be taken. [Fiske to SecNav?], memo ran dum, “De vel op- 78 Bristol to CO, USS North Carolina [Oman], 13 Au- ment of an Aero nau tic Ser vice in the Navy,” 30 De - gust 1914, ONA, 1082-14. cember 1913, ONA [1-14-1?], seems to be Fiske’s 79 [Bristol?] to the Aide for Oper a tions, 16 Octo ber rec om men da tions to SecNav for ac tion. [Fiske?], 1914, ONA, 1460-14. press release, “Naval Aeronau tics : Air Craft Will 80 Oman to SecNav, telegram, 19 Au gust 1914, ONA, Take Their Place in the Fleet,” 31 December 1913 1106-14. ONA, 1-14-3. 81 Mustin to Bristol, 24 August 1914, GB-449. 60 Daniels assigned Fiske to the Naval War Col lege in July 1915 to get him out of Washing ton. Stein, From 82 Office of Na val Aero nau tics to Office of Na val In tel- Tor pe does to Avi a tion, p. 195. ligence, 4 Septem ber 1914, ONA, 1189-14. 61 Press notice, “Report of a Naval Board on Aero nau - 83 Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet, p. 125. tics,” 10 Jan u ary 1914, ONA, 58-14; Archibald 84 Press release, 15 April 1915, ONA, 1222-15; press Turnbull and Clifford Lee Lord, His tory of the re lease, 26 April 1915, quoting a letter from Daniels United States Naval Avia tion, Liter a ture and History to the pres ident of Wil liams Col lege in re sponse to a of Naval Avia tion (Manches ter, N.H.: Ayer, 1971), query from the lat ter, ONA, 1697-15; Bris tol to pp. 33–34. Daniels, 4 March 1916, ONA, 995-16. The three air- 62 Daniels to Towers, 3 Janu ary 1914, ONA, 2-14-1. craft were Burgess-Dunne pushers. Despit e avia tors’ requests for trac tor machines, Bris tol believed that 63 Bristol to Command ing Offi cer [hereaf ter CO], USS pushers were the better mili tary design; Mustin to Mis sis sippi [Mustin], 7 Jan u ary 1914, ONA, 10-14. Bristol, telegram, 11 March 1915, ONA, 764-15. At the time, no one was sure whether Pensacola would be the perma nent home of na val aviation. 85 “Terms of the Office of the Chief of Naval Oper a - tions,” Na val His tor i cal Cen ter, www.his tory.navy 64 Bristol to Towers (via Mustin), 6 Janu ary 1913, .mil/. ONA, 13-14. 86 [Benson?], 8 July 1915, ONA, 2434-15. The reor gani - 65 Mor ton, Mustin, pp. 81–101. zation was made offi cia l by Daniels in his memo ran - 66 [Bristol] to Aide for Person nel, 6 Jan u ary 1913, plus dum of 12 Oc tober 1915, 26983-566 ½, SecNav GC. 5 en closures, ONA, 8-14. 87 The po sition of Chief of Na val Op er a tions (CNO) 67 Smith to CO, Flying School [Towers], 10 March was con sider ably weaker when it was estab lished 1914, ONA, 255-14. than it is now. Robert Wil liam Love, Jr., ed., The 68 Barnett to Commander in Chief, Atlan tic Fleet Chiefs of Naval Oper a tion s (Annapolis, Md.: Na val [hereaf ter CINCLANTFLT], 3 Febru ary 1914, In stitute Press, 1980), pp. 4–7. 16721-86:1; and CINCLANTFLT to Aide for Op era - 88 U.S. Navy Dept., press release, 1 July 1915, ONA, tions, 14 Feb ru ary 1914; both SecNav GC. 2557-15. 69 Two planes were in good shape, and one was 89 Bureau of Ordnance to Office of Na val Avia tion, 30 question able—it and the fourth were brought along Octo ber 1915, 4407-15; SecNav to Comman dant, for spare parts. Bir ming ham was the flag ship of a Pensacola, 4 Septem ber 1915, 3397-15; U.S. Navy torpedo-boa t squad ron commanded by William S. Dept., press release, 10 Novem ber 1915, 4500-15; Sims. Direc tor of Naval Avia tion [Bristol] to the Burgess 70 CO, USS Mis sis sippi to CINCLANTFLT, 19 May Co., 24 July 1915, 2730-15; Com man dant, 1914, ONA, 1037-14. Pensacola [Mustin] to BuNav, 16 August 1915, 3126-15; CNO to BuC&R, 1 Decem ber 1915, 71 Mustin to Bristol, 14 May 1914, ONA, 611-14; 4621-15; all ONA. [Bristol?], “Memo ran dum for Secre t ary,” 29 May 1914, ONA, 693-14. 90 Bristol to Herbster, 2 March 1916, ONA, 938-16; Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet, pp. 117, 136. 72 Towers to Bristol, 3 Au gust 1914, ONA, 1028-14; Reynolds, Admi ral John H. Towers, pp. 84, 89. 91 Turnbull and Lord, His tory of the United States Na - val Avia tio n, p. 59. 73 Reynolds, Ad mi ral John H. Tow ers, pp. 89–105. The ONA corre spondence also contains many of Tow- 92 McKean to CNO, 10 April 1916, ONA, 4156-16. ers’s letters from London. 93 Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet, pp. 151–52. 74 For USS North Carolina, see Morton, Mustin, p. 96; 94 Aide for Mate rial [McKean] to CNO, 8 June 1916, Mustin to Bristol, 11 July 1914, ONA, 904-14. ONA, 2382-16. 75 Mustin to Bristol, 1 Au gust 1914, 1027-14; Bris tol’s 95 Reynolds, Admi ral John H. Towers, pp. 106–107. reply, 6 August 1914, 1049-14; Mustin to Bristol, 96 Ibid., pp. 150–52; Bristol to Mustin, 30 June 1915, tele gram, 6 Au gust 1914; Bristol’s reply of same ONA, 2320-15. date, 1051-14; Mustin to Bristol, 5 Au gust 1914, 1060-14; Bristol’s reply, 17 August, 1060-14; 97 Mustin to CNO, radio gram, 12 June 1916, ONA, Herbster to Bristol, tele gram, 6 Au gust 1914; Bris - 2505-16. See also note 82, above. tol’s re ply, 8 August 1914; all ONA. Turnbull and 98 Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet, pp. 142, 155–56. Lord, His tory of the United States Na val Avia tion, p. 44; Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet, pp. 115–17.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:11 AM IV Riverine Op era tions of the Danube Flotil la in the Austro-Ger1689–1815m an Roma nian Campaig n of 1916

MI CHAEL B. BARRETT

t three o’clock in the af ternoon of 27 Au gust 1916, the traf fic stopped on the Austr ian-Roma nian bor der. It took a while to reg is ter with the guards, Abe cause Roma nian sol diers initia lly stopped the flow twenty ki lome ters from their side of the border . Aus trian gendarmes and custo ms offi cials first no ticed things were amiss when sched uled trains failed to ap pear. They duly repor ted this trou bling de velop ment to their head quar ters, know ing and dread ing what it meant. They did not have long to wait; shortly aft er nine o’clock, word came back from the bor der cross ings that trains ente r ing Roma nia were be ing fired on.1 Two hun dred miles to the south, on the Dan ube River, the war started a half hour later, at 9:30 PM, with a torpedo fired from a well conceale d Roma nian torpedo boat ly ing off Ramadan Is land, in the harbor of the Roma nian city of Giurgiu. The tor pedo streaked across the river to where vessels from the Aus trian Dan ube Flotilla lay at anchor at the Bulgar ian city of Rustchuk. Aimed at Bosna, the flag ship of the flotilla, the tor pedo missed, hitting instead a nearby barge of fuel and coal, which ex ploded, broke in half, and sank as flames from the burn ing fuel en gulfed the an chor age. At first the Aus trian sail ors sus pected a tor pedo, but when no fur - ther ac tivity ensued they conclud ed that the fire had started due to sponta ne ous combus tion or careless ness. But at 10:30 word came from army head quarters that Roma nia had declared war.2 For the entire flotilla to remain at the open anchor age at Rustchuk was out of the ques tion. A flurry of signals and ra dio mes sages set ves sels in mo tion, and the flo - tilla’s 1st Divi sion weighed an chor and headed upriver for the safety of the Belene Chan nel at Sistov. The de part ing craft, in vis i ble in the dark, stole safely out of Rustchuk. When dawn broke, an ob server would not have been faulted for think ing he had stepped back fifty years in time, for the craft puff ing and chuffing upriver were museum pieces that resem bled the mon i tors of Flag Offi cer Andrew Hull Foote or Admi ral David Farragut, those “cheese boxes on rafts” whose appear ance on the rivers of the Confed er acy had inev i ta bly her alded the ar rival of a Union

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army. Only machine guns and radio masts vis i bly differ en ti ated the craft from those of the Ameri can Civil War. The re sem blance was nei ther su per fi cial nor co in ci den tal. Im pressed with the manner in which the moni tors had facil i tated success ful campaigns deep in the heart of the South, the Austro-Hun gar ian navy had delib er ately copied the design . Each sporting a turret with a single gun of approx i mately five-inch (120-mm) cali - ber and some smaller twelve-pounder guns, Maros and Leitha, laid down in 1865, had entered service in 1878 and promptly par tici pated in the occu pa tion of Bosnia- Herzegovina. The next forty years saw the flo tilla gain in numbers and size.3 By 1914, on the eve of war in Europe, the flo tilla numbered some six moni tors, some with howit zers and tur rets mount ing twin five-inch guns, de signed to slug it out with enemy vessels and shore batter ies. The mon itors had ar mored protec tion for the gun po si tions as well as along the wa ter line. Four ad di tional mon i tors came off the ways in 1914 and 1915, but ow ing to the loss of Temes I in 1915 the flo tilla numbered nine at the start of the 1916 campaign. The origi nal moni tors carried comple - ments of fifty-seven men and had a speed of 7.5 knots; the fi nal ves sels had crews of 105 men and could at tain thir teen knots. In ad di tion, there were pa trol boats carry - ing machine guns and small cannon de signed for recon nais sance and for engag ing infan try and small watercraft. Armed steamers were envi sioned if war came; like the pa trol boats, they would be armored against rifle fire and were to tow barges and carry troops. They could also protect civil ian shipping. Mining craft were con structed to lay mines and sweep them, as well as to set up barri cades and take down enemy ones. Lo gis ti cal ves sels and tugs car ried ev ery thing nec es sary for self-suf fi ciency. Hos pi tal barges took care of the wounded, while head quarters ves sels had sleep ing quarters for the staffs and sup port el e ments, as the mon i tors were too cramped to accom mo date any but their comple ments. 4 Ironi cally, the Aus trian mon i tors never en gaged in the en vi sioned ship-to-ship combat; of the Dual Monar chy’s poten tial riverine ene mies, Serbia had no ves sels and Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in 1915. Roma nia did have a river flotilla, but techni call y it sided with the Central Powers un til 1914, and an inept strategy when it en tered the war on the Tri ple Entente side in 1916 wasted its assets. Nev er- the less, the Aus trian Dan ube Flotilla saw plenty of action fight ing enemy shore bat - ter ies and as sist ing with river cross ings in the cam paigns against Ser bia and Ro ma nia; the mon i tor Temes I is credited by many with firing the first shot of the war, at Belgrade on 28 July 1914.5 More im por tantly, the mon i tor flo tilla played a criti cal role in the Roma nian campaign, thwarting a Roma nian crossing of the Dan- ube. Had that cross ing succeeded, Field Marshal von Mackensen’s di ver sion in the Dobrudja begin ning in Septem ber 1916, which stunned the Romanians and transferred the initia tive in that campaign to the Central Powers, might have had a very dif ferent end ing, leaving the Cen tral Powers overex tended on a front lon ger than

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the en tire pre vi ous east ern front at the end of ten u ous lines of com mu ni cation at the farthest reaches of the Austro-Hungar ian Empire. The Dan ube Theater The Danube River the ater was im por tant for two rea sons: it de lineated for the most part (starting in the west at the Iron Gate and ending at Kalimok, where the river passed into purely Roma nian terri tory) the border between Roma nia and Bulgaria (an ally of the Austro-Hungar ian Empire) and was hence the likely place of mili tary op era tions be tween the two na tions, at least ini tially; also, it was the main av e nue of trade for south east ern Eu rope in a re gion be reft of rail lines and bridges. From Kalimok the border ran overland southeast across the Dobrudja re gion to the Black Sea at Varna. Between Belgrade in Serbia and the Black Sea, a dis tance in ex cess of five hun dred miles, only one bridge crossed the Danube—the recently opened King Carol Bridge at Cernavoda4, carry ing Roma nia’s commerce via a rail line from its only seaport (Constanza) to the capi tal at Bucha rest. The river con stituted the major high way of south east Europe. Before the war hun dreds of barges had plied its waters between Ro ma nia and the Cen tral Powers, carry ing the rich nat u ral resources of Wallachia, namely, pe tro leum prod ucts and agri cul tural goods. When the war be gan, over a mil lion tons of grains, vege ta bles, and coal pur chased by the Cen tral Pow ers sat in these barges, virtu ally all in Ro ma nian har bors and seized by Ro ma nian armed forces.6 In general, once clear of the narrow and turbu lent Iron Gate on the border with Serbia, the Dan ube slows ap pre cia bly and wid ens. What high land and bluffs ex ist on the Ro ma nian side are some ten to fif teen ki lo me ters in land and north from the river chan nel; thus a low, swampy area with ponds and la goons forms the Ro ma - nian floodplain. On the Bulgar ian side of the river, the hilly ex ten sions of the Bal kan Moun tains usu ally come right to the river’s edge, pre sent ing that side of the river with for mi da ble banks and high bluffs. Just be yond Silistria the Dan ube turns north, flowing in that direc tion to Braila, where it again turns east and flows into the Black Sea. At the mouth of the Danube, there is a delta with three main channels . The south ernmost, the sixty-three-ki lo me ter-long Sulina Chan nel, is the nor mal one for ship ping, as deep-draft ves sels cannot use the other two.7 The Dan ube suffered from low wa ter in the sum mer, narrow ing the nav i gable channel. Ordi narily the Roma nian Hydrologic Service buoyed the river during low-water season (start ing around 1 June) and pulled the mark ings when the ice came, usually in late No vem ber.8 The Romanians did not per form this func tion in 1916, so the Dan ube Flotilla had to rely on lead-line soundings as it ne goti ated the river. Crossing the Danube was not hard—armies had passed over it since antiq uity— but cross ing the river un der fire was an other thing. The lo cations suit able for the

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purpose were few and well known, and a reso lute defender with mod ern artil lery could thwart any attempt. 9 Ini tial Op er a tions The mon i tors played an es sen tial role in the Bal kans from the be ginning of the war, but our at ten tion must turn to 1916 and Ro ma nia. The Austrian high command antic i pated the eventual en try of Roma nia into the war on the side of the Entente and had moved the flo tilla to the lower Danube in late 1915, after the fall of Serbia. The Aus tri ans moved into sev eral Bulgar ian har bors, princi pally Lelek, now that Bulgaria was a member of the Central Powers, and conducted recon nais sance along the Dan ube. They ac quired ex cel lent, de tailed knowl edge of Ro ma nian for ti fi cations, bar ri cades, mine fields, and ar til lery de fenses.10 As Ro ma nia’s at ti tude be came more ques tion able, the Austri ans placed the flo tilla un der the op era tional con trol of Army Group Mackensen, the se nior Cen tral Pow ers head quar ters in the re gion. In the event hos til i ties erupted, Field Marshal von Mackensen directed, the flo tilla was to se cure its anchor age facil i ties and de stroy en emy har bors and rail yards, while es tab lish ing mine bar ri ers across the Dan ube to deny the Ro ma nian flo tilla use of the river. To that end, a mine barrier, designed to be det o nated by an ob - server, was pre pared near Lelek.11 The on set of hos til i ties on 27 Au gust caused the flo tilla, as we have seen, to scat - ter to safe an chor age at the Belene Chan nel, where Persin Is land di vided the river into two chan nels and hid the south ern one, the Belene Chan nel, which ran for sev - eral miles along the Bulgar ian side of the river. Even tu ally the chan nel emerged and rejoined the Dan ube at Sistov, a Bulgar ian city facing north across the river toward its Ro ma nian counter part, Zimnicea. Aware of the advan tage of this cover, the Aus- tri ans had des ignated Belene as their main base in case of hos til i ties and had begun stockpil ing bridging equipment there for a possi ble river crossing. The 1st Mon itor Divi sion ar rived early on the 28th. The min ing craft steamed in later, hav ing left Rustchuk at five that morn ing, after min ing the river. Finally, late in the day, the 2nd Mon i tor Di vi sion made its way in, carry ing barges of oil, coal, and grain taken from the Romanians at Giurgiu. The di vi sion had waited un til day light, then steamed across the river, captured the barges, and shelled the city, setting the oil and grain storage areas, as well as the har bor, on fire. Much farther up stream at Kladovo, the moni tor Almos dispatched several patrol boats that night to run a gantlet of enemy fire at the Iron Gate and to safety in the harbor at Orsova, but the trip was too danger ous in the dark for the moni tor. Dawn saw Almos bombard ing the Ro ma nian city of Turnu Severin, de stroy ing a cav alry barracks, si lencing shore bat ter ies, and set ting afire rail yards and stor age facil i ties be fore transiting the Iron Gate to Orsova.12 Over the next several days the moni tors, oper at ing in groups of two and ac compa nied by the smaller patrol craft, un dertook cutting-out oper a tions

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against the var i ous Ro ma nian ports, seiz ing cargo barges and de stroy ing what they could not make off with.13 Septem ber proved quiet. The Aus tri ans blocked off the west ern entrance to their an chorage at Belene with a mine field and rein forced their fa cili ties, es pe cially with an ti aircraft weapons, as the Romanians tried to bomb the flo tilla on an al most daily basis—with out much luck. At the end of the month came a long-sought op era tion against Corabia, a river port thirty miles west of Belene where, rumors abounded, the Rus sians had an an chor age. Be sides elim i nat ing that men ace, the ex pe di tion promised to per mit the Aus trians a chance to respond to en emy artil lery bombard - ments and rein vig o rate the fighting spirit of the sailors, who had begun to feel penned up in the Belene Chan nel.14 II Moni tor Group, con sist ing of the mon i tors Sava and Inn, the ar mored steamer Sam son, and some pa trol boats, left Belene in fog at 5:15 AM on 29 Sep tem ber. Exit ing the west en trance to the Belene Chan nel and head ing upriver, it im me di ately came under fire from Roma nian shore bat ter - ies. Return ing fire, the Austri ans passed un scathed. Beyond Nikopol they linked up with two patrol boats (Viza and Barsch) sent ahead to scout the chan nel for mines. Fog, a narrow channel, and poor sounding led to the grounding of Sava, but Sam - son pulled it off with out dam age. At Corabia, reached around noon, Inn ad vanced into the lower har bor and took under fire shore facil i ties, while Sava moved above the town and sent the pa trol boat Viza into the har bor to make sure it was free of obsta cles. Once Sava got the all-clear signal, it entered the harbor, where the Russians had their an chorage, and promptly reduced the en emy de fenses to rubble with its 120-mm guns. It later silenced an enemy field artil lery battery, firing from a distance of 3,600 me ters. Sam son arrived and towed away nine partially loaded Aus- trian and Ger man grain barges. Three Rus sian ves sels (in cluding a two-stack coastal steamer) and numer ous smaller craft went to the bottom. Al though the shelling lasted over two hours, the city of Corabia was spared; not a shell landed on it. The townspeo ple nonethe less pan icked; the amazed Austri ans watched as Red Cross flags appeared from windows, in appar ent confu sion with white flags. Some hu mor was added when a motor ized barge, fleeing with nine completely naked people, in- cluding two women, ran aground on an is land op po site the harbor entrance. The Austrian flo tilla left around four o’clock in the af ter noon, af ter round ing up its prizes. On the re turn voy age, it en countered a few timid vol leys and a few near misses from the ar til lery op po site the en trance to the Belene Chan nel.15 The Ro ma nian Dan ube Cross ing At ten o’clock the morn ing of 1 Oc to ber, an alarm ing tele graph ar rived at the flo tilla head quarters: “This morning at 0400 the en emy crossed the Danube at Rjahovo with three com pa nies [of in fan try]. Two heavy how it zers and two 90mm field guns already en route.”16

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By noon six bat tal ions had crossed to the Bul garian side of the river, and there were clear signs the enemy had started to con struct a pon toon bridge. The Romanians had sto len a move and taken the Cen tral Powers completely by surprise. The river crossing should not have come as a surprise, for the Romanians had crossed the Danube in their 1913 inva sion of Bulgaria. 17 Both sides had recog nized the value of the Dobrudja region (his tori call y, the coastal strip of southeast ern Ro- ma nia and north east ern Bulgaria)—sim ply stated, nei ther side could risk cross ing the Dan ube unless its Dobrudja flank was se cure. The Romanians had planned to ad vance there with a combined Russo-Roma nian army corps, the appear ance of the Rus sians be ing de signed to de ter the Bul gar i ans from de clar ing war.18 Mackensen moved im medi ately, however, and his unex pected routing of the 150,000 Roma - nian and Russian forces in Dobrudja caused panic in Bucha rest and shook the Ro - manian high command. 19 King Ferdinand relieved the chief of the general staff, Gen. Vasile Zottu;20 he also replaced the commander along the border with Bul- garia, Gen. Mihail Aslan, with Gen. Alex an der Averescu (1859–1938), his top field commander. Averescu, who had led the 2nd Army into Transylvania, char acter is ti - cally sought to rec tify the im pend ing calam ity with a bold move: trans ferring the im pe tus of the Ro ma nian of fensive from Transylvania to Bul garia to meet the threat there, crossing the Danube, and advanc ing into the Dobrudja right into the rear of Mackensen’s army, cutting the Ger mans’ line of com mu ni cations. Or der ing a halt to op era tions in Transylvania, Averescu began mov ing forces to the south and plan ning for the river cross ing.21 The Romanians commit ted an army corps with three divi sions to the assault, the first wave crossing in boats without initial oppo sition at four in the morn ing from Flamanda on their side to Rjahovo on the Bulgar - ian side. Mackensen’s 3rd Bulgar ian Army was caught flat-footed and had advanced too far into the Dobrudja to render imme di ate help, throwing the respon si bil ity into the lap of Gen. Rob ert Kosch’s VII Corps in Sistov. Kosch had few as sets, but he had two unique ones, which he im me di ately or dered into ac tion: air craft and the Dan ube Flo tilla.22 The aircraf t arrived first, around noon, and bombed and strafed both the troops wait ing on the shore and soldiers at tempt ing to erect a bridge. The few Ro ma nian aircraf t made the mistake of trying to defend the bridge site by circling over it, leaving the initia tive to the Ger mans, who at tacked at will, kill ing over two hundred offi cers and a thou sand sol diers. The Ro ma nian ground forces watched in im po tent fury. The bombs se riously wounded Lieu ten ant Col o nel Popovici, the en gineer in charge of the bridging. General Lambru, commander of the 21st Divi sion, took over the construc tion efforts. Lambru esti mated that the German attack cost his advance four hours—the bridge was completed by seven in the evening, as opposed to three that af ter noon.23 The loss of those hours was to prove fa tal.

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The flotilla commander, Capt. Karl Lucich, sent a mine expert, Com mander Paulin, overland to Rjahovo to deter mine the best loca tion from which to launch float ing mines against the bridge. Mean while, III Mon i tor Group (Bodrog and Körös), under Commander Masjon, two pa trol boat sections, a min ing squadron, and the German mo tor launch Weichsel raised steam and departed in two sections for Rjahovo, the pa trol boats leaving at seven o’clock that evening and the rest at nine. Masjon had orders to destroy the bridge and bridging mate rial, along with bringing under fire, and pre vent ing a with drawal by, the units that had crossed over. The de par ture times al lowed for an arrival at or close to dawn. The river near the cross ing site was shal low; in fact, flo tilla craft had not been able to pass the area as late as Au gust ow ing to shal low wa ter. The many sand bars and shoals shifted con stantly, re quir ing ap proach ing ves sels to sound the depth, thus rul ing out a night ap proach by the mon i tors. The Aus tri ans also feared, with am ple jus ti fi cation, mines and ob sta cles placed in the river up stream of the bridge. Further, the river was nar row, restrict ing both ma neu ver ing and the num ber of ves sels that could approach closely. Finally, a daylight approach offered visi bil ity to ad just fire.24 A fierce storm slowed the prog ress of the Aus tri ans, both the ves sels mak ing their way to Rjahovo and Com mander Paulin’s efforts at launching floating mines (the winds blew all of them back on shore).25 The storm also wreaked havoc with the bridge construc tion. Rain and light ning scattered the en gineers, broke the bridge three times, and rendered pas sage over it impos si ble until early the next morning. 26 At 3:00 AM, Kosch’s headquar ters radi oed Masjon to in form him that a di vi sion had crossed over and that “attack ing and destroy ing the bridge was of deci sive impor - tance.” At eight the pa trol boats Barsch and Viza arrived at Rjahovo and approached to within two hun dred meters of the bridge, driving off an enemy artil lery battery that had reckless ly set up along the bank without cover. Ironi call y, the storm, which had caused such damage to the bridge, raised the water level of the Danube to the point where the Aus trian pa trol boats could cross the dam the Romanians had constructed several kilo me ters upstream of their bridge. The patrol boats opened fire with machine guns and small cannon, their shrap nel shells in flicting many casu alties and scat ter ing en emy in fan try. Ro ma nian ar til lery ze roed in on the Aus trian ves sels, and a direc t hit on the bridge of Barsch took out its steer ing, killing three sail ors and wounding five. Having expended all their ammu ni tion and un able to launch float ing mines ow ing to the height of the waves, the boats withdrew. 27 At 10:30, the mon i tors Bodrog and Körös ar rived, cir cling three ki lo me ters upstream from the bridge. Blocked from coming closer by the Roma nian dam, the two began a steady bombard ment with their 120-mm guns, ignor ing a hail of fire deliv - ered by Roma nian field-artil lery batter ies from both sides of the river. It became clear, how ever, that the moni tors’ guns would not shatter the bridge, so Masjon

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consid ered try ing to cross the dam and ramming the bridge. He backed off when he real ized the bridge was higher than the deck of his vessels , which meant the turrets of the moni tors would make contact, and there was a likeli hood the turret guns would snag on the bridge, trap ping the Aus trian ves sel. Both sides con tin ued their shell ing, with Bodrog taking five hits and having to run behind Taban Island to effect tem po rary re pairs to a stuck tur ret. Körös kept up the fire until en emy shells sev ered steam lines, blinding every one on the bridge. Its conning offi cer unable to see, the ves sel ran aground momen tarily on the Ro ma nian side of the river. Finally, the onset of darkness, the exhaus tion of the crews, and the discov ery that the Romanians had launched float ing mines forced the mon i tors to leave the scene. Both vessels later that night returned to the Belene base.28 While III Moni tor Group slugged it out with the Romanians, I and IV Groups (un der Lieuten ant Com mander Wulff) had de parted from Belene tow ing barges with am mu ni tion, coal, and bunker fuel. Enemy shore bat ter ies op po site the east end of the Belene Chan nel on Ginghinarelle Island holed the coal barge, forcing I Group to run for cover to make repairs, while IV Group dared not risk shells hit ting the fuel barge and waited until nightfall to head down stream. The two groups arrived at Rjahovo dur ing the morning of 3 Octo ber. They discov ered that the Romanians had repaired the pre vi ous day’s dam age to the bridge and that enemy troops were streaming across it—but they were marching back to the Roma nian side! Army Group Mackensen had discov ered from a captured Roma nian col onel that Gen eral Averescu had ordered a retreat and had even coun te nanced abandon - ing his artil lery on the Bulgar ian side of the river if neces sary. Mackensen franti cally direc ted that the bridge be de stroyed at all costs to thwart the enemy re treat. His staff sug gested us ing fireships if nec es sary.29 I and IV Mon itor Groups had brought good weather with them, and Szamos, some three kilo me ters upstream near Taban Island, released a number of floating mines around 10:00 AM on 3 Oc to ber. So did the pa trol boat Compó. An hour later came a se ries of mighty ex plo sions, rip ping three enor mous gaps in the bridge. Joined by Leitha, the two moni tors kept the remnants of the bridge un der fire until dark, prevent ing the Romanians from making re pairs and escap ing. As night fell, I Moni tor Group relieved IV Group. I Group had brought along two empty barges, par tially flooded, to en sure low pro files, and filled with ex plo sives. It re leased the barges and heard five large explo sions an hour or two later, but darkness prevented it from ascer tain ing the damage. 30 Later that night, around eleven, came word that Bulgar ian-Ger man forces had taken Rjahovo. At 1:00 AM a radio mes sage indi - cated that the Ro manian moni tor flotilla was heading upriver, north of Turtucaia. At four, orders came from VII Corps to complete the destruc tion of the bridge and of any related ma terial left on the shoreline, and then to head for the barrier at Kalimok.31 The dark ness pre vented the Austrian mon i tors from nav i gat ing the

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channel in the dark to Kalimok, and by midday it was clear that the news about ap- proaching Roma nian moni tors was false. The flotilla attempted to re turn to the base at Belene. Ginghinarelle Is land A nasty sur prise awaited the flo tilla upon its re turn. At the east open ing of the Belene Chan nel to the Dan ube lay Ginghinarelle Is land, a low-ly ing land mass one kilo me ter wide and four long, behind which on the Roma nian side of the river stretched im pen e tra ble swamps and marshes for sev eral ki lo me ters be fore reach ing high ground at Fantanele. The Romanians had es tablished ar til lery at Fantanele, but their bom bardment of the Belene base had done lit tle dam age, because Persin Is land blocked di rect ob ser va tion. The Ro ma nian oc cu pa tion of Ginghinarelle at the end of Septem ber recti fied that failure, allow ing partial viewing for artil lery spotters. The Romanians promptly pro tected their po sition by laying mines in the open ing of the Belene Chan nel and plac ing an in fan try com pany and two ar til lery bat ter ies on Ginghinarelle. The Aus tri ans de cided to drive the Romanians off the is - land, but their in fan try could not cross safely un til the ar til lery on Ginghinarelle, as well as that at Fantanele, was si lenced. That mis sion fell to II Mon i tor Group (mon - i tors Inn and Sava), along with a ten-centi meter artil lery battery already on Persin Island. After a day of bombard ment by the two mon i tors and the German artil lery, a combined force of German infan try and Austrian combat engi neers overran the is land on 8 Octo ber, captur ing six guns, 130 prison ers, and related equip ment. The flotilla’s minesweeping de tach ment then cleared the chan nel, allow ing the en try of I and III Mon itor Groups, which had had to wait at Lelek after their success ful oper a - tions against the Ro manian bridgehead at Rjahovo.32 The Austro-Ger man Dan ube Cross ing, 23 No vember 1916 Even before the start of the war with Roma nia, both the Austrian and German high commands had en vi sioned crossing the Danube with a force from Bul garia under the com mand of Field Mar shal von Mackensen. To that end, the Aus tri ans had moved their bridging equipment from depots in Hungary to the Belene Channel base in early Au gust 1916.33 The Austri ans wanted to cross the Danube at the on set of the war, but the Ger mans, who called the shots, vetoed that plan until both the Dobrudja flank was secure and the German 9th Army, under General von Falkenhayn, had success - fully crossed the Transylvanian Alps.34 The Danube crossing would bring Bu charest under concen tric at tack from two di rections, with Falkenhayn ad vancing on the en - emy capi tal from the north west and a German-Bul gar ian army coming from the south. Gen eral Kosch’s VII Corps, the se nior German head quar ters in Mackensen’s Danube Army, had the mis sion of con duct ing the cross ing. Kosch was an excel lent choice; units under his leader ship had al ready made a success ful crossing of the Dan- ube in the recent Serbian campaign. 35 His mis sion for the flo tilla was succinct—

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protect the flanks of the cross ing and pro vide artil lery support. III Mon itor Group, tempo rarily at Lelek, sailed back upriver to protect the right flank of the crossing, while I Group guarded the left. IV Group provided ar til lery support for a feint at Samovit, de signed to draw Ro ma nian at ten tion.36 The op era tion be gan at 6:30 in the morn ing of 23 No vem ber and proceeded rel- atively smoothly, in terrupted only by the dense fog, not by the enemy. Captain Lucich, on Temes II, anchore d in the middle of the crossing zone but with hardly any enemy oppo si tion to the crossing he had little to do other than to watch the fer - ries and mo tor boats ply back and forth in the fog across the river, car rying the in - fan try. Enns, charged with protect ing the troops landing in Zimnicea, simply came alongside the city quay and blew away the customhouse, ending any resis tance from that point. By noon on the 24th, three divi sions had crossed from Bul garia to Ro- mania, and a day later (the 25th) the Aus trians had thrown a bridge across the Dan- ube. After LII Corps had crossed the river and headed for Bucha rest, command and control of the flo tilla passed directly to Army Group Mackensen.37 Later in the month, on the 27th, III Moni tor Group assisted the Bulgar ians in crossing the Dan ube from Rustchuk to Giurgiu. Once ashore, the Bul gari ans constructed a pon toon bridge, fin ish ing it around 4 De cember. Austrian en gineer units assisted. At this time, the river craft of the Roma nian navy, which the Bul gar ians had been unable to locate for three months, mirac u lously appeared, and in good op er at ing or der. They pro ceeded with the sys tem atic plun der ing and burn ing of ports and towns on the Roma nian side of the river from Giurgiu to Turnu Severin. The Aus tri ans in ter vened sev eral times to stop the sense less de struction. II Moni tor Group helped cor ner the 1st Roma nian Infan try Divi sion at the junc ture of the Olt and Danube Rivers. Pursued across Wallachia from Orsova by Colo nel Szivo’s brigade, the Romanians could not cross the river and had to surren der. 38 Breach ing the Kalimok Barrier and the Fi nal Ad vance As Mackensen’s Danube Army moved northeast to ward Bucha rest, his logis ti cians wanted to send am mu ni tion barges down stream to ports where in tact rail lines crossed the river. The field mar shal or dered “mines cleared with all means as fast as 39 pos si ble; progress reports daily at 1800 [6:00 PM].” This touchy work fell to Lt. Cdr. Georg Ritter von Zwierkowski, head of the mine-clearing detach ment. 40 The chief obsta cle lay at Kalimok, on the for mer Roma nian-Bul gar ian border, where a sys tem of im ped i ments con sist ing of con tact and ob server-det o nated mines and concrete and metal-tipped wooden pil ings, with bar riers on top of them, all inter - wo ven with 3.5-inch steel ca bles, effec tively blocked traf fic. Even the barge Anny, which had ripped through the Roma nian pontoon bridge at Rjahovo, had floun- dered against this mas sive bul wark. Zwierkowski initially told Mackensen’s headquar ters that the work would take thirty or forty days; in the event, he opened a channel within a week. Zwierkowski’s

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sail ors, as sisted by en gineer troops, started the gar gantuan task on 11 Decem ber, and by the 17th a small channel hugging the Roma nian bank was clear to Oltenita. The flotilla moved there on the 18th and then to Silistria on the 24th. By the end of the month Zwierkowski’s force had cleared the river of mines as far as Hirsova, a distance of 257 kilo me ters, earning for him the coveted and rare Mili tary Maria Theresa Medal.41 By Janu ary the flotilla had ad vanced to Braila, opening the Danube to the Cen tral Pow ers as far as the Siret River. South east of Braila, Zwierkowski mined the Danube so the Russians could not enter it from the Black Sea. By that time, ice had formed on the rivers, and most of the flo tilla was with drawn to Hun gary for mainte - nance. The 1916 campaign had ended with the Cen tral Powers having effec tively knocked Roma nia from the war. {LINE-SPACE} Con spicu ously miss ing in action from the 1916 cam paign was the Ro ma nian river flotilla, whose ab sence raises the question of why. When the war began, the Roma - nian flotilla lay at Hirsova, a fact that ne cessi tated an im medi ate de cision once hos- tili ties erupted. The flotilla had to be moved to one side or the other of the Kalimok barrier before the lat ter was sealed. With Mackensen’s forces march ing into the Dobrudja on 1 Septem ber, defend ing that region had prior ity; thus the Roma nian vessels remained north of the bar rier, unable to pro vide assis tance to their own river crossing or to threaten the Austro-German one, an oper a tion that sealed Ro - ma nia’s fate.42 Con sequently the Aus trian Danube Flotilla had free run of the south - ern border, where its ves sels provided valuable artil lery support to the German Danube crossing and safe guarded crit i cal ship ments of sup plies af ter the cross ing. Its most impor tant mission, how ever, clearly came with the oppor tu nity to inter - rupt the Ro ma nian crossing at Rjahovo, where it ex celled.

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NOTES 1 For the Roma nian order to close the bor der, see as the moni tors Temes I, Temes II, Bodrog, and War Min istry, Great General Staff, Or der no. 2765, Enns, and one of the moni tor divi sions for two for Headquar ters, I Army Corps, Bucha rest, 13 Au- years. Published in the last year of the war, this vol - gust 1916, in Ro ma nia in razboiul mondial 1916– ume cov ers 1914–16 and is much more de tailed 1919 (Bucha rest: Ministerul Apararii Natjionale, than his later work, Die österreichisch-ungarische Marele Stat-Major, serviciul istoric, 1934–46), an- Donauflotille im Weltkriege, 1914–18: Dem Werke nex, vol. 1, doc. 103, pp. 254–55; Arthur Freiherr “Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg, 1914–18” (Vienna, Arz von Straussenberg, Zur Geschichte des Grossen Leipzig: W. Braumüller, 1934) [here after Donau - Krieges 1914–1918 (Graz: Akad. Druck- u. flotille im Weltkriege], pp. 82–84. A Ro ma nian ac- Verlagsanstalt, 1969), p. 108ff. An imme diate report count, while ad mit ting the at tack was a failure, went that night to the Aus trian army high com - claimed that three tor pedo boats actu ally at tacked mand. See Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), the flotilla. The Austri ans never saw any boats or NFA, AK1/k11, 1AOK, op. 343/24, 27 August 1916. any more torpe does. See Constantin Kiritescu, 2 Olaf Richard Wulff, Österreich-Ungarns Istoria razboiului pentru intregirea Romaniei 1916– Donauflottille in den Kriegsjahren, 1914–1917 (Vi - 1919, trans. A. Razu (Bucha rest: 1922), chap. 2, sec- enna: L. W. Seidel, 1918) [hereaf ter Donauflottille in tion on “At tacking the Austro-Hungar ian Fleet at den Kriegsjahren], pp. 173–76. Wulff commanded Rusciuk,” available at 1914-1918.invisionzone.com/ the flotilla for two weeks in Septem ber 1914, as well forums/.

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3 All Austro-Hun gar ian mon itors were named after confirms Wulff; ÖStA, DF, KuK DF Kommando, rivers within the Dual Monar chy: Maros, Leitha, Res. 1416, Combat Report, 29.9-9.10.1916. Körös, Szamos, Bodrog, Temes (I and II), Inn, Enns, 15 ÖStA, DF 1359, II Moni tor Group, op. 18, Ac tion Bosna, and Sava. against Corabia, 3 Oc tober 1916; KuK DF 4 All in all, the flotilla consist ed of some ten moni tors, Kommando, Res. 1416, Combat Report, twelve patrol boats, several minesweep ers and mine- 29.9-9.10.1916, pp. 1–5. Pages 190–92 of Wulff, lay ers, and nine as sorted lo gis ti cal ves sels. Wulff, Donauflottille in den Kriegsjahren, have photo graphs Donauflotille im Weltkriege, pp. 11–12; for a list of of this raid. the vessels and arma ments, pp. 260–61. 16 ÖStA, DF, KuK DF Kommando, Res. 1416, Com bat 5 Ibid., p. 249; Anthony Sokol, The Impe rial and Royal Re port, 29.9-9.10.1916, p. 5. Austro-Hun gar ian Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In - 17 The Romanians crossed un op posed in four lo ca - stitute Press, 1968), p. 92. Also Heinz Steinrück, tions, with the largest crossing of three army corps “Das österreichisch-ungarische Donauflotille im led by then–crown prince Ferdinand at Corabia. Weltkriege” Militärwissenschaftliche und technische Austrian ob servers admired the techni cal skill of the Miteilungen, nos. 1/2 (1928), pp. 11–18. engi neers. See Regele, Kampf um die Donau, pp. 35– 6 ÖStA, DF, 1052-1500, Exec u tive Commit tees of the 36. Three Central Grain Purchas ing Combine s to the 18 As the price for joining the Entente, Roma nia had Aus trian War Min is try, no. 14652, 28 Septem ber demanded 150,000 Russian troops for a campaign 1916, pp. 5–29. in the Dobrudja, plus an al lied of fen sive against 7 Wulff, Donauflotille im Weltkriege, p. 10. Bul garia launched from Salonika led by the al lied 8 ÖStA, DF, 300-800, KuK Kreigsministerium, Army of the Orient. This and the other Roma nian Marinesektion, 1853, 25 March 1916. demands were exor bi t ant. The give-and-take (mostly take by Ro ma nia) can be traced in The Na - 9 Oskar Regele, Kampf um die Donau: Betrachtung der tional Archives (United Kingdom): vari ous reports Flussübergänge bei Flamanda und Sistow (Potsdam: from the Briti sh ambas s ador to Roma nia, Sir L. Voggenreiter, 1940), p. 42. George Barclay, in FO 371, folders 2606 and 2707, 10 ÖStA, AOK, OOK, Ru Gruppe/k 550, Recon nais - 1916. The allies eventu ally agreed to a show of force sance Re port of Ro ma nian For ti fi ca tion on the from Salonika to tie down the Bulgar ian armies North Side of the Danube, Col. v. Brosch, 20 June there, while Rus sia sent an army corps (weak di vi - 1916. This is a de tailed, fourteen-page re port, with sions) to the Dobrudja. maps. The Romanians had worked fever ishly on the 19 Kiritescu, Istoria razboiului pentru intregirea river’s defenses since early 1916. Cf. Brosch’s report Romaniei 1916–1919, chap. 2, sec. 5, “Days of Emo- with that from the Aus trian mil itary attaché in Bu - tion and Reflec tion.” charest, ibid., DF 3-800, Evid. Bureau des kuk GS, B 150/1, mid-De cem ber 1915–mid-Feb ru ary 1916; 20 Zottu had completely discounted in his mo bili za - Wulff, Donauflottille in den Kriegsjahren, p. 168; tion planning any Central Power ad vance from the Steinrück, “Das österreichisch-ungarische south. Worse, he had predict ed that even if the Bul - Donauflotille im Weltkriege,” p. 56. gari ans crossed the Danube, they would not have the strength to move on Bucha rest. See Roma nia’s 11 Rudolf Kiszling, “Darstellung der Teilnahme der War Plan, Plan “Z” in Ro ma nia in razboiul mondial, dem Oberkommando Mackensen unterstellten an nex 1, “Chapter 2,” doc. 43, pp. 111–12. Zottu k.u.k. Truppen und der Donauflotilla am Feldzüge had also come un der suspi cion for treason; he com- in der Dobrudscha, Donauübergang bei Sistov und mitted suici de in Novem ber 1916. Vormarsche nach Bukarest,” ÖStA, MS1/Wk Ru 1916–1919 [hereaf ter Donauflotilla am Feldzüge in 21 “Memoir Concern ing the Situ a ti on and the Dispo si - der Dobrudscha, Donauübergang bei Sistov und tions That Are Supposed to Be Taken on the 15th of Vormarsche nach Bukarest], pp. 4–5. Most of Sep tem ber 1916,” Ro ma nia in razboiul mondial, an - Mackensen’s forces were Bul gar ians, fac ing the En - nex 2, doc. 1, pp. 3–6; doc u ment 2 is the oper ations tente Army of the Ori ent, led by French gen eral or der (no. 852, 19 Septem ber) from the high com - Maurice Sarrail. mand, or der ing a switch from the offen sive to the defen sive in Transylvania. Ernst Kabisch, Der 12 Wulff, Donauflottille in den Kriegsjahren, pp. 178– Rumänienkrieg 1916 (Berlin: O. Schlegel, [c. 1938]), 82. Almos did not have suffi cient power to over- p. 51; and Regele, Kampf um die Donau, pp. 59–60. come the current at the Iron Gate un til its crew, in Kiritescu, Istoria razboiului pentru intregirea midstream and in view of the en emy, jetti soned Romaniei 1916–1919, chap. 2, secs. “Gen eral twenty-five tons of coal. See Steinrück, “Das Averescu’s Criti cis m” and “Review of the Oper a tion österreichisch-ungarische Donauflotille im Plan,” gives the best account of the confu sion in the Weltkriege,” p. 57. Roma nian high command. The same source, under 13 Wulff, Donauflottille in den Kriegsjahren, pp. 185– “General Averescu’s Offen sive,” describ es the Ro- 87. ma nian strat egy. 14 The German LII Corps, which had op er ational com- 22 ÖStA, DF, KuK DF Kommando, Res. 1416, Com bat mand over the Danube Flotilla, gave permis sion for Re port, 29.9-9.10.1916, pp. 5–6. the oper ation on 28 Septem ber, the day after Army 23 Com mander 3rd Army to Commander, Army Group Mackensen’s oper a tions chief, Col. R. Group South, 1 Octo ber 1916, doc. 19, pp. 38–39; V Hentsch (1870–1918), came under en emy fire while Army Corps, op. 347, 2 Oc tober 1916, doc. 21, pp. visit ing Belene. See ibid., p. 188. The offi cial report

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39–40; both Ro ma nia in razboiul mondial, an nex 2; Sohn, 1920), pp. 236–37. There is consid er able de- Regele, Kampf um die Donau, pp. 77–78. Also bate over who origi nated this plan, with both the Kiritescu, Istoria razboiului pentru intregirea Falkenhayn and Ludendorff camps claiming credit. Romaniei 1916–1919, chap. 2, sec. “Cross ing the Cf. Ludendorff’s Own Story, Au gust 1914–No vem ber Dan ube.” 1918 (New York: Harper, 1919), vol. 1, pp. 295–96, 24 ÖStA, DF, KuK DF Kommando, Res. 1416, Com bat and Georg Wetzell, Kritische Beiträge zur Geschichte Report, 29.9-9.10.1916, pp. 6–7. des Weltkrieges; von Falkenhayn zu Hindenburg- Ludendorff. Der Wechsel in der deutschen Obersten 25 Kiszling, “Donauflotilla am Feldzüge in der Heeresleitung im Herbst 1916 und der rumänische Dobrudscha, Donauübergang bei Sistov und Feldzug. Beiheft z. 105 Jahrgang d. Mil. W. Blattes Vormarsche nach Bukarest,” p. 8. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1921). 26 Masjon ra dioed back that his visi bil ity was zero, 35 Kosch (1867–1942) led X Army Corps in the Ser- and he had to stop his vessels. See ÖStA, DF, KuK bian campaign and then at Verdun until August DF Kommando, Res. 1416, Com bat Report, 1916, when he was sent to take com mand of the 29.9-9.10.1916, p. 7. The Romanians said the bridge newly orga nized LII Corps in Sistov, Bulgaria , and swayed fifty to a hun dred me ters lat er ally and was promoted to lieuten ant gen eral. pitched up and down some six to ten me ters; Kiritescu, Istoria razboiului pentru intregirea 36 ÖStA, MS1/Wk Ru 1916–1919, Bericht [Gruppe Romaniei 1916–1919, chap. 2, sec. “Cross ing the Generalmajor Gaugl] beim Donauübergang, 23 No - Dan ube,” and V Army Corps, op. 347, 2 Octo ber vem ber 1916, pp. 1–2; Kiszling, “Donauflotilla am 1916, an nex 2, doc. 21, pp. 39–40. Feldzüge in der Dobrudscha, Donauübergang bei Sistov und Vormarsche nach Bukarest,” p. 14. 27 ÖStA, DF, KuK DF Kommando, Res. 1416, Com bat Report, 29.9-9.10.1916, pp. 8–9. 37 Kiszling, “Donauflotilla am Feldzüge in der Dobrudscha, Donauübergang bei Sistov und 28 Ibid., pp. 9–10. Körös had taken twelve direct hits; Vormarsche nach Bukarest,” p. 16; [German In fan- Hermann Schmidtke, Völkerringen an der Donau try Divi sion von der Goltz] I op. 235, Oper a tion Or- (Berlin: Al fred Marschwinski, 1927), pp. 75–77. For der for the Cross ing, 19.1.1916; KuK Pioniergruppe the Roma nian perspec t ive, see Kiritescu, Istoria Oberst Mjk, no. 310 [oper a tion order for the Aus- razboiului pentru intregirea Romaniei 1916–1919, trian engi neers conduct ing the crossing], 21 No- chap. 2, sec. “Crossing the Danube.” vem ber 1916; after-ac tion report from same 29 ÖStA, DF, KuK DF Kommando, Res. 1416, Com bat headquar ters, op. 338, 23 Novem ber 1916; Regele, Report, 29.9-9.10.1916, pp. 11–14. Averescu called “Aus das Kriegestagebuch einer österreich- off the oper a tion on the night of 2–3 Octo ber; ungarischen Pionier-Feld-Kompanie,” p. 172; Kiritescu, Istoria razboiului pentru intregirea Schmidtke, Völkerringen an der Donau, pp. 85–89. Romaniei 1916–1919, chap. 2, sec. “The Retreat.” 38 Ibid., pp. 16–17; Wulff, Donauflottille in den 30 ÖStA, DF, KuK DF Kommando, Res. 1416, Com bat Kriegsjahren, pp. 238–40. For an eyewit ness account Re port, 29.9-9.10.1916, p. 14. of the pursuit across Wallachia, see Bernhard Bellin, 31 Ibid., p. 15. Sturmtruppe Picht: Ein Erinnerungsblat aus dem Kriege gegen die Rumänen im Jahre 1916 (Berlin: 32 Ibid., pp. 19–25. Also KuK DF Kommando, II Mon - Verlag Tra dition Wilhelm Kolk, 1929). itor Group to k.u.k Donauflotilla Com mander, Com bat Report, Res. 21 op. 9, Octo ber 1916. This 39 Wulff, Donauflotille im Weltkriege, pp. 111–14. report has, as enclo sures, the II Mon itor Group op - 40 Zwierkowski (1873–1932) did not under stand the era tions order for the un dertak ing, along with a word “no.” Born in Poland, af ter an undis tin- map. For an eyewit ness account of the storming guished career in the Austro-Hun gar ian navy he of the island, see Oskar Regele, “Aus das Krieges- was given in 1912 a “tombstone promo tion” to lieu- tagebuch einer österreich-ungarischen Pionier- tenant commander and pushed out. He tried to re- Feld-Kompanie,” in Im Felde Unbesiegt. Erlebnisse turn to the navy when war broke out, but it would im Weltkrieg erzählt von Mitkämpfern, ed. Gustav take him only at his perma nent rank of lieuten ant. von Dickhuth-Harrach (Mu nich: J. F. Lehmanns He in stead joined an Uh lan (light cav alry) reg i- Verlag, 1922), vol. 2, pp. 170–71. Regele comment(!), but he some how worked his way back to manded the 2nd Company, 5th Austro-Hun garian the navy, ending up at Orsova in late 1915, clearing Pi o neer Reg i ment. Cf. Wulff, Donauflottille in den the Serbian sec tion of the river of mines to enable Kriegsjahren, pp. 206–208, for photo graphs of cap- ship ment of am mu ni tion to Tur key. Fear less, he tured soldiers and ma teriel. Also, Kiritescu, Istoria person ally steered the tiny minesweeping ves sels in razboiului pentru intregirea Romaniei 1916–1919, their searches. After the war, he joined the Pol ish chap. 2, sec. “The Retreat.” navy, retir ing in 1927. Carl von Bardolff, Oskar von 33 Kiszling, “Donauflotilla am Feldzüge in der Hofmann, and Gustav von Hubka, Der Militär- Dobrudscha, Donauübergang bei Sistov und Maria Theresien Orden: Die Auszeichungen im Vormarsche nach Bukarest,” p. 3. Weltkrieg, 1914–1918 (Vienna: Verlag Militär- wissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, 1943). 34 Erich von Falkenhayn, Der Feldzug der 9. Armee gegen die Rumänien und Russen, 1916/17. Erster Teil: 41 Ibid.; Wulff, Donauflotille im Weltkriege, p. 114, and Der Siegeszug durch Siebenbürgen. Zweiter Teil: Die Donauflottille in den Kriegsjahren, pp. 238–54. Kämpfe und Siege in Rumänien (Berlin: E. S. Mittler 42 Kiritescu, Istoria razboiului pentru intregirea & Sohn, 1921), pp. 6–8, and Die Oberste Romaniei 1916–1919, chap. 2, sec. “The Fight at Heeresleitung 1914–1916 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Arabagi.”

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:11 AM V “There’s Nothing a Marine Can’t Do” Public ity and the Ma rine Corps, 1911–1917

HEATHER PACE MARSHALL

isiting his lo cal librar y in 1916, Sgt. Frank Stubbe was dis appointed to dis - cover that he was the first person to bor row Richar d Collum’s Histor y of the VUnited States Ma rine Corps since 1904. For Stubbe this ex pe ri ence made man i fest the public’ s ig noranc e about the Corps. As a recruite r, he strugg led not only to con vey the message that the Ma rine Corps even ex isted but also to con vince peo ple that it was a “good” orga niza tion. 1 Stubbe was not the first to rec og nize this problem. In 1911 the U.S. Ma rine Corps Recruit ing Public it y Bur eau be gan is suing book lets for po ten tial recruits, set ting forth the Corps’s per en nial proble m: the public only had a “vague idea” what Mari nes did.2 Still, the bur eau appeared to con- sole itself with the belief that at least people rec og nized the Mar ine “as be ing a man who is thor oughly onto the job, and lets it go at that.”3 Rather than seeking to con vey to the public what mission it fulfilled, the Corps wished to empha siz e the qualit y of ser vice it prov ided and its abil ity to carry out any as sign ment. Count less newspa per ar ti cles pro claimed the va ri ety of tasks that Mari nes could ac complish. One paper even hyperbolized, “There’s Noth ing a Ma rine Can’t Do.”4 Be tween its estab lish - ment in 1911 and World War I, the bur eau did ever y thing it could think of to reach the pub lic. A jour nalist at the time might have summa r ized the bur eau’s ac tiv i ties with the headline, “There’s Nothing That the Public it y Bur eau Won’t Try.” The Corps’s approach to public ity had begun decades ear lier. After the Civil War, a hand ful of offi cers sought to create an im age for the insti tu tion by pro ducing a written history. They claimed, in accu ratel y, that the Marine Corps was the oldest mili tary service in the United States and stressed its rich tradi tions. 5 With the Pub - licity Bu reau’s estab lish ment in 1911, the ef forts of Marines to make them selves known to the Amer i can pub lic be came in sti tu tion alized and in creas ingly co he sive and effec tive. Unable to claim an exclu sive mission, the Corps sought to convince the public that it was an elite in stitu tion. This outward focus had criti cal rami fi ca - tions in ter nally. The themes the bu reau dis cussed and de bated en abled the strength en ing and so lid i fi ca tion of the Corps’s larger in sti tu tional iden tity. Two trends worked to encour age the Marine Corps to curry pub lic favor. First, the in sti tu tion faced an other of its fre quent ex is ten tial crises in 1908, when

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Pres i dent The o dore Roo se velt is sued Ex ec u tive Or der 969. The or der ter mi nated the as sign ment of Ma rines as po lice men aboard na val ves sels. Con gres sio nal resistance to the order tempo raril y ended threats to the Corps, but some Marines proba bly believed that the insti tu tion needed broader support above and beyond that of Congre ss.6 The Corps’s in creased manpower require ments in the wake of the Spanish-Cu ban-Amer i can war also neces si tated the expan sion of its recruit ing base.7 As a result the in sti tu tion shifted away from an ad hoc method of recruit ing to a more perma nent one. Re cruiters would also depart from a heavy re liance on clas - si fied ads, which of ten con sisted of formu laic requests for volun teers, and fo cused on prac ti cal bene fits, such as pay and the pros pect of travel. With the Pub lic ity Bu reau’s es tab lish ment, the Corps’s re cruit ing ef forts became formal ized. 8 The bureau served as a central clearing house for the pro duction of post ers, re cruit ing pam phlets, and other ma te ri als.9 Hand in hand with the acqui si tion of more ef fective means to reach the public were major changes in the message the service wanted to com mu ni cate. Rather than sim ply ad vertis ing as they had in the past, Marines actively courted jour nalists, to obtain favor able cover age of their in sti tu tion and its ac tiv i ties.10 Pub lic ity re placed ad ver tise ments as the Corps’s primary re cruiting tool. The Marine Corps adopted a business model of re cruiting. As Sgt. Clarence Proctor noted, suc cessful businesses fo cused less on “giv[ing] no - tice” and more on shaping pub lic opin ion.11 The Corps could achieve this goal most effec tively by making clear what distin guished its product from others. 12 It had to dem on strate its supe rior ity not only to its pri mary compet i tors, the army and navy, but also to civil ian employ ers. 13 Marines seized on every oppor tu nity to demon - strate the insti tu tion ’s strengths.14 Like civil ian adver tis ers, who sought to carve out market niches for their products, the bureau struggled to deter mine the best way to in crease famil iar ity with an in sti tu tion that con fused the gen eral public no end.15 The Re cruit ers’ Bul le tin, a monthly pub lica tion of the bu reau that dis cussed recruit - ing and pub licity matters, took every oppor tu nity to recount the public’s ig no- rance. One re cruiter told of a pros pect who ar rived at a Ma rine re cruit ing sta tion only to announce contra dic to rily that he “want[ed] to be a soldier” and yet would “rather be a sub marine [sic] than any thing else.”16 Si mul ta neously, the Corps sought to ex pand its fo cus from its tradi tional recruit ing area on the Atlan tic sea- board to the entire na tion.17 While de vel op ments in trans por ta tion like au to mo- biles might enable recruit ers to reach untapped mar kets, they did not en sure that peo ple would be aware of the Marine Corps’s ex is tence, much less want to enlist in it, when re cruit ers ar rived.18 To per suade the pub lic of the in sti tu tion’s mer its, the bu reau launched a “com- prehen sive” campaign designed to en sure that people became just as famil iar with the Corps as they were with the army and the navy. The bureau sent press releases to thou sands of news pa pers, “em broi dered” just enough to en sure that news pa pers

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would want to pub lish them.19 By doing so the Corps wanted to convey the message that “ev ery old Tom, Dick, and Harry is n’t el i gible to en ter its ranks.”20 His to rian James D. Norris has iden ti fied the use of “super latives” as a com mon ten dency among adver tis ers who had yet to deter mine how to distin guish their products from those of their com peti tors. 21 Making vague sugges tions about the Corps’s se lectiv ity was far eas ier than ex plain ing why the in sti tu tion should be con sid ered elite. Like profes sional adver tis ers, the bureau be gan seeking a trademark, or what might to day be consid ered “brand ing,” to make a Marine easily recog niz able. 22 One recruiter believed that the public needed to latch onto a standard image asso ci ated with the Corps. He sug gested the fig ure of the “Hiker,” which to him seemed “em- blematic of an ideal Marine—at trac tive, rough and ready, prepared, and command ing re spect.”23 This recruiter ’s vision of the model Marine linked the insti tu tion to its more recent expe di tion ary service on shore rather than its history of service aboard navel vessels. The phrase “soldiers of the sea” was more popu lar within the bureau, however. It al lowed the Corps to dis tinguis h itself from the army and the navy while stressing the ver sa tile na ture of its du ties. The bu reau re in forced this theme with the con cept of an oppor tu nity for “two in one” service, which, ide- ally, would provide the recruit with more vari ety than the other services could. It also hoped the idea of “double service” would appeal to those seeking adven ture. 24 From the bureau’s perspec tive, it was “much more sat is factory to be a Ma rine than a bluejacket,” because a Marine was always “charg ing gal lantly into some thing or other, and the papers at home talk about you.”25 Of course, newspa pers mentioned the Ma rines so frequently because of the bureau’s success in dissem i nat ing its ar ti cles. While many of the bureau’s practices coin cided with the emer gence of modern adver tis ing in the United States, the Corps stopped short of fully adopting Madi son Av enue’s practices. In 1912 Congress had thwarted the in sti tu tion’s early hopes of using a profes sional ad vertis ing agency, in order to save money.26 Perhaps as a result, the Corps’s approach to public ity did not always mirror commer cial adver tis - ing. A pro fes sional ad ver tiser’s sug ges tions pub lished in the Bul le tin trou bled one Ma rine.27 The adver tiser had advised the bureau to de-empha size the possi bil i ties of war and focus instead on “op portu nity.” 28 In response, Sgt. George Kneller expressed his dis taste for what he saw as mis rep resen ta tion. While Kneller had no problem with pointing to the practi cal appli ca tions of the Corps’s training in an in- ciden tal way, he very much op posed the adver tiser’s sugges tion to avoid any men - tion of the “cannon and the uniform.” Kneller believed this approach would require recruit ers to “practice a form of hy poc risy and resort to sub ter fuge.”29 His opinion coin cided with the rheto ric among recrui ters that in the long run honesty prof ited the Corps. Recruit ers preferred a smaller number of top-qual ity men more likely to com plete train ing over a large num ber of re cruits likely to suf fer high

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at tri tion.30 Con tri bu tors to the Bul le tin repeat edly stressed the value of be ing straightfor ward with candi dates to en sure that they under stood what mili tary service entailed. 31 They also de liber ately held out the lure of chal lenge. As one Ma rine wrote, life in the Corps was “not a bed of roses.”32 Still, one re cruiter, tak ing this analogy one step farther, ar gued that at least the Corps had fewer “thorns” than any other branch.33 Becom ing a Marine might not be easy, recruit ers suggested, but overcom ing the chal lenges the insti tu tion offered would provide the recruit with long-term ben e fits. Faced with im pend ing quo tas, no doubt some re cruit ers es - chewed the approach so popu lar in the Bul le tin. Over all, though, the discour se of challenge helped rein force the bureau’s claim that the Corps was an elite mili tary insti tu tion while perhaps saving it money in the short term. The bureau sug gested hyper bol i cally that to join such an insti tu tion required some thing akin to phys i cal per fec tion. Of course, all mil i tary in sti tu tions main tain cer tain phys i cal re quire ments. Ma rine re cruit ers, how ever, linked the pur port edly elite status of the Corps to the physi cal quali ties it re quired. These traits drew on such currents in larger soci ety as social Dar winism. 34 As one ser geant rhymed, Ma - rines were the “best of men / That Un cle Sam can get, / And if you’re not per fect in eye and limb / You’ll be re jected, you bet!”35 The impor tance the Corps placed on high stan dards re in forced its cor po rate iden tity as an elite in sti tu tion while play ing to so ciety’s im age of the ideal man.36 After the Corps rejected a talented marksman because he was missing several fingers, a bureau press release explained that not only would the re cruit have ex pe rienced dif fi culty while drilling but his hand would “look bad.”37 Image had grown as impor tant to the Ma rines as real ity. The bureau held recruit ers to simi larly high standards and encour aged them to strive to improve their social status and economic standing. 38 A recruiter’s expe rience differed in many respects from that of most other Marines. The av erage recruiter could and did of ten spend years in one lo cation. Many recruit ers worried they would lose the stabil ity they had ac quired after years of more itiner ant service.39 The bureau held up the life style of recruit ers as a model for what a recruit could achieve by serv ing in the Corps. One press release high lighted Sgt. Maj. James Deaver’s acqui si tion of a sig nif i cant for tune as an ex am ple of how a Ma rine could enter the service with “no capi tal” and through his “own efforts” make something of himself. It describ ed how Deaver had saved his money carefully and invested it wisely.40 The sugges tion that the Corps could make a man “better” re in forced the sense of be longing to an elite in sti tu tion even as it of fered a re cruit the sense that the service provided a road to self-improve ment. 41 In this vein, the Corps promised a via ble path for enlisted Marines to be commis - sioned as of fi cers.42 This prospect, along with the bureau’ s rheto ric of domes tic ity, reso nated with Ameri cans seek ing ways to im prove their po si tions in so ciety. 43 The Corps strongly resisted any sugges tions that it was de signed to re form rep ro bate

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char ac ters or of fer a last re sort for the un em ployed.44 A “crack mili tary body” was no “dump ing ground for incorrigibles,” one news pa per’s head line in formed its readers; the sub sequent ar ticle sought to counter the notion that the Corps accepted moral de linquents. 45 The insti tu tion sought only those who would work to “maintain” the Corps’s high repu ta tion. Re cruiters, Sgt. Louis Zanzig argued, had a respon si bil ity to ensure they selec ted the re cruits most likely to identify with the Corps. Given its pur portedly “wonder ful” history, the Corps could “afford to be par tic u lar.”46 In this way the bureau made an “emotional” appeal that corre - sponded with the approach of Ameri can adver tis ers in the first decades of the twen- tieth centu ry.47 At the same time, its re cruiters stated their de sire to choose recruits who would main tain the in sti tu tion’s cor po rate iden tity. The bureau did not just stress that recruits might become offi cers. It also broke down some of the tradi tional hier ar c hical divide betwee n offi ce rs and enlisted men. Perhaps be cause many recruit ers consti tuted the elite of the Corps’s en listed ranks, offi cers and enlisted Marines appear to have inter min gled more within the bureau than they did in the Corps as a whole. One Bul le tin im age showed bureau Marines of vari ous ranks exchang ing jokes at a dinner held in honor of a sergeant who had been selected to be come an offi cer.48 Over time the bu reau’s culture seems to have im printed it self on the in sti tu tion’s broader corpo rate iden tity. The bu reau certainly took steps to describ e the Corps as the most demo cratic mili tary branch. One arti cle suggeste d that the “cast [sic] system” so preva lent in the army and the navy might explain why they, unlike the Marine Corps, struggled to obtain recruits. 49 An- other ar ticle even con nected the asser tion that the Corps was the “fin est” and “most effi cient” branch to the idea that it was the most dem ocrati c.50 The lee way given to recruit ers also encour aged a more dem o cratic culture, espe - cially in the pages of the Bul le tin. Often in charge of their own recruit ing subdis - tricts, enlisted Marines contrib uted their re cruiting expe riences and ideas to the Bul le tin and, in the process, helped mold the Corps’s identity in a forum largely free from the influ ence of the Comman dant and head quarters. 51 Sgt. Norman Shaw, for exam ple, faulted offi cers for sug gesting uniform changes that he believed would erase im por tant as pects of the Corps’s his tory. He also praised Marines who re fused to im i tate the army’s uni form changes.52 Oc ca sion ally the Bul le tin’s edi tor at the time, Maj. Al bert McLemore, would in ter ject a dis sent ing opin ion. Other of fi cers, however, sometimes moved to support an enlisted Marine’s idea in oppo si tion to McLemore. In one de bate, a ma jor backed Sgt. Louie W. Putnam’s sugges tion to add current news arti cles to recruit ing signs as a means of encour ag ing more people to stop and read the signs.53 Like wise, in one case even the crit i cal com ments of the edi tor and a commen ta tor could not deter another ser geant from writing a second ar ti cle elabo rat ing on his ideas for im prov ing the Corps’s uni form.54 Other offi cer s wrote to commend en listed Marines for the ideas they had submit ted to the

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pub li ca tion.55 The Bul le tin provided a forum for offi cers and enlisted Marines to debate pol i cies openly. Some of these sugges tions shaped the insti tu tion as a whole, es pecial ly its practices and cer e mo nies. One tra di tion at trib uted to en listed Ma rines was that of ren - der ing salutes to Civil War vet erans, an ini tia tive of Sgt. Ed ward Callan.56 Many of these ideas sought to ensure that Marines remained connecte d to their in stitu tion. The Com man dant quickly adopted the pro posal that Ma rine retire ments be cele - brated with more “cere mony.” 57 The Corps also ef fi ciently im plemented Sgt. Leslie C. McLaughlin’s sug gestion that all hon orably discharged Marines be presented with pins upon leaving the ser vice.58 Re cruiters believed that en suring the good will of retir ing Marines would help secure future recruits in their home com mu ni ties. The Bul le tin not only provided a forum for discuss ing how to ob tain recruits but also fos tered the Corps’s iden tity. As the service’s first in sti tu tional mag a zine, the Bul le tin filled a partic u lar need. Beyond its prag matic pur pose, it encour aged recruit ers and Marines in general to iden tify emo tion ally with their insti tu tion. One ram i fi ca tion of the Bul le tin’s success was the re al iza tion of the need for ser vice mag - a zines for all Ma rines, not just re cruit ers.59 One sergeant expressed his ap proval, noting he was tired of reading national mili tary publi ca tions only to find the Corps rele gated to a small section. 60 In provid ing a forum for discus sion of histor i cal and other matters, the Bul le tin also helped solid ify some of the Corps’s tradi tions. Capt. Frank Evans, for exam ple, noted that of all the services the Corps was the only insti tu tion to have its own “song,” “The Halls of Monte zuma.” He de cried the fact, how ever, that so many dif - ferent versions of the song circu lated among Marines. The tendency of Marines to modify the song after each expe di tion, he claimed, only aggra vated the prob lem.61 Hop ing to “stan dard ize” the lyric, Ev ans sug gested purg ing those verses con tain ing “undig ni fied or bombas tic wording. ” That the song, at least by 1914, stated that the Marines were “the fin est ever seen” suggests how the bureau’ s rheto ric might have seeped into the Corps’s insti tu tional identity at large. Over time the song was referred to more frequently as a “hymn,” exem pli fying the ex tent to which the bureau stressed a corpo rate identity verging on the spir itual. Just as in di vid ual en listed re cruit ers made im por tant con tri bu tions to de bates within the bureau, they had some room for ini tiative in con veying the Corps’s image to the pub lic. The bureau encour aged recruit ers to reach out to jour nalists in their com mu ni ties. These efforts often enabled the Corps to se cure favor able and free public ity. 62 Over a five-month span, one sergeant’ s efforts to win public ity for the Corps re sulted in the publi ca tion of sixteen arti cles in a small Mis souri town. Such ef forts af forded re cruit ers an op por tu nity to end the pe ren nial con fu sion about what purpose a Ma rine served. One offi cer met with report ers on an

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in di vid ual basis to limit factual errors. As a result, some recruit ers believed they fi - nally were making prog ress in ed ucat ing the public about their insti tu tion. 63 Small, local newspa pers were not alone in favor ably receiv ing the bureau’s pub- licity efforts. Metro pol i tan newspa pers and maga zines gladly used the arti cles they received from the bureau. 64 More over, many ed i tors re sponded fa vor ably when que ried about the qual ity of the ar ti cles. Pub lica tions with wide cir cula tions, in - clud ing the New York Her ald, the New York Tri bune, and the New York Jour nal, used the bu reau’s releases. A few edi tors, how ever, expressed concerns that the Corps might be devi at ing from straightfor ward journal ism. The city ed itor of Washing - ton, D.C.’s The Star, for exam ple, pointed out that the ele ment of “pro paganda” ev- i dent in some sto ries tended to un dercut the “good hu man in ter est” of the sto ries.65 A willing ness to try just about any thing charac ter ized the bu reau’s approach to pub lic rela tions. The of fice is sued a num ber of ar ti cles, ranging from the hu mor ous to the se rious, de tail ing why po ten tial re cruits had been rejected. 66 One story re - counted how William James had been about to be sworn into the Corps when he saw a cat and began screaming in fear.67 James’s subse quent re jection by the Ma - rines helped to re mind the reader that the Corps could af ford to be se lective, while enter tain ing the reader with a humor ous inci dent. William James’s irra tio nal fear of a harm less cat demon strated that he was not a “real man” and thus un worthy of becom ing a Marine. 68 Marine post ers had stated the desire to re cruit “men” since the nineteenth cen - tury, but the ad di tion of the word “real” in the twen ti eth cen tury suggested the need for men to prove them selves. Sim i larly, Ma rine of fi cials ex plained how men with “artis tic tem pera ments” were more likely to desert.69 Re cruit ers had flex i bil ity in de vis ing so lu tions for ap pli cants de fi cient in other ar eas. Min ne sota re cruit ers even opened a “night school” for physi call y quali fied recruits who had not received enough ed u ca tion.70 But a recruit either met the de sired standard of mascu lin ity or he was not fit to be a Marine. As the possi bil ity of involve ment in World War I began to seem more likely, the Corps struggled to remain com pet i tive as the army’s man power needs in creased substan tially and both the army and navy be gan to im plement practices sim i lar to the bu reau’s.71 In response Ma rines un leashed a wealth of cre ative ideas to bring their insti tu tion into the limelight. While some ideas verged on the outland ish, many repre sented the Corps’s tradi tional deter mi na tion to do more with less. On one oc casion, a party of Ma rines set out with jour nal ists in tow to rid the New Jersey coast of sharks that had been terror iz ing swimmers. 72 The out ing did not re sult in any shark deaths; how ever, the As so ciated Press wire ac count of the ex cursion reached North Carolina, where one re cruiter found him self besieged with ap pli - cants in ter ested in join ing the Corps to par tic i pate in sim i lar ex pe di tions.73 Another

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recruiter ignited a de bate through out Boston. Af ter hear ing a Civil War vet eran be- moan the pub lic’s igno rance of the na tional an them, the re cruiter had a dis cussion with a Boston jour nal ist re garding the pos si bility of writ ing an arti cle on the sub - ject. When the ar ti cle’s publi ca tion prompted further dis cussion, the re cruiter took ad van tage of public inter est to pass out five thou sand small cards with the an them’s lyrics on the front and an abbre vi ated history of the Corps on the back. Marines dis- tributed all of the cards in less than an hour.74 When it came to releas ing arti cles to newspa pers, the bureau was just as creative. It appears to have written some ar ti cles to spark pride in local resi dents. Af ter the Corps issued a list of those Marines who had obtained expert marks manship ratings, the bureau released a skele ton ar ti cle for recruit ers to edit as they saw fit to in - clude names of lo cal Marines. 75 One ar ti cle cited the “many in ter est ing ex pe ri ences and ad ven tures” of Oral R. Marvel, who was sta tioned in China. The ar ti cle stressed that his of ficers con sid ered his quali fying as a marksman as “little short of marvel - ous,” given that he was “scarcely more than a recruit.” In the fu ture, they “ex- pect[ed] him to break many marks manship records.” That two other Marines located in differ e nt cities rece ived almost identi cal commen da tions in print, however, suggests that Marvel’s actions were not quite as ex ceptional as the ar ti cle por- trayed. Other arti cles mentioned lo cal Marines’ rela tives, per haps seek ing to rectify the tra di tion ally neg a tive im ages of en listed ser vice men by dem on strat ing their home town ties to pre sum ably re spect able cit i zens.76 The bureau referred to these arti cles as “flimsies,” designed to allow indi vid ual recruit ers to “hang a local con- nection to them.”77 {LINE-SPACE} By the time the United States de clared war on Germany in 1917, the Corps had po - si tioned it self to ob tain the types of re cruits it wanted, train them, and en sure their pres ence over seas in a land war that was atyp i cal of its pre vi ous ex pe ri ence. The Corps’s at ten tion to war time pub licity reaped post war div i dends. By 1918, the bu - reau could rest easy, in the as surance that the pub lic had a pos i tive im age of the Corps’s wartime contri bu tions. Rather than being asso ci ated with any partic u lar duty, “Ma rine” conjured up visions of indom i ta ble, elite fighters. This im age helped to jus tify an in sti tu tion perched un comfort ably and vulnerably between the navy and the army. A side ef fect of the Public ity Bu reau’s efforts was the crystalization of an iden tity for the Marine Corps. Recruit ers and other Marines helped to develop an image of the Corps as an insti tu tion of elite fighters capa ble of any mission. The Bul le tin enabled Marines of dispa rate ranks to enhance and solid ify the Corps’s tradi tions and prac tices. By the time Ma rines arrived on the battle fields of World War I, they would be practiced at seizing on any op portu nity to ensure they received publ ic ity for their efforts.

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Presi dent Harry Truman once de scribed the Marine Corps’s pub licity ma chine as something akin to the best propa ganda efforts of the So viet dicta tor Joseph Sta- lin.78 His com ments can prob a bly be un der stood in ref erence to his ex pe ri ence as an army offi cer during World War I. If he shared the common opinion of army offi cers at the time, he would have be lieved the Corps to be a master of self-promo tion at the ex pense of its sister ser vices. The tools the in sti tu tion had honed over almost a decade proved invalu able when it came time for Marines to demon strate their worth in a way that would reso nate across the United States. If the bureau’ s efforts en sured that the Corps would be fea tured in news print across the coun try, Marines would work to ensure that its exploits during World War I were written in indelible ink.

NOTES The au thor would like to thank Dr. Alex Roland for 8 Capt. H. C. Snyder “estab lished” the bureau; see his many sug ges tions. She is also grate ful for the sup - “The Public ity Bu reau: Its Equipment and Activ i - port of her husband, Maj. John Marshall, and her parties,” Bul le tin (Febru ary 1917), p. 1. Sgt. James F. ents, Temple and Ce cilia Pace. Taite credited Maj. A. S. McLemore for the success 1 Sgt. Frank Stubbe, “Wilkes-Barre Opinions,” Re- of the bu reau in “Pub lic ity, Etc.,” Bul le tin (Jan u ary cruit ers’ Bul le tin [here af ter Bul le tin] (Janu ary 1916), 1915), p. 9. In 1907, recruit ers in Chicago had estab - p. 14. lished a small public ity of fice that pro vided press re - leases to the public, presag ing the birth of a 2 For one of many ex am ples of the bu reau’s frustra - structure that could com bine the Corps’s dual needs tion and at tempts to rec tify this igno rance, see “Set - for public ity and re cruiting; see Robert Lindsay, ting Them Right,” Bul le tin (Decem ber 1915), p. 16. This High Name: Public ity and the U.S. Marine 3 U.S. Marine Corps Recruit ing Public ity Bureau, U.S. Corps (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin, 1956), p. 9. Ma rines: Du ties, Ex pe ri ences, Op por tu ni ties, Pay, 2nd 9 For ex am ple, the Corps printed a cal en dar for dis tri - ed. (New York: Chasmar-Winchell, 1912), p. 3. bution. Sgt. Joseph Ascheim, “A Good Way to Get 4 “There’s Nothing a Ma rine Can’t Do,” Co lum bus Names for the Pub licity Bureau,” Bul le tin (March Daily Enquirer, 13 No vem ber 1916, p. 8. 1915), p. 2. 5 I discuss this process in further detail elsewhere. See, 10 Sgt. William H. Green, “Small Town Re cruiting and for ex ample, “‘Telling It to the Ma rines’: Construc t- Some Sugges tions for Recruit ers ,” Bul le tin (August ing and Using the Corps’s Early History, 1875– 1916), p. 12; Lindsay, This High Name, p. 9. Like ci- 1935” (paper presented at the annual meet ing for vil ian adver tisements of the period, the Corps’s the Soci ety for Mil itary History, Manhattan, Kansas, nineteenth-cen tury adver tise ments were “modest” 18–21 May 2006). in scope and scale; James D. Norris, Trans for ma tion 6 Later Marines certainly recog nized the impor tance of Amer i can So ci ety, 1865–1920 (New York: Green - of pub lic sup port. See “Words of Praise from Chi - wood, 1990), pp. 12–13. cago,” Bul le tin (Decem ber 1914), p. 2. 11 Sgt. Clarence B. Proc tor, “Adver tising and Recruit - 7 The Corps increased more than five fold between ing: Some Public ity Bureau Help,” Bul le tin (Octo ber 1896 and 1916, from 2,676 Marines to 15,630. Rob- 1916), p. 6. ert Heinl, Sol diers of the Sea: The United States Ma - 12 Im por tant works on ad ver tis ing in clude Tim o thy rine Corps, 1775–1962, 2nd ed. (Balti more, Md.: Jackson Lears, Fa bles of Abun dance: A Cul tural His- Nau tical and Avia tion, 1991), pp. 610–11. tory of Adver tis ing in America (New York: Ba sic Books, 1994); Roland Marchand, Ad ver tis ing the

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Ameri can Dream: Mak ing Way for Mo dernity, 1920– 29 Sgt. George Kneller, “Straight from the Shoul der: 1940 (Berkeley: Univ. of Cali for nia Press, 1985); Handling of the Recrui ting Question, ” Bul le tin Ste phen Fox, The Mirror Mak ers: A His tory of Amer- (Feb ru ary 1917), p. 4. i can Ad ver tis ing and Its Cre ators (New York: Wil - 30 Sgt. Louis F. Zanzig, “Good Advic e from Indi a nap o - liam Morrow, 1984); Daniel Pope, The Mak ing of lis,” Bul le tin (Decem ber 1914), p. 13; “Quality be - Mod ern Ad ver tis ing (New York: Ba sic Books, 1983); fore Quan tity in Fi nal Stand ing Con sid er ation,” Pamela Walker Laird, Adver tis ing Progress and the Bul le tin (Octo ber 1916), p. 8. Rise of Con sumer Mar ket ing (Bal timore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1998); and Ste phen Harp, 31 “Edi to rial,” Bul le tin (Decem ber 1914), p. 8; Sgt. Mar ket ing Michelin: Ad ver tis ing and Cul tural Iden- Thomas McCrum, “A Few Sugges tions from an Old tity in Twen ti eth-Cen tury France (Bal ti more, Md.: Recruiter to Begin ners,” Bul le tin (March 1915), p. 6; Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2001). Sgt. Frank Stubbe, “Some Wilkes-Barre View- points,” Bul le tin (Septem ber 1915), p. 19. 13 Norris, Transf orma t ion of Ameri c an Soc iety, 1865– 1920, p. 22. 32 While it would be diffi cult to prove a defi nite link, the Corps drew on this theme in the 1970s. A popu - 14 See, in partic u lar, the images included in The Ma - lar re cruiting poster depict ing a drill sergeant yelling rines in Rhyme, Prose, and Car toon (New York: U.S. at a recruit stated, “We didn’t prom ise you a rose Marine Corps Recruit i ng Public ity Bureau, 1914). garden.” See Allan R. Millett, Sem per Fi de lis: The 15 Norris, Transf orma t ion of Ameri c an Soc iety, 1865– His tory of the United States Marine Corps (New 1920, p. 48. York: Free Press, 1980), p. 613. For an other use of 16 “Wanted to Be Subma rine,” Bul le tin (Decem ber this phrase see Bishop Rhinelander, “The Bacca lau - 1914), p. 11. re ate Ser mon,” in Uni ver sity of Penn syl va nia: Pro - ceed ings of Com mence ment, June 19, 1918 17 For the im portance of rail roads, see Norris, Trans - (Phil a del phia: Univ. of Penn syl va nia, 1918), p. 29. for ma tion of Amer i can So ci ety, 1865–1920, pp. 3–4. 33 Sgt. Norman F. Hatcher, “Thorns and Roses,” Bul le- 18 For commen tary about gen eral public igno rance, tin (August 1916), p. 22. see Sgt. L. W. Ahl, “An Idea for Produc ing Better Recruit i ng Results,” Bul le tin (Janu ary 1915), p. 10, 34 Timo thy Jack son Lears stresses the Anglo-Saxon and Capt. C. S. McReynolds, “Odds and Ends from em pha sis on phys i cal per fec tion com mon in ad ver - Musty Files with Apolo gies to the Re cruit ers’ Bul le - tis ing; Lears, Fables of Abundanc e, pp. 169, 172. Also tin,” Bul le tin (Janu ary 1917), p. 5. McReynolds be- see Paul A. Kramer, “Empires, Excep tions, and lieved that the public was igno rant of all mil itary An glo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British branches, partic u larly the Marine Corps. and United States Empires, 1880–1910,” Jour nal of Amer i can His tory 88 (March 2002), pp. 1315–53. 19 For contra dic tory numbers on how many arti cles it Nu mer ous stories informed readers of the Corps’s re leased, see “More Room for Pub licity Bureau,” strict stan dards for en list ment; see “Only 3 Per cent Bul le tin (Janu ary 1915), p. 16; and “Our Press De- Able to Pass Marine Test,” San Jose Mer cury News, 3 part ment,” Bul le tin (Novem ber 1915), p. 12. January 1917, p. 3. 20 Capt. Frank E. Ev ans, “First Aids to Public ity,” Bul - 35 See, for exam ple, Capt. Frank E. Evans, “The Lure of le tin (Novem ber 1914), p. 2. the Fighting Man,” Bul le tin (July 1915), p. 2. 21 Norris, Transf orma t ion of Ameri c an Soc iety, 1865– 36 For this ideal in the United States see John F. 1920, p. 26; Richard A. Foley, “The Super la tive in Kasson, Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man: The Ameri can Adver tis ing,” Print ers’ Ink, 2 Janu ary White Male Body and the Chal lenge of Mo der nity in 1919, pp. 57–58. America (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002). 22 For a dis cus sion of trade marks or brand ing, see 37 “His Trigger Finger Made No Differ ence,” Nancy F. Koehn, “Henry Heinz and Brand Creatio n Wilkes-Barre (Pa.) Times, 30 Au gust 1916, p. 6. in the Late Nineteenth Cen tury: Making Markets for Pro cessed Food,” Busi ness His tory Re view 73 (Au- 38 The Bul le tin abounds with light hearted sto ries about tumn 1999), pp. 361–62. recruit ers and their fami lies; see “Marjo rie’s Mad- ness,” Bul le tin (No vem ber 1915), p. 19. Some re - 23 “Standard i zing Our Adver tis ing,” Bul le tin (July cruiters appre ci ated the quality of fam ily life that 1916), p. 20. re cruiting duty in the Corps enabled. Sgt. L. C. 24 Cpl. Percy Wiess, “Service and Study: Marines Can McLauchlin compared the Marine Corps’s pro vi- Learn While They Earn,” Bul le tin (Janu ary 1917), p. sions for mar ried recruit ers favor ably to those of the 6; “The Recrui ting Signs,” Bul le tin (Febru ary 1917), army in “Spokane Let ter,” Bul le tin (December p. 20; “The Recruit i ng Situ a t ion,” Bul le tin (June 1914), p. 2. 1916), p. 16. 39 For humor ous commen tary on this fear, see “Adios 25 “Spokane Reporter Converted: Prefers Marines Be- Trabajo,” Bul le tin (April 1915), p. 15; and “The Bul- cause of Their Picture Books,” Bul le tin (March le tin Ap pre ci ated in the West ern Di vi sion,” Bul le tin 1916), p. 5. (Decem ber 1914), p. 11. 26 Lindsay, This High Name, p. 11. 40 “With $100,000 Deaver Retires from Marines,” 27 The Bul le tin was first published in Novem ber 1914. Char lotte (N.C.) Obser ver, 26 No vem ber 1915, p. 9. 28 Clif ford Bleyer, “Stim u lat ing Re cruit ing Sug gested 41 For the idea that the Corps could improve a man, by an Ad ver tis ing Ex pert,” Bul le tin (Decem ber see Gus R. Fisher, “Too Old to Be a Marine,” Bul le- 1916), p. 13. tin (July 1916), p. 14; and “A Recruiter’s Varied

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Expe ri ences ,” Bul le tin (Decem ber 1914), p. 16. For a 58 “Honor able Disc harge Buttons,” Bul le tin (Febru ary recruit who enlisted for this reason, see “He Came 1917), p. 3. Down from Alaska to Enlist,” Bulle tin (Jan u ary 59 “New Marine Corps Pub lica tion,” Bul le tin (June 1917), p. 22. 1916), p. 16. All re cruiters received a copy of the 42 “Cor poral Miller, of Lehman, May Be Made Lieu- Bul le tin. The bureau also dis tributed enough cop ies ten ant,” Wilkes-Barre (Pa.) Times, 3 Au gust 1916, p. so that one in twenty Ma rines would receive one, 8. One recruiter even suggested that it was better to count ing on in di vid u als to share cop ies. “Dis tri bu- be a private in the Corps than an offi cer in another tion of Bulle tin, ” Bul le tin (November 1918), p. 24. branch; see Sgt. C. W. Herzog, “The Truth Counts,” 60 Stubbe, “Some Wilkes-Barre Viewpoints,” p. 9. Bul le tin (Janu ary 1915), p. 13. 61 Capt. Frank E. Evans, “‘The Halls of Monte zuma’: 43 Norris, Transf orma t ion of Ameri c an Soc iety, 1865– Call for All Ver sions of Song,” Bulle tin (Febru ary 1920, p. 47. 1916), p. 7. Evans’s arti cle seems to have inspired 44 “Wants No Rum Hound: Ma rine Corps Not Refuge the bureau to take action. See “Favor ite Song of the for Dipso ma n iacs,” Wheeling (W. Va.) State, 11 Au- Ma rines,” Wilkes-Barre (Pa.) Times, 25 Febru ary gust 1916, p. 9; “Ex plain the Ser vice to Every body ,” 1916, p. 12. Today the Corps is known as the only Bul le tin (Janu ary 1915), p. 13. insti tution to have a “hymn” rather than a song. By 45 “Only Real Men Can Hope to Join Uncle Sam’s 1914 more Ma rines were begin ning to re fer to the Carefully Trained Marine Corps,” Wilkes-Barre song as a hymn; see, for exam ple, “‘Ma rines’ Hymn’ (Pa.) Times, 13 April 1916, p. 7. This approach also Reca lled,” Char lotte (N.C.) Ob server, 26 April 1914, overlapped with Progres sive ideas regard ing moral - p. 4. ity within mil i tary in sti tu tions. See, for ex am ple, 62 “They Know and Won’t Tell,” Bul le tin (June 1916), Nancy K. Bristow, Mak ing Men Moral: Social Engi - p. 16. neering during the Great War (New York: New York 63 Capt. William E. Parker, “The Recruit ing Offi cer Univ. Press, 1996). and the News pa per,” Bul le tin (June 1915), p. 16. 46 Sgt. Louis F. Zanzig, “How to Obtain Good Men,” 64 See, for ex am ple, “Blushing through Our Tan,” Bul - Bul le tin (March 1915), p. 18. Lt. Arthur J. Burks ex- le tin (Octo ber 1916), p. 16. pressed a sim ilar idea in “Sell ing the Corps,” Ma rine Corps Ga zette 9 (June 1924), p. 115. 65 “Press Bureau Checks Up and Receives Some Won - der ful Re plies,” Bul le tin (August 1916), p. 10. 47 Norris, Transf orma t ion of Ameri c an Soc iety, 1865– 1920, p. 44. 66 For more lighthearted arti cles, see “Take Him,” Idaho States man, 17 Janu ary 1916, p. 5; and “Ford 48 Bul le tin (April 1918), p. 25. Jokes Reach Marine Corps,” Char lotte (N.C.) Ob - 49 “The U. S. Marine Corps: An Object Lesson of De- server, 20 Decem ber 1915, p. 6. mocracy in the Mili tary,” Wilkes-Barre (Pa.) Times, 67 “Afraid of a Cat[:] Rejected as Marine,” Colum bus 27 No vem ber 1916, p. 8. Daily Enquirer, 5 Febru ary 1917, p. 1. 50 “Disti nguish ing Emblem for Recruit ers ,” Bul le tin 68 “Only Real Men Can Hope to Join Uncle Sam’s (Decem ber 1914), p. 14. For the sugges tion that the Carefully Trained Marine Corps,” p. 7. Corps was “a little better” than the other branches because its “offi cers [were] closer to their men, 69 “Taper ing Fin gers Mean Anything but Stabil ity ,” look ing out for their welfare,” see James F. J. Idaho States man, 28 Au gust 1916, p. 3. Archibald and Berton Braley, “Sol diers and Sailors, 70 “Young Men Study for En try into Ma rine Corps,” Too,” Collier’s , 16 May 1914, p. 12. Mont gom ery Ad ver tiser, 10 Decem ber 1916, p. 2. 51 “Tis Not for Gold We’re Here,” Bul le tin (No vem ber 71 For sugges tions regard ing the better quality of the 1916), p. 16; Sgt. John F. Cassidy, “School for Re - Corps’s recruit i ng mate rial, see “Spokane Reporter cruiters at Recruit Depot Is Suggested,” Bul le tin Converted ,” p. 5. The army’s methods lagged be- (May 1916), p. 6. hind the Corps’s; see “Army Of ficers Get Ad ver tis- 52 Sgt. Norman M. Shaw, “A Plea for Big, Yellow ing In struc tion,” Print ers’ Ink, 2 January 1919, p. 86. Chev ron,” Bul le tin (Septem ber 1915), p. 4. 72 Sgt. W. W. Sibert, “Down North Carolina Way,” 53 “The Bul le tin Ap pre ci ated in the West ern Di vi sion,” Bul le tin (16 August 1916), p. 28. For newspa per ar- p. 11; Sgt. Louie W. Putnam, “Vari ous Sugges tions ticles about the expe di tion, see “Expert Shark Hunt- and Comments, ” Bul le tin (August 1916), p. 22. ers Orga nize for Crusade,” Mont gom ery Ad ver tiser, 21 July 1916, p. 10. 54 “The Disti nguish ing Emblem for Recruit ers ,” Bul le- tin (Feb ru ary 1915), p. 7. 73 Sibert, “Down North Carolina Way,” p. 28. 55 Capt. Wil liam Brackett, “Sgt. Katcher Has Right 74 Sgt. B. J. Doherty, “News paper Public ity Up Boston Idea,” Bul le tin (Octo ber 1916), p. 22; Capt. Frank E. Way May Help You,” Bul le tin (May 1916), p. 4. Ev ans, “Car ry ing the Mes sage,” Bul le tin (May 75 “An other Luzerne County Boy Makes Good with 1915), p. 4. Marines,” Wilkes-Barre (Pa.) Times, 7 Febru ary 56 “Mil itary May Honor Veter ans of Civil War with 1916, p. 2. Offi cer’s Salute ,” Morn ing Olympian, 9 June 1916, p. 76 See, for exam ple, “Louis Harvey with Marines,” 1. Grand Forks (N.D.) Herald, 19 Septem ber 1915, p. 6. 57 Sgt. John F. Cassidy, “Lack of Pub lic ity,” Bul le tin 77 “At ten tion! Ev ery one!,” Bul le tin (Novem ber 1915), (June 1915), p. 5. p. 24. 78 Quoted in Lindsay, This High Name, p. 3.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:12 AM HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:12 AM VI Arms and the Man Some Ap proaches to the Study of Brit ish Na val Com mu ni ties Afloat, 1900–1950

BRUCE TAY LOR

f arms and the man I sing.” So be gins the Aeneid, Vir gil’s al le gory of war and duty. This pa per endea v ors to trace out some appr oaches to re search- Oing another it era tion of men unde r arms—that of the Royal Navy afloat in the first half of the twen ti eth cen tury. Its aim is to offe r a frame work within which re searchers can addr ess one of the stern est chal lenges in the field, that of re con- struct ing the so cial hist ory of a warship commu nit y. The thoughts and concl usions contained here have come out of pro longed resear ch on the life and function ing of the battle cruiser HMS Hood, in many respects an un usual ship, given its fame and status, but in other s all too typi cal with re gard to the proble ms fac ing those re- searching the subtle and complex world of ship board life.1 A naval commu nity afloat is no more fixed than the ves sel that en closes it. It is the fate of a ship’s company to be scattered by recommissioning or the va garies of war af ter no more than a few years. Also, with very few excep tions, the ship itself is destined to succumb to changes by dock yards and to the efforts of the breakers, to the vi o lence of the enemy, or to the will of the ocean. Naval life afloat is welded in dis cipline, tra di tion, and war and yet sus cep ti ble to an ni hi la tion in a mat ter of sec - onds; it is its tran sient yet last ing qual ity that af fords it much of its fas cina tion— short in time but rich in mem ory. As in sti tu tions go, a ship and its com mu nity are therefore charac ter ized by an unusual degree of imper ma nence, their physi cal forms and mani fes ta tions by destruc tion that is of ten almost total. Not for them the conti nu i ties of the reg imen tal mess, ar chive or museum, or for that matter the per- sistence of the navy it self, though the ad vance of oceano graphic technol ogy makes it one of the iro nies of na val his tory that sink ing is now a surer way of sav ing a ves sel for pos terity than practi call y any other. Despite the linger ing questions surround - ing its loss, HMS Hood, sunk in 1941, is more tangi ble, through the discov ery of its wreck in 2001, than could have seemed possi ble thirty years ago. From a docu men tary point of view, this imper ma nence means that a ship’s own archive, from the wardroom wine book to the engine-r oom oil reg isters, is likely to be dispersed and most proba bly destroyed. While not lacking, the sur viv ing offi cial docu men ta tion of so great a vessel as Hood, for twenty years the flag ship of the

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Royal Navy, rarely extends beyond op era tional mat ters and tech ni cal issues. 2 Of the ship’s func tion ing and evo lution, of its in ter nal af fairs and on going mo rale, there is lit tle in of fi cial col lec tions from any part of its ca reer. Hood ex pe ri enced the sui cide of its first lieuten ant in June 1939 and what ap pears to have been a mu tiny of sorts in Decem ber 1940, but one would never know it from the Admi ralty docu men ta - tion housed in The Na tional Archives at Kew in London. 3 Hood, of course, was shat - tered within the space of a few minutes, but it is un likely that its ar chive would have fared any better had it survived to be scrapped, since the posi tion seems in respect to be no differ ent for other ships in this period or before. This is not to be wondered at, since na val au thor i ties tend to con cern them selves with the in ter nal af fairs of a vessel only in respect of of ficer promo tion or should its morale or condi tion affect its op er a tional vi a bil ity. The sort of ma te rial on which a so cial his to rian might feed is therefore rarely en- countered in of fi cial sources, and all at tempt ing “to tal his to ries” of warships in all their rich ness of context, struc ture, and char acter must gird them selves for pro - longed research among widely scattered sources. For here lies the central challenge to any who would write the social history of a warship: where they survive at all, the ma jor ity of re cords illu mi nat ing life on board are the prod uct of in di vid u als and are held in pri vate hands, though increa sing numbers are be coming avail able to research ers through ar chival deposit and on the internet. The inter pre ta tion of this mate rial and what it may tell us of the nature of the authors’ at tachments to their ship as in di vid uals or as members of a partic u lar group ing forms the back drop to this pa per, a reminder that the culture and commu nity of a warship are even richer and more impos ing in their or der and design than the structure that enclos es them. So, where to be gin? The an swer, per haps, is to start by fram ing the his tory of the vessel under review in a detailed chro nology. This can be built up rela tively simply from the regis ters of Royal Navy ships’ move ments or in greater detail from the surviv ing deck logs of subma rines or fighting ships of cruiser size or larger.4 The next step is to form a pic ture of the naval day, the four-hour watch system that provided the rhythm of its rou tine, day in and day out for years on end.5 Equally impor tant is to draw a clear dis tinction be tween peace and war, the one al ways in ex pecta tion of the other. It is sometimes said that the life of a peacetime navy is compar a tively un - eventful. Certainly it lacks the emotional voy age that only battle can bring, but like- wise is it spared the deaden ing routine that is the chief charac ter is tic of war at sea, against the backdrop of sleep depri va tion and fear of the unknown and the unex - pected, the sense of a grinding monot ony that only catas tro phe might inter rupt. On the other hand, the Sec ond World War in partic u lar brought numbers of civil ians into the closed world of shipboard life, both in the wardroom and on the lower deck, people destined to change that world for ever and be transformed in their turn by the real i ties of their ser vice.

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Having fixed the unit in time, the researc her is ready to turn to its fabric. One of the fea tures of naval his tory gener ally, and ship biog ra phy in par ticu lar, is that it requires of its practi tio ners an unusu ally firm grasp of the im medi ate phys i cal and techni cal envi ron ment of their sub ject if they are to do it justice. In this re spect those who study na val commu ni ties have been well served by the fo cus on techni cal matters that has increas ingl y charac ter ized naval inter est and naval publish ing over the last thirty or forty years. Who, for in stance, would not find their re search en- hanced into a third di mension by a volume from the remark able Anatomy of the Ship series launched by Conway Mari time Press in 1982, or the ShipShape series pro duced by Chatham Publish ing between 1997 and 2003?6 Fail ing these or their like, the researc her may turn to the huge de posit of ships’ plans held by the Na tional Mari time Museum at Wool wich and begin to appre ci ate the scale of the enter prise from each stroke of the drafts man’s pen. The plans im press now for their scale, just as the fin ished ar ti cle impressed for its im men sity, for the power and con se quence vested in it, and for that partic u lar war ship aesthetic refined by na val archi tects in the first decades of the twenti eth cen tury. This sense was never better evoked than by the jour nalist V. C. Scott O’Connor, who ac com pa nied Hood on the ship’s world cruise of 1923–24, which an nounced it as the greatest war ship afloat: “Hood . . . moved upon her course, like the stars them selves, without a sound or murmur. Upon her quar ter-deck one stood, for all her greatness, very near the sea. Above its smooth lev els there rose, as if to re mind one of the ship’s dread pur pose, her co los sal tur rets, the long strain ing muzzles of her guns, like ghosts of Ar ma geddon, her tiers of decks.”7 But the fabric of a ship is one thing, its oper a tion quite another. To be af forded a plan or pho to graph of a fif teen-inch tur ret is not, alas, to be given any signif i cant idea of its func tion ing, though as with ship de sign and structure gener ally, there is an in creasing fund of ma te rial on weap ons sys tems and sen sors, such as ra dar.8 However, such sources rarely provide any impres sion of the impact of such systems on those who op erated them, the monstrous power of the guns, the searing heat of the en gine spaces. This is im por tant be cause to study a ship in de tail is to be made aware that certain items of equip ment acquired charac ters all their own, charac ters in ti mately as so ci ated with those given re spon si bil ity for serv ing or main tain ing them. Can any mem ber of Hood’s engi neer ing de partment have thought of the boiler room fan flats without thinking also of Chief Mechanician Charles W. Bostock, whose proud est pos ses sion was a cer tif i cate from the Net ley men tal asy - lum stating that he was entirely sane?9 Or imagine the tur rets without the “quali fied ordnancemen,” or “turret rats,” long-service able seamen with no in ter est in pro - mo tion but suf fi cient guile to leaven their work with those il licit plea sures that made life bear able? The navy, mind ful of the di sas ters at Jutland, might is sue strin - gent rules against smok ing in the turrets, but these could hardly stop a man from

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light ing up in the work ing chamber or discour age an ordnance arti ficer from puffing, on a pipe, his way through his morning turret in spection. 10 Nor, for that matter, could it stop Able Seaman “Tubby” Barney, a Scot, from slaking his thirst with a ru in - ous cocktail of white spirit and Pusser’s lime juice after a hard morning’s work.11 In the way of this or any other navy, its work co existed with the lives of those who made it what it was. Equally, much as a vessel’s career may be traced in offi cial or private sources or its fabric divined from plans and published mate rial, the tenor of its shipboard life is far harder to fol low or re con struct in its net work of com mand struc tures, unit or - gani zation, and per sonal rela tions. A war ship was noth ing if not a com mu nity of com mu ni ties, of groups of men di vided into de part ments, messes, watches, tricks, and working parties yet parts of a highly evolved orga ni za tion centu ries in the making. Not with out reason did Adm. Lord Chatfield, cap tain of the bat tle cruiser Lion during the Great War and First Sea Lord from 1932 to 1938, describe the manage - ment of fleets and ships as a “national art,” one that prompted a succes sion of man - u als out lin ing ideal forms of ship board or ga ni za tion dur ing the pe riod un der re view.12 Like John Roberts’s Anatomy of the Ship volume on HMS Hood, it is hard to imagine studying that ship without refer ence to Capt. Rory O’Conor’s Runni ng a Big Ship on “Ten Com mand ments,” published in 1937, the au thor hav ing served as Hood’s exec u tive of fi cer from 1933 to 1936. That the Royal Navy was recog nized for its exper tise in what might be called ship husbandr y is shown by the fact that Run - ning a Big Ship was translated into both French and Ital ian be fore the outbrea k of war.13 Although the tendency of most of these man uals is to descr ibe ship orga ni za tion in ho listic terms and from above, any making a detailed study of the op era tion of a vessel will find it the ag grega tion of groups of perhaps ten or twenty indi vid u als who in turn reflec ted the wider orga ni za tion of the ship it self by spe cial ization and, of course, rank, with all that this implied. Through out its myr iad spaces, decks, and compart ments, dozens of such commu ni ties performed their duties and lived their lives with varying degree s of compe tence and enthu siasm, from the Double Bot tom Party to the Royal Marine Band and the staff of an admi ral. The men who consti - tuted them came to know each other inti mately in their work and leisure, their days and nights, as much ashore as afloat. Through their charac ter and soci ety the ship acquired that distinc tive qual ity that set it apart from all others, caus ing its men to remem ber it with varying de grees of fondness, equanimity, or loathing for the rest of their lives. This brings us to one of the key is sues in ship bi ogra phy, the ques tion of re la - tions be tween of fi cers and men. In the def eren tial so ciety of early twen ti eth-cen tury Brit ain, a ma jor ity of men held their of fi cers in awe, not only for rea sons of rank and so cial status but also for their edu ca tion and com mand of language. For their part,

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too many of fi cers contin ued to re spond to this def erence with tact less ness bor der - ing on dis dain, much as they re spected the skill, te nacity, and re source ful ness of those un der their com mand. Some thing of this in nate con de scension is cap tured in the jour nal ist Filson Young’s mem oir of Christ mas at sea dur ing his in ter lude in Lion over the win ter of 1914–15. Here he recalls the tradi tional round by the ship’s senior offi cers of the mess decks, in this case season ally deco rated by their inmates for Vice Adm. Sir David Beatty and his staff: What was more re markable, and not a little touch ing, was that men living such a life of un - changing rou tine and toil, cramped and crowded, poised in securely be tween life and death, should think it worth while to add to their labours by building up for such a brief moment these child ish structures of deco rative rubbish. It was elo quent of the need there is in every heart to make festi val at some time or other, and surely el o quent also of that envi able gift, one of the best which the blue jacket pos sesses, of making some thing out of noth ing, of be ing happy with little, and of con structing out of the ma terial of daily toil a bright-hued fabric of pleasure. 14 Although the Inver gordon mutiny of 1931 ush ered in a signif i cant change in officer atti tudes, there can be little doubt that arro ganc e and thoughtless ness lay at the root of much disgrun tle ment and disaf fec tion on the lower deck. In most instances the men could draw on a sub tle and evolved languag e to express their dis gust or dis - appoint ment at those given command over them. A tone of voice, a nuance of body language, a show of ret i cence all spoke vol umes to those on the re ceiv ing end. Adm. Sir Frank Twiss captures this per fectly in re calling a botched ma neu ver made by him while command ing his first ship, the frigate Porlock Bay: With a nasty rending noise the stanchions bent and broke and then, in one of those moments of ut ter silence which usually fol low di saster, I heard a sailor’s voice from some where aft, “Away stan chions.” I never for got that cry. It said every thing the Ship’s Com pany thought of their new Captain: cack-handed, no ship handler, spoiling our nice ship, not what we expected of you, Sir, not what we look for at all.15 There were moments, how ever, when extreme aggra va tion called for more di - rect means of commu ni cation. Shoddy or list less work, mass leave-breaking, and des ultory per formances in fleet sporting events were sure signs of poor morale and failing leader ship. By con trast, the of fi cer whose men called him a “gent” was being paid their very high est compli ment, and there was little they would not do for him. Adm. Sir Reginald Bacon has this memory of Cdr. Sacheveral Darwin, with whom he served in the battle ship Alexandra in the early 1880s: One morn ing, after we had been in com mission some months, he slipped coming down a ladder, and broke his knee-cap, which ne ces sitated his going to hos pital. Christmas Day came, and in the after noon his two boy messen gers were sent by the crew up to the hos pital with a bas ket con tain ing some thing from each of the men’s messes to show that he had not been forgot ten. A rare mark of affec tion from a crew.16 But most were glad to keep their distance and gener ally had as lit tle contact with of fi cers as possi ble. Nowhere is this at ti tude more ex qui sitely cap tured than in the follow ing exchange between Midn. George Blundell, then in command of Hood’s first picketboat, and his Westcountry cox swain. The year is 1924.

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I have often reflected on what a lot the petty offi cers tactfully taught me on how to be have. One day we landed a number of of ficers just after lunch: the ship’s com pany was still at work. On re turn I asked the cox swain (Jeffreys was his name; he was a darling man) “What do the men think of the offi cers go ing ashore in working hours?” Jeff looked at me with that “three badge” twin kle in his eye. “Lor’ bless you, Sir,” he re plied, “We likes to see them out of the way.” I have never for gotten that wise remark. 17 Offi cers, of course, took a very differ ent perspec tive on rela tions with the men, though these varied depend ing on the type of ves sel con cerned; plainly, disci pline and polish were less perti nent among the picked and highly trained men in the con- fines of a sub marine or destroye r than they were in a bat tleship, with a thou sand com part ments and many hands to keep from idle ness. For most of fi cers, guardians of a great tradi tion, relent less work and super vi sion served not only to restrain the unrul i ness and aggres sion that made the Brit ish sailor the for mi da ble man he was but also to harden him against the day when the sea or the enemy might mete out more than irksome labor or petty disci pline. Nat urally, the navy had mecha nisms to re lieve the ten sions that in ev i ta bly arose, in clud ing the elab o rate “Cross ing the Line” cere mony and, more fre quently, the risqué in ver sions of rank, gen der, and sex ual ori en ta tion rep resented in the “S.O.D.S. op eras” with their wry and fre - quently mor dant com men tar ies of ship board life, events, char acters, and mo rale.18 Evi dently, much of this expe ri ence remains locked in the mind, fated to slip qui- etly into obliv ion un less coaxed out by time or prov i dence. This is why—where still possi ble—c ontact with veter ans is so valuable to any study of a naval commu nity, giving the researc her the oppor tu nity less to identify the salient features of life afloat or the highlights of a ship’s career or com mission than to put these into the per spective of its daily atmo sphere and routine, to gauge the tenor of its life, and to appre ci - ate the extent to which inci dents were blips in an exis tence that for many was charac ter ized more by bore dom and drudgery than by excite ment or zeal. For the source ma te rial that sur vives, in what ever form it is transmit ted—let ters, di a ries, mem oirs pub lished or oth erwise, oral his to ries, film, or di rect contact with vet erans —many obsta cles and pitfalls remain where its inter pre ta tion is concerned. To read the mem oirs of an offi cer and a rating of the same commis sion (or, gener ally, cruise, in Ameri can par lance) is to appre ci ate the gulf-like gap in outlook and pros - pects sep a rat ing the two sides. There was mutual re spect, collab o ration, and a de - gree of comrade ship in adver sity, but to pretend that any ship was truly “of one company” is to ignore the fundamental realities of service afloat. Both then and since, the opin ions ex pressed are in vari ably bound up in the as - sump tions and re al i ties of class that con tinue to char acter ize Brit ish and par tic u - larly English so ciety gen erally. The views range from mor bid bit ter ness and dis gust among ratings to suppo si t ions among senior offi cers of harmony and satis fac tio n that ex isted among only a small pro por tion of rat ings. Between these ex tremes are memoirs of fering pene trat ing in sights into the life and atmo sphere of the ship from

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both rat ings and of fi cers. Inev i ta bly, much of this ma te rial re flects the very de cided opinion, preju dice, or agenda of its author, either at the time or later. Those using it must there fore be careful to draw a dis tinction be tween opin ions reflect ing personal expe rience and those that can be taken as rep resen ta tive of the views of a wider commu nity of men, be tween those written at the time and those that are the products of memory, more reasoned and or dered in their perceptions but less accurate to the moment in their detail or emotional tone. Then there is the mat ter of con fi den ti al ity and with hold ing of in for ma tion al- luded to just above. The “Si lent Service” (that is, the sub ma rine arm), whose mem - bers set down and pub lish their mem oirs less frequently and less can didly than do those of the other armed ser vices, yields its se crets only with the greatest re luctance . The sense of a world apart that only those who lived it can share or un derstand re - mains strong. Beyond this, service in a ship usu ally implies a bond of loy alty and at - tach ment to be broken only by death. In writing on such an emotive sub ject as HMS Hood—sunk with huge loss of life in an epi sode that has come to repre sent the Cal - vary endured by the Royal Navy in the Second World War—one cannot fail to be - come aware of the amount of in forma tion, in ev i ta bly concern ing its less agreeable as pects and ep i sodes, that was and is known but can nei ther be re vealed nor ad mit - ted. This of itself has some thing to say about the mental ity of those under re view, about the val ues of the com mu nity in which they served, and the self-per ception of the navy of the time and since. Nor is this men tal ity con fined to vet erans, and so to bring a subject under close and dispas sion ate scru tiny is to risk raising the ire of those who, for reasons that have more to do with the present than the past, would rather the gilded image of the Royal Navy be left untar nished. A warship commu nity is of course part of a wider insti tu tion—a navy—which in its turn is an ex pres sion of the gov ernment that di rects and sup ports it and the culture and so ciety from which it emerges. No ship com mu nity can there fore be ab- stracted from the wider context of events, and the first half of the twenti eth cen tury saw far-reach ing changes in British so ciety that are accu rately reflected in the Royal Navy.19 Even with a vision ary ge nius like Sir John Fisher at the helm, the speed of techno log i cal change in the first years of the century largely outpaced the ability of the Royal Navy to as sim i late it, and for var i ous reasons the ser vice was unable to make good its many ad van tages during the Great War. The in ability of the navy to deliver a knockout blow to the High Seas Fleet at Jutland or prevent the shelling of towns along the east coast of England or the slaughter of British mer chantmen in 1917 was a blow to a service steeped in the tradi tion of Nel son and di min ished its prestige in so ciety at large. Then in 1921 came the “Geddes Axe,” which beached a third of its offi cer corps and contrib uted to poor offi cer morale for the rest of the decade. The postwar years also produced a pronounce d reac tion against techni cal spe cial iza tion and tech nol ogy gen er ally—the “ma te ri al ists,” as its practioners were

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known—which was long suspected to have blunted the offen sive capa bil i ties of the navy. Among other things, this re sulted in con certed steps to re duce the in fluence of naval engi neer ing and even in a dispar ag ing of gunnery offi cers in some quarters. Meanwhile, a pro found nos tal gia among certain se nior and re tired of fi cers for the service of their youth prompted a movement for the resto ration of sail training in the Royal Navy, a scheme Admi ral Chatfield was at pains to quash on becom ing First Sea Lord in 1932.20 All this against the backdrop of ongo ing debate as to the worth of the battle ship and the holi day on capi tal-ship construc tion, which was ex tended in 1930—issues central to the per pet ua tion of the navy as an ef fective force. The Royal Navy also found diffi culty in adjust ing to social and economic change. On the lower deck the settle ment of 1919 had brought sail ors’ pay above the breadline, but the fail ure of the navy to rec ognize the pro found so cial upheaval brought on by the Great War, its neuter ing of enti ties set up to rep resent lower-deck grievances , and a series of in ept and ill-advised pay cuts led to the Invergordon mutiny in 1931.21 Gone were the “crews of lithe, active, cat like men of poor ed uca tion but giants in muscle and pluck” who had charac ter ized the navy un til the turn of the twen ti eth cen tury.22 Re flect ing more strin gent qual i fi ca tions for en try and im prove - ments in ed u cation on a na tional level, the Royal Navy was now re ceiving men of much broader forma tion and as pi rations than had been the case be fore the Great War—men who found lit tle out let for their am bitions in the navy. By the late 1920s the legion of sailors promoted to petty offi cer during the war was acting as a bar to ad vancement for younger men, many of whom rep resented much more suitable candi dates for higher rat ings. As one sailor re called, “It was explained to us by the odd older members of the crew—a lot of whom were survi vors of the war time fleets, now drasti call y reduced— [that they] only put up with the poor condi tions and pay to avoid the mass unem ploy ment that awaited them if they did not achieve Pension Age.”23 Then there were those for whom cyn i cism was the ulti mate les son of their ex pe - rience: “Of the oth ers, survi vors of the previ ous gen era tion, most were tough old nuts with noth ing to lose, their Good Conduct badges having gone to the wind many a time, and toughened up by peri ods of deten tion. [Together , this] made for a tough old navy that required tight control.” 24 Need less to say, few offi cers were under any illu sions as to the type of man they were dealing with here. Capt. Fran cis Pridham of Hood made no bones about it: There are of course var i ous kinds of “black sheep.” The chap who is “grey black” through his own fool ishness, gets drunk on shore and makes himself a noisy nuisance, is no great anxi ety. The re ally “black” ones, the Bolshies, the coarse, the lech er ous and the surly gaol bird are the danger ous ones. I have no com punc tion in say ing that the risk we run in carry - ing this type justi fies us hounding him down, and out, when we find him out. The Navy is not a re for ma tory.25

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Inver gordon pro vided a stark rev e la tion of the ad min is tra tive de fi cien cies un der which the Royal Navy had been labor ing since the end of the Great War and showed the Admi ralty to be discon nected from both the offi cer corps and the lower deck. Nonethe less, the 1930s brought on a profound change of approach and leader ship at the top. In ship board life this was re flected in a re newed em pha sis on the di vi - sional sys tem of war ship or gani zation (re fined by Cdr. Wil liam James and Capt. W. R. Hall in the bat tle cruiser Queen Mary im medi ately before the Great War) and in improved train ing and pro motion prospects for talented ratings. Mindful of the po lit i cal militance of many of the older men it had tra di tion ally recruited as stokers from the indus trial north of Britain, the navy turned to youn ger men from the south to staff the engi neer ing de partments of its ships, though at some cost to shipboard orga ni za tion, as sepa rate messes had to be estab lished to keep new recruits from their older ship mates. The 1930s also saw an eas ing of the ten sions that had tra di tion ally charac ter ized rela tions be tween ma rines, stok ers, and sea men, the prod uct of a broader out look among those joining the navy and greater ef forts at inte gra tion on the part of their di vi sional of fi cers. The pop u lar ity of ship board lend ing li brar ies and wide in ter est in advanced courses are tell ing indi cators of the sort of men be ing drawn to a naval career. This against a decline in tradi tional ship board crafts like fancy rope work and even in the num ber of those tak ing their rum rations; in 1934 less than a quar ter of those el i gi ble on Hood’s lower deck elected to do so, though finan cial consid er - ations no doubt had a bear ing on this figure. 26 Meanwhile, the worsen ing diplo mati c situ a tio n ushered new ships, new tech - nology, and new ideas into the navy. As re cruitment gath ered pace in the late 1930s, the navy’s com mit ments dur ing the Ab ys sin ian cri sis of 1935 and then the Span ish Civil War dis rupted both its training regime and the ordered sequence of the naval year, with its ro ta tion of fleet ex ercises, train ing, compe ti tion, re fit ting, and leave.27 Then came the Second World War, which drafted hun dreds of thou sands of reserv - ist offi cer s and “hostil i ties-onl y” ratings into the ser vice, with all the logis ti cal and training require ments this brought in its train.28 The great in flux of vol un teers and con scripts did not be gin un til 1940, but once they started ar riv ing in num bers the at mo sphere afloat changed per cep ti bly. For the reg u lars of the peace time navy it was no doubt an ex as per at ing yet fas cinat ing spec ta cle. Here were men, drawn from ev ery walk of life, thrust in time of war into the un for giv ing and largely closed world of the lower deck of the Royal Navy. Some wilted un der the pres sure, but curi os ity and mu tual respect caused many unlikely friendships to be struck up. As technol - ogy assumed an ever greater role in naval oper a tions and attri tion thinned the ranks of career offi cers, the navy came increas ingly to rely on the Royal Na val Volun teer Re serve and the Royal Na val Re serve to bridge the gap.29 There were ten sions, of

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course, as reserv ist of fi cers brought their breezy ap proach and tech ni cal expertise into the conservative environment of the peacetime service, but the navy would never be the same again. This brings us to per cep tions, first those of the navy and then ours as histo ri ans. Although firm conclu sions are hard to come by and gener al iza tion is a risky propo - sition, it is al ways useful to specu late on the ex tent of in di vid uals’ or a group’s at - tachment to the ships in which they sail or the navy in which they serve, of their al le giances by rank, spe cial iza tion, or geo graph ical or i gin—or lack thereof. Equally, in an in sti tu tion that routinely sep a rated men from home for very ex tended pe ri- ods, the nature of a sailor’s attach ment to the land is an impor tant indi ca tor of his rela tion ship to the par ent in sti tu tion. By the 1930s the navy had long since ceased to be a world of bache lors, and in 1934 nearly 40 percent of Hood’s company were married, while 30 percent had de pend ent children—part of the wider family of a ship’s company, a part whose exis tence was first acknowl edged by farsighted offi - cers like Rory O’Conor.30 Most, however, re mained married to the service and its culture, and at its best the navy, among both its of fi cers and men, was a com mu nity or set of com mu ni ties in which it was suffi cient for a man to feel that he had earned the respect of his peers and could be counted as one of them in the fullest sense—enough to believe that in extre mis the moment might come when they laid down their lives for you and you might do like wise for them. Courage, forti tude, and loy alty—in Toynbee’s memo - rable phrase “none the less vir tues for be ing jewels set in blood and iron.”31 At its worst that com mu nity was a sullen and cyni cal rump imbued with the darker sides of na val life, of skulking, thiev ery, bully ing, and sexual preda tion, and in the case of of fi cers char ac ter ized by time serv ers, fail ures, and non en ti ties, those who, in Cap - tain O’Conor’s words, lacked “the spark of lead ership, . . . the abil ity to organ ise, and the will to carry things through.”32 Such a world was discov ered by Ordi nary Seaman George Melly on being drafted to HMS Argus, once an air craft car rier and by then an accom mo da tion ship at Chat ham. It is July 1945: The Argus, as I soon discov ered, was a den of skivers, mis fits and lu na tics, a floating, teth - ered thieves’ kitchen. Our Cap tain, an elderly and scrawny re li gious ma niac risen from the ranks, seldom left his cabin and could be heard, dur ing the night watches, loudly de claim ing the more bloodthirsty passages from the Old Testa ment. De spite his age and length of ser - vice, he was still, and un derstand ably, a Lieu tenant. The rest of the ship’s com pany were all in volved in a con spiracy to re main ex actly where they were, tucked snugly away, a cosy and corrupt comm unity dedi cated to mutual aid.33 Finally, we come to the con trast be tween our per cep tions and con cerns as his to - rians and those of the in di vid uals under review. To ques tion a vet eran about life afloat is to grasp the ex tent to which dispar ity of expe ri ence is matched by a gulf in prior i ti es. Few veter ans of Hood there fore have—or had—very much in ter est in precisely how it was sunk. Rather, they imag ine sheets of flame en velop ing men and

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spaces inti mately known and nostal gi cally recalled. Ab stracted from the tacti cal and stra te gic re al i ties that ex er cised their su pe ri ors and an i mate their his to ri ans, they remem ber the comrade ship, the sense of hardships shared that made all things bearable and set the navy apart from every other walk of life—the commu nity evoked here by Leading Seaman Leon ard Williams of Hood: Here we lived to gether as a giant family. We knew each other’s fail ings and weaknesses, and liked each other in spite of them. We slept in close prox im ity, in swaying hammocks. We even bathed together in the com mu nal bathrooms. In fact we lived can didly with one an - other, ac cepting the rough with the smooth. This sharing and liv ing together forged a com- radeship which one can never find in ci vil ian life. Nor was the ship herself left out of our lives, for ev erything we did was for her. On our smartness, the way we dressed, in fact every - thing we did depended our ship’s effi ciency rat ing in the fleet. She was our constant task mis tress. While we could, and of ten did, call her all the rough names under the sun when things went wrong, heaven help those, not of our com pany, who tried to do the same. This is the team spirit we miss when we leave the service, for it is some thing very fine. Some thing which, through countless ages, has scaled the highest moun tains, fought and won hope less bat tles.34 The re-cre ation of such a com mu nity in all its splen dor and mis ery, in its ter ror and en nui, its struc ture and sub tlety, has rarely proved en tic ing to his to ri ans, who in tak ing on any such pro ject must re sign them selves to the pos si bility, even the like li hood, of only par tial success af ter much la bor. While few would dis pute the central ity of the hu man di men sion of life afloat in na val stud ies, un til a larger body of researc h is available to permit of compar i son between ships and navies, the dom- i nant im pression of such com mu ni ties must re main more firmly rooted in the realm of fiction than of his tory, and of arms more than men.35

NOTES My thanks to Dr. Nicho las Lambert, Prof. Jon Cen tury (New York: Viking, 2001); John Reeve Sumida, and Prof. Chris topher McKee for their kind - and Da vid Stevens, eds., The Face of Na val Bat tle: ness and en cour age ment in con nec tion with this pa per The Hu man Expe ri ence of Mod ern War at Sea (St. —and also to Deborah Eppolito, to whom it is lov- Leo nards, NSW, Austra lia: Allen and Unwin, 2003); ingly ded i cated. Ken neth Poolman, The British Sailor (London: 1 See Bruce Tay lor, The Battlecruiser HMS Hood: An Arms and Armour, 1989); and G. G. Connell, Jack’s Il lus trated Bi og ra phy, 1916–1941 (London: Chat - War: Lower-Deck Rec ol lec tions from World War II ham, 2005). See also Capt. John Wells, The Royal (Manchester, U.K.: Crecy, 1995). Navy: An Illus trate d Social History , 1870–1982 2 It can be summa rized as follows. There are two vo- (Stroud, Glos., U.K.: Alan Sutton/Royal Naval Mu - lu mi nous col lec tions of tech ni cal pa pers re lat ing to seum, 1994); Henry Baynham, Men from the Dread - its fabric, to gether with the trans actions of the noughts (Lon don: Hutch in son, 1976); Chris to pher boards of enquiry held into the sinking. On the op- McKee, So ber Men and True: Sailor Lives in the er ational side, there are over twenty years of deck Royal Navy, 1900–1945 (Cam bridge, Mass.: Harvard logs, a collec tion of papers concern ing the world Univ. Press, 2002); Ronald H. Spector, At War at cruise of 1923–24, and brief reports on the involve - Sea: Sail ors and Naval Com bat in the Twen ti eth ment of the ship’s detach ment in the Nor wegian

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campaign in April 1940 and of the ship itself at the Général de la Marine, 1938); and Rory O’Conor, I shell ing of the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir in July “dieci Comandamenti” per governare una grande of that year. Where the ship’s inter nal af fairs are nave (Rome: Tipo-Litografia dell’Ufficio di concerned, the mate rial is limited to several med ical Gabinetto del Ministero della Ma rina, 1938). offi cers’ journ als and assorted papers concern ing 14 Filson Young, With the Battle Cruis ers (Annapolis, dis ci plin ary is sues, in clud ing the Inver gordon mu - Md.: U.S. Naval In stitute, 1986), p. 144. tiny. For refer ences see Taylor, Battlecruiser HMS Hood, p. 250. 15 Adm. Sir Frank Twiss, Social Change in the Royal Navy, 1924–1970: The Life and Times of Admi ral Sir 3 Ibid., pp. 121, 195. Frank Twiss, KCB, KCVO, DSC (Stroud, Glos., U.K.: 4 The reg isters of ships’ movements are archived in Alan Sutton/Royal Naval Mu seum, 1996), p. 111. the Naval Histor i cal Branch of the Min istry of De- 16 Adm. Sir Reginald H. Bacon, A Naval Scrap-Book. fence, Portsmouth. Ships’ logs are held in The Na- First Part: 1877–1900 (Lon don: Hutch in son, c. tional Archives at Kew, but those of miscel la neous 1925), p. 50. or smaller ves sels, in clud ing de stroy ers, were dis - posed of in the early 1970s. 17 Capt. George Blundell, mem oirs, vol. 3, anec dote 3, p. 6, Impe rial War Museum, Depart ment of Docu - 5 See, for ex am ple, Taylor, Battlecruiser HMS Hood, ments, 90/38/1. pp. 232–34. 18 S.O.D.S. stands for Ship’s Own Dramatic Soci ety, or 6 Both series owe their exis tence to Robert Gardi ner, Ship’s Op er atic and Dra matic So ci ety. edi tor in chief of, suc cessively, Conway Mari time Press and Chat ham Publishing. 19 See Capt. Stephen W. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars (Lon don: Col lins, 1968–76); Vice Adm. Sir 7 V. C. Scott O’Connor, The Em pire Cruise (London: Louis Le Bailly, From Fisher to the Falklands (Lon- Rid dle, Smith, and Duffus, 1925), p. 37. don: In stitute of Marine En gineers, 1991); and 8 See, for exam ple, Nor man Friedman, Na val Fire - Chris to pher M. Bell, The Royal Navy: Seapower and power: Bat tle ship Guns and Gun nery in the Dread - Strat egy be tween the Wars (London: Palgrave nought Era (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In stitute Press, Macmillan, 2000). 2008); and Derek Howse, Ra dar at Sea: The Royal 20 Admi ral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, It Might Hap- Navy in World War 2 (London: Macmillan, 1993). pen Again (Lon don: Heinemann, 1948), pp. 54–59. 9 See Taylor, Battlecruiser HMS Hood, p. 46. 21 An thony Carew, The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 10 Ibid., p. 87. 1900–39: The Inver gordon Mutiny in Perspec tive 11 Ibid., p. 46. (Man chester, U.K.: Manches ter Univ. Press, 1981). 12 Admi ral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, The Navy and 22 Ba con, Na val Scrap-Book, p. vi. Defence (Lon don: Heinemann, 1942), p. 219. The 23 Fred Coombes, typescrip t mem oirs, Impe rial War chief man u als of ship board or ga ni za tion are, chro - Mu seum, Depart ment of Docu ments, 91/7/1, p. 42. nolog i cally , Capt. W. W. Hewett, Or der Book for Ex - 24 Ibid. ecu tive Offi cers of the Royal Navy, 2nd ed. (Ports- mouth, U.K.: Gieve, Matthews, and Seagrove, 1900; 25 Lec tures on Mu tiny, part 1, Preven tio n, p. 8. Author’s first pub lished 1894); Cdr. Sir Robert Arbuthnot, col lec tion. Com mander’s Or der Book for a Med i ter ra nean Bat - 26 See Taylor, Battlecruiser HMS Hood, p. 231. tle ship (Portsmouth, U.K.: Griffin, 1900); Capt. 27 Ibid., pp. 75–79. Christo p her Cradock , Whis pers from the Fleet: A Seama nship Story Book, 2nd ed. (Portsmouth, U.K.: 28 Brian Lavery, Hostil i ties Only: Training in the War- Gieve, Matthews, and Seagrove, 1908; first pub- time Navy (Lon don: Na tional Mar i time Mu seum, lished 1907); Cdr. the Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett, The 2004). Modern Of ficer of the Watch, 5th ed. (Portsmouth, 29 Brian Lavery, In Which They Served: The Royal Navy U.K.: Gieve, Matthews, and Seagrove, 1913; first Off icer Expe ri ence in the Second World War (Lon- published 1908); Capt. A. D. Pound, Man-of-War don: Conway Mari time, 2008). Or gani sa tion (Portsmouth, U.K.: Gieve, Matthews, 30 See Taylor, Battlecruiser HMS Hood, p. 231. and Seagrove, c. 1910); Cdr. W. M. James, New Bat- tle ship Or gani sa tions and Notes for Ex ec u tive Of fi cers 31 Ar nold J. Toynbee, A Study of His tory (Oxford, (Portsmouth, U.K.: Gieve’s, 1916); A Watch-Keeper U.K.: Ox ford Univ. Press, 1939), vol. 4, p. 640. [Lt. Cdr. B. V. Sturdee], Five Min utes to One Bell: A 32 O’Conor, Run ning a Big Ship on “Ten Com mand - Few Hints to Ju nior Watch-Keep ers Together with ments,” p. 149. Some Re marks on the Du ties of a De stroyer First Lieu - 33 George Melly, Rum, Bum and Concer tina (London: ten ant (Portsmouth, U.K.: Gieve’s, c. 1918; first Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 57. published c. 1914); Cdr. Russell Grenfell, A Cruiser Com mander’s Or ders (Portsmouth, U.K.: Gieve’s, 34 Leon ard Charles Williams, Gone a Long Jour ney 1933); and Capt. Rory O’Conor, Running a Big Ship (Bedhampton, U.K.: Hillmead, 2002), p. 141. on “Ten Com mand ments” (With Mod ern Ex ec u tive 35 Promi nent exam ples of fict ional re-creations of Ideas and a Complete Or ganisa tion) (Portsmouth, shipboard life are C. S. For ester, The Ship (London: U.K.: Gieve’s, 1937). Mi chael Jo seph, 1943); Nich o las Monsarrat, The 13 Rory O’Connor [sic], Ser vice intérieur (Running a Cruel Sea (Lon don: Cassell, 1951); and Alistair Big Ship on Ten Com mand ments) (Paris: État-Ma jor MacLean, H.M.S. Ulys ses (Lon don: Col lins, 1955).

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:12 AM VII Ostfriesland, the General Board of the Navy, and the Wash ing ton Na val Treaty A Relook at a His toric Sink ing

JOHN T. KUEHN

his paper re visits the hist oric sinking of the Ger man dreadnought battle - ship Ostfriesland in Chesa peake Bay aft er World War I by Army Air Corps Tbomb ers. Few events have been sur rounded with so much hype and myth. Ac cord ing to a her oic version of events, Wil liam “Billy” Mitchell demon str ated conclu sively the obso lesc ence of bat tle ships, and by exte nsion na vies, by sink ing a mod - ern dreadnought with his bomb ers. The oppo site view holds that the sinking of a moored ves sel of questi onable seaworthiness in fine weather with no crew to “fight” it proved nothing about the effi cac y of airpower against na val power. The real story, as usual, is more com pli cated, and this es say hopes to ex plore some of these com plexi ties, in cluding those that have been obscured by overheated his tor i cal ap proaches. In par tic u lar, this in ves ti ga tion will ex am ine how the Gen- eral Board of the U.S. Navy reacted to data collected by repre sen ta tives of the Bu- reau of Con struction and Re pair who sub mit ted de tailed af ter-action re ports on the var i ous Army Air Corps tests. If one does this, one finds that the General Board took the ev i dence gathered from Ostfriesland and other or dnance tests so se ri ously that it decided to use the scrapping clause of the Washing ton Naval Treaty as an op- portu nity to test further the ef ficac y of airpower and the sur vivabil ity of battle ships. The General Board found that the re ality dif fered greatly from the hype and com - mitted itself to a prac tical progra m of battle ship improve ment within the con fines of the Washing ton Naval Treaty and based on solid evi dence and analy sis. Before dis cussing the phys i cal evi dence, the con text of a con flict between Gen. Billy Mitch ell and the General Board must be provided. Each side had very good reasons to be resent ful of the other. In the sum mer of 1919 Mitchell related the fol - lowing to a credu lous congres sio nal audi ence: “We believe that if we are al lowed to de velop es sentially air weap ons . . . that we can carry the war to such an extent in the air as to make navies almost useless on the surface of the waters. The Navy General Board, I might say, agree with me on that.” This tes timony found its way into the records of the Gen eral Board, whose members most certainly did not agree with Gen - eral Mitch ell. Their pro test was so vo cif er ous that Secre tary of War New ton D. Baker was forced to write a letter to the secre tary of the navy the follow ing Octo ber

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stat ing, “A careful pe rusal of the re cord of this hearing indi cates that Gen eral Mitchell was not jus tified in the conclu sion which he reached.”1 It is almost certain that Baker and John J. Pershing (who had commanded the Ameri can Expe di tion ary Force, now held the rank General of the Armies, and would in 1921 be ap pointed Chief of Staff of the Army) were not so circum spect and restrain ed when they talked with Mitch ell about the mat ter. So began a feud within a feud, the feud be tween Mitchell and the General Board—a feud whose climax occurred with the sink ing of a German dread nought. In order to un derstand why General Mitchell concluded that the Gen eral Board agreed with him we must go back to April of the same year, when Gen eral Mitchell and Gen. C. T. Menoher (Mitch ell’s nom i nal supe rior) tes ti fied be fore the Gen eral Board as it debated the “de velop ment of naval avia tion policy,” specif i call y the need for an avia tion in sti tu tion or ganic to the navy and sepa rate from the army. The General Board was itself a rela tively young orga ni zation, hav ing been created by the secre tary of the navy by exec u tive fiat only in 1900, as a sort of incog nito na val general staff. It was composed of about a dozen senior captains and ad mi rals (with a junior offi cer as sec retary) and in cluded the Chief of Naval Oper a tions (CNO) and the Comman dant of the Marine Corps as per manent (“ex officio”) members until 1932. Its offi cial role was advi sory in na ture, but it had more or less be come the se - nior policy-mak ing body in the navy and provided the last word on ship and fleet design . At the time of Mitch ell’s testi mony, the member ship includ ed the most senior ad mi rals on active duty. Often the se nior mem ber present was in fact the most se nior of fi cer in the navy. (This was before the CNO po si tion de vel oped into the service chief for the navy under Adm. Ernest King in World War II.)2 The other key ele ment needed to un derstand Mitch ell’s testi mony to the Gen eral Board involves its unique hearing process. The General Board gathered infor ma tion on var i ous top ics before render ing “advice” to the sec retary of the navy through formal, secret hear ings. Addi tion ally, this se cret testi mony was transcribed and maintained for fu - ture refer ence in the writ ing of recom men da tions for the sec retary of the navy, of ten encom passed in General Board studies referred to as “seri als.” 3 To day, Mitch ell’s release of in forma tion from the hear ing might be regarded as a vi o lation of the rules gov ern ing clas si fied in for ma tion. The topic of na val avi a tion was of great in ter est to the navy’s se nior lead ership and the Gen eral Board in par tic u lar. In March 1919 the board held hear ings on recent gunnery tests us ing airborne spot ters and the bat tle ship Texas. These hear ings had im pressed the Gen eral Board with the po ten tial value of na val avi a tion. On 3 April 1919 Mitch ell and Menoher tes ti fied, along with sev eral key mem bers of the na scent Di rec tor ate of Na val Avi a tion (later re or ga nized as a new Bu reau of Aero nau tics— BuAer for short). Among these offi cers were many of the “pio neers” of naval avi ation —John Towers, Henry C. “Hank” Mustin, and Kenneth Whit ing. The rules for these

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hearings were very liberal for a mili tary orga ni za tion. The board toler ated a consid er - able amount of infor mal ity and often made a point not to inter rupt or contra dict wit- nesses in or der to get as broad a scope of tes ti mony as pos si ble.4 The se nior ad mi ral present that day was the former fleet commander (1913–14), Rear Adm. Charles Badger. Badger deferred the conduct of the meet ing to Adm. Charles G. Winterhalter, for mer com mander of the Asi atic Fleet. Winterhalter es - tablished a con genial at mo sphere and de ferred to Mitchell and Menoher, as the fol- lowing passage demon strates: “I have outlined in general what our imme di ate needs are, and will be very glad if you will, in your own way, han dle this sub ject.”5 The start ing point for the dis cussion was the navy’s ac qui si tion of a num ber of Sopwith aircraf t for training and testing out concepts. Mitchell’ s first words were confron ta tional: “My opinion in regard to the employ ment of an air service, as a general prop o sition, is to get what mate rial the peo ple who are using it desire for their work. The airplanes men tioned will be shot down as fast as they go up against an enemy.” When Admi ral Winterhalter stressed that the planes were simply for training, Mitchell remained ad a mant: “We would shoot [them] down im medi ately.” This exchang e might cause one to conclud e that the pri mary enemy of the United States, in Billy Mitchell’s mind, was its navy.6 Mitchell may have gained the impres sion that the General Board agreed with him be cause it po litely listened to him. The most di rect evi dence came after about seven pages of testi mony, most of it by Mitchell. “My opinion is you can make a di - rect attack on ships from the air in the future,” claimed Mitch ell. Winterhalter agreed, but such agreement did not equate to con currence that na vies are “almost useless.” Rather, it was a simple recog ni tion that air planes can attack ships. This line of question ing led to a proposal for some testing. Winterhalter, putting himself in Mitchell’s shoes, mused out loud about his own sense of the current vulner a bility of ships to attack from the air: “You gentle men [of the Army Air Corps] ought to feel very much encour aged about the con di tion of sur face vessels at the pres ent time. They are most vul nera ble to at tack from the air. There is now more weight in ver ti - cal armor than in hor i zontal armor.” Mitchell responded im me di ately, “We can try a good many things out around Chesa peake Bay.” At this point Mitch ell may have stopped lis tening and come to his mis taken con clusion that it fol lowed from this discus sion that the Gen eral Board agreed navies were “almost use less.” Winterhalter went on to stress that he agreed that testing was nec essary “to find out what your methods of attack are so we can find them out to meet them.” The navy wanted to do the testing to im prove its surface vessels’ defenses against prospec tive fu ture ene mies—not against the Army Air Corps. However, given this ex change, one can under stand why some one with Mitch ell’s per son al ity—head strong and ego cen tric—might mis take com mon

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courtesy with com plete agreement. Winterhalter later asked Mitch ell whether it might not be a good idea for the army to assign a “liai son” of ficer to “join our avia - tors here”—that is, at all the hear ings asso ci ated with naval avia tion. Mitchell agreed that this was a good idea.7 Thus it must have been a bit ter surprise to Mitch ell to be rebuked by his own service secre tary at the in sti gation of the Gen eral Board (and Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels). Lost in all the hype was the board’s rec om men da tion to its boss ad vo cat - ing the fur ther aggres sive devel op ment of naval avia tion ships, planes, and orga ni - zations “capa ble of accom pa nying and oper at ing with the fleet in all waters of the globe.”8 In the mean time, forceful voices lent them selves to the cause of the de velop - ment of avi a tion within the navy. In 1919 Adm. Wil liam Sims returned from his wartime com mand of the na val forces deployed to aid the al lies in the Great War. He was assigne d to the Naval War Col lege and reopened that insti tu tion (closed tem po rarily during the war) in July. A long time ad vo cate of re form, Sims was a commit ted “battle ship ad mi ral” who was as yet un convinced of the value of carrier avia tion. He proceeded to test rig orously the use of aircraft in the college’ s curric u lum, during its pe riodic war games. By Jan u ary 1921 he had be come an ad - vocate of a sepa rate naval air service within the navy and had even begun to consider aircraf t carri ers as capi tal ships that would displac e the battle ship from its perch as the center piece of the bat tle fleet.9 Meanwhile, an other key per sonal ity had become convinced of the value of naval avia tion and of the need for the navy to have a strong orga ni za tion in charge of it— Capt. Wil liam Moffett, an of fi cer with po lit i cal con nec tions. In De cem ber 1918, while in command of the battle ship Mis sis sippi, Moffett had observed as Towers and Mustin dem on strated the effec tive ness of gunnery spot ting by naval avi a tion; Tow ers and Mustin then con verted him to their cause. Moffett had his con gressio - nal contacts urge the Navy Depart ment to appoint him to suc ceed Capt. Thomas Craven as Direc tor of Naval Avia tion and to rec ommend that the job be upgrade d to an ad mi ral’s billet. The navy was al ready lean ing in the di rection of as signing Moffett, since he was con sid ered a “bat tle ship of fi cer.” In March 1920 Moffett was appointed to the job, and in July the billet was upgraded by Congres s to the di rector ship of a full-up navy bureau, with accom pa nying admi ral’s rank. One must un - derstand that for an or gani zation to have the sta tus and name of “bureau” was a very big deal in those days—it meant that the insti tu tional navy be lieved naval avia - tion had a prom is ing future. 10 Iron icall y, the same month that Moffett was appointed chief of the navy’s newest bu reau, Mitchell finall y got his chance to test out his ideas about avia tion making na vies “al most use less” against a bona fide dread nought bat tle ship—SMS Ostfriesland. As part of the ar mi stice agreement signed in No vem ber 1918, the

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United States was au tho rized to take pos session of sev eral warships of Ger many’s former High Seas Fleet, in cluding Ostfriesland.11 On 12 July 1921, the same day Con gress passed the law estab lish ing BuAer, Ostfriesland and the light cruiser SMS Frankfurt departed from their moorings in New York Harbor un der tow, bound for Ches a peake Bay.12 Mitch ell and the sec retary of the navy, Josephus Daniels, had been en gaged in a pub lic de bate about the ef fective ness of land-based bomb ers against battle ships. Daniels reput edly re sponded to Mitchell’s proposal to test his ideas against the battle ship Iowa by saying, “I’m so confi dent that nei ther Army nor Navy avi a tors can hit the Iowa when she is under way that I would be perfectly willing to be on board her when they bomb her!” Deadlines estab lished by the allies for de struction of the German ves sels af ter the war and con gressio nal pres sure or ches - trated by Mitchell (whose father had been a sena tor from Wiscon sin) resulted in the new ad min is tra tion’s di recting a new secre tary of the navy, Edwin Denby, to accede to the tests in July 1921.13 Mitchell’ s goals for the test contrasted sharply with those of the navy. Mitchell meant to prove the con cept that airplanes could sink battle ships. Once this was es tablished he hoped it would provide the momen tum for his drive to estab lish an inde - pendent air force by causing Congres s to act legis la tively. Addi tion ally, in proving that the navy had no proper appre ci a tion for the poten tial of airpower, he could claim that any naval compo nent for airpower properly belonge d within the new indepen- dent service he hoped to estab lish. This reflec ted what the British had done with their Fleet Air Arm, which was con trolled, mainly through bud getary means, by the Air Minis try and the Royal Air Force.14 On the navy side, the goals were more modest: to study and collect data on the effect of bombs of vari ous sizes on ships of vari ous sizes, study Ger man war ship de sign, and take the les sons learned and use them to de sign less vul ner a ble war ships.15 Mitch ell pre pared his pi lots for these tests as if he was pre par ing for actual com - bat. For him the tests were the moral equiva lent of war.16 However, his tar get was not at all what it was painted in the popu lar press to be—the latest and greatest in un sink able dread nought tech nol ogy. Ostfriesland was no spring chicken. It had been launched in 1909 as a first-gen era tion Ger man dread nought, built in re sponse to Sir John “Jackie” Fisher’s “dreadnought revo lu tion,” in the course of what had been to that point the most expen sive peacetime arms race in the his tory of warfare. The ship had man aged to survive the bat tle of Jutland in 1916 but was almost sunk be fore reach ing port by a Brit ish mine. Ostfriesland finished out the war much as did the rest of the High Seas Fleet, mostly in port, with its mate rial condi tion de- grading. It was not at Scapa Flow (where most of the German fleet had scuttled it- 17 self ) and was turned over to the U.S. Navy in April 1920. The navy, as was its habit, assigne d an offi cer of proven expe ri ence and compe - tence from its Bureau of Con struc tion and Repair to take charge of the prepa ra tions

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of Ostfriesland for the test—Cdr. (later Adm.) Al ex an der Hamil ton Van Keuren. He was to inspect the ves sel and collect data in order to do what Admi ral Winterhalter had empha sized two years previ ously—fig ure out how to make warships, espe cially bat tle ships, less vul nera ble to at tack from the air. Van Keuren found Ostfriesland in poor mate rial condi tion. Many of its water tight hatches and scuttles were so damaged that they had to be se cured with Manila ropes for the voy age down to Chesa - peake Bay. Van Keuren’s report clearly indi cated that the ship was lower in the water than it should have been and that it contained brack ish water in its bilges and tanks. Hull vents that should have been above the water line were now at the wa terline and so were secured to pre vent even more wa ter from enter ing the ship.18 By the time Ostfriesland reached the Virginia Capes for further ex am i nation on 16 July, Van Keuren observed a “slight list to port.” Addi tion ally, he found hatches and manholes open to the ma chinery spaces. His most impor tant find ing, though, was that the ship had taken on even more water dur ing its transit, which raised real concer ns in his mind about the over all water tight integ rity of the ship. He ended his para graph en ti tled “Wa ter in Ship” as fol lows: “A slow leak age was tak ing place which became more seri ous later on when an chored out side [Lynnhaven Inlet] in rough water.” On 18 July the ships were towed out to the “Exper i men tal Grounds” test site in Ches a peake Bay. By 20 July, before the first round of bombing, Van Keuren observed that Ostfriesland had settled another foot into the sea, which convinced him that it was slowly sink ing. Also, its port list was now more pro nounced, at two de grees.19 The first round of bomb ings, against other ships prior to 20 July, went well. Frankfurt , a sub marine, and a destroye r were all sent to the bottom through the cu- mula tive ef forts of navy, Marine, and army avia tors. On 20 July it was Ostfriesland’s turn. The big news that day was that Ostfriesland remained afloat, de spite the de liv - ery of five 1,100-pound bombs in an un au tho rized low-level raid by Mitch ell’s flyers (us ing compasses sup plied by the navy). The nom i nal pur pose of the tests was to test the ef fective ness of level medium-to-high-al ti tude bombing. Mitchell was furi - ous and made the de cision to use his spe cially built 1,800-pound bombs the follow - ing day—he needed a big media event. None the less, the 20 July bombing had caused seri ous damage to Ostfriesland, although Van Keuren’s exam i nation of the ship, slowly sink ing af ter the bombing, states noth ing about the de ploy ment of a boarding party to keep it afloat, as do some accounts. (Perhaps these ac counts con- fuse Van Keuren’s inspec tors with a dam age-control boarding party.) Van Keuren believed that the day’s bomb ing had accel erated the process by which the ship was fill ing: it was now down by the stern over four feet, with large quanti ties of water in its en gine rooms, bilges, and “dead pock ets.” Its port list was now three de grees. He was so concer ned it might sink dur ing the night that he had the old battle ship Del a- ware sta tioned along side—to what purpose his re port does not say. One might

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presume Van Keuren meant for Del a ware to stand by in order to send another party aboard to make final obser va tions, the better to deter mine how and why the ship sank, one more time be fore it went down.20 Mitchell had one more chance to prove his point, and his ac tions imme di ately prior to the fi nal day of bombing reflect his anxi ety: a change in the bomb load and a per sonal brief ing to his pi lots. Prior to the army bomb ers’ ar rival, Van Keuren had ob served that Ostfriesland was now down by its stern over eight feet, al most dou ble from the day before, and that it had settled over all an other two feet into the Chesa - peake. The first five planes, carry ing the lighter 1,100-pound bombs, went in and scored two hits. The second wave, also with 1,100-pound bombs, after hits were scored, was sent back to Langley, Virginia, while Van Keuren and his team went aboard to as sess the dam age. The army avia tors, who had been recalled in mid-run to allow the inspec tion, per the rules, dumped their bomb loads not far from the navy ships ob serving the test, in a dan gerous dis play of ju ve nile pique. Van Keuren’s obser - vation is worth quoting in its entirety from the report, for what it tells us: “There was no free water in any holds or compart ments that we en tered on the days im medi ately pre ceding bombing nor any signs of strained bulk heads. As remarked before, how - ever, I felt sure the ship was slowly taking water all the time from the time she an - chored on the exper i men tal grounds, and this may have been spreading slowly to bunk ers through the in ner bot tom or 2nd skin.” None the less, the beat-up German dread nought remained stubbornly afloat. The navy was pre pared to sink it with the four teen-inch guns of the dread nought Penn syl va nia if it re mained afloat af ter flight op era tions were secured. Finally, Van Keuren noted that several of the water tight hatches had been jarred open but that there was no time to re secure them, proba bly due to the un ex pected ar rival of Gen- eral Mitch ell for one last bomb ing run.21 Mitchell had decided on one more run with his heaviest bombs (which had not been used in the first runs), and he led the charge per son ally in the lead air craft. This time Mitch ell and his avi a tors ignored the rules and the re call signals after the first hits, de liv ering 1,800-pound bombs one after the other. Van Keuren and his team were thus denied the oppor tu nity to collec t further data on the ship’s now certain sink ing. Ostfriesland began to settle rapidly by the stern, some thing the famous pho to graph of its final moments shows quite clearly. After twenty-one min utes, Ostfriesland turned tur tle and dis ap peared into the wa ter, first stand ing almost on end with its bow in the air. Mitchell sent his final bomber in to drop its load on the bubbling water where it had once been. He then flew a victory pass over the “en - emy” navy ships.22 A picture is worth a thou sand words, and Mitchell had gotten his, despite his vi o- lation of the rules and the ques tion able circum stances surround ing Ostfriesland’s de - mise. Mitchell was exul tant, as were those who favored drastic naval disar ma ment in

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Congre ss. Sena tor William Borah trumpeted that “the exper i ment off the Vir ginia coast demon strated . . . that the battle ship is practi call y obso lete.” 23 The more so ber Van Keuren came away with a dif ferent set of con clusions, which he cat a loged in a secret report and for warded to the Gen eral Board on 30 August 1921. He believed that the test clearly showed “that a crew aboard could have eas ily kept the ship almost free of water.” He also observe d “that but for the initial wa ter in the ship, the damage inflicte d by bombs would not have sunk the ship, and that gun fire would have had to be resorted to ac com plish this end.” These com ments, be ing secret and not meant for public consump tion, give us good reason to believe that Van Keuren was ren der ing an ob jec tive pro fes sional opin ion as a na val con struc tion en gi neer. Van Keuren summa rized for the board the follow ing larger recom menda tions: • Elim inate or strengthen any areas of contact with the outside sea. • De velop shrap nel-type an ti air craft or dnance. • Develop aircraf t carri ers with fighters to shoot down bomb ers. • Develop new tactics and maneu vers to defeat bomb ers, to shoot them down before they reach the battle line. • “Since the shots that miss are the shots that count in this new form of warfare, we must see that the least pos si ble num ber of shots are fired by hostile air planes and that those that are fired go very wide of their mark.” The last opin ion per haps in fluenced the General Board the most in terms of bat - tle ship de sign. It must have also been grat i fied to see Van Keuren sup port its own ear lier de ci sion to con vert Ju pi ter into the air craft car rier Langley. Dur ing the hearings the previ ous Feb ruary, Admi ral Badger had led a General Board discus sion on “charac ter is tics of airplane carri ers” that consid ered us ing the design of the planned new battle cruisers, displac ing thirty-five thou sand tons with the latest boil ers and elec tric drive, as the hulls for big, fast aircraft car ri ers for the fleet. Clearly the Gen - eral Board ap pre ci ated the po ten tial of na val avi a tion.24 Before Van Keuren’s report ar rived, though, the Har ding ad min is tra tion had al - ready acted, send ing out its in vi ta tions to a na val dis arma ment confer ence to meet that Novem ber in Washing ton, D.C. Harding and Sec retary of State Charles Evans Hughes wanted to de fuse ten sions in the Pa cific and halt the post war naval arms race among Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. It seemed possi ble that the battle ship would fare poorly and perhaps even be abolished, along with the subma - rine, as a naval weapon. Meanwhile, Mitchell had very much overplayed his hand after his great moment. In partic u lar, he had alienated airpower advo cates inside the navy that might, under differ ent cir cumstances , have supported his bid for an inde pend ent air force—partic u larl y Adm. Wil liam Moffett and Cdr. John Tow ers. Tow ers, es pe cially, would prove in stru men tal in keep ing na val avi a tion in side the navy during the crit ical period of the Mor row Board and its report in 1925. Within his own ser vice, Mitchell was repu di ated by none other than General Pershing in

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the report of the Joint Board on the tests, which charac ter ized the battle ship as “still the back bone of the fleet.”25 In the meantime the General Board prepared for the Wash ington Na val Con ference. The techni cal ex perts provided by the ac tive-duty naval offi cer corps to the confer ence included Capt. William V. Pratt (an Admi ral Sims protégé) and Adm. W. L. Rodgers. Both were sit ting mem bers of the Gen eral Board, and Rodgers was in fact its se nior mem ber.26 The General Board recom mended that Hughes pro pose a fleet equal in size to that of the British and twice the size of that of the Japa nese. Hughes rejected the General Board’s posi tion and instead made his sweeping pro - posals to declar e a “Capi tal Ship Building Holi day” and fix tonnages to which the three major naval powers would scrap, down to a ratio of 5 : 5 : 3 for the capi tal-ship fleets of the United States, Great Brit ain, and Ja pan, re spectively. Much writ ten about the Wash ington Na val Con ference has missed that Hughes preempted any dis cussion of the ab o li tion of bat tle ships in the seem ingly lib eral pro posal actu ally to de commis sion and scrap them. To get the Jap a nese to agree to this nu mer i cally “infe rior po sition” the Ameri cans also traded away, in ar ti cle 19 of the Washing ton Na val Treaty, the right to de velop na val bases further in the Phil ip pines and Guam.27 Two other ar ti cles of the treaty, which resulted from in tense ne goti a tions dur ing the con ference, reflected the di rect im pact of the Ostfriesland sink ing and Van Keuren’s recom men da tions to the General Board. It is worth em phasiz ing that a copy of his report was placed spe cifi call y in the naval avia tion files that were used to write General Board studies for the secre tary of the navy in Au gust 1921, prior to the con fer ence. The impor tanc e of air craft car ri ers was re flected in ar ti cle 9 of the treaty, which made allow ance to convert as many as two thirty-three-thou sand-ton battle cruis ers tar geted for scrap ping into air craft car ri ers (Lexington and Saratoga). As mentioned previ ously, the General Board had already proposed the idea of using the ex ist ing bat tle-cruiser hull and pro pul sion de signs as the bases for its first pur pose- built aircraf t carri ers, and here was the op portu nity to do just that, under the sanction of the Wash ington Na val Treaty. The treaty failed to limit the numbers of naval aircraft that navies could build to use in concert with their fleets.28 The sec ond ar ti cle of inter est here em pha sized the Gen eral Board’s actions vis-à-vis the battle ships retained un der the terms of the treaty. The Ameri cans and the British— Ostfriesland very much in the minds of the former and pos sibly the latter —ensured the in sertion of a spe cial paragraph in arti cle 20 of the treaty al lowing weight incre ases of up to three thousand tons to allow the major powers to im prove the de fenses of bat tle ships “against air and sub ma rine at tack.” Pratt tes ti fied to the General Board about his own role in the adoption of this proposal at the confer - ence. He told the board that the proposal had been initially the idea of the British naval del egates and that its in tent was to allow battle ships to keep pace with threats by air craft and sub marines , which were not limited under the terms of the treaty. As

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a mem ber of the General Board, he had cer tainly seen Van Keuren’s report. This suggest s that the Ostfriesland ex pe ri ence, es pe cially the com ments re gard ing near misses and water tight integ rity, played a direc t role in the drafting of this “recon - struction clause.” It very much opened the door for the sig natory powers, includ ing the U.S. Navy, to continue to improve the sur viv ability of the battle ships they re - tained un der the treaty to keep pace with the threat posed by airpower. Two years later, the first major naval spending pro gram passed in Con gress since World War I approved the first phase of a bat tleship modern iza tion program to im plement anti - aircraft improve ments, as well as in ternal changes to im prove surviv ability against air attacks. 29 The General Board had also learned that de commis sioned bat tle ships, es pe cially of the most mod ern types, made ex cellent tar gets to test weap ons de velop ment and warship de sign. Pursu ant to this it lobbied the navy sec retary and the pres i dent for per mis sion to scrap some of the new est bat tle ships in much the same man ner they had dis posed of the German ships, by the de ploy ment of the new est gun nery and aerial and torpedo weap ons against them. The treaty allowed the navy to dis pose of one of the ships sched uled for scrapping as a target each year. Given the expe rience of Ostfriesland, the navy was keen on taking advan tage of this clause.30 The battle - ship Wash ing ton’s use as an exper i mental target was imme di ately proposed. It was the navy’s most modern battle ship scheduled for scrapping un der the treaty. Someone on the board had broached this is sue; use of Wash ing ton for ex per i men - ta tion had been adopted in 22 April 1922 as the board’s of fi cial policy. Admi ral Rodgers stated that he knew “of no reason why we cannot destroy the Wash ing ton by tar get practice in the period set by the treaty and be in every respect within the terms of the treaty.”31 In the event, Wash ing ton was not the first ship to be disposed of in this way. In 1923 the older Vir ginia and New Jer sey were bombed and sunk by the Army Air Corps. Service feeling over these tests tended to in crease, rather than weaken, the navy’s resolve to strengthen the battle ship but also beef up its own fleet avia tion.32 The next ships dis posed of were the bat tle ships North Dakota and South Carolina. These ships were altered with the proposed con version de signs in mind, espe cially South Carolina. Results from their use as tar gets provided needed data to test the blister de sign for coal bunkers and their deck-pro tection de signs. Valuable data were also gathered on shock protec tion for gun turrets. 33 Pres i dent Cal vin Coo lidge ap proved Wash ing ton’s use as a target in August 1924. The navy secre tary had em pha sized to him that the tests were ex peri mental and “in the public inter est,” since the results would be studied “by a board of naval experts” for use in the modern iza tion pro gram.34 The subse quent tests showed that the navy’s design for surviv ability of its class (the Ten nes see class) was basi cally sound. The Wash ing ton tests, which would not have been held if not for the treaty

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and the ex pe ri ence of Ostfriesland, es tab lished the sound ness of the navy’s con tin - ued in sti tu tional sup port for the bat tle ship. These tests did much to de fuse the navy’s con cern over near misses that had arisen from the Ostfriesland and other level-bombing tests, while provid ing the navy with valu able under wa ter data to en hance tor pedo pro tection. Wash ing ton was eventu ally sunk by four teen-inch gunfire from Texas, which further re inforc ed the navy’s commit ment to improve deck pro tection and lengthen the range of its guns, as per mitted by the treaty.35 Navy lead ers’ atti tudes were both changing and staying the same. Atti tudes about the central role of the battle ship changed little inside the insti tu tional navy; most navy leaders redou bled their efforts to retain it as the pillar of naval power. However, in main taining this stance they changed their views in other ar eas, espe cially regard ing the threat of airpower and subma rines. These non tra di tional plat forms gained im por tance in the minds of these men, in part due to their dedi ca tion to the idea of the surviv able, big-gun battle ship. 36 Not only did the tests, partic u larl y on Wash ing ton, alle vi ate many of the con - cerns the Gen eral Board had had about the sound ness of the de sign of its most mod ern bat tle ships, but in the cru cible of war these same ship de signs would prove themselve s against the best that avia tion could throw at them. On 7 De cember 1941 at Pearl Har bor, Ten nes see, West Vir ginia, and Mary land, ships whose de sign and damage-c ontrol training had been based on and val idated by the ex peri ence of Wash ing ton, were hit with bombs and torpe does from Japan’s profes sional naval avia tors. It was a testa ment, perhaps, to the legacy of Ostfriesland, the General Board, and the Washing ton Naval Treaty that both Tenne ss ee and Mary land were easily raised from the shallow water of Pearl Harbor and steamed back to the West Coast under their own power for repairs. West Vir ginia, which took an incred i ble seven torpedo hits in addi tion to di rect hits by armor-pierc ing ord nance deliv ered by dive-bombers, showed what a trained and dedi cated crew could do to keep a dreadnought from capsiz ing while un der air at tack. It too set tled to the bot tom of Pearl Harbor; its dam age was severe, and it was not re floated un til six months later. But then this ship too was repaired and would take its reveng e on Ja pan at the Surigao Strait in 1944. Obvi ously Mitchell’s procla ma tion of the “death of the bat - tle ship” was prema ture. However, as with all things, perhaps in 1921 the bat tle ship became aware of its own mor tal ity.37

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NOTES 1 Hon. Newton Baker to the Sec retary of the Navy, 21 Agents of In no va tion, chap. 3, for a de tailed dis cus - Oc to ber 1919, General Board Studies , 449 series , rec- sion of hear ing pro ce dures and dynam ics. Both ord group [hereaf ter RG] 80, War Depart ment Cor - Badger and Winterhalter were rear admi rals, but as respon denc e, National Archives and Records Ad- fleet command ers they had held tempo rary four- minis tra tion [hereaf t er NARA]. star rank (ad mi ral). 2 For a short history of the General Board during this 6 3 April 1919, PHGB, NARA. period see John T. Kuehn, Agents of In no va tion: The 7 Ibid. Gen eral Board and the De sign of the Fleet That De - feated the Japa nese Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In - 8 Wil liam son A. Murray and Barry Watts, “Mil itary stitute Press, 2008), chap. 3. See also “De vel opments In no va tion in Peace time,” in Mil i tary In no va tion in in Naval Avia tion,” 3 April 1919, Proceed ings and the Inter war Pe riod, ed. William son Murray and Hearings of the Gen eral Board, RG 80, NARA Allan R. Millett (Cambri dge, U.K.: Cambri dge [hereaf ter PHGB, NARA]. Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 390–92. 3 Kuehn, Agents of In no va tion, pp. 15–21. 9 Ibid., p. 392; see also Richard Hough, Death of the Battle s hip (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 22. 4 27 March and 3 April 1919, PHGB, NARA. See also Kuehn, Agents of In no va tion, pp. 15–21. 10 Murray and Watts, “Mili tary Inno vation in Peace- time,” pp. 393–96. Secre tary of the Navy, General 5 Arlington Na tional Cem e tery, www.arlingtoncemetery Order 65 estab li shing Bureau of Aeronau tics, 10 .net/; 3 April 1919, PHGB, NARA. See Kuehn,

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Au gust 1921, attached to GB (General Board) study 25 Ran som, “Battle ship Meets the Airplane,” p. 22; 1140, 15 August 1922, RG 80, NARA. O’Neil, “Trans forma tion,” pp. 101–104. For the 11 “Condi tions of an Ar misti ce with Germany,” WWI: Wash ing ton Con fer ence, see Kuehn, Agents of In no - The World War I Doc u ment Ar chive, wwi.lib.byu vation , pp. 2, 3, 25–27; and Clark G. Reynolds, .edu/. See also William son Murray, “Versailles: The “John H. Tow ers, the Morrow Board, and the Re - Peace without a Chance,” in The Mak ing of Peace: form of the Navy’s Avia tion,” Mil i tary Af fairs 52, Rulers , States, and the After math of War, ed. Wil- no. 2 (April 1988), pp. 78–84. For General Pershing’s liamson Murray and Jim Lacy (Cambri dge, U.K.: view, see Report on the Results of Avia tion and Ord - Cam bridge Univ. Press, 2009), p. 221. nance Test (Washing ton, D.C.: Joint Board, 18 Au - gust 1921), p. 7. 12 Cdr. A. H. Van Keuren, CC (USN), report, “Ex-Ger man Bat tle ship OSTFRIESLAND: Com- 26 “Inter pre ta tion of Treaty re Modern iz ing Capi tal ments on Bombing of,” 29 July 1922 [hereaf ter Van Ships,” 17 April 1922, PHGB, NARA. See also Har- Keuren Report], p. 449, RG 80, NARA. old H. Sprout and Marga ret Sprout, Toward a New Or der of Sea Power: Ameri can Naval Pol icy and the 13 “Fight for Survival: The Battle at Home & the Court World Scene, 1918–1922 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Martia l of Billy Mitch ell,” Home of Heroes, www Univ. Press, 1940), pp. 146, 242. .homeofheroes.com/; Wil liam D. O’Neil, “Transfor - ma tion: Billy Mitchell Style,” U.S. Na val In stitute 27 George Baer, One Hun dred Years of Sea Power (Stan - Pro ceed ings (March 2002), p. 100; Harry H. Ran- ford, Calif.: Stan ford Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 93–96. som, “The Bat tle ship Meets the Airplane,” Mil i tary See John T. Kuehn, “The In fluence of Naval Arms Affairs 23, no. 1 (Spring 1959), pp. 21–27. Lim i ta tion on U.S. Na val In no va tion in the Inter- war Period, 1921–1937” (Ph.D. diss., Kansas State 14 O’Neil, “Trans forma tion,” p. 101. For a con cise dis- Univ., 2007), pp. 77–80. cus sion of the Brit ish sys tem, see Geoffrey Till, “Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, Ameri - 28 Van Keuren Report. See also Kuehn, Agents of In no - can, and Japa nese Case Studies,” in Mil i tary In no va- vation , app. 1, p. 185. tion in the Interwar Period, ed. Murray and Millett, 29 “Inter pre ta tion of Treaty re Modern iz ing Capi tal pp. 191–226. Ships.” The de tails of mod ern iza tion al lowed un der 15 Van Keuren Re port. the treaty were contained in the “recon struc tion clause,” which can be found in arti cle 20, chap. 2, 16 For an objec tive short descrip tion of Mitch ell’s part 3, para. (d); see, again, Kuehn, Agents of In no - prepa ra t ions, see Lisle Rose, Power at Sea: The vation , app. 1, pp. 193–94; Sprout and Sprout, To - Breaking Storm, 1919–1945 (Colum bia: Univ. of ward a New Or der of Sea Power, chaps. 8–14. See Missouri Press, 2006), pp. 26–27. See also Hough, also Kuehn, “The Influ ence of Naval Arms Limi ta - Death of the Bat tle ship, pp. 30–31. tion on U.S. Naval In no vation in the Interwar Pe- 17 Gene T. Zimmerman, “More Fiction than Fact: The riod, 1921–1937,” pp. 143–45, 147–49. Sink ing of the Ostfriesland,” War ship In ter na tional 30 GB 449, 4 Novem ber 1921, PHGB, NARA. Admi ral 12, no. 2 (1975), pp. 142–54; Holger H. Herwig, Taylor of the Bureau of Construc tion and Repair “The Battlefleet Revo lu tion, 1885–1914,” in The Dy- had in fact made this very recom men da tion in a let- nam ics of Mil i tary Rev o lu tion, 1300–2050, ed. Wil- ter to the General Board before the Washing ton liamson Murray and MacGregor Knox (Cam bridge, Con ference had even convened: “If the oppor tu nity U.K.: Cam bridge Univ. Press, 2001), chap. 7. For should be had to carry out such ex peri ments on fairly Jutland see John Keegan, The Price of Ad miralty mod ern ships, this . . . would be of great value.” (Lon don: Penguin, 1988), p. 176. 31 Admi ral Rodgers to Col o nel Lucas, 22 April 1922, 18 Van Keuren Report. GB 438-1, PHGB, NARA. 19 Ibid. 32 H. B. Grow, “Bombing Tests on the ‘Virginia ’ and 20 Ibid.; Arthur Hezlet, Aircraft and Sea Power (New ‘New Jersey ,’” U.S. Naval Insti tute Pro ceed ings 49, York: Stein and Day, 1970), pp. 109–10. See also no. 12 (Decem ber 1923). Rose, Power at Sea. This other wise excel lent account 33 Nor man Friedman, U.S. Bat tle ships: An Il lus trated states a boarding party was sent aboard Ostfriesland De sign His tory (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In stitute to “keep it afloat” (p. 27), but Rose does not cite the Press, 1985), p. 186. author i ta tive Van Keuren report, which, in this author’s opin ion, clar ifies what the board ing party was 34 Secre tary of the Navy to the Presi dent, 17 Novem ber do ing. 1924, GB 438-1, PHGB, NARA. Presi den tial ap- proval was attached, bearing the same date. 21 Van Keuren Re port; Hough, Death of the Bat tle ship, pp. 32–33. 35 Kuehn, Agents of In no va tion, p. 75. 22 Hough, Death of the Bat tle ship, pp. 34–35. The 36 Alan D. Zimm, “The U.S.N.’s Flight Deck Cruiser,” photo clearly shows Ostfriesland’s port list and how Warship Inter na tion al 16, no. 3 (1979), p. 231. that accel er ate d its capsiz ing and sinking. Zimm ar gues that this dedi ca tion, at least in 1930, was perfectly under stand ab le, given the defen sive 23 Hough, Death of the Bat tle ship, pp. 34–35; 61 Con- power of bat tle ships ver sus the ca pa bil i ties of the gres sio nal Re cord (5 August 1921), p. 4708. aircraft of that day. 24 Van Keuren Report; “Charac ter is tics of Airplane 37 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War (New Car riers,” 21 Febru ary 1921, PHGB, NARA. York: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 60–62, 446; USS West Virginia (BB-48), www.usswestvirginia.org/.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:12 AM HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:12 AM VIII “This Tem po rary Strategical With drawal” The Eastern Fleet’s War time Af ri can So journ

AN DREW STEW ART

he Afr i can coast line cov ers in ex cess of six teen thou sand miles, and at the start of the Sec ond World War there were eighty-eight har bors around the Tconti nent that were pro tected from wind and sea on all sides and that were spacious enough and had suffi cient depth to ac commo date a consid er able number of large, oceango ing ves sels simul ta neously. At this stage Brit ish contr ol exte nded to 37 per cent of the total Afri can coast line, and within this there were a total of thirty-two of these “first-class” mar i time ports, a combi na tion of unde veloped and de vel oped nat u ral fa cil i ties—most no ta bly Freetown in Si erra Le one and Port Su- dan in Ang lo-Egyp tian Sudan—and a number that had been ar ti ficially de veloped, such as at Simonstown in the Union of South Afr ica and Takoradi on the Gold Coast.1 Along the whole of the Indian Ocean coast from centr al Mozam biq ue north ward along Tanganyika and Kenya to the bound ary of Italian Somali land, there were a total of four teen of these most highly sought-aft er har bors. Not inc lud- ing East London and Durban, once again in South Af rica, there were seven oth ers either un der dir ect Brit ish contr ol or within the ter ri tory of one of its Domin ion part ners that faced to ward the Indian Ocean. Only two of these were de veloped, and the depth of the natu ral har bor in Mombasa was sig nifi cantl y greater than that of Dar es Salaam. Kilindini in Swahili means “deep water” and is the name given to a harbor lying on the west coast of Mombasa Island, within a large bay; it would sub se quently be accepted as the name also of the fleet base es tab lished there by the Royal Navy. It was de scribed by one con tem po rary lecturer as “by far the fin est har bor any where on the east coast of Af rica from the Red Sea to Delagoa Bay.”2 The is land of which it forms a part is roughly three miles long by two miles broad, an almost en tirely flat mass formed from coral stone, with a Euro pean pop ula tion in 1939 of not much over 1,200 people, water depths nearby of one hundred feet and more, and modern wharves that “vessels drawing 33 feet can come alongside.” 3 A report published in a U.S. aca demic jour nal three years later de scribed it as ly ing “within one of the fin est deep-water bays of Africa, formed by the drowned lower courses of several converg - ing mi nor streams.”

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In the summer of 1925 the British gov ernment had pur chased for the sum of £350,000 from a “Major Grogan” what up until then had been the privately owned Mbaraki Pier.4 The fol lowing year the Sec retary of State for the Col o nies and Do - min ions, Sir Leopold Amery, was asked about the cost for construc tion work then tak ing place at the port of Kilindini, to which he re plied that the total figure involved in build ing two deep water berths was £1,320,957, a figure that did not in - clude the out lay for the ma jor’s wharf.5 By way of compar i son, during a much later debate in the House of Commons it was con firmed that the total expen di ture on the construc tion and equip ping of Sin gapore as a na val base and for tress up un til the out break of hos til i ties in Sep tem ber 1939 was ap prox i mately £18,234,000. Of this figure £3,750,000 had come in the form of grants or gifts from New Zea land, Hong Kong, the Feder ated Ma lay States, and the sul tan of Johore, and the Straits Settle - ments govern ment had presented as a gift the site on which the base was built, but even so the Kilindini base was clearly much the cheaper op tion!6 As a later de tailed re view would note, a small mil i tary na val base was estab lished at Kilindini at the outbrea k of the Second World War, but initially “the calls upon it had been small and well within its re sources.” These demands en tailed the pro vi - sion of “a mea sure of” protec tion for con voys and es corts using the port, along with the main te nance of an exam i na tion ser vice, a port war signal station, and a small num ber of minesweep ers and patrol ves sels. The coast defenses consisted of just two six-inch coastal guns. There were no anti aircraft weapons, although trenches had been dug against Italian air raids and in some parts of the town bomb and splin- ter barri cades had been constructed. There had also been an air-raid protec tion sys - tem orga nized and a par tial blackout was in force. The short comings that existed were, however, made up for by the fact that as a harbor Kilindini had “admi rable nat ural protec tion.” It has a clear view to sea ward and a reef that was almost awash at low water and narrowed the ap proach, making the entrance extremely hazard ous to both under wa ter and surface craft except in daylight, or with navi ga tional aids.7 Questions about Kilindini’s wartime role had first arisen in Febru ary 1940, but at this stage the prin cipal inter est seemed to lie not so much in what naval role, however lim ited, Kenya could play but in who would bear the cost.8 A de tailed in - ves ti gation was be gun by the Admiralty, by send ing the com mand ing of fi cer of HMS Glou ces ter to East Af rica to produce a detailed re view of how much money was being spent at Kilindini and who should pay—the Ken yan gov ernment, the Co lo nial Of fice, or the Ad mi ralty.9 Rear Adm. Ralph Leatham, Commander in Chief, East In dies Sta tion, sub se quently re view ing the find ings, reminded those in - volved that all expen di ture on the Kenya Royal Na val Vol un teer Re serve “is pri mar - ily the con cern of the re spective gov ernments.” 10 Conclud ing with a reminder that the need for econ omy was more urgent than ever, he was pre pared to ac cept that if

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the base could not “man age with out a fe male typ ist and can not ob tain an ef fi cient one for less than £20 a month, I ap prove this rate of wages.” In the months that fol lowed, war came to East Africa , as the Italian leader, Benito Musso lini, decided the time was oppor tune to join his Axis part ner while there were still spoils to be taken. His at tack succeeded in cap tur ing British Soma li land—the em pire’s first ter ri to rial loss—but quickly turned into one of the war’s less frequently discussed mili tary di sasters. A large Italian naval force played little meaning - ful role in the proceed ings, and when the British Com mon wealth force eventu ally captured the impor tant harbor at Massawa it was littered with scuttled ves sels.11 With the Ital ian threat removed, atten tion turned to the growing danger in the Indian Ocean, but there was scant reason to believe that Kilindini’s role would be any greater than pro vid ing a con tin u ing har bor for con voys and af ford ing lim ited re gional mar i time pro tec tion. The sud den and tu mul tu ous Jap a nese thrust that be gan in Decem ber 1941 changed this posi tion dra mat i cally. The Eastern Fleet had been formally consti tuted that month, amalgam at ing the East Indies Squadron and the China Squad ron, and within three months it had been flushed from its main base in Sin gapore to Trincomalee in Cey lon, with Adm. Sir James Somerville in com - mand—the fleet’s third commander since the initial Japa nese attack. 12 The fleet that Somerville had inher ited, the larg est yet as sembled by the Royal Navy dur ing the war, was split into two tacti cal units, a fast Force A, un der his own command, and a slower Force B. While it might have been large in size—five battle - ships, three air craft carri ers, seven cruis ers, and four teen de stroy ers—there was much about this fleet that was cause for concern. When he had taken com mand he signaled his forces, “So this is the East ern Fleet. Well never mind. There’s many a good tune played on an old fiddle.” 13 Privately, he compared his posi tion to that of his “brother Command ers-in -Chief” in the Home and Medi ter ra nean Sta tions, who were “riding comfort ably in the Rolls Royces” while he was “pushing a broken- down Ford with a flat tyre.”14 Four of the battle ships were the First World War R-class ships, “old, slow and short of en dur ance”; one of the car ri ers, HMS Her mes, was small and el derly, while the other two had air and naval crews that lacked train - ing and bat tle ex pe ri ence.15 Four of the de stroy ers (of their own “R class”) were also of World War I vin tage. The offi cial naval histo rian would describ e the Eastern Fleet as “a force which on paper looked substan tial” while noting a battle ship group that was pos sibly “more of a li abil ity than an as set,” a weak air ele ment, a lack of shore-based long-range recon nais sance aircraft, the al most com plete ab sence of shore-based air striking forces, and sparsely prepared and equipped main bases.16 This did not take into ac count the impact of the first two weeks of April 1942, when Vice Admi ral Chuichi Nagumo’s Striking Force at tacked and de stroyed var i ous ves sels in and around the wa ters of Cey lon.17

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Somerville was a tonic for the East ern Fleet—“he was bold, witty and out spo ken, an ad mi ral with the com mon touch and, at times, a some what Ra belai sian turn of hu mour,”—but the task fac ing him was a sig nif i cant one.18 His force was in tended to de ter the Japa nese from under tak ing large-scale and protracted oper a tions in the Indian Ocean; it was subse quently estab lished that the Impe rial Japa nese Navy’s war plans never contained any pro vision for such oper a tions, merely for raids, but this was not known at the time.19 Adm. Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, had warned Prime Minis ter Winston Churchill on 8 March 1942 that Cey lon it self was now also threatened and could succumb in the same way as Malaya had. Its loss would “under mine our whole strate gic posi tion in the Mid dle as well as the Far East.”20 He was not alone in his as sessment, and in tel li gence indi cated that an at - tack on the island could be expected on or about 1 April. Stephen Roskill, in his of fi cial history, ar gues that the de cision to in clude the elderly R-class battle ships indi cated that the Naval Staff back in Whitehall had failed to real ize the true nature of the threat to Ceylon. 21 The even tual Jap a nese at tack on Co lombo and raid on Trincomalee, along with the sink ing of Her mes and a num ber of other ves sels, was the net outcome— one that left Somerville in no doubt that his fleet could not be protected in those waters against an oppo nent who could bring devas tat ing air attacks to bear. With the se cretly pre pared base at Addu Atoll, the southern most atoll of the Maldives—known as Port T—not yet deemed safe, he had lit tle choice other than to send the slower force to its East Afri can redoubt while the faster one steamed to Bom bay. He was forced to “lie low in one sense but be pretty active in another—ke ep the old tarts out of the picture and roar about with the others. ”22 A key indi vid ual in the Eastern Fleet was Act ing Vice Adm. Sir Algernon Willis, who in Febru ary 1942 had trans ferred to HMS Res o lu tion as Vice Admi ral Com- manding 3rd Battle Squadron and Somerville’s second in command. He had previ - ously been Com mander in Chief, South At lantic, with re spon si bility for con voys passing through that area to the Mid dle East and for oper a tions against enemy subma rines and ocean raid ers; before that he had been chief of staff for nearly two years to Commander in Chief, Medi ter ra nean. He would retain this new posi tion for a lit tle over a year before being called back to the Med i terra nean, where he would be confirmed in the rank of vice admi ral and placed in command of Force H, which would op erate in the west ern basin and pre vent the Ital ian fleet from in ter fering with the land ings in North Africa, Sicily, and Salerno. An obitu ary by the renowned British airpower his to rian Dr. Noble Frankland would be gener ous in its praise, de - scribing him as “one of the least conspic u ous and most re mark able figures in our recent naval history,” an of ficer who “seemed indeed always to reach the right deci - sion, though of ten, it might be ar gued, for the wrong rea sons,” but who possessed “a re mark ably in ci sive in tel li gence and an in stinc tive judg ment which but sel dom

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failed.”23 These were traits that he made good use of throughout his command in East Af rica. Wil lis was to take charge of “the old tarts,” his force con sist ing of the four R-class destroy ers, supported by a number of the more modern destroy ers and four cruisers.24 Somerville thought highly of his dep uty—“abso lute first class as my second in command and I couldn’t have a better one”—and he was soon content to leave the fleet’s train ing to him and his dep u ties while he fo cused on the wider is sues.25 Somerville’s imme di ate consid er ation would be to protect what was known as the “WS” series of fast mili tary convoys, which carried troops and equip ment to the Middle East and India. 26 As he wrote back to the Admi ralty and Vice Adm. Henry Moore, the vice chief of the Naval Staff, the battle of the Indian Ocean was going to be “pri mar ily a CARRIER one, for until the en emy’s carri ers can be reduced, the battle ships can only act as a protec tive force for ours and not a very effec tive one un - til we get something like parity in the air over the sea.” This meant that there was little option other than to make a “tempo rary strategical withdrawa l to the west—for it can be called no less—[which] is de press ing but very neces sary un til we can be rein forced.”27 His more imme di ate task, however, was to prepare for a possi ble Japa - nese thrust, which could poten tially come as far as the East Afri can lit to ral. All ports along the coast were to be defended, since if even one were captured Japa nese forces could poten tially land and then attempt to seize the larger ports from the landward side. The scale of the attack was initially consid ered to be one Japa nese carrier launch ing thirty aircraft, a brief bombard ment, and small landing forces conduct ing raids. In the first week of April 1942 this was revised “in light of recent de velop ments Far East.” The new esti mates were of up to 150–200 car rier- borne aircraft op er at ing from three or four car ri ers sup ported by a brief bom bard - ment by four teen-inch bat tle ships or sim i lar ves sels, along with at tacks by tor pedo and minelaying craft. Accom pa nying this, it was esti mated, would be a force of ap - proxi mately one brigade equipped to seize and hold a lightly de fended base or to “smash and burn fa cili ties.”28 Detailed notes were there fore prepared on all of the stra te gic coastal po si tions, but given the scar city of re sources avail able it was rec ognized that it would not be possi ble to defend all of the six hundred miles of British- held coast line. This conclu sion was in part based on the ab sence of coastal railway or road commu ni ca tions, added to which were lessons learned from the Far East campaign that sug gested that dispers ing what little strength was to hand would be a mis take. As a result it was de cided that coastal and an ti aircraft guns could be sent to Zanzi bar and Berbera, and some equipment would go to the port of Tanga in Tanganyika (con sid ered as a “bor der line” risk, de spite an An glo-Indian force hav - ing selected it for an amphib i ous op era tion in 1914), but Mogadishu and Kismayu in the for mer Italian Soma liland would have to be left unde fended.

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In all of the planning Kilindini was held to be “undoubt edly the pri mary port,” for it would not be possi ble with out it “to maintain a force of any size” nor conduct “a defen sive campaign of any mag nitude.” Hence it was agreed that Kilindini would receive the great est share of resources and become a tem po rary base for the Eastern Fleet, with the neigh boring is land of Zan zi bar to act as an over flow.29 It was not just a po ten tial dockyard and repair facil ity but also a convoy as sembly and commer cial port. There were also the oil fuel depot, ammu ni tion storage, and aerodrome at Port Reitz, not to mention the cable station. The base could ac commo date six capi - tal ships or carri ers, two ten-thou sand-ton cruis ers, and any small num ber of cruisers and de stroy ers; by June the to tal for the larg est pos si ble ships had grown by one, with the ca veat that if ex tra buoys and moorings were laid a further four could be accom mo dated and that Mombasa Old Port could take a flo tilla of destroy ers in an emer gency.30 But as one contem po rary commen ta tor noted, with only small resources and no town of any appre cia ble size in the vicin ity, the process of rede vel - opment “involve d much expan sion and elabo r ation.” 31 The de fenses remained fairly desper ate, how ever—there still being no anti aircraft weapons, aside from some light ma chine guns, and only two six-inch coastal defense guns. The perma - nent garri son consisted of the 16th Bat tal ion of the King’s Afri can Rifles, the Mombasa Com pany of the Kenya Defence Force, and the troops man ning the coastal guns. It was hoped that two more six-inch guns would become available during the summer, as well as two 75-mm guns intended to coun ter smaller vessels. 32 One Ameri can visi tor during this period was quoted as refer ring to Mombasa as “two streets and a hostile popu la tion.” Still, it was bound for here that the bulk of the commander in chief’s staff departed from Colombo, sailing on board HMS Alaunia on 24 April 1942 and arriv ing at Kilindini nine days later, a total of 229 peo - ple, which included forty-three offi cers and a number of women and children. The latter caused special dif ficul ties, as all civil ians not employed in es sential war work had been evacu ated from Mombasa. Some lo cal resi dents were aggrieved that the new arriv als were allowed to stay when their own family members had not been; ten sions were not im proved when the na val of fi cers and these “non es sen tials” were billeted in three ho tels that had been re tained ex clusively for their use. This rel a - tively small num ber of addi tional per sonnel placed a premium on all other accom - moda tion and cre ated a gulf not just with respect to the local popu lace but with the previ ously incum bent naval staff as well. This was the po sition when on 7 May the commander in chief himself arrived, along with a large propor tion of the Eastern Fleet carry ing about fif teen thou sand of fi cers and men. For the most se nior of fi cers, in clud ing Ad mi ral Somerville, there was a rather op u lent res i dence; they were given permis sion by the gover nor of Kenya to use Govern ment House. For the remain der of the fleet staff, though, the posi tion was initially fairly dire, with a chronic short age of accom mo da tion and office space. A deci sion taken to

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in crease the building program at the base dramat i cally was en tirely justi fied. Indeed with provi sion needed on shore for 1,500 person nel, it appears that the possi bil ity was even con sid ered of req ui si tion ing ac com mo da tion un til new quar ters could be con structed—in short, forc ibly evac u at ing the is land’s ci vil ian pop u la tion. The sugges tion had al ready been made that the base be ef fectively turned into a closed mil i tary zone. In late April, Gen. Sir Wil liam Platt, Gen eral Com mand ing Of fi cer in Chief East Africa , informe d the author i ties in London that in light of the reports of what had hap pened in Singa pore he and Willis had “agreed that cer tain cate go ries of useless mouths should be compul so rily removed from Mombasa Island and mainland imme di ately adja cent now while there is yet time.”33 The proposal in- stantly se cured Churchill’s personal endorse ment, but as events changed it was not im plemented, and in mid-June it was can celed.34 In the mean time, emer gency ac com mo da tion for eight hun dred Eu ro pean and seven hundred native dockyard workers was built rapidly, but it was of “a very tempo rary nature.” Most of the sleep ing or living huts were built from what ap peared to be stone walls but were in fact sheets of Hessian (jute-based cloth, like burlap) plastered on both sides with cement wash, while the roofs were made of corru gated iron or palm thatch. Meanwhile ex ceptions con tinued to be made for more “impor tant” arriv als. From late April 1942 an eclec tic collec tion of lin guists, ana lysts, cryptanalysts, wire less op era tors, and ca reer dip lo mats was housed in a req ui si - tioned Indian school on the is land’s rocky northern shore. Attached to the Eastern Fleet’s Chief of Intel ligence Staff, this small group, based in HMS Alidina, was at the forefront of efforts to crack Japa nese codes, an oper a tion that had begun at the famed Bletchley Park near Lon don.35 The huge number of arriv als created var ied so cial and cultural pressures. Most obvi ously, consid erable strains were placed on the often already expen sive sup plies, and shortages became common. Those arriv ing from Ceylon noted that the cost of liv ing was much higher than that in Co lombo, commod i ties gener ally being 30 percent more expen sive. The quan tity, and in deed qual ity, of the lo cal bread available was another cause for com plaint; maize meal was hav ing to be mixed with the lim - ited supplies of wheat flour. Perhaps of greatest impor tance for many was the fact that there were just two lo cal brewer ies, and they were not able to keep up with de - mand. The situ a tion later improved with the arrival of sup plies of Cana dian beer, but there were many cases “of drunken ness and unruly behav ior in the streets” as ratings over came the shortages by drinking neat spirits, not just imported vari et ies but also the more po tent lo cally brewed ver sion. With no broth els, there were a number of private houses where “men are in vited in by the ‘ladies,’” most of whom were half-caste In di ans or Goans. As a re port noted, this meant that “ve ne real dis - ease is prev a lent and on the in crease.” One posi tive fac tor was the Af ri can na tives, who were descri bed as “simple, doc ile and easy to govern,” partic u larl y as some of

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them were apt to get drunk on palm wine and liked to smoke bhang, the local name for hash ish.36 Accounts pro vided by some peo ple based there at the time reveal it to have been a surpris ingly stressful expe rience. A brewery worker turned naval cook serv ing on the bat tle ship HMS Warspite recorded in his diary that being alongside at Kilindini was “a rather humdrum exis tence” and that life was “a lit tle less strained when the ships were at sea.” Even the latter, how ever, was not appar ently the most inter est ing sort of ac tivity, with “its sweeps out into the In dian Ocean for ever exer cis ing, shooting at targets, and the carri ers carry ing out dummy air attacks on the ships.” Indeed the rou tine of train ing, the cramped liv ing condi tions, and the gen erally op pres sive heat made him glad when orders came to move back to the Medi ter ra nean. 37 A lo cal po liceman who was of fi cial censor when the East ern Fleet arrived in Kilindini wrote of this pe riod, “There were more than 150 Royal na val ves sels of all sizes and un - usual de scriptions anchored deep into Port Reitz and around Port Tudor. At one time we had seven Ad mi rals and two Gen erals, all with their staff, on the Is land. Mombasa was really ‘Blood Pressure Cor ner.’ There were high rank ing offi cers ev- erywhere you went and you marched down the main road with your arm ex tended at a per ma nent sa lute.”38 Cdre. C. G. Stuart had arrived in Kilindini in 12 May 1942 to take command of the base; Somerville had almost in stantly promoted him to rear ad mi ral and appointed him as Flag Offi cer, East Africa and Zan zibar. Writ ing back to the Ad mi - ralty he reported that he had found that the site suffere d “from many de fects,” the main one of which was “the lack of alongside deep water wharfage.”39 There were many other dif fi culties too, such as a lack of suf fi cient tele phone equip ment, not enough of ficers and ratings or accom mo da tion for them, and a lack even of small craft for general port duties. He wished to impress upon the Admi ralty the dif ficul - ties of trying to estab lish a base on an island of about five and a half square miles that had a popu la tion of about fifty thousand people. All offi cers who were to be sent to the base should, he urged, be “rea son ably young and en ergetic; phys i cally fit for the trop ics and tem perate in their hab its.” Indeed, the best men were needed and not the “leftovers” if the base were to “as sume the impor tance that is appar ently intended.” Another key rec ommen da tion in his lengthy report was that though the skilled Euro pean labor that it proposed be sent should all be civil ians, either volun - teer or conscripted, they should be “enrolled in the Navy in some appro pri ate rating and be subject to na val dis cipline.” There were many other problems, “too nu merous to men tion,” but the base staff were “not down hearted.” The new com - mander’s as sessment, in fact, fin ished on a most pos i tive note, as suring the au thor i - ties in London that the site could be adapted within a reason ably short time follow ing the ar rival of a fleet repair ship, skilled workers, and equipment. If the

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Admi ralty were commit ted to the idea it would in his view be possi ble to estab lish an effec tive fa cility on the East Afri can coast. By the first week of August there was posi tive news also from Willis, who was able to write Somerville that “the unlocated fleet policy” had proved more success - ful than he had thought possi ble back in the dark days of April.40 He was real is tic, though, in his as sess ment. De spite Amer i can efforts in the Pa cific, which had “as - sisted very mate rially” (the victo ries at Midway and in the Coral Sea had been won that spring and summer, and the Solomons campaign was about to begin), he did not be lieve his forces were yet in a po si tion to con tain the Jap a nese main fleet. The Eastern Fleet was still not strong enough to main tain a con centrated cov ering force and provide ocean escorts for convoys in the face of an attack by “much more than a sin gle cruiser or a couple of armed merchant cruisers.” The dilemma with which they were now faced was “the eternal conflict between ‘cover,’ ‘pa trol and search,’ and ‘es cort.’” He did not believe that hunt ing groups would be an effec tive use of re - sources, as there was a vast area to cover and results were produced only when there was “some ad vance in for ma tion of a raider’s in ten tions.” In ter est ingly, Wil lis was clearly within the se lect group of those who were in receipt of in tel ligence from the ULTRA source, as he suggested that only with “re ally firm intel ligence” such as these signals pro vided would hunt ing groups be worth under tak ing. His overall conclu - sion was that at this stage it would not be worth breaking up the “limited cover ing force in or der to strengthen con voy es corts.” In short, un til such time as his strength im proved or the Jap a nese mari time forces were weakened the Brit ish strat - egy needed to re main an en tirely de fensive one. Despite the contin u ing weakness of the East ern Fleet’s posi tion, the Admi ralty was still working on the prem ise as late as Decem ber 1942 that it would ul ti mately return to Ceylon. The date when this would take place would depend on three “un- knowns”: the stra te gic sit u a tion; the de vel op ment of base fa cil i ties, par tic u larly de - fenses, in Cey lon; and, crit i cally, the re in forcement of the East ern Fleet to en able it to take the offen sive. 41 Capt. Donald Mac intyre, in his biog ra phy of Somerville, wonders about the impact on “so vig orous and forceful an Admi ral” of having to keep his force safe by, in effect, delib er ately avoiding any naval confron ta tion with the Jap a nese.42 His stay in Govern ment House in Mombasa provided him an oppor tu nity for some mea sure of rest af ter an in ten sive pe riod at sea. In deed he him - self noted that his time ashore “was a wel come change from the hot and cramped quar ters on Warspite’s bridge and the monot o nous ocean day after day.”43 For the ad mi ral, the new base was suffi ciently pleasant to al low him “to get the phys i cal ex- ercise he found so nec es sary,” with long daily tramps, bath ing, and early-morn ing rowing in a small boat. It could be said that the Eastern Fleet com mander remained person ally as active as he could, but the approach he was forced to adopt for his

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command has perhaps quite rightly been termed “a policy of masterly inac tiv ity.”44 There were, however, more aggres sive di versions, such as when in late May 1942 he departed with the fast portion of his fleet for Colombo, carried out a diver sion ary cruise toward the Andamans, returned to Colombo, and then got back to Kilindini by the end of August. It is far from clear how he would have fared if he had en countered any sizable Japa nese op po si tion, but the cruise offered his force valuable training and experience.45 Throughout the sec ond part of 1942 and into the fol lowing year, the Eastern Fleet was steadily depleted to provide ships for other theaters, leaving barely enough ships to escort the vital Cape–Suez and Indian Ocean con voys. Indeed, the fleet’s sta tus quickly became that of “a trade pro tection Force,” while all efforts contin ued in the prep a ration of bases to sup port the an tic i pated fu ture of fensives back across the Indian Ocean.46 In the first week of Novem ber the admi ral and his staff trans ferred to the cruiser HMS Birmin gham for passage to Bombay and confer ences in New Delhi with Gen. Sir Archibald Wav ell, his fel low com mander in chief, be fore flying back to London to meet with Chur chill. He was back in Mombasa on 30 De- cember and spent another month at the Afri can base. Further travels followed, culmi nat ing in a re turn to South Af rica and one last stop at Kilindini. This marked the end of what his biog ra pher termed a period of “constant shifting from ship to ship and to air craft,” as a fi nal re call home to England fol lowed.47 The base he left behind had now be come a major hub of mari time activ ity; where the av erage number of ships using the port in peacetime had been about forty monthly, in wartime this figure had quickly grown to about a hundred. 48 East Af ri - can waters, however, contin ued to pose a threat to the Allied war effort. As late as March 1944 a suspected Jap a nese subma rine was detected op erat ing near the port; two months later a Ger man U-boat became stranded in the Gulf of Aden, and sal - vage crews were dispatched from Kilindini to recover what equipment they could.49 Throughout Au gust 1944 there were multi ple sinkings of Al lied merchant ship ping between Mombasa and the Mozam bique Channel. A long search of the area was con ducted, with the Flag Offi cer, East Africa tak ing charge. His conclu sion was that three enemy subma rines were oper at ing there; a task force was deployed to con duct a more exten sive search, although this proved fruitless. 50 The sink ing of a Greek vessel in the first week of Sep tem ber led to a note in the fleet’s war di ary that it seemed likely the sub marine involved had “passed close to Kilindini.”51 This was the last such recorded in cident. By May 1945 all ships trav eling from Durban north were offi cial ly doing so unescorted. In reality the threat in these waters had ceased some months before. {LINE-SPACE} With his refer ence to the fleet-in-being strategy, Sir Julian Corbett empha sized that its es sence is “mobil ity and an un tir ing aggres sive spirit rather than rest and

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resis tance.” The fleet has to be kept “ac tively in be ing—not merely in ex is tence, but in active and vigor ous life.”52 This was criti cally impor tant for Somerville and Wil- lis, in light of the forces available to them. Ac cording to one commen ta tor the fleet they com manded was no match for the Japa nese Combined Fleet in the spring of 1942; it was “a rag-bag of a fleet” that was “out-paced and out-gunned on the surface, completely outmatched in the air.”53 The British command ers sought to use what re sources they had to the best of their abili ties, but it is proba bly for the best that “the old tarts” never actu ally found them selves tested by the might of the Impe - rial Japa nese Navy. As for the Brit ish base at Kilindini, it ulti mately provided an ac- ceptable bolt-hole at a time when there were few al terna tive options. When the tide of war turned in favor of the Al lies, the ratio nale for its devel op ment was reduced. The flirta tion with the idea that it might be come a major naval base was very much, there fore, a re ac tive re sponse to a pre vi ously un imag in able and hu mil i at ing mar i- time defeat. It did, however, pro vide a pleas ant break for al ready war-wearied com - mand ers and new drink ing op por tu ni ties on trop i cal beaches for or di nary members of the Royal Navy.

NOTES All ar chival sources are from The National Archives , its neigh bor was only twenty feet deep; Port Su dan Kew, un less oth er wise stated. was the deep est port, at some sixty-three feet. 1 George F. Deasy, “The Harbors of Africa,” Eco nomic 4 “Con trol of Kilindini Har bour,” Times, 5 August Ge og ra phy 18, no. 4 (Octo ber 1942), pp. 325–27. 1925, p. 14. 2 Maj. Sir Humphrey Leggett, “The British East Afri - 5 “Question by Sir F. Wise and Col o nel Wedg wood, can Terri to ri es and Their Strategical Impli ca t ions,” House of Commons Debate,” 8 March 1926, Overseas Empire Transmis sion, 19 June 1940, in Hansard, vol. 192, c1889. Journal of the Royal Af rican Soci ety 39, no. 156 (July 6 “Question by Sir J. Power,” House of Commons 1940), p. 206. Debate, 24 June 1942, Hansard, vol. 380, cc1992- 3 Deasy, “Harbors of Africa,” pp. 334, 327; Mom- 3W. Us ing “Pur chas ing Power of Brit ish Pounds basa’s depth was recorded at thirty-three feet, while from 1264 to Present,” MeasuringWorth,

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eh.net/hmit/ppowerbp/, and the retail price index 28 Admi ralty to C-in-C East In dies, 14 March 1942, and data for 2008, the ap prox imate ad justed cost for 1442A; Admi ralty to C-in-C East In dies, 2 April the pur chase and con struc tion of the Kilindini base 1942, 2016A, WO106/5213. equates to £72,279,093.44; the cost for the Sin ga - 29 Col o nel Rolles ton, min ute, 11 March 1942; “Note pore facil ity would have been £633,301,975.08. on East Afri can Ports,” n.d.; MO5, note, 12 March 7 Eric Jolley, “An Account of the Devel opment of 1942; all WLLS5/5. Kilindini at Mombasa in East Africa as a Naval Base 30 “Summary East Af rica and India n Ocean Islands, ” for Eastern Fleet” [hereaf ter “Devel op ment of Octo b er 1942, WO252/856. Kilindini”], Mombasa, 8 Octo ber 1942, ADM1/ 13010, pp. 2–29. 31 Jolley, “De vel opment of Kilindini,” p. 1; Admi ral to Secre tary of Admi ralty, 28 Septem ber 1943, ADM1/ 8 Henry Moore (Gov er nor of Kenya) to Malcolm 13010. MacDon ald (Sec re tary of State for the Col o nies), 6 Febru ary 1940; head of mil itary branch, minute, 10 32 MO5, “Note on the Defences of Mombasa,” 4 April 1940; both ADM116/4567. March 1942, WO106/5213. 9 “The Command ing Offi c er, HMS Glouces ter’s Re - 33 GOC-in-C East Africa to War Of fice, no. 19203, 22 port on Na val Af fairs at Kilindini,” 23 Febru ary April 1942, WO106/5213. 1940, ADM116/4567. 34 Admi ralty to Deputy C-in-C Eastern Fleet, 11 June 10 “Naval Expen di ture in East Afric a,” Commander- 1942, ADM1/12982. in-Chief [hereaf ter C-in-C], East Indies Station, 19 35 Hugh Denham, “Bedford-Bletchley-Ki lindini- June 1940, ADM116/4567. Co lombo,” in Codebreakers: The In side Story of 11 Ashley Jackson, The Brit ish Empire and the Sec ond Bletchley Park, ed. F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp World War (Lon don: Hambledon, 2006), p. 281; (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 270– Cristiano D’Adamo, “Regia Ma rina Italiana: Red 72. They would eventu ally move with the remain der Sea,” Regia Ma rina Italiana, www.regiamarina.net/. of the headquar ters staff and fin ish the war in Colombo. 12 Adm. Sir Tom Phillips had been lost with HMS Re- pulse and HMS Prince of Wales, after which Adm. 36 Jolley, “Devel opment of Kilindini,” pp. 2–29. Sir Geoffrey Layton had taken command. 37 The Second World War Mem oirs of R. B. Buckle 13 Cited in Jack Broome, Make An other Sig nal (Lon- (London: Impe rial War Museum, ref. 11358, n.d.), don: Kimber Books, 1973). pp. 88, 93. 14 Capt. Don ald Macin tyre, Fighting Admi ral: The Life 38 “Mombasa Was Base for High-Level UK Es pio nage of Ad mi ral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville (London: Oper a tion,” Coastweek (Kenya), n.d., available at Ev ans Brothers, 1961), p. 205. www.coastweek.com/. 15 John Winton, The Forgot t en Fleet (East Sus sex, U.K.: 39 Rear Adm. C. Stuart to Sec retary of the Admi ralty, 6 Douglas-Boyd Books, 1989), p. 20. June 1942, ADM1/12977. A tran scribed copy of the War Diary for this period of the Eastern Fleet’s ac - 16 Capt. S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. 2, The Pe - tivity can be found at Na val-History.Net. riod of Bal ance (Lon don: Her Majesty’s Statio nery Office [hereaf ter HMSO], 1956), p. 23. 40 Wil lis to Somerville, 6 August 1942, WLLS5/5. 17 Winton, Forgot t en Fleet, p. 21. 41 Mili tary Branch, minute, 2 Decem ber 1942, ADM1/ 12977. 18 Ibid., p. 20. 42 Mac in tyre, Fight ing Ad mi ral, p. 204. 19 Min is try of De fence [here af ter MoD], War with Ja- pan, vol. 1, Background to the War (London: HMSO, 43 Ibid. 1995), p. 98. 44 Winton, Forgot t en Fleet, p. 32. 20 Roskill, Period of Bal ance, p. 22. 45 Ibid., p. 214. 21 Ibid., pp. 26–28. 46 Ibid., p. 215. 22 Mac in tyre, Fight ing Ad mi ral, p. 22; MoD, Back - 47 Ibid., p. 223. ground to the War, vol. 1, p. 98; Roskill, Pe riod of 48 “Summary East Af rica and India n Ocean Islands. ” Bal ance, p. 29. 49 “War Diary: March 1944,” 2 April 1944; “War Di- 23 “Admi ral of the Fleet Sir Algernon Wil lis,” obitu ary, ary: May 1944,” 24 June 1944; both ADM199/772. Times, 14 April 1976, p. 21; “Sir Algernon Willis,” obitu a ry, Times, 24 April 1976, p. 14. 50 “War Diary: August 1944,” 9 Septem ber 1944, ADM199/772. 24 Roskill, Period of Bal ance, pp. 23, 25. 51 “War Diary: Sep tember 1944,” 14 Octo ber 1944, 25 Cited in Mac intyre, Fight ing Ad mi ral, pp. 205, 211. ADM199/772. 26 Lt. Cdr. Arnold Hague, RNR (Ret.), “Route to the 52 Sir Julian Corbett, Some Prin ci ples of Mar i time Strat - East: The WS (Winston’s Spe cial) Con voys,” 2007, egy (1911; repr. Annapolis, Md.: Naval In stitute Na val-His tory.Net. Press, 1972), p. 214. 27 Wil lis to Vice Adm. H[enry] R. Moore, Vice Chief 53 Richard Humble, Fra ser of North Cape: The Life of of the Naval Staff, 13 April 1942, Churchill Archives Ad mi ral of the Fleet Lord Fra ser (1888–1981) (Lon- Centre, Churchill College, WLLS5/5. don: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 239.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:12 AM IX Es cort Oil ers The Un told Story of the Battle of the At lan tic

KENNETH P. HANSEN

omb ined es cort of con voy oper a tions dur ing the Bat tle of the Atlan tic by the Royal Cana dian Navy (RCN) and U.S. Navy was the test bed for the de velop - Cment of un der way re fu el ing pro ce dures for con voy es corts. De vel op ment of the abilit y to refuel at sea from mer chant tank ers played a vi tally im por tant part in de- ciding the ul ti mate out come. The story of how this was ac complished and of who played the key roles in it is a great and un told story of the Battle of the Atlan tic. Allied escorts suffered from an oper a tion ally limit ing lack of endur a nce during early con voy op er a tions. In tel li gence ad van tages were wasted. Mean while, Ger man subma rines con centrated in a bot tle neck area south of Ice land caused by es cort meeting points. This arti fi cial restric tion heightened the likeli hood of U-boats’ inter cept ing a con voy. The poor per formance of RCN escort groups up to May 1943 has been thor - oughly doc u mented. The no tion per sists that for the nag ging problems of Ca na dian es cort in ef fi ciency there was sim ply no al ter na tive to in creas ing in di vid ual train ing, ad vanc ing equip ment stan dards, and im prov ing group op er a tional co he sion.1 How ever, be sides these qual i ta tive is sues, ef fec tive use of op er a tional lo gis tics could in crease substan tially the num ber of warships avail able per convoy. Ac cordingly, se nior U.S. Navy com mand ers de vel oped the con cept of un der way re plen ish ment from the bunkers of merchant tank ers. The increased fuel supply for escorts allowed the use of speed for tacti cal advan tage and the employ ment of evasion for oper a tional ad van tage. This in crease in op er a tional and tac ti cal flex i bil ity has not previ ously been credited for the clima ctic events of mid-1943, when Allied naval forces were able to as sume a more of fensive pos ture in their strug gle against Ger - man U-boats. The abil ity to re fuel escorts at sea from com mercial tank ers was de vel oped prin - cipally by Capt. Paul R. Heineman, USN, commander of Task Unit 24.1.3 (known in British and Ca nadian lit era ture as Escort Group A-3). Captain Heineman adapted the stan dard U.S. Navy abeam-refu el ing method and trained Ca nadian and British escort vessels in the practice. He also brought the poten tial of under way

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refu el ing to the atten tion of the Com mander, North-Western Approac hes, Adm. Sir Max Horton. Hor ton in turn, over the stren u ous ob jec tions of his se nior staff, ordered the adoption of this prac tice by Royal Navy es cort groups. In 1942, Escort Group A-3 included four Wickes-class “flush decker” de stroy ers: Schenk, Bab bitt, Greer, and Badger, plus the Sec re tary-class U.S. Coast Guard cut ter Spencer. The Ca na dian mem bers included the River-class de stroyer Skeena and the Flower-class cor vettes Arvida, Bit ter sweet, Collingwood, Daup hin, May flower, Rosthern, Trillium, and Wetaskinwin, as well as the British cor vettes Dianthus, Nas- tur tium, and Wall flower. Of these, only Trillium, commanded by Lt. Philip Cabell Evans, RCNR, escorted ev ery convoy pro tected by the A-3 group between SC-95 in August 1942 and HX-234 in April 1943. When the group was disbanded, the Ca nadian units were reas signed into the new C-5 group, and the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard units were dispersed to other as signments. 2 The de stroyer USS Bab bitt first tested ex peri men tal refu el ing at sea from com- mercial tank ers in June 1942.3 Cap tain Heineman recorded that the A-3 group commonly practiced refu el ing from commer cial tankers from August 1942.4 Lieu- tenant Evans has been identi fied as “a retired US Naval offi cer who joined the RCN and helped in struct it in fuelling at sea.”5 This is incor rect. Evans gradu ated from the U.S. Na val Acad emy in 1930, stand ing fourth in his class, and left the ser vice in 1936.6 He was forced to leave the U.S. Navy due to night-vision prob lems.7 His pro - fessional writings make it clear that he had ab so lutely no practi cal knowledge of refuel ing at sea before his time in the A-3 group. Evans’s expe riences while in command of HMCS Trillium are pivotal to the history of Cana dian expo sure to Amer i can op er a tional lo gis tics prac tices.8 Evans published an un signed arti cle in the Janu ary 1943 issue of the RCN Monthly Re view wherein he de scribed his expe riences refu el ing at sea from com- mercial tankers. 9 His arti cle reports his join ing Task Unit 24.1.3 in Au gust 1942. At the first com mand ing of fi cers’ confer ence, Heineman, who is de scribed by Samuel Eliot Morison as “one of our best escort command ers,” said, “We would of course be prepared to fuel at sea by follow ing the destroy ers, us ing gear to be provided by USCGC Spencer.”10 Evans would write of observ ing Bab bitt “re peat edly fuel ing from one of the convoy oilers, under vari ous sea condi tions” dur ing the es cort of convoy ON-125 in early Sep tem ber. Trillium and Evans soon took their turn. As this con voy was the second that Trillium escorted af ter joining the A-3 group, Ev- ans’s comment that “en ergetic coaxing” from the group commander was required to get him to at tempt re fuel ing takes on spe cial signif i cance. Evans’s descrip tion of events is both comic and star tling. It was hardly a suc cess; no fuel was trans ferred, two haw sers were parted, and Trillium lost one of its fore castle bol lards. Captain Heineman kept up the pressure on Evans and the other escort command ers to mas ter the pro cess, and his ef forts were even tu ally success ful. During

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the course of seven convoy-es cort oper a tions, ending with ON-156 in Janu ary 1943, Trillium and Evans became very profi cient at refu el ing at sea. He reports having made thir teen success ful refuelings out of six teen at tempts, re ceiving 297 tons of fuel in the pro cess. The largest amount of fuel trans ferred in a single oper a tion amounted to fifty-two tons (23 percent of total ca pacity), which took two hours to accom plish. The key to the entire process was learning to hold station along side the oiler without the aid of steadying lines.11 The amounts of fuel in volved were gener ally small and the rates of trans fer low, because the sys tem used a sin gle 2.5-inch canvas “deck wash” hose. Despite the low trans fer rate, a great ad van tage was that the fuel ing point was moved off the fore castle deck and into the shelter of the ship’s waist, making fuel ing in rough weather fea si ble. The dif ference between the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy ap proaches to re fu eling at sea soon be gan to have sig nif i cant in fluences on the con duct of op era tions and tactics. In a tech nique de vised around 1906, the Royal Navy em ployed a bronze-metal lic hose, in one of three di am e ters: seven-inch, five-inch, or 3.5-inch.12 For under way replen ish ment the re ceiving ship was towed astern; a cap i tal ship be ing refu eled would custom arily tow the oiler.13 Either a five-inch or 3.5-inch hose was sus- pended from a 4.5-inch wire tow ing haw ser by a system of sup port ing straps known as “stirrups.” In the stir rup method, de stroy ers and other mi nor warships were fit - ted with 3.5-inch fuel ing connec tions. Tow ing speed in a re fu eling from a battle ship was normally twelve knots; the de stroyer was meant to stop its en gines. If a higher tow ing speed was ordered, the de stroyer used its en gines to reduce the strain on the haw ser. The length of the tow line was 120, 240, or 360 feet, depend ing on the weather.14 The system was com plex and took hours to rig. The stir rup method was no to riously un reli able, due to the heavy and frag ile bronze hoses, which were both dif fi cult and com pli cated to han dle. They were also prone to rup tur ing. The bronze hoses were reput edly tested to a pres sure of 150 pounds per square inch (psi), al though the nor mal dis charge pressure from the cargo transfer pumps was rou tinely lim ited to 75 psi.15 Even this 50 percent reduc - tion in op er at ing pres sure was an in ad e quate pre cau tion, and rup tures con tin ued to be com mon. Once a breach occurr ed, it took hours to repair and return a hose to ser vice. Nev er the less, de spite these lim i ta tions, the astern method re mained the prin cipal means of refu el ing British warships at sea un til the end of the Second World War, though an alongside fuel-transfer method was devised by the Royal Navy in 1937.16 In that along side technique, the aircraf t-recov ery crane of a battle ship or cruiser was used to “boom out” the hose, which was supported by a hose cradle known as a “trough.” Destroy ers were required to ap proach to as close as forty to sixty feet to the supply ing ship. The trough method could be used only when weather condi tions

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were favor able, and it required expert ship-handling skills. The deple tion of a cap ital ship’s fuel reserves and the require ment to re main on a steady course while fueling were regarded as major tacti cal limi ta tions. The trough method has been claimed er - rone ously as the pre cursor of the mod ern abeam method of refu el ing at sea.17 Al- though use ful, this alongside sys tem was always regarded as a second ary method of pro vid ing a small “top-up” of fuel to mi nor warships; it was not used to re fuel large warships. The 3.5-inch hose re stricted the fuel trans fer rate to between eighty to a hundred tons per hour.18 An uncel e brated out come of the fa mous “Bis marck chase” had enormous im pli- cations for Allied replen ish ment oper a tio ns. After Bis marck was sunk, the Royal Navy used decoded Ger man naval signals to inter cept the Ger man network of nine widely dis persed sup ply ships sup port ing the bat tle ship’s sor tie, known as Op era - 19 tion RHINE, plus the blockade-run ner Elbe. Two captured ves sels, the aux iliary tank ers Gonzenheim and Lothringen, car ried re plen ish ment equip ment com pletely unlike that in their British or Ameri can counter parts. 20 German fuel hoses were made of rein forced rubber with threaded alumi num end fittings that allowed the hoses to be made buoyant by filling with air. Whether used by replen ish ment ships or U-tank ers, the hoses were either boomed out or sim ply floated down to at ten dant warships. This made si multa neous replen ish - ment of several ships or sub marines pos sible, even under quite adverse condi tions. British an alysts imme di ately recog nized the util ity of the German hoses, and plans were made to copy and produce them for Royal Navy use for astern replen ish ment. The hose could now be sim ply floated astern of the oilers and picked up by the trail - ing warship. The RFA (i.e., Royal Fleet Auxil iary) Eaglesdale conducted trials in March 1942.21 Until that time, it was consid ered that refu el ing using the stirrup method in any thing but the calmest con di tions was im pos si ble. The along side, or abeam, method ad vo cated by Heineman and by Ev ans in his 1943 ar ti cle required a shorter length of canvas hose (250 feet) than the astern method, with its float ing hose (550 to 600 feet), and in stead of a spe cially man u factured rubber hose, the hose was made of readily obtain able canvas. While Evans ac- knowledged that fuel ing from astern, either by the stir rup method or a float ing hose, was recom mended in the stan dard Ad mi ralty refer ence (CB 4080), he pointed out that rub ber hoses were simply not available and that manila for towing hawsers was in short sup ply. Quite sarcas ti cally, Evans wrote in his ar ti cle, “We are chiefly in ter est ed in get ting our fuel before the war ends.” He described the equip ment needed for the Amer i can system as, in contrast to ei ther astern method, “sim ple, cheap and easily obtain able.”22 Although the astern method of refu el ing was regar ded as easier than the along - side method by the Royal Navy, Cana dian escorts had sig nifi cant diffi culty with us - ing it. The archi val records are full of reports con cern ing the inep ti tude of RCN

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escorts at refu el ing and a plethora of inci dents involving ruptured fuel hoses or parted haw sers. During the escort of convoy SC-124, HMCS May flower in ap pro pri- ately at tempted a re fuel ing from astern of the Amer i can escort oiler Ches ter O. Swain, despite the fact the tanker was fitted only for along side refu el ing with canvas hoses. Af ter part ing the tanker’s only ma nila haw ser, May flower fouled its own screw during an ill-advised at tempt to pass a 10.5-inch haw ser to the oiler.23 An- other cor vette from Escort Group C-3, HMCS Eyebright, was detached from the convoy to tow May flower to Londonderry. Quite late into the war, Ca na dian es corts were ac cused of be ing “igno rant of the in struc tions, . . . not follow ing in struc tions from the es cort oiler, . . . be ing un able to keep sta tion, . . . be ing un fa mil iar with the trans fer [pro cess], . . . and not hav ing equip ment ready.”24 In Decem ber 1943, Capt. M. F. Wil son of the Ad mi ralty Trade Di vi sion wrote to Rear Adm. Leonard W. Murray, RCN, com mander of the Northwest Atlan tic Area, in an attempt to provide advice on Cana dian refu el ing problems. 25 The prob lem in the RCN seemed to be that many command ing offi cers did not appre ci ate that the ma nila line was not in tended to be used as a tow line, as had been done (though with wire haw sers) before the war us ing the stir rup method. Ca na dian war ships con tin - ued gen erally to ig nore proce dures laid down in the Admi ralty Book of Refer ence BR 853, Pro ce dure for Oil ing at Sea by the Buoy ant Hose Method, a fact that drew the ire of Captain Wil son and eventu ally of the Cana dian Na val Board. A let ter from the secre tary of the board to Ad mi ral Murray stated, “The main cause of misun der - stand ing is as you say faulty commu ni cation, and the need for so much com mu ni - cation is very largely due to the BR either not be ing studied suffi ciently or not being com plied with.”26 Despite this prod ding, Ad mi ral Murray was un able to ef fect sig - nif i cant im prove ment and the com plex i ties of the astern re fu el ing method con tin - ued to challenge the seaman ship skills of his neophyte command ing offi cers. Damage to refu el ing gear became so widespread that on 21 Janu ary 1944 Admi - ral Murray signaled, “As the ser vices of es cort oil ers may be vi tal to the ocean es - corts, ships of the Naval Es cort Force are not to refuel in SC or HX con voys [i.e., eastbound to the United King dom] ex cept in cases of ab so lute ne cessity.” 27 Two days later, the Ad mi ralty placed fur ther re stric tions on Ca na dian es corts: “Diffi - culty is being found in main tain ing neces sary mini mum num ber of escort oilers with convoy and risk of damag ing equipment at outset of voyage is not accept able. Re quest that oiling at sea by western local escorts be tempo rarily restricted to ON [westbound from the United King dom] convoys.” 28 With no for malized training process and few oppor tu ni ties to practice at sea, it was inev i ta ble that the RCN’s diffi culties would con tinue to plague the es cort groups and limit their en durance. Not all of the problems ex peri enced by the RCN, however, related to poor seaman ship skills and lack of ex pe ri ence. The na ture of their ships’ pro pul sion sys tems also helped to make refu el ing at sea dif ficult.

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Part of the rea son for Ca na dian prob lems in re fu el ing astern was the re cip ro cat - ing ma chin ery in mi nor war ships. The com mand ing of fi cer of the Flower-class cor - vette HMCS Sackville, Act ing Lt. Cdr. A. H. Ankin, RCNVR, re ported that his ship took a long time to respond to engine or ders, which often caused the corvette to put heavy strain on the steadying line.29 Ankin advo cated the use of a ten-inch manila hawser to pre vent damage to the fueling hose. U.S. Navy ships and Coast Guard cutters, plus the Royal Navy’s de stroy ers and most its sloops, were tur bine powered, which gave them much more pre cise speed control. Evans’s arti cle about refu el ing at sea concluded with an im pas sioned plea for other com mand ing of fi cers, es cort group com mand ers, and “higher au thor i ties ashore” to consider adopting the alongside method of refu el ing as standard prac - tice.30 Evans rec ommended that one to three oilers be assigne d to each convoy and that es cort group com mand ers plan for fuel ing their escorts at sea “as frequently as condi tions per mit.” He exhorted his fellow captains to try the alongside method and to be per sis tent: “We found the first ten times were the worst.” Ev ans also hinted at the widesprea d resis tance in the RCN to the idea: “Every one from your No. 1 [i.e., first lieu tenant] will tell you that it sim ply can’t be done. Oh no? It works!” [em pha sis orig i nal]. His ar ticle was a last-ditch effort to get his expe ri ence s out to a wider au di ence. Evans had sub mit ted an ear lier formal report, dated 16 No vem ber 1942, through his chain of command. 31 He had completed five convoy op era tions since his first ex po sure to fueling at sea during convoy ON-125. In his report, Ev ans de - scribed the process in detail, and in a no ta bly less ironic manner than his later arti - cle. He reported that the use of steadying ropes was a hindranc e rather than a help and that it was pos si ble to main tain po si tion near a tanker at dis tances of twenty- five to sev enty-five feet solely by the use of rud der and the en gine. He asserted con - fidently that the oper a tion was not diffi cult, “even in moder ately rough weather. The worst con di tion is that of a fol lowing or a quar ter ing sea.” There is no re cord of an of fi cial reply to Ev ans’s re port, but the doc u ment it self bears a marginal note from Capt. Horatio N. Lay, Di rector of Plans at Na val Staff Head quar ters: “Never heard of this be fore—obso lete any way on ac count of buoy - ant hose astern method.” Lay’s off handed con dem na tion is par tic u larly reveal ing as he was re garded as the only head quar ters staff of fi cer with re cent sea going expe ri - ence.32 He obvi ously did not recog nize the su peri or ity of the along side method and was not prepared to con sider the possi bil ity that the Ameri can method could be used by Cana dian warships, de spite strong evi dence to the contrary. The first Cana dian response to the knowledge that Ameri can escorts were exper - i ment ing with refu el ing alongside from convoy tank ers was to ask the Admi ralty for di rection. A letter on refu el ing at sea from the secre tary of the Na val Board was sent

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to the sec retary of the Board of Ad mi ralty on 26 August 1942. The Ca na dian let ter in di cated that it was un derstood that re fuel ing at sea from a tanker in con voy could con sid er ably in crease the en dur ance of war ships.33 The let ter ad mit ted openly that the mem bers of the Na val Board were “not com pletely aware of the lat est meth ods devel oped for oiling small craft at sea.” It suggested the provi sion of sets of refu el ing gear, spe cifi cally bronze-metal lic hoses, to se lected tank ers in con voys. On 9 Septem ber, a message from Rear Adm. Roland M. Brainard, Commander, Task Force 24, which was ad dressed to all Amer i can, British, and Ca na dian na val high com mand au thor i ties, was the first im por tant of fi cial warning on the is sue of in ad e quate es cort en dur ance. Brainard fore cast es corts hav ing to leave con voys due to fuel shortages and antic i pated that the sit ua tion would worsen due to adverse weather. He took the un prece dented step of rec om mend ing a tanker be desig nated and ap pro pri ately equipped for re fu el ing es corts.34 Adm. Er nest J. King, the U.S. Chief of Na val Op er a tions, added his support to Admi ral Brainard’s rec ommen da - tion in a mes sage sent on 11 Septem ber. He rec ognized the current endur ance diffi - culties and en dorsed the ad van tages of the pro posal from Brainard. “As an im me di ate pal lia tive,” King sug gested that the cur rent west ern meet ing point should be moved as far eastward as possi ble. 35 This was a not-too-sub tle sugges tion that the problem was largely British in ori gin. It was not un til 7 Oc to ber that Ca nadian Na val Staff Headquar ters sent a message to the Ad mi ralty with a di rect request for guidance. 36 The Ad mi ralty did not re ply un til 21 Oc to ber and then said only, “Detaile d re ply is be ing for warded by air.”37 The Ad mi ralty reply came in a letter dated 29 Octo ber. It assured the RCN that ar rangements were be ing made for tank ers to sail in con voys to and from New York for oiling escorts at sea “as far as may be found practi cable.” It went on to de scribe the trough, or alongside, method as “effi cient in calm weather” and the stirrup (astern with bronze-me tal lic hose) and “der rick” (astern with float ing rub ber hose) meth ods as “de signed for any weather when men can work on the fore castle of an escort vessel.” 38 British reluc tance to en dorse the con cept of refu el ing at sea is quite evi dent from the letter’s charac ter iza tion of the alongside method and ob vious prefer ence for the two astern methods. However, the stipu lated limi ta tion of ability to work on the forecas tle of a small es cort restricte d refu el ing oper a tions to fair con- ditions not of ten encoun tered in the North Atlan tic. An attach ment to the Admi ralty letter of 29 Oc to ber was enti tled “Guidance for Masters of Com mercial Tankers Employed on Es cort Fuelling Service in the Use of Buoyant Rub ber Oil Hose by Boom Method.”39 In it, mas ters of es cort oil ers were partic u larl y entreated to ensure that the greatest care was taken when using either rubber hoses or manila haw sers. It em phasized that the safety of the convoy and its escorts de pended largely on the effi cienc y of the tanker selected for this impor tant

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duty. The doc u ment equated the safety of the tanker, its equip ment, and its per son - nel to that of the whole convoy. These impor tant cautions soon proved prophetic. On 6 Novem ber 1942, the Admi ralty desig nated what must have been one of the first es cort oil ers—Brit ish Val our, which departed with convoy ONS-144 on 15 No- vember. It was fitted with the float ing-hose system and was loaded with approx i - mately six hun dred tons of fuel oil. Brit ish Val our was ordered to load a full cargo of fuel oil in New York and return with the first avail able home ward convoy. It would be available for fuel ing es corts at sea during both the outward and homeward voyages. 40 By 21 No vem ber the Admi ralty was able to signal that five tank ers fitted with buoyant hose equip ment for fueling over the stern were available for North At lantic convoys. Four more were in the process of being con verted, and other suitable candi dates were being sought, with a view to provid ing suffi cient tankers to cover all North Atlan tic convoys. British escorts and tank ers were to be supplied with Confi - den tial Book 4080(42), Oil ing at Sea Instruc tions.41 The dis agreement between Amer ican and British author i ties over the most suitable method of fueling at sea now began to pick up energy . An Admi ralty message declared that canvas hose had been found to be “unsuit - able repe ti tion un suit able,” since it became porous after expo sure to fuel oil and the rate of fueling by the 2.5-inch hose was too slow. The Admi ralty claimed that Amer- i can es corts had on sev eral oc casions been fueled by the Brit ish five-inch buoyant hose, and “no dif fi culties [had been] re ported.” The sig nal suggested that astern refuel ing become the standard method and that “the along side trough method should be fit ted in tankers as subsid iary.” 42 A reply from the U.S. Navy was soon re ceived. Despite the Admi ralty’s assur ances, Ameri can naval author i ties were satis fied neither with the rate of arrival of British-pro vided escort oil ers nor with adoption of the astern refu el ing method as standard practice. In an attempt to press their views with Royal Navy au thor i ties, a meet ing was orga nized for 21 Decem ber 1942 at Derby House, Londonderry, headquar ters of Western Approaches Command. The subject was promul gated sim ply as “Oiling at Sea.” Captain Heineman arrived on 17 Decem ber, after serving as escort commander for convoy SC-111. Heineman was well armed with in for ma tion and ex pe ri ence, hav ing used the con voy’s pas sage to con duct op er a tional ex per i ments. During the pas sage of SC-111, Task Unit 24.1.3 had refu eled eleven times from two oilers: Brit ish Prog ress (seven times) and Vacuum (four times). Neither of these tankers had been desig nated offi cially as an escort oiler, nor had either been equipped with five-inch float ing hoses. The regu larly assigned escort oiler for SC-111 had put into Hali fax for repairs and had not made the pas sage. The alongside method of fueling had been used, with out tow ing lines. All fuel ing hoses,

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flanges, clamps, and slips had been provided by the Ameri can es corts and passed to the tank ers while at sea. Stan dard 2.5-inch canvas deck-wash hose in fifty-foot lengths with screw couplings had been used; each tanker had been pro vided with 250 feet. A system of clips to support the hose from a der rick-sup ported carry ing line had been impro vised by Brit ish Prog ress and proved to be quite advan ta geous. 43 At the meet ing, Captain Heineman tabled a letter from Capt. A. Kenney, mas ter of Brit ish Prog ress, de tail ing which ships had re ceived the 242 tons of fuel trans ferred: HMCS Trillium, eighty-three tons; USS Badger, sixty-two tons; HMCS Rosthern, forty-four tons; HMCS Dauphine, forty-two tons; and HMS Wan derer, eleven tons. The only other ship in Task Unit 24.1.3 was Spencer, Heineman’s flagship, which had not re quired fuel, be cause of its su per lative en dur ance. Cap tain Kenney’s let ter con cluded that in his opin ion the alongside method was the best for fuel ing small escorts at sea. It also recom mended that the fuel oil be heated to one hundred de - grees Fahren heit, to ease the pump ing process. 44 A report of proceed ings by HMS Wan derer, which had had the least suc cess in fueling alongside, made its way to the Ca nadian Na val Board, by way of the Captain for Destroy ers in Newfound land, Capt. Harold T. Grant, RCN. Wan derer had made three at tempts at alongside re fu eling. Its captain, Lt. Cdr. D. H. P. Gardi ner, RN, classi fied two of these as “com plete fail ures.” The third at tempt had re sulted in re - ceiv ing a small amount of oil be fore “the oiler’s bow wave caused an out ward sheer and the hose parted.” Gar di ner grudg ingly acknowl edged that the small amount of fuel trans ferred had al lowed Wan derer to remain with the convoy until morn ing in - stead of depart ing in the middle of the night. Gar diner concluded, “Trough method could easily have been em ployed on the last two occa sions if the gear had been avail - able, but oiling a destroyer through a can vass [sic] hose without a tow of any sort is easier to imagine than to carry out.”45 As Ev ans had ex plained, the first at tempts at along side re fu el ing were bound to be dif fi cult. Gardi ner was ob vi ously not well prac ticed at this chal leng ing ma neu ver. Captain Grant forwarded the report from Wan derer to Na val Staff Headquar ters in Ot tawa. In his cov ering remarks, Grant commented that Lieu ten ant Com - mander Gardi ner was “a com pe tent sea man and ship han dler.” Grant used the re - port to discount the Ameri can alongside refu el ing method: “It is consid ered that the most practi cable method of re fuel ing at sea under all con ditions is that finall y adopted by the Ad mi ralty as stan dard, i.e. astern by 5-inch rubber hose, adapter, and 3½-inch hose [led to the fuel tank tops] in each ship.”46 Grant neglected to mention in his mem o randum that the Ca na dian corvettes Trillium, Rosthern, and Dauphine, as well as the Ameri can destroyer Badger, had all fueled success fully and that none of them had been required to detach from the con voy due to fuel shortage as Wan derer had. The cred i bil ity of a reg u lar-navy Brit ish of fi cer was for Grant

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enough to dis count the quite evi dent and quantifiably supe rior seaman ship skills of one U.S. Navy and three Cana dian RCNVR command ers. As a prelude to the meet ing on 21 Decem ber at Derby House, Cap tain Heineman reported to Ad mi ral Brainard that a “beau ti fully timed” signal had ar - rived at West ern Approaches Command from his headquar ters on the 18th. The signal was retransmitted by Ad mi ral Horton to the base com mander at Londonderry and to the captains com manding es cort forces at Liver pool and Greenock on 19 Decem ber. It called for escorts to be “topped up with fuel from oil - ers on every possi ble oc casion, even on the first or sec ond day from the sailing port” and rec ognized that the perma nent ab sence of an es cort due to short age of fuel was far more danger ous to the con voy than its tem po rary absence while refu el ing. 47 Heineman would later as sess that the is sue of es cort oil ers had now risen to con - sid erable prom i nence with the Brit ish. He re corded the pres ence at the meet ing of a virtual who’s who from Western Approaches Command, includ ing Admi ral Hor- ton and twelve mem bers of his se nior staff: “The stage was all set.” Heineman be gan by de scribing his ex pe riences with re fu eling at sea by the var i ous meth ods, and “a great dis cussion arose” re garding the mer its of astern re fu eling versus the Amer i can alongside method. Heineman held noth ing back, telling the West ern Approaches staff that the British version of the along side method using bronze hoses was “defi - nitely im prac ti ca ble in North At lan tic win ter weather.”48 Although the point is not clearly elab o rated on in his record of events, Heineman argued that only one practi - cable method of re fuel ing at sea in winter weather ex isted, namely, the Amer i can along side method. Heineman’s “ace in the hole” was his recent expe rience with Brit ish Prog ress. He explaine d that during a winter transit, all his short-legged es corts had been able to re fuel, ad mit tedly with dif fer ing suc cess. The de ci sive fac tor was that British Prog - ress had not been a des ignated es cort oiler and that the en tire af fair had been accom - plished with impro vised equipment. At that point, Admi ral Horton had heard enough. As Heineman de scribed it, “When this was dis closed, the Ad mi ral took charge.” Horton announc ed that he consid ered the canvas-hose method the only one feasi ble at the present time for North At lantic trade convoys. He made a number of deci sions that he wanted carried out “at once.” Three escort oilers were to be desig nated for each con voy and equipped with two thousand feet of canvas hose plus the nec es sary fit tings and cou plings. Even tank ers al ready fit ted with float ing hose were to be equipped with canvas hose for use in an emer gency, “so as to leave noth ing to doubt.” Cap tain Kenney was to be contacted and asked to explain the process to staff repre sen ta tives, for relay to Western Approaches forces. Cap tain Heineman commented later, “To me, the whole affair was very satis fac to rily handled by the Admi ral, and I left the confer ence very well pleased.”49 This was as it should be, for he had won an impor tant victory.

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Unfor tu nately, Heineman’s victory came too late for the RCN. Convoy ONS-154 de parted Liv erpool on 19 Decem ber 1942, two days prior to the con ference at Derby House. The convoy’s only es cort oiler was Scot tish Heather, which was equipped with buoyant rubber hose for refu el ing astern and Admi ralty bronze-metal lic hose for refu el ing along side. The fra gil ity of the me tal lic hoses and Ad mi ralty re sis tance to alongside re fu eling meant it would re fuel escorts only by the astern method. On 26 Decem ber, despite very rough weather, it man aged to trans fer one hun dred tons of fuel to HMCS St. Laurent, the flag ship of the senior offi cer of Escort Group C-1, Cdr. Guy S. Windeyer, RCN. Attacks by a U-boat wolf pack began on 27 Decem ber and con tin ued al most with out in ter rup tion un til late on 28 De cem ber. The bat tle has been de scribed as “a di sas ter of the first order.” 50 The outcome led direc tly to the withdrawal of Cana dian escort groups from North Atlan tic ser vice, just before the criti cal months of the Battle of the Atlan tic, when the German U-boat force would reach its point of culmi na tion. Largely overlooked in accounts of the bat tle for convoy ONS-154 is the fact that Scottish Heather was heavily damaged on the after noon of 27 Decem ber by a torpedo from U-225, commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Wolfgang Leimkühler. Scottish Heather was forced to leave the convoy and return to port for repairs. The related fact that the effi ciency of Allied es corts in de fense of ONS-154 declined quickly as they ran out of fuel due to the ef fects of heavy weather and sus tained com bat is also largely ignored. The Brit ish de stroy ers Meteor and Milne, as well as the Ca na dian cor vettes Battleford and Shediac, were forced to de tach from the convoy due to low fuel and make for the Azores on the af ter noon of 30 Decem ber, even though it was known there were still five U-boats in pur suit. The fact that Battleford towed Shediac the last forty miles when the latter ran out of fuel and that Milne towed Meteor for the last five miles for the same reason merited only a foot note in the Ca na dian of fi cial his tory.51 That Scottish Heather had dropped out of the convoy to refuel the Cana dian corvette Chilliwack, in di rect con tra ven tion of Com mander in Chief, West ern Approaches’ signal of 19 Decem ber has yet to be prop erly recog - nized. The un neces sary risk to the con voy and its escorts caused by allow ing Scottish Heather to leave the main forma tion is an other charge of incom pe tence that has yet to be laid at the feet of the RCN in gen eral, and of Commander Windeyer in partic - ular. The damage done to the rep uta tion of the RCN by the de feat of Escort Group C-1 has a large logis ti cal compo nent that has com pletely escaped the no tice of naval his to ri ans. Changes in the con duct of refu el ing at sea followed the di saster of ONS-154. On 9 March 1943, Ad mi ral Horton sent a widely ad dressed message that de clared, “Allied success in meeting the heavy U-boat threat de pends largely on the ability to fuel ex pe di tiously at sea.” He was aware of the defi ciencies in equip ment and in the train ing of the oilers but could report that “all pos sible steps” were being taken

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to make im prove ments. Com mand ers of all escorts were urged to give re fuel ing oper a tions “their closest atten tion and to miss no oppor tu nity to carry out this evolu tion at sea.” Horton assured his command that the highest prior ity was being given to the manu fac ture of rubber hose and to the fitting out of oilers. 52 More support was soon lent to Western Approaches Command to solve the persis tent problem of low escort en durance. An Admi ralty signal sent on 28 March 1943 made funda men tal changes to Brit- ish or gani zation for es cort of convoy op era tions: “It has been decided that tank ers fit ted with oil ing at sea gear for service as escort oilers are to be recog nised as form - ing an inte gral part of the convoy escort system in the propor tion [of] 2 escort oilers to each escort group.”53 In order to im ple ment this de cision, the Ad mi ralty as signed the highest prior ity, over all other work, to accom plish ing four criti cal tasks: the fitting of fueling platforms or other type of oil ing-at-sea gear; the main te nance, repair, or alter ation of that gear; repairs to tankers that had been or were being fitted with gear; and the berthing and discharg ing of escort oilers. With such high-level support, escort oil ers soon became available for ser vice in all trans atlan tic con voys. The Admi ralty also signaled a ma jor change in oper at ing practices for the escort of convoys. Oilers were to be stationed well within the convoy, normally in the two columns adja cent to the convoy commo dore’s flagship, as would also be escort car- riers when they were present. To fa cili tate re fuel ing, the en tire convoy would al ter course if the planned track proved unsuit able due to condi tions of sea and swell. Even the ba sic defi ni tion of an escort group was changed: “The compo sition of an Escort Group is thus, in ef fect, the ves sels forming the Group plus two Escort Oil- ers.”54 Op er a tional lo gis tics had fi nally be come an in te grated con cept within Royal Navy convoy doctrine. An Es cort Oiler Su per vis ing Of fi cer or ga ni za tion was es tab lished, with of fices on both sides of the Atlan tic. The staff assign ed to the escort oiler of fices were tasked to provide detailed infor ma tion for every con voy at least six days be fore depar ture: the num ber of escort oilers ready to sail; the type of equip ment fit ted; what ex pe rience of oil ing at sea the of fi cers and crews possessed; and whether time would per mit any of the tank ers’ proceed ing to Moville, Ireland, to ex change practi cal instruc tion be fore sail ing.55 Re cords were kept on oiler and es cort perfor mance, and at tempts were made to re solve dif fi culties. Ob serva tions from op era tions were soon be ing used as the ba sis for im ple ment ing im prove ments to pro ce dures and equip ment. By mid-April 1943, escort-oiler numbers had increased substan tially. Exclud ing Royal Fleet Auxil ia ries, which were gener ally regarded as worthless for convoy service, eighty escort oilers were available for oper a tions and an other twelve were fitting out. Thirteen tank ers had been inspected and judged suitable for fitting out when they became available, while another three had yet to be inspected. 56 Still, and de spite the firm di rec tion pro vided ear lier by Ad mi ral Hor ton, Brit ish-con trolled

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tankers tended not to be fitted with the canvas-hose system. Moreover, the Royal Navy held firm to the belief that alongside refu el ing could not be conducted in rough weather. “Escort Tanker Listing Number Seven” car ried the no tice “Along- side or on the quarter (Not prac tica ble for rough weather).”57 The offi cial guidance for escort oiler super vis ing offi cers said, “The means of oiling-at-sea to be fit ted when ever pos si ble is the buoyant rubber hose method with plat form and rail. This is least at the mercy of the weather and conse quently of best all-round effi ciency.”58 There were some dis sent ing opin ions. In May 1943, the com mand ing of fi cer of HMCS Arvida, Lt. D. G. King, RCNVR, one of Philip Evans’s contem po raries in the A-3 group, sent a strongly worded report enti tled “Fuelling at Sea” to the command ing of ficer of HMCS Ottawa . In it he advo cated the alongside method and describ ed the astern method as “clumsy in the ex treme, dif fi cult, and at times highly dan gerous to per son nel rigging the lines and hose.”59 By the time of this re port, the A-3 escort group had been disbanded and Arvida was a member of Es cort Group C-5. The com mand ing offi cer of Ot tawa was Cdr. Hugh F. Pullen, RCN, Se nior Of fi cer Escorts for C-5.60 Like his pro fes sional brothers, he did not attach any special signif i canc e to the unor tho dox sug gestions of Arvida’s re serv ist com mander. In the end, a wide va riety of refu el ing arrange ments were maintained. The ma - jority were varia tions of the orig inal Brit ish astern method. Incred i bly, even the old and highly unre li able British bronze-metal lic hoses were fitted into twenty-eight tank ers for use in alongside re fu eling. The ten dency of these hoses to fail un der the most mod est of pressure undoubt edly had much to do with the Royal Navy’s re luctance to fuel along side. The in stal lation of these use less hoses also rep resented a challeng e to the author ity of Admi ral Horton, who had clearly ordered the instal la - tion of Amer i can canvas hoses. {LINE-SPACE} Fail ures by Ca na dian his to ri ans and na val au thor i ties to ex am ine the im por tance of op er a tional lo gis tics have led to some ex traor di narily in ac cu rate con clu sions about what actu ally took place in Royal Cana dian Navy–U.S. Navy Atlan tic rela tions. Ad - mi ral Murray’s claim that it was he who had taught Admi rals Bristol and Brainard the system for convoy orga ni za tion and protec tion is a grotesque distor tion of the facts. More over, Admi ral King’s offer to have Ad mi ral Brainard take Murray as his deputy for a period to effect a tran sition in command and to have Brainard remain as a perma nent ad viser to Murray was almost certainly based on Ameri can concerns about Ca na dian lo gis ti cal sup port and sus tain ment de fi cien cies and not due to re luctance on King’s part to surren der control. Charges that King was “completely out of touch with the re ali ties of the situ a tion in the North West Atlan tic and blatantly ig norant of the scope of the RCN’s partic i pa tion in es cort work since Septem ber 1939” can now be rejected .61 The volume and detail of infor ma tion

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transmit ted back and forth between the two command ers of Task Force 24, Bristol and Brainard, and King reveal that both the strate gic and oper a tional levels of command in the U.S. Navy were inti mately aware of all events during the Battle of the Atlan tic and of the Ca nadian part in them. Counter charges should be laid against both Ca nadian po lit i cal and naval author i ties that they were un aware of their force-gen er a tion and lo gis ti cal-sus tain ment de fi cien cies. These short com ings, which were clearly identi fied by U.S. Navy observ ers, had direct bearing on Cana - dian tac ti cal ef fec tive ness. While Ca na dian com mand ing offi cers from Escort Group A-3 strongly advo - cated the wholesale adoption of the U.S. Navy refu el ing techniques , the cultural bias of the RCN prohib ited the rec ogni tion of what practi cal ex peri ence clearly dem on strated—that high en dur ance, good sea-keep ing char ac ter is tics, and prac tica ble lo gis ti cal sup port were es sen tial to ef fec tive sus tained na val op er a tions. The inabil ity of the Ca nadian naval staff to make its own judgments about the op era - tional im portance of refu el ing at sea without Ad mi ralty guidance is another in - struc tive insight into the intel lec tual imma tu rity of its members and their complete lack of un der stand ing about the im por tance of op er a tional lo gis tics.

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NOTES 1 Marc Milner, “RCN Par tici pa tion in the Battle of 13 Ibid., p. 65. the Atlan tic,” in RCN in Retro sp ect, 1910–1968, ed. 14 Ibid., p. 85. The longer towing distance was used to James A. Boutilier (Vancou ver: Univ. of British Co- reduce the strain on the hawser in heavy weather. lum bia Press, 1982), p. 167. 15 Royal Navy, Man ual of Sea man ship, BR 68 (London: 2 Marc Milner, North Atlan tic Run: The Royal Ca na- His Maj esty’s Sta tio nery Of fice, 1932), vol. 2, pp. dian Navy and the Battle for the Con voys (Toronto: 60–61. Univ. of Toronto Press, 1985), app. 2, pp. 290–91. 16 Ibid., p. 19. 3 Samuel E. Morison, His tory of United States Na val Oper a tions in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown, 17 E. E. Sigwart, Royal Fleet Aux il iary: Its An ces try and 1947), vol. 1, p. 108. Af fil i a tions, 1600–1968 (London: Adlard Coles, 1969), p. 19. See also Jean-Yves Béquignon, 4 Com mander, Task Unit [hereaf ter CTU] 24.1.3 to “Ravitailler à la mer,” Chasse-marée, no. 145 (Au- Com mander, Task Force [hereaf ter CTF] 24, “Fuel- gust 2001), p. 5. ing at Sea,” 5 Janu ary 1943, Heineman Papers, box 9, folder 4, U.S. Na val Histor i cal Center, Oper a- 18 Royal Navy, Man ual of Sea man ship (1932), vol. 2, p. tional Ar chives, Wash ing ton, D.C. [here af ter NHC/ 64. OA]. 19 Jak Showell, German Navy Hand book, 1939–1945 5 Morison, His tory of United States Naval Oper a tions (Phoenix Mill, U.K.: Sutton, 1999), pp. 37–39. in World War II, vol. 1, p. 337 note 42. 20 For Gonzenheim and Lothringen, Stephen W. 6 “Alumni Lookup, Classes, 1930,” s.v. “Evans,” Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939–1945 (Lon don: Her United States Naval Academy , www.usna.com/. Majesty’s Statio nery Office, 1956–61), vol. 1, pp. 542–46, table 24. 7 Godfrey H. Hayes, Days of Endeavour (Victo ria, B.C.: 1999), pp. 76, 81. 21 Sigwart, Royal Fleet Aux il iary, p. 20. 8 Ev ans received a “men tion in dispatches ” on 10 22 “Fuelling a Cor vette at Sea,” pp. 35–36. June 1944. The cita tion read, in part, “He has 23 “A Minor Oper a ti on in Mid-At lan tic,” Crowsnest 1, worked hard to develop new ideas and methods and no. 12 (Octo ber 1949), pp. 28–29. has al ways con ducted him self with cour age and 24 “Report on Trip to U.K. in Connec tion with Es cort ability in nu mer ous combats with enemy subma - Oilers,” 6 March 1944, record group [hereaf ter RG] rines.” “WW 2, ‘E,’ Evans, Philip Cabell,” Awards to 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 3, Na- the Royal Ca nadian Navy, www.rcnvr.com/. tional Archive of Can ada [hereaf ter NAC]. 9 “Fuelling a Corvette at Sea: A Little History,” RCN 25 Capt. M. F. Wilson, Admi ralty Trade Divi sion, to Monthly Re view (Janu ary 1943), pp. 31–38. Flag Of ficer New foundland, St. John’s, “Oiling at 10 Samuel E. Morison, The Two Ocean War: A Short Sea with out Use of the Steadying Line,” 17 De cem- His tory of the United States Navy in the Sec ond ber 1943, RG 24, se ries D-1-b, box 3960, file World War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 135. 1044-1-26, pt. 3, NAC. 11 Thomas Wildenberg, Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast 26 Secre tary of Naval Board to Flag Of ficer Newfound - Tank ers and Re plen ish ment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, land, “Fuel ling at Sea,” 6 June 1944, RG 24, series 1912–1995 (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In stitute Press, D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 3, NAC. 1996), pp. 30–45. 27 Commander in Chief, Cana dia n Forces, 12 Royal Navy, Man ual of Sea man ship, BR 68 (London: North-West ern Ap proaches [hereaf ter CinC CA His Majesty’s Statio nery Office, 1923), vol. 2, p. 80. NWA], to ad dress in di cat ing group [col lec tive

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ad dress; here af ter AIG], and Na val Ser vice Head- 43 CTU 24.1.3 (Heineman) to CinC WA, 20 De cember quarters [hereaf ter NSHQ], mes sage 21 2020Z Janu - 1942, Heineman Papers, box 9, folder 4, NHC/OA. ary 1944, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 44 A. Kenney, Mas ter, SS Brit ish Prog ress, to CTU 1044-1-26, pt. 3, NAC. 24.1.3 (Heineman), “Report on Fuelling Es cort Ves- 28 Admi ralty to CinC CA NWA and NSHQ, message sels,” 14 Decem ber 1942, Heineman Papers, box 9, 23 1551A Jan u ary 1944, RG 24, series D-1-b, box folder 3, NHC/OA. 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 3, NAC. 45 Com mand ing Of fi cer, HMS Wanderer, Lt. Cdr. D. 29 Com mand ing Of fi cer, HMCS Sackville to Cap tain H. P. Gar diner, RN, to Cap tain (D) New found land, “D” St. John’s, 4 Febru ary 1944, RG 24, series Re port of Proceed ings, 16 Decem ber 1942, RG 24, D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 3, NAC. series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC. 30 “Fuel ling a Cor vette at Sea,” p. 37. 46 Captain for Destroy ers [hereaf ter Captain D] New- 31 Com mand ing Of fi cer, HMCS Trillium, “Notes on found land, Capt. H. T. Grant, memo ran dum to Fuelling a Cor vette at Sea,” 16 No vem ber 1942, RG Secre tary of Naval Board, 20 Decem ber 1942, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, vol. 1, NAC. NAC. 32 David Zimmerman, The Great Na val Battle of Ot- 47 CinC WA to Commander Liver pool, Cap tains D tawa (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1989), p. and all escorts, message 22 1235A Decem ber 1942, 82. Heineman Papers, box 9, folder 3, NHC/OA. 33 Secre tary of Naval Board Ottawa to Secre tary of Ad - 48 CTU 24.1.3 to Chief of Staff, CTF 24, 16 Janu ary miralty , “Oiling Escort Vessels at Sea from Tank - 1943, RG 80, Heineman Papers, box 9, folder 4, ers,” 26 August 1942, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, NHC/OA. file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC. 49 A transcrip t of Heineman’s letter of 16 Janu ary 1943 34 CTF 24 to Com mander-in-chief, COAC [here af ter is avail able from the author upon request. Cominch, COAC]; COAC, Western Approac hes 50 Milner, North Atlan tic Run, p. 210. [hereaf ter CinC WA]; and COAC, U.S. Fleet [here - 51 W. A. B. Douglas et al., No Higher Purpose: The Of fi - af ter Cominch], message 09 1745Z Septem ber 1942, cial Op era tional History of the Royal Ca nadian Navy RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, in the Sec ond World War, 1939–1943 (St. Catha rines, NAC. Ont.: Vanwell, 2002), vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 575 note 219. 35 Cominch to Admi ralty, NSHQ; British Admi ralty 52 CinC WA to AIG 32, message 09 1045A March Del e ga tion [here af ter BAD]; COAC; FONF; and 1943, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, CinC WA, mes sage 11 2106Z Sep tem ber 1942, RG pt. 1, NAC. 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC. 53 Admi ralty to CinC CA NWA, mes sage, 7 June 1943, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, 36 NSHQ to Admi ralty, message 07 1525A Octo ber NAC. 1942, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC. 54 “Notes for Escort Oiler Super vis ing Offi cers, New York and Hali fax: Duties and Respon si bil i ties,” 37 Admi ralty to NSHQ, message 21 2301A Octo ber mem o ran dum, 22 May 1943, RG 24, series D-1-b, 1942, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC [empha sis pt. 1, NAC. origi nal]. 38 Admi ralty to Secre tary Naval Board Ot tawa, BAD, 55 Ibid. BATM Ottawa [here after BATM Ot tawa], and HC [hereaf ter HC] for Cana dian Deputy of Stores New 56 Admi ralty Naval Store Depart ment, tele gram to Ad- York, 29 Octo ber 1942, RG 24, se ries D-1-b, box miralty, 12 April 1943, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC. 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC. 39 Ad miralty to Secre tary Naval Board Ot tawa, BAD, 57 “Es cort Tanker Listing Num ber Seven,” memo ran - BATM Ot tawa, and HC for Ca na dian Deputy of dum, 10 May 1943, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3959, Stores New York, “Guidance of Mas ters of Com- file NSS 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC. mercia l Tankers Employed on Escort Fuelling Ser- 58 “Notes for Escort Oiler Super vis ing Offi cers, New vice in the Use of Buoyant Rubber Oil Hose by York and Hal ifax.” Boom Method,” 29 Octo ber 1942, RG 24, series 59 Com mand ing Of fi cer, HMCS Arvida to Command - D-1-b, box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC. ing Of fi cer, HMCS Ot tawa, “Fuelling at Sea,” 16 40 Ad mi ralty to CinC WA, NSHQ Ot tawa, et al., mes - May 1943, RG 24, series D-1-b, box 3960, file sage 06 1712A No vem ber 1942, RG 24, se ries D-1-b, 1044-1-26, pt. 2, NAC. box 3960, file 1044-1-26, pt. 1, NAC. 60 Ken Macpherson and John Burgess, The Ships of 41 No copies of this manual have survived. None could Canada’ s Naval Forces 1910–1993 (St. Catha rines, be located in either Brit ish or Cana dian public or Ont.: Vanwell, 1994), pp. 28, 231. mil i tary ar chives. 61 Wilfred G. D. Lund, “The Royal Cana dia n Navy’s 42 Admi ralty to Commander, Na val Forces Europe, Quest for Auton omy in the North West Atlan tic,” message 21 1319 No vem ber 1942, Heineman Pa- in RCN in Retro sp ect, 1910–1968, ed. Boutilier, pp. pers, box 9, folder 4, NHC/OA. 154–56.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:13 AM X See Fido Run A Tale of the First Anti-U-boat Acous tic Tor pedo

KATHLEEN BROOME WIL LIAMS

y March 1943 the Battle of the At lantic had reached a cri sis. That month, Ger - man U-boats sank 108 ships, coming close to forcing Brit ain out of World BWar II. In re sponse to the es calat ing threat a new weapon was rushed into action. Fido—an Amer i can-cre ated, air-launched, an ti sub ma rine, acous tic-hom ing tor pedo, and the first of its kind—was let loose against the U-boats. To pre serve its se - cret Fido was offi cially called the “Mark 24 mine.” Eventu ally it had sev eral other code names, incl ud ing the “six-hundr ed-pound depth charge” and “Proc tor,” while some of its us ers called it “Wan der ing Annie ” or “Zombie. ”1 Although later deployed in the Pa cific against Japa nese subma rines and in the Ca ribbean Sea and Indian Ocean, Fido is quintessentially an At lantic story. No mir- a cle weapon, tech no log i cal de vice, in tel li gence break through, in dus trial pro duc tivity, or even reso lute war riors won the Atlan tic campaign for the Allies. It took the combined weight of them all to de feat German ad mi ral Karl Dönitz’s skilled submariners, and Fido played an im por tant part at a crit i cal time. How did this new weapon move—remark ably fast—from concept to effec tive oper a tional use? The answer revolves around Allie d coop er a tion, from top deci sion makers to ground techni cians . While many ac counts of the Bat tle of the Atlan tic note Fido’s use in ac tion, none has ex am ined the me chan ics of day-to-day co op era - tion required to get it there.2 The Fido saga demon strates that co op era tion depended on in no va tion, im pro vi sa tion, flex i bil ity, and com pro mise—across na tional bor ders and at mi cro as well as macro lev els—among sci en tists, in dus try, civil ian lead ers, and the mil i tary, pre figur ing the sorts of re la tion ships so soon re - quired by NATO oper a tions. 3 Cre ation For fif teen years scien tists at the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport, Rhode Island, had churned out re ports claiming that an acous tic-hom ing torpedo was the o ret i - cally impos si ble, since torpe does made too much noise themselves to be able to home on any ex ter nal noise source.4 Yet Capt. Louis McKeehan, a naval reserve offi cer whose peacetime job was di rector of the phys ics labo rato ries at Yale, was not

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constrained by the received wis dom of navy engi neers. In Novem ber 1941 he asked scien tists at HUSL, the Harvard Under wa ter Sound Lab, whether an acoustic torpedo was feasi ble. 5 In just over one year, phys icist Harvey Brooks and his team at HUSL, working closely with en gineers at the Bell Tele phone Labs, proved that it was. They de signed a small, slow-speed elec tric tor pedo that was quiet enough to per mit acous tic con trol. Its speed was too slow to use against en emy war ships but suffi cient to over take the fast est submerged subma rine. Small size also meant the torpedo could be launched from an aircraf t instead of a destroyer or another sub ma rine.6 The tor pedo was en dowed with ca nine at tributes, the var i ous parts re ferred to as Fido’s “head,” “body,” and “tail.” Fido was steered by connect ing rudders in his tail to four hydrophones mounted near his nose, shielded to prevent him from chasing his own tail. The hydrophones were arrang ed for up/down and right/left direc tional control and, like a dog’s ears, were very sensi tive. Be fore launch ing, the rud ders were tested by scratching Fido gently on the head near one of the hydrophones. When working prop erly the rudders re sponded by steering toward the scratching. 7 Unlike later, ac tive (so nar pinging) tor pe does, Fido was pas sive. He lis tened, he chased, he bit, but he did not bark.8 By May 1943, only seven teen months af ter the begin ning of the pro ject, Fido had en tered service and made his first kill.9 As Brooks recalled years later, the team that cre ated Fido in cluded “musi cians who had fiddled around with hi-fi in their spare time, bankers who were ham radio op era tors and min isters who had majored in phys ics in college .”10 Another HUSL mem ber called the Fido group “electronicers, acousticians and screw balls.”11 Most were young, many of them grad uate stu dents. They worked twelve-hour days, six or seven days a week, thriving on inno va tion and exper i ment. To empha size the ur- gency of their task, workers at HUSL were greeted each morning by a board bearing the tonnage of shipping lost to U-boats over the previ ous twenty-four hours.12 Warned by reports of defi cien cies in conven tional torpe does that were filter ing back from the Pacific , the “Fido Gang” planned a stren uous set of trials for its prog - eny. First, run ning tests and prelim i nary steer ing tri als were con ducted from row- boats. Later, the Na val Air Station at Squantum near Quincy, Massa chu setts, provided aircraf t, PBY Catalina patrol planes, for trials leading to the devel op ment of success ful methods of dropping the tor pedoes from the air.13 There were many gaffes and bloopers, though, as Fido was put through his paces, due in part to lack of ex pe ri ence in con duct ing tri als. For in stance, the sec ond tor pedo body tested was lost when it struck the tar get boat during an acoustic attack. Later, one of the preproduction models being tested in an inland lake made a success ful attack on a target but “in circling for a re-attack ran up a bank and nearly climbed a tree.”14 The torpedo suffered no damage, so it was run a second time, but just as it was launched

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in the vicin ity of the ar tifi cial target a real tar get showed up in the form of a small motor boat. The tor pedo chased the motor boat for almost a mile, running perfectl y success fully until, fortu nately, the lake be came so shallow that the torpedo sim ply nosed into the mud. When air tests of Fido be gan, one of the first tri als of the torpedo’s air sta biliz ers was a fiasco. Two of the stabi lizer surfaces tore off as soon as the torpedo dropped from the PBY. As a result the body turned end over end, landed in the wa ter tail first, broke up, and sank.15 Another day the torpedo release mecha nism in the aircraft failed to work. With the bomb bay open, two HUSL mem bers strug gled to free the stuck torpedo while the bomber pilot circled down town Boston await ing in- structions. On yet another occa sion an HUSL member was driving a truck car rying Fido to load him into the bomb bay when he rammed the tail struc ture of the aircraft, doing so much damage that test ing had to be postponed for several days.16 The fin ished torpedo mea sured nine teen inches in di am e ter and was eighty-four inches long. It was propelled by an electric motor and could run at twelve knots for fifteen minutes. Fido weighed in at seven hundred pounds and carried ninety-two pounds of high-explo sive Torpex.17 HUSL’s suc cess in dem on strat ing an ex per i - mental device rela tively simply made in its own workshop persuaded the navy to au tho rize im me di ate pro duc tion.18 The tac ti cal doc trine for us ing Fido was sim ple. When a sur faced U-boat dived, a torpedo bomber, slowing its air speed to around 125 knots, dropped Fido slightly ahead of the U-boat’s swirl from an al ti tude of some two hun dred feet.19 Once in the water, Fido circled at full speed under hydro static control (that is, oper at ing at a depth controlle d by water pres sure) until he picked up propel ler noises from a submarine. At that point, control switched from hy drostatic to acous ti cal homing, and Fido steered toward the target un til he came into contact, at which point—as Harvey Brooks expresse d it—Fido “was supposed to explode and fa tally cripple the target.” However, if Fido overshot on his first approach and lost the sig nal al to - gether, he searched in a circle until he picked it up again and renewed his ap proach. Under ideal condi tions he could detect propel ler noises at a max imum range of about 1.4 ki lome ters. In the absence of an acoustic signal, Fido circled until his bat - tery ran down and he sank.20 Ne go ti a tion By the time Fido came along the Allies had already set up channels of commu ni ca - tion, es tab lished pat terns of con sulta tion, and be gun an exten sive ex change of scien - tific and tech ni cal infor ma tion. In Lon don, Prime Min is ter Winston Churchill chaired weekly meetings of the Anti-U-boat Warfare Commit tee, meet ings that were at tended by Averell Harriman, Pres i dent Frank lin Roo se velt’s spe cial rep re sen ta tive for war aid, and Adm. Har old “Betty” Stark, commander of U.S. Naval Forces,

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Eu rope.21 Churchill also invited Maj. Gen. Ira Eaker to “give us the advan tage of your knowledge of the work done by the squadrons of the 8th U.S. Air Force oper at - ing in the U-Boat war.”22 Co oper a tion among the major Allied forces was a criti cal factor in the defeat of the U-boats, but coop er a tion was never easy and Fido required some times prob lem atic interservice, as well as in ter na tional, co op er a tion.23 Word of Fido first reached the Admi ralty in London in De cember 1942 from the Brit ish Ad mi ralty Del e ga tion (BAD) in Wash ing ton, D.C., the Ad mi ralty’s li ai son with the U.S. Navy.24 Soon, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was involved too.25 By Feb ru - ary 1943, Fido was in full produc tion in the United States, with one thou sand weap - ons ex pected to be ready by 1 May.26 The British had still not received full details of Fido’s di mensions and per formance, but, hav ing been at war for over three years, they prepared for its arrival with practiced speed.27 Noting that Fido might “have a deci sive ef fect on the course of the war,” the Admi ralty informe d the RAF that a res - o lu tion of po ten tial dif fi cul ties was of the “ut most im por tance.”28 The two agreed to create an interservice panel to deal with all aspects of Fido, includ ing supply, mainte nance, train ing, and op er a tion.29 Two days af ter its creation, the panel de cided that Coastal Command would assign Fidos initially to Aldergrove RAF Station in Northern Ireland and to Reykjavík, Iceland. Eventu ally, Fidos would be de ployed also from many air fields in Eng land, and depots were estab lished to supply them to na val forces afloat. With out hav ing seen a sin gle weapon, Air Marshal Sir John “Jack” Slessor, head of Coastal Command, be lieved he could be ready to oper ate with Fidos within one or two weeks of receiv ing them.30 While the U.S. Navy De- partment controlle d the supply and transpor ta tion of the torpe does, it agreed that the Admi ralty would de termine the lo cation of the stations in the United King dom to re ceive them and whether the torpedoes would be used for shore-based or ship - borne op er a tions.31 From Febru ary 1943, encrypted cable messages about Fido flowed almost daily between BAD in Washing ton and the Admi ralty and Air Minis try in London, con - tin u ing unabated un til the end of the war in Europe. Nev erthe less, there were still differ ences to over come. The British looked forward to using Fido against the Ger - mans, while, pre dict ably, the first in clina tion of the Amer i can Chief of Na val Op er- a tions, Adm. Er nest King, was to use Fido against the Jap a nese.32 Ul ti mately, the sit u a tion in the At lan tic proved de ci sive. By March, Ad mi ral Dönitz had more U-boats at his disposal than ever be fore, and several convoys were severely mauled as they fought their way across the ocean.33 Soon, BAD received word that the Mark 24 would be used first against the U-boats, the available weapons divided among Newfound land, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. 34 Fi nally, on 6 May 1943, Fido was let loose.35 Af ter less than two weeks in ac tion Jack Slessor wrote that “the Mark XXIV mine looks very promis ing. ”36

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Close coop er a tion over Fido contin ued to the end of the war. There were regu lar meetings at Coastal Command headquar ters in Liver pool between U.S. Navy rep- resen ta tives and those in Coastal Command respon si ble for Fido to iron out any problems that arose and to keep abreast of new devel op ments and improve ments in the weapon and its use.37 Tacti cal Employ ment In the hands of the Allies, Fido proved his worth. His first suc cess was on 12 May, when an Aldergrove Liber a tor (a B-24 heavy bomber) from RAF No. 86 Squadron sank U-456. An Ameri can, Iceland-based Catalina of Patrol Squadron (VP) 84 sank U-640 two days later. Soon, too, Brit ish and Amer i can escort carri ers were launching Fido attacks on U-boats.38 On 11 August an Avenger torpedo bomber from the es cort carrier USS Card (CVE 111), on a rou tine sub ma rine search north of the Azores, spot ted a sur faced U-boat and exe cuted a text book Fido at tack. An F4F-4 Wildcat—a fighter ac compa nying the bomber—went in for a strafing run, followed imme di ately by the Avenger, which dropped two depth charges, forc ing the U-boat to crash-dive. Thirty seconds af ter the U-boat’s dis ap pearance, the Avenger released a Mark 24 mine. The pilot of the fighter “watched the mine hit the water about 20 feet to star - board and just ahead of the in distinct swirl left by the sub” and then saw the mine travel un derwa ter and swing around toward the sub, striking it on the starboard side about half way between the con ning tower and the stern. Ten seconds later a large under wa ter ex plo sion threw a geyser of water high into the air about 150 feet ahead of the spot where the U-boat had last been seen. Oil im me di ately came up in the cen ter of the ex plo sion area, even tu ally forming a crescent-shaped slick five to six hun dred feet long.39 The aircraft from Card, us ing Fido, had sunk U-525.40 Land-based aircraft accom plished sim i lar feats. Dur ing the war more than four hun dred airfields were built in the United Kingdom, and air craft car ry ing Fido flew from a number of them. RAF Sta tion Dunkeswell, in Devon on the south coast of Eng land, be came an im por tant base for an ti sub ma rine Fido-de ploy ing squad rons tasked with patrol ling the Bay of Biscay, gateway to the Atlan tic oper at ing ar eas for three of ev ery four Ger man and Italian subma rines. Since most squadrons flying from Dunkeswell were Ameri can, the station rep resents a unique picture of Allied co op er a tion.41 In June, some six weeks af ter Fido’s first suc cess, Group Cap tain E. C. Kidd, RAF, arrived at Dunkeswell to pre pare the site as quickly as possi ble to oper - ate sev eral U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) squad rons. Initially, the sta tion—still in a rudi mentary state—was to function as a normal RAF Coastal Command sta tion. Fly ing con trol, op er a tional con trol, ad min is tra tion, and an ti air craft de fense, as well as the spe cial arrange ments required for the accom mo da tion of the Mark 24 mine, were to be provided from British sources.42

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“Some US Liber a tors [of the 479th Anti subma rine Group] from Gander [in Newfound land] have already ar rived UK,” Slessor wrote to the head of the U.S. Tenth Fleet, on 28 June. “They will need a lit tle accli ma ti zation and work ing up in Coastal Command proce dure and none of their mainte nance person nel will arrive for some time but hope they will soon be work ing in the Bay [of Biscay].” The 479th Group was under the U.S. Eighth Air Force for admin is tra tive purposes but came under the oper a tional con trol of Coastal Command. 43 “Find the new patrol ar - rangements in the Bay work ing well,” Slessor con tin ued. He noted that he would be certain of suc cess if Coastal Com mand could in crease air strength in the bay and— in addi tion to other improve ments suggest ed by the Admi ralty —if the new group could use the Mark 24 mine.44 “Whether the U-boats re turn to the North Atlan tic . . . or go for inde pend ent shipping all over the At lantic,” Slessor concluded, “the Bay still remains the first place to get at them.” Over the next two months the station at Dunkeswell was hastily thrown together . Con struc tion crews ar rived to build nec es sary struc tures, in clud ing spe cial re in forced storage ar eas for Fidos, and RAF per sonnel came from all over to fill them.45 Living quarters—cold and perpet ually clammy Nissen huts—were in a “rather damp valley” away from the airfield it self, adding to the general misery of the loca tion. 46 On 29 July the ground eche lons of the 479th’s 4th and 19th Squad rons arrived, followed shortly by their aircrews. They had received train ing and some practice with the new Mark 24 mines, and on 7 Au gust they be gan op era tional sor ties from Dunkeswell.47 The weather was “cloudy with driz zle,” for which Dunkeswell be came no to rious. 48 Soon they were joined by two more U.S. Army squad rons, also fly ing Liber a tors on exhaustingly long patrols over the Bay of Biscay.49 Less than four weeks later Group Captain Kidd noted, with commend able under state ment, that the smooth ad min is tra tion and effi ciency of the squad rons had been “somewhat ham pered” by the deci sion to move out the army units and substi - tute U.S. Navy units at the end of the month. “Loads of equipment” that had just been uncrated would have to be recrated, and al though Kidd maintained that plans for the sta tion were still pro ceed ing on track, “in ev i ta bly,” he confessed, “en thu si - asm has been damped.”50 The change from army to navy was not just local. In July, Admi ral King and army chief of staff George Mar shall had agreed that the navy would take over all anti subma rine air activ ity. As the USAAF withdrew from the anti subma rine war it was replaced by U.S. Navy units.51 Kidd had the impres sion that “the US Navy will dif fer consid erably” from the army. “There fore,” he ended on a truly dip lomatic note, “the Sta tion Head quarters staff is now mainly concerned with deal ing with the needs of the US Navy.”52 In a June 2009 arti cle, a profes sor of strat egy at the Na val War Col lege noted, “The side able to cope with—or, better yet, get ahead of—per pet ual change holds the advan tage over a less adaptive foe.”53 Dunkeswell tested every one’s adapt ability.

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Just one month af ter ar riv ing, the USAAF 6th Squad ron was trans ferred, and two days later advanced ele ments of the first U.S. Navy squadron, Bombing Squadron (VB) 103, took up res i dence. Together with VB-105 and VB-110, which had arrived in “dribs and drabs” at Dunkeswell by the end of Octo ber, the three squad rons were part of Fleet Air Wing 7 of the U.S. Twelfth Fleet, headquar tered in nearby Plym- outh. In an ef fort to en sure smooth rela tions with the squardons’ British hosts, the air wing appointed a liai son offi cer to Coastal Command headquar ters. 54 In Novem ber, Kidd noted that the only thing worth record ing was the final de- parture of the USAAF and the begin ning of efforts to reor ga nize the station “to suit the needs of the US Navy.” The op era tional role of the sta tion con tin ued with out inter rup tion amid the confu sion. Liber a tors (the navy desig nated them PB4Y-1s) contin ued to rack up long patrol hours over the bay, inter spersed with spo radic U-boat sightings and Fido attacks as well as air combat against Ger man fighters and bombers .55 In March 1944, the U.S. Navy assumed command of Dunkeswell from the RAF, mak ing it a U.S. Naval Air Facil ity, the only one in the Eu ropean The ater of Oper a - tions.56 By then there had al ready been exer cises to “indoc tri nate” U.S. Navy forces in the use of var i ous RAF sys tems, and a civil engi neer from Coastal Com mand vis - ited to see what works were needed to meet Amer i can require ments.57 A year later, and after Ameri can planes had main tained a con tin u ous, gruel ing schedule of air pa trols from Dunkeswell, the enemy’s sit u a tion on the con ti nent had be come criti cal, and Coastal Com mand called for extreme vigi lance from its squad rons.58 On 25 April 1945, U-326 was de stroyed off the Brest Pen in sula by a Mark 24 mine from VPB-103 in the last Fido kill from Dunkeswell. The crew sighted smoke from a snor kel (schnorkel, which allowed U-boats to oper ate their die sels and recharge batter ies submerged) and a wake at a distance of about two miles and on approach ing could clearly see the snor kel, which looked like an en- larged periscope. The Liber a tor dropped two mines just ahead of the U-boat from a height of two hun dred feet while mak ing 132 knots. On enter ing the wa ter both mines were seen to track straight to the target without “porpoising.” The U-boat exploded, fol lowing which a large, green oil slick appeared. A man, appar ently dead, was floating on his back in a prone posi tion wear ing a yellow Mae West.59 {LINE-SPACE} Overall, Fido’s success in the At lantic was im pres sive. By one count, based on Op era - tions Evalu a tion Group study 289 in 1946, Fidos were dropped in 204 at tacks against subma rines. Ameri can aircraft made 142 of these attacks, sinking thirty-one subma - rines (22 percent of attacks) and damaged fifteen (11 percent). In the remain ing sixty-two at tacks other Allies, predom i nantly British, sank six subma rines (10 percent) and damaged three (5 percent). Most of the subma rines sunk were Ger man U-boats in the Atlan tic, although five Japa nese subs were also sunk by Fidos, one in

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the At lantic and four in the Pa cific. The thirty-seven sub ma rines sunk by Fidos repre - sent about 15 per cent of all sub ma rines sunk by air escort or air anti subma rine warfare op era tions be tween May 1943 and the end of the war.60 Be tween Oc to ber 1943 and April 1945 Dunkeswell Lib era tors con tributed to that record with thirty-four Fido at tacks, re sult ing in seven U-boats sunk (21 per cent of the at tacks) and possi - ble damage to an other eleven (32 per cent), a respect able record. 61 A history of the Tenth Fleet noted that Fido, in conjunc tion with ahead-throw ing weapons like Hedgehog and new depth charges, had “raised the proba bil ity of a ‘kill,’ once a U-boat had been located, to an amount which, although falling short of certainty, was an as surance of success.” 62 Ef fec tive co op er a tion among the Royal Air Force, the U.S. Army Air Forces, and the U.S. Navy en sured that Dunkeswell played an im por tant part in this success. After spring 1943 more than five thou sand Amer- i cans served at the air field, fly ing over 6,460 mis sions at a cost of some forty planes and 183 na val airmen killed in action. The Amer i cans left Dunkeswell soon af ter VE Day, and the air field reverted to the RAF.63 After the war, the scien tists at Bell Labs who had worked on Fido returned to telephone work, Captain McKeehan returned to Yale, and Harvard took back its build ings and ended its clas si fied work. The rapid and success ful creation of Fido, however, had demon strated the strengths enjoyed by civil ian researc h labs and their unex pec ted poten tial for apply ing basic resear ch to the devel op ment of naval technol ogy. The navy rec ognized this. At its urg ing, in 1946 Con gress created the Office of Na val Research to fund inno va tive re search at univer si ties across the country. The Cold War en sured that this fed eral fund ing would for ever change the sci en tific land scape and so lid ify the new con nection forged among sci ence, indus try, and the mil i tary. The les sons of war time co op er a tion, ex em pli fied in the cre ation and use of Fido, smoothed the way for the close and ef fective in ter na tional de fense part ner- ship that would charac ter ize NATO.64

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NOTES Not long be fore his untimely death, David Syrett, na - (Fido), box 334, RG 181, NARA-NE [here after val histo rian, teacher, men tor, and friend, sug gested “Com pletion Report on No-94 (Fido)”]. that Fido should be my next project. As ever, I owe 6 “Final Re port,” chap. 2, p. 4, file Histor i cal Mate rial, David so much. My thanks are also due to Jock box 319, RG 181, NARA-NE. Torpedo ex pert Tom Gardner, Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, Randy Pelick writes that Fido’s small ex plo sive power was Papadopoulos, Michael Whitby, Joe Fitzharris, and suffi cient to disable a subma rine, forcing it to the Eu gene Feit for comments, infor ma tion, and ad vice surface, where it could be finished off by other air or on this pro ject. sur face forces. Fido, he main tained, “was de signed 1 The Germans began work ing on an acous tic- as a mis sion kill tor pedo ver sus a di rect tor pedo hom ing torpedo in 1935, but it was a U-boat- kill.” See Tom Pelick, “Fido: The First U.S. Homing launched antiescort weapon; early versions were in - Tor pedo,” Sub ma rine Re view (Janu ary 1996), p. 68. effec tive until the T-5 Zaunkönig, which had its first 7 “Com ple tion Re port on No-94 (Fido),” p. 99. confirmed hit in Octo ber 1943. When it was proposed to re fer to the Mark 24, in some cases, as 8 Fido Steering Report, intro duc tion, 27 Febru ary Proctor, one sensi b le corre sp ondent—prob a bly 1942, file H-55, box 330, RG 181, NARA-NE. The tired of Fido’s many names—sug gested “that we call first ac tive hom ing torpedo, the Mark 32, would the beast Proctor in all cases or not at all.” Hand - come later. written note, 4 Au gust 1944, AIR 15/564, The Na - 9 For the roles of Bell Labo rato ries and Western Elec- tional Archives, Kew, Surrey, United Kingdom tric, see M. D. Fagen, ed., A His tory of En gi neer ing [hereaf ter TNA]. The au thor’s name is and Science in the Bell System: National Service in unde ci pher a ble. War and Peace (1925–1975) (n.p.: Bell Tele phone 2 See, for exam ple, Peter Padfield, War benea th the Labo ra to ries , 1978), pp. 187–201. Sea (New York: Wiley, 1995), p. 367; Clay Blair, 10 Harvey Brooks, “Col league’s Viewpoint of F. V. Hitler’s U-boat War: The Hunted, 1942–1945 (New Hunt,” part 1, Jour nal of the Acous ti cal So ci ety of York: Random House, 1998), pp. 27, 251, 328, 395– America 57, no. 6 (June 1975), p. 1247. 97, 467, 557; Kenneth Poolman, The Winning Edge: 11 “Harvard Under wa ter Sound Labo ra tory, 1941– Tech nol ogy in Ac tion, 1939–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: 1946,” p. 37, unpub lished reunion report, 9–10 Oc - Na val In stitute Press, 1997), pp. 85, 88; Dan Van tober 1993, Cambrid ge, Mass., cour tesy Harvey der Vat, The Atlan tic Cam paign: World War II’s Brooks. Great Strug gle at Sea (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), pp. 350, 366; John Terraine, The U-boat 12 “Notes on Lec tures Given by Dr. Boner for the Ben- Wars, 1914–1945 (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1989), efit of New Research Men and Techni cians,” p. 4, 2 pp. 618–19; and Alfred Price, Air craft ver sus Sub ma - Septem ber 1943, file Histor i cal Mate rial, box 319, rine (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In stitute Press, 1973), RG 181, NARA-NE; Harvey Brooks, “Auton o mous pp. 107, 130–35, 141, 146, 159, 171, 178, 222, 224. Science and Socially Respon sive Science: A Search for Res o lu tion,” Annual Reviews 26 (2001), p. 31; 3 For an excel lent overview of wartime coop er a tion “Harvard Under wa ter Sound Labo ra tory, 1941– see Mark A. Stoler, Allies in War: Britain and Amer- 1946,” p. 34; Harvey Brooks, inter view by author, ica against the Axis Powers (Lon don: Hodder and Cam bridge, Mass., Janu ary 2004; Brooks, “Col - Arnold, 2005). league’s Viewpoint of F. V. Hunt,” pp. 1246–47. 4 “Final Re port: Applied Acoustics in Subsurface 13 F. V. Hunt to Fido Gang, 15 Decem ber 1942, file War fare,” p. 11, 31 Janu ary 1946, file Final Re port: Histor i cal Mate rial, box 319, RG 181, NARA-NE. Applied Acous tics in Subsurface Warfare, box 334, Re cord Group [hereaf ter RG] 181, National Ar- 14 “Com pletion Report on No-94 (Fido),” p. 7. chives and Re cords Ad min is tra tion [here af ter 15 Ibid., p. 6. NARA] North east Region Waltham, Mass. [hereaf - 16 “Harvard Under wa ter Sound Labo ra tory, 1941– ter NARA-NE]. 1946,” pp. 38–39. 5 “Com pletion Report on No-94 (Fido) an Air- 17 “Glossary of Torpe does,” memo ran dum, 22 Febru - launched Acoustic Anti sub ma rine Mine,” p. v, 1 ary 1944, p. 4, file Extra Copies of Index to HUSL Jan u ary 1946, file Com pletion Report on No. 94 Exter nal Re ports, box 379, RG 181, NARA-NE;

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Fagen, ed., History of Engi neering and Science in the 28 Admi ralty to Under Sec re tary of State, Air Min istry, Bell Sys tem, p. 189. Conven tional torpe does carried 8 March 1943, AIR 20/1101, Trials 12/42–9/43, payloads of about five hun dred pounds. TNA. 18 “History of the Anti-subma rine Measures Divi sion 29 “Re port No.1 Mark XXIV USA Mine,” 15 March of Tenth Fleet,” p. 19, file History of A/S Measures 1943, AIR 20/1101, Trials 12/42–9/43, TNA; “Min- Divi sion, box 437, RG 38, NARA, Col lege Park, Md. utes of Meeting Held at Admi ralty, 16 March 1943, [hereaf t er NARA2]; “Comple tion Report on No-94 Subject: forma tion of an inter-service panel to deal (Fido),” p. 7. with the in tro duction of the Mark XXIV mine into 19 See, for exam ple, “Report of Anti sub ma ri ne Action service,” AIR 20/1101, Trials 12/42–9/43, TNA. by Air craft,” 11 Au gust 1943, file A/S Oper ations by 30 Notes of meeting held at Admi ralty, 18 March 1943, US Escort Carri ers (CVE), War His tory, case 8853, AIR 20/1101, Tri als 12/42–9/43, TNA; BAD to Ad- M.055386/43, 1943, ADM 199/1408, TNA. miralty, 21 March 1943, Part I Proctor, case 163, p. 20 “Data Sheet to Accom pany ‘Record of In ven tion’ for 16, ADM 199/2404, TNA; BAD to Admi ralty, 26 Case 5,” p. 2, file In ven tion Descrip tion No. 5, box March 1943, Part I Proctor, case 163, p. 24, ADM 328A, RG 181, NARA-NE; Coastal Com mand 199/2404, TNA; AOC RAF Iceland to Headquar ters Headquar te rs, “General Instruc ti ons for the Oper a - Coastal Com mand [hereaf ter HQCC], 16 August tion of the Mark 24 Mine,” pp. 2–4, AIR 15/562, 1943, AIR 15/562, TNA. TNA; “Pro posal for Fido Project,” p. 12, file H-40, 31 Com mander in Chief, U.S. Fleet [hereaf ter box 30, RG 181, NARA-NE; DTM [here after DTM] Cominch] to BAD, 25 April 1943, file S-1943, box 3, to Com mander in Chief, Medi ter ra nean, 21 March RG 38, NARA2. 1944, Part I Proc tor: Policy Signals Cov er ing Period 32 BAD to Admi ralty, 28 Febru ary 1943, Part I Proctor, Febru ary 1943–July 1945, War History “X,” Direc - case 163, p. 2, ADM 199/2404, TNA; D.A./S.W. to tor of Tor pedo, Anti-Subma rine, and Mine Warfare BAD, 6 March 1943, Part I Proctor, case 163, p. 6, Divi sion Domes tic Records, 1943–45, case 163, p. 2, ADM 199/2404, TNA. ADM 199/2404, TNA; for Harvey Brooks quote see Brooks, “Auton o mous Science and Soci ally Respon - 33 Padfield, War be neath the Sea, p. 314. sive Science,” p. 32. 34 Cominch to Vice Chief of Naval Oper a tions, 13 May 21 On the Anti-U-boat Warfare Com mittee see W. J. 1943, file S-1943, box 3, RG 38, NARA2; BAD to R. Gardner, “An Allied Perspec tive,” in The Bat tle of Admi ralty, repeated Air Minis try, 17 March 1943, the Atlan tic 1939–1945: The 50th Anni ver sar y In ter- Part I Proctor, case 163, p. 10, ADM 199/2404, na tional Na val Con fer ence, ed. Stephen Howarth TNA. and Derek Law (Annapolis, Md.: Naval In stitute 35 BAD to Admi ralty, 6 May 1943, Part I Proc tor, case Press, 1994), pp. 516–37. 163, p. 48, ADM 199/2404, TNA. 22 Portal to Prime Minis ter, 21 July 1943, AIR 20/848, 36 Slessor to Portal, 18 May 1943, AIR 20/848, Anti-U-Boat Warfare: Anglo-Amer i can Coop er a - Anti-U-Boat Warfare: Anglo-Amer i can Coop er a - tion, TNA; Chur chill to Eaker, 23 July 1943, AIR 20/ tion, TNA. 848, Anti-U-Boat Warfare: Anglo-Amer i can Coop - 37 AOC RAF Iceland to HQCC, 16 August 1943, AIR era tion, TNA. 15/562, TNA; Notes on meet ing held at HQCC, 13 23 For an overview see Philip Lundeberg, “Allied Co- Au gust 1943, AIR 15/562, TNA; Com manding op er a tion,” in Battle of the Atlan tic, ed. Howarth Officer, Fleet Air Wing 7 to Chief, Bureau of Ord- and Law, pp. 345–70. See also Kenneth P. Hansen, nance, 2 Janu ary 1945, file S-76-1(1) 1945, box 37, “King, Canada, and the Convoys : A Reap prai sal of RG 38, NARA2. Ad mi ral Er nest King’s Role in Op er a tion Drum - 38 Price, Air craft ver sus Sub ma rine, p. 135; Terraine, beat” (pa per pre sented at the Na val His tory Sym po - U-boat Wars, has the dates right for the first two sium, Annapolis, Md., Sep tember 2007), for early kills but wrongly iden tifies the U-boats: see J. dif fi cul ties in cre at ing a co op er a tive work ing en vi- Rohwer and G. Hummelchen, Chro nol ogy of the ronment among the Allies in the At lantic war. To be War at Sea, 1939–1945, rev. ed. (Annapolis, Md.: sure, Polish, Free French, Nor wegian, Dutch, and Naval In stitute Press, 1992), pp. 211–12; DTM to other naval forces not con sidered in this chap ter Cominch, 13 May 1943, Part I Proctor, case 163, p. also played a part in the Al lied co ali tion in the 14, ADM 199/2404, TNA; and Reykja vik, Iceland to Atlan tic. HQCC, 15 May 1943, Part I Proctor, case 163, p. 17, 24 RAF Dele ga tion to Air Minis try, 11 Decem ber 1942, ADM 199/2404, TNA. Part I Proctor, Case His tory AIR 20/1101, Tri als 12/42–9/43, TNA. 163, consists of 275 pages of oper a tional signals re- 25 To As sistant Chief of Air Staff (Ops), n.d., AIR 20/ cording Fido use. These reports came from Iceland 1101, Trials 12/42–9/43, TNA. and Aldergrove, from St. Eval, from Dunkeswell, and from the es cort carri ers HMS Biter, HMS 26 BAD to Admi ralty, 28 Febru ary 1943, Part I Proctor, Striker, and others. They give the facts as perceived case 163, ADM 199/2404, TNA; “Techni cal Proce - at the time and il lus trate how sel dom an a lysts could dure: Mark 24 Mine,” 10 April 1943, file S-1943, be sure of results. They are tes taments, however, to box 3, RG 38, NARA2. the exten sive use of Fido from May 1943 onward. 27 DTM to Assis tant Con trol ler (R&D), etc., refer ence Some authors maintain the Catalina got the first sheet, 16 Feb ru ary 1943, AIR 20/1101, Trials 12/42– kill; see Alan C. Carey, US Navy PB4Y-1 (B24) Lib- 9/43, TNA; BAD to Admi ralty, 28 Feb ru ary 1943, era tor Squadrons in Great Brit ain during World War AIR 20/1101, Tri als 12/42–9/43, TNA.

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II (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Mil itary History, 2003), p. 52 “Station Com mander’s Resume, 24 August 1943,” 20. RAF Station, Dunkeswell, RAF Oper a tions Record 39 “Report of Anti sub ma ri ne Action by Aircraft ,” 11 Book, form 540, AIR 28/229, TNA. Au gust 1943, ADM 199/1408, TNA. I am indebted 53 James R. Holmes, “Where Have All the Mush to Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones for find ing this report Mortons Gone?,” U.S. Na val In stitute Pro ceed ings for me. (June 2009), p. 59. 40 Rohwer and Hummelchen, Chro nol ogy of the War at 54 “Admin is tra t ion, 21–30 Septem ber 1943,” RAF Sta- Sea, 1939–1945, p. 221. tion, Dunkeswell, RAF Op er ations Record Book, 41 Dunkeswell is ac tive today, with air oper ations by form 540, AIR 28/229, TNA. A fa mous mem ber of Air West ward. It still has sev eral of its World War II VB-110 was Lt. Joseph P. Ken nedy, Jr., elder brother buildings, includ ing the unusual control tower and of a future presi dent of the United States, John F. a num ber of Nissen huts, the British equiva lent of Ken nedy. Quon set huts. A small mu seum on the site has a fine 55 Dunkeswell to HQCC, 6 Novem ber 1943, Part I collec tion of memo ra bili a, much of it donated by Proctor, case 163, ADM 199/2404, TNA; “Station former U.S. Navy person nel who served there. I am Com mander’s Resume, 30 Novem ber 1943,” RAF most grateful to Janet Shenfield for taking me to Stati on, Dunkeswell, RAF Oper a ti ons Record Book, visit Dunkeswell in July 2008 on a cold, rainy, windy form 540, AIR 28/229, TNA. The navy desig nated day that, I was as sured, was quite typ ical. the B-24 as the PB4Y-1, and squad rons flying it 42 “Sum mary of Events, 22–26 June 1943,” RAF Sta- were desig nated VB (Navy Bomber) un til 1 Octo ber tion, Dunkeswell, RAF Op er ations Record Book, 1944, when the desig na tion changed to VPB (Navy form 540, AIR 28/229, TNA. Patrol Bomber). 43 Welsh to F. S. Low, 28 June 1943, file Air Marshall 56 “Sum mary of Events, 31 March 1944,” RAF Station, Welsh Misc., box 27, RG 38, NARA2; “Sum mary of Dunkeswell, RAF Op er a tions Re cord Book, form Events, 26 June 1943,” RAF Station, Dunkeswell, 540, AIR 28/229, TNA. RAF Op era tions Record Book, form 540, AIR 28/ 57 “Admin is tra tion II,” p. 2, 26 Feb ru ary 1944, RAF 229, TNA; Gra ham Smith, Devon and Cornwall Air - Stati on, Dunkeswell, RAF Oper a ti ons Record Book, fields in the Sec ond World War (Newbury, U.K.: form 540, AIR 28/229, TNA. Coun tryside Books, 2002), pp. 98–99. I am grate ful 58 Dunkeswell to HQCC, 11 March 1945, Part I Proc - to Amyas Crump for bring ing this book to my at- tor, case 163, ADM 199/2404, TNA; to Direc tor of tention and getting a copy for me. Na val Intelligence to NID 0157, 13 March 1945, 44 Welsh to F. S. Low, 28 June 1943, file Air Marshall Part I Proctor, case 163, ADM 199/2404, TNA. Welsh Misc., box 27, RG 38, NARA2. For an ex cel- 59 Dunkeswell to HQCC, 11 March 1945, Part I Proc - lent quanti ta tive analy sis of oper a tions in the bay tor, case 163, ADM 199/2404, TNA; Smith, Devon see Brian McCue, U-boats in the Bay of Biscay and Cornwall Air fields in the Sec ond World War, p. (Wash ington, D.C.: Nationa l Defense Univ. Press, 110; Rohwer and Hummelchen, Chro nol ogy of the 1990). War at Sea, p. 345. 45 Group Cap tain Morris to RAF Stations Reykja vik, 60 Freder ick J. Milford, “US Navy Torpe does: Part Ballykelly, St. Eval, and Dunkeswell, 26 Au gust Four—WWII devel op ment of Homing Torpe does 1943, AIR 15/562, TNA; Group Captain Kidd to 1940–1946,” Sub ma rine Re view (April 1997). For DTM, 13 Septem ber 1943, AIR 15/562, TNA. an other esti mate see Pelick, “Fido,” p. 69, cit ing E. 46 “Ad min is tra tion, 3–19 Sep tem ber 1943,” RAF Sta- W. Jolle, A Brief His tory of US Navy Tor pedo Devel - tion, Dunkeswell, RAF Op era tions Record Book, op ment, NUSCTD 5436 (n.p.: Na val Un der water form 540, AIR 28/229, TNA; Carey, US Navy Systems Center–Tech ni ca l Direc tor, 25 Septem ber PB4Y-1 (B24) Lib era tor Squadrons in Great Brit ain 1978). during World War II, pp. 40–41. 61 Carey, US Navy PB4Y-1 (B24) Liber a tor Squadron s 47 “Sum mary of Events, 26 June to 31 August 1943,” in Great Britain during World War II, p. 147. Com- RAF Station, Dunkeswell, RAF Oper a tions Record pare this with the record of the German hom ing Book, form 540, AIR 28/229, TNA. torpedo Gnat: of 640 Gnats fired, only 3 percent hit; 48 A. F. Bennett and W. H. Scheer, “Recom men dation see Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, The Royal Navy and Re gard ing Main te nance and Other Pro ce dures: Anti-sub ma rine War fare 1917–1949 (New York: Mark 24 Mine,” 5 August 1943, AIR 15/562, TNA; Routledge, 2006), p. 26. Group Captain Kidd to DTM, 13 Sep tember 1943, 62 “History of the Anti-subma rine Measures Divi sion AIR 15/562, TNA. of Tenth Fleet,” p. 51. 49 “Sum mary of Events, 17 Oc tober 1943,” RAF Sta- 63 Smith, Devon and Cornwall Air fields in the Sec ond tion, Dunkeswell, RAF Op er ations Record Book, World War, p. 110; Carey, US Navy PB4Y-1 (B24) form 540, AIR 28/229, TNA. Lib er a tor Squad rons in Great Brit ain dur ing World 50 “Station Com mander’s Resume, 24 August 1943,” War II, pp. 143–46, gives the to tal num ber of those RAF Station, Dunkeswell, RAF Oper a tions Record who died in crashes, failed to return, or were shot Book, form 540, AIR 28/229, TNA. down as 204. 51 “History of the Anti-subma rine Measures Divi sion 64 Dr. Eric Walker, asso ci ate direc tor of HUSL, went to of Tenth Fleet,” p. 42. Penn State after the war and set up the Ordnance Research Labo ra tory to continue acousti c torpedo research. See Pelick, “Fido,” p. 70.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:13 AM HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:13 AM XI Hid ing in Plain Sight The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Oper a tions under EMCON, 1956–1972

ROBERT G. ANGEVINE

he abilit y to op erate freely, unthr eatened by adv ersar ies seek ing to track and target them or int erfe re with their commu ni ca tions, that the U.S. Navy’s Tair craft car ri ers have enjo yed for the last two decades is un likely to continue. China has been de velop ing an antiaccess/area-de nial capa bil ity, cent ered on antiship bal listic mis siles, that may soon be able to lo cate and at tack U.S. car ri ers at con sid er able dis tances.1 The Chi nese People ’s Lib era tion Army has also de veloped conc epts for info rma t ion warfar e that int eg rate compu ter netwo rk oper a tions, electronic war fare, and ki netic strikes to de grade an oppo nent’s abilit y to col lect, pro cess, and dis sem i nate in for ma tion.2 If combin ed effec tiv ely, antiship bal listic mis - siles and at tacks on info r ma tion net works could endan ger the U.S. Navy’s command of the sea.3 Although the specific problems presented by antiship ballis tic mis siles and infor ma tion war fare are new, the broader op er a tional chal lenges are not. Dur ing the Cold War, the threat posed by Soviet naval avia tion and sub marines prompted the U.S. Navy to stage a num ber of exper i ments ex am in ing the conduct of dis persed op era tions at sea. Spreading out across a wide area, it was believed, would make U.S. naval forces harder to de tect, iden tify, and tar get. In order to lessen the chance of detec tion fur ther, the U.S. forces in the exper i ments strictly limited their commu ni ca tions. Dis persed op er a tions un der emis sion con trol (EMCON) rep re sented a signif i cant depar ture from more ac tive and overt meth ods of oper a tion and posed new op er a tional chal lenges. Navy ex per i ments like the HAYSTACK and UPTIDE se - ries there fore of fer col lec tively an ex cel lent op por tu nity to study or ga ni za tional ad- ap ta tion and change in re sponse to new tech nol o gies and threats and to con sider the conduct of distrib uted oper a tions in the absence of a network. The U.S. Navy in the 1950s One of the primary challenges fac ing the U.S. Navy in the early years of the Cold War was how to em ploy its com mand of the sea to in fluence events ashore. The So - viet Un ion was es sen tially a land power; it did not possess a fleet capa ble of challeng ing Amer i can mar i time su prem acy. In stead, Amer i can and West ern Eu ro pean

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pol icy makers expected a land attack against Western Europe and the Middle East to con sti tute the So vi ets’ prin cipal of fen sive thrust in any fu ture con flict.4 As early as 1948, the U.S. Navy began envis aging an offen sive strike force that would seek to slow the So viet ground advance across West ern Europe. 5 By 1956, the carri ers of the Navy’s Med i ter ranean-based Sixth Fleet were tasked with not only slow ing any So- viet attack headed west and south but also striking key targets in the southern Euro - pean part of the Soviet Union. 6 In or der for their air craft to reach their tar gets, however, the Sixth Fleet’s carri ers had to move into the eastern Medi ter ra nean, close to the Soviet Union, and sur vive there long enough to conduct launch op era tions. In the mid-1950s, the car riers’ chances of doing so appeared slim. A series of air-de fense exer cises over the pre ceding years had dem on strated the fleet’s inabil ity to defend it self against even rela - tively small Soviet air raids.7 In 1956, Admi ral John H. Cassady, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlan tic and Medi ter ranean, conceded in his an - nual report, “It is widely recog nized that a car rier task force cannot provide for its air de fense under condi tions likely to ex ist in com bat in the Med i ter ranean.” 8 The Hay stack Con cept When Vice Admi ral Harry Felt assumed command of Sixth Fleet in 1956, the fleet’s ability to per form its pri mary mission was there fore question able. Per haps as a con - sequence, Sixth Fleet had the rep u ta tion of be ing a social rather than an op era tional fleet. Felt sought to change that repu ta tion and im prove the effec tive ness of his new com mand by in fusing the fleet’s staff with new blood.9 One of the young of fi cers Felt brought in was Lieu ten ant Jere miah Denton.10 Denton’s back ground was in lighter-than-air avi a tion and elec tronic war fare. He had tested large air borne radars in blimps and served as the project offi cer for the WV-2, one of the Navy’s first air borne-early-warning radar aircraft. Denton thus pos sessed a solid un der stand ing of air de fense op er a tions, So viet ae rial at tack ca pa- bil i ties, and air borne ra dar sys tems.11 Draw ing on his exten sive expe ri ence looking at radar scopes, Denton had devel - oped an idea of how to extend the survival time of the Sixth Fleet’s carri ers during a general war.12 He joined forces with Ralph Beatty, the Oper a tions Eval ua tion Group ana lyst attached to Sixth Fleet, who had been working on mathe mat i cal techniques for calcu lat ing how a fleet of aircraft could find a carrier in a back ground of simi lar targets. Together, they began devel op ing the new concept. 13 Denton and Beatty argued that the Soviet bomb ers’ greatest challeng e was finding and iden ti fying the Sixth Fleet’s carri ers. The fleet should there fore do ev erything in its power to “thwart and delay” rec ogni tion of the carri ers. It should disperse widely and inter min gle with commer cial shipping in order to elimi nate the unmis tak able appear ance on air borne radar scopes of the standard close, circu lar (“bull’s-eye”) forma tion. All nearby support ing units, includ ing the de stroy ers

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serv ing as plane guards and screen ing the car ri ers against sub ma rines, should dis - perse, and the car ri ers should op er ate in de pend ently. Strict con trol of all elec tronic emis sions and the wide spread use of de ception would in crease the effec tive ness of the concept, which Denton dubbed “Haystack,” because of its empha sis on making the car ri ers dif fi cult to find.14 When Felt left Sixth Fleet af ter just six months to become Vice Chief of Naval Oper a tions, he made a point of prais ing Denton, Beatty, and the Haystack con cept in front of his suc cessor, Vice Admi ral Charles “Cat” Brown, and the en tire Sixth Fleet staff.15 Under Brown’s command, Sixth Fleet be gan conduct ing exper i ments to test the Hay stack concept. Small-scale tests began in Octo ber 1956. The HAYSTACK Ex er cises The first ma jor ex ercise test ing the Hay stack con cept, HAYSTACK CHARLIE, was conducted in Jan u ary 1957 in the Med i ter ranean Sea about a hun dred miles west of Sardinia. The primary objec tive of the two-day exer cise was “to test the effec tive - ness of tac ti cal decep tion as a method of striking force air defense.” The exer cise pitted two air craft car ri ers, USS Coral Sea (CVA 43) and USS Randolph (CVA 15), their es corts, and their logis ti cal support ships against a conven tional subma rine and land-based snooper and attack aircraft flying out of Naples and Malta. The car- riers, which oper ated up to 250 miles apart, conducted simu lated nuclear strikes against war time targets and then retired, while the ag gressor force tried to find and at tack them as soon as pos si ble.16 The ex er cise re sults sug gested that tac ti cal de cep tion was ef fec tive. The car ri ers were able to avoid detec tion long enough to launch thirty to thirty-five simu lated atomic strikes each day before being “attacked” by “ag gressor” aircraft. Small groups of ships were employed effec tively as de coys; they attracted at tacks from sev eral air craft search ing for the car ri ers. In par tic u lar, the guided-mis sile cruiser USS Boston (CAG 1) and two destroy ers acted as an effec tive “mis sile trap” early in the exer cise, shooting down several snooper aircraf t trying to in vesti gate the three closely packed radar blips.17 The results in di cated, how ever, that the Hay stack concept was still imper fect. Destroy ers were frequently too close to the carri ers. The three de stroy ers escort ing Coral Sea were within ten miles of the car rier when the ex ercise began, enabling a snooper air craft to de tect the car rier in the first five min utes. The de stroy ers accom - pany ing Randolph remained more distant, but they were still close enough to attract at ten tion from snooper aircraft soon af ter the ex ercise started. Air craft also tended to op er ate too close to the car ri ers. Ag gres sor air craft at tacked Randolph after inter - cept ing the ra dar of an an ti sub ma rine pa trol plane cir cling the car rier. A snooper aircraft also detected the ra dar signal of an airborne-early-w arning plane oper at ing near a car rier.18

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HAYSTACK DELTA, a sev enteen-hour ex ercise, was held on 2 March 1957 in the Med i ter ra nean Sea south east of Malta and Sic ily. The ex er cise em pha sized pas sive air defense using traps and decoy groups. It matched two carri ers, USS Forrestal (CVA 59) and USS Lake Champlain (CVA 39), against two conven tional subma - rines and land-based at tack, snooper, and elec tronic coun ter mea sure (ECM) air - craft op erat ing out of Na ples and Malta.19 The exer cise results again suggested that tacti cal decep tion was success ful. The strike aircraft expe ri enced signif i cant problems identi fy ing targets due to heavy cloud cover and squalls, careful emis sion con trol, and de ceptive for ma tions. Learn - ing from past ex ercises, the de stroy ers in HAYSTACK DELTA remained farther away from the carri ers and often paired with other ships to simu late carri ers. The eight aggres sor strikes de tected thir teen pos si ble mil i tary tar gets, but only one correctly iden ti fied a car rier (Forrestal) and its plane guard. Three strikes de tected Boston and two accom pa ny ing destroy ers, which were stationed in the expected direc tion of attack in order to draw strikes away from the car riers, and closed to inves ti gate or attack. Two other strikes attacked oilers, which were paired with destroy ers and being used as de coys for the first time.20 Emis sion con trol also proved ef fective. Only ra dar picket de stroy ers and sec tor air-de fense ships, not carri ers, used nav i gation aids. The ag gressor ECM aircraft lo - cated the task force’s oper at ing area but could not locate or identify indi vid ual units, due to the sup pres sion of elec tronic sig nals char ac ter is tic of par tic u lar ships.21 In or der to ex peri ment with the use of islands to hinder the identi fi ca tion of surface units by aggres sor aircraft, the venue for HAYSTACK ECHO was moved to the Aegean Sea. The exer cise, which was held from 9 to 11 April 1957, pit ted Forrestal, Lake Champlain, and their es corts against two sub ma rines and land-based snooper, ECM, and attack aircraft oper at ing from Athens. The primary objec tive, again, was to practice tac tical control and air defense in a dispersed dis posi tion. 22 Postexercise analy sis was to indi cate that it had not re alis ti cally tested the Hay- stack concept, because of the require ment for nighttime air oper a tions and the conse - quent need for the carri ers to employ plane guards and tac ti cal air navi gation sys tems (TACANs). An aggres sor ECM aircraft had inter cepted Lake Champlain’ s TACAN emis sions shortly af ter the ex ercise began and vectored in snooper aircraft to track the carrier and strike aircraft to attack it. The ini tial two at tacks had been success ful, as were two later strikes; snooper air craft had tracked Lake Champlain al most con tin u - ously for the rest of the ex ercise. Forrestal had been de tected vi sually at 7:14 AM on 10 April and had been tracked contin u ously thereaf ter, al though it had not been attacked suc cess fully un til 3:01 PM. ECM aircraft had also detected and success fully attacked the carri ers on several other occa sions during the exer cise. The analy sis concluded, “Air control with out the use of TACAN by carri ers is essen tial.” 23

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Other attempts at de ception in HAYSTACK ECHO were only moder ately success - ful. The heavy cruiser Sa lem (CA 139) and two destroy ers decoyed snooper aircraf t into shad owing them for several hours, until day break revealed that the group was not a car rier and its es corts. The many is lands in the op erat ing area, how ever, did not ap pear to hin der the ag gressor force’s ability to find the car ri ers. Instead, they compli cated the task force’s efforts to defend itself. Landlocking of radars (the ten - dency of radar return from landmasses to mask contacts around them) severely handi capped the abil ity of the task force to detect aggres sor aircraft and control its own aircraf t. More over, once the car riers and de coy groups were located, they were unable to relo cate quickly. The aggres sors could thus ignore the de coys and concen - trate their efforts on the car riers. 24 The purpose of the Haystack concept was to develop tactics that would extend the survival time of U.S. car riers in the Medi ter ra nean during the initial period of a nuclear exchange. After the con clusion of HAYSTACK ECHO, Brown declared the ex- ercises a suc cess. In a letter to the Chief of Naval Oper a tions (CNO) that also went to all the ma jor commands in the Navy, Brown claimed, “Haystack tactics have been proved effec tive in increas ing the crit ical sur vival time available for launching coun ter strikes against ag gressor bases under to day’s war con di tions in this area.”25 When the ex ercise series began, the ex pected survival time for car riers in the Med i - ter ranean had been less than two hours. During HAYSTACK CHARLIE, DELTA, and ECHO, the car ri ers, with one ex cep tion, sur vived for at least eight hours; half of the par tic i pat ing car ri ers sur vived for over fif teen hours.26 Extend ing the sur vival time of the car riers by even a few hours gave them enough time to hit So viet air fields and ports, thereby reduc ing the threat they faced thereaf ter. “As each hour without attack passes,” Brown ex plained, “the chances of con tin ued sur vival in creases many fold.”27 The U.S. Navy in the 1960s The Sixth Fleet fo cused most of its atten tion on the threat posed by Soviet long- range avi a tion in part be cause there was no sig nif i cant So viet na val pres ence out side home wa ters at the time. In the mid-1950s So viet sur face combat ants started to visit for eign ports oc ca sion ally, and they be gan con duct ing an nual ex er cises in the North and Nor wegian Seas in the late 1950s, but there were still rela tively few So viet subma rines oper at in g in the Medi ter ra nean. The commander of the Sixth Fleet from 1958 to 1959, Vice Admi ral Clarence E. Ekstrom, felt the subma rine threat facing Sixth Fleet was “quite man ageable.” 28 The de velop ers of the Haystack concept ex pected that dispers ing the de stroy ers screening the carrier would increase the carrier’ s vulner a bil ity to subma rine attack but consid ered the risk ac cept able in areas where the subma rine concen tra tion was low or when the air threat ex ceeded the sub ma rine threat.29 By 1961 they were

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confident that the com bina tion of disper sion, de ception, and emission con trol would en able U.S. car ri ers to survive against enemy subma rine attack long enough to conduct their retal ia tory nuclear strikes, even in areas of rela tively high concen tra - tions of sub ma rines, so long as those sub ma rines were conven tion ally pow ered. Beatty es ti mated that a car rier could survive for an av erage of five days in a ten- thou sand-square-mile area con tain ing two con ven tional sub ma rines.30 The in tro duc tion of the nu clear-powered subma rine in the mid-1950s, how - ever, revo lu tion ized under sea warfare. 31 The first So viet nu clear subma rines began enter ing service in 1958 and soon threat ened to ren der the Hay stack tactics obso - lete. By the early 1960s leading Navy of fi cials were increas ingly focused on how to counter the po ten tial threat of nu clear subma rines. A paper, “The Strate gic Con- cept for An ti sub ma rine Warfare,” cir cu lated by the CNO, Ad mi ral Arleigh Burke, identi fied hostile subma rine activ i ties as “foremost among the threats to our use of the seas.”32 Com pound ing the challenge was the equip ping of nuclear subma rines with antiship cruise mis siles. As early as 1960, Rear Admi ral Jimmy Thach, one of the Navy’s leading anti sub ma rine warfare (ASW) experts, predicted that subma rine forces would increas ingly rely on missiles as their pri mary weapons, even against ship ping.33 The So viet Echo II class, a nuclear-pow ered subma rine equipped with eight SS-N-3A (Shaddock) mis siles, entered service in 1962. The SS-N-3A mis sile was, with the ex ception of certain air craft, the longest-ranged antiship weapon in the world; it was capa ble of striking targets at sea from a distance of 250 nauti cal miles. Since the typ i cal defen sive per im eter of an Ameri can carrier battle group ex- tended only a hun dred nau ti cal miles from the center, an Echo II could remain out - side the per im eter and po ten tially launch an at tack un de tected. Af ter an ex ercise to test per for mance against So viet nu clear sub ma rines fir ing “stand off” mis siles, one U.S. Navy commander concluded, “It is evi dent that the force would have had es- sentially no capa bility against such an attack.” 34 Although the cruise mis sile–firing subma rine presented dan gers, it also had weak nesses. Its chief prob lem was de tect ing and iden ti fy ing its tar gets while pre - serv ing its own stealth. As Beatty ob served, “The abil ity of a sub ma rine to iden tify car ri ers by so nar alone in large dis persed dis po si tions is poor. Vi sual iden ti fi ca tion is usu ally nec es sary.”35 He recom mended test ing the ef fective ness of dis persed forma tions against nu clear subma rines and placing an increased empha sis on the de - vel op ment of acous tic de cep tion tac tics and equip ment, par tic u larly ex pend able acous tic de coys.36 The UPTIDE Con cept By the late 1960s, the Navy increas ingly empha sized im prov ing its ability to de fend against mis sile-firing nuclear subma rines. In June 1968, the commander in chief of

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the Pacific Fleet, Admi ral John J. Hyland, initi ated Project UPTIDE (Unified Pacific Fleet Project for Tacti cal Improve ment and Data Extrac tion). One of the pri mary objec tives of UPTIDE was to devise and evalu ate tactics Pacific Fleet anti subma rine warfare groups (typ i cally an ASW carrier, its air wing, and a destroyer squadron) could use to frustrate and de fend against missile and torpedo at tacks by enemy sub- marines within moving or static areas of high tacti cal inter est. 37 The driv ing force behind the UPTIDE series was Vice Admi ral E. P. “Pete” Aurand. An in no va tor and icon o clast, Aurand sug gested shift ing the fo cus of the ASW ef fort from kill ing sub ma rines to re duc ing their ef fec tive ness by pre vent ing en coun ters.38 Echo ing Beatty, Aurand argued that although the nucle ar sub marine was very fast and could remain submerged indef i nitely, it was still essen tially blind. An un as sisted sub ma rine re lied heavily on pas sive acous tic sen sors to de tect, clas - sify, track, and local ize car riers and other high-value targets. Degrad ing the infor - ma tion the sub ma rine re ceived could sig nif i cantly re duce its ef fec tive ness. The UPTIDE ex per i ments fo cused on re duc ing the prob a bil i ties that the submarine would detect, identify, and local ize its target. The prob abil ity that the submarine would detect its target could be reduced by strict acoustic and electro mag- netic emis sion con trol. Aurand may have drawn in spi ration from his pre vi ous ob - serva tion of Soviet naval oper a tions in the Sea of Japan. Aurand had noticed that Soviet radar anten nas neither rotated nor emitted. He specu lated that the Soviet navy’s policy was to leave its radars turned off unless there was no other way to obtain de sired in forma tion. Al though it de nied the So vi ets early warning, Aurand believed, “such a policy has merit, espe cially when compared to the predom i nant practice of most U.S. ships to emit con stantly.” He concluded, “Finesse in the han - dling of emitters, electronic, visual, and acous tic should be devel oped by our ships, espe ciall y in the vicin ity of Soviet ships.”39 The proba bil ity that the sub marine would success fully identify a de tected target could be decreased through acoustic decep tion. The proba bil ity that the subma rine would local ize it (i.e., close to within range of its weapons) could be dimin ished by forcing the sub marine to move slowly, by deploy ing good passive acoustic systems in all an ti sub ma rine ve hi cles, es pe cially he li cop ters and de stroy ers.40 The UPTIDE Exper i ment s Project UPTIDE devel oped in three phases from Jan u ary 1969 to No vem ber 1972. In each phase, an ASW group exam ined vari ous dimen sions of the challeng e presented by nu clear subma rines fir ing cruise mis siles.41 The purpose of Phase I was to lay the foun dation for Phases II and III by explor ing the broad outlines of the problem, re fin ing the ex per i men tal de sign and meth od ol ogy, and de vel op ing pro ce- dures for process ing and ana lyzing data. It exam ined the sit u a tion from the perspec tive of the en emy subma rine and de rived data on the sub ma rine’s

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capa bili ties to de tect, iden tify, and fire its mis siles at high-value tar gets. Phase I also estab lished a baseline for compar i son of conven tio nal anti sub ma rine warfare tac - tics with UPTIDE tac tics.42 Phase I consisted of three con tin u ous free-play exper i ments (each a Hunter- Killer An ti sub ma rine Warfare Ex er cise, or HUKASWEX), which took place from Janu ary to March 1969. In each exer cise, USS Kearsarge (CVS 33), its aircraft, and De stroyer Squad ron 23, con sti tut ing An ti sub ma rine War fare Group 1, tried to de - fend Kearsarge against two oppos ing subma rines with simu lated cruise-missile capa bil i ties. The sub ma rines par tic i pat ing in Phase I were USS Pomodon (SS 486) and Medregal (SS 480) for HUKASWEX 1-69 and USS Snook (SSN 592) and Scamp (SSN 588) for HUKASWEX 2-69 and 3-69. The results of Phase I under scored the magni tude of the threat posed by the cruise-mis sile subma rine and estab lished the key met ric that would be used in Phase II—the survival time of the car rier. In 144 ex ercise hours, the subma rines conducted three tor pedo at tacks and nine teen launch events sim u lat ing the fir ing of sev enty-eight mis siles at the carrier. Eighty-seven percent of the mis siles were judged to have met the bear ing param e - ters for acqui si tion of their targets. The av erage survival time of the carrier was nine hours.43 Phase II was the major data-collec tion and tac ti cal-evalu a tion phase of Pro ject UPTIDE. It consisted of four major exper i ments from Septem ber 1969 to Janu ary 1971. The ex per i ments were de voted to ex am in ing the ef fec tive ness of dis per sion, acous tic and elec tro mag netic emis sion con trol, sim u la tion of the high-value tar get by surface escorts, and ac tive acous tic de cep tion against cruise mis sile–fir ing sub- marines in a scenario involv ing a carrier oper at ing within a fixed area and simu lat - ing the launching of strike aircraft. 44 The ini tial Phase II ex per i ment, UPTIDE 2-B, took place in late Sep tem ber and early Octo ber 1969 and pitted Anti sub ma rine Warfare Group 3—consist ing of USS Hor net (CVS 12), its aircraft, and Destroyer Squadron 31—against USS Scul pin (SSN 590) and Razor back (SS 394). By employ ing a dispersed forma tion, steam ing below propel ler cavi ta tion speed (i.e., the speed at which the collapse of bubbles behind the blades be comes de tect ably loud), con trol ling emis sions, and us ing escorts as “wolf trap” units to lure the subma rines away, Hor net was able to avoid identi fi- cation for the en tire seven-day ex ercise. The subma rines were deceived, lured, or confused for the ma jor ity of the ex ercise and spent nearly all the rest of the time in unpro ductive searches. To ward the end of the ex ercise, in frustra tion, Scul pin used stra te gic infor ma tion to fire a spread of eight mis siles at a range of two hun dred miles. Signif i cantly, two of them could have met the bear ing param e ters to acquire Hor net. Nev er the less, the com mander of An ti sub ma rine War fare Group 3 de - scribed the exer cise as “an unprec e dented suc cess against the under sea ad versary by

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an ASW group us ing a to tally new con cept in com mu ni cations, for ma tions, tactics, decep tion, and electronic/acous tic emission control.” 45 UPTIDE 2-C, held in Janu ary and Febru ary 1970, marked the in tro duction of a new tac ti cal el e ment—the acous tic de cep tion de vice. The mine sweeper USS Leader (MSO 490) was equipped with an ac tive acous tic sim u lator called “Tergiver sa tor,” de vel oped by the Na val Un der wa ter Sound Cen ter in New Lon don, Con nect i cut. Ter giver sa tor trans mit ted into the wa ter car rier and es cort pro pul sion noises and ac tive so nar trans mis sions. Work ing to gether, Leader and the guided-mis sile cruiser USS Chi cago (CG 11) were able to deceive the sub ma rines USS Plunger (SSN 595) and Snook. After listen ing to the de ception de vice’s out put for three hours, Plunger concluded that it was a heavy warship and fired two missiles at it. Mean- while, Hor net was able to sur vive un de tected for eighty-seven hours. Only when the carrier oper ated inde pend ently at high speed were the subma rines success ful in mak ing a co or di nated mis sile at tack.46 The num ber and range of acous tic de cep tion de vices ex panded sig nif i cantly in UPTIDE 2-D, which was held in Oc to ber 1970. Seven de vices were em ployed, in - cluding an updated version of Tergiver sa tor; two SADSAC (Small Acous tic Device Sim u lat ing a Car rier) buoys, de vel oped by the Na val Un der wa ter Re search and De- velop ment Center; and four NYVOs (Nymph’s Voices), devel oped by Magnavox. Once again the devices proved ef fective. They were able to mask the identity of USS Ticonderoga (CVS 14) for the first ninety-three hours of the ex ercise and induce Scul pin and Snook to ded i cate two of their four launch events and nine of their six - teen mis siles to them.47 The fi nal exer cise of Phase II, UPTIDE 2-E, under scored the dra matic im pact that the ex per i men tal tac tics could have on car rier sur viv abil ity. Us ing UPTIDE tac tics, Ticonderoga was able to avoid detec tion by Plunger and USS Haddock (SSN 621) for the en tire 140 hours of the reg u larly scheduled ex ercise. On the last day, the carrier reverted to conven tional tactics; it was targeted for simu lated missile attacks within four and a half hours. The prin cipal finding from Phase II was that UPTIDE dis persion and de ception tac tics al lowed car ri ers and their es corts to avoid con sis tently en coun ters with sub - ma rines. In nearly 650 exer cise hours, there were just fourteen launch events, simu - lat ing the fir ing of fifty-six mis siles. More over, less than one-third of the mis siles met the bear ing pa ram e ters for ac qui si tion. On av er age, the sub ma rines went a hun dred hours between valid fire-control solu tions on the carrier and were unable to conduct any tor pedo attacks. In the four week-long exer cise peri ods of UPTIDE Phase II, the “Blue” (i.e., U.S.) force achieved an av erage survival time of al most five and a half days for the high-value target between subma rine-launched missile firings —an improve ment by a factor of eigh teen over Phase I results us ing conven tional tactic s.48

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Phase III of UPTIDE, in two exper i ments from Octo ber 1971 to No vem ber 1972, ex am ined tran sit scenar ios and used a new mea sure of perfor mance—miles safely traveled. The challenges the ASW group faced were in creased to in clude inte - grated surface, subsurface, and air threats, but they were off set by corre spond ing in- creases in the group’s ca pa bil i ties. Among the new ca pa bil i ties in tro duced were land-based patrol air craft, towed passive sonar ar rays, and heli cop ter-equippe d de- stroyers. Acoustic decep tion devices were also used exten sively, and with consid er - able success. Com bining these new ca pa bili ties with UPTIDE tactics, the ASW group in UPTIDE 3-A was able to make good 86 per cent of the nine hun dred miles it at tempted with out a suc cessful at tack by a sub ma rine. Only when three of the five acoustic decep tion devices being used broke down was the carrier detected and success fully tar geted.49 The fi nal ex ercise of the UPTIDE se ries, UPTIDE 3-B, oc curred in Octo ber and No vem ber 1972. It added several new capa bili ties to the Blue forces, includ ing two squadrons of land-based patrol air craft and a heli cop ter-equippe d destroyer . The Blue forces also success fully made tacti cal use of towed sonar arrays and Sound Sur- veil lance Sys tem (SOSUS) in for ma tion, al though the slow tow ing speed of the towed ar rays limited their utility in transit scenar ios. 50 Dispersed Oper a tions under EMCON The forces partic i pat ing in the HAYSTACK exer cises and those conduct ing the UPTIDE series struggled to command and control widely dispersed forces under EMCON. Dur ing the HAYSTACK ex ercises, Sixth Fleet sought to ex ploit “ev ery available method of deliv er ing message traffic that will permit the origi nat ing ship to main tain the high est practi cable degree of electronic si lence.”51 The fleet for bade the com mand ing of fi cers of ships to use electronic means of com mu ni cation un less ab so lutely nec es sary.52 Instead, they were to em ploy vi sual sig nals, such as flag hoists or blink ers, to con trol flight op era tions and trans mit mes sages.53 The fleet also urged the use of he licop ters and air planes to carry messages between ships. There was al ways the possi bility of miss ing a mes sage drop, but the he - licop ter or aircraft would typ i cally carry ex tra cop ies of mes sages. The messages, enclosed in the equiv a lent of a buoy, would also float and could there fore be re- trieved. Aircraf t could also deliver messages to shore-based radio stations for relay to their ulti mate desti na ti ons.54 In cases where elec tronic com mu ni cation was nec es sary, the fleet re lied on air - borne relay of ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) transmis sions, which are typi cally limited to hori zon ranges and so are more diffi cult to detect than high-frequenc y trans mis sions. Al though So viet air craft, subma rines, and sur face ships could in ter - cept UHF transmis sions, they had to be fairly close to the task force to do so. UHF was thus seen as a “rela tively secure means of com muni ca tion.” 55

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Many of the methods UPTIDE forces employed were simi lar to those used during the HAYSTACK ex ercises. Among these were “bean-bag commu ni cations” (de - liv ery of mes sages by he li cop ter) and air borne UHF re lay. A cen tral el e ment of UPTIDE was the exten sive use of an air borne-early-warning aircraft to relay UHF commu ni cations from the carrier to its es corts and other ships. During UPTIDE 3-A, an ti sub ma rine air craft and the car rier’s com bat in for ma tion cen ter used UHF so heavily that they nearly sat u rated the avail able circuits. 56 The restric tion to al ter na tive meth ods and the near sat u ration of avail able circuits pro duced sig nif i cant de lays in com mu ni ca tions. In HAYSTACK CHARLIE, in ex - pe rience with the al ter na tive ra dio tech niques used and the ex is tence of too many units on the nets in each sec tor com bined to pro duce long com mu ni cations de lays.57 In UPTIDE 3-A, the de lay times for messages with imme di ate op era tional rele vance ranged from ten to 318 minutes. Even flash-prece dence messages were delayed for up to sixty min utes.58 Di min ished com mu ni ca tions ca pa bil i ties placed a pre mium on plan ning. To im plement the Haystack concept, Sixth Fleet relied more heavily on doctrine and fixed plans.59 Accord ing to the concept, “Movements of the fleet will be preplanned and promul gated as much in advance as possi ble, to allow maxi mum practi cable elec tronic si lence.”60 Before every port visit, Sixth Fleet would dissem i nate the “posi tion and in tended move ment” (PIM), or route, that task forces would fol low should there be a warning that nu clear war was immi nent. To re duce the num ber of PIM-change messages, task force command ers were instructed to plan ahead and cover sev eral days’ movements with one mes sage if possi ble. 61 To min i mize the vol ume of electronic emis sions, Sixth Fleet also adopted a set of ba sic com mu ni ca tions pro ce dures. Pre as signed al pha nu meric groups in di cated de - sired PIM changes or changes in ship sta tions. Sim ple air craft codes were used to transmit classi fied infor ma tion. Recip i ents of messages did not “Roger” or acknow - ledge receipt. 62 UPTIDE simi larly empha sized planning. Just prior to UPTIDE 3-A, the commander of Anti subma rine Warfare Group 3, Rear Admi ral Carl J. Seiberlich, gave command ing offi cers of all his units the oppor tu nity to work with his staff on the devel op ment of plans and options. The de tailed and in clusive plan ning process pro duced signif i cant bene fits. As Seiberlich later ex plained to Aurand, he and his staff received valuable in puts, while “the command ing offi cers all feel that they have had a piece of the planning ac tion, and under stand our philos o phy and ob jec- tives.”63 One of the focal points of the plan ning process was mini miz ing oppor tu ni - ties for de tection of the car rier. UPTIDE tactics tried to re duce acoustic detect - ability through the use of noncavitating speeds where pos si ble. Imple ment ing the tactic required, accord ing to the UPTIDE 3-A report, “ju dicious planning of the time and loca tion when cavitating speeds were required. 64

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“There Might Be Some Use ful Ideas There” As Ralph Beatty once noted, inter est in decep tive forma tions and dispersed oper a - tions un der emis sion con trol seems to be cycli cal. Every few years a ver sion of the same ba sic idea emerges. Each it era tion of the con cept has been a re sponse to a dif - ferent specific threat—such as nuclear attack by land-based avia tion in the HAYSTACK se ries, cruise-mis sile at tack by subma rines in the UPTIDE series—and has there fore approac hed the prob lem with little refer ence to past efforts. Yet the basic chal lenge has re mained the same: How can na val forces con duct ef fective op - er a tions while dis pers ing widely and min i miz ing com mu ni ca tions in or der to avoid detec tion and attack? Since the U.S. Navy is likely to face simi lar challenge s in the future, it might do well to heed Beatty’s sugges tion: “Pay atten tion to what’s happened be fore. There might be some useful ideas there.”65 One of the use ful ideas high lighted by a review of the U.S. Navy’s ex peri ments with dispersed oper a tions under EMCON during the Cold War is the util ity of alter na tive meth ods of com mu ni ca tion. Dur ing the HAYSTACK and UPTIDE exer - cises, the partic i pat ing forces chose to limit their commu ni cations in or der to mini mize the ad versary’s ability to de tect and identify them. They ex peri mented with a wide vari ety of methods—b oth low-tech (flag hoists) and high-tech (airborne UHF relay). The ability to com muni cate and exchange infor ma tion us ing a range of differ ent methods and to relay com muni ca tions from platform to plat form proved in valu able. As the par tici pants in HAYSTACK and UPTIDE dis cov ered, how ever, al ter na tive com mu ni ca tion meth ods typ i cally have less ca pac ity than more tra di tional ones. Con se quently, it is im por tant to de velop de tailed pro ce dures for op er at ing with dimin ished net work ca pac ity. Sixth Fleet in cluded com pre hen sive ap pen di ces in its op er a tions or ders out lin ing the spe cific in struc tions for op er at ing with di min ished com mu ni cations. The in structions spelled out which mes sages and which us ers should re ceive pri or ity un der var i ous con di tions and which pro ce dures should be em ployed.66 It was also im por tant to prac tice em ploy ing al ter na tive means of com mu ni cation. The forces par tic i pat ing in HAYSTACK CHARLIE ex pe ri enced what an a lysts de - scribed as “ex cessive” de lays, due in part to in ex pe rience with the com mu ni cations method em ployed. Sim i larly, air con trol in HAYSTACK DELTA was unsat is fac to ry due in part to con trol ler in ex pe ri ence.67 Even with the de vel op ment of ap pro pri ate pro ce dures and ex ten sive prac tice, forces us ing al ter na tive meth ods of com mu ni ca tion ex pe ri enced de lays. Ac cord ing to the UPTIDE 3-A ex er cise re port, the re duc tion in com mu ni ca tions ca pa bil i ties and use of al ter na tive meth ods “ex tracted a price from the BLUE forces in terms of inad e quate infor ma tion exchange between the BLUE OTC [offi cer in tacti cal command] and his dispersed forces.” “Infor ma tion of value to the OTC from outly ing

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units is often received late or not at all,” the report explained, “and outly ing units of ten lack the ‘big pic ture’ in forma tion held by the OTC.”68 The de lays and di min ished flow of in for ma tion in her ent in the use of al ter na tive com mu ni ca tions meth ods un der scored the im por tance of plan ning and de cen tralized de cision mak ing. The pro mul gation of plans as far in ad vance as pos si ble enabled the command ers of the forces par tici pat ing in the HAYSTACK and UPTIDE series to convey their intents before commu ni ca tions were dimin ished. The unit command ers, thus fully aware of their mis sion, were able to take the ini tia tive, make deci sions quickly, and imple ment them ag gres sively. As U.S. naval forces in creasingly op erate un der the threat of antiship-bal lis tic- mis sile at tack while re ly ing on rapid com mu ni ca tion and in for ma tion ex change, poten tial adver sar ies are likely to seek to detect, track, and target those forces and disrupt their commu ni ca tio n and infor ma ti on networks. In future contests for control of in forma tion, as Beatty warned a decade ago, it will be impor tant to un- derstand what works and what does not work.69 The prin ciples and practices the U.S. Navy de vel oped while ex per i ment ing with dis persed op er a tions un der EMCON ap pear to fall in the for mer cat e gory. As Rear Ad mi ral George P. Steele told Aurand after receiv ing a briefing on UPTIDE, “I was able to make use of a great deal of it [the UPTIDE concept], and I am a be liever; it works, and very well.”70

NOTES This chapter appeared, by per mission of the author, as Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Ana lyst s Consid er an ar ticle in the Spring 2011 is sue of the Na val War the Antiship Bal lis tic Mis sile,” Na val War Col lege Coll ege Review. Re view 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 53–86; Eric 1 Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Evolving Anti-acces s Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Bal- Approach: ‘Where’s the Next (U.S.) Carrier?’” listic Missile: Devel op men ts and Missing Links,” China Brief 10, no. 18 (10 Septem ber 2010), pp. 5–8; Na val War Col lege Re view 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), An drew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Us ing the pp. 87–115.

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2 Bryan Krekel, Capa bi lity of the People’s Repub li c of 17 OEG, Sixth Fleet Con cept and Anal ysis of Haystac k China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Com puter Net- Op er a tions, pp. 13–14. work Ex ploi ta tion, prepared for the U.S.-China Eco - 18 Ibid., pp. 14, 16, 19, 23. nomic and Se cu rity Re view Com mis sion (McLean, Va.: Northrop Grumman Corp., 2009); Timo thy L. 19 Ibid., p. 25. Thomas, “China’s Electronic Long-Range Recon - 20 Ibid., pp. 27–31. naissanc e,” Mil i tary Re view (No vem ber–De cem ber 21 Ibid., pp. 25, 28. 2008), pp. 47–54; Tim o thy L. Thomas, “Chi nese and Ameri can Network Warfare,” Joint Force Quar- 22 Ibid., pp. 37, 42. terly, no. 38 (3rd Quarter 2005), pp. 76–83. 23 Ibid., pp. 42–46. 3 Robert C. Rubel, “Talking about Sea Con trol,” Na- 24 Ibid. val War Col lege Re view 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2010), 25 Brown to Burke, “Hay stack Con cept of Strik ing pp. 38–47. Forces,” p. 3. 4 Jakub J. Grygiel, “The Dilem mas of US Mari time 26 Ibid., p. 2. Suprem acy in the Early Cold War,” Jour nal of Stra - te gic Stud ies 28 (April 2005), pp. 191–206; Philip 27 Ibid., pp. 3, 6–7. Alphonse Dur, “The Sixth Fleet: A Case Study of In - 28 Vice Adm. C. E. Ekstrom to Philip Alphonse Dur, 3 stitu tion al ized Naval Presen ce” (PhD diss., Harvar d Jan u ary 1975, quoted in Dur, “Sixth Fleet,” p. 75. Univer sity, 1975), p. 72. 29 R. E. Beatty and L. S. Pocinski, Sub ma rine Op po si - 5 Dur, “Sixth Fleet,” pp. 21, 33, 39. tion to Carri ers in Large Dispersed Dispo si tions, Op- 6 Grygiel, “Dilem mas of US Mari time Suprem acy in era tions Evalu a tion Group Study 642 (Washing ton, the Early Cold War,” pp. 191–206; Dur, “Sixth D.C.: OEG, Office of the CNO, 13 Febru ary 1961), Fleet,” p. 72. p. 4. 7 Adm. Jere miah Denton, telephone inter view, 26 and 30 Denton, inter view; Beatty and Pocinski, Sub ma rine 27 May 2009. Op po si tion to Car ri ers in Large Dis persed Dis po si- tions, pp. 3, 10. 8 Com mander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlan tic and Medi ter ra nean, to Chief of Naval Op- 31 Owen Cote, The Third Bat tle: In nova tion in the U.S. era tions [hereaf ter CNO], ser. 00285, “Report of Navy’s Silent Cold War Strug gle with Soviet Subma - Op er a tions and Con di tions of Com mand, 1 July rines, New port Pa per 16 (New port, R.I.: Na val War 1955–1 May 1956,” 1 May 1956, quoted in Dur, Col lege Press, 2003), p. 52. “Sixth Fleet,” pp. 76–77. 32 Adm. Arleigh Burke, CNO, “The Strate gic Concept 9 Adm. Harry Donald Felt, Rem i nis cences of Ad mi ral for Anti sub ma rine Warfare,” declas s ified , 15 Janu - Harry Don ald Felt, Oral History (Annapolis, Md.: ary 1960, file 3300, Anti-Subma rine Oper a tions, U.S. Naval In stitute, 1974), p. 274. 1960, p. 1, Imme diate Office Files of the CNO, OA, NHHC. 10 Edward A. Smyth and Eugene P. Visco, “Mili tary Oper a ti ons Research Soci ety Oral Hist ory Project 33 Rear Adm. J. S. Thach, “The Trend in ASW,” de clas- In terview of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Jr.,” Mil i tary Op er a- sified, 22 Jan uary 1960, file 3300, Anti-Subma rine tions Re search 9, no. 3 (2004) [hereaf ter “In terview Oper a tions, 1960, p. 3, Imme diate Office Files of the of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Jr.”], p. 66. CNO, OA, NHHC. 11 Denton, inter view. 34 Jan Breemer, So viet Sub ma rines: De sign, De vel opment, and Tactics (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Infor ma tion 12 Smyth and Visco, “Inter view of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Group, 1989), pp. 91, 103–106, 113, 117, 119; John Jr.,” p. 66; “Men and Machines,” Na val Avi a tion Jordan, So viet Sub marines, 1945 to the Pres ent (Lon- News (Septem ber 1974), p. 24. don: Arms and Armour, 1989), pp. 74–84, 103–108; 13 Smyth and Visco, “Inter view of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Malcolm Muir, Jr., Black Shoes and Blue Water: Sur - Jr.,” pp. 66–67. face War fare in the United States Navy, 1945–1975 14 Oper a ti ons Evalu a tion Group [hereaf ter OEG], The (Washing ton, D.C.: Naval Histor i cal Center, 1996), Sixth Fleet Con cept and Anal ysis of Haystac k Op er a - pp. 74, 115–16, 135–36, 172; Norman Polmar and tions, OEG Re port 77 (Wash ing ton, D.C.: Of fice of Jurrien Noot, Sub ma rines of the Rus sian and So viet the CNO, 24 Jan u ary 1958), pp. 3–4; “The Haystack Na vies, 1718–1990 (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In stitute Concep t,” Vice Adm. C. R. Brown, Commander Press, 1991), pp. 155–56, 166, 177, 186–87, 333–34; U.S. Sixth Fleet [hereaf ter COMSIXTHFLT], to Cote, Third Battle, pp. 60–61. Adm. A. Burke, CNO, encl. 1, “Hay stack Concept of 35 Beatty and Pocinski, Sub ma rine Op po si tion to Car ri - Strik ing Forces; Re port On,” de clas sified, 2 No vem - ers in Large Dispersed Dispo si tions, p. 3. ber 1957, pp. 2–3, Sixth Fleet Files, 1957, Post-1946 36 Ibid. Command File, Oper a ti onal Archives , Naval His- tory and Heri t age Command, Washi ngton, D.C. 37 Vice Adm. Turner Caldwell, Di rector of ASW Pro- [hereaf ter OA, NHHC]. grams, to CNO, “Comments on COMASWFOR- PAC’s UPTIDE Pro pos als,” de clas si fied, 11 July 15 Felt, Rem i nis cences of Ad mi ral Harry Don ald Felt, pp. 1969, Anti sub ma ri ne Warfare Folder, Imme di ate 282–83. Of fice Files of the CNO, OA, NHHC; Capt. W. E. 16 OEG, Sixth Fleet Con cept and Anal ysis of Haystac k Sims to CNO, “Brief of Pro ject UPTIDE Pre sen ta - Op er a tions, p. 5; “Haystac k Concep t,” in Brown to tion to CAB,” declas si fied, 23 Novem ber 1970, Anti - Burke, “Hay stack Con cept of Strik ing Forces,” p. 3. sub ma rine War fare Folder, Im me di ate Of fice Files of the CNO, OA, NHHC; R. F. Cross Asso ci ates,

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Sea-Based Airborne Anti sub ma ri ne Warfa re, 1940– 1971, COMASWFORPAC Personal File, 1971, box 1977, vol. 2, 1960–1977, 2nd ed., de clas sified (Al ex - 5, Aurand Papers, OA, NHHC. an dria, Va.: 1978), p. 102. For more on UPTIDE, 50 R. F. Cross Asso ci ates, Sea-Based Air borne An ti sub - see Rob ert G. Angevine, “Inno va tion and Exper i - ma rine War fare, 1940–1977, p. 151. menta tion in the US Navy: The UPTIDE Anti sub - marine Warfare Exper i ments, 1969–72,” Jour nal of 51 Brown to Burke, “Hay stack Con cept of Strik ing Stra te gic Stud ies 28 (Feb ru ary 2005), pp. 77–105. Forces,” p. 7. 38 Vice Adm. Eli T. Reich, Rem i nis cences of Vice Ad mi- 52 COMSIXTHFLT, “Change 9 to Op Order 50-56,” ral Eli T. Reich, Oral History (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. declas si fied, p. K-VI-3, Sixth Fleet Com mand File, Naval In stitute, 1982), vol. 2, p. 617; Robert H. 1957, Post-1946 Command File, OA, NHHC. Smith, “Re mem ber ing Ad mi ral Pete Aurand,” U.S. 53 “Haystack Concept,” in Brown to Burke, “Haystack Naval Insti tute Pro ceed ings (Decem ber 1989), p. Con cept of Striking Forces,” pp. 13, 16; Denton, 108; Rear Adm. E. P. Aurand, “An Ap proach to inter view . Think ing about ASW Prob lems,” de clas si fied, 54 Denton, inter view. [1966] file “An Ap proach to Thinking about ASW Prob lems,” E. P. Aurand Pa pers, OA, NHHC. 55 “Haystack Concept,” in Brown to Burke, “Haystack Con cept of Strik ing Forces,” p. 16. 39 Commander, Anti sub ma ri ne Warfare Group 1, “Re port of Oper a tions Northeast of Luzon to Con - 56 Rear Adm. N. C. Gillette, Jr., COMASWGRU 3, to duct Overt Surveil lance of Soviet Forces Which Had Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, COMASWFORPAC, 12 Exited the Sea of Japan,” ser. 072, 26 Febru ary 1966, Jan u ary 1970, Personal File, 1970, COMASW- ASWGRU 1, 1966, p. 5, Post-1946 Com mand File, FORPAC, 1969–72, box 5, Aurand Papers, OA, OA, NHHC. NHHC; Com mander Third Fleet [hereaf ter COMTHIRDFLT], “UPTIDE Re port 6: UPTIDE 40 Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, “Speech to Destroyer Exer cis e 3A [Transit Phase],” 4 Septem ber 1973, p. Confer ence,” declas si fied, 22 Septem ber 1971, V-2. COMASWFORPAC, 1969–1972, box 8, Aurand Of- fice Files, OA, NHHC; Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, 57 OEG, Sixth Fleet Con cept and Anal ysis of Haystac k “ASW in the Pacifi c,” declas si fied, 20–21 May 1970, Op er a tions, pp. 14, 16, 19, 23. Tenth NSIA/Navy ASW Confer ence, Washing ton, 58 COMTHIRDFLT, “Uptide Re port 6,” pp. V-1, V-2. D.C., COMASWFORPAC, 1969–1972, box 8, 59 OEG, Sixth Fleet Con cept and Anal ysis of Haystac k Aurand Of fice Files, OA, NHHC. Op er a tions, p. 4. 41 Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, Commander, Antisub- 60 “Haystack Concept,” in Brown to Burke, “Haystack marine Warfare Forces Paci fic [hereaf t er COM- Con cept of Strik ing Forces,” p. 15. ASWFORPAC], to Dr. Joel S. Law son, Jr., Di rector of Navy Labo ra to ries , declas si fied, 17 April 1972, 61 Ibid., p. 16. Personal Corre spon dence, 1970–1972, box 6, 62 COMSIXTHFLT, Op Or der 50-56, app. I, p. E-I-10; Aurand Papers, OA, NHHC. Man age ment of Proj - “Haystack Con cept,” in Brown to Burke, “Hay stack ect UPTIDE ac tually began in Octo ber 1968, and Con cept of Strik ing Forces,” p. 16. Phase I commenced in Decem ber 1968, but the first 63 Seiberlich to Aurand. exer ci se did not begin until Janu ary 1969; COMASWFORPAC Command History, 1968, pp. 64 COMTHIRDFLT, “Uptide Report 6,” p. II-3. 5–6, box 839, Post-1946 Command File, OA, 65 Smyth and Visco, “Inter view of Dr. Ralph Beatty, NHHC. Jr.,” pp. 71–72. The chal lenge is not lim ited to naval 42 Sims to CNO; R. F. Cross Asso ciates, Sea-Based Air - forces. It is pos sible to envi sion a future secu rity en- borne An ti sub ma rine War fare, 1940–1977, p. 150. vi ron ment dom i nated by re con nais sance strike complexes that places a premium on de tecting, 43 Sims to CNO. tracking, and target ing stealthy forces and commu - 44 Aurand to Lawson. ni cat ing in a de graded in for ma tion en vi ron ment. 45 Sims to CNO; R. F. Cross Asso ciates, Sea-Based Air - See Michael G. Vickers and Robert C. Martinage, borne An ti sub ma rine War fare, 1940–1977, p. 150; The Revo lu tion in War (Wash ing ton, D.C.: Cen ter Commander, Anti-subma ri ne Warfare Group 3 for Strate gic and Budget ary Assess ments , 2004). [hereaf ter COMASWGRU 3], Com mand History, 66 COMSIXTHFLT, “Change 9 to Op Order 50-56,” 1969, encl. 4, declas si fied, p. 2, Post-1946 Com- pp. K-VI-1 to K-VI-4. mand File, OA, NHHC. 67 OEG, Sixth Fleet Con cept and Anal ysis of Haystac k 46 Sims to CNO; R. F. Cross Asso ciates, Sea-Based Air - Op er a tions, pp. 23, 35. borne An ti sub ma rine War fare, 1940–1977, pp. 150– 68 COMTHIRDFLT, “Uptide Report 6,” p. VI-2. 51. 69 Smyth and Visco, “Inter view of Dr. Ralph Beatty, 47 Sims to CNO; Aurand, “Speech to Destroyer Jr.,” p. 71. Con fer ence.” 70 Rear Adm. G. P. Steele to Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, 48 Sims to CNO; Aurand, “Speech to Destroyer COMASWFORPAC, de clas si fied, 30 Jan u ary 1972, Con fer ence.” Per sonal Cor re spon dence, 1970–1972, box 6, 49 Aurand to Lawson; Rear Adm. C. J. Seiberlich, Aurand Papers, OA, NHHC. COMASWGRU 3, to Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, COMASWFORPAC, de clas si fied, 28 De cem ber

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:13 AM HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:13 AM XII Turb ulence and Terror ism The Story of Head quar ters Sup port Ac tiv ity Sai gon, 1964–1966

JOHN DARRELL SHERWOOD

n Christ mas Eve 1964, Lt. (j.g.) Anne Darby Reynolds, a U.S. Navy nurse as signed to Station Hos pi tal Sai gon, was in the liv ing room of an apart - Oment she shared with three other nurses in the Brink Bache lor Offi c ers Quar ters (BOQ)—a drab, seven-story ho tel leased by the navy to pro vide housing for Ameri can offi c ers in Saig on. As she gazed at the street through a French door, hop ing to see Bob Hope, who had just ar rived in town for his an nual Christ mas tour, a two-hundr ed-pound bomb in a panel truck went off in the building ’s ga rage. The French door blew into the room, and glass broke on top of Reynolds, cutting her leg. Since she was on call that evening, her first thought was, “Oh boy. Hospi tal OR [op erat ing room] call. Here we go!” Dazed, Reynolds tried to go to her bedr oom to re trieve her sneak ers but was or dered to evac u ate by an other offi cer. She no ticed fire and smoke as she made her way to the building ’s court yard and then assist ed the vic tims. When the am bulanc es ar rived, she got into the first one and took some pa - tients to the hos pi tal, six miles away. Reynolds had no idea she was bleed ing herself until a corps man said, “You need to be su tured, so I am putt ing a su ture set aside for you.” Reynolds worked on patients un til ev ery one was taken care of be fore request - ing that her leg be exam ined. 1 The Brink BOQ bombing de stroyed three floors of the build ing, killing two U.S. service men and injur ing sixty-three Ameri cans, an Austra lian army offi cer, and forty-three Viet nam ese civil ians. Four navy nurses in the build ing, includ ing Reynolds, were wounded in the attack; each one insisted on treating victims at the scene and help ing with di sas ter re sponse be fore tend ing to her own in ju ries.2 During the early 1960s, the navy ran nearly all of the ma jor sup port functions in the capi tal city for the U.S. Mili tary Assis tance Advi sory Group. Every thing from med i cal fa cil i ties to food and bil let ing to head quar ters se cu rity in Sai gon was managed by the Headquar ters Support Activ ity Saigon (HSAS). This role contin ued until May 1966, when HSAS was dises tab lished and many of its re spon si bili ties were turned over to the army. Origi nally estab lished as a housekeep ing and logis tics or- gani zation, HSAS ulti mately found it self on the front lines of a wave of ur ban terrorism after the Viet Cong began attack ing Ameri can facil i ties in Sai gon in 1964.

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The command also became mired in a con troversy surround ing its second com- manding of ficer , Capt. Archie C. Kuntze. Although he was later cleared of the charge, the press accused Kuntze of en gaging in black-market ac tiv i ties in Sai gon during a period when the black market repre sented a ma jor supply source for the Viet Cong and was be com ing a blight on South Viet nam’s fragile econ omy. The story of HSAS’s strug gles to feed, house, and sup ply Amer ica’s in ten sive buildup in Viet nam, de fend the cap i tal city from ter rorism, and han dle an ex plo sive con tro versy sur round ing its sec ond com mand ing of fi cer is that of one of the navy’s greatest and least un derstood achieve ments of the war. Headq uart ers Supp ort Activ ity Saigon Headquar ters Support Activ ity Sai gon was commis sioned on 1 July 1962 at a cere - mony in Sai gon’s Kinh Do The ater. When Capt. Malcolm C. Fried man, the first HSAS commander, took over the ac tivity, he knew that it would be a huge job for the navy, but the ex tent and rate of the ac tivity’s growth, espe cial ly in the year after he de parted, sur prised even him.3 When the com mand was es tablished, it was de - signed to sup port a max i mum of nine thou sand men; by June 1964, when Fried- man left the job, it was di rectly sustain ing over twenty-five thou sand U.S. mili tary and gov ernment per son nel in 240 loca tions. HSAS grew from 445 active-duty per - son nel in 1962 to 1,600 in De cember 1965. By 1966, the command was pro vid ing housing, utili ti es, transpor ta tion, police protec tio n, legal aid, medi cal care, food ser vices, shop ping, rec re ation, ed u ca tion, pay, and re li gious ser vices for over fif teen thou sand Amer i can and al lied per son nel in Sai gon. It ex tended ad di tional ser vices to the over 180,000 U.S. soldiers, sail ors, air men, and Ma rines sta tioned through - out Viet nam. In just three years’ time, HSAS had grown to be come the larg est and most im por tant na val shore fa cility in the world.4 The navy traces its formal in volve ment in Viet nam to 1950, when the U.S. Mili - tary Assis tance Advi sory Group (MAAG) was es tablished to take over from the French the role of training the South Vietnam ese armed forces. As the advi sory role expanded and MAAG became the U.S. Mili tary Assis tance Command Vietnam (MACV) in 1962, the U.S. armed forces recog nized that they would need a dedi - cated logis tics outfit to sup port the larger command. As “admin is tra tive agent” for all U.S. armed forces in the Pacific, the navy became re sponsi ble for provid ing logis - tics support for the MACV headquar ters and other ac tivi ties and units des ignated by the Chief of Naval Oper a tions—a tall task for a service more accus tomed to manag ing seaborne and port logis tics than dry-land oper a tions in an urban area.5 The magni tude of the challenge was exac er bated further by the poor state of the Vietnam ese infra struc ture. When Captain Friedman arrived in Saigon in 1962, he found a city more than thirty years behind most Ameri can urban areas in terms of roads, electric i ty, water, and sewage systems. Only 203 miles of narrow roads existed for a city of two mil lion peo ple, 642,000 motor ve hi cles, a half-mil lion bicy cles and

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rick shaws (cyclopousses), and thou sands of ani mal-powered carts. The smell of human and an i mal excre ment per meated nearly every corner of the city.6 The poor san itary con ditions in Sai gon made food service one of Friedman’s top pri or i ties. HSAS in her ited six en listed messes from the army, and one of its first chal lenges was sup ply ing food for these fa cili ties.7 It had to ac quire forty-two thousand cu bic feet of addi tional re frig erated space in 1962 just to maintain its stocks of fresh and frozen food in a city where the av erage daytime high tem pera ture was ninety de grees Fahr en heit.8 A food-inspec tion service, complete with army vet eri - nari ans, had to be devel oped from scratch. By 1966 HSAS was feeding or pro vid ing basic foodstuffs for more than 180,000 troops in the coun try, serving over ten thou - sand meals a day, and racking up $500,000 worth of mess sales a month.9 In or der to downplay the Ameri can presence in the city and placate South Viet- nam ese gov ernment of fi cials sensi tive about the is sue, HSAS could not build a cen- tralized Ameri can base com plex in the heart of Saigon. Instead, it had to lease facil i ties throughout the ur ban area on an ad hoc basis. “There was always a problem in setting up a lease that was accept able to the Vietnam ese and also to our mili - tary require ments,” explained Friedman, but “the Vietnam ese did build things for us on a hand shake and lease them to us.”10 By Decem ber 1965, HSAS was manag- ing 318 construc tion con tracts at a cost of four million dol lars and had signed real-es tate leases worth nearly nine mil lion.11 The fa cility that per haps best il lus trated the real es tate, main te nance, and con - struc tion chal lenges con fronted by HSAS was Sta tion Hos pi tal Sai gon. South Viet - namese govern ment restric tions on building new facil i ties compelled HSAS to acquire a building on the open market and then convert it to a func tional hundred- bed hos pi tal.12 The HSAS real-estate de part ment even tu ally found a di lap i dated five-story apart ment house on Tran Hung Dao, one of downtown Saigon’s busiest thor ough fares.13 Since the hospi tal initially had no kitchen, food had to be transported to patients from nearby enlisted quarters. The “cast room” was an open-air space near some sheds.14 Ambu la tory pa tients had to walk cross the busy Tran Hung Dao to reach the X-ray depart ment, located in the Metropole Hotel; nonambulatory patients had to be transported there by one of the hos pital’s four ambu lanc es or by stretcher and gurney.15 The hos pi tal was sur rounded by a con crete wall topped with wire grenade screens and guarded by mil i tary po lice and Viet nam ese sol diers. Ten med i cal of fi - cers, two med i cal service of fi cers, six teen nurses, and ninety hos pi tal corps men worked in the hospi tal. 16 The navy ob tained per mis sion from the Viet nam ese gov- ernment to con struct several new facil i ties near the hos pi tal, in cluding a mod ern kitchen, a din ing room, and a surgi cal suite. During the construc tion of the 1,500-square-foot sur gi cal suite, lo cal con struc tion work ers rou tinely def e cated on

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the floors of unfin ished bathrooms, compel ling HSAS to disin fect those spaces completely on a daily basis. 17 “I learned a great lesson there,” Cap tain Fried man later recounted. “You cannot convert these people into indoor plumb ing over - night. They are just not ready for it.”18 Such were the challeng es of building and oper at ing a modern hospi tal in Saigon in the early 1960s, but it should be stressed that HSAS stood up the hospi tal in just six weeks.19 During its first year of op era tion, it treated three hun dred in pa tients and 1,800 out pa tients, and by 1965 these num bers had grown to 2,500 and 53,000, re spec tively.20 In the end, the pro fes sion al ism and ex per tise of the navy med i cal staff compen sated for the physi cal defi cien cies of the hospi t al. Upon com mis sion ing, HSAS assumed re spon si bility for nine BOQs and seven bache lor en listed men’s quarters (BEQs), with the capac ity to hold two thousand men; by 1965 it was running fifty-four such facil i ties plus four tran sient ho tels, hous ing more than 6,400 mil i tary per son nel. Most of these fa cili ties were converted ho tels and apart ment build ings, spread out in the down town area of Sai gon. HSAS gen er ally pro vided quar ters with air-con di tion ing, maid ser vice, and po ta ble hot and cold run ning water. 21 During the Vietnam War, the navy op erated fifty-three commis sar ies in the con ti nen tal United States and thirty-six overseas. These stores did over $224 mil - lion in busi ness. On 18 Au gust 1965, HSAS opened a brand-new com mis sary in Sai - gon. The new store stocked over 1,400 items, such as 130 va ri et ies of chilled and frozen food and fifty kinds of produce. It supported the entire allied mili tary com munity in Sai gon and 260 mili tary clubs in the field. Dur ing 1965, the store regis tered over $300,000 worth of sales per month and man aged an inven tory ap proaching three mil lion dol lars. Us ing a lo cal con trac tor, HSAS built the flag ship store in just three months.22 HSAS also oper ated the largest Navy Exchang e system in the world, with a central store in Sai gon and a hun dred sat ellite op era tions in the field.23 The sys tem of - fered ser vicemen a wide vari ety of retail goods plus such spe cialized services as watch repair, engr aving, photo graph devel op men t, tailor ing , dry cleaning, and hot food served in a cafe te ria. The exchange in Saigon stocked basic items like toi letries, candy, to bacco, station ery, and uni forms, as well as ap pli ances, cameras, and elec- tron ics. By Decem ber 1965 it employed eight hun dred peo ple and required 160,000 feet of stor age space. Exchang es received little appro pri ated-fund support from the govern ment. They mainly supported them selves through their oper a tions, but they still managed to keep prices lower than equiva lent commer cial stores.24 The prof its earned by the Viet nam op era tion went to sup port the Spe cial Ser- vices Divi sion, which pro vided recre ation for all U.S. forces in Vietnam. The divi - sion op er ated bowl ing al leys, craft shops, movie theaters , swim ming pools, librar- ies, and even a waterskiing con ces sion. It also ran rest-and-recre ation (R&R)

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flights to Hong Kong, Bangkok, Tai wan, the Phil ip pines, and Ja pan. The Pershing Field ath letic com plex of fered soft ball, ten nis, hand ball, vol ley ball, bas ket ball, and archery. The hobby shop sold ten thousand dollars’ worth of mer chandise per month to over 1,700 pa trons. By the end of 1965, a li brary system with nine branches maintained a col lection of twenty-four thou sand vol umes. It also mailed out over sixty thou sand newspa pers and maga zines a month to more than 750 field units.25 To man age its burgeon ing workforce of Vietnam ese civil ians, HSAS estab lished an Indus trial Re lations De part ment, which among other things cre ated an em - ployee clas si fi ca tion sys tem, pay sched ules, ca reer de vel op ment plans, and man agement practices. As Fried man later put it, “We ended up with a small civil ser vice commis sion” to admin is ter a civil ian workforce that by 1966 had grown to seven thou sand peo ple.26 This large, well or ganized ci vil ian workforce en abled HSAS’s compact mili tary staff to pro vide logis tics support for the Amer ican buildup in South Vietnam at very low cost.27 The scale of HSAS’s mission can per haps best be de fined by the amount of money it handled. By 1966, it ac counted for over two hundred million dollars in appro pri - ated funds. Ninety percent of this money went to support other mil itary com mands, includ ing 237 cash ac counts held by units in the field. In Saigon alone, the HSAS dis- burs ing offi cer spent over thirteen million dollars per month and completed over 91.2 million piastres ($1.2 million) in foreign-cur rency transac tions. 28 HSAS not only pumped millions of dol lars into the Vietnam ese economy and employed thousands of locals but also sought to help bolster MACV’s popu lar sup - port through a vari ety of civil ian assis tance or “civic action” program s designe d to help “win hearts and minds.” Project HANDCLASP, admin is tered by the HSAS chap- lain’s office, distrib uted over two hundred tons of supplies to remote villages and ham lets in South Viet nam in 1965. Estab lished in 1959, HANDCLASP was de signed to enhance percep tions of the United States and the U.S. Navy through the distri bu - tion of hu man i tar ian, ed u ca tional, and good will ma te rial to dis ad van taged peo ple in foreign countries throughout the world. Through direct person-to-per son con - tact in the con duct of com mu nity-re la tions en deav ors, the op er a tion si mul ta- neously al lowed U.S. Navy per son nel to gain in sight into other na tions and cultures. HANDCLASP received donated goods from U.S. compa nies and nonprofit orga ni za tions and transported them to Vietnam and other loca tions worldwide on navy ships, utiliz ing chaplains and navy volun teers to distrib ute the items. Goods inclu ded toys, clothes, edu ca tiona l mate ri al s, food and household items, medi cal sup plies, tools, and con struc tion ma te ri als.29 A cor nerstone of navy civic action in Vietnam, medi cal civic-ac tion program s (MEDCAPs) provided free medi cal care, vacci na tions, and medi cine s to Vietnam e se civil ians in Sai gon as well as in the coun try side. When twenty thou sand Sai gon-area

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civil ians were struck with cholera in 1964, fifteen navy med ical per sonnel from Naval Medi cal Research Unit 2 helped estab lish a 160-bed treat ment fa cility at Sai gon’s Cho Quan Infec tious Dis ease Hospi tal, where, along with 425 Viet nam ese med i cal staff, they treated 1,877 chol era victims and largely brought the dis ease under control in just one month’s time.30 Work ing on week ends, den tal teams from the HSAS dental de part ment of ten treated two hun dred Vietnam ese pa tients in a sin gle ten-hour vil lage MEDCAP.31 In 1965, Station Hos pi tal Sai gon performed surger ies on fifty civil ian pa tients suf fering from hare lips and cleft pal ates, in an op era tion called CLEFT LIP. HSAS was the navy’s most complex, multi faceted com mand of its size in the early 1960s. It performed a tre mendous va riety of roles, ranging from those of a tra - di tional navy sup ply or ga ni za tion to oth ers more ap pro pri ate to a mu nic i pal gov- ernment. That the HSAS staff rose to the occa sion and ran most of the command’s di verse and far-rang ing activ i ties in a pro fes sional and ef fi cient man ner speaks vol - umes about the tal ent of its naval person nel. Whether it involved building a new commis sary in Saigon or dealing with a cholera epi demic, HSAS per sonnel proved willing to take on nearly any task as signed, no mat ter how large or small. De spite the diffi cult living and working condi tions of Sai gon, most HSAS sailors performed their jobs with good cheer and opti mism, but few activ ities in Saigon proved simple, even running basic medi cal facil i ties. This was es pe cially true during the wave of ter ror that struck the city be ginning in early 1964. A New Kind of War: Terror ism in Sai gon, 1964–1966 The first major terror ist at tack against an HSAS facil ity occurred on 9 Febru ary 1964 at the Pershing Field recre ational complex in Saigon. A bomb fabri cated from a mortar shell exploded un der the bleachers of a baseball park during a game, kill ing two Amer i cans and wound ing twenty-four oth ers. Wit nesses noted that the Viet - nam ese chil dren who usu ally played around the field had left be fore the blast. In - vesti gators later found a wire leading from the crater to a toilet area used by a Vietnam ese national employed by the facil ity. HSAS re luctantly closed this pop ular R&R facil ity af ter the at tack.32 The Viet Cong struck again on the 16th at the Capi tal Kinh Do Theater, where HSAS had been commis sioned. A group of Viet Cong terror ists gunned down Pvt. 1st Class Peter M. Feierabend, an army mili tary po liceman guarding the facil ity. 33 They then rolled an ex plo sive de vice in a coffee can down the center aisle of the the - ater dur ing a Sunday show ing of The Di ary of Anne Frank (1959). An alert Marine, Capt. Donald E. Koelper, noticed the device and leaped to the stage to warn every - one to take cover. The bomb killed Koelper and wounded thirty-six other Ameri - cans, includ ing three dependent children. When the navy estab lished HSAS, it viewed its major mission as logis tics support, not force pro tection or counterterrorism. In fact, from 1962 to 1964, HSAS

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Saigon’s entire secu rity ele ment consisted of a 181-man U.S. Army Mili tary Po lice (MP) company. 34 This unit, augmented by Vietnam ese National Police and Viet- namese Mili ta ry Police, was respon si ble for guarding all majo r Ameri can mili t ary in stal lations in Sai gon. After the Brink Ho tel bomb ing in Decem ber 1964, MACV de cided to re in force the 560th MP Com pany with the 575-man 716th MP battal ion, but USAID offi cials initially refused to sign off on the plan, ar guing that se curity should be left to the Viet nam ese.35 Instead, HSAS had to beef up its se curity force by acti vat ing a sixty-five-man navy landing force to provide addi tional guards for facil i ties.36 Not un til after at tacks on Ameri can bases at Bien Hoa and Pleiku did MACV prevail in this de bate, but even with an expanded MP force HSAS never had enough secu rity resources to defend properly all of its facil i ties from Viet Cong ter- rorists. In 1965, MACV esti mated that HSAS needed a mini mum of 1,500 addi tional Ameri can troops to grapple with the problem. 37 America was slow to rec ognize that ter rorism, far from be ing an oc casional an noy ance, was a core strat egy of the Viet Cong and that Sai gon was its cen tral front.38 The de cen tral ized na ture of HSAS fa cil i ties made them par tic u larly vul ner a ble to ter rorist at tacks. Friedman noted, “It was a ma jor prob lem. . . . [W]e had to lease fa cil i ties where they were.”39 HSAS was respon si ble for the se curity of 190 manned struc tures and ho tels in Sai gon, as well as the streets surround ing those build ings.40 Even buses for Amer i can ser vice men and de pend ents trav el ing be tween fa cil i ties had to be guarded.41 The port of Sai gon posed a partic u larly daunting secu rity challenge. It was far and away Vietnam’s busiest port, ranking for much of the war as one of the world’s top twenty ports in terms of cargo handled. In 1964, HSAS’s Port Termi nal Divi sion handled thirty ships and over thirty thousand tons of cargo a month. Port person nel worked twelve-hour, seven-day-a-week shifts to keep up with the moun tain of sup plies arriv ing in Sai gon. One of the navy’s biggest con cerns was that the Viet Cong might se - verely disrupt this flow by sinking a vessel in Saigon harbor or the forty-six-mile shipping channel that ran from Vung Tau to Sai gon.42 That fear almost came true on 2 May 1964, when Viet Cong sabo teurs blew a three-by-twelve-foot hole in the hull of USNS Card (T-AKV 40), a former escort carrier converted into an air craft ferry. The ex plo - sion occurred amidships, just above the wa terline, and twenty-four minutes after the blast Card settled to the bottom of the forty-eight-foot-deep channel. In a matter of minutes, Viet Cong sappers had done what no German U-boat had accom plished in World War II—sink Card, which had won a Presi den tial Unit Cita tion and three battle stars in that con flict. It was the first ma jor U.S. vessel to be sunk in ac tion in the Viet - nam War.43 Although no one died in the attack and the ship was re floated and towed away two days later, the Card in ci dent proved a pub lic-re la tions di sas ter, es pe cially since it oc curred right under the eyes of the en tire Sai gon-based foreign press corps. “The

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inci dent gave further evi dence of growing Viet Cong bold ness and the frequent in- ef fi ciency of South Viet nam ese se cu rity pro ce dures,” a Time mag a zine cor re spon- dent wrote.44 An edi to rial in the Boston Globe noted that “Amer ican prestige in Southeast Asia has been severely damaged. Even more dis turbing are indi ca tions of laxity that could make such a seri ous di saster pos si ble.”45 Army of the Repub lic of Viet nam (ARVN) troops had been re spon si ble for guarding the channel, and a company of air borne troops had been in the area during the at tack, but these secu - rity forces had failed to prevent the attack. Accord ing to Friedman, “the Vietnam ese had been sort of lacka dai si cal” about secu rity. 46 One year after the Card at tack, mili tary port op era tions in Saigon reached a new high: in Octo ber 1965, HSAS super vised the un load ing of 330,000 measure ment tons of mili tary cargo from ninety-six ships and shipped forty thou sand measure - ment tons to other ports in Vietnam via Mili tary Sea Transpor ta tion Service ships. To en sure that the ship ping lanes in Sai gon would be quickly reopened in the event of a fu ture min ing at tack, the navy as signed Harbor Clearance Team (HCT) 1 to Phu An, just out side of Sai gon, in Decem ber 1965. The team, which com prised var - i ous pieces of sal vage, dewatering, and lift equip ment and six teen navy di vers, stood ready to clear the Saigon wa terways of wrecks quickly. Three addi tional harbor- clearance teams based out of Subic Bay, in the Philip pines, could be quickly airlifted to Saigon should person nel or equipment be needed to aug ment HCT-1.47 Viet Cong terror ism in the Saigon area tapered off during the summer of 1964 and then re sumed 1 No vem ber, with an at tack on the Bien Hoa air base, twenty-five ki lo me ters north east of Sai gon.48 Follow ing the Bien Hoa attack, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the MACV com mander, airlifted U.S. Army and Marine troops to augment the de fenses of Da Nang, Bien Hoa, and other air fields, but he re jected the idea of utiliz ing Ameri can ground troops in a static-defense role over the long term. He strongly believed that the proper role for U.S. ground forces was offen sive oper - a tions against en emy units in the field. Base de fense, he rea soned, was the respon si - bility of tenant forces, security police, and the ARVN. The Viet Cong attacks on the Brink Hotel on 24 Decem ber and on Camp Hol lo- way in Pleiku province on 7 Febru ary 1965 again highlighted the in ad equacy of the base secu rity country wide. At Pleiku, the Viet Cong fired 81-mm mortar, 57-mm recoil less rifle, and rifle grenade rounds into the U.S. adviser compound and the 52nd Avi a tion Bat tal ion area for fif teen min utes, kill ing eight Amer i can ser vice men and wound ing another 108.49 Pleiku helped con vince Presi dent Lyndon B. Johnson to evacu ate U.S. gov ernment and military dependents from Vietnam. No building symbol ized the Ameri can involve ment in Vietnam more than the Ameri can embassy in Saigon. A former French commer cial house, the chancery was located near the Caravelle Ho tel and the Cen tral Market. Wooden road barri cades surrounded the building to prevent cars from parking near it, and six Vietnam ese

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Na tional Po lice stood guard at all times. Nonethe less, at 10:46 AM on 30 March 1965, a Viet Cong ter rorist deto nated a 250-pound bomb hidden in a se dan in front of the embassy while a second terror ist opened fire on the guards from a scooter. The bomb blast, which could be heard as far as Tan Son Nhut airfield, blew out every window in the five-story chan cery and turned the first floor into knee-deep rub - ble. It also destroyed the Viet nam ese restau rant across the street and nu merous ve hi cles parked across the street. Ca sual ties in cluded seven teen killed and twenty- seven wounded.50 A favor ite hangout for Ameri cans in Saigon was the My Canh Café, a float ing restau rant on the Saigon River renowned for its good Vietnam ese food and river - side views. On 26 June 1965, a grenade ex ploded in the es tablish ment at the height of the dinner hour. Then, as dazed and wounded custom ers tried to flee to shore by way of a gang plank, a mine planted in the river bank exploded, causing mass casu al - ties among them. In all, thirty-two people were killed, and another forty-two were wounded.51 Accord ing to Construc tion Elec trician (Wiring) Third Class William Gary Hadley, a twenty-year-old Seabee who assisted in recov er ing bodies after the at - tack, “There were pools of blood and shattered glass every where. This is the first time I had ever seen so many dead and wounded people. I remem ber carry ing a decap i - tated body out of the restau rant. After I got back to my billet, I was cov ered in blood and had to throw out all my clothes. Blood had even got ten inside my boots.”52 The next big attack occurred approx i mately six months later. Just be fore dawn on 4 Decem ber 1965, a grey panel truck packed with 250 pounds of plastique blew up in front of the Metropole Hotel, a large enlisted billet housing 160 Ameri can ser- vicemen. The blast sheared off several stories of the converted ho tel’s facade, killing eight and wounding another ninety-five.53 One of the last ma jor bombings before HSAS was dises tab lished occurred at the Victo ria Hotel BOQ on 1 April 1966. At 5:15 in the morning, a group of terror ists approached the bil let, which housed two hundred junior offi cers from all services, and began firing auto matic weapons at the Ameri can and Vietnam ese guards at the build ing’s en trance. A grey panel truck con tain ing two hun dred pounds of ex plo - sives then drove up and det o nated in front of the building, destroy ing the first two floors and damag ing the third. The blast killed three Ameri cans and wounded another 113.54 As these ex am ples reveal, the ter rorist bombings that oc curred in Saigon between Febru ary 1964 and April 1966 repre sented a com pletely new type of war for Ameri can forces—one the mili tary assis tance command had not antic i pated. HSAS devel oped Amer ican fa cili ties in Saigon ac cording to the wishes of South Vietnam - ese offi cials. Where possi ble, as noted above, these pol iti cians wanted the Ameri - cans to lease pre ex ist ing facil i ties in Sai gon rather than build a cen tral ized base com plex. The pol icy was de signed to down play the Amer i can pres ence and also

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pump money into the hands of local prop erty owners and business men. However, it also made these fa cili ties per fect targets for urban terror ists. The build ings were not only hard to defend but also poorly construc ted. “They did not use enough rebar [rein forcing bars] in the con crete,” ex plained Maj. I. Thomas Sheppard, a for - mer army in tel li gence offi cer at tached to MACV, “so when bombs went off near them, the dev as ta tion was hor ri ble.” The Viet nam ese af fec tion for floor-to-ceil ing glass windows and slid ing glass doors ex acer bated the prob lem. The back of the Metropole, for ex am ple, was mostly glass, and no one had been in structed to tape win dows be fore the blast. Ac cord ing to Hadley, “There was so much glass in some of the bod ies that they could n’t be safely picked up.”55 After the bombings commence d, HSAS tried to improve the physi cal secu rity of its structures by adding more guards and placing vehi cle barri ers near major buildings, but in the end HSAS never had the manpower to defend Saigon ade quately from terror i sm.56 By 1966, it still had only one bat tal ion of MPs, augmented by Viet - namese police, to provide secu rity for nearly two hundred instal la tions. Further - more, even heavily guarded buildings proved vulner a ble to bomb ing, given their loca tions on busy city streets. Af ter the Victo ria attack, HSAS actu ally had to block many boule vards with con crete cylin ders filled with sand or concrete. By 1966 MPs had also for ti fied all of their posts with sand-filled fifty-gallon drums and sand - bags.57 Such measures made Saigon look like an armed Ameri can camp, greatly in- conve nience d the local citi zenr y, and yet failed to pre vent the capi tal city from once again becom ing an urban war zone during the 1968 Tet Offen sive. A base complex outside the city within a forti fied and well defended per ime ter would not only have been much easier to se cure but also have mit i gated the U.S. presence and ap peased the lo cal pop u lace. The Mayor of Saigon The man at the cen ter of the U.S. battle against terror ism dur ing the 1964–66 pe - riod was Capt. Archie Kuntze, who re placed Malcolm Friedman as the com mander of HSAS in June 1964. Infor mally known as the “mayor of Sai gon,” Kuntze visited nearly every bombing scene during his ten ure, occa sion ally assum ing the role of on-scene commander for first respond ers.58 The twin de mands of the rapid U.S. mili tary buildup and the increas ing inci dents or terror attacks made his job one of the most de mand ing in the navy. To feed, house, and guard Sai gon’s burgeon ing Ameri can popu la tion, Kuntze occa sion ally had to cut corners. Sometimes this meant writing sole-source contracts with local contrac tors rather than taking the time to open contract s for compet i tive bidding. In other cases, it meant buy ing Ameri can goods or chang ing money for Viet nam ese of fi cials at the army Post Ex change (PX) for the sake of rela tion ship-build ing. As Kuntze put it in a 1966 mem o randum to the sec retary of the navy,

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The assign ment in Saigon was a dif ficult one. The rapid es cala tion of the conflict placed tre- men dous de mands upon me and my staff. There was no pre ce dent in navy man u als for this type of command in the sit ua tion exist ing in Vietnam. Problems that did not have answers in the rule books were con stantly placed before me re quir ing im me diate solu tions that might other wise have been con sidered irreg u lar. I cannot over em phasize the fact that I was a road builder without signs to point the way.59 Kuntze’s supe rior, Vice Adm. Edwin B. Hooper, the commander of Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, wrote that Kuntze was “never inhib ited by red tape, never bash - ful, but always ener getic, imagi na tive, aggres sive, and ambi tious.” 60 The very skills that made Kuntze the per fect man to run HSAS also made him vul - nera ble to charges of im pro priety. On 14 No vem ber 1966, a general court-mar tial found him guilty on three spec ifi ca tions of a charge of conduct “unbe com ing of an of ficer.” The navy had not court-martialed a navy captain for personal conduct since 1951, and the Kuntze trial emerged as one of the most fa mous navy courts-martial of the twen ti eth cen tury.61 The fall of Kuntze and the legacy of his com mand proved to be a public-re la tions fi asco for the navy in Viet nam. The story dem on strates how ap - pearances of impro pri ety in a mil i tary context of ten cause more dam age than the im - propri eties themselves, espe ciall y in a command under the micro scope of the press and sub ject to petty jeal ou sies of the other services. Given the chal lenges of working in a cor rupt third-world country, Kuntze might have survived the contro versy had he bent rules only for the good of the navy, but he also broke a few for his girlfriend, and it was those vio la tions that ulti mately led to his convic tion. 62 A native of Sheboygan, Wiscon sin, Kuntze gradu ated from the Naval Academy in 1943 and saw ex ten sive com bat in the Pa cific during World War II as a de stroyer offi cer. In Ko rea he commanded USS Begor (APD 127), a high-speed trans port that in serted par ti sans onto the coast of North Ko rea in 1951. Af ter the war, he com - manded Mine Squad ron 7 and held var i ous staff as signments with Sev enth Fleet and the Bu reau of Per son nel. Kuntze took over HSAS on 6 June 1964 and im me di - ately be gan raising some eye brows with his life style. He es tab lished his quar ters in an ele gant former French villa, elabo rately deco rated the man sion’s many rooms in var i ous styles, and placed two stuffed Asian ti gers at the base of its grand stair way. Re cently sepa rated, he lived in his pa latial digs with a beau ti ful twenty-six-year-old Tai wanese girlfriend, Jannie Suen, and soon gained a repu ta tion in Sai gon for hold- ing “lavish” parties and rub bing shoulders with many of the town’s elite.63 Kuntze’s lifestyle may have led to some grumbling, but it was not unusual. The Viet nam ese had been ac customed since the French co lo nial pe riod to for eign mili - tary of fi cers liv ing in glam or ous vil las. What ini tially sparked an in ves ti ga tion of Kuntze was alle ga tions of cor ruption and black marketeering. In 1965, several beer dis trib u tors ac cused Kuntze, who con trolled all li quor pro cure ment for the U.S. mil i tary, of giv ing contracts to one or two ven dors and ex cluding the rest. Since Jannie Suen worked for one of the liquor distrib u tors under contract with HSAS, its

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compet i tors assumed that Kuntze was steering business toward her company. That same year, the press learned that the Sai gon HSAS had ordered 150,000 cans of women’s hair spray for an Amer i can female pop ula tion of just 750. Ap parently GIs wanted the spray for their Viet nam ese girlfriends, and Kuntze’s pol icy was to sell goods that service men de manded. Un for tu nately for Kuntze, these so-called girl - friends later re sold many of the hair-spray bot tles to street vendors. Given Sai gon’s problems with the black mar ket, any hint that Kuntze’s actions might be fueling such ac tiv ity caused a storm of contro versy. 64 As the U.S. pres ence had grown in South Viet nam, so too had the black mar ket for foreign goods in Saigon. Black markets and currency manip ula tions had be - come major causes of infla tion and were to be para sites on the Viet namese economy for the entire war. By the mid-1960s, one could buy anything from Ameri can lip stick to NATO-cal i ber ammu ni tion and M-16 ri fles in Sai gon street stalls. Essen - tially, any item sold through the exchanges or brought into Viet nam to sup ply the U.S. armed forces could end up in the black market and be re sold. Because Viet- namese did not have exchang e privi lege s, they were willing to pay a premium for these goods. The black market was also an impor tant sup ply source for the Viet Cong. Some his to rians es ti mate that 80 per cent of the Viet Cong sup plies dur ing this period came from the Saigon open and black mar kets. Some of the goods origi - nated from GIs, who purchased mer chan dise in the ex change and re sold it for a profit to the vendors, but much of the black-market merchan dise was stolen. Dur- ing 1965 alone, exchange losses from pil fering amounted to $2.25 mil lion out of $50 million in to tal sales—a loss rate of 4.5 percent. Goods disap peared lit erally by the truck load from poorly guarded warehouses. By 1966, some items even had to be rationed to curb black marketeering, and the Vietnam ese Na tional Po lice began mak ing raids on stalls sus pected of sell ing black-market goods.65 The cata lyst that finall y prompted MACV to initi ate an in vesti ga tion of Kuntze, however, was not the hair-spray contro versy but the ar rest of Jannie Suen by the Viet nam ese Mili tary Secu rity Service (MSS) on 7 Janu ary 1966. A ship ment of cloth from Thailand to her apartment with no proof of duties paid prompted the arrest. Since Suen’s fa ther ran a dress shop in Tai pei, MSS of fi cials sus pected that she might be involved in the ille gal impor ta tion of cloth. Al though Suen was release d a few days later without any charges filed, the inci dent prompted MACV to go ahead with an in ves ti ga tion of Kuntze.66 Com mander, Na val Forces Viet nam launched two sep a rate in ves ti ga tions: a board of inquiry, consist ing of four navy captains, and a Naval Inves ti ga tive Service (NIS) in ves ti ga tion. Both in ves ti ga tions ex am ined Kuntze’s pur chases of mer chan - dise abroad “for the accom mo da tion of Miss Jannie Suen” and the possi ble mis use of govern ment aircraf t for such junkets. They also looked at his finan cial records, to see whether there was any ev i dence of ille gal currency exchanges or other types of

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fraud. Finally, they ex plored his re lation ship with Suen, to deter mine whether Kuntze had en gaged in conduct un becom ing of an offi cer with her. Kuntze was in the process of divorc ing his first wife during his tour in Vietnam, so the board chose not to inves ti gate him for adultery, but they did in vesti gate the lesser offense of co- hab i ta tion out side of mar riage.67 The inves ti ga tions into Kuntze’s finan cial transac tions revealed inter est ing de - tails about Kuntze and HSAS but not enough hard ev i dence of wrong do ing to con - vict the cap tain of money laun der ing. From Au gust 1965 to March 1966 Kuntze had exe cuted sixteen “ex-cash” transac tions total ing $14,372. These transac tions had involved the exchang e of piastres for U.S. Treasury checks denom i nated in dollars. Kuntze had then mailed these checks to his ac count at Chase Manhattan Bank in New York. The accep tance of mili tary pay ment certif i cates as a repay ment of debt from a foreign national would have been against regu lations, but nei ther the board nor the court-martial uncov ered enough evi dence to con vict him of this charge.68 Some of Kuntze’s transac tions needed to be kept confi den tial for polit i cal reasons. When asked by the board of in quiry to pro duce a full account ing of the trans - actions, Kuntze refused, argu ing that such “expla na tion would certainly, in many in stances, be most em barrass ing to of fi cials high in the gov ern ment of both the United States and Viet nam. . . . [S]ome [are] mat ters which can not be ex plained without possi ble polit i cal reper cus sions, partic u larly on the local scene.”69 In his court-martial he pro vided more de tails, claiming that some of the transac tions had been repay ments from Viet nam ese for “ra dios and fans and other items for Viet - nam ese of fi cials.” Kuntze be lieved that do ing small fa vors for Viet nam ese of fi cials “was in the best inter est of the United States.”70 Others were for CIA agents, who had requested that he change money for them.71 The net effect of indi vid u als or compa nies convert ing piastres to dollars and then ship ping those dol lars over seas was run away in flation and con tin ued loss of con fi dence in the South Viet nam ese econ omy. As his to rian Wil liam Thomas Allison puts it, “The South Viet nam ese gov ernment, U.S. aid pro grams, and the U.S. mili tary PX, club, and mess sys tems . . . fer til ized an al ready well-tilled black market with cash, from which the weedy seeds of corrup tion took even greater root.”72 Many of the en ter prises con trolled by HSAS in di rectly (in some cases di - rectly) fu eled black-mar ket ac tiv ity. As a con se quence, al le ga tions that Cap tain Kuntze may have been fanning the flames of corrup tion even further by changing money or buying exchange merchan dise for Vietnamese officials created a furor in the press. In its fi nal re port, the board of in quiry chas tised Kuntze for buying goods for Viet nam ese: “The board consid ers that by the pur chase of merchan dise from the Navy Ex change and the im por ta tion of li quors for sale to Viet nam ese nation als, with out ref er ence to their en ti tle ment to such ma te ri als un der ei ther MACV

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Direc tives or Viet nam ese law, Captain Kuntze showed ut ter dis regard for both U.S. regu lations and Viet nam ese law and thereby acted in a man ner reflect ing adversely upon the po si tion of Com mand ing Of fi cer, HSAS.”73 In the end, how ever, no charges were filed for these actions. Ulti mately, the court-martial found enough hard evi dence of wrongdo ing to convict him only of per mit ting a for eign fe male to “reside openly and no to ri ously” in his offi cial quar ters, al low ing her to use an offi - cial vehi cle, and unlaw fully import ing 250 yards of cloth from Thailand. As punish - ment, he was given a repri mand and “bumped” a hundred numbers on the lineal list, effec tively ending his chances of pro motion. He retired soon after the trial ended. “Had I adhered strictly to ‘The Book’ heav ens knows where we would be today,” Kuntze later wrote in a letter to Rear Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. “To do the job was the most impor tant thing and the job was done. What must be remem bere d is that the orient is an other world com pared to the staffs and business methods; deal - ings and politics are very different.”74 Despite an increas ing terror ist threat, a chaotic business envi ron ment, and a mush rooming influx of Ameri can troops, HSAS met nearly all of its funda mental lo gistic goals, and Kuntze de serves much of the credit for this suc cess. However, his “damn the tor pedoes” atti tude also caused prob lems. Cut ting corners by secur ing sole-source contracts with proven vendors may have saved HSAS valuable time, but it also created en emies. Kuntze’s flamboy ant life style caused even more dif fi culties for the com mand. As Lt. Cdr. Bill Manthorpe, the of ficer in charge of the NIS inves - tiga tion of Kuntze, put it, “What was most irri tat ing to the incre asing number of army gener als in town was seeing a mere navy cap tain driv ing around town in an air-condi tioned car with white-walled tires and other alleg ed aspects of high living.”75 Clearly, these offi cers believed that a man in charge of millions of dollars should have behaved more modestly, especially given the media climate in Saigon. The in ter na tional me dia pres ence in Sai gon guar an teed that any thing hap pen - ing in Vietnam would be imme di ately broadcast across the inter na tional news wires. From hair-spray deliv er ies to barracks bombings, the me dia covered it all, and not al ways in a man ner favor able to HSAS. Press inter est in the Amer i can buildup and in the “mayor of Saigon” also guaran teed that the navy’s repu ta tion would be sullied by the trial. It revealed a world where twenty-three million dol lars was kept in an icebox, black marketeering and cur rency manip ula tions were the norm, and Ameri can offi cers lived like James Bond, complete with villas and exotic young women. De spite all the sacri fices made by HSAS sail ors and of fi cers during the 1964–66 battle of Saigon and all the good work they did in support ing the Amer i can buildup and pro vid ing hu man i tar ian aid to the Viet nam ese, HSAS would be forever remem bered for its flamboyant commander, Archie Kuntze, and his various misdeeds.

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Some pop u lar his to ries and jour nal is tic ac counts of the ep i sode con tend that the U.S. Army ini ti ated the Kuntze in ves ti gations to help con vince MACV to trans fer the Sai gon lo gis tics func tion im me di ately to the army.76 In truth, plan ning for the trans fer had be gun sev eral years be fore the con tro versy erupted. In No vem ber 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff di rected Adm. Ulys ses S. Grant Sharp, Com mander in Chief, Pacific , to develop a logis tics oper a tion to support the Amer ican buildup. Sharp’s staff stud ied the is sue, concluded that ex ist ing arrange ments were inad e - quate to meet “the present inten sity of oper a tions,” and rec ommended that HSAS be replaced with an army logis tics command. The final MACV plan, which Admi ral Sharp signed in Decem ber 1964, envi sioned a new army logis tics command of 2,100 men to support a buildup of forty thousand men. HSAS would not be dises tab - lished im me di ately, but plan ning would begin for an eventual turn over of most of its re spon si bil i ties to the army.77 Port op era tions were transferred in the fall of 1965, followed by exchange services in De cem ber. By Feb ru ary 1966, pur chas ing, con tract ing, and ci vil ian ad min- istra tion had been turned over, and by April medi cal, mainte nance, supply and en gi neer ing, clubs and messes, spe cial ser vices, bil let ing, and pro vost op er a tions as well. On 17 May 1966, HSAS was awarded a Navy Unit Commen da tion and dis es- tablished. It would be the end of an era. Not until the first Gulf War would the navy again run such a large logis tics oper a tion. 78

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NOTES 1 Capt. Darby Reynolds, USN (Ret.), inter view by Dr. 835; HSAS Command Fact Sheet, 15 Decem ber Jan K. Herman and Capt. Pa tricia Col lins, USNR, 1965, item 15210104001, Vietnam Ar chive, Texas 27 April 1998, Navy Bu reau of Medi cine History Tech Univer sity , Lubbock , pp. 1–2; Marolda and Office, Washing ton, D.C., pp. 1–7; Lt. Cdr. Ann Fitz ger ald, United States Navy and the Viet nam Con - Darby Reynolds, Offi cer Bio File, 13 April 1970, Op- flict, pp. 255, 361. era tional Archives [hereaf ter AR], Naval History 5 Edwin Bickford Hooper, Mo bil ity, Sup port, En dur- and Heri tage Command [hereaf ter NHHC]; U.S. ance: A Story of Naval Op era tional Logis tics in the Pacifi c Fleet, “Annual Re port,” 26 June 1964–30 Vietnam War, 1965–1968 (Washing ton, D.C.: U.S. March 1965, p. 98, Post-1946 Com mand Files, AR, Navy Dept., NHD, 1972), p. 14. NHHC; Peer de Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of In tel li gence (New York: Times Books, 1978), 6 Hovis, Sta tion Hos pi tal Sai gon, pp. 46, 50. p. 254; Naval History Divi s ion [hereaf ter NHD], 7 HSAS, Draft History, Commander, Naval Forces Of fice of the Chief of Na val Op er a tions, “His tory of Viet nam [here af ter COMNAVFORV] Re cords, AR, U.S. Naval Oper ations in Southeast Asia,” vol. 3, pt. NHHC. 3, Febru ary 1971, p. 843, Viet nam Com mand Files 8 Malcolm C. Fried man, “Comments Concern ing the [hereaf ter VCF], AR, NHHC. Es tab lish ment and Prob lems of HEDSUPPACT Sai - 2 Com mander in Chief, U.S. Pacifi c Fleet [hereaf ter gon,” Ed ward J. Marolda Papers, AR, NHHC. Tem- CINCPACFLT] message 250002Z Decem ber 1964, per a ture data de rived from “Av er age Weather CINCPACFLT Mes sage Collec tion, AR, NHHC; Ed- Condi tions in Ho Chi Minh City,” BBC, www.bbc ward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzger ald, The United .co.uk/. States Navy and the Viet nam Con flict: From Mil i tary 9 “Four Years in Vietnam,” p. 16; NHD, “History of As sis tance to Con flict, 1959–1965 (Wash ing ton, U.S. Naval Oper a tions in Southeast Asia,” vol. 3, pt. D.C.: Naval Histor i cal Center, 1986), pp. 482–83; F. 3, pp. 837–39. O. McClendon, Jr., “Doc tors and Den tists, Nurses and Corpsmen in Vietnam,” U.S. Naval Insti tute 10 Fried man, “Com ments Con cern ing the Es tab lish- Pro ceed ings, Na val Re view Issue (May 1970), p. 279; ment and Prob lems of HEDSUPPACT Saigon”; Na tional Mil i tary Com mand Cen ter [here af ter Capt. Malcolm C Friedman, USN, inter view with NMCC] Op er a tional Sum mary [here af ter Opsum], Oscar P. Fitzger ald, p. 9, Oral His tory Collec tion, 26 Decem ber 1964, p. 2, box 94, NMCC Opsums, AR, NHHC [here af ter Fried man, in ter view]. Post-1946 Command Files, AR, NHHC. 11 Hooper, Mo bil ity, Sup port, En dur ance, pp. 63–64; 3 NHD, “History of U.S. Naval Oper a tions Viet nam,” “Four Years in Viet nam,” p. 17. vol. 2, “1964,” p. 135; Marolda and Fitzger ald, 12 Fried man, “Com ments Con cern ing the Es tab lish- United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, p. 357; ment and Prob lems of HEDSUPPACT Saigon,” p. Lt. Cdr. Bobbi Hovis, USN (Ret.), Station Hospi tal 3; Com mander, U.S. Mil i tary As sis tance Com mand Sai gon: A Navy Nurse in Vietnam, 1963–1964 Vietnam [hereaf ter COMUSMACV] message 1600Z (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In stitute Press, 1991), pp. Septem b er 1963, Hospi t al Saigon, Marolda Papers, 113–16. AR, NHHC; Head, Med ical De partment to Com - 4 “Four Years in Vietnam: HEDSUPPACT—Big Job,” mand ing Of fi cer, HSAS, mem o ran dum, “HSAS All Hands (June 1966), p. 16; NHD, “History of U.S. Medi ca l Depart ment, Saigon,” 17 Novem ber 1965, Na val Oper a tions in Southeast Asia,” vol. 3, pt. 3, p. Marolda Papers, AR, NHHC.

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13 Hovis, Sta tion Hos pi tal Sai gon, p. 39. COMUSMACV to Com mander in Chief, U.S. Pa- 14 Ibid., pp. 36–37, 42–43. cific Com mand [here af ter CINCPAC], mes sage 161540Z Febru ary 1964, Marolda Papers, AR, 15 Lt. Cdr. Alvina Harri son, “Mili tary Nursing in Viet NHHC. Nam, Jan u ary 1965 to 17 Feb ru ary 1966,” p. 2, NAVSUPPACT Sai gon Hospi tal, Nurse Corps Files, 34 HSAS, Command History, 1 July 1962, p. 10, box box 36, AR, NHHC. 182, VCF, AR, NHHC. 16 Jan Herman, “Navy Medi cin e in Vietnam,” draft 35 Graham A. Cosmas, The United States Army in Viet - manu script, 2 Janu ary 2007, p. 29; McClendon, nam: MACV, the Joint Com mand in the Years of Es - “Doc tors and Den tists, Nurses and Corps men in ca la tion, 1962–1967 (Wash ington, D.C.: Center of Vietnam,” p. 279. Mili tary History, 2006), p. 172. 17 Hovis, Sta tion Hos pi tal Sai gon, pp. 25, 41. 36 “U.S. Bomb Squads Search Mili tary Barracks,” Sai- gon Daily News, 26 Decem ber 1964, p. 6. 18 Friedman, inter view, p. 5. 37 COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, message 3004087 19 Fried man, “Com ments Con cern ing the Es tab lish- March 1965, “Request for Ad ditional Secu rity Per - ment and Prob lems of HEDSUPPACT Saigon,” sonnel,” March 1965 folder, box 219, Viet nam Flag p. 3. Plot, AR, NHHC. 20 Head, Med i cal De part ment to Com mand ing Of fi - 38 Silva, Sub Rosa, pp. 220, 247, 250. cer, HSAS, 17 No vem ber 1965, p. 4. 39 Fried man, in ter view. 21 Marolda and Fitzger ald, United States Navy and the Viet nam Con flict, pp. 255–57; HSAS, Command 40 Hooper, Mo bil ity, Sup port, En dur ance, p. 65. History, 1965, p. 5, Post-1946 Com mand Files, AR, 41 HSAS, Command History, 1965. NHHC; “Four Years in Viet nam,” p. 18. 42 Marolda and Fitzger ald, United States Navy and the 22 HSAS, Press Release 060-65, 18 August 1965, Viet nam Con flict, pp. 357–59; Capt. William H. Sheboygan County His tor i cal Re search Cen ter, Hardcastle, in ter view with Os car P. Fitz ger ald, 22 Sheboygan Falls, Wis.; “The Big Four,” Navy Sup ply April 1975, p. 81, Oral His tory Collec tion, AR, Corps Newslet ter (April 1966), p. 16; “Four Years in NHHC. Vietnam,” p. 21. 43 CINCPAC to Joint Chiefs of Staff [here af ter JCS], 23 NHD, “History of U.S. Naval Oper a tions Vietnam,” message 040201Z May 1964, “Sinking of USNS vol. 2, “1964,” p. 135. Card,” Card folder, box 205, CNO Flag Plot, AR, 24 Cdr. J. Scott Kirkwood, “The Renais sance Man,” NHHC; As so ciated Press, “U.S. Ship Is Sunk by Navy Supply Corps Newslet ter (April 1966), pp. 24– Vietnam ese Reds; Crewmen Escape,” New York 31; NHD, “His tory of U.S. Na val Op er ations in Times, 2 May 1964, p. 1. Southeast Asia,” vol. 3, pt. 3, pp. 842–43; “The Big 44 “Re mem ber the Card!,” Time, 8 May 1964, p. 31. Four,” pp. 14–15. 45 Edi to ri al, Boston Globe, 4 May 1964, cited in Com- 25 HEDSUPPACT Chronol ogy, box 182, VCF, AR, mander, First Naval District to Chief of Naval In for- NHHC; NHD, “His tory of U.S. Na val Op er ations in ma tion, message 041720Z May 1964, “CNO Press South east Asia,” vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 843; Hooper, Mobil - Brief ing Item,” Card folder, box 205, CNO Flag ity, Sup port, En dur ance, p. 62. Plot, AR, NHHC. 26 Friedman, inter view, p. 22. 46 HEDSUPPACT Saigon to Naval Support Activ ity 27 HSAS’s substi tu tion of Vietnam ese and contract Phila del phia, message 070715Z May 1964, “USNS workers for Ameri can mili tary person nel greatly im- Card,” Card folder, box 205, CNO Flag Plot, AR, pressed Glen Gibson, the Deputy Sec re tary of De- NHHC; Friedman, inter view, p. 30. fense for In stal la tions and Lo gis tics, who toured 47 Marolda and Fitzger ald, United States Navy and the HSAS’s facil i ties in Jan uary 1965. See Marolda and Viet nam Con flict, p. 356; Com mander, Sev enth Fleet Fitz ger ald, United States Navy and the Viet nam Con - to Seventh Fleet, mes sage 120718Z May 1964, flict, p. 364, and “Four Years in Vietnam,” p. 21. “Antiswimmer and Antisaboteur Mea sures during 28 “Four Years in Vietnam,” p. 19; NHD, “History of RVN Visit,” Seventh Fleet Mes sage Traf fic, AR, U.S. Naval Oper ations Viet nam,” vol. 2, “1964,” p. NHHC; Hooper, Mo bil ity, Sup port, En dur ance, p. 142. 62; “COMNAVFORV Monthly Sum mary,” April 1966, pp. 7–8, VCF, AR, NHHC. 29 Withers M. Moore, “Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, 1954–1964,” draft manu script, p. 116, LY NHHC; 48 The most signif i cant attack in Saigon during the “Four Years in Viet nam,” p. 21; HSAS Command summer of 1964 occurred at the Caravelle Hotel, Fact Sheet, 15 Decem ber 1965, p. 21. where many foreign jour nal ists stayed during the war, and also the site of the Austra lian and New 30 Chief, Bureau of Medi cine to Op-09B92, ser. 38, 11 Zealand embas si es. At 11:30 AM on 25 Au gust, a Febru ary 1966, in Marolda Papers, AR, NHHC. bomb exploded in Room 514 of the Caravelle, dam- 31 “Four Years in Vietnam,” p. 22. aging nine rooms and sending glass fly ing into the 32 Marolda and Fitzger ald, United States Navy and the street. Several people were injured, but no one died Viet nam Con flict, p. 358; Hovis, Station Hospi tal in the attack, because most of the jour nal ists were Sai gon, p. 62; Silva, Sub Rosa, p. 250. out on as signments that day. For more on the inci - dent see Silva, Sub Rosa, pp. 252–53, and “Mem oirs 33 He served with the Army’s 560th Mil itary Police of the Caravelle,” www.caravellehotel.com/images/ Com pany, which was at tached to HSAS. See newslet ter/pres sroom/caravellememoirs.pd f.

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49 COMUSMACV to JCS, message 0710001 Feb ru ary 61 “Navy Captain Convic ted of Unofficerlike Con- 1965, roll 18, CINCPACFLT Mes sage Traffic, AR, duct,” New York Times, 15 No vem ber 1966, p. 7. NHHC; NMCC Opsum, 8 Feb ru ary 1965, Febru ary 62 Ibid. 1965 folder, box 94, NMCC Opsums, Post-1946 Com mand Files, AR, NHHC. 63 Rick Johnson, “South Vietnam, the Amer ican Waterloo: Sai gon’s Navy Mayor in Trouble,” un- 50 Among the wounded were Lt. Cdr. Donald G. published arti cle, courtesy of Paul A. Johnson, avail- Scully, a na val ad viser visit ing the em bassy that day; able at walterzoomiesworld.blogspot.com/; “The Silva, the CIA station chief; and Deputy Ambas sa - ‘Mayor,’” Time, 12 Au gust 1966, available at www dor Ural Alexis John son. For more, see “Out rages .time.com/; Sheppard, inter view; Hadley, inter view, like This,” Time, 9 April 1965; NMCC Opsum, 30 28 March 2008. March 1965, box 95, NMCC Opsums, Post-1946 Com mand Files, AR, NHHC; COMUSMACV to 64 “Capta in’s Para dise,” Newsweek, 15 Au gust 1966; NMCC, mes sage 300918Z March 1965, Marolda Pa - Sheppard, in terview; Johnson, “South Vietnam, the pers, AR, NHHC; Amer ican Em bassy Saigon to Amer i can Waterloo.” USINFO WASHDC, message 300920Z March 1965, 65 In 1967, the U.S. embassy and the MACV staff judge box 219, Viet nam Flag Plot, AR, NHHC; Don ald G. advo cate general estab li shed an Irreg u lar Practi ces Scully, Bronze Star Cita tion, Awards and Special Com mittee in 1967 in an attempt to curb black Projects Branch files, AR, NHHC; “Bomb Blast in marketeering. This com mit tee mon i tored ex change City Kills 16, 150 Hurt; U.S. Em bassy Dam aged,” purchases and currency ex changes in an ef fort to Sai gon Daily News, 31 March 1965, pp. 1, 6. catch service men involved in the black mar ket. Nev- 51 The dead included thirteen Amer icans, and the erthe less, black marketeering contin ued in Sai gon wounded, sev en teen. throughout the war. See Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, Law at War: Viet nam 1964–1973 (Wash ing ton, 52 CEW1 Wil liam Gary Hadley, telephone inter view D.C.: U.S. Army Dept., 1975), pp. 103–105; Wil liam with John Darrell Sherwood, 11 March 2008 [here- Thomas Allison, Mil i tary Jus tice in Viet nam: The af ter Hadley, in ter view]. Rule of Law in an Amer i can War (Lawrence: Univ. 53 The ca su al ties in cluded one Amer i can ser vice man Press of Kan sas, 2007), p. 40; and 2nd Lt. Courtney killed and another seventy-two wounded. See “250 Frobenius, USA, tele phone inter view with John Lbs. of Plastique,” Time, 10 Decem ber 1965, avail- Darrell Sherwood, 15 June 2009. able at www.time.com/; NMCC Opsum, 4 Decem - 66 Sheppard, inter view; Capt. Archie C. Kuntze, Board ber 1965, p. 1, box 101, NMCC Opsums, AR, of In quiry, 12 June 1966, Findings of Fact, para. 50a, NHHC. 00 Re cords, 1966, AR, NHHC. 54 NMCC Opsum, 1 April 1966, p. 6, box 103, NMCC 67 “State Sum mary of War Casu al ties from World War Opsums, AR, NHHC. II for Navy, Ma rine Corps, and Coast Guard Per - 55 I. Thomas Sheppard, telephone inter view with John son nel,” Re cords of the Bureau of Na val Per son nel, Darrell Sherwood, 19 March 2008 [hereaf ter Re cord Group 24, Na tional Ar chives II, Col lege Sheppard, inter view]; Hadley, in terview, 28 March Park, Mary land, via wwwa.nko.navy.mil/; Archie C. 2008. Kuntze to Rear Adm. I. C. Kidd, 12 May 1966. 56 Iron ically, the rela tive lull in terror ism between the 68 Kuntze, Board of In quiry, Opinions, para. 32a. Metropole and the Victo ria attacks convinced HSAS 69 Capt. Archie C. Kuntze to Con ven ing Au thority, 2 to remove some of the barri ers, includ ing ones near May 1966, as cited in Kuntze, Board of In quiry, the Victo ria, to show that it did not fear the Viet Find ings of Fact, para. 100a. Cong. Bar riers went back up after the 1 April 1966 at tack. See “BOQ Blasted in V.C. At tack,” Sai gon 70 Kuntze, as cited in Joseph Di Mona and Birch Bayh, Daily News, 2 April 1966, p. 1. Great Court-Martial Cases (New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1972), p. 208. 57 R. W. Dietrich, “Sai gon MPs Guard ‘City within a City,’” COMSERVPAC [Com mander Service Force, 71 Ibid. Pa cific] In for ma tion Bul le tin, May 1966, pp. 17–19, 72 Allison, Mil i tary Jus tice in Viet nam, p. 141. item 15210107001, Vietnam Ar chive, Texas Tech 73 Kuntze, Board of Inquiry, Opinions, para. 45a. Univer sit y. 74 Capt. Archie C. Kuntze to Rear Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, 58 Charles Mohr of the New York Times inter viewed Jr., 2 May 1966, 00 Records, 1966, AR, NHHC; Isaac Kuntze at the Vic toria bombing, and UT1 T. E. C. Kidd, Jr., Bio File, AR, NHHC. Tomlin remem bered seeing Kuntze at the Metropole attack. Charles Mohr, “Sai gon G.I. Billet 75 Lt. Cdr. William Manthorpe, as cited in Douglas H. Bombed in Vietcong Ter ror At tack,” New York Hub bard, Jr., Special Agent, Vietnam: A Naval Intel - Times, 4 Decem ber 1965, pp. 1, 3; Hadley, inter - ligence Memoir (Washing ton, D.C.: Poto mac Books, view, 28 March 2008. 2006), p. 26. 59 Capt. Archie C. Kuntze to Secre tary of the Navy, 76 For an exam ple, see Hub bard, Special Agent, Viet- memo ran dum, “Request for Volun tary Retire ment nam, p. 26. un der Provi sions of Title 10 USCA 6823,” 8 Sep- 77 Marolda and Fitzger ald, United States Navy and the tem ber 1966, 00 Files, AR, NHHC. Viet nam Con flict, pp. 360–65; CINCPAC, Com- 60 Hooper, Mo bil ity, Sup port, En dur ance, p. 60. mand History, 1964, pp. 329–33. 78 Hooper, Mo bil ity, Sup port, En dur ance, pp. 61–65.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:14 AM ABOUT THE AU THORS

Dr. Rob ert G. Angevine is the author of The Rail road and the State: War, Pol itics, and Tech nol ogy in 19th-Century Amer ica (2004) and ar ti cles on mili tary ap proaches to technol ogy, naval exper i men ta tion, and Ameri can mili tary and naval intel li genc e. He received his PhD in mili tary history from Duke Univer sity in 1999 and currently works as a defense ana lyst in the Wash ington area. He has taught at Duke, Ameri - can, and George Mason Uni ver si ties and now serves as Ad junct As sis tant Pro fes sor of History at George Washing ton Univer sity.

Dr. Michael Barrett is a profes sor of history at The Cita del, teach ing courses on World War I, modern Ger many, and geog ra phy, among oth ers. A gradu ate of The Cita del, he did his PhD at the Univer sity of Massa chu setts, where he was a Fulbright Scholar (Ger many). He is the author of Op er a tion Albion: The Ger man Con quest of the Bal tic Islan ds (In di ana Uni ver sity Press), and Clausewitz Re vis ited (Praeger– ABC CLIO), coauthored with H. P. Willmott. He is a re tired bri ga dier gen eral in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Laurence M. Burke II is a PhD candi date in history and pub lic policy at Carne gie Mellon Univer sity. His re search in ter ests lie in the his tory of tech nol ogy and mil i - tary his tory. He was awarded the Ramsey Fellow ship in Na val Avia tion History (Na tional Air and Space Museum) and the General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Me- mo rial Disser ta tion Fel lowship (United States Ma rine Corps) in 2008, both of which have greatly assisted his researc h. This paper is drawn from his disser ta tion, whose working title is “What to Do with the Air plane? Deter min ing the Role of the Airplane in the US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, 1908–1930.”

Capt. Craig C. Felker gradu ated from the United States Na val Academy in 1981. A naval avia tor and heli cop ter pilot, he served in a vari ety of oper a tional and staff as- signments, the most no ta ble of which in cluded Op era tions DESERT SHIELD and

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:14 AM 162 NEW IN TER PRE TA TIONS IN NA VAL HIS TORY

DESERT STORM in 1991, and as the di rector of the Pres i dent’s Emergency Oper a - tions Cen ter in the White House from 1995 to 1997. While serv ing as an instruc tor in his tory at the Na val Academy, Com mander Felker was selected for the Na val Academy ’s Perma nen t Mili ta ry Profes so rship Program. He receive d his PhD from Duke in May 2004, and returned to the Acad emy the fol lowing June. In Febru ary 2007 Texas A&M Uni versity Press published his book Test ing Amer i can Sea Power: The U.S. Navy Fleet Prob lems, 1923–1940, which exam ined the ways in which warfare simu la tion tested the Navy’s Mahanian vi sion, and provided a means of adapt - ing the vision to include new technol o gies. Captain Felker was the direc tor of the 2009 Na val His tory Sym po sium.

Dr. Kenneth P. Hansen, Com mander, Ca na dian Navy (Ret.), is the Visit ing Defence Fellow in the Cen tre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie Univer sity, Hali fax, where he is the Direc tor of the Mari time Se curity in the 21st Cen tury Project and Deputy Direc tor for the center’s Mari time Stud ies Programme. His research inter - ests in clude con cept de vel op ment, op er a tions plan ning, and lo gis ti cal sus tain ment. His thirty-two-year naval career included a vari ety of posi tions in several ships of the Ca na dian At lan tic Fleet, a num ber of se nior op era tions and staff ap point ments, and the Mili tary Co-Chair of the Mari time Stud ies Programme at the Ca nadian Forces College , Toronto.

Dr. Marcus O. Jones is as so ci ate pro fes sor of Ger man eco nomic and mil i tary his tory at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is the author of a study of German indus try and oc- cupa tion policy in the Sec ond World War, as well as of ar ti cles on Bismarckian stra- tegic pol icy and the U-boat campaigns of both world wars. Dr. Jones earned his PhD at Yale Univer sity in 2005.

Dr. John T. Kuehn is a former naval avi a tor (EP-3/ES-3) who has completed cruises aboard four dif ferent air craft car riers. He flew EP-3 missions dur ing the last de cade of the Cold War, the first Gulf War (DESERT STORM) and the Balkans (DELIBERATE FORCE, over Bosnia). CDR Kuehn has served on the fac ulty of the U.S. Army Com - mand and Gen eral Staff Col lege since July 2000, re tir ing from the na val ser vice in 2004. He earned a PhD in his tory from Kan sas State Uni ver sity in 2007. He is the author of Agents of In no va tion and Eye wit ness Pa cific The ater with Den nis Giangreco.

Dr. Christo pher P. Magra is As sis tant Pro fessor of Early Ameri can History and Di rector of the Atlan tic History Cen ter at the Cali for nia State Univer sity at Northridge. He has pub lished arti cle s related to mari time history in the Inter na ti onal Journal of Mari - time His tory, the New England Quarterly, and the North ern Mar i ner. The Ca na dian Nauti cal Researc h Soci ety honored him with the Keith Matthews Award for his

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:14 AM ABOUT THE AUTHORS 163

schol arship. Cam bridge Univer sity Press pub lished his first book, The Fish er man’s Cause: At lan tic Com merce and Mar i time Di men sions of the Amer i can Rev o lu tion, in 2009. He has already begun research on his second book, a compar a tive anal ysis of Brit ish na val im press ment in the At lan tic world.

Dr. Heather Pace Mar shall received a PhD from Duke Univer sity. The daughter and wife of Marines, she has al ways been fasci nated with under stand ing the or i gins of and devel op ments in the Marine Corps’s insti tu tional culture. Her disser ta tion explores changes in the Corps’s im age and iden tity from the Civil War to World War I.

Dr. John Darrell Sherwood is a histo rian with the Naval His tory & Heri tage Com- mand, and the author of five books in mili tary and naval history, includ ing Nixon’s Trident : Na val Power in Southeast Asia, 1968–1972 (2009), Black Sailor, White Navy: Ra cial Un rest in the Fleet dur ing the Viet nam War Era (2007), and Af ter burner: Na- val Avi ators and the Vietnam War (2004). Sherwood holds a PhD in mili tary history from The George Washing ton Univer sity, and is currently working on a history of U.S. Navy coastal and riverine op era tions during the Vietnam War.

Dr. An drew Stew art studied for his doctor ate in the Depart ment of War Studies, King’s College London, and was awarded his PhD in Decem ber 2001. The fol lowing year he joined the Defence Studies Depart ment, King’s Col lege London, based at the Joint Services Com mand and Staff Col lege. His research exam ines vari ous is - sues con nected to the Brit ish Empire and the Sec ond World War. His book Em pire Lost: Brit ain, the Do min ions and the Sec ond World War was published in Sep tem ber 2008 by Con tin uum and his next pro ject is centered on the Brit ish Com mon wealth mili tary ef fort in East Africa during the Second World War.

Dr. Bruce Tay lor was born in Chile in 1967 and edu cated at the Uni versity of Man- chester and at Oxford, where he received a DPhil in modern history in 1996. He is au thor of The Battlecruiser HMS Hood: An Il lus trated Bi og ra phy, 1916–1941 (2005) and together with Daniel Morgan is complet ing An nals of the Wolves: U-boat Sinkings of Al lied War ships as Re corded in Ger man Logs. He lives in South ern Cal i for nia.

Dr. Kathleen Broome Wil liams is the Direc tor of General Edu ca tion and profes sor of his tory at Cogswell Polytechnical Col lege in Sunnyvale, Cal i for nia. Her published work includes Secret Weapon: U.S. High-Frequency Di rec tion Find ing in the Bat tle of the At lan tic (Na val Insti tute Press, 1996), Im prob a ble War riors: Women Sci en tists and the U.S. Navy in World War II (Na val Insti tute Press, 2001), and Grace Hop per: Ad mi ral of the Cyber Sea (Na val Insti tute Press, 2004), as well as arti cles and book

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chap ters on na val sci ence and tech nol ogy. She serves on the board of trust ees of the Soci ety for Mili tary History and the ad vi sory board of H-Mari time.

Dr. Carlos Alfaro Zaforteza was born in Spain in 1957. After a career in the building in dus try he gradu ated in war stud ies from King’s College London. He is presently finish ing his PhD and teaching naval history at that in stitu tion. His main inter ests are Spanish na val policy, inter na tional naval his tory, and the role of medium/small na vies in the nine teenth cen tury. He has pub lished in Brit ish, Amer i can, and Span - ish jour nals, in clud ing War in His tory, War ship In ter na tional, and Revista de Historia Naval.

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:14 AM NAVAL WAR COLLEGE HISTORICAL MONOGRAPH SERIES

1. The Writ ings of Stephen B. Luce, ed ited by John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf (1975). 3. Pro fes sors of War: The Na val War Col lege and the Devel op ment of the Na val Pro fes sion, Ron ald Spector (1977). 4. The Blue Sword: The Na val War Col lege and the Amer i can Mis sion, 1919–1941, Michael Vlahos (1980). 5. On His Maj esty’s Ser vice: Ob ser va tions of the Brit ish Home Fleet from the Di ary, Re ports, and Let ters of Jo seph H. Wellings, As sis tant U.S. Na val At taché, Lon don, 1940–1941, ed - ited by John B. Hattendorf (1983). 7. A Bib li og ra phy of the Works of Al fred Thayer Mahan, com piled by John B. Hattendorf and Lynn C. Hattendorf (1986). 8. The Fra ter nity of the Blue Uni form: Ad mi ral Rich ard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy and Al lied Naval Coop er a tion , Joel J. Sokolsky (1991). 9. The In flu ence of His tory on Mahan: The Pro ceed ings of a Con fer ence Mark ing the Cen te - nary of Al fred Thayer Mahan’s The In flu ence of Sea Power upon His tory, 1660–1783, ed - ited by John B. Hattendorf (1991). 10. Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceed ings of a Con fer ence on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admi ral Sir Herbert Richmond , ed ited by James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (1993). 11. Ubi Sumus? The State of Na val and Mar i time History, ed ited by John B. Hattendorf (1994). 12. The Queenstown Pa trol, 1917: The Di ary of Com mander Jo seph Knefler Taus sig, U.S. Navy, ed ited by Wil liam N. Still, Jr. (1996). 13. Do ing Na val His tory: Es says to ward Im prove ment, edited by John B. Hattendorf (1995). 14. An Ad mi ral’s Yarn, edited by Mark R. Shulman (1999). 15. The Mem oirs of Ad mi ral H. Kent Hew itt, edited by Evelyn M. Cherpak (2004).

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16. Three Splen did Lit tle Wars: The Di ary of Jo seph K. Taussig, 1898–1901, edited by Evelyn M. Cherpak (2009). 17. Di gest ing His tory: The U.S. Na val War Col lege, the Les sons of World War Two, and Fu ture Na val War fare, 1945–1947, Hal. M. Fried man (2010). 18. To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Prob lems, 1923–1940, Albert A. Nofi (2010). 19. Talk ing about Na val His tory: A Col lection of Es says, John B. Hattendorf (2011).

HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday,February 15, 2012 10:22:14 AM HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:14 AM HM20_Felker&Jones-NativeB Wednesday, February 15, 2012 10:22:14 AM NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS New Interpretations in Naval History Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy 10–11 September 2009 New inNaval Interpretations History Edited by Craig C. Felker andMarcus O. Jones

Edited by Craig C. Felker and Marcus O. Jones

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