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JP 3-02.1 Joint Doctrine for Landing Forces Operations

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JP 3-02.1 Joint Doctrine for Landing Forces Operations JOINT PUB 3-02.1 JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS 1 NOVEMBER 1989 Reply Zip Code: JCS TEST PUB 3-02.1 20318-7000 1 November 1989 MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List Subject: JCS Test Pub 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations 1. This test publication contains proposed joint doctrine to guide the activities and employment of the Armed Forces of the United States when two or more Services, or Service elements, acting as part of or in support of a joint force, conduct landing force operations. 2. JCS test publications are developed and issued in accordance with JCS Pub 1-01. This test publication has been staffed with the Services and unified and specified commands. It is now ready to undergo evaluation in the field. After a thorough evaluation is accomplished, and feedback from the field and the evaluation process is considered, the publication will be implemented under the provisions of JCS MOP 197. MALCOLM B. ARMSTRONG Major General, USAF Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability Attachment JCS TEST PUBLICATION 3-02.1 Distribution: By Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000 Joint Staff DIA US Coast Guard Five Copies each to: Offices of CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC Four copies each to: USCINCLANT USCINCEUR CINCSAC CINCFOR USCINCCENT USCINCSOC USCINCTRANS USCINCPAC USCINCSO USCINCSPACE Additional copies may be obtained from the Joint Doctrine and Education Division (JDED), Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000. ii RECORD OF CHANGES FOR JCS TEST PUB 3-02.1 (JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS) RECORD OF CHANGES CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POST NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS While this publication is in the "test pub" stage, change recommendations should be submitted through the chain of command to the Joint Doctrine and Education Division, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000, in accordance with guidance provided in JCS Pub 1-01. iii JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS PREFACE 1. Purpose a. This publication sets forth doctrine applicable to landing forces in amphibious operations. It is a companion to JCS Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations" (formerly FMFM 31-11/NWP 22(B)/AFM 2-53/LFM 01), and provides information of primary interest to landing forces that complements and supplements the material therein. b. In its entirety, this publication provides the fundamental doctrine, techniques, and procedures for any landing force, notwithstanding the organizational, tactical, and procedural differences that exist between those Services capable of providing landing forces. 2. Basis. The publication has been developed by the Marine Corps in coordination with the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in accordance with the statutory responsibilities for amphibious warfare assigned to those Services by the National Security Act of 1947 (amended), DOD Directive 5100.1, and JCS Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." This publication, interpreted within the framework of the above act, provides amplification concerning the responsibilities of all Services for amphibious warfare. 3. Scope a. This publication closely parallels the content and format of JCS Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations." Efforts have been made to avoid redundancy with the information in that publication. Certain material is, however, repeated in order to facilitate reader understanding and provide greater clarity and continuity of discussion. b. This publication provides an overview of the complexity of planning and executing landing force operations. It is written from the perspective of a senior staff officer or commander whose organization may take part in, or provide support to, landing force operations, yet who may have little experience in such operations. A considerable body of information on specific areas is omitted by design, both because it is not considered relevant to the intended readership and because it is not unique to landing force operations. The publication does, however, provide reference to where more detailed information may be found. iv c. This publication emphasizes information unique to landing force operations and deemphasizes information common to land warfare. The discussion of embarkation planning, ship-to-shore movement, and supporting arms is extensive. Tactical operations ashore, after the initial stages of the assault, do not differ sufficiently from land operations in general to warrant extensive discussion. d. This publication does not include doctrine for base development, base defense, or the initiation of subsequent operations, although these may require consideration during the planning process. Further, a number of areas that require emphasis and detail in planning are not treated in depth. These areas include air operations, electronic warfare, operational security, deception, mine and countermine warfare, and offensive and defensive operations ashore. The need for thorough planning and proper execution in these, and many other functional areas, is acknowledged. However, the complexity of these general and specific areas does not lend itself to detailed discussion in this publication. Further, differences that may exist in the specific environment of a particular operation will not materially alter the doctrine for this form of warfare. 4. Content a. The organization of the separate chapters in this publication provides an introduction to the material, including necessary definitions. The purpose and scope provides an overview of the subject matter and its relationship to other areas. The responsibilities paragraph sets forth the responsibilities of the major commanders, emphasizing the functions and tasks of the commander landing force (CLF). Additional paragraphs provide information as required to fully clarify the subject matter of each chapter. b. This publication provides discussion of each of the chapters in JCS Pub 3-02 from the landing force perspective. Detailed information on development of the landing plan is contained in the Appendix. 5. Terminology. Terms used throughout this publication are defined in JCS Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms"; in JCS Pub 3-02; in the glossary; or when appropriate, within the text of this publication. For ease of reference, a glossary of acronyms and definitions of key terms is included. Whenever the terms commander, amphibious task force (CATF) or amphibious task force commander, and commander, landing force (CLF) or landing force commander are used, they apply equally to Navy or Marine Corps, joint, combined, or other amphibious operations. v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE Preface...............................................iv Glossary Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms...............xvii Part II Definitions..............................xxii I THE CONCEPT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS Introduction......................................I-1 Purpose and Scope.................................I-1 General...........................................I-1 Responsibilities of Key Individuals in Amphibious Warfare..............................I-5 Planning Considerations...........................I-5 Types of Amphibious Operations....................I-6 Operations in Support of an Amphibious Operation.......................................I-7 Sequence of Amphibious Operations.................I-8 Planning..........................................I-8 Embarkation.......................................I-9 Rehearsal.........................................I-9 Movement..........................................I-9 Assault...........................................I-9 Termination of an Amphibious Operation............I-9 II ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND Introduction.....................................II-1 Purpose and Scope................................II-1 General..........................................II-1 Responsibilities.................................II-2 Planning Considerations..........................II-2 Organizational and Command Considerations........II-2 Basic Planning Considerations....................II-4 Landing Force Organization.......................II-4 Command Relationships............................II-5 The Initiating Directive.........................II-12 The Amphibious Objective Area....................II-13 Airspace Control.................................II-14 Airspace Control Systems.........................II-15 Transfer of Control of Functions.................II-15 Joint Force Air Component Commander..............II-16 vi III THE APPROACH TO PLANNING Introduction....................................III-1 Purpose and Scope...............................III-1 General.........................................III-1 Responsibilities................................III-2 Planning Considerations.........................III-3 Special Considerations..........................III-3 Basic Considerations............................III-4 Planning Procedures.............................III-7 The Planning Process............................III-10 The Initiating Directive........................III-11 Early Designation of Commanders and Assembly of Staffs............................III-12 Initial Planning Conference.....................III-12 Planning Aids...................................III-14 Planning Guidance...............................III-15 Outline Plan....................................III-17
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