Name: Edhelper Naval Changes in the War

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Name: Edhelper Naval Changes in the War Name: edHelper Naval Changes in the War When the Civil War began, it did not just affect the army, but the navy as well. When the war began, naval battles were fought in wooden ships. In months, though, they were experimenting with ironclad ships, submarines, and torpedoes. Perhaps the most well known ironclad ships were the Merrimac and the Monitor. Ironclads were so named because of the iron plates which covered the parts of the ship above the water. The Merrimac was a Union ship that had been burned and sunk. The Confederates raised her and used the hull as the basis for their new ironclad warship. She was renamed the C.S.S. Virginia, but was still known as the Merrimac. She rode low in the water which made her hard to steer. However, she was well built, and her crew was determined to show it. On March 8, 1862, the Merrimac sailed up the James River and attacked the blockaded ships at Hampton Roads. She rammed and sunk the steamship Cumberland and then attacked the frigate Congress. Cannon balls bounced off of the Merrimac and seemed to do no harm. The next day, the U.S.S. Monitor arrived to protect the Union ships. She was determined to stop the Merrimac from sinking more ships. She was faster and easier to maneuver, but the Merrimac was bigger, stronger, and carried more guns. The two ironclads began fighting it out. They fired their cannons back and forth at each other. The Merrimac tried ramming the Monitor, but her iron ram had broken off the day before. If it had not, she could have sunk her adversary. The fight continued for 3 hours before the Monitor ran to shallow water where the Merrimac could not follow. After waiting for the Monitor to come back, the Confederate ironclad finally left to get more fuel and ammunition. That was the last time the two ships met. The Merrimac struck such fear into the hearts of people on the Union side that her name was feared from Boston down to Washington. Then, on the night of May 10, 1862, her commander made the mistake of lightening the ship too much. Her wooden hull was exposed above the water line. She could not engage the enemy that way, and she could not get the weight back right then. To keep her from being sunk or falling into enemy hands, she was blown up. Her success encouraged both sides to produce more of the ironclad ships. The second great invention of the Civil War era was the submarine. Versions of submarine designs had been around for more than a century, but no one had been able to make a design that worked. The first successful working submarine was the C.S.S. Hunley. The Hunley was powered by her small crew turning a hand crank inside. The torpedo was mounted on a long rod attached to the bow. Name: edHelper After successfully blowing a hole in the hull of a blockade ship outside Charleston harbor, she sank, and everyone onboard drowned. Other subs were also built, but she was the first to actually sink an enemy ship. Naval battles were fought on both rivers and ocean, all impacting the outcome of the war. The South used her ironclads to break up Northern blockades which were seriously choking her trade. Her blockade runners were small fast ships that could get through if they were fortunate. Soon Northern ironclads moved south and assisted the Northern army in not only blockading ports, but also in maintaining Union control of the Mississippi. Inventors had quickly become involved in the war effort. Southern inventors learned to use their imaginations when creating new weapons, whether they were torpedoes, mines, submarines, or ironclads. These same great minds from both sides would help to reforge the nation after the war. Naval Changes in the War Questions 1. Which is not one of the inventions used to help fight the naval part of the Civil War? A. Ironclad ships B. Torpedoes C. Pontoon boats D. Submarines 2. Since the Monitor disengaged from the battle with the Merrimac, she was considered the loser at that time. What might the outcome have been if she had continued to fight? 3. Ironclad means: A. The whole ship was wrapped in iron. B. The exposed parts were covered with iron. C. The crew wore iron clothes. D. All of the above. 4. The Hunley was a great ironclad ship. A. False B. True 5. If the Union had been able to capture the Merrimac, how might that have affected the war? Name: edHelper 6. The Merrimac was renamed: A. U.S.S. Cumberland B. C.S.S. Carolina C. U.S.S. Voyager D. C.S.S. Virginia 7. Why was it such a problem when the Merrimac commander lightened the ship too much? 8. Why would Southern inventors need to use their imaginations more for inventing new war machines than their Northern counterparts? edHelper Name: How many of these can you write about? Think! Write! Check all the ones you answered. How would Union blockades of major Confederate ports affect their ability to trade? How would the blockades affect the South's ability to carry on the war effort? Don't stop writing. Use a blank piece of paper to continue..
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