Patrol Torpedo Boats During World War II
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Coastal Warfare in World War II
Coastal Warfare in World War II Christopher P. Carlson Cold Wars 2003 Admiralty Trilogy Seminar Introduction Coastal Warfare in WWII ♦ What is Coastal Warfare? ♦ Lioral/Coastal Environment ♦ Background ♦ Mighty Midgets - “Small Craft” ♦ Roles and Missions ♦ Tactics Overview ♦ National Development ♦ Post-WWII ♦ Coastal Warfare and CaS ♦ Some Good Books What is Coastal Warfare? Coastal Warfare in WWII ♦ “Lioral” or Coastal waters ♦ Shallow water, often sheltered waters • Sometimes too shallow for larger naval vessels ♦ Not seagoing ships • Can’t operate in Sea State 4-5, even then it’s unpleasant ♦ More than just PTs and other high-speed craft • Motor launches for minesweeping, ASW, rescue (e.g. British MLs) • Small minesweepers (e.g. German R-boats) • Barges for transporting cargo (e.g. Japanese Daihatsus) • Landing craft ♦ Common factor is small size • Limited endurance • Light armament • Low damage capacity !! Littoral/Coastal Environment Coastal Warfare in WWII ♦ Difficult environment due to the close proximity of land ♦ Detection Issue - Heavy clu1er ♦ Classification Issue - Many false contacts ♦ Reduced operation space - Restricted maneuverability ♦ All combine to reduce a ship’s reaction time Coastal waters Background Coastal Warfare in WWII ♦ WWI - These are distinct from the “Torpedo Boat” • Seagoing vessel intended for fleet action ♦ Who built coastal combatants? • Britain: Built a dozen Coastal Motor Boats (CMBs) ■ 40 ft long, single rearward launched torpedo & a few MGs ■ Several dozen motor launches, 76ft long, 3 pdr, general-purpose -
BULKELEY, JOHN D.: Papers, 1928-84
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY ABILENE, KANSAS BULKELEY, JOHN D.: Papers, 1928-84 Accessions 70-76 & 86-21 Processed by: BSR, TB Date Completed: April 2001 Admiral Bulkeley deposited his papers in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in March 1970. A small accretion was received in April 1986. Linear feet: -1 Approximate number of pages: 1200 Approximate number of items: 420 Admiral Bulkeley signed an instrument of gift for his papers on April 3, 1970. Literary rights in the writings of Admiral Bulkeley in this collection and in all other collections of papers donated to the Eisenhower Library were retained by Admiral Bulkeley. Upon his death in April 1996 such rights passed to the public. Under terms of the instrument of gift, the following classes of items are withheld from research use: 1. Papers relating to the family and private business affairs. 2. Papers relating to the family and private business affairs of others persons who have had correspondence with Admiral Bulkeley. 3. Papers relating to investigations of individuals or to appointments and personnel matters. 4. Papers containing statements made by or to the donor in confidence unless in the judgment of the Director of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library the reason for the confidentiality no longer exists. 5. All other papers which contain information or statements that might be used to injure, harass, or damage any living person. SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE John Bulkeley, a career naval officer, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1933 and was serving in the Pacific at the start of World War II. -
THE FEASIBLITY of the OVER-THE-HORIZON AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT for U.S. NAVY and MARINE CORPS FORCES a Thesis Presented To
THE FEASIBLITY OF THE OVER-THE-HORIZON AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FOR U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FORCES A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Colege in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE STEPHEN L. GOERTZEN, LCDR, USN B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1982 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1993 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: LCDR Stephen L. Goertzen, USN Thesis Title: The Feasibility of the Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Assault for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Forces Approved by: u , Thesis Committee Chaiman LTCOL W. A. Sp , Member Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ABSTRACT THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OVER-THE-HORIZON AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FOR U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FORCES: An analysis of the doctrine, equipment, and technology contributing to the feasibility of the over-the-horizon amphibious assault. By Lieutenant Commander Stephen L. Goertzen, USN, 128 pages. This study is an analysis of the tactics,techniques, procedures, doctrine, equipment, and technology utilized in over-the-horizon amphibious assaults. The study examines the issues surrounding current feasibility of the assault, as well as future feasibility of the assault. -
Why China Has Not Caught Up
Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet Why China Has Not Andrea Gilli and Caught Up Yet Mauro Gilli Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage Can adversaries of the United States easily imitate its most advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Do reverse engineering, industrial espi- onage, and, in particular, cyber espionage facilitate and accelerate this process? China’s decades-long economic boom, military modernization program, mas- sive reliance on cyber espionage, and assertive foreign policy have made these questions increasingly salient. Yet, almost everything known about this topic draws from the past. As we explain in this article, the conclusions that the ex- isting literature has reached by studying prior eras have no applicability to the current day. Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that ris- ing states beneªt from the “advantage of backwardness,” as described by Andrea Gilli is a senior researcher at the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Defense College in Rome, Italy. Mauro Gilli is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Insti- tute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland. The authors are listed in alphabetical order to reºect their equal contributions to this article. The views expressed in the article are those of the authors and do not represent the views of NATO, the NATO Defense College, or any other institution with which the authors are or have been -
FS 34 Canadians and Coastal Forces WWII
Canadians and Coastal Forces During World War II Page 1 of 6 _____________________________________________________________ Researched and Written by: Capt. (N) (Ret’d) Michael Braham Edited by Lt. (N) (Ret’d) Hugh J.M. Spence historical overviews of the Royal Canadian In the FCWM Research Paper Canada’s Navy Navy and have thus remained fairly unknown 1910-2010: The Ships , it is noted that “some to the majority of Canadians. of the lesser combatant ships” are omitted. This paper remedies that in part by describing The 29 th Canadian MTB Flotilla the role of Canadians in coastal fighting craft during World War II. The 29 th Canadian MTB Flotilla was formed in March 1944, and was equipped with 71.5 ft., As an organization, the Royal Canadian Navy “hard-chine” craft (angular hull components as takes somewhat of a back seat in this because, opposed to smooth or moulded,) built by as will be seen in the following text, the British Power Boats at Hythe on Southampton Canadian participation in these agile craft was Water. Originally designed as Motor Gun Boats conducted in fleet organizations run by the (MGBs), they were modified and re-designated Royal Navy. In a related vein, there is but as Motor Torpedo Boats. Driven by three Rolls passing mention of Canadians serving with the Royce or Packard V-12 Supercharged 1250 Royal Navy on RN small boat missions, such as H.P. engines, each with a 2,500 gallon capacity in the Adriatic. of 100 octane gas, these vessels had an operational radius of about 140 miles while This paper focuses on the various types of cruising at 25 knots, and a top speed of some Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) in which Canadians 40 knots. -
Torpedo Technology
DRDO MONOGRAPH ERIES NO. I INTRODUCTION TO TORPEDO TECHNOLOGY Rear Adm (Retd) NK Ramanarasaiah, VSM Former Director Naval Science & Technological Laboratory Visakhapatnam DEFEN E RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION MINISTR Y OF DEFENCE, GOVT OF INDIA NEW DELHI·II0 011 1993 © 1993, Defence Scientific Information & Documentation Centre (DESIDOC), Delhi-110 054 Cover Photograph (Taken by the author) : The firing of a practice torpedo from a Kamorta class ship. Designed, typeset and printed at DESIDOC, Metcalfe House, Delhi-110 054. uthor r eh ing the' ienti t of the Y ar' award from the then Prime Mini ter ,'mt. Indira ;undhi - 198 ... uthor with Shri R Venkataraman, the then Defence Mini °ter \ hen he vi ited TL in the earl eightee. FOREWORD Oceans have always fascinated man and he has, from early days of civilisation, turned to them for adventure and exploration. Indeed, they have been his 'main highways' for extending his 'empire' and 'trade'. Over the last century, he has been exploiting the waters of the ocean for re ources-living and nonliving-and to fill his unsatiating need for energy. With such a role to play, oceans have been the arena where man has been waging wars to protect his sovereignty over the resources and to subjugate his enemies resulting in 'Armadas'-from Spanish wars to the present. It would not be an overstatement to declare that the 'sea power' to a large extent dictated the outcome of many wars upto and including the World War II The most potent weapon the seagoing ships of this century have been carrying is the 'torpedo', be it for antiship warfare or antisubmarine warfare, the latter being dominant since the World War II. -
US EPA, Pesticide Product Label, ARSENAL HERBICIDE APPLICATORS CONCENTRATE,09/07/2017
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, DC 20460 OFFICE OF CHEMICAL SAFETY AND POLLUTION PREVENTION September 7, 2017 Nina S. Rao Regulatory Manager BASF Corporation 26 Davis Drive P. O. Box 13528 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-3528 Subject: Notification per PRN 98-10 – Updating label language to specify NY State applicator requirements. Product Name: Arsenal Herbicide Applicators Concentrate EPA Registration Number: 241-299 Application Date: 08/10/2017 Decision Number: 532575 Dear Nina S. Rao: The Agency is in receipt of your Application for Pesticide Notification under Pesticide Registration Notice (PRN) 98-10 for the above referenced product. The Registration Division (RD) has conducted a review of this request for its applicability under PRN 98-10 and finds that the action requested falls within the scope of PRN 98-10. The label submitted with the application has been stamped “Notification” and will be placed in our records. Should you wish to add/retain a reference to the company’s website on your label, then please be aware that the website becomes labeling under the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and is subject to review by the Agency. If the website is false or misleading, the product would be misbranded and unlawful to sell or distribute under FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E). 40 CFR 156.10(a)(5) list examples of statements EPA may consider false or misleading. In addition, regardless of whether a website is referenced on your product’s label, claims made on the website may not substantially differ from those claims approved through the registration process. -
A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present
CRM D0006297.A2/ Final July 2002 Charting the Pathway to OMFTS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations From 1941 to the Present Carter A. Malkasian 4825 Mark Center Drive • Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850 Approved for distribution: July 2002 c.. Expedit'onaryyystems & Support Team Integrated Systems and Operations Division This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Specific authority: N0014-00-D-0700. For copies of this document call: CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123. Copyright 0 2002 The CNA Corporation Contents Summary . 1 Introduction . 5 Methodology . 6 The U.S. Marine Corps’ new concept for forcible entry . 9 What is the purpose of amphibious warfare? . 15 Amphibious warfare and the strategic level of war . 15 Amphibious warfare and the operational level of war . 17 Historical changes in amphibious warfare . 19 Amphibious warfare in World War II . 19 The strategic environment . 19 Operational doctrine development and refinement . 21 World War II assault and area denial tactics. 26 Amphibious warfare during the Cold War . 28 Changes to the strategic context . 29 New operational approaches to amphibious warfare . 33 Cold war assault and area denial tactics . 35 Amphibious warfare, 1983–2002 . 42 Changes in the strategic, operational, and tactical context of warfare. 42 Post-cold war amphibious tactics . 44 Conclusion . 46 Key factors in the success of OMFTS. 49 Operational pause . 49 The causes of operational pause . 49 i Overcoming enemy resistance and the supply buildup. -
Inventor Hollands Proposed New Semi-Submerged Torpedo Boat
THE CALL Sunday SAN EditionFRANCISCO, SUNDAY, APRIL 24, 1898. THE LATEST NAVALWONDERS FOR DESTROYING BATTLE-SHIPS from the coast, the water must be com- mistake on the part of the officer In INVENTOR HOLLANDS PROPOSED NEW SEMI-SUBMERGED TORPEDO BOAT. paratively smooth and clear, the tor- command may spoil everything and This new mari r be protected by being pedo must be discharged with absolute doom all on board to a terrible death. will sunk four feet under the surface of the water. The small exposed portion will he surrounded with accuracy. slightest [mentor Elolland declares that such a vessel will practically The breakdown in be irresistible and invulnerable because she will combine all the delicate machinery, the slightest i Continued on Page Twor.ty-alx: boat and a torpedo l-<.at destroyer, arid can also be used as a destroyer of torpedo boat destroyers. INVENTOR HOLLAND'S TWO NEW SEA FIGHTING MONSTERS, THE SUBMARINE TORPEDO BOAT AND THE SEMI-SUBMARINE TORPEDO BOAT. • HOLLAND has just Iboal will bo pimply rlddied and sawed Such a boat as this combines all the miles under the water, to riso and sink :into pieces bj rapid-fire ammunition. qualities ith another ma- of a torpedo-boat and a tor- at the will of her operators, and to dis- \u25a0 a Further, ;isubmerged armored torpedo- pedo-boat destroyer, and can also so her be charge a torpedo at a target. She pre- submerged torped boal will be able to get near as .id( stroyer of torpedo-boal de- target that by greatly reducing the stroyers. -
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress September 16, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL32665 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Summary The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, and the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship goal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115- 91 of December 12, 2017). The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal. The new goal is expected to introduce a new, more distributed fleet architecture featuring a smaller proportion of larger ships, a larger proportion of smaller ships, and a new third tier of large unmanned vehicles (UVs). On June 17, 2021, the Navy released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that presents the Biden Administration’s emerging successor to the 355-ship force-level goal. The document calls for a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, including 321 to 372 manned ships and 77 to 140 large UVs. A September 2021 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates that the fleet envisioned in the document would cost an average of between $25.3 billion and $32.7 billion per year in constant FY2021 dollars to procure. -
Naval Postgraduate School Thesis
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS by Patrick Thomas Baker June 2011 Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin Second Reader: Douglas Porch Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2011 Master‘s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French Mistral Amphibious Assault Warships 6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Thomas Baker 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. -
Surya Class Frigate
SURYA CLASS FRIGATE A trailblazing design, the Surya class takes its place with the Constitution, Saladin and Fed- It wasn’t until 2248 that the Surya—along with the Coventry, Loknar, Saladin and Larson eration as one of the most important ship classes of the Class I era. classes—was able to free up the larger heavy cruisers and assume primary responsibility for defensive/offensive operations. It was from this point forward that these ships began to Originally, the Anton class was set to be produced to uprated specifications—the design build an impressive and fearsome reputation. itself being altered to correct a number of flaws. However, the changes compounded what was already a complicated and complex design. After review, the decision was sub- sequently reversed and existing ships were gradually withdrawn from service. In 2249, the Pralaya (FF 1855), Avenger (FF 1860) and Illustrious (FF 1863) were present with the 8th Fleet at the Battle of Thranstor. The introduction of Phaser weaponry that year and Instead, the ASDB revisited an earlier proposal, the Hunt class Light Cruiser. Little more than its presence on the majority of the Starfleet vessels present at the battle helped ensure a a Ptolemy class transport/tug with more comprehensive armament, Hunt was an intriguing swift and overwhelming Federation victory. The Pralaya was lost with all hands not long af- modification of an already proven design, though it was eventually dropped in favor of the ter, being drawn into an ambush outside the Beta Aurigae star system. Kearsarge class. Throughout the war though, a favored tactic of fleet commanders was to disguise these The potential of a fully armed Ptolemy was not lost on designers though and from this point, vessels as Ptolemy class transport/tugs and use them (usually in groups of 2 or more) as they continued to study various proposals based around it.