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JP 3-02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Landing Force

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JP 3-02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Landing Force Joint Publication 3-02.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Landing Force Operations 11 May 2004 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication establishes doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) for all phases of planning and conducting joint amphibious operations from the perspective of the landing force. It addresses unique landing force operations, including planning, ship-to- shore movement, and fire support. It also covers the organization, command and control, and related operations of the landing force and its major components. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected JTTP to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. 3. Application a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures i Preface not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: T. J. KEATING Vice Admiral, USN Director, Joint Staff ii JP 3-02.1 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... vii CHAPTER I CONCEPT, ORGANIZATION, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL • General ..................................................................................................................... I-1 • Concept of Landing Force Operations........................................................................ I-2 • Landing Force Organization ...................................................................................... I-4 • Command and Control .............................................................................................. I-4 • Operational Areas .......................................................................................................I-5 • Air Command and Control ........................................................................................ I-6 CHAPTER II PLANNING • General ................................................................................................................... II-1 • Primary Decisions ................................................................................................... II-2 • Landing Force Planning Process .............................................................................. II-8 CHAPTER III EMBARKATION AND DEPLOYMENT • General .................................................................................................................. III-1 • Deployment ............................................................................................................ III-1 • Embarkation ........................................................................................................... III-3 CHAPTER IV SUPPORTING, ADVANCE FORCE, AND PREASSAULT OPERATIONS • General .................................................................................................................. IV-1 • Supporting Operations ............................................................................................ IV-2 • Advance Force Operations ..................................................................................... IV-2 • Pre-assault Operations ............................................................................................ IV-4 CHAPTER V SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT • General .................................................................................................................... V-1 • Responsibilities ........................................................................................................ V-2 • Planning for Ship-to-Shore Movement...................................................................... V-2 • Amphibious Demonstration ...................................................................................... V-4 iii Table of Contents • Organization for Landing.......................................................................................... V-6 • Supply and Movement Categories ............................................................................ V-7 • Movement Control ................................................................................................. V-12 • Conduct of Ship-to-Shore Movement ..................................................................... V-18 CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS ASHORE • General .................................................................................................................. VI-1 • Landing Force Operation Plan ................................................................................ VI-2 • Planning Considerations ......................................................................................... VI-3 • Landing Force Organization ................................................................................... VI-5 • Landing Force Scheme of Maneuver ...................................................................... VI-7 • Reserves ................................................................................................................. VI-8 CHAPTER VII INTELLIGENCE • General ................................................................................................................. VII-1 • Required Capabilities ............................................................................................ VII-1 • The Intelligence Process and Landing Force Operations ........................................ VII-2 • Landing Force Intelligence Planning ...................................................................... VII-4 • Intelligence Support to Landing Force Operations Ashore ...................................... VII-6 CHAPTER VIII FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION • General ............................................................................................................... VIII-1 • Responsibilities ................................................................................................... VIII-1 • Fire Support Systems ........................................................................................... VIII-2 • Fire Support Planning .......................................................................................... VIII-4 • Fire Support Coordination ................................................................................... VIII-7 • Air Support ......................................................................................................... VIII-7 • Artillery Support ................................................................................................ VIII-10 • Naval Surface Fire Support ................................................................................. VIII-13 CHAPTER IX LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS • General .................................................................................................................. IX-1 • Responsibilities ...................................................................................................... IX-2 • Planning Considerations and Factors ...................................................................... IX-4 • Key Concepts ......................................................................................................... IX-5 • Planning Sequence ................................................................................................. IX-6 • Logistic Plans ......................................................................................................... IX-7 iv JP 3-02.1 Table of Contents • Landing
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