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Military Operations Planning and Methodology Thoughts on Military Problem-Solving

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Military Operations Planning and Methodology Thoughts on Military Problem-Solving , 2017 Military Operations Planning and Methodology and Planning Operations Military Military Operations Planning and Methodology Thoughts on military problem-solving ROBERT ERDENIZ ISBN ISSN KTH www.kth.se Military Operations Planning and Methodology -Thoughts on military problem-solving Robert Erdeniz Licentiate thesis in Philosophy and Military studies KTH Royal Institute of Technology Swedish Defence University (SEDU) Stockholm, 2017 2 Abstract Robert Erdeniz, Military Operations Planning and Methodology: Thoughts on military problem-solving, Licentiate thesis in Philosophy and in Military stud- ies. Theses in Philosophy from the Royal Institute of Technology (no. 58). Stockholm, 2017. ISBN 978-91-7729-336-1. ISSN 1650-8831. This thesis discusses military operations planning and methodology by review- ing two of NATO’s planning documents, i.e. the ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning’ (AJP 5) and the ‘Comprehensive Operations Plan- ning Directive’ (COPD), and defends the following claim. Parts of the description of NATO’s Operational-Level Planning Process (OLPP), as described in the AJP 5 and the COPD, is methodologically incon- sistent (contradictory), due to epistemic and practical implications of method- ology. As such, the thesis discusses three topics: approaches to Operational Art, plan- ning heuristics and implications of methodology. The thesis also intertwines military operations planning, methodology and military problem-solving. This thesis consists of two published papers and an introduction. The introduc- tion explains and further discusses operations planning as well as terms and concepts stated within the two papers. Paper I focuses on the AJP 5 and discusses the methodological distinction be- tween two, out of three described, approaches to Operational Art, which are denoted the ‘Design’ and the ‘Systemic’ approach. The methodological distinc- tion between these two approaches is vague and paper I states one epistemic and one practical implication of methodology. Briefly, conducting military operations planning with a Design approach implies applying Value-focused thinking and hence requires explicit statements of military and non-military stakeholders’ values (e.g. goals/objectives). Paper II focuses on the COPD and discusses two specific planning heuristics. The first heuristic relates to the Systemic approach and the other heuristic re- lates to the third approach, denoted the ‘Causalist’ approach, applicable within Operational Art. There is a methodological contradiction between the two dis- cussed planning heuristics and paper II states one epistemic and three practical implications of methodology. Briefly, simultaneously applying planning heuris- tics relating to the Systemic and the Causalist approach, characterised by meth- 3 odological properties like e.g. emergence and invariance, entails a methodolog- ical contradiction within the COPD. The conclusions stated within this thesis imply that NATO’s description of the OLPP suffers from a methodological contradiction, based on the discussion and review of the AJP 5 and the COPD. Hence, the conclusions constitute an argu- ment for revising parts of the AJP 5 and the COPD, especially the description of the approaches to Operational Art and its related planning heuristics. The revision should focus on the planning heuristics contributing to the meth- odological contradiction and NATO should consider the following suggestion. NATO should develop a “handbook of methodology” to better explain and describe the methodological challenge of conducting military operations plan- ning and hence further describe important parts of the “how to” of military problem-solving as well as the military decision-making process. Keywords: military operations planning, methodology, military problem- solving, military decision-making, approaches to Operational Art, planning heuristics, AJP 5, COPD. Robert Erdeniz Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, Division of Philoso- phy, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Brinellvägen 32, SE-100 44, Stock- holm, Sweden. Department of Military studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations sec- tion, Swedish Defence University (SEDU), Drottning Kristinas väg 37, SE-114 28, Stockholm, Sweden. 4 Thesis composition This Licentiate thesis consists of an introduction and the following two papers: I. Erdeniz, R. (2016). Approaches to Operational Art Revisit- ed: Theoretical and Practical Implications of Methodology. Proceedings of the 21st International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS), UK, London. (full paper peer-review) II. Erdeniz, R. (2016). Operations planning revisited: theoreti- cal and practical implications of methodology. Defence Studies. 16(3), 248-269. Acknowledgments I would like to first and foremost show my gratitude to my main supervisor Till Grüne-Yanoff (professor at the Division of Philosophy, KTH) for providing comments, courses and general encouragement throughout the process of writ- ing this thesis. I would also like to thank my assistant supervisor Peter Thun- holm (professor at the Tactical Warfare Division, SEDU) for general support, comments and always offering positive views on my thesis and progress. Furthermore, I would like to thank all participants at the Higher seminars at both the KTH and the SEDU, offering valuable feedback on matters of philos- ophy and Military studies as the path between these different academic disci- plines has been an intellectual challenge, and still is. I would like to offer special thanks to Nicolas Espinoza for encouraging me to apply to the Ph.D.-programme and for all the support of being a “second” assis- tant supervisor and always being able to cheer me up in time of need. Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. Ulrik Franke at SICS for comments on paper 1 and all the anonymous reviewers on both papers, which helped me clarify my own thoughts on these topics. 5 Yet another important group of people deserving my gratitude are my col- leagues at the SEDU. Being able to discuss operations planning with experi- enced officers and scholars at the SEDU has inspired the content of this thesis. As such, I am especially grateful to all colleagues having faith in my ability to teach at the SEDU as the experiences of discussing operations planning and methodology with officers participating in education at the SEDU has been invaluable. Finally, a special thanks to the members of “the philosophical four” at the SEDU for all the discussions and thought provoking ideas and arguments. © 2017 by Robert Erdeniz ISSN: 1650-8831 ISBN: 978-91-7729-336-1 Printed in Stockholm, Sweden by US AB 2017 6 Contents Abstract ........................................................................ 3 Thesis composition ....................................................... 5 Acknowledgments ........................................................ 5 Sammanfattning på svenska (Summary in Swedish) 9 Introduction ................................................................ 11 1.The aim, problem and question ............................ 13 1.1 Example 1: personal experience from the Swedish Armed Forces headquarters .............................................. 19 1.2 Example 2: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM ............... 21 1.3 Example 3: the development of military concepts and doctrines ........................................................................... 25 1.4 The problem and the research question ..................... 28 2.Operations planning and methodology ................ 31 2.1 Approaches to Operational Art and methodology ..... 31 2.1.1 Operational Art ................................................ 31 2.1.2 Approaches to Operational Art ........................ 37 2.1.3 Methodology ..................................................... 42 2.1.4 Conclusions on Operational Art and methodology .............................................................. 4 2.2 Planning heuristics and the implications of methodology ..................................................................... 45 2.2.1 The OLPP and the planning heuristics ............ 45 2.2.2 Implications of methodology ............................ 5 2.2.3 A counter-argument concerning the implications of methodology .......................................................... 57 2.2.4 Conclusions on heuristics and implications of methodology .............................................................. 59 3.Summary of the papers and the conclusions ....... 61 3.1 Paper I: The Design versus the Systemic approach... 61 3.2 Paper II: The Systemic versus the Causalist approach ........................................................................... 63 3.3 The results and the overall conclusion ...................... 64 4.An outlook: thoughts on military thinking and future research ........................................................... 67 4.1 System thinking within operations planning: a fallacy of methodological pluralism? ........................................... 67 4.2 Military problem-solving: an academic endeavour? . 69 4.3 Upcoming research: what could be topics for future papers? ............................................................................. 71 References ................................................................... 73 Paper 1: Approaches to Operational Art Revisited: Theoretical and Practi- cal Implications of Methodology Paper 2: Operations planning revisited: theoretical and practical implica- tions of
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