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Field Manual (FM) 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 Provides Doctrine for Army and Marine Units That Are Countering an Insurgency

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Field Manual (FM) 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 Provides Doctrine for Army and Marine Units That Are Countering an Insurgency FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES MAY 2014 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, C1 Change No. 1 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 2 June 2014 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies 1. Change 1 to FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 13 May 2014, amends text as necessary. 2. A plus sign (+) marks new material. 3. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 13 May 2014, is changed as follows: Remove Old Pages Insert New Pages pages 1-13 through 1-14 pages 1-13 through 1-14 pages 2-3 through 2-4 pages 2-3 through 2-4 pages 4-1 through 4-2 pages 4-1 through 4-2 pages 4-5 through 4-6 pages 4-5 through 4-6 pages 4-11 through 4-12 pages 4-11 through 4-12 pages 7-5 through 7-10 pages 7-5 through 7-10 4. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes. DISTRUBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, C1 2 June 2014 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: RAYMOND T. ODIERNO General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: GERALD B. O’KEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 1414902 BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS: DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 121724, requirements for FM 3-24. Marine Corps: PCN 143 000124 00 This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html). To receive publishing updates, please subscribe at http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Field Manual Headquarters No.3-24 Department of the Army Washington, DC Marine Corps Warfighting Publication Headquarters No. 3-33.5 Marine Corps Combat Development Command Department of the Navy Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 13 May 2014 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies Contents Page PREFACE............................................................................................................... v INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. vii PART ONE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CONTEXT Chapter 1 UNDERSTANDING THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT............................................ 1-1 United States’ Strategy and Policy to Counter an Insurgency ........................... 1-4 Land Forces and the Range of Military Operations ............................................ 1-6 Legitimacy and Control ....................................................................................... 1-8 Understanding Unified Action ........................................................................... 1-10 Strategic Principles ........................................................................................... 1-19 Chapter 2 UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................... 2-1 Demographic and Urbanization Trends .............................................................. 2-1 The Operational Variables .................................................................................. 2-2 The Mission Variables and Civil Considerations .............................................. 2-10 Chapter 3 CULTURE........................................................................................................... 3-1 Understanding Culture ........................................................................................ 3-1 Assessing a Cultural Situation ............................................................................ 3-2 Organizing to Understand Culture ...................................................................... 3-4 Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. *This publication supersedes FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, dated 15 December 2006. Marine Corps PCN: 143 000124 00 i Contents PART TWO INSURGENCIES Chapter 4 INSURGENCY PREREQUISITES AND FUNDAMENTALS .............................. 4-1 Intrastate War ...................................................................................................... 4-1 Insurgency Prerequisites .................................................................................... 4-3 Insurgency Fundamentals ................................................................................... 4-5 Other Analytical Frameworks ............................................................................ 4-22 Chapter 5 INSURGENCY THREAT CHARACTERISTICS ................................................. 5-1 Disposition and Activities .................................................................................... 5-1 Support Activities ................................................................................................ 5-3 Associated Threats ............................................................................................. 5-5 PART THREE COUNTERINSURGENCIES Chapter 6 MISSION COMMAND AND COMMAND AND CONTROL ................................ 6-1 Command in Counterinsurgency ........................................................................ 6-1 Headquarters Use In Counterinsurgency ........................................................... 6-4 Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Synchronization .............. 6-5 Chapter 7 PLANNING FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES ........................................... 7-1 Conceptual Planning ........................................................................................... 7-4 Transitions ......................................................................................................... 7-10 Operational Considerations .............................................................................. 7-12 Information Operations ..................................................................................... 7-18 Chapter 8 INTELLIGENCE .................................................................................................. 8-1 Intelligence Fundamentals .................................................................................. 8-2 All-Source Intelligence ........................................................................................ 8-3 Human Intelligence ............................................................................................. 8-4 Chapter 9 DIRECT APPROACHES TO COUNTER AN INSURGENCY ............................ 9-1 Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition Framework .................................................. 9-1 Other Direct Enablers ....................................................................................... 9-11 Chapter 10 INDIRECT METHODS FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES........................ 10-1 Nation Assistance and Security Cooperation ................................................... 10-1 Generational Engagement ................................................................................ 10-2 Negotiation and Diplomacy ............................................................................... 10-4 Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and Reintegrate ..................................... 10-6 Other Indirect Enablers ................................................................................... 10-10 Chapter 11 WORKING WITH HOST-NATION FORCES .................................................... 11-1 Assessing and Developing a Host-Nation Force .............................................. 11-2 Relationships ..................................................................................................... 11-6 Security Cooperation Planning ......................................................................... 11-8 Chapter 12 ASSESSMENTS ............................................................................................... 12-1 Assessment Frameworks .................................................................................. 12-1 Assessment Methods ........................................................................................ 12-2 Assessment Considerations ............................................................................. 12-2 Developing Measurement Criteria .................................................................... 12-3 ii FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 13 May 2014 Contents Chapter 13 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................ 13-1 Authority to Assist A Foreign Government ....................................................... 13-1 Rules of Engagement ....................................................................................... 13-2 Law of War ....................................................................................................... 13-2 Non-International Armed Conflict ..................................................................... 13-7 Detention and Interrogation .............................................................................. 13-8 Enforcing Discipline of U.S. Forces ................................................................ 13-10 Training and Equipping Foreign Forces ......................................................... 13-11 Commander’s Emergency Response Program .............................................. 13-12 Claims and Solatia .......................................................................................... 13-13 Establishing the Rule of Law .......................................................................... 13-13 SOURCE
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