Asia Programme Meeting Summary

Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

12 February 2015

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2 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 12 February 2015, made up of a keynote speech by Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami and three sessions. At the first session, James Przystup, Ryo Sahashi and Sam Bateman discussed the main security challenges – traditional and non-traditional – in the Asia- Pacific. At the second session, Masayuki Masuda, Thang Nguyen Dang and Douglas Guilfoyle spoke about the rule of law in the region and how it can be upheld; and at the third session, Ren Xiao, Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Sir Anthony Dymock and Alessio Patalano extended the dialogue to beyond the Asia-Pacific. John Swenson-Wright gave concluding remarks.

Keynote speech

Japan’s basic principles for maritime security in the Asia-Pacific are very simple, according to Ambassador Nogami. He identified these as: security based on international law; refraining from force or the threat of force; and seeking peaceful solutions to conflict. These principles require that an open, rule- based system is in place for international shared spaces. China is currently perceived as failing to follow these principles and as threatening the Asia-Pacific status quo, maintenance of which is Japan’s priority. However, China does not want to be seen as a direct challenger, and the time is thus right to create a rule- based system that will provide a solution for all maritime disputes.

Chinese military spending continues to rise and its naval activity in the region is expanding, but the most controversial policy area, with far-reaching consequences, is island reclamation – mostly in the Spratly and the Paracel Islands – on which harbours will be built. It is likely that the next step will be the announcement of a further Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed islands by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The littoral powers of the South China Sea (SCS) have been unable to find a unified solution to this problem because of their preoccupation with territorial disputes, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework for finding resolutions has met resistance from several landlocked countries. Meanwhile, the maritime capabilities of these states are fairly minimal, despite assistance from Japan and the US. In the future, a multilateral scheme may be needed for enhancing this work.

Nogami rejected the implication that Japan’s resources may not support an increased maritime security role in the future. In budgetary terms, Japan’s projected maritime security spending is not exorbitant, and has the backing of roughly 70 per cent of the population. Meanwhile, Nogami noted, Japan’s relations with the US have strengthened as part of the US ‘Rebalance to Asia’ policy and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), while Australia–Japan and India–Japan ties are also good. Japan’s supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) relies on maritime routes, further increasing the importance of its maritime security.

Session One: Traditional and non-traditional maritime security challenges in the Asia- Pacific

Traditional challenges

James Przystup characterized the traditional security challenges of the past decade in the Asia-Pacific as mainly emanating from China. The current situation, in which minor incidents in ‘grey zones’ could easily escalate into grave situations, may be exacerbated in the future by the intensification of Chinese activity in the airspace and waters around Japan and the modernization of the PLA. The serious nature of this challenge is shown by the large number of Chinese territorial incursions into the waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (41 in 2014), or cases such as the 2013–14 PLA navy exercises without prior 3 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

notification in the vicinity of the Malaysian exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In response, many states in the region have increased their military budgets and expanded ties with the US.

Such developments come at the same time as the US administration’s 2011 announcement of its ‘rebalance’. So far, the military angle of the rebalance has been overstated, at the expense of its economic side, and Przystup emphasized that the policy is not anti-China, despite China’s exclusion from the TPP. Its aim is to move China towards the position of a responsible stakeholder that supports an open international order. Confidence-building measures are needed between China and other regional/international powers. Eventually, a binding code of conduct and ways of preventing the use of force will be needed, but this is a distant prospect.

Non-traditional challenges

Ryo Sahashi discussed non-traditional security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, with a focus on natural disasters – to which the Asia-Pacific is particularly vulnerable. The damaging effects of natural disasters – large numbers of killed, injured and displaced persons, and stunted economic growth – can be exacerbated by poor governance and a lack of coping mechanisms in many littoral countries. Some recommendations for coping with natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific are as follows:

• Littoral countries should make better use of US and Japanese military assets designed for disaster-relief, and Japanese naval assets need a mandate to cooperate with other governments in natural disaster zones without needing formal permission. • Japan, the US and Australia should support development in littoral countries that will promote long-term disaster management objectives. • Guidelines, to be followed by military bodies and NGOs carrying out disaster relief, should be created and promoted, or, where they already exist, enforced. • A good exit strategy in place for relief operations is essential; and participating nations must be sensitive to the legacy of colonialism, which can cause antagonism towards humanitarian intervention in affected countries. • Hosting nations must cooperate with relief operations, and provide such operations with intelligence and protection. • A mechanism for regional cooperation is needed; a combination of an ASEAN-based regional security architecture and the US–Japanese alliance could be viable. • A balance between inclusivity and efficiency must be found for determining the number of participants to be included in the security architecture.

There is an argument that the use of military assets to cope with non-traditional challenges such as natural disasters creates a security dilemma between powers, but Sahashi countered that this is not necessarily the case, and that US and Japanese military cooperation for disaster relief has been very cautious in order to avoid provoking China.

Capacity-building and cooperation

Sam Bateman advocated increased security cooperation at both national and regional level on institutional arrangements, legal frameworks, and resource usage in the Asia-Pacific. Traditional security concerns (e.g. sea lines of communication [SLOC] protection) are unlikely to provide opportunities for increased cooperation in the short-term because of a high degree of mutual distrust between regional powers, often stemming from competing territorial claims. Cooperation on non-traditional issues such as civil maritime activities, including resource control and marine ecology, could provide a basis for building 4 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

eventual trust on traditional security issues. At present, the region risks becoming heavily navalized, with a lack of management strategies in place in case of an international incident.

Moving forward, the profile of regional forums on civil maritime issues needs to be strengthened, and there should be a clearer division of labour between different forums and agencies. A framework for cooperation is required that will reflect the concerns of all stakeholders, and EU experience on this front could be utilized. Capacity-building must be depoliticized and operationalized. Finally, more effort should also be made to consider the problem from Beijing’s point of view, otherwise China’s security dilemma will continue to spiral.

In addition to confidence-building measures, the importance of Track II diplomacy was noted. Despite some cynicism being raised as to the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific’s track record for getting initiatives through to Track I, it is important for ensuring future cooperation. It was suggested that the best hope for future generations might lie in the Track III educational diplomacy dimension.

Capacity-building in the Straits of Malacca The point was raised that the small states along the Straits of Malacca have a serious security dilemma, as they require a large expenditure to maintain security. A Japanese-led initiative aimed to establish a cooperative mechanism to which other countries could contribute in order to aid their security, but this has been underfunded. Some years ago a programme funded by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), with the US and the EU among the stakeholders, helped facilitate maritime security for these small nations, and working groups have been established. Ultimately, however, the problem lies in the lack of enthusiasm and willingness to share information among some Southeast Asian states, mainly due to sovereignty issues.

Session Two: The rule of law in the maritime domain

The East China Sea: practical approaches and the rule of law

Masayuki Masuda talked about the rule of law in the East China Sea, the importance of which has been stressed many times in recent years by Shinzo Abe. Japan-China relations over maritime issues have developed slowly but positively since the Abe-Xi talks in November 2014, Masuda upheld, even against the background of the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the East China Sea. The importance of the rule of law has been recognized, with recent talks establishing emergency protocols in case of unforeseen circumstances, and working groups discussing the law of the sea, marine ecology and other problems. Both sides have decided to strengthen communication and consultation, especially on issues such as domestic law and international norms. A regional framework for maritime security is also being developed that could prevent an incident from escalating into a full-blown conflict. Positive developments in US-China maritime security, such as the promise of notification of major military activities, are also a cause for optimism, and will in turn ameliorate Tokyo-Beijing relations. The rule of law takes a long time to establish, but incremental steps towards it are being taken.

It was argued that establishing rules of engagement between China and Japan may not, alone, be enough to stabilize bilateral relations. Masuda noted, though, that Tokyo’s position is that disputes with China do not exist. Instead, it aims to manage the situation, a goal that the rule of law would enable by limiting Beijing’s capacity for unpredictable approaches.

5 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

The South China Sea: efforts to maintain the rule of law

Thang Nguyen Dang noted that, just as in the East China Sea, maritime security in the SCS is seriously impeded by its inescapable tie to maritime territorial claims. The rule of law, embodied in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), provides a path to resolution of these security dilemmas. UNCLOS is accepted by most states, and has become the political and legal framework for maritime security for actors such as Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. However, it is not comprehensive enough, and it needs to be complemented by other agreements – such as the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement (ratified only by Indonesia and the Philippines) and the 1998 Maritime Shore Convention (implemented by very few states). Regional cooperation is also necessary, but at present is under-developed and lacks formal agreements. None the less, forums such as the ASEAN Maritime Forum, despite not being centred on security, provide a good example of how maritime affairs can be approached comprehensively.

For resolving territorial disputes, the diplomatic channel has had limited success, but steps have been taken by ASEAN–China on establishing a code of conduct for the SCS. The results of legal channels to settle disputes have yet to be seen, but their very existence highlights that the rule of law is being upheld – and signifies progress.

A key problem in the SCS is a lack of trust between states, exemplified by the fact that no states use money from the maritime fund established by China for SCS cooperation. A holistic approach may therefore have to be eschewed at times in favour of a more realistic piecemeal approach, as trust can be built on the basis of less sensitive issues, such as environmental protection, before addressing sovereignty issues.

Europe: what role in the Asia-Pacific?

Douglas Guilfoyle highlighted the contested nature of the concepts of maritime security and the rule of law, which limits Europe’s possible role in the Asia-Pacific. Understandings of the ‘rule of law’ change according to cultural values, and will therefore have a different meaning outside Europe. Furthermore, the concept of maritime security, which covers a ‘laundry list’ of issues, leads to a securitized response to all issues that can hamper transnational cooperation. This can be avoided by dividing it into four categories: environment, economic development, national security and human security.

Within this fourfold approach, the EU has not yet clearly defined its Asia-Pacific policy. The past few years have seen inconsistencies in the areas of maritime security that the EU prioritizes, and the nature of its role. Is it an ‘honest broker’, or should it favour its ‘natural partners’ in the region? There is no common European position on many elements of maritime security, such as distribution of power between naval assets and coastguards. Furthermore, the EU must do more for its own people before being able to export its policies effectively to the Asia-Pacific; there are still many grey areas concerning EU maritime law (e.g. unregulated fishing).

However, the EU could help by:

1. Facilitating progress in ASEAN confidence-building measures;

2. Finding means of capacity-building that are sustainable using a bottom-up approach (i.e. starting with human capital rather than working down from naval assets); and

3. Using its experience of capacity-building in East and West Africa in relation to countering Somali piracy. Counter-piracy initiatives were most successful when ambitions were modest and local 6 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

governments’ needs were taken into account. If the EU has this approach in the SCS, it could be successful.

Guilfoyle concluded that educational diplomacy was the key to the EU’s role in capacity-building in the Asia-Pacific, and proposed that initiatives be taken to increase EU investment in human capital – such as person-to-person contacts, providing experience and training contracts. It was also suggested that academics could facilitate diplomatic relations by exchanging information and concepts.

Session Three: Maritime security beyond the Asia-Pacific

Regional cooperation on Maritime Security

It is a mistake to frame the SCS security dilemma as a US–China problem, argued Ren Xiao, noting that China is pursuing bilateral solutions with claimants with territorial disputes, and a regional format for ensuring stability with all littoral countries. Nevertheless, relations between China and the US still have a significant impact on regional maritime security. Several cases in the last few years have been interpreted by Beijing as violations of its EEZ, especially since it does not recognize the US concept of ‘international waters’. The USS Cowpens incident of 2013 highlighted the lack of mechanisms in place for crisis management when it comes to possible confrontation at sea.

None the less, there have been positive developments in recent years, and military diplomacy has been effective. These include: China’s code for unplanned encounters at sea, adopted in Qingdao last year; US President Obama’s 2014 visit to China, when confidence-building measures and a code of conduct were created; and Chinese participation in naval exercises near Hawaii that brought together 23 countries. Military–military exchange between the US and China has arguably become a bright spot in their diplomatic relations. In the long term, China is becoming more like the US in terms of power status, and it would be expedient for it to adopt US attitudes to international waters.

The emerging concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’

Ambassador Rakesh Sood discussed the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, maintaining that the US-driven concept of the Asia-Pacific does not describe global realities, and that India’s geopolitical position has evolved beyond South Asia. India is part of the Indian Ocean ring stretching from South Africa to Australia, shares land/maritime borders with 11 neighbours including Thailand and Indonesia, and is involved in several regional frameworks including the ASEAN–India Free Trade Area and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).

The context of maritime security is also changing. Traditional structures organized around a superpower are being replaced by many regional organizations with varying membership. Modern regional security architectures will have to be multipolar and rule-based. The US is currently relinquishing its power as a global hegemon, while undertaking the more assertive rebalance to Asia. Furthermore, in addition to India, China is emerging as a major maritime power and will expand its interests beyond existing areas (e.g. through the Maritime Silk Road Economic Belt). There are many geopolitical hotspots along the Indian and Pacific oceans, and non-traditional security challenges are emerging.

India has not traditionally joined alliances. There is, however, potential for increased security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific context with Australia and Japan, as demonstrated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Tokyo. Relations with the US have also been strengthened since the end of the Cold War, when the two states became ‘engaged democracies’. Engagement is aided by the 2 million-strong 7 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

Indian diaspora in the US. While non-alignment may be becoming less viable and India wants to have strategic partnerships, it will avoid being locked into an alliance.

The Indo-Pacific concept that recognizes the organic linkages between the Pacific and Indian oceans may therefore better encapsulate shifting geopolitical realities.

Fighting piracy off the African coast

Sir Anthony Dymock showed how African experiences of fighting sea piracy off the coast of Africa could have lessons for the Asia-Pacific. At the level of the African Union (AU), the means of increasing maritime security are well understood (e.g. better information-sharing), but resources and strategic capacity are lacking. Traditionally, the AU looked to external funding to provide this, but has encountered difficulties in securing paramilitary assistance. Maritime security funding has therefore tended to be bilateral and ad hoc.

The problem of Somali piracy raised the profile of maritime security and provided a platform for transnational naval cooperation. However, it remains to be seen whether longer-term development initiatives can prevent a resurgence in levels of piracy after warships depart. Somalia was also a special case because of its identity as a ‘failed state’, which allowed the UN a strong mandate. This would not apply to piracy in the Asia-Pacific, but EUCAP Nestor [the EU maritime capacity-building mission for the Horn of Africa/Western Indian Ocean region] provides a good example of an integrated international approach that has been relatively successful.

It is important to take account of the interconnectedness of maritime security. Maritime criminals have an agility that traditional land forces would find it hard to keep up with. Furthermore, issues such as fishing are clearly linked to piracy. In order to be successful, maritime security policies evidently have to be totally interconnected and work across borders. There is no one perfect model for maritime security, but a cultural shift is required with a view to becoming more flexible and opportunistic, sharing information and using the best assets available.

There are also positive and negative lessons to be learnt from maritime security experiences in the Asia- Pacific that may have lessons for African maritime security. The negative legacy of unresolved maritime demarcation is clear, but there have been positive developments such as negotiations beginning between the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and China. Countries have realized the importance of managing the problem between them, and of having contingency strategies in place to prevent a small incident from escalating. Third-party arbitration is clearly important for breaches of territory.

Euro-Asian cooperation to preserve the ‘commons’

Alessio Patalano used UK–Japan security cooperation to shed light on possibilities for Euro-Asian cooperation to preserve the ‘commons’. The two countries share a maritime-centric defence posture, as well as reliance on maritime trade and commerce, but have different means at their disposal and different priorities. In terms of strategic thinking, Japan’s most significant challenge is posed by natural disasters, while the UK’s inability to match its ambitions with capacity has been demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, there are significant areas where cooperation to secure the commons can happen. The UK and Japan are both faced with transnational security issues and regional issues – which are back on the agenda as demonstrated by the threat of Chinese attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas. 8 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

The UK and Japan do not have a global bridge, but they can both access theatres such as the Indian and Arctic Oceans. They also share a strong relationship with the US. Future bilateral or indeed trilateral cooperation may determine whether the three countries can address the challenges to international shipping law and international waters, as well as build up future capabilities. Introducing or expanding information sharing, joint command crisis response facilities, joint exercises and access to bases would ensure the existence of a political option to intervene in crises.

The Northeast Passage The impact of Russia’s new military assertiveness on the growing trend towards using the Northeast Passage (NEP) was queried. This is a serious issue, as there has been a considerable reprise in Russian activity in the area, and Russia’s submarine defence programme was never cut. This leaves the threat level high. However, despite being essential to Russia for exporting Siberian resources, the NEP will never be a quick China–Europe route, and the impact of global warming on global shipping patterns has been overhyped.

Concluding remarks

In his concluding remarks, John Swenson-Wright highlighted the prevalence of optimism in approaching these issues, and that maritime security in the Asia-Pacific now has foundations in the existing legal framework. However, UNCLOS will not be sufficient for managing tensions and a more coherent security architecture is needed, but there is clearly no single template for this, and the issue requires further research. Finally, the importance of dialogue and use of all three diplomatic tracks is evident in all aspects of maritime security.